Oh yeah, more ammunition against conceivability arguments. I'm actually psyched for this one. You wouldn't believe the unseemly things that some people are trying to pull with modal logic. It's disgusting.
@@luszczi that sounds even better :D Btw, there is also some discussion of conceivability and the idea of impssible worlds in the fictional worlds theory. Like what kind of a world is a world of a story where there actually are round squares :D
I actually like the idea that conceiving is evidence for possibility in the same sense that perceiving is evidence for reality. If that's the case, then skepticism about modality is expected to happen just like skepticism about knowledge from the external world. And just like we don't expect a final theory of perception to hold perceptions as good justification, the lack of a final theory of conception isn't reason enough to doubt modal knowledge.
I am writing a PhD in which I am developing a new argument for anti-Humeanism based on John D. Norton's material theory of induction, so really looking forward to watch your video!
The converse is also dubious. Inconceivability does not imply impossibility. All kinds of weird possibilities were once thought inconceivable. The universe can be finite but unbounded. Euclidean geometry is not the only geometry. Lines can have a fractal dimension greater than their topological dimension. There may have been a beginning point in time before which there was no time. Square circles exist in taxicab geometry. There are paraconsistent logics that allow for true contradictions.
Ya. I’d also insist that all squares are physically round, since we exist in curved spacetime. Course this assumes spacetime is real and not logical which Is what I do believe. That spacetime geometry, and geometry in general is a subset of logic and exists in the superset of all possible logic (geometries) that can and often do exist like round squares.
@@NightmareCourtPicturesIn spherical geometry, a square is a polygon whose edges are great circle arcs of equal distance, which meet at equal angles. Unlike the square of plane geometry, the angles of such a square are larger than a right angle. Larger spherical squares have larger angles.
28:00 Another problem, if we want to differentiate from the other, for the pure pictorial understanding is that, if 1000 sided objects are in fact not conceivable, and unconceivability is evidence for impossibility, then we could easily construct an example of something we have reason to believe isnt possible but we nonetheless think is actual. So it's not just that this gives the wrong result with regards to our possibility judgements, but it also contradicts with our actuality judgments, so that's kind of just pointing out that the error scope would be bigger.
27:55 One objection that I see to the 1000 sided object example is that something not being purely pictorially conceivable *for human beings* isnt a problem because it is still conceivable, for an alien for example. It's sufficient that it can be conceived, by who I assume isn't really relevant.
But why assume that the 1000 sided is conceivable for a sufficiently advanced alien, whereas a round square is in principle not conceivable for anything? I worry that this will just end up presupposing the impossibility of the round square.
7:38 P2 is already assuming a contradiction: If we're operating in a physicalist world for the sake of argument (as indicated by P1, "if physicalism is true, then..."), then by definition a zombie counterpart is inconceivable. In any conceivable physicalist universe in which one may exist, a zombie lacking consciousness constitutes a physical difference from its non-zombie counterpart, and therefore does not satisfy the definition we've given for a zombie counterpart.
I think the problem is that consciousness is undefined; in particular it is undefined in physicalist terms. Without definition the term consciousness may already be implying a denial of physicalism (in fact it most probably is).
A few thoughts on this. If a metaphysics like Leibniz's or St. Maximus the Confessor's is taken, the true nature of physical objects is not to be found within our observation of things or physics. In any metaphysics in which we ourselves constitute a [real] microcosm representing [all of] external reality in various degrees of perception, the direct nature of physics is not determined from parts, or their arrangements, but merely from the phenomenon of parts and their arrangements. This means transparent iron is conceivable when we imagine the phenomena of iron (the properties) and relate them to a transparent object. If we go beyond the phenomenal within such a metaphysics, we do not end up in physics - which is itself phenomenal and part of the microcosms - but directly in metaphysics. Once this has been structured in a logically functional way, one has directly represented the lowest level of existence, A, and the phenomenal, B, and created transparent iron within it. In this case, physics only belongs to B, the explanation of transparent iron is already given in A. Modal skepticism seems to build on a worldview in which one tries not to assume metapyhsics A, which is why it should be clear that one can almost never realistically speak of conceivability. Because the complete justification of something like transparent iron would always be out of reach. By complete justification, I don't necessarily mean a precise justification down to the last detail, but an explanation that covers the whole area. In other words, as soon as conceivability is broken down to a logical, metaphysical and physical possibility - the logical can be quickly covered by the statements themselves ("transparent" and "iron" don't entail the negation of the other as far as I know) and the physical can be collapsed into the metaphysical depending on the model - and all these areas are explained by the system so that transparent iron is possible, then one says it is conceivability. Modal skepticism tells me two things. 1. even if something is personally conceivable, that may be due to lack of data and does not mean that it is actually conceivable at a systematic level, so, given your system is true, it is possible that what you called "conceivable" is not at all possible, not even metaphysically. 2. we cannot assume a neutral ground from which we can speak of conceivability. Something is only ever conceivable within a logic, ontology and metaphysics. That is what I call a system. We can therefore only speak within systems and measure them in terms of their functionality. If you do not assume metaphysics to account for physics, you cannot speak of conceivability, as modal skepticism seems to have shown.
15:25 It really looks like contradictions are conceivable in the linguistic representational sense lol I do understand the words used in "The cat is on the mat and not on the mat". The words are appropriately put together, which we presumably have to say if all contradictions are false. I am able to infer various things from it, for instance that the cat is on something. Defeasible evidence for possibility of contradictions, let's go! Gonna convert all my non-dialetheist friends!
On a more serious note, even if this type of conceivability probably won't be of much evidential power to many, precisely because of the consequence above, it's still good to be able to point out that contradictions are conceivable, in some sense.
For me, it doesn't seem as if one could part the linguistic and pictorial representation from each other. You may talk about x and y while both entail the negation of the other but not connect both statements to one picture in your mind. You may connect x and y that entail no negation of the other to one picture but then there are still multiple things possible this picture could actually show before defining it linguistically (or by intuion/emotion). And ofc, through the modal sceptics and the possibility to define "round square" on any picture you like, it seems we cannot speak about conceivability equating any kind of possibility as long as we haven't thought about a metaphysics that is functional to explain the phenomena of a thing, but when we did so, we can within that metaphysics speaks of such a thing being conceivable.
I'm very surprised that you didn't address the most important paper ever written on this "Does Conceivability entail Possibility" by Chalmers, where he lays out in detail why he thinks the consciousness case is disanalogous to the "certain arrangements of atoms make something opaque" case
Covering Chalmers's paper would have required a much longer video; I'm hoping to revisit the topic in the future so I'll probably talk about the paper there. Honestly though, part of the reason is that I just don't find the paper that interesting. I don't think it addresses what seem to me to be the most serious challenges to Hume's maxim. And where it does address challenges, I think there are better answers available (e.g. two-dimensional semantics can help with the challenge of a posteriori impossibilities, but I find Yablo's response to that satisfying and that response doesn't rest on such controversial theses in phil of language). So I guess I'm just not as impressed by the paper as you. Now, maybe that shouldn't matter so much for the purposes of an introductory video, but then, I can't cover everything, and like I said I intend to revisit the topic later anyway.
As a former psychology student I have an observation that might be important - you don't mention any senses other than vision that a person can use to imagine things, for example: - linguistic representation seems to be a kind of sensory representation because either we imagine the letters (then it's visual) or we just say the words in our head (then it's auditory) - we can imagine a three-dimensional shape fully at the same time in a tactile manner because we can imagine feeling it from all sides at the same time
I don't know what the current consensus among psychologists is on this, but based on my own introspection, I find it implausible that linguistic representation is generally (quasi-)sensory representation. Most of my thoughts appear to be purely conceptual -- I can imagine the letters or imagine the sounds in my head, but that takes a lot of effort. Usually, my thoughts are not accompanied by any mental imagery whatsoever, visual or otherwise. I don't see the letters in my mind's eye and I don't hear the sounds in my mind's ear... At least, as far as I can tell. I don't really trust introspection, so it wouldn't surprise me if it turned out that I do have such imagery, but I'm just not aware of it. I don't think that tactile imagery solves the problem, because this imagery will also be extremely limited in similar ways. Indeed, note that although I can imagine feeling a small cube from all sides at the same time, tactile imagery seems worse off with respect to larger cubes. Imagine a cube whose edges are 1 mile long. You'll be able to see much more of that than you can feel! Moreover, even with a small cube, you can only feel the surfaces, not the insides.
A round square if conceived as an object with a stroke seems at least from a macro anatomical construction through vector graphics to consist of circles that overlapping to construct a visually large depiction of a square whose stroke (outer visible edge that is what is seen) is thick. If a line has no dimension (vectors have no dimension unless we give them appearance through a stroke dimension) but is just a concept then it can be conceived of being round square which through jiggery pokery can be depicted as such through nested drawings or even illusion like the vase and old women depiction flipping conceivability. A zombie counterpart would have macro anatomical peripheral nervous system sensations but conceive of that as a description like 'this is terribly delightful' and whistle like a bird. Although on further inspection the zombie would have a micro anatomical construction as histology (tissue) and cytology (cells) identical too that seem to signal identical information though the peripheral nervous system to central nervous system as indicating motor information from the brain correlates with sensory information from the peripheral nervous system as indicting that whistling is the same as screaming and wincing after being having a local incision to remove a splinter. The PZ is like a round square by token of how the system is constructed within a discourse where if the dominant discourse happens to be anatomical surgeons then PZ would still be entitled to pain relief drugs as the doppelgänger. However in a discourse where ontological possibility entails a nervous system has a homunculus central nervous system with the 12 pairs of cranial nerves entering the cranium but instead is fed into a computer simulation of the real counterpart that feeds the identical motor outputs and sensory inputs as digits then this could count as a round square analogy where consciousness is usually conceived of as the central nervous system maintaining homeostasis through sensation and regulation through whatever means is available to continue metabolism from the perspective of the various organ system functions like how the liver deals with detoxification as the invisible conscious workflow to maintain the organism which happens to have complex social relations and a purported mind. This purported mind belongs to a community of nervous systems and set within modernity a set of institutional practices based on forms of competitive codes that permit other members to inspect what is a property of conceivability. So from this perspective the text thus far is outsider discourse grafted onto a purported para legitimised discourse linked to a form of institutional practice that purposes to have associations with Pre Socratics.
I am almost sure that Berto and Schoonen made a constraint for linguistic and hybrid conceivabilities: no contradictions. If they did not. I used them in a chapter of my PhD thesis and added this clause.
Doesn't Moore's paradox (like trying to imagine a world where it's raining but everybody believes it's sunny) prove that inconceivability doesn't imply impossibility?
Conceivability is strictly a property of ideas. Possibility is a property of both physical systems and propositional formalisms. For example, I can CONCEIVE of an omnipotent deity creating a rock so heavy that he can't lift it. I can CONCEIVE the Liar Paradox, the Barber Paradox, and so on. Conceivability, strictly speaking, need not be formally valid, much less formally sound. But this need not be mere symbolic nonsense. Kurt Gödel showed that any nontrivial formalism can express propositions which are well formed (in other words, CONCEIVED) within the formalism, but cannot be decided (as to whether or not they are, in fact, POSSIBLE.) And of course within physical systems we must look solely to the system in question as to what is POSSIBLE. It's CONCEIVABLE that, because there are generally two roots to a quadratic equation, the surface area of a rectangular table is a negative number. But it is not POSSIBLE that it is a negative number, not in this universe anyway.
Is the Sorensen's paper you are trying to remember the name one where he offers a large sum of money to anyone who shows him a (pictorial) contradiction? If so, I have it here and I can look the name for you.
Genie: what is your wish I want an entire mountain made of pure plutonium! Genie: Your wish is granted, it's 14 billion light years from here, because that shit's gonna explode, and I'm sending you there now.
I will always be suspicious of the claim that "2 + 2 = 4" is necessarily true. I'm suspicious if it's true at all. At least not in the same sense that "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples" is true (which is contingent on a bunch of assumptions about apples).
I guess if you're a fictionalist then it's necessarily false. So it would still work as an example of a necessity. But yeah, pretty much any example of a necessity is open to dispute. For one thing, some folks have defended the view that there are no necessities, period (Chris Mortensen has a couple of nice articles in which he argues that anything is possible).
1. Florovium, not Flavorium. 2. What is conceivable in pictorial representation are the particular features being represented. 3. Venus as seen in the evening is distinct from Venus as seen in the morning. 4. "Electrons are at the same time both particles and waves" is a logical impossibility that happens to be true. It's in fact easier to make logical sense of "round square" (a shape with flat sides and rounded corners would do). 5. "A three-sided pentagon" is also supposed to be a logical impossibility, but is in fact easy to construct: any pentagon with two 180° angles will do.
It's "flevorium", though maybe I pronounced it incorrectly! Re (4), John Norton also gives a nice example of a round square: in the spherical geometry of the surface of a sphere, you can connect four sides of equal length, where this will make a circle (draw four straight lines around the equator). I suspect that our judgments about what's logically impossible, about what's conceivable or inconceivable, etc., are strongly influenced by familiarity. Philosophers very rarely encounter people talking about round squares, except in the context of an example of something that we're not going let you get away with saying, so of course they end up being inconceivable.
@@KaneB Let's split the difference: Flerovium. There's an e there, indeed, but the r still comes before the v 🙂 (it's named after a Russian physicist, and the "ov" is the most common suffix in Russian surnames). And to the philosophical point, yep, familiarity has a lot to do with it. But that just tells you conceivability and possibility are expandable categories. Never say something is impossible full stop. It might just be a failure of your imagination.
@@whycantiremainanonymous8091 Despite reading about this just before making the video, and then double checking the spelling after your correction, I didn't catch that I mixed up the "r" and the "v". D'oh!
No. Suppose: (1) the universe has a beginning; (2) the universe just popped into existence, so nothing made the universe exist; and (3) the initial conditions of the universe could have been different. Then the initial conditions would be contingent but not dependent on anything.
Conceivability is a worse start up for metaphysics. It's just ridiculous to when it says i can conceived that it can fail to exist!how exactly it proofs that our universe could've fail to exist?
If something is true then it is obviously possible. This simple observation dismisses any notion of "logical" or "physical" possibility! There are only two meaningful notions of possibility: that is 1/ something that is conceivably possible in the future, and 2/ something that was (at some point in the past) conceivably possible in the future. In both cases there must be some (at least possible) causal link between actuality and possibility. I find it perplexing that all model treatments in logic seem to ignore this basic fact.
That's almost Graham Oppy's view. Except that for Oppy, it wasn't about "conceivable" possibility, but about literal, objective randomness in the laws of physics. So for Oppy, all possible world are those which branch out from some past state of the actual world, in a way that is allowed by the indeterministic laws of physics.
@@СергейМакеев-ж2н "Conceivable" was a slip, forgive me, what I mean IS objective possibility. That is there must exist a possible path of the evolution of objective reality resulting in said "possible condition".
probability is a subset of conceivability. But not all things conceivable are probable. C ( p, x) It can be conceivable that x is improbable, but probable.
For more on "genuine" representation, see: th-cam.com/video/2XBThMyqtyo/w-d-xo.html
THAT WAS THE BEST MEOWING EVER
Not liking and commenting on this video is inconceivable and impossible
I wasn't going to comment, until I realized that you're right
Oh yeah, more ammunition against conceivability arguments. I'm actually psyched for this one. You wouldn't believe the unseemly things that some people are trying to pull with modal logic. It's disgusting.
You have my attention and interest, what for example?
@@TheoEvian It involves zombies. Philosophical zombies. Nasty stuff.
@@luszczi that sounds even better :D Btw, there is also some discussion of conceivability and the idea of impssible worlds in the fictional worlds theory. Like what kind of a world is a world of a story where there actually are round squares :D
Great way to start my day. Thank you internet professor Baker.
imagine not knowing Kane B career lore
@@RestIsPhilosophy I have a career? When did that happen? Lol
I actually like the idea that conceiving is evidence for possibility in the same sense that perceiving is evidence for reality. If that's the case, then skepticism about modality is expected to happen just like skepticism about knowledge from the external world. And just like we don't expect a final theory of perception to hold perceptions as good justification, the lack of a final theory of conception isn't reason enough to doubt modal knowledge.
Didn't think I was gonna hear Kane straight up meow in a video about conceivability arguments, but here we are. 😂
Rather, I should say that I could not have conceived of something like that occurring!
Twice!! Inconceivable!!
Same
This video opened my third code of representation
I am writing a PhD in which I am developing a new argument for anti-Humeanism based on John D. Norton's material theory of induction, so really looking forward to watch your video!
Are you familiar with Barbara Vetter’s work?
@@juliusseizure591 Yes, i also met her at a workshop last week :)
Based
@@johannesheinle2822 nice!
The converse is also dubious. Inconceivability does not imply impossibility. All kinds of weird possibilities were once thought inconceivable. The universe can be finite but unbounded. Euclidean geometry is not the only geometry. Lines can have a fractal dimension greater than their topological dimension. There may have been a beginning point in time before which there was no time. Square circles exist in taxicab geometry. There are paraconsistent logics that allow for true contradictions.
Ya. I’d also insist that all squares are physically round, since we exist in curved spacetime.
Course this assumes spacetime is real and not logical which Is what I do believe. That spacetime geometry, and geometry in general is a subset of logic and exists in the superset of all possible logic (geometries) that can and often do exist like round squares.
@@NightmareCourtPicturesIn spherical geometry, a square is a polygon whose edges are great circle arcs of equal distance, which meet at equal angles. Unlike the square of plane geometry, the angles of such a square are larger than a right angle. Larger spherical squares have larger angles.
28:00
Another problem, if we want to differentiate from the other, for the pure pictorial understanding is that, if 1000 sided objects are in fact not conceivable, and unconceivability is evidence for impossibility, then we could easily construct an example of something we have reason to believe isnt possible but we nonetheless think is actual.
So it's not just that this gives the wrong result with regards to our possibility judgements, but it also contradicts with our actuality judgments, so that's kind of just pointing out that the error scope would be bigger.
What a great video! Thank you TH-cam algorithm. Thanks for the time you took to make and share this.
Thank you!
27:55
One objection that I see to the 1000 sided object example is that something not being purely pictorially conceivable *for human beings* isnt a problem because it is still conceivable, for an alien for example. It's sufficient that it can be conceived, by who I assume isn't really relevant.
But why assume that the 1000 sided is conceivable for a sufficiently advanced alien, whereas a round square is in principle not conceivable for anything? I worry that this will just end up presupposing the impossibility of the round square.
Hmmmmm
Thanks!
This was excellent.
7:38 P2 is already assuming a contradiction:
If we're operating in a physicalist world for the sake of argument (as indicated by P1, "if physicalism is true, then..."), then by definition a zombie counterpart is inconceivable. In any conceivable physicalist universe in which one may exist, a zombie lacking consciousness constitutes a physical difference from its non-zombie counterpart, and therefore does not satisfy the definition we've given for a zombie counterpart.
I think the problem is that consciousness is undefined; in particular it is undefined in physicalist terms. Without definition the term consciousness may already be implying a denial of physicalism (in fact it most probably is).
A few thoughts on this. If a metaphysics like Leibniz's or St. Maximus the Confessor's is taken, the true nature of physical objects is not to be found within our observation of things or physics. In any metaphysics in which we ourselves constitute a [real] microcosm representing [all of] external reality in various degrees of perception, the direct nature of physics is not determined from parts, or their arrangements, but merely from the phenomenon of parts and their arrangements. This means transparent iron is conceivable when we imagine the phenomena of iron (the properties) and relate them to a transparent object. If we go beyond the phenomenal within such a metaphysics, we do not end up in physics - which is itself phenomenal and part of the microcosms - but directly in metaphysics. Once this has been structured in a logically functional way, one has directly represented the lowest level of existence, A, and the phenomenal, B, and created transparent iron within it. In this case, physics only belongs to B, the explanation of transparent iron is already given in A.
Modal skepticism seems to build on a worldview in which one tries not to assume metapyhsics A, which is why it should be clear that one can almost never realistically speak of conceivability. Because the complete justification of something like transparent iron would always be out of reach. By complete justification, I don't necessarily mean a precise justification down to the last detail, but an explanation that covers the whole area. In other words, as soon as conceivability is broken down to a logical, metaphysical and physical possibility - the logical can be quickly covered by the statements themselves ("transparent" and "iron" don't entail the negation of the other as far as I know) and the physical can be collapsed into the metaphysical depending on the model - and all these areas are explained by the system so that transparent iron is possible, then one says it is conceivability.
Modal skepticism tells me two things. 1. even if something is personally conceivable, that may be due to lack of data and does not mean that it is actually conceivable at a systematic level, so, given your system is true, it is possible that what you called "conceivable" is not at all possible, not even metaphysically. 2. we cannot assume a neutral ground from which we can speak of conceivability. Something is only ever conceivable within a logic, ontology and metaphysics. That is what I call a system. We can therefore only speak within systems and measure them in terms of their functionality. If you do not assume metaphysics to account for physics, you cannot speak of conceivability, as modal skepticism seems to have shown.
This was a very good video and the concerns it raised are very important. Thanks!
Thank you!
30:00 This is indeed from Roy Sorensen in Chapter 9, page 344 of Conceivability and Possibility doi:10.1093/oso/9780198250890.001.0001
Thanks for the reference! Unfortunately, it seems I lost my copy of that book. But good to know where it's from.
15:25
It really looks like contradictions are conceivable in the linguistic representational sense lol
I do understand the words used in "The cat is on the mat and not on the mat". The words are appropriately put together, which we presumably have to say if all contradictions are false. I am able to infer various things from it, for instance that the cat is on something.
Defeasible evidence for possibility of contradictions, let's go! Gonna convert all my non-dialetheist friends!
On a more serious note, even if this type of conceivability probably won't be of much evidential power to many, precisely because of the consequence above, it's still good to be able to point out that contradictions are conceivable, in some sense.
For me, it doesn't seem as if one could part the linguistic and pictorial representation from each other. You may talk about x and y while both entail the negation of the other but not connect both statements to one picture in your mind. You may connect x and y that entail no negation of the other to one picture but then there are still multiple things possible this picture could actually show before defining it linguistically (or by intuion/emotion).
And ofc, through the modal sceptics and the possibility to define "round square" on any picture you like, it seems we cannot speak about conceivability equating any kind of possibility as long as we haven't thought about a metaphysics that is functional to explain the phenomena of a thing, but when we did so, we can within that metaphysics speaks of such a thing being conceivable.
Following your vasectomy, many philosophers hold that conception is no longer possible
what a cute little kitten ❤
I'm very surprised that you didn't address the most important paper ever written on this "Does Conceivability entail Possibility" by Chalmers, where he lays out in detail why he thinks the consciousness case is disanalogous to the "certain arrangements of atoms make something opaque" case
Covering Chalmers's paper would have required a much longer video; I'm hoping to revisit the topic in the future so I'll probably talk about the paper there. Honestly though, part of the reason is that I just don't find the paper that interesting. I don't think it addresses what seem to me to be the most serious challenges to Hume's maxim. And where it does address challenges, I think there are better answers available (e.g. two-dimensional semantics can help with the challenge of a posteriori impossibilities, but I find Yablo's response to that satisfying and that response doesn't rest on such controversial theses in phil of language). So I guess I'm just not as impressed by the paper as you. Now, maybe that shouldn't matter so much for the purposes of an introductory video, but then, I can't cover everything, and like I said I intend to revisit the topic later anyway.
14:20 we need more catboy kane
As a former psychology student I have an observation that might be important - you don't mention any senses other than vision that a person can use to imagine things, for example:
- linguistic representation seems to be a kind of sensory representation because either we imagine the letters (then it's visual) or we just say the words in our head (then it's auditory)
- we can imagine a three-dimensional shape fully at the same time in a tactile manner because we can imagine feeling it from all sides at the same time
I don't know what the current consensus among psychologists is on this, but based on my own introspection, I find it implausible that linguistic representation is generally (quasi-)sensory representation. Most of my thoughts appear to be purely conceptual -- I can imagine the letters or imagine the sounds in my head, but that takes a lot of effort. Usually, my thoughts are not accompanied by any mental imagery whatsoever, visual or otherwise. I don't see the letters in my mind's eye and I don't hear the sounds in my mind's ear... At least, as far as I can tell. I don't really trust introspection, so it wouldn't surprise me if it turned out that I do have such imagery, but I'm just not aware of it.
I don't think that tactile imagery solves the problem, because this imagery will also be extremely limited in similar ways. Indeed, note that although I can imagine feeling a small cube from all sides at the same time, tactile imagery seems worse off with respect to larger cubes. Imagine a cube whose edges are 1 mile long. You'll be able to see much more of that than you can feel! Moreover, even with a small cube, you can only feel the surfaces, not the insides.
fantastic video
A round square if conceived as an object with a stroke seems at least from a macro anatomical construction through vector graphics to consist of circles that overlapping to construct a visually large depiction of a square whose stroke (outer visible edge that is what is seen) is thick. If a line has no dimension (vectors have no dimension unless we give them appearance through a stroke dimension) but is just a concept then it can be conceived of being round square which through jiggery pokery can be depicted as such through nested drawings or even illusion like the vase and old women depiction flipping conceivability. A zombie counterpart would have macro anatomical peripheral nervous system sensations but conceive of that as a description like 'this is terribly delightful' and whistle like a bird. Although on further inspection the zombie would have a micro anatomical construction as histology (tissue) and cytology (cells) identical too that seem to signal identical information though the peripheral nervous system to central nervous system as indicating motor information from the brain correlates with sensory information from the peripheral nervous system as indicting that whistling is the same as screaming and wincing after being having a local incision to remove a splinter. The PZ is like a round square by token of how the system is constructed within a discourse where if the dominant discourse happens to be anatomical surgeons then PZ would still be entitled to pain relief drugs as the doppelgänger. However in a discourse where ontological possibility entails a nervous system has a homunculus central nervous system with the 12 pairs of cranial nerves entering the cranium but instead is fed into a computer simulation of the real counterpart that feeds the identical motor outputs and sensory inputs as digits then this could count as a round square analogy where consciousness is usually conceived of as the central nervous system maintaining homeostasis through sensation and regulation through whatever means is available to continue metabolism from the perspective of the various organ system functions like how the liver deals with detoxification as the invisible conscious workflow to maintain the organism which happens to have complex social relations and a purported mind. This purported mind belongs to a community of nervous systems and set within modernity a set of institutional practices based on forms of competitive codes that permit other members to inspect what is a property of conceivability. So from this perspective the text thus far is outsider discourse grafted onto a purported para legitimised discourse linked to a form of institutional practice that purposes to have associations with Pre Socratics.
I am almost sure that Berto and Schoonen made a constraint for linguistic and hybrid conceivabilities: no contradictions. If they did not. I used them in a chapter of my PhD thesis and added this clause.
Doesn't Moore's paradox (like trying to imagine a world where it's raining but everybody believes it's sunny) prove that inconceivability doesn't imply impossibility?
Excellent video. Thanks! I tried to read this article, but found it hard to understand. The 'third code' thing.
Conceivability is strictly a property of ideas. Possibility is a property of both physical systems and propositional formalisms.
For example, I can CONCEIVE of an omnipotent deity creating a rock so heavy that he can't lift it. I can CONCEIVE the Liar Paradox, the Barber Paradox, and so on.
Conceivability, strictly speaking, need not be formally valid, much less formally sound.
But this need not be mere symbolic nonsense. Kurt Gödel showed that any nontrivial formalism can express propositions which are well formed (in other words, CONCEIVED) within the formalism, but cannot be decided (as to whether or not they are, in fact, POSSIBLE.)
And of course within physical systems we must look solely to the system in question as to what is POSSIBLE. It's CONCEIVABLE that, because there are generally two roots to a quadratic equation, the surface area of a rectangular table is a negative number. But it is not POSSIBLE that it is a negative number, not in this universe anyway.
Kane B cat ASMR channel incoming 🐱
I haven't watched the whole video yet, but you should probably check out Amie Thomasson's theory of modal normativism. Thanks for the cat noises btw
Her work on this is excellent! I've been planning on doing a video on it for years. I'll get around to it eventually.
14:21 meow
Lol
14:32
@jitsekuilman2492 You could hear me, if you like. The advantage would be that I don't keep saying 'Haitch two O'.
@@Brian.001 I will never stop saying "haitch". It's the letter *H*. So I say its name with a *H*.
MEOW for the algorithm! 😺
8:43 I think there is a typo on your slide
It should say "Or more weakly...for believing that possibly p"
And of course, you also notice it moments later
God damn it!!!!
As a radiophile, orophile, and lithophile, I would love there to be mountains of Plutonium for me to climb.
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In all possible worlds in which Kane B makes TH-cam videos I leave poorly conceived comments.
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Is the Sorensen's paper you are trying to remember the name one where he offers a large sum of money to anyone who shows him a (pictorial) contradiction? If so, I have it here and I can look the name for you.
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Genie: what is your wish
I want an entire mountain made of pure plutonium!
Genie: Your wish is granted, it's 14 billion light years from here, because that shit's gonna explode, and I'm sending you there now.
On what basis do we think that there aren't conceivable impossibilities or unconceivable possibilities?
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@@KaneBkitty kane
humesmaxxing
I will always be suspicious of the claim that "2 + 2 = 4" is necessarily true. I'm suspicious if it's true at all. At least not in the same sense that "2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples" is true (which is contingent on a bunch of assumptions about apples).
I guess if you're a fictionalist then it's necessarily false. So it would still work as an example of a necessity. But yeah, pretty much any example of a necessity is open to dispute. For one thing, some folks have defended the view that there are no necessities, period (Chris Mortensen has a couple of nice articles in which he argues that anything is possible).
1. Florovium, not Flavorium.
2. What is conceivable in pictorial representation are the particular features being represented.
3. Venus as seen in the evening is distinct from Venus as seen in the morning.
4. "Electrons are at the same time both particles and waves" is a logical impossibility that happens to be true. It's in fact easier to make logical sense of "round square" (a shape with flat sides and rounded corners would do).
5. "A three-sided pentagon" is also supposed to be a logical impossibility, but is in fact easy to construct: any pentagon with two 180° angles will do.
It's "flevorium", though maybe I pronounced it incorrectly!
Re (4), John Norton also gives a nice example of a round square: in the spherical geometry of the surface of a sphere, you can connect four sides of equal length, where this will make a circle (draw four straight lines around the equator).
I suspect that our judgments about what's logically impossible, about what's conceivable or inconceivable, etc., are strongly influenced by familiarity. Philosophers very rarely encounter people talking about round squares, except in the context of an example of something that we're not going let you get away with saying, so of course they end up being inconceivable.
@@KaneB Let's split the difference: Flerovium. There's an e there, indeed, but the r still comes before the v 🙂 (it's named after a Russian physicist, and the "ov" is the most common suffix in Russian surnames).
And to the philosophical point, yep, familiarity has a lot to do with it. But that just tells you conceivability and possibility are expandable categories. Never say something is impossible full stop. It might just be a failure of your imagination.
@@whycantiremainanonymous8091 Despite reading about this just before making the video, and then double checking the spelling after your correction, I didn't catch that I mixed up the "r" and the "v". D'oh!
People with aphantasia can't form mental images (or mental sounds, etc. if they are totally aphant)
Does contingency means dependency?
No. Suppose: (1) the universe has a beginning; (2) the universe just popped into existence, so nothing made the universe exist; and (3) the initial conditions of the universe could have been different. Then the initial conditions would be contingent but not dependent on anything.
Catboy Kane B when?
Who says that logical possibility is greater than metaphysical?
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Conceivability is a worse start up for metaphysics. It's just ridiculous to when it says i can conceived that it can fail to exist!how exactly it proofs that our universe could've fail to exist?
If something is true then it is obviously possible. This simple observation dismisses any notion of "logical" or "physical" possibility! There are only two meaningful notions of possibility: that is 1/ something that is conceivably possible in the future, and 2/ something that was (at some point in the past) conceivably possible in the future. In both cases there must be some (at least possible) causal link between actuality and possibility. I find it perplexing that all model treatments in logic seem to ignore this basic fact.
That's almost Graham Oppy's view. Except that for Oppy, it wasn't about "conceivable" possibility, but about literal, objective randomness in the laws of physics. So for Oppy, all possible world are those which branch out from some past state of the actual world, in a way that is allowed by the indeterministic laws of physics.
@@СергейМакеев-ж2н "Conceivable" was a slip, forgive me, what I mean IS objective possibility. That is there must exist a possible path of the evolution of objective reality resulting in said "possible condition".
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probability is a subset of conceivability. But not all things conceivable are probable. C ( p, x)
It can be conceivable that x is improbable, but probable.
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