Bertrand Russell had a room in Whewell’s Court while attending Trinity College, Cambridge, from 1890 to 1893. So if you don't count the courtyard common area, there were zero blades of grass in Bertrand Russell's lawn on 26 June 1891.
Have people ever found it useful enough to categorise truth/reality? I would initially consider 4 categories of reality: 1. Anything we can perceive directly with out current abilities and communicate about to eachother 2. Anything that exists in the universe but we have no way of perceiving right now, either by means of perception (bigger magnifying glass), spatial position (patch of alpha centauri to stick a microscope into), theory/idea that gives us a new frame to observe something 3. Concepts that only exist within the human mind (dreams, philosophy, fiction, theories of the real world). I would consider these "real" but it is useful to differentiate between a dream apple and a real apple for example 4. Anything that "exists" that we as humans/'life' will never be able to observe, perceive, experience, or even imagine. It would instantly counteract this if I could come up with something, but an example might be what a 5th-dimensional object would "smell" like - we can imagine a smell, we could even make some calculations as to how eventually particles would interact in 5 spatial dimensions to create life that would have an olfactory organ and then how other particles in this environment would be interpreted by this organ and subsequently the brain, but we can't ever smell it for ourselves, we will never be able to directly compare it with other smells. Perhaps 1 and 2 could be rewritten to differentiate between what can be perceived purely by the human sensory organs vs what requires technological aid, but I feel that it makes things too complicated and doesn't account for differences between humans, let alone any other form of life. It is interesting to discuss but I feel that defining "truth" and "reality" requires more knowledge than we currently have, at the very least with regards to psychology/neuroscience, as we can't escape our own perception, which makes pragmatism appealing to me; however just like in real life we aim to be pragmatic insofar as we have urgent requirements, such as safety, security, energy, and when we have satisfied those requirements it becomes pragmatic to work on preparing for the future. I'm trying to say that the more we learn and the further our theories develop, the more we can strive for absolute theories about our reality rather than simply true ones. If all of the poisonous berries in my area are red, it may be pragmatic to believe that poison naturally occurring in berries dyes the berry red, for as long as I am hungry and don't know how berries or poisons develop. I am interested in the point you bring up regarding buried secrets; is it not possible that a fact as innocuous as how many green ties were worn on 18/6/1934 will be useful if in the future we aim to build a complete simulation of the universe? It may not be useful now but it certainly will be at some point. I think the concept of entropy is important in an absolute view of truth/reality, as the movement of any particle anywhere in the universe has an impact on the universe's overall entropy. So literally anything, at least in what would go in the first 2 categories (maybe even 3 if somehow the physical chemicals of the human brain are able to be analysed in a way that can predict with certainty what is being thought at the current time and what behaviours will result) is useful in this case through contributing to entropy.
Just in case for those who do not know: William James did not only make important contributions to pragmatist philosophy, he was also the father of American psychology!
On James' theory, what makes it true that some belief x is "expedient in our thinking"? That the belief that it is is itself expedient? It seems to me that the only satisfying solution to this problem is by some appeal to another theory of truth.
Sorry in advance for how long this is! James is notoriously inconsistent and ambiguous, but I'll try and explain as best as I understand it. For Peirce, claims that are true are those that ultimately satisfy inquiry, that are "unassailable by doubt." Philosopher Cheryl Misak describes Peirce position as being that "if we were to reach a stage where we could no longer improve upon a belief, there is no point in withholding the title 'true' from it." But, of course, we can never quite know when it becomes impossible to improve upon a belief, so we've defined truth out of existence for all practical purposes. Against this, James argues that we can describe beliefs which currently satisfy inquiry as "true," understanding that this truth may be superseded. This is John Dewey's example, not James's but, it's a good one: would you describe Newton's physics as "untrue"? They've unquestionably been supplanted by superior theories, namely Einstein's, but does this make them "false"? Some people may be comfortable saying yes, but I'm not. Nevertheless, Einstein's ideas are more true than Newton's, and so we now use them. And, of course, Einstein's ideas have been supplanted in time as well. These theories, in their time, satisfied inquiry, and paved the way for further inquiry which revealed even greater truths. Saying this makes them "false" would be odd. By that logic, the irreconcilability of quantum theory with relativity means that everything we know in modern physics is also "false," which is absurd. I'm taking your initial question to be asking what James means by expedience, and I understand him to mean that an expedient idea is one which satisfies the parameters of our current level of inquiry. This is what makes the pragmatic theory of truth a practical theory; true ideas are those which enable us to act to our own satisfaction in a given situation. When the parameters of our inquiry change, formerly "true" ideas may be found wanting, because what made them expedient historically are now limits. The way I like to think about the pragmatic theory of truth is that it is a naturalized form of the correspondence theory. There is a correspondence between thought and reality, and this correspondence determines truth, but the nature of this correspondence is practical. The relationship between my thought that "my keyboard is white" is mediated by the physical processes of my sensory organs, and the truth of that idea is contingent on me continuing to experience my keyboard as white. Ideas are, in essence, predictions about future conditions, and "true" ideas are ideas which continue to produce reliable predictions, by which I mean predictions which continue to adequately describe future experiences I have.
@@radshiba3345 A very helpful answer, but I think I was actually unclear - what I meant was: on James' criterion, how do we tell if it's *true* that a particular belief is expedient to enquiry (once we've determined what that expediency is). Is it because the belief that a particular belief is expedient to enquiry is itself expedient to enquiry? Where does this questioning bottom out if not in one of the other theories of truth?
Martin Gardner noticed that Pragmatists usually explain their theory of truth by translating its terms into those of the Correspondence theory. Gardner asked, why not keep the Correspondence theory with its widely understood terms? It easily handles issues of utility, or whatever else the Pragmatists desire. Do we really need a new way of talking about some old ideas?
The pragmatist’s view of truth is self-refuting, because pragmatism cannot and yet must put itself forward as true by the higher standard it rejects. Consider that the pragmatic theory of truth, if applied to itself, would require that the truth of pragmatism is itself merely pragmatic in character. Thus a non-pragmatic theory of truth, such as a correspondence theory, if it proved to be pragmatically superior, should, according to pragmatism, be regarded as a true theory of truth in place of pragmatism. But if a non-pragmatic theory of truth were regarded as true only because it was the most pragmatic theory of truth, then really pragmatism would still be the true theory of truth, despite pragmatism itself not satisfying its own pragmatic standard! This would further mean that pragmatism was really being thought of by the pragmatist as corresponding to the truth about truth, and that pragmatism was supposed by him to be true because of such correspondence with what the nature of truth independently was. However, pragmatism cannot understand its view of truth as having an objective correspondence with reality and still be pragmatism.
Interesting line of thought. With regard to correspondence, Kane already addressed this in Peirce, where he agrees that correspondence is a good definition, only that it is trivial or empty since we don't know what we mean by 'correspondence' ('matching' is the word used in the video), or 'reality', and thus it doesn't tell us what would count as true. These concepts have no content that is not specified by their practical effects (according to the pragmatic maxim). For Peirce, beliefs are dispositions to act, not propositional attitudes, so reality just gets cashed out in fundamentally non-theoretical terms. Obviously, if you're playing the game of metaphysics, then strict correspondence may be more practically useful then other theories of truth--but this is an instance of the pragmatist theory rather than a performative contradiction, maybe. It is only a contradiction if they are opposed from the POV of the pragmatist, which they seem not to be.
Suppose we accept pragmatism, and we claim that the truth of pragmatism itself is pragmatic: either pragmatism is ultimately fated to be agreed upon by all who investigate, or pragmatism is expedient in our way of thinking. In that case, it doesn't seem like the view is self-refuting. Perhaps there's a worry about circularity here? But then it's entirely to be expected that any theory of truth that we accept should come out as true by its own standards. Similarly, the correspondence theorist has to say that correspondence theory itself corresponds to the facts. So I think the self-refutation problem only arises if we judge that pragmatism does not itself meet its own pragmatic standards. Perhaps the worry is that all pragmatists are committed to problematic conditionals such as: (C) If the correspondence theory were pragmatically superior, then correspondence theory would be correct. The problem is that as soon as we judge that correspondence theory is correct, then we can't take it that the pragmatic superiority of the correspondence theory establishes its correctness. So conditional (C) can't be true. But the pragmatist is committed to its truth. I think in response to this problem, the pragmatist should just deny (C) and instead hold something like: (C*) If the correspondence theory were pragmatically superior, then pragmatism is false. For most propositions P, establishing the pragmatic superiority of P at the same establishes the truth of P, by the pragmatist's lights. With respect to theories of truth specifically though, establishing the pragmatic superiority of any non-pragmatic theory of truth would amount to a refutation of pragmatism, and so would not, even by the pragmatist's lights, establish the truth of that non-pragmatic theory of truth. Note that we can generate similar problematic conditionals for other theories of truth. For instance: (P) If the pragmatic theory of truth corresponded to the facts, then the pragmatic theory of truth would be correct. As soon as we judge that the pragmatic theory of truth is correct, we can't take it that its correspondence to the facts establishes its correctness. So conditional (P) can't be true. But the correspondence theorist is apparently committed to its truth. Again, the move here is to deny that (P) is true and instead hold: (P*) If the pragmatic theory of truth corresponded to the facts, then the correspondence theory is false.
Thank you very much for constantly exceeding expectations, it’s so personally comforting and intellectually satisfying. I had a quick question, what are you thoughts on poetry and it’s place in philosophy? Do you consider it able to aptly communicate philosophical concepts? Or at the very least supply us with truth?
I do not think there is an alternative to taking external physical reality as axiomatic. It cannot be established subjectively and attempts to do so are pointless. Establishing external reality from an objective perspective already makes the presumption of external reality. Most of the time we do make the tacit presumption of an external physical reality; the best we can do is to make it explicit. Given a presumption of external reality, the correspondence argument, though circular (or perhaps trivial) is nevertheless a starting point, which I think can be reinforced by Peirce's arguments, though I would want to add that the correspondence would involve no serious prospect of falsification (or that P i= true where if P ≠ true would have catastrophic implications for the the wider presumption of reality).
On the last criticism Sure Peirce might have been rather optimistic about convergence of inquirers' belief after an indefinite period of inquiry, and even very optimistic of scientific method's ability to achieve this, but then pragmatism itself doesnt really require this does it? What is holding a pragmatist from holding the pragmatic axiom in regards to truth, and then saying "and it seems there is very little truth out there by [all the aforementioned troubles]". In fact, if Peirce was fine with the possibility of another method stabilizing our inquires more than the scientific method does, if its really just an exampler method Peirce points to, why couldnt he also accept that kind of pessimism in the case where we frustrate a series of methods upon further inquiry. If I'm not mistaken Rorty sort of goes there and is (controversially) considered a pragmatist.
Peirce's idea of consensus is interesting. Is there a reference where he lays out this theory clearly? Does he use a phrase like permanent or stable consensus?
His paper "How to make our ideas clear" is probably his most famous, and contains a clear statement of the consensus view of truth, plus a discussion of the buried secrets problem. I don't know if he ever uses the exact phrase "permanent/stable consensus", but I doubt anyone would take this to be a mischaracterization of his views.
My comment is not related directly to this video but on another issue namely "The problem of evil" and I would like your response in terms of whether you accept or reject the justification of the problem of existence of evil or suffering which I am going to mention here: that is that suffering can be seen as a crucible ordained by a higher power. It serves as a transformative medium through which humanity grapples with its inherent limitations, ultimately emerging refined and morally elevated. This perspective posits suffering as a conduit for spiritual and moral growth, embodying God's response to the intrinsic challenges of human existence. While suffering's intensity necessitates human intervention and ethical frameworks, its finite nature affirms the ultimate triumph of the human spirit over adversity, illustrating the profound synergy between divine design and human agency. This finite nature of suffering is epitomized in history by figures like Hitler, whose malevolence, though profound, was ultimately vanquished, underscoring the intrinsic capacity of humanity and the laws of nature to overcome even the most extreme manifestations of evil. Thank you!
Capitalism is a theory that constantly uses force to alter perceptions hence the pain if the person is at the pragmatic undesirable end of the system which entails doing things undesirable although ethically sound. This is the case when people must service the bottom line to hold onto a standard of living compared to peers which can force people into debt if in light of their concept of having a role within their in-group which is pragmatic but not desirable for financial sustainability. Capitalism instilling doubt in one’s abilities is pragmatism at play for it forces the organism to abstract to a symbolic realism which in society is the brand or top line pragmatism. The top line is pragmatism of the brand as identity politics entails symbolic convergence based on in-group prototypes which requires a cognitive load on a group that forces in-group capitalist doubt which is to out sourced as in the use of AI to do marketing labor so to mitigate in group doubt pertaining to the brand. A brand could be a science theory like the Higgs field which requires investment in particle smashing machines to verify the emergence of the Higgs particle. This kind of verificationist seeking for truth is similar to the invisible hand of capitalism taming the animal spirits. The invisible hand of pragmatism tames the spirit of doubts like the liminal belief that money left by a tooth fairy is an angle investor in my start-up company that produces implanted anti doubt modules in brains so persons can just stop procrastinating and get on with being their best self. If force and pragmatism correlate at service of a minority cohort desirability state as standard of living it then seems pragmatic capitalism is peak idealism in disguise as the liar's dividend due to revenue requires moral pragmatism entailing a moral hazard. Pragmatism would therefore from the identity politics be a continuations of slices of personal identity as facts of the matter through some form of representation which prior to photographies invention around 1850 was largely an elite activity through portrait painting which in a sense kept the brand alive. So pragmatism being is in a sense a projection of the self qua social capital through forms of wealth generation and extraction of wealth from the periphery ,as enclaves, to the core as the Metropol. Pragmatism from capital virtue theory suggests best interest ought to burry the peripheries secrets or toils given what counts is wealth that is extravagant and of the manifest image rather than the scientific image of truth which entails to know the blades of grass on an aristocrat's lawn is a pragmatic imperative if computationally possible. This is naive pragmatism due to identity politics as is the case of optimism for winning the lottery but guides marketing and current compute power that is about economic pragmatism and climate change etcetera for impacting worse off for future generations or better off given current policies. However 250000 years from now a field of science predicts there will be one land mass and a climate too hot for any mammals to survive so in that sense pragmatics is only for the loveable future which is for grand kids maybe. The pragmatists drive can be understood as a form of legacies of the true self which is a form of kinship altruism. The certainty of my mortality focuses the mind on narrow truth claims like if a predator is present or not which is contingent on if I am an extinctivist about my death or believe in an after life which would be about pragmatism of facing my creator in light of the consequences of life lived according to which ever world religion I would have happened to participate in and believe. However if extinctivism is my choice how should I mitigate doubt over embarking on some alternative trajectory as pragmatic in light of being a verificationist? The market techniques of A/B testing in everyday life outcomes seems plausible methodology for a hard core extinctivist to as it were maximise minimalist doubt to live the best life and have truth as a side kick.
It seems that these guys are conflating what we mean by truth with what we mean by knowledge. A statement is true if it happens to correspond with reality. A statement is knowledge if it is sufficiently justified. Knowledge does not mean inflalability.
I think you could probably think of the position that 'truth is justified belief' as being broadly pragmatist from what i understand. although maybe more accurate would be 'truth = limit of justified belief' in the sense that what is true is precisely what our justified beliefs (or consensus) is approaching over time.
@@janmatula1534 truth means that a statement corresponds to reality. Knowledge means that a statement is well justified. Knowledge does not guarantee truth, but gives an indicator towards truth. The process of knowledge progresses by a system of proofs and refutations.
@@janmatula1534 what I am saying is that such pragmatism applies well to knowledge. To say that truth is based on pragmatism is to mis-represent what we mean when we say "truth"
Pragmatism is sober and maybe a practical version of nietzsche. But nobody has been as honest as nietzsche. All the prescriptive philosophy of american pragmatism is some form of democratic elitist cultural criticism. But little bit of nietzsche and a little bit of pragmatism does provide a good explanatory hypothesis of 21st century world. Sometimes i think, that truly if there is no god, how do we define or experinance what is good or bad or true or false. Only things that exist then are things we like/approve and things we dislike/disapprove. All human thought becomes one long circular argument, mere opinions, which are certainly not TRUE. I still have some remnants of religious faith in me, sometimes some days, I can feel the almighty looking over me. I feel the certainity, the love and acceptance of my fate, bliss and satisfaction in my existance. But I dont feel it all the time. I suppose people few centuries back felt that more frequently. We can say it is just neuroscience, self domestication, some mild form of constant hallucination, some kind of mild permanent state of trance. But religion is a human discovery, it is a great psychological/scientific discovery. All the societies had traditions for some form of piety/spirituality/mysticism/religiosity. And was it all a con job? I dont think so. It does work, as a world view, as a psychological background, on which we can construct our personalities and psyche. How do you really LIVE in a world, where you subconsiously acknowledge everything to be banal, contingent, random, accidental and ultimately meaningless and purposeless? Modern utopian/messianic religions of nationalisms(religious/ethnic/racial etc.)/liberalism/veganism/feminism/ scientism etc. do replace traditional religious metaphsyics. But do they give any kind of spiritual/religious experience. Does richard dawkins or supreme vegan leader do achieve psychological states of bliss, satisfaction and wholesomeness, which religiosity used to do for many people in traditional societies. I believe religions were invented(naturally) by trail and error and natural selection, to plant ideologies in societies which save people from Nihilism and existential angst and pessimism. What did we do!?, we killed god, now we cannot become our own god. On a lighter note, have you ever wondered that the western trend of rising gender dysphoria in young children is so much like some ancient biblical curse YHWH punishes nations with. I dont know hebrew but YHWH would have said, "for those wicked people, my retribution made their children confused, eager to cut their private parts". LOL Our current existence is a biblical curse if you think hard enough. Nietzsche was a prophet, maybe the last prophet. But we should falsify him. He is a very bad bad prophet.
you're very confused and maintain that confusion by isolating yourself with your insufferableness. This mostly stems from your insistence that dilemmas you are in only due to the beliefs that you are brutalized into are significant, they are not for anyone else that isn't beaten up in a similar way with you for a millennia. You lose most people by the second paragraph, "how do we define or experience Yada Yada Yada without God" is only a problem for someone still a theist, a very particular kind of theist, brutalized in a very particular kind of way. You'll find most atheists will just respond with "you do only define or experience those without God, because God doesn't exist" and to not take this seriously and universalize a catastrophe of "God dying" is to maintain the imperial mission of Christianity (even without a sincere full belief on it on your part by your account) in cowardice of what is new, or what was there before it was cleansed.
Correspondence theory: th-cam.com/video/CXKHqeKI0K4/w-d-xo.html
Coherence theory: th-cam.com/video/kPr_e493Uqc/w-d-xo.html
Relativism: th-cam.com/video/cAWqJeGt9HU/w-d-xo.html
Values in science: th-cam.com/video/YecBcnakxGY/w-d-xo.html
Bertrand Russell had a room in Whewell’s Court while attending Trinity College, Cambridge, from 1890 to 1893. So if you don't count the courtyard common area, there were zero blades of grass in Bertrand Russell's lawn on 26 June 1891.
Russell was a literal aristocrat. How on earth could he not have a lawn?! Lol.
Have people ever found it useful enough to categorise truth/reality? I would initially consider 4 categories of reality:
1. Anything we can perceive directly with out current abilities and communicate about to eachother
2. Anything that exists in the universe but we have no way of perceiving right now, either by means of perception (bigger magnifying glass), spatial position (patch of alpha centauri to stick a microscope into), theory/idea that gives us a new frame to observe something
3. Concepts that only exist within the human mind (dreams, philosophy, fiction, theories of the real world). I would consider these "real" but it is useful to differentiate between a dream apple and a real apple for example
4. Anything that "exists" that we as humans/'life' will never be able to observe, perceive, experience, or even imagine. It would instantly counteract this if I could come up with something, but an example might be what a 5th-dimensional object would "smell" like - we can imagine a smell, we could even make some calculations as to how eventually particles would interact in 5 spatial dimensions to create life that would have an olfactory organ and then how other particles in this environment would be interpreted by this organ and subsequently the brain, but we can't ever smell it for ourselves, we will never be able to directly compare it with other smells.
Perhaps 1 and 2 could be rewritten to differentiate between what can be perceived purely by the human sensory organs vs what requires technological aid, but I feel that it makes things too complicated and doesn't account for differences between humans, let alone any other form of life. It is interesting to discuss but I feel that defining "truth" and "reality" requires more knowledge than we currently have, at the very least with regards to psychology/neuroscience, as we can't escape our own perception, which makes pragmatism appealing to me; however just like in real life we aim to be pragmatic insofar as we have urgent requirements, such as safety, security, energy, and when we have satisfied those requirements it becomes pragmatic to work on preparing for the future. I'm trying to say that the more we learn and the further our theories develop, the more we can strive for absolute theories about our reality rather than simply true ones. If all of the poisonous berries in my area are red, it may be pragmatic to believe that poison naturally occurring in berries dyes the berry red, for as long as I am hungry and don't know how berries or poisons develop.
I am interested in the point you bring up regarding buried secrets; is it not possible that a fact as innocuous as how many green ties were worn on 18/6/1934 will be useful if in the future we aim to build a complete simulation of the universe? It may not be useful now but it certainly will be at some point. I think the concept of entropy is important in an absolute view of truth/reality, as the movement of any particle anywhere in the universe has an impact on the universe's overall entropy. So literally anything, at least in what would go in the first 2 categories (maybe even 3 if somehow the physical chemicals of the human brain are able to be analysed in a way that can predict with certainty what is being thought at the current time and what behaviours will result) is useful in this case through contributing to entropy.
Thanks for tackling this key controversy at the most fundamental level of Philosophy. Kudos!
🎯🎖️🏅🏆
this video has extremely high pragmatic utility
Just in case for those who do not know: William James did not only make important contributions to pragmatist philosophy, he was also the father of American psychology!
Finally. I’ve been waiting on you to do this
Very disappointed this wasn’t a video on the sink pee vs toilet pee mist dilemma.
If I may inquire, how does piss turn to mist?
@@pesk8801 I believe the extent of the piss mist depends on the proximity of the person to toilet, but I’m not well versed on this dilemma.
This is a difficult problem so I'm putting extra time and care into it. I wouldn't want to go off half-cocked on this one.
@@KaneBI’ll just take this as the British way of saying “that will be the next video.”
What a coincidence - Just went through a chapter on Peirce and James today 😄
Amazing content as usual
Thanks!
On James' theory, what makes it true that some belief x is "expedient in our thinking"? That the belief that it is is itself expedient? It seems to me that the only satisfying solution to this problem is by some appeal to another theory of truth.
Sorry in advance for how long this is!
James is notoriously inconsistent and ambiguous, but I'll try and explain as best as I understand it. For Peirce, claims that are true are those that ultimately satisfy inquiry, that are "unassailable by doubt." Philosopher Cheryl Misak describes Peirce position as being that "if we were to reach a stage where we could no longer improve upon a belief, there is no point in withholding the title 'true' from it." But, of course, we can never quite know when it becomes impossible to improve upon a belief, so we've defined truth out of existence for all practical purposes. Against this, James argues that we can describe beliefs which currently satisfy inquiry as "true," understanding that this truth may be superseded.
This is John Dewey's example, not James's but, it's a good one: would you describe Newton's physics as "untrue"? They've unquestionably been supplanted by superior theories, namely Einstein's, but does this make them "false"? Some people may be comfortable saying yes, but I'm not. Nevertheless, Einstein's ideas are more true than Newton's, and so we now use them. And, of course, Einstein's ideas have been supplanted in time as well. These theories, in their time, satisfied inquiry, and paved the way for further inquiry which revealed even greater truths. Saying this makes them "false" would be odd. By that logic, the irreconcilability of quantum theory with relativity means that everything we know in modern physics is also "false," which is absurd.
I'm taking your initial question to be asking what James means by expedience, and I understand him to mean that an expedient idea is one which satisfies the parameters of our current level of inquiry. This is what makes the pragmatic theory of truth a practical theory; true ideas are those which enable us to act to our own satisfaction in a given situation. When the parameters of our inquiry change, formerly "true" ideas may be found wanting, because what made them expedient historically are now limits.
The way I like to think about the pragmatic theory of truth is that it is a naturalized form of the correspondence theory. There is a correspondence between thought and reality, and this correspondence determines truth, but the nature of this correspondence is practical. The relationship between my thought that "my keyboard is white" is mediated by the physical processes of my sensory organs, and the truth of that idea is contingent on me continuing to experience my keyboard as white. Ideas are, in essence, predictions about future conditions, and "true" ideas are ideas which continue to produce reliable predictions, by which I mean predictions which continue to adequately describe future experiences I have.
@@radshiba3345 A very helpful answer, but I think I was actually unclear - what I meant was: on James' criterion, how do we tell if it's *true* that a particular belief is expedient to enquiry (once we've determined what that expediency is). Is it because the belief that a particular belief is expedient to enquiry is itself expedient to enquiry? Where does this questioning bottom out if not in one of the other theories of truth?
Martin Gardner noticed that Pragmatists usually explain their theory of truth by translating its terms into those of the Correspondence theory. Gardner asked, why not keep the Correspondence theory with its widely understood terms? It easily handles issues of utility, or whatever else the Pragmatists desire. Do we really need a new way of talking about some old ideas?
The pragmatist’s view of truth is self-refuting, because pragmatism cannot and yet must put itself forward as true by the higher standard it rejects. Consider that the pragmatic theory of truth, if applied to itself, would require that the truth of pragmatism is itself merely pragmatic in character. Thus a non-pragmatic theory of truth, such as a correspondence theory, if it proved to be pragmatically superior, should, according to pragmatism, be regarded as a true theory of truth in place of pragmatism. But if a non-pragmatic theory of truth were regarded as true only because it was the most pragmatic theory of truth, then really pragmatism would still be the true theory of truth, despite pragmatism itself not satisfying its own pragmatic standard! This would further mean that pragmatism was really being thought of by the pragmatist as corresponding to the truth about truth, and that pragmatism was supposed by him to be true because of such correspondence with what the nature of truth independently was. However, pragmatism cannot understand its view of truth as having an objective correspondence with reality and still be pragmatism.
Interesting line of thought. With regard to correspondence, Kane already addressed this in Peirce, where he agrees that correspondence is a good definition, only that it is trivial or empty since we don't know what we mean by 'correspondence' ('matching' is the word used in the video), or 'reality', and thus it doesn't tell us what would count as true. These concepts have no content that is not specified by their practical effects (according to the pragmatic maxim). For Peirce, beliefs are dispositions to act, not propositional attitudes, so reality just gets cashed out in fundamentally non-theoretical terms. Obviously, if you're playing the game of metaphysics, then strict correspondence may be more practically useful then other theories of truth--but this is an instance of the pragmatist theory rather than a performative contradiction, maybe. It is only a contradiction if they are opposed from the POV of the pragmatist, which they seem not to be.
Suppose we accept pragmatism, and we claim that the truth of pragmatism itself is pragmatic: either pragmatism is ultimately fated to be agreed upon by all who investigate, or pragmatism is expedient in our way of thinking. In that case, it doesn't seem like the view is self-refuting. Perhaps there's a worry about circularity here? But then it's entirely to be expected that any theory of truth that we accept should come out as true by its own standards. Similarly, the correspondence theorist has to say that correspondence theory itself corresponds to the facts. So I think the self-refutation problem only arises if we judge that pragmatism does not itself meet its own pragmatic standards.
Perhaps the worry is that all pragmatists are committed to problematic conditionals such as:
(C) If the correspondence theory were pragmatically superior, then correspondence theory would be correct.
The problem is that as soon as we judge that correspondence theory is correct, then we can't take it that the pragmatic superiority of the correspondence theory establishes its correctness. So conditional (C) can't be true. But the pragmatist is committed to its truth. I think in response to this problem, the pragmatist should just deny (C) and instead hold something like:
(C*) If the correspondence theory were pragmatically superior, then pragmatism is false.
For most propositions P, establishing the pragmatic superiority of P at the same establishes the truth of P, by the pragmatist's lights. With respect to theories of truth specifically though, establishing the pragmatic superiority of any non-pragmatic theory of truth would amount to a refutation of pragmatism, and so would not, even by the pragmatist's lights, establish the truth of that non-pragmatic theory of truth.
Note that we can generate similar problematic conditionals for other theories of truth. For instance:
(P) If the pragmatic theory of truth corresponded to the facts, then the pragmatic theory of truth would be correct.
As soon as we judge that the pragmatic theory of truth is correct, we can't take it that its correspondence to the facts establishes its correctness. So conditional (P) can't be true. But the correspondence theorist is apparently committed to its truth. Again, the move here is to deny that (P) is true and instead hold:
(P*) If the pragmatic theory of truth corresponded to the facts, then the correspondence theory is false.
Literally was thinking about this the other day! Thankuu
Ah yes, my cup of t e a.
Great work kane
Thank you very much for constantly exceeding expectations, it’s so personally comforting and intellectually satisfying. I had a quick question, what are you thoughts on poetry and it’s place in philosophy? Do you consider it able to aptly communicate philosophical concepts? Or at the very least supply us with truth?
I do not think there is an alternative to taking external physical reality as axiomatic. It cannot be established subjectively and attempts to do so are pointless. Establishing external reality from an objective perspective already makes the presumption of external reality. Most of the time we do make the tacit presumption of an external physical reality; the best we can do is to make it explicit.
Given a presumption of external reality, the correspondence argument, though circular (or perhaps trivial) is nevertheless a starting point, which I think can be reinforced by Peirce's arguments, though I would want to add that the correspondence would involve no serious prospect of falsification (or that P i= true where if P ≠ true would have catastrophic implications for the the wider presumption of reality).
So I guess the next video will most likely be about Deflationary accounts of truth theory? 🤔
The next video in the truth series will be on Tarski. Then I'll probably do deflationary theories after that.
Thanks!
very nice
Charles Purse
On the last criticism
Sure Peirce might have been rather optimistic about convergence of inquirers' belief after an indefinite period of inquiry, and even very optimistic of scientific method's ability to achieve this, but then pragmatism itself doesnt really require this does it? What is holding a pragmatist from holding the pragmatic axiom in regards to truth, and then saying "and it seems there is very little truth out there by [all the aforementioned troubles]".
In fact, if Peirce was fine with the possibility of another method stabilizing our inquires more than the scientific method does, if its really just an exampler method Peirce points to, why couldnt he also accept that kind of pessimism in the case where we frustrate a series of methods upon further inquiry.
If I'm not mistaken Rorty sort of goes there and is (controversially) considered a pragmatist.
Any thoughts on Huw Price's global expressivism?
I haven't read enough about it to have any opinion.
@@KaneB I think you might like it.
Peirce's idea of consensus is interesting. Is there a reference where he lays out this theory clearly? Does he use a phrase like permanent or stable consensus?
His paper "How to make our ideas clear" is probably his most famous, and contains a clear statement of the consensus view of truth, plus a discussion of the buried secrets problem. I don't know if he ever uses the exact phrase "permanent/stable consensus", but I doubt anyone would take this to be a mischaracterization of his views.
Where's Dewey?
Copied everything from Peirce anyway (or Purse, as Kane says it).
@@hrsmp I regret to inform you that Kane is pronouncing his name correctly. It’s not ‘Pierce’
My comment is not related directly to this video but on another issue namely "The problem of evil" and I would like your response in terms of whether you accept or reject the justification of the problem of existence of evil or suffering which I am going to mention here: that is that suffering can be seen as a crucible ordained by a higher power. It serves as a transformative medium through which humanity grapples with its inherent limitations, ultimately emerging refined and morally elevated. This perspective posits suffering as a conduit for spiritual and moral growth, embodying God's response to the intrinsic challenges of human existence. While suffering's intensity necessitates human intervention and ethical frameworks, its finite nature affirms the ultimate triumph of the human spirit over adversity, illustrating the profound synergy between divine design and human agency. This finite nature of suffering is epitomized in history by figures like Hitler, whose malevolence, though profound, was ultimately vanquished, underscoring the intrinsic capacity of humanity and the laws of nature to overcome even the most extreme manifestations of evil.
Thank you!
First 😎
Capitalism is a theory that constantly uses force to alter perceptions hence the pain if the person is at the pragmatic undesirable end of the system which entails doing things undesirable although ethically sound. This is the case when people must service the bottom line to hold onto a standard of living compared to peers which can force people into debt if in light of their concept of having a role within their in-group which is pragmatic but not desirable for financial sustainability. Capitalism instilling doubt in one’s abilities is pragmatism at play for it forces the organism to abstract to a symbolic realism which in society is the brand or top line pragmatism. The top line is pragmatism of the brand as identity politics entails symbolic convergence based on in-group prototypes which requires a cognitive load on a group that forces in-group capitalist doubt which is to out sourced as in the use of AI to do marketing labor so to mitigate in group doubt pertaining to the brand. A brand could be a science theory like the Higgs field which requires investment in particle smashing machines to verify the emergence of the Higgs particle. This kind of verificationist seeking for truth is similar to the invisible hand of capitalism taming the animal spirits. The invisible hand of pragmatism tames the spirit of doubts like the liminal belief that money left by a tooth fairy is an angle investor in my start-up company that produces implanted anti doubt modules in brains so persons can just stop procrastinating and get on with being their best self. If force and pragmatism correlate at service of a minority cohort desirability state as standard of living it then seems pragmatic capitalism is peak idealism in disguise as the liar's dividend due to revenue requires moral pragmatism entailing a moral hazard. Pragmatism would therefore from the identity politics be a continuations of slices of personal identity as facts of the matter through some form of representation which prior to photographies invention around 1850 was largely an elite activity through portrait painting which in a sense kept the brand alive. So pragmatism being is in a sense a projection of the self qua social capital through forms of wealth generation and extraction of wealth from the periphery ,as enclaves, to the core as the Metropol. Pragmatism from capital virtue theory suggests best interest ought to burry the peripheries secrets or toils given what counts is wealth that is extravagant and of the manifest image rather than the scientific image of truth which entails to know the blades of grass on an aristocrat's lawn is a pragmatic imperative if computationally possible. This is naive pragmatism due to identity politics as is the case of optimism for winning the lottery but guides marketing and current compute power that is about economic pragmatism and climate change etcetera for impacting worse off for future generations or better off given current policies. However 250000 years from now a field of science predicts there will be one land mass and a climate too hot for any mammals to survive so in that sense pragmatics is only for the loveable future which is for grand kids maybe. The pragmatists drive can be understood as a form of legacies of the true self which is a form of kinship altruism. The certainty of my mortality focuses the mind on narrow truth claims like if a predator is present or not which is contingent on if I am an extinctivist about my death or believe in an after life which would be about pragmatism of facing my creator in light of the consequences of life lived according to which ever world religion I would have happened to participate in and believe. However if extinctivism is my choice how should I mitigate doubt over embarking on some alternative trajectory as pragmatic in light of being a verificationist? The market techniques of A/B testing in everyday life outcomes seems plausible methodology for a hard core extinctivist to as it were maximise minimalist doubt to live the best life and have truth as a side kick.
Hey dawg. Will you make a phenomenology introduction or series?
That's not likely any time soon.
@KaneB You dislike it, have many other topics you want to cover before it, both?
39th
It seems that these guys are conflating what we mean by truth with what we mean by knowledge. A statement is true if it happens to correspond with reality. A statement is knowledge if it is sufficiently justified. Knowledge does not mean inflalability.
I think you could probably think of the position that 'truth is justified belief' as being broadly pragmatist from what i understand. although maybe more accurate would be 'truth = limit of justified belief' in the sense that what is true is precisely what our justified beliefs (or consensus) is approaching over time.
@@janmatula1534 truth means that a statement corresponds to reality. Knowledge means that a statement is well justified. Knowledge does not guarantee truth, but gives an indicator towards truth. The process of knowledge progresses by a system of proofs and refutations.
@@InventiveHarvest the point is the pragmatists seeks to give meaning to 'reality' and 'truth' by means of some epistemological concepts probably.
@@janmatula1534 what I am saying is that such pragmatism applies well to knowledge. To say that truth is based on pragmatism is to mis-represent what we mean when we say "truth"
Pragmatism is sober and maybe a practical version of nietzsche. But nobody has been as honest as nietzsche. All the prescriptive philosophy of american pragmatism is some form of democratic elitist cultural criticism.
But little bit of nietzsche and a little bit of pragmatism does provide a good explanatory hypothesis of 21st century world.
Sometimes i think, that truly if there is no god, how do we define or experinance what is good or bad or true or false. Only things that exist then are things we like/approve and things we dislike/disapprove. All human thought becomes one long circular argument, mere opinions, which are certainly not TRUE.
I still have some remnants of religious faith in me, sometimes some days, I can feel the almighty looking over me. I feel the certainity, the love and acceptance of my fate, bliss and satisfaction in my existance. But I dont feel it all the time. I suppose people few centuries back felt that more frequently. We can say it is just neuroscience, self domestication, some mild form of constant hallucination, some kind of mild permanent state of trance. But religion is a human discovery, it is a great psychological/scientific discovery. All the societies had traditions for some form of piety/spirituality/mysticism/religiosity. And was it all a con job? I dont think so. It does work, as a world view, as a psychological background, on which we can construct our personalities and psyche.
How do you really LIVE in a world, where you subconsiously acknowledge everything to be banal, contingent, random, accidental and ultimately meaningless and purposeless?
Modern utopian/messianic religions of nationalisms(religious/ethnic/racial etc.)/liberalism/veganism/feminism/ scientism etc. do replace traditional religious metaphsyics. But do they give any kind of spiritual/religious experience.
Does richard dawkins or supreme vegan leader do achieve psychological states of bliss, satisfaction and wholesomeness, which religiosity used to do for many people in traditional societies.
I believe religions were invented(naturally) by trail and error and natural selection, to plant ideologies in societies which save people from Nihilism and existential angst and pessimism.
What did we do!?, we killed god, now we cannot become our own god.
On a lighter note, have you ever wondered that the western trend of rising gender dysphoria in young children is so much like some ancient biblical curse YHWH punishes nations with. I dont know hebrew but YHWH would have said, "for those wicked people, my retribution made their children confused, eager to cut their private parts". LOL
Our current existence is a biblical curse if you think hard enough.
Nietzsche was a prophet, maybe the last prophet. But we should falsify him. He is a very bad bad prophet.
you're very confused and maintain that confusion by isolating yourself with your insufferableness. This mostly stems from your insistence that dilemmas you are in only due to the beliefs that you are brutalized into are significant, they are not for anyone else that isn't beaten up in a similar way with you for a millennia.
You lose most people by the second paragraph, "how do we define or experience Yada Yada Yada without God" is only a problem for someone still a theist, a very particular kind of theist, brutalized in a very particular kind of way. You'll find most atheists will just respond with "you do only define or experience those without God, because God doesn't exist" and to not take this seriously and universalize a catastrophe of "God dying" is to maintain the imperial mission of Christianity (even without a sincere full belief on it on your part by your account) in cowardice of what is new, or what was there before it was cleansed.
Nietzsche didn’t give us the awesome distinction between digisigns and legisigns now did he