That was a very nice chat, so much information, am I the only one that thinks we need Dr. Camarda back to do a part two? Sure felt like there was potential to talk a lot more!
This was one of the best videos Ive ever seen on this topic. I thought the culture at NASA during the shuttle program was just 'poor'. No, I stand corrected, its closer to negligent. I don't think you can sugarcoat it any other way. (Edit: Disclaimer: IF.. what he says was true. )
This was riveting. I'm astounded that NASA astronauts in orbit did not trust the flight controllers and had methods to go around them. Gobsmacked. Never ever imagined that coming from the American space program.
I’ve said before that NSF are awesome, but this interview just goes so far beyond it’s hard to quantify their greatness. What a guest! His opening gambit about his lack of trust in NASA Mission Control. Wow! Mind officially blown. Those photos of him literally standing up to say No. So powerful. Awesome honest knowledge of his subject too.
I whole heartedly agree with you. I have only just finished watching it today. As an engineer that worked for a company with a supposed "open door policy", I got roasted for my 'doing the right thing' and can relate so much to Dr Charlie's time in NASA. But of course, my role was not a high risk to the users of our products, so I can relate only a very little. I will certainly "Watch this space" (no pun intended) for another interview with a hands on engineer: Dr Charlie
As an engineer, this was one of your very very best! Charlie is a huge wealth of information I'll probably read his papers AND buy his book 😊 Back in the day I passed up working for NASA 🚀 because of the culture, which I heard about from my buddies who worked there
Thank you to all involved for this little interview (lol), very thought provoking. Kevin, you are a LEGEND! Elysia wrote in chat that you were the MVP and I wholeheartedly agree. Christmas bonus for you, good sir!
Did STS-1 or STS-2 had foam problems? Their tanks were painted white. If not was it the paint that kept it bound together with a more aerodynamic surface?
NASA has been more concerned with deadlines than safety for a few decades. Leadership job security says to press ahead. The loss of 2 shuttles and the overwhelming flight issues with 2 starliners is enough to take flight decisions away from NASA management.
From the delays we are seeing in Artemis and the issues we still have that need to be fixed a lot of the issues the NASA had are still endemic. They have resisted change as they believe managers and bean counters know best. As soon as the heart of the organization stops being the focus of its drive it becomes ineffective.
I worked in a research organization where the belief was from government that you didn't need to know anything about the nature of the organization you were running. if you were a manager, you could manage employees and meet the charter of the organization.it totally stopped doing research and became a bureaucratic agency that did nothing but built roadblocks to real research. my regional manager said to everyone if you have a problem, I only want to hear about it if you have the solution. We originally had a flat structure where you could talk to anyone you needed to get the resources you needed to get the job done, to a strict hierarchical structure that totally limited the way you got information within the organization. This has happened with many Australian research organizations run by state and federal governments.
Charles Camarda, does FMEA (Failure mode and effects analysis) was very bad system for Space Shuttle, as system that could predict critical failure that was happening on all flights with lowest rating, meanwhile less critical problem put with highest rating on top of the list, was it changed, and was it critical to failures? And also question that i was interested as shuttle fan, i like orange color of the tank and insolation, but could it been changed to some insolation that would not flake off, like full covered shell on top of the tank, or maybe some panels with connections to not rip off, or could it been removed for starship like look, maybe with active cooling?
FMEA and other rules, processes, and procedures are useless if our safety orgs disengage their brains and critical thinking and don’t know how to develop a research culture and can creat high performance teams that can get to real root causes to fix anomalies before they become tragedies. It’s the second half of my book
@@charlescamarda5788 yeah, i agree, also i like how you highlighted importance of social science in this situation in the interview. what about shuttle insolation change is it possible to use something else for insolation and not foam, i know besides sls foam is used on Vulcan now, is it only way to insure cold temperatures for hydrogen? i know thats probably not really important question and not really smart, i just interested 😅
The only reason the foam was present was because of the original decision to use hydrolox propellants. The only reason the STS and SLS need SRBs just to get off the launch pad was the decision to commit to hydrolox propulsion. As somebody with half a century of experience leading engineering projects, and the son of someone with half a century of experience leading engineering projects, WHY was NASA obsessed with technology which greatly increased the engineering risks in hundreds of different ways. Meanwhile there was a FORTY YEAR DELAY in examining the much safer Methylox technology. Surely researching new propellant technologies, and developing new rocket engine technologies such as full-flow staged combustion should have been the responsibility of NASA, not private companies.
Sadly, even though there were and are mistakes made, this sounds more and more like a political hit list in a time when the new admin has dictatorial ambitions. Pogroms always start with good intentions.
That was a very nice chat, so much information, am I the only one that thinks we need Dr. Camarda back to do a part two?
Sure felt like there was potential to talk a lot more!
It was Lex Fridman worthy!
Incredible discussion, and timely: Artemis, Boeing, transforming bureaucracy...
This was one of the best videos Ive ever seen on this topic.
I thought the culture at NASA during the shuttle program was just 'poor'.
No, I stand corrected, its closer to negligent.
I don't think you can sugarcoat it any other way.
(Edit: Disclaimer: IF.. what he says was true. )
This was riveting. I'm astounded that NASA astronauts in orbit did not trust the flight controllers and had methods to go around them. Gobsmacked. Never ever imagined that coming from the American space program.
What an awesome guest, thank you!
Definitely try to have him back on stream for the next flight of Starship or on a flame trench afterwards!
an absolutely fascinating interview. Thanks Charlie.
I’ve said before that NSF are awesome, but this interview just goes so far beyond it’s hard to quantify their greatness. What a guest! His opening gambit about his lack of trust in NASA Mission Control. Wow! Mind officially blown. Those photos of him literally standing up to say No. So powerful. Awesome honest knowledge of his subject too.
Das, that was probably the best interview you did, really captivating
Thank you. Such an interesting conversation, and glad we could help share it. - Das
I whole heartedly agree with you. I have only just finished watching it today. As an engineer that worked for a company with a supposed "open door policy", I got roasted for my 'doing the right thing' and can relate so much to Dr Charlie's time in NASA. But of course, my role was not a high risk to the users of our products, so I can relate only a very little.
I will certainly "Watch this space" (no pun intended) for another interview with a hands on engineer: Dr Charlie
As an engineer, this was one of your very very best! Charlie is a huge wealth of information I'll probably read his papers AND buy his book 😊
Back in the day I passed up working for NASA 🚀 because of the culture, which I heard about from my buddies who worked there
What a great video! I talk about Psychological Safety every day!
That was Really Interesting :)
what a cool video!
This was really interesting.
Incredibly engaging interview. Fascinating stories! I want more 😎
hey John great show as always .man what an interesting guy dr Carlie is i hope that you get a cance to have him on board again,thank you both
Thank you to all involved for this little interview (lol), very thought provoking. Kevin, you are a LEGEND! Elysia wrote in chat that you were the MVP and I wholeheartedly agree. Christmas bonus for you, good sir!
This is really phenomenal stuff! Thank you!
I wanna say a big thank you to Kevin, thanks for staying on top of all the images!
I'll second that.
Wow, that was amazing. What a great guy. Thanks for this!
Did STS-1 or STS-2 had foam problems? Their tanks were painted white. If not was it the paint that kept it bound together with a more aerodynamic surface?
thank you Kevin
NASA has been more concerned with deadlines than safety for a few decades. Leadership job security says to press ahead. The loss of 2 shuttles and the overwhelming flight issues with 2 starliners is enough to take flight decisions away from NASA management.
From the delays we are seeing in Artemis and the issues we still have that need to be fixed a lot of the issues the NASA had are still endemic. They have resisted change as they believe managers and bean counters know best. As soon as the heart of the organization stops being the focus of its drive it becomes ineffective.
Great Slideshow 😜. No, seriously, that was great and very interesting and inspiring as well ! Thanks very much 🚀
Great interview, sadly the issues in NASA are common for many companies
I worked in a research organization where the belief was from government that you didn't need to know anything about the nature of the organization you were running. if you were a manager, you could manage employees and meet the charter of the organization.it totally stopped doing research and became a bureaucratic agency that did nothing but built roadblocks to real research. my regional manager said to everyone if you have a problem, I only want to hear about it if you have the solution. We originally had a flat structure where you could talk to anyone you needed to get the resources you needed to get the job done, to a strict hierarchical structure that totally limited the way you got information within the organization. This has happened with many Australian research organizations run by state and federal governments.
Engineers are not the problem - government bureaucrats are the problem
Cue "Mission Impossible" theme ...
The sickness is spreading; DAS is not shaving his beard until the next flight of Starship!
Resume @2:00:00
Not the 3 body problem, the million part problem!
Pizza boxes size what size extra large or small?
14" x 14"
Buran Buran
BURT RUTAN
you wouldn't understand it in any language Burt. You wouldn't even know what a composite was if not for the NASA of the 70's
Charles Camarda, does FMEA (Failure mode and effects analysis) was very bad system for Space Shuttle, as system that could predict critical failure that was happening on all flights with lowest rating, meanwhile less critical problem put with highest rating on top of the list, was it changed, and was it critical to failures?
And also question that i was interested as shuttle fan, i like orange color of the tank and insolation, but could it been changed to some insolation that would not flake off, like full covered shell on top of the tank, or maybe some panels with connections to not rip off, or could it been removed for starship like look, maybe with active cooling?
FMEA and other rules, processes, and procedures are useless if our safety orgs disengage their brains and critical thinking and don’t know how to develop a research culture and can creat high performance teams that can get to real root causes to fix anomalies before they become tragedies. It’s the second half of my book
@@charlescamarda5788 yeah, i agree, also i like how you highlighted importance of social science in this situation in the interview. what about shuttle insolation change is it possible to use something else for insolation and not foam, i know besides sls foam is used on Vulcan now, is it only way to insure cold temperatures for hydrogen? i know thats probably not really important question and not really smart, i just interested 😅
@@YuriKurokhtin Thereare otherways of insulating cryogenic tanks. We were working on an evacuated metallic honeycomb structure.
@@charlescamarda5788 that's cool! (pun not intended) i need to research a little about metallic honeycomb insolation
If SpaceX hit a vulture, what sort of environmental impact would they have to complete and what fines would they be hit with?
Just put a bunch of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon tiles and Gap Filler on the bottom of Orion.😂
Hey, Mr. Astronaut, is that your crash helmut? "Oh, I hope not"
Oldie! So good! 👍👍👍
@@bobdalton2062 We're revealing our age 🤣
The only reason the foam was present was because of the original decision to use hydrolox propellants.
The only reason the STS and SLS need SRBs just to get off the launch pad was the decision to commit to hydrolox propulsion.
As somebody with half a century of experience leading engineering projects, and the son of someone with half a century of experience leading engineering projects, WHY was NASA obsessed with technology which greatly increased the engineering risks in hundreds of different ways.
Meanwhile there was a FORTY YEAR DELAY in examining the much safer Methylox technology. Surely researching new propellant technologies, and developing new rocket engine technologies such as full-flow staged combustion should have been the responsibility of NASA, not private companies.
Sadly, even though there were and are mistakes made, this sounds more and more like a political hit list in a time when the new admin has dictatorial ambitions. Pogroms always start with good intentions.
Change your Kool-Aid
I have never seen an astronaut/ cosmonaut not going on a spacecraft however unsafe it was.
No, that is why you never ask the crew. It is the Heads of the Safety Office, the Astronaut Office and Engineering that need to make the decision