Question:- Why didn't the Royal Navy and US Navy jointly secretly invoke the escalator clause when it was evident that Germany was not abiding by Versailles with the Scharnhorst Class 1935, Bismark 1936 and the Japanese with the Washington and London Treaties with the Circle Three Plan in 1934?
@@fightforaglobalfirstamendm5617 because we don't play that way. You sign a treaty to abide by it. The goal of this treaty was disarmament. And the prevailing opinion was to continue in that course and thus that's why you had the US remaining neutral for most of the 1930s. Plus add in the small factor , couldn't afford it.
Why didn't the Japanese just reveal the Yamato in 39 or 40? Isn't the point of building a massive ship to scare the adversary so keeping it a secret seems to be just to be counter intuitive, wouldn't it make more sense to do what the British did to HMS Dreadnought and announce it for the world to see?
This is a "how close can we get" question. If you go back to 1910 England, Germany, and USA, and hand them complete plans for a KGV class battleship, a Bismarck class battleship, and a South Dakota class battleship. How CLOSE would these nations be able to recreate these future ships in 1910? Let's forget cost and politics, this is a technical capability question.
47:28 I would give that distinction to HMS Conqueror torpedoing General Belgrano in 1982. That action caused the entire Argentine fleet to retire and remain in port for the duration of the war. And it was with cheap torpedoes that did not need replacing.
@@20chocsaday No. As evidenced by the US only joining the war nearly two years later. It certainly shifted public opinion against Germany and was a very useful propaganda tool to get the American public on the Allied side and motivate them when they joined the war, but it didn't cause the US entry. US entry into WWI was caused by the Zimmerman Telegram combined with the Germans reintroducing unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917.
I don't think so. The Lusitania sinking was in 1915, the US didn't enter the war until 1917. While it was a contributing factor, there were other causes as well.
@@20chocsaday No, it didn't. The sinking of Lusitania was a "legal act". She was a British ship sunk in British (Irish !) waters to begin with. However, US protests forced Germany to abandon unrestricted U-boat warfare until 1917.
From a cost-effective point of view, probably yes. But for total kills, I'd put my money on I-19. I'm still curious to why Belgrano was such a big threat to the British fleet. She had no anti shipping missiles and her old machinery didn't allow for more than 20 knots. How well would that have worked out against relatively modern British DDs ?
00:00:35 - What is the actual relationship between a captain and an admiral on his ship? To make this one a lot simpler: it depends on the admiral. If the Admiral wishes to command the ship he is on for whatever reason, he can. If a captain overrides an admiral's orders or commands, the captain's ability to do so is dependent on the charisma of the captain and the timidity of the admiral. Where things get murky is the fact that this is about two human beings asserting legal and actual power over one another, so what the rules say and what the conditions demand are very different concerns. This is what Drach's answer is mostly addressing, the many different ways in which a captain and admiral can work around, with, or against each other depending on those conditions. 00:05:36 - Where is/was the line for gross insubordination drawn, and how loose were the boundaries on it? Again, depends on the conditions. The Rules are simple: refuse an order and get punished for it. The question is if someone is actually refusing an order or adapting to the situation in a manner consistent with the values of the military in question. German military tradition, for example, was inclined towards a subordinate that refused orders to attack was much more likely to be punished for insubordination than a subordinate that declined one order to attack in favor of attacking somewhere else. The expectation of the German tradition was to attack somewhere, so failure to attack was generally punished more.
generally, a case of "looking with the blind eye & claiming I don't see any flags" when it came to commands for retreat was treated as a good thing in most navies... I only heard about one navy where the opposite was the case, and that was the Chinese Imperial Navy *(which was never particularly a big naval power)
47:28 If you use "torpedo" in its original form, as referring to naval mines, then those put in place in the Dardanelles by the Ottoman minelayer "Nusret" had a massive effect: not only did they sink two battleships, but they led to the Gallipoli land campaign... and all that happened thereafter.
They basically hung Kimmel and Short out to dry while MacArthur got off freely. To me, it's completely backwards. Kimmel and Short couldn't do anything that could start a war or show signs of aggression. When the Philippines got hit, Pearl Harbor had been hit. Nothing was done to prevent the attack. MacArthur got pulled out of the Philippines when they were considered lost.
MacArthur was a Egomaniac in pure form I have no love for him he flew his personal luggage out on the few airworthiness B17s while leaving the Air Corps crews behind when they should have been Evacuated.
@@Archie2c you are right there. It was because of him that we took the Philippines back. Nimitz wanted to bypass them. I think Nimitz was right, however, they couldn't have cut off the Philippines like other islands. First off, the Philippines was a collection of islands. Secondly, they were large in size. Other islands were specks on the map. Philippines shows up like Japan. Third, to starve the Japanese on the Philippines would be to starve the natives. Forth, due to the size of the Philippines, it would be impossible to completely isolate them. Fifth, we did have help from the population of the Philippines and to cut them off would have really hurt our relationship with them. To me, Halsey was like him. Patton was another one. Admiral Lee and Spruance were smart. They knew what fights to pick and they won them.
@@michaelpiatkowskijr1045 because they were unnecessary and should have been left to die off like most of the Central Pacific if not deliberately cut off from resupply just sink any troop ships leaving ask the Anzacs who were constantly unappreciated by that ass hat.
@@lovablesnowman If the powers that be believe that the details are not for public, historical scrutiny then there's not much we can do about it; even under public disclosure legislation.
@@NickPenlee yeah but why would they do that? They've released other incredibly embarrassing stuff before. Pretty much everything regarding our early nuclear weapons programme is an absolutely terrifying read. We irradiated our own soldiers to test how radiation works. My point is we've released worse stuff before. And by not releasing the HMS Glorious files they're just adding more fuel to the conspiratorial fire
@@lovablesnowman Yes, it all adds fuel to a conspiracy theory argument; of course it does. But ask yourself why they even placed such a lengthy disclosure period in the first place. Something warranted it and that something will still initiate heavy redacting in 2041 I imagine.
@@lovablesnowman yes but it isn't ACTUALLY 100 years yet. That does make a difference under UK archival document release rules, especially for really sensitive stuff and for personal data like service records.
The 100 year secrecy stuff with Glorious leads me to suspect that people in high places in London are involved with orders that caused the situation (such as the Admiralty or PM) I'm pretty sure if the blame could be placed on a lowly Captain it'd be public by now.
Let’s see…who do we know in the British government at the time with a history of interfering with military operations who also had the authority to impose a 100 year ban on releasing information?
Huff-Duff. There was a more technical reason for the success of Huff-Duff. Radio triangulation was common even into the 20's, but the known method was to turn a loop antenna until there was a null. This took a skilled operator, and the transmission had to be long enough to do the turning. The Germans figured this would take longer than 10-15 seconds, so they kept their messages short to counter this. I understand why this was why the contact and weather reports were so condensed. What Huff-Duff did (heavily simplified) was use two crossed loops, and use the different amplitudes to instantly plot a line on a "radar" screen. Thus, a bearing could be determined in less than a second.
Adding a dipole to a loop antenna eliminates the question of which of two possible directions the signal came from too by looking at the phase of the dipole compared to the loop antenna signal.
@@allangibson2408 I don't know if they removed the ambiguity or not--in many cases, you don't need it. If you have two contacts, there is only one intersection point. My experience is in sound. In sonobuoys, used for submarine detection, the basic sensor is often based in the DIFAR hydrophone, This is a crossed dipole for the sin and cos channels, and an omni for the phase reference. These are made for use in air, as well, but often don't perform well in open spaces because of wind noise.
Bravo for you work of unmatched brilliance, clarity and visual elegance. You left something out about Admiral Farragut. This might be pertinent in terms of England’s naval defeat of France and Europe by extension, and World War submarine campaigns versus opposition ship building capacity. That is, backup construction potential. Farragut flung whatever squadron he had at hand because Federal shipyards could replace his losses much faster than Rebs could compensate for their ship and fort losses. Like Hitler, Hirohito and the USA Pro-fa today, the slaver rebellion relied on massive, pre-arranged sucker punches to KO its adversaries before their backup construction potential could restore order. Bullies with glass jaws otherwise. What do you think?
The US did its 5 star rank promotions very carefully to make sure that one officer, like Marshall, would be able to command a subordinates, such as McArthur and Eisenhower. Literally 1-2 days between each promotion. And it had to promote Bradley to 5 star rank so he could be Chief of Staff while McArthur was still on active duty.
I doubt that the Japanese had an ocean going tug capable of towing the Hornet anyway and they certainly weren’t going to risk one of their capital warships in such a foolish maneuver.
@@tomdolan9761 one of the other reasons they didn’t pursue TF16 after Santa Cruz was their own fleet had taken damage. There were PBYs flying about and they were running low on fuel. Now add all those factors plus a battered non functioning fleet carrier being towed. That makes their fleet a big target. Especially if with their own carriers being further away and missing most of their squadrons.
@@tomdolan9761 I believe a heavy cruiser was big enough to tow a carrier, and had a few times in WW2. The damage level of the towed carrier would make a difference.
Lee at Leyte Gulf: Gets especially tricky when Halsey is on one of his two fastest battleships. Plus, since TF 34 had never been established, Lee wasn't directing anything. His ships were all parts of other Task Groups and so under the orders of other admirals.
The Japanese modification to the Type 91 aerial torpedo used at Pearl Harbor was not perfect. Of the 35 torpedoes dropped, 19 were hits (15 on 4 BBs, 2 on Utah, one each on two CAs), one clean miss ran up on Ford Island and the rest hit the bottom. These have been recovered over the years since. No remains of Type 93s (midget submarine) were ever recovered from inside the harbor. Reference: Zimm, Alan. Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths and Deceptions. Casemate Publishers, 2011.
An example of the USN using a warship for transportation, was the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis, which brought the plutonium core of the Nagasaki bomb, "Fat Man", to Tinian.
If you read the report of the US Naval technical mission to Japan it suggests that the reason for adding the small winglets (and their wooden extensions) in 1940/41 was to increase warhead size, not for better shallow water operations. In the original version of the Type 91, roll control was handled by the torpedo having a centre of gravity below the geometric centre. This meant that the warhead compartment was only partially filled. By adding the small winglets (the report refers to them as flippers) gyro stabilised to handle roll control; in the Type 91 Mod 2 this allowed the warhead to be increased from 330lb to 450lb. No mention is made of these modifications having anything to do with shallow water operations. In fact it says that the wooden frames on the flippers were used on all air launched torpedoes from 1941 onwards. It does mention that having these flippers (and their wooden extension for air travel) helps control directional stability after water entry, but there is no mention of them improving depth control. (Reports of the US naval technical mission to Japan 1946 - Section 0 - 01-2 - Aircraft Torpedoes - Page 25 - Section O. )
The very first question, about the relationship between an admiral and captain on his own ship; there is also the very rare relationship that existed between two admirals and a captain on a single ship. During the Battle Off Samar (Oct. 25, 1944) Admiral Kurita Takeo; who was the Commander of Second Fleet (Hereafter referred to as Center Force) had been forced to transfer to the Yamato when his flagship Atago had been torpedoed and sunk on night of October 23, making the Yamato the new flagship of Center Force. However, the Yamato was already the flagship of Battleship Division 1, which was commanded by Admiral Ugaki Matome, who previously had been Chief of Staff to the late Admiral Yamamoto. The acting Captain of the Yamato was Rear Admiral Morishita Nobue. So I'm wrong, this was a triumvirate of admirals on a single ship. Actually, I have to take that back, Admiral Kurita's Chief of Staff was Rear Admiral Koyanagi Tomiji. What is that, a quadumvirate of admirals on a single warship? At some point fairly early in the Battle Off Samar, Admiral Ugaki made a comment that apparently irked Admiral Kurita. I'd have to look it up to find the exact quote, but it wasn't critical of Admiral Kurita; or at least it wasn't openly critical, though perhaps in Japanese there was some implied criticism. The comment was about the battle itself, what Ugaki thought was happening or a guess about what the Americans were doing, but whatever it was Admiral Kurita replied by telling Ugaki "Take command of Battleship Division 1." In other words, "You give orders to the Yamato and Nagato; like "open fire" or "Nagato follow me," but let the me handle the important stuff." There was also some misunderstanding by Admiral Ugaki about why Admiral Kurita gave certain orders, which can be found in Ugaki's diary. He stated, "Though it's (Kurita's) reasoning was unknown, the fleet order called for battleship divisions and cruiser divisions to attack and the destroyer squadron to follow. The Fleet's (Kurita's) attacking directions were conflicting and I feared the spirit of an all-out attack at short range was lacking." (Kurita wanted his destroyers to conserve fuel to reach Leyte Gulf and be able to return back to their base; he didn't believe in suicide missions, and apparently Kurita was confident his battleships and cruisers guns would suffice for the task at hand. Also, Kurita didn't feel like explaining his decisions.) Also, according to either H.P. WIlmott's book "The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action" or Evan Thomas' book, "Sea of Thunder," Admiral Ugaki could be heard muttering to himself, "We are going the wrong way. The enemy is in the other direction," after Admiral Kurita had given his order to withdraw and was heading North to meet a non-existent American taskforce Kurita thought was there. So, there was some real tension between the two men. Admiral's Morishita and Koyanogi managed to stay out of this mess. Morishita concentrated on maneuvering his ship and giving other orders directly related to the Yamato itself while Admiral Koyanagi did things like convey messages from the radio room to Kurita and back.
Another very informative video. I found your explanation of the strategic subtleties of the Channel Fleet in WWI really interesting. Loved the Warhammer reference!
I think if the Japanese had captured the Hornet, they would have no shipyard capacity to refurbish her. In other words, refurbishing the Hornet would have delayed a Japanese carrier.
That’s assuming they can get her out of the battle area. Hornet had no power so the IJN would be stuck towing her until their own engineers figure out how to restore it .There were PBYs lurking around and all it would take is for one to spot the fleet, figure out what’s going on and radio Noumea. Before Halsey orders Kincaid and Murray to find Hornet and either retrieve her or force the IJN to scuttle her.
Involving the USS Hornet, the Japanese Navy did capture an American warship and repair it. The destroyer USS Stewart (DD-224). She was damaged by gunfire and placed in the drydock in Java. The base was under attack and could be captured by ground forces. The ship was deemed to damaged to sail so they tried to damage it as useless to the Japanese. The Japanese raised it and rebuilt it. Granted, this is a 1920 destroyer and not a 1940 aircraft carrier.
I agree with the wooden fin attachment being for air stability. It is sound aerodynamics for the air, not hydrodynamic for the water. That is to say, like a throne dart. The warhead is much heavier and wants to pitch down in the airstream. The fins add much needed drag to provide a counter force and keep the front from dipping too low and preventing the torpedo on contact with the water from plunging downwards.
You can’t think of it as “adding drag to keep the nose up” but rather as centre of pressure vs centre of gravity. I don’t think the fins on these torpedoes are going to be enough to affect angle of attack in air, so it’s always going to follow a parabolic arc into the water
Regarding captains and admirals, I have always felt that this relationship was particularly prone to turning sour in the Kriegsmarine. Obviously, the issue with Lütjens and Lindemann is well known. Furthermore, there were issues between Lütjens and Scharnhorst's captain, Hoffmann, during Operation Berlin, when Hoffmann approached one of the escort battleships relatively closely in an attempt to draw it off and allow Gneisenau to go for the merchants. Afaik, this earned him a sharp rebuke from Lütjens. Then there were some tensions between Ciliax and Tirpitz' captain, Topp, during Victorious' torpedo attack in March 1942, when Ciliax tried to interfere with Tirpitz' evasive maneuvers and Topp told him that this was none of his business. Ciliax was apparently ashamed of his behaviour, since he made a big show of awarding Topp the Iron Cross on Tirpitz' bridge immediately after the attack.
If I had to make a guess, being micromanaged by a "superior officer" aboard your own ship because he literally had nothing better to do and no other captains to bother was slowly driving them mad.
I'd say that had more to do with German military culture, where aggression and independence of commanders were integral concepts for both soldiers and sailors alike. More so than other fleets, the Germans really didn't need admirals for anything involving less than a half-dozen ships, but a lack of ship numbers resulted in the presence of admirals "by tradition," so they ended up being in the way.
very interesting! thank you! do you happen to have a source that describes the interactions between Lutjens and Lindemann? I would like to read up on the matter
@@0Fingolfin0I have read that, after Bismarck’s steering was disabled, Lutjens addressed the crew in a decidedly discouraging manner, basically saying “we are doomed but will not die easily.” After that, Lindemann gave his own address and it was pointedly less defeatist.
So 2 observations.. "Wiggle Room" in orders.. Don't know what the Brit version is but in America.. " Better to beg for forgiveness, than ask for permission.." Secondly RE HuffDuff .. The obvious answer would be for the Kreigsmarine would be to record the transmission to disc AKA a wax record.. then play it at high speed... Essentially a primitive version of a "Squirt" transmission.. Too fast for Huffduff to triangulate
Drach should have pointed out that HF/DF was much faster than regular RDF - it could establish a line of bearing in a second or two, so two ships with it could pinpoint a location nearby pretty quickly. "Squirt" messages could not carry much data in that time, whereas U-boat command needed lots of data from their boats - location, weather, sightings, supply status, etc. That was all necessary because of their wolfpack doctrines and tactics. US boats operated more autonomously.
@@gregorywright4918 German U-Boats operated under very strict central command and control. Having them report their location daily was probably a mistake…
You can also use a variant of the HF/DF idea to ID an electronic transmission like a long range air defense radar. Ukraine could have used a line of bearing on Russian cruiser Moskva based on unique radar and launch Neptune missile down the line. Not precise but possible.
One of the things that hampered the US recognition of the function of the modifications to the 'ailerons' on the air-dropped torpedoes was the assumption that Japanese production was inherently inferior. All torpedoes need some mechanism to keep them 'upright' in the water so that the controls at the tail worked properly, and the US used a passive solution -- they tipped the warhead compartment at an angle when pouring the explosive for the warhead, which put more of the weight of the explosive charge on the 'bottom' of the torpedo, so that it would roll upright just from the weight distribution. Since the US did it that way, that was clearly the best way to do it, so the wooden fins at the back had to be the modification that the Japanese had made to keep the torpedoes from diving too deep, and they didn't look any deeper for a more correct explanation.
A good example of how seniority in rank determines command is shown in the Movie Zulu. At 28 minutes they determine who's in charge by date of commission.
49:03 - @Drachinifel : "There is precious little you can point to that managed to accomplish anything on that scale" *** IJN MOGAMI HAS ENTERED THE CHAT ***
Lee’s force was integrated into the carrier formations in Halsey’s Third Fleet and Halsey’s flagship was New Jersey which presumably would have been one of Lee’s fast battleships. Furthermore Lee had voiced concern about the fast battleships not having operated as a separate formation particularly at night. He wasn’t about to disobey specific orders from Halsey given the operational situation
Did a bit of reading into Halsey. When he was made 3rd fleet commander. He was mulling the idea of using a carrier (so either one of the Essexes or back to Enterprise). But apparently due to issues in the Marianas including fleet operations “too stiff” and fighter direction “too disorganised.” Resulting in a push by his staffers for Halsey to have more tactical command of the fleet. That means more staff and more room required. Hence New Jersey was chosen as his flagship.
It made sense to move a fleet flag staff to an underutilized flag space where it wouldn’t interfere with carrier operations plus I imagine given the tempo of carrier operations various task force elements needed to be detached to be rearmed much more frequently than battleships. The fleet could refuel routinely by that late in the war but rearming underway was still very much experimental.
@@tomdolan9761 Halsey also mentioned in his memoirs that it was also because a battleship can take a hit far better than a carrier. Even one as well designed as an Essex. Or the damage control crew is highly experienced like on Enterprise.
@@tomdolan9761 saying that earlier in the year I asked Drach that had Halsey detached Task Force 34 would he need to change flagship. He said yes. But that it would only be onto South Dakota or Massachusetts as they would be escorting the Carriers to Cape Engano. The only reason he would use a carrier as a flagship would be if Halsey gave Lee all the battleships.
Re Hornet: The Stewart (Clemson-class DD) was blown up in drydock and captured by the Japanese and recommissioned. My dad (a career destroyer officer) commented that it wasn't worth it, except for the prestige of operating a captured US ship. The Japanese may have done the same thing with the Hornet. Clemson was only used as a patrol ship by the Japanese, and the Hornet may have had a similar semi-combatant role (plane ferry, or something).
There is a TH-cam vid (I forget who's) that explains a captured USN DD was recommissioned by the IJN and was continually reported as an American destroyer trapped behind Japanese lines. Perhaps it was the Stewart.
The Japanese had the concept of a "support/repair" carrier. Given the extensive machine shop space, with modern mills/lathes, compared to a Japanese design, she could have been used in that role. Along with the obvious propaganda victory of course.
@@nowthenzen Stewart was reported that way. She survived the war. My father said it looked weird, because she had the Clemson lines as a flush-deck DD, but they had put that distinctive Japanese bow on her during the refit, as well as trunking the forward two funnels together. She was recovered and recommissioned after the war (as just DD224, since the name had been reused), and sunk as a target in 1946
The Japanese Army operated more aircraft carriers than the Japanese Navy (and submarines). They just weren’t particularly big or fast being the equivalent of the American escort carriers. The problem the Japanese had was never the lack of aircraft carriers - it was lack of carrier aircraft and pilots.
The most famous example of supposed insubordination is arguably Nelson's 'blind eye' at Copenhagen. Supposed, because the signal to withdraw was to denote a change of orders made to cover Nelson's retreat if such proved necessary: a permission as much as an order. Nelson decided to stay put and carried on with the battle, amusing the officers who had also seen the signal by turning that blind eye to good use. He'd certainly have been censured by his senior officer if the action had subsequently gone badly, but not court-martialled.
53:16 - For fast transports for troops or other small high value cargo I'd call out the USN's ADPs. That was a situation where warships were converted to fast transports; however the WWI era Wickes and Clemson destroyers were nowhere near as large or valuable as the types of ships the question was asking about. And because of that as the Fletcher Swarm materialized the US was willing to convert some of those old destroyers to transports by reducing their armorment, removing half their boilers (and associated smokestacks and engines) and converting the volume into cargo/berthing space; resulting in still a fairly high speed (25 knot) fast transport. Primarily carrying troops for assault landings (as they also got some landing craft on davits) -- they could carry other relatively small high value cargo.
I think you mean APDs, not ADPs (AP for Assault Personnel and D for Destroyer-conversion). But these were optimized for landing troops, not cargo. They had no freight cranes and relied on the troops manhandling any supplies they needed into the landing craft. They would not do much good in the Med resupplying Malta or Crete, which needed large quantities of food, fuel, and ammo. There was another special class of high-speed transport, the pre-war high speed ocean liners, which were converted for war service by ripping out all the fancy furnishings and installing floor-to-ceiling bunks for troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops were transported this way at sustained speeds of greater than 30 kts, far faster than U-boats could track or shoot at. But again, very little cargo could be carried that the troops did not bring on and off themselves. Some of them had small fore and aft holds, but they needed dockside cranes to load and unload.
Those guys posing for a photo at around 15.30 are in a distinctly undisciplined stance. When I was in the army if you stood with your arms crossed like that you would have had a sargeant major screaming at you in no time. The correct way of standing when not at attention is to hold your hands behind your back.
Would ,Could you please provide any information about HMS Burwell please. As I had a relative serve on her I would be so grateful. Thankyou Love this channel keep up the superb work 👍
No, the faster the transport the faster it can transition the region in which a given air threat can project force. A faster convoy is in danger from a given threat for much less time, meaning it can be subjected to fewer sorties, or even be in and out of reach before aircraft can be assigned to attack it. Speed is always going to be important. If you are speaking of speed during the actual engagement, it becomes less so, but still if the cxonvoy is out close to the edge of fuel for the attackers, it might mean the difference between weathering one attack or four, in addition, speed of maneuver can do much to extend the life of a ship, look at all the heroic helmsmen dodging bombs that Drach has described in various videos. Sheer speed is as much part of dodging as helm, as is fast deceleration/acceleration at times. Nowadays, with fast jets and faster missiles this speed of ships things becomes much less of a factor, but in the era this channel deals with its very important.
You underestimate Farragut. Had he not aggressively seized New Orleans early in the war, the South actually might have won. Imagine a nautical McClellan.
How can you mention older dreadnoughts being assigned to the Channel Fleet without mentioning that HMS Dreadnought herself missed Jutland specifically because it had been reassigned to supplement the pre-dreadnoughts of the Channel Fleet?
You both went to a technology to reduce the time it took to transmit. It was called a squirt transmission. I believe they recorded the message on a wire recorder and then played it through a system that produced the morse code and transmitted at high speed.
Ref Seniority = In the US Army of today, an officer of the same rank but senior to a second can not be made to serve as a subordinate to the second without his agreement
On the subject of radiolocation and countermeasures. There seems to be an additional option: extremely short signals. Too short for the enemy to plot. The Germans developed a device code-named "KURIER" (en: Courier or Messanger). It was to be capable of transmitting a prerecorded, very short signal in less than 1 second. The receiving side would have needed a special receiving station to record the message. [My source: "Geschichte des Deutschen Uboot-Baus".]
I don't think that would work with the quantity of messages that the U-boats were sending back to HQ: position, weather, sightings, supply status, etc. Given the existing tech, it would have to operate on common frequencies at fixed times of day (in order for the other end to be ready to record it), and given the measure-countermeasure battle going on and the Allies' partnership with cutting-edge academics, a means of recording and/or triangulating would probably have been developed within months.
i kinda disagree with your take on fast transports considering they already existed in the pacific. either repurpose more older DDs like they did in the pacific campaign or simply build more ships roughly along the same lines as older DDs but with transport capability in mind from the get go, to maximize cargo/troop capacity over their converted cousins in the pacific.
A couple issues there - the attempts to resupply Crete and Malta happened in '41, before the battles in the Pacific began (and extended to the Pedestal convoys in mid-42). And the Brits did not HAVE older DDs to spare to rebuild into fast transports. The US was looking at their WW1 DDs that were being replaced by the classes built in the late '30s. Also, all the fast DD transports were optimized for transporting troops, not large quantities of supplies. The Med islands needed food, fuel, and ammo, which you need large cargo holds and large cranes or pumps to load and unload. Building more ships is not easy either, because the shipyards are already building at max pace for existing needs and you are proposing to divert a yard or two from building needed new destroyers to building an older design with more transport space. And then what happens when the fast transport need goes away?
What was the process that caused the RN to upgrade from a 12" to a 13.5" gun, instead of a 14" (other than a desire to annoy Vickers and their pushy sales force). Since the new gun could not use the ammunition from the previous version of the 13.5" they were starting with a clean slate, and a 2" increase would seem to be better than a 1.5" increase.
The Commanding officer is the ultimate authority for the safe and efficient operation of their ship. The flag does NOT have the authority to tell the CO how to operate their ship. The flag is the OTC and can direct the disposition and employment of the ships under their command.
@@Drachinifel Very true...Was speaking to US Navy doctrine...I'm sure you have read about the difference of opinion between RADM Davison and CAPT Gehres of Franklin on March 19, 1945. Davison upon leaving the Franklin to shift his flag suggested abandoning ship...
There is a reprint of an age of sail training manual called 'the young sea officers sheet anchor' which you would probably find interesting. If you need more in formation to aid you in tracking it down I can try and dig my copy out of storage. I believe it can still be purchased from a mail-order company called 'Lee Valley Tools', which is where I got it. it's fantastic, covering rigging and systems, as well as seamanship, from the period after the napoleonic wars, the pinnacle of sail as the dominant force in commerce and military transport. Great drawings.
On admirals and insubordination, various naval dramas (from _The Caine Mutiny_ to _Crimson Tide_ ) give the impression that the final, _final,_ decision is down to the XO/OOW rather than the captain himself. How accurate is this?
The VERY general situation is that the Captain concerns himself with what the ship as a whole is doing --- speed, direction, mission, etc. The XO oversees and directs how everything happens inside the ship --- rosters, departmental efficiency, the ship's physical condition.
I've heard that Crimson Tide giving the XO the final say was a little unrealistic and mostly done for plot purposes. I don't think the XO had the power to relieve the captain of his duties.
@@iexist.imnotjoking5700 For what it's worth Richard P. Henrick, the author who wrote the script for Crimson Tide said that they'd based it off a three-way argument that happened on a Russian sub during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in that case the Americans had dropped signal charges to get the submarine to surface and the Captain, the XO and the Zampolit got into a dispute over whether or not to respond with a (nuclear tipped) torpedo. Fortunately those that advocated for surfacing won the day.
@@Graham-ce2yk I know, but it's not exactly the same scenario in the movie. Not to mention that the US Navy probably has different mechanisms in place than the Soviet Navy.
Eight narrow rings and a star were the insignia of a Rear Admiral between May 1863 and January 1865, when it was changed to one broad ring, one medium-sized ring, and a star.
I have not looked at every comment, if you post on Sunday, you get Sunday drinker's comments: but 'Captain of Your Ship' was a great record, which was playing in my head for the first question; and the link shows the song & DLT speaking German badly; like he DJ'ed. th-cam.com/video/Rk6X5MSL2zM/w-d-xo.html
On Fast transports were not refrigerated ships previously carrying meat to europe being reltively fast were converted to troop transports as they were faster than the average merchant?
@@allangibson2408 there's little need to move troops like they are illegal immigrants. They had plenty of Passenger ships. There is no speed advantage in a convoy. So the idea using your refrigerated ship is a moot point. It's also a unheated, unventilated space with no head facility and in emergency, a little chance for escape...
And there is no way to get those HMS Glorious records unsealed early? I came across the Operation Paul theory while watching a documentary about the sinking. A very in-depth article the author had a relative loss on the carrier. Maybe one day the wrecks can be surveyed and shown what kind of damage they took. Cause I have read Royal Navy sonar has shown 3 "large" objects on the seabed in the area. So they know where they are.
My first thought during the bit about interpreting orders was Nelson at Copenhagen -- Admiral Parker, seeing three of his ships signaling unable to proceed or in distress, not being able to see the rest of the fleet through the gunsmoke, fearing that Nelson had been fought to a standstill and couldn't legally/honorably retreat without orders, hoisted the signal to retreat as more permission than orders, knowing that Nelson would use his best judgement. Nelson was actually kicking ass and not bothering to take names, of course, and when informed of the signal by the captain of his flagship, famously put the telescope to his blind eye and said something to the effect of "I don't see any signal." Kind of darkly amusing that the one frigate captain who saw the "retreat" signal but not Nelson's signals of "yeah, whatever, crack on, boys!" and actually retreated and was killed when his frigate left the concealment of the heavies' gunsmoke.
I remember reading though that Nelson was starting to get the worse of it at Copenhagen and ending up resorting to a threat to bombard Copenhagen to extract himself from the fighting as several ships were grounded and overall his fleet was fairly battered. Is that true?
Who runs the ship? The shipmaster is the local manager. The admiral and team on board is the strategic situational masterplaner allocating local and distant ressources. The ship is now the flagship. A shipmaster overrules an admiral in certain situations. An admiral stays out of ship management. A shipmaster will work together with other shipmasters. A admiral will work together with other admirals and generals. All are lead by the joint chiefs under political rule of Congress or Prez.
This channel is getting some seriously shameful adverts. "Drinking water before bed..." Means you will lose sleep to pee. TH-cam adverts would not be allowed on British TV now, and are verging on the criminal. So they'll be on the BBC soon.
Pinned post for Q&A :)
Question:- Why didn't the Royal Navy and US Navy jointly secretly invoke the escalator clause when it was evident that Germany was not abiding by Versailles with the Scharnhorst Class 1935, Bismark 1936 and the Japanese with the Washington and London Treaties with the Circle Three Plan in 1934?
@@fightforaglobalfirstamendm5617 because we don't play that way. You sign a treaty to abide by it. The goal of this treaty was disarmament. And the prevailing opinion was to continue in that course and thus that's why you had the US remaining neutral for most of the 1930s. Plus add in the small factor , couldn't afford it.
Why didn't the Japanese just reveal the Yamato in 39 or 40? Isn't the point of building a massive ship to scare the adversary so keeping it a secret seems to be just to be counter intuitive, wouldn't it make more sense to do what the British did to HMS Dreadnought and announce it for the world to see?
When ORP Orzel episode?
This is a "how close can we get" question.
If you go back to 1910 England, Germany, and USA, and hand them complete plans for a KGV class battleship, a Bismarck class battleship, and a South Dakota class battleship. How CLOSE would these nations be able to recreate these future ships in 1910?
Let's forget cost and politics, this is a technical capability question.
Comparing Huff Duff to Khorne the Blood God is possibly one of the weirdest analogies I've heard and I am 100% here for it. Great work as ever Drach.
47:28 I would give that distinction to HMS Conqueror torpedoing General Belgrano in 1982. That action caused the entire Argentine fleet to retire and remain in port for the duration of the war. And it was with cheap torpedoes that did not need replacing.
Did sinking Luisatania bring the USA into the war?
@@20chocsaday No. As evidenced by the US only joining the war nearly two years later.
It certainly shifted public opinion against Germany and was a very useful propaganda tool to get the American public on the Allied side and motivate them when they joined the war, but it didn't cause the US entry.
US entry into WWI was caused by the Zimmerman Telegram combined with the Germans reintroducing unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917.
I don't think so. The Lusitania sinking was in 1915, the US didn't enter the war until 1917. While it was a contributing factor, there were other causes as well.
@@20chocsaday No, it didn't. The sinking of Lusitania was a "legal act". She was a British ship sunk in British (Irish !) waters to begin with. However, US protests forced Germany to abandon unrestricted U-boat warfare until 1917.
From a cost-effective point of view, probably yes. But for total kills, I'd put my money on I-19.
I'm still curious to why Belgrano was such a big threat to the British fleet. She had no anti shipping missiles and her old machinery didn't allow for more than 20 knots. How well would that have worked out against relatively modern British DDs ?
00:00:35 - What is the actual relationship between a captain and an admiral on his ship?
To make this one a lot simpler: it depends on the admiral. If the Admiral wishes to command the ship he is on for whatever reason, he can. If a captain overrides an admiral's orders or commands, the captain's ability to do so is dependent on the charisma of the captain and the timidity of the admiral.
Where things get murky is the fact that this is about two human beings asserting legal and actual power over one another, so what the rules say and what the conditions demand are very different concerns. This is what Drach's answer is mostly addressing, the many different ways in which a captain and admiral can work around, with, or against each other depending on those conditions.
00:05:36 - Where is/was the line for gross insubordination drawn, and how loose were the boundaries on it?
Again, depends on the conditions. The Rules are simple: refuse an order and get punished for it. The question is if someone is actually refusing an order or adapting to the situation in a manner consistent with the values of the military in question. German military tradition, for example, was inclined towards a subordinate that refused orders to attack was much more likely to be punished for insubordination than a subordinate that declined one order to attack in favor of attacking somewhere else. The expectation of the German tradition was to attack somewhere, so failure to attack was generally punished more.
generally, a case of "looking with the blind eye & claiming I don't see any flags" when it came to commands for retreat was treated as a good thing in most navies... I only heard about one navy where the opposite was the case, and that was the Chinese Imperial Navy *(which was never particularly a big naval power)
@@stanislavkostarnov2157 Depends on which era you are talking about...
47:28 If you use "torpedo" in its original form, as referring to naval mines, then those put in place in the Dardanelles by the Ottoman minelayer "Nusret" had a massive effect: not only did they sink two battleships, but they led to the Gallipoli land campaign... and all that happened thereafter.
Great video as always. Hopefully I’ll bump into you at a Fight Camp down the line if I can ever bother to meander that far West again.
They basically hung Kimmel and Short out to dry while MacArthur got off freely. To me, it's completely backwards. Kimmel and Short couldn't do anything that could start a war or show signs of aggression. When the Philippines got hit, Pearl Harbor had been hit. Nothing was done to prevent the attack. MacArthur got pulled out of the Philippines when they were considered lost.
MacArthur was a Egomaniac in pure form I have no love for him he flew his personal luggage out on the few airworthiness B17s while leaving the Air Corps crews behind when they should have been Evacuated.
That narrative is false. But keeps getting repeated. You also while trying to hang one man; give Admiral Admiral Hart and General Brereton a pass.
@@Archie2c you are right there. It was because of him that we took the Philippines back. Nimitz wanted to bypass them.
I think Nimitz was right, however, they couldn't have cut off the Philippines like other islands. First off, the Philippines was a collection of islands. Secondly, they were large in size. Other islands were specks on the map. Philippines shows up like Japan. Third, to starve the Japanese on the Philippines would be to starve the natives. Forth, due to the size of the Philippines, it would be impossible to completely isolate them. Fifth, we did have help from the population of the Philippines and to cut them off would have really hurt our relationship with them.
To me, Halsey was like him. Patton was another one. Admiral Lee and Spruance were smart. They knew what fights to pick and they won them.
@@michaelpiatkowskijr1045 because they were unnecessary and should have been left to die off like most of the Central Pacific if not deliberately cut off from resupply just sink any troop ships leaving ask the Anzacs who were constantly unappreciated by that ass hat.
And with a war warning he deliberately failed to activate existing War Plan Orange
You'll find that the info release on HMS Glorious will be heavily redacted!
It'll be deemed too sensitive for full disclosure!
It's been nearly 100 years ffs.....
Let us see the records. It can't possibly be worse than the rumours that are flying about anyway
@@lovablesnowman
If the powers that be believe that the details are not for public, historical scrutiny then there's not much we can do about it; even under public disclosure legislation.
@@NickPenlee yeah but why would they do that? They've released other incredibly embarrassing stuff before. Pretty much everything regarding our early nuclear weapons programme is an absolutely terrifying read. We irradiated our own soldiers to test how radiation works.
My point is we've released worse stuff before. And by not releasing the HMS Glorious files they're just adding more fuel to the conspiratorial fire
@@lovablesnowman
Yes, it all adds fuel to a conspiracy theory argument; of course it does.
But ask yourself why they even placed such a lengthy disclosure period in the first place. Something warranted it and that something will still initiate heavy redacting in 2041 I imagine.
@@lovablesnowman yes but it isn't ACTUALLY 100 years yet. That does make a difference under UK archival document release rules, especially for really sensitive stuff and for personal data like service records.
The 100 year secrecy stuff with Glorious leads me to suspect that people in high places in London are involved with orders that caused the situation (such as the Admiralty or PM) I'm pretty sure if the blame could be placed on a lowly Captain it'd be public by now.
Let’s see…who do we know in the British government at the time with a history of interfering with military operations who also had the authority to impose a 100 year ban on releasing information?
Huff-Duff. There was a more technical reason for the success of Huff-Duff. Radio triangulation was common even into the 20's, but the known method was to turn a loop antenna until there was a null. This took a skilled operator, and the transmission had to be long enough to do the turning. The Germans figured this would take longer than 10-15 seconds, so they kept their messages short to counter this. I understand why this was why the contact and weather reports were so condensed. What Huff-Duff did (heavily simplified) was use two crossed loops, and use the different amplitudes to instantly plot a line on a "radar" screen. Thus, a bearing could be determined in less than a second.
Adding a dipole to a loop antenna eliminates the question of which of two possible directions the signal came from too by looking at the phase of the dipole compared to the loop antenna signal.
@@allangibson2408 I don't know if they removed the ambiguity or not--in many cases, you don't need it. If you have two contacts, there is only one intersection point.
My experience is in sound. In sonobuoys, used for submarine detection, the basic sensor is often based in the DIFAR hydrophone, This is a crossed dipole for the sin and cos channels, and an omni for the phase reference. These are made for use in air, as well, but often don't perform well in open spaces because of wind noise.
Bravo for you work of unmatched brilliance, clarity and visual elegance. You left something out about Admiral Farragut. This might be pertinent in terms of England’s naval defeat of France and Europe by extension, and World War submarine campaigns versus opposition ship building capacity. That is, backup construction potential.
Farragut flung whatever squadron he had at hand because Federal shipyards could replace his losses much faster than Rebs could compensate for their ship and fort losses. Like Hitler, Hirohito and the USA Pro-fa today, the slaver rebellion relied on massive, pre-arranged sucker punches to KO its adversaries before their backup construction potential could restore order. Bullies with glass jaws otherwise. What do you think?
The US did its 5 star rank promotions very carefully to make sure that one officer, like Marshall, would be able to command a subordinates, such as McArthur and Eisenhower. Literally 1-2 days between each promotion. And it had to promote Bradley to 5 star rank so he could be Chief of Staff while McArthur was still on active duty.
Loved the Khorne reference Drach, hope you are on the side of the god-emperor.🤣
With the way he disrespects anybody in superior office? He's 100% heretic.
@@giupiete6536 Is anyone in 40K not a heretic? It's like the RPG everyone was a Commie/Mutant/Traitor, your job was to put suspicion on everyone else.
This just struck me, should it be "Castle Drach" or "Forcastle Drach"??
I think you need an "E", as in "ForEcastle"...
On the other side of the coin. If Hornet was captured by the IJN after Santa Cruz. A lot of heads would roll.
*"wait a minute how this happened we are smarter than this!"*
Looks sidelong at the incompetent torpedo designers in the boa, no Idea why we couldn't manage to torpedo a carrier.
IJN Hornet: evil laugh.
I doubt that the Japanese had an ocean going tug capable of towing the Hornet anyway and they certainly weren’t going to risk one of their capital warships in such a foolish maneuver.
@@tomdolan9761 one of the other reasons they didn’t pursue TF16 after Santa Cruz was their own fleet had taken damage. There were PBYs flying about and they were running low on fuel. Now add all those factors plus a battered non functioning fleet carrier being towed. That makes their fleet a big target. Especially if with their own carriers being further away and missing most of their squadrons.
@@tomdolan9761 I believe a heavy cruiser was big enough to tow a carrier, and had a few times in WW2. The damage level of the towed carrier would make a difference.
Lee at Leyte Gulf: Gets especially tricky when Halsey is on one of his two fastest battleships. Plus, since TF 34 had never been established, Lee wasn't directing anything. His ships were all parts of other Task Groups and so under the orders of other admirals.
The Japanese modification to the Type 91 aerial torpedo used at Pearl Harbor was not perfect. Of the 35 torpedoes dropped, 19 were hits (15 on 4 BBs, 2 on Utah, one each on two CAs), one clean miss ran up on Ford Island and the rest hit the bottom. These have been recovered over the years since. No remains of Type 93s (midget submarine) were ever recovered from inside the harbor. Reference: Zimm, Alan. Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths and Deceptions. Casemate Publishers, 2011.
An example of the USN using a warship for transportation, was the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis, which brought the plutonium core of the Nagasaki bomb, "Fat Man", to Tinian.
If you read the report of the US Naval technical mission to Japan it suggests that the reason for adding the small winglets (and their wooden extensions) in 1940/41 was to increase warhead size, not for better shallow water operations. In the original version of the Type 91, roll control was handled by the torpedo having a centre of gravity below the geometric centre. This meant that the warhead compartment was only partially filled. By adding the small winglets (the report refers to them as flippers) gyro stabilised to handle roll control; in the Type 91 Mod 2 this allowed the warhead to be increased from 330lb to 450lb. No mention is made of these modifications having anything to do with shallow water operations. In fact it says that the wooden frames on the flippers were used on all air launched torpedoes from 1941 onwards. It does mention that having these flippers (and their wooden extension for air travel) helps control directional stability after water entry, but there is no mention of them improving depth control. (Reports of the US naval technical mission to Japan 1946 - Section 0 - 01-2 - Aircraft Torpedoes - Page 25 - Section O. )
Okay, "Khorne the Blood God of Electronic Warfare" was not something I'd been expecting :D.
For your wet Saturday morning listening pleasure.
Thanks Drach.
The very first question, about the relationship between an admiral and captain on his own ship; there is also the very rare relationship that existed between two admirals and a captain on a single ship. During the Battle Off Samar (Oct. 25, 1944) Admiral Kurita Takeo; who was the Commander of Second Fleet (Hereafter referred to as Center Force) had been forced to transfer to the Yamato when his flagship Atago had been torpedoed and sunk on night of October 23, making the Yamato the new flagship of Center Force. However, the Yamato was already the flagship of Battleship Division 1, which was commanded by Admiral Ugaki Matome, who previously had been Chief of Staff to the late Admiral Yamamoto. The acting Captain of the Yamato was Rear Admiral Morishita Nobue. So I'm wrong, this was a triumvirate of admirals on a single ship. Actually, I have to take that back, Admiral Kurita's Chief of Staff was Rear Admiral Koyanagi Tomiji. What is that, a quadumvirate of admirals on a single warship?
At some point fairly early in the Battle Off Samar, Admiral Ugaki made a comment that apparently irked Admiral Kurita. I'd have to look it up to find the exact quote, but it wasn't critical of Admiral Kurita; or at least it wasn't openly critical, though perhaps in Japanese there was some implied criticism. The comment was about the battle itself, what Ugaki thought was happening or a guess about what the Americans were doing, but whatever it was Admiral Kurita replied by telling Ugaki "Take command of Battleship Division 1." In other words, "You give orders to the Yamato and Nagato; like "open fire" or "Nagato follow me," but let the me handle the important stuff."
There was also some misunderstanding by Admiral Ugaki about why Admiral Kurita gave certain orders, which can be found in Ugaki's diary. He stated, "Though it's (Kurita's) reasoning was unknown, the fleet order called for battleship divisions and cruiser divisions to attack and the destroyer squadron to follow. The Fleet's (Kurita's) attacking directions were conflicting and I feared the spirit of an all-out attack at short range was lacking." (Kurita wanted his destroyers to conserve fuel to reach Leyte Gulf and be able to return back to their base; he didn't believe in suicide missions, and apparently Kurita was confident his battleships and cruisers guns would suffice for the task at hand. Also, Kurita didn't feel like explaining his decisions.) Also, according to either H.P. WIlmott's book "The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action" or Evan Thomas' book, "Sea of Thunder," Admiral Ugaki could be heard muttering to himself, "We are going the wrong way. The enemy is in the other direction," after Admiral Kurita had given his order to withdraw and was heading North to meet a non-existent American taskforce Kurita thought was there. So, there was some real tension between the two men.
Admiral's Morishita and Koyanogi managed to stay out of this mess. Morishita concentrated on maneuvering his ship and giving other orders directly related to the Yamato itself while Admiral Koyanagi did things like convey messages from the radio room to Kurita and back.
Wow, what a messy situation, thank you for the information!
Can you please talk about the Spanish civil War navy and submarines
Another very informative video. I found your explanation of the strategic subtleties of the Channel Fleet in WWI really interesting. Loved the Warhammer reference!
Lexington Vs Kaga Carrier 8inch Slapfest love it
Ah, yes. Sunday morning !! Drach- check. Coffee- check. Seat at modeling station & 1:700 USS TEXAS replica I'm workin' on- check. Dose of Suboxone- check. Bliss- check.
🚬😎
Perfection.
Is it too cheeky to point out that HF/DF cares very much from whence the transmissions flowed as that was entirely the point?
I think if the Japanese had captured the Hornet, they would have no shipyard capacity to refurbish her. In other words, refurbishing the Hornet would have delayed a Japanese carrier.
That’s assuming they can get her out of the battle area. Hornet had no power so the IJN would be stuck towing her until their own engineers figure out how to restore it .There were PBYs lurking around and all it would take is for one to spot the fleet, figure out what’s going on and radio Noumea. Before Halsey orders Kincaid and Murray to find Hornet and either retrieve her or force the IJN to scuttle her.
Involving the USS Hornet, the Japanese Navy did capture an American warship and repair it. The destroyer USS Stewart (DD-224). She was damaged by gunfire and placed in the drydock in Java. The base was under attack and could be captured by ground forces. The ship was deemed to damaged to sail so they tried to damage it as useless to the Japanese. The Japanese raised it and rebuilt it. Granted, this is a 1920 destroyer and not a 1940 aircraft carrier.
USS Wake?
I agree with the wooden fin attachment being for air stability. It is sound aerodynamics for the air, not hydrodynamic for the water. That is to say, like a throne dart. The warhead is much heavier and wants to pitch down in the airstream. The fins add much needed drag to provide a counter force and keep the front from dipping too low and preventing the torpedo on contact with the water from plunging downwards.
You can’t think of it as “adding drag to keep the nose up” but rather as centre of pressure vs centre of gravity. I don’t think the fins on these torpedoes are going to be enough to affect angle of attack in air, so it’s always going to follow a parabolic arc into the water
Looks like the time stamp @ 53:16 should be 52:16, Drach :)
Another example is John Wayne’s character, Rock, interpretation of orders at beginning of ‘In Harm’s Way.
I loved the movie, but my wife laughs at the women's hairstyles and party music...
Regarding captains and admirals, I have always felt that this relationship was particularly prone to turning sour in the Kriegsmarine.
Obviously, the issue with Lütjens and Lindemann is well known. Furthermore, there were issues between Lütjens and Scharnhorst's captain, Hoffmann, during Operation Berlin, when Hoffmann approached one of the escort battleships relatively closely in an attempt to draw it off and allow Gneisenau to go for the merchants. Afaik, this earned him a sharp rebuke from Lütjens.
Then there were some tensions between Ciliax and Tirpitz' captain, Topp, during Victorious' torpedo attack in March 1942, when Ciliax tried to interfere with Tirpitz' evasive maneuvers and Topp told him that this was none of his business. Ciliax was apparently ashamed of his behaviour, since he made a big show of awarding Topp the Iron Cross on Tirpitz' bridge immediately after the attack.
If I had to make a guess, being micromanaged by a "superior officer" aboard your own ship because he literally had nothing better to do and no other captains to bother was slowly driving them mad.
I'd say that had more to do with German military culture, where aggression and independence of commanders were integral concepts for both soldiers and sailors alike. More so than other fleets, the Germans really didn't need admirals for anything involving less than a half-dozen ships, but a lack of ship numbers resulted in the presence of admirals "by tradition," so they ended up being in the way.
very interesting! thank you! do you happen to have a source that describes the interactions between Lutjens and Lindemann? I would like to read up on the matter
@@0Fingolfin0I have read that, after Bismarck’s steering was disabled, Lutjens addressed the crew in a decidedly discouraging manner, basically saying “we are doomed but will not die easily.”
After that, Lindemann gave his own address and it was pointedly less defeatist.
@@dougjb7848 thank you!
I would think the downwards venting stacks would either require a forced air assist, or be quite a lot less efficient than vertical stacks.
Yes to the forced air, and also they experimented with water injection (unsuccessfully).
So 2 observations.. "Wiggle Room" in orders.. Don't know what the Brit version is but in America.. " Better to beg for forgiveness, than ask for permission.."
Secondly RE HuffDuff .. The obvious answer would be for the Kreigsmarine would be to record the transmission to disc AKA a wax record.. then play it at high speed... Essentially a primitive version of a "Squirt" transmission.. Too fast for Huffduff to triangulate
Its hard to get the message at normal speed with morse due to atmospheric distortion, a minor glitch and the whole message is toast.
They did do that, though they recorded onto wire not wax.
And then the British developed high speed HFDF… (with crossed loop antenna and/or four dipole antennas).
Drach should have pointed out that HF/DF was much faster than regular RDF - it could establish a line of bearing in a second or two, so two ships with it could pinpoint a location nearby pretty quickly. "Squirt" messages could not carry much data in that time, whereas U-boat command needed lots of data from their boats - location, weather, sightings, supply status, etc. That was all necessary because of their wolfpack doctrines and tactics. US boats operated more autonomously.
@@gregorywright4918 German U-Boats operated under very strict central command and control. Having them report their location daily was probably a mistake…
You can also use a variant of the HF/DF idea to ID an electronic transmission like a long range air defense radar. Ukraine could have used a line of bearing on Russian cruiser Moskva based on unique radar and launch Neptune missile down the line. Not precise but possible.
Bismarck movie shows Admiral Lutjens vs Captain Lindemann
Remember, that was a war movie produced by the Brits shortly after WW2...
Perhaps an extra day in Mobile would have allowed you a visit to Fort Morgan and the US Naval Aviation Museum.
i am CHUFFED, to the MAX (love you Brits, but i''m a Yank) to learn the true purpose of the wooden fins on Japanese torpedoes !:-)
💜🙏⚡️
One of the things that hampered the US recognition of the function of the modifications to the 'ailerons' on the air-dropped torpedoes was the assumption that Japanese production was inherently inferior. All torpedoes need some mechanism to keep them 'upright' in the water so that the controls at the tail worked properly, and the US used a passive solution -- they tipped the warhead compartment at an angle when pouring the explosive for the warhead, which put more of the weight of the explosive charge on the 'bottom' of the torpedo, so that it would roll upright just from the weight distribution. Since the US did it that way, that was clearly the best way to do it, so the wooden fins at the back had to be the modification that the Japanese had made to keep the torpedoes from diving too deep, and they didn't look any deeper for a more correct explanation.
@@seanmalloy7249 So the "extra drag on entering the water and breaking off" argument doesn't hold water?
A good example of how seniority in rank determines command is shown in the Movie Zulu. At 28 minutes they determine who's in charge by date of commission.
49:03 - @Drachinifel : "There is precious little you can point to that managed to accomplish anything on that scale"
*** IJN MOGAMI HAS ENTERED THE CHAT ***
The Japanese might have done well to copy American AA
There is a universal symptom called "Not Invented Here". The US suffered from it too...
Lee’s force was integrated into the carrier formations in Halsey’s Third Fleet and Halsey’s flagship was New Jersey which presumably would have been one of Lee’s fast battleships. Furthermore Lee had voiced concern about the fast battleships not having operated as a separate formation particularly at night. He wasn’t about to disobey specific orders from Halsey given the operational situation
Your conclusions were all wrong - Halsey acted stupidly
Did a bit of reading into Halsey. When he was made 3rd fleet commander. He was mulling the idea of using a carrier (so either one of the Essexes or back to Enterprise). But apparently due to issues in the Marianas including fleet operations “too stiff” and fighter direction “too disorganised.” Resulting in a push by his staffers for Halsey to have more tactical command of the fleet. That means more staff and more room required. Hence New Jersey was chosen as his flagship.
It made sense to move a fleet flag staff to an underutilized flag space where it wouldn’t interfere with carrier operations plus I imagine given the tempo of carrier operations various task force elements needed to be detached to be rearmed much more frequently than battleships. The fleet could refuel routinely by that late in the war but rearming underway was still very much experimental.
@@tomdolan9761 Halsey also mentioned in his memoirs that it was also because a battleship can take a hit far better than a carrier. Even one as well designed as an Essex. Or the damage control crew is highly experienced like on Enterprise.
@@tomdolan9761 saying that earlier in the year I asked Drach that had Halsey detached Task Force 34 would he need to change flagship. He said yes. But that it would only be onto South Dakota or Massachusetts as they would be escorting the Carriers to Cape Engano. The only reason he would use a carrier as a flagship would be if Halsey gave Lee all the battleships.
Re Hornet: The Stewart (Clemson-class DD) was blown up in drydock and captured by the Japanese and recommissioned. My dad (a career destroyer officer) commented that it wasn't worth it, except for the prestige of operating a captured US ship. The Japanese may have done the same thing with the Hornet. Clemson was only used as a patrol ship by the Japanese, and the Hornet may have had a similar semi-combatant role (plane ferry, or something).
There is a TH-cam vid (I forget who's) that explains a captured USN DD was recommissioned by the IJN and was continually reported as an American destroyer trapped behind Japanese lines. Perhaps it was the Stewart.
The Japanese had the concept of a "support/repair" carrier. Given the extensive machine shop space, with modern mills/lathes, compared to a Japanese design, she could have been used in that role. Along with the obvious propaganda victory of course.
@@nowthenzen Stewart was reported that way. She survived the war. My father said it looked weird, because she had the Clemson lines as a flush-deck DD, but they had put that distinctive Japanese bow on her during the refit, as well as trunking the forward two funnels together.
She was recovered and recommissioned after the war (as just DD224, since the name had been reused), and sunk as a target in 1946
The Japanese Army operated more aircraft carriers than the Japanese Navy (and submarines). They just weren’t particularly big or fast being the equivalent of the American escort carriers.
The problem the Japanese had was never the lack of aircraft carriers - it was lack of carrier aircraft and pilots.
The most famous example of supposed insubordination is arguably Nelson's 'blind eye' at Copenhagen. Supposed, because the signal to withdraw was to denote a change of orders made to cover Nelson's retreat if such proved necessary: a permission as much as an order. Nelson decided to stay put and carried on with the battle, amusing the officers who had also seen the signal by turning that blind eye to good use. He'd certainly have been censured by his senior officer if the action had subsequently gone badly, but not court-martialled.
53:16 - For fast transports for troops or other small high value cargo I'd call out the USN's ADPs. That was a situation where warships were converted to fast transports; however the WWI era Wickes and Clemson destroyers were nowhere near as large or valuable as the types of ships the question was asking about. And because of that as the Fletcher Swarm materialized the US was willing to convert some of those old destroyers to transports by reducing their armorment, removing half their boilers (and associated smokestacks and engines) and converting the volume into cargo/berthing space; resulting in still a fairly high speed (25 knot) fast transport. Primarily carrying troops for assault landings (as they also got some landing craft on davits) -- they could carry other relatively small high value cargo.
I think you mean APDs, not ADPs (AP for Assault Personnel and D for Destroyer-conversion). But these were optimized for landing troops, not cargo. They had no freight cranes and relied on the troops manhandling any supplies they needed into the landing craft. They would not do much good in the Med resupplying Malta or Crete, which needed large quantities of food, fuel, and ammo.
There was another special class of high-speed transport, the pre-war high speed ocean liners, which were converted for war service by ripping out all the fancy furnishings and installing floor-to-ceiling bunks for troops. Hundreds of thousands of troops were transported this way at sustained speeds of greater than 30 kts, far faster than U-boats could track or shoot at. But again, very little cargo could be carried that the troops did not bring on and off themselves. Some of them had small fore and aft holds, but they needed dockside cranes to load and unload.
Those guys posing for a photo at around 15.30 are in a distinctly undisciplined stance. When I was in the army if you stood with your arms crossed like that you would have had a sargeant major screaming at you in no time. The correct way of standing when not at attention is to hold your hands behind your back.
At minute 17 i really expected you'd say "where is his (lee's) commanding officer, the world wonders
23:40 Correction: the Japanese 155 mm Shell was 123.2 lbs while the British 6"/50 of WW2 had the 112 lbs shell
Thanks for catching that, just as well I used averages! 😀
I think rules lawyering court martial offences is just lawyering.
How does a commodore fit into the equation with admirals and captains??
Would ,Could you please provide any information about HMS Burwell please.
As I had a relative serve on her I would be so grateful.
Thankyou
Love this channel keep up the superb work 👍
The speed of a transport becomes null compared the speed of the attacking aircraft.
No, the faster the transport the faster it can transition the region in which a given air threat can project force. A faster convoy is in danger from a given threat for much less time, meaning it can be subjected to fewer sorties, or even be in and out of reach before aircraft can be assigned to attack it. Speed is always going to be important. If you are speaking of speed during the actual engagement, it becomes less so, but still if the cxonvoy is out close to the edge of fuel for the attackers, it might mean the difference between weathering one attack or four, in addition, speed of maneuver can do much to extend the life of a ship, look at all the heroic helmsmen dodging bombs that Drach has described in various videos. Sheer speed is as much part of dodging as helm, as is fast deceleration/acceleration at times.
Nowadays, with fast jets and faster missiles this speed of ships things becomes much less of a factor, but in the era this channel deals with its very important.
You underestimate Farragut. Had he not aggressively seized New Orleans early in the war, the South actually might have won. Imagine a nautical McClellan.
"Castle Drach" had 10 views 3 years ago.
How can you mention older dreadnoughts being assigned to the Channel Fleet without mentioning that HMS Dreadnought herself missed Jutland specifically because it had been reassigned to supplement the pre-dreadnoughts of the Channel Fleet?
7:30
Stay ‘ere … and make sure that ‘e … d’nt leave.
Could you do the implacable class carriers.
You both went to a technology to reduce the time it took to transmit. It was called a squirt transmission. I believe they recorded the message on a wire recorder and then played it through a system that produced the morse code and transmitted at high speed.
Ref Seniority = In the US Army of today, an officer of the same rank but senior to a second can not be made to serve as a subordinate to the second without his agreement
Brilliant 👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍
Consistently quality.
Thank you, Drachinifel.
On the subject of radiolocation and countermeasures. There seems to be an additional option: extremely short signals. Too short for the enemy to plot.
The Germans developed a device code-named "KURIER" (en: Courier or Messanger). It was to be capable of transmitting a prerecorded, very short signal in less than 1 second. The receiving side would have needed a special receiving station to record the message. [My source: "Geschichte des Deutschen Uboot-Baus".]
I don't think that would work with the quantity of messages that the U-boats were sending back to HQ: position, weather, sightings, supply status, etc. Given the existing tech, it would have to operate on common frequencies at fixed times of day (in order for the other end to be ready to record it), and given the measure-countermeasure battle going on and the Allies' partnership with cutting-edge academics, a means of recording and/or triangulating would probably have been developed within months.
i kinda disagree with your take on fast transports considering they already existed in the pacific. either repurpose more older DDs like they did in the pacific campaign or simply build more ships roughly along the same lines as older DDs but with transport capability in mind from the get go, to maximize cargo/troop capacity over their converted cousins in the pacific.
A couple issues there - the attempts to resupply Crete and Malta happened in '41, before the battles in the Pacific began (and extended to the Pedestal convoys in mid-42). And the Brits did not HAVE older DDs to spare to rebuild into fast transports. The US was looking at their WW1 DDs that were being replaced by the classes built in the late '30s. Also, all the fast DD transports were optimized for transporting troops, not large quantities of supplies. The Med islands needed food, fuel, and ammo, which you need large cargo holds and large cranes or pumps to load and unload. Building more ships is not easy either, because the shipyards are already building at max pace for existing needs and you are proposing to divert a yard or two from building needed new destroyers to building an older design with more transport space. And then what happens when the fast transport need goes away?
BuT..... HowEVerrrr........ i love it
The vessel 8n the foreground of the photo at around 54 min mark appears to have "butterfly wings what is it, and why?
It's a combination of smoke from that vessel's funnel and the propellor wash from the one alongside the larger ship.
What was the process that caused the RN to upgrade from a 12" to a 13.5" gun, instead of a 14" (other than a desire to annoy Vickers and their pushy sales force). Since the new gun could not use the ammunition from the previous version of the 13.5" they were starting with a clean slate, and a 2" increase would seem to be better than a 1.5" increase.
Would sir like a 14" gun with that
@@toddwebb7521 lol
Did you actually referred Joe Blogs?
The Commanding officer is the ultimate authority for the safe and efficient operation of their ship. The flag does NOT have the authority to tell the CO how to operate their ship. The flag is the OTC and can direct the disposition and employment of the ships under their command.
Doesn't stop some of them from trying 😀
@@Drachinifel Very true...Was speaking to US Navy doctrine...I'm sure you have read about the difference of opinion between RADM Davison and CAPT Gehres of Franklin on March 19, 1945. Davison upon leaving the Franklin to shift his flag suggested abandoning ship...
Would you ever do a video on the rigging and actual sailing of age of sail ship?
There is a reprint of an age of sail training manual called 'the young sea officers sheet anchor' which you would probably find interesting. If you need more in formation to aid you in tracking it down I can try and dig my copy out of storage. I believe it can still be purchased from a mail-order company called 'Lee Valley Tools', which is where I got it.
it's fantastic, covering rigging and systems, as well as seamanship, from the period after the napoleonic wars, the pinnacle of sail as the dominant force in commerce and military transport. Great drawings.
On admirals and insubordination, various naval dramas (from _The Caine Mutiny_ to _Crimson Tide_ ) give the impression that the final, _final,_ decision is down to the XO/OOW rather than the captain himself. How accurate is this?
The VERY general situation is that the Captain concerns himself with what the ship as a whole is doing --- speed, direction, mission, etc. The XO oversees and directs how everything happens inside the ship --- rosters, departmental efficiency, the ship's physical condition.
I've heard that Crimson Tide giving the XO the final say was a little unrealistic and mostly done for plot purposes. I don't think the XO had the power to relieve the captain of his duties.
@@iexist.imnotjoking5700 For what it's worth Richard P. Henrick, the author who wrote the script for Crimson Tide said that they'd based it off a three-way argument that happened on a Russian sub during the Cuban Missile Crisis, in that case the Americans had dropped signal charges to get the submarine to surface and the Captain, the XO and the Zampolit got into a dispute over whether or not to respond with a (nuclear tipped) torpedo. Fortunately those that advocated for surfacing won the day.
@@Graham-ce2yk I know, but it's not exactly the same scenario in the movie. Not to mention that the US Navy probably has different mechanisms in place than the Soviet Navy.
46:31 noti sounds lol
That photo at 51:20 is amazing
77th, 21 August 2022
Jesus Loves You
wootastic.
D4ac? Sir the photo of Farragut? An 8 ring 1 star admiral/ captain? Why?
Oh boy, the US Navy's rank markings at the time of the Civil War is insane.
Were the rings indicative of service time? 1812 to 1862 is 50 years. Only one star. I think the highest rank in the US Navy at the time was Admiral.
Eight narrow rings and a star were the insignia of a Rear Admiral between May 1863 and January 1865, when it was changed to one broad ring, one medium-sized ring, and a star.
@@Tevildo thanks, thought that amount of scrambled eggs was excessive?
@@Tevildo
Rear Admiral. I just hope San Francisco never has a Navy.
:)
I have not looked at every comment, if you post on Sunday, you get Sunday drinker's comments: but 'Captain of Your Ship' was a great record, which was playing in my head for the first question; and the link shows the song & DLT speaking German badly; like he DJ'ed. th-cam.com/video/Rk6X5MSL2zM/w-d-xo.html
On Fast transports were not refrigerated ships previously carrying meat to europe being reltively fast were converted to troop transports as they were faster than the average merchant?
That doesn't make a lot of sense? That type of vessel has no accommodation for people.
@@WALTERBROADDUS Having no accomodation is easily fixed in a dockyard in a couple of weeks.
Putting troops in a hold has a long history.
@@allangibson2408 it's also extremely unnecessary.
@@WALTERBROADDUS A lot of troops were moved in cargo ships during WW2. A ship would move troops on one voyage and equipment on the next.
@@allangibson2408 there's little need to move troops like they are illegal immigrants. They had plenty of Passenger ships. There is no speed advantage in a convoy. So the idea using your refrigerated ship is a moot point. It's also a unheated, unventilated space with no head facility and in emergency, a little chance for escape...
get here early today
And there is no way to get those HMS Glorious records unsealed early?
I came across the Operation Paul theory while watching a documentary about the sinking. A very in-depth article the author had a relative loss on the carrier.
Maybe one day the wrecks can be surveyed and shown what kind of damage they took. Cause I have read Royal Navy sonar has shown 3 "large" objects on the seabed in the area. So they know where they are.
My first thought during the bit about interpreting orders was Nelson at Copenhagen -- Admiral Parker, seeing three of his ships signaling unable to proceed or in distress, not being able to see the rest of the fleet through the gunsmoke, fearing that Nelson had been fought to a standstill and couldn't legally/honorably retreat without orders, hoisted the signal to retreat as more permission than orders, knowing that Nelson would use his best judgement. Nelson was actually kicking ass and not bothering to take names, of course, and when informed of the signal by the captain of his flagship, famously put the telescope to his blind eye and said something to the effect of "I don't see any signal." Kind of darkly amusing that the one frigate captain who saw the "retreat" signal but not Nelson's signals of "yeah, whatever, crack on, boys!" and actually retreated and was killed when his frigate left the concealment of the heavies' gunsmoke.
I remember reading though that Nelson was starting to get the worse of it at Copenhagen and ending up resorting to a threat to bombard Copenhagen to extract himself from the fighting as several ships were grounded and overall his fleet was fairly battered. Is that true?
Who runs the ship? The shipmaster is the local manager. The admiral and team on board is the strategic situational masterplaner allocating local and distant ressources. The ship is now the flagship. A shipmaster overrules an admiral in certain situations. An admiral stays out of ship management. A shipmaster will work together with other shipmasters. A admiral will work together with other admirals and generals. All are lead by the joint chiefs under political rule of Congress or Prez.
Shipmaster~captain?
Works OK until you only have one ship for both to control.
This channel is getting some seriously shameful adverts. "Drinking water before bed..." Means you will lose sleep to pee. TH-cam adverts would not be allowed on British TV now, and are verging on the criminal. So they'll be on the BBC soon.
TH-cam ads of that type are mostly tailored to the viewer, not so much to the channel. What have _you_ been doing to attract such an ad?
@@mbryson2899 Getting old, probably...