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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 16 พ.ค. 2022
- Hitler’s Winter: The German Battle of the Bulge
Part of Germans at War Week Part 1 (Part 2 coming in June 2022)
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The Battle of the Bulge was the last major German offensive in the West. Launched in the depths of winter to neutralize the overwhelming Allied air superiority, three German armies attacked through the Ardennes, the weakest part of the American lines, with the aim of splitting the Allied armies and seizing the vital port of Antwerp within a week. It was a tall order, as the Panzers had to get across the Our, Amblève, Ourthe and Meuse rivers, and the desperate battle became a race against time and the elements, which the Germans would eventually lose. But Hitler's dramatic counterattack did succeed in catching the Allies off guard in what became the largest and bloodiest battle fought by US forces during the war.
In today's show Anthony Tucker-Jones will talk about the battle from the German point of view, from the experiences of the infantrymen and panzer crewmen fighting on the ground in the Ardennes to the operational decisions of senior commanders such as SS-Oberstgruppenführer Josef 'Sepp' Dietrich and General Hasso von Manteuffel that did so much to decide the fate of the offensive.
Anthony Tucker-Jones, a former intelligence officer, is a highly prolific writer and military historian with well over 50 books to his name. His work has also been published in an array of magazines and online. He regularly appears on television and radio commenting on current and historical military matters.
Hitler's Winter: The German Battle of the Bulge by Anthony Tucker-Jones
USA bookshop.org/a/21029/97814728...
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I’ve listened to many of these and have become increasingly impressed with Paul’s knowledge and especially his ability to see things in context and to keep bringing the conversations back to the big picture. I’ve read and watched hundreds of histories but I’ve never felt as “smart” about the war as I feel with these shows.
Thanks you very much George. I feel I have got better since the early days
The BofB was a big SNAFU for both sides. The Allies just had the ability to reconstitute themselves whereas the Germans had shot their last bolt.
The Ardennes Offensive always seemed like something from a Greek tragedy to me. The Germans really knew that it was hopeless, but still they tried their best. The American units, although some were green, were just not the pushover French reserve divisions of 1940. Neither could the German Army apply the pressure along the whole front to pin the Allied reserves down from interfering with the main thrust. Still it was a dramatic battle all the same. Great discussion Paul and Anthony with many a thought provoking comment.
I prefer just calling it the Ardennes Offensive.
I think that Eisenhower & Bradley never received the level of criticism they deserved for being caught out - with 80,000-odd casualties - when Germany launched the Ardennes offensive.
Howdy folks. This is a comprehensive overview of the German view of the Ardennes battle. Great information and an educated outlook on the situation. One of Woodys best shows ever.
I really enjoyed Anthony's presentation. It was great to hear a well researched presentation on the German perspective on the Battle of the Bulge. I hope Anthony comes back on WW2TV soon.
Paul's comments are really incisive! What a great interlucutor!
Fantastic presentation 👍
Many thanks
Excellent program today. Anthony has done considerable research to learn more about the German side of the battle. Thanks for another enjoyable episode Paul!!
Great Video, have just ordered Anthony's Book. A couple of quick points on assault gun comments in the video (didn't see specific mention of this in the YT comments) as an aside for anyone interested:
1. Anthony wasn't quite right about the Assault Guns being artillery controlled. They were when the StuG was first designed and the first 'batteries' formed pre-war; but once Guderian became Inspector General of Panzertruppen about 1943 they were taken off the artillery and then all tanks, assault guns (and I believe Jagdpanzers) came under the Panzertruppen. So at time of 'The Bulge' they were panzer troops (not artillery).
2. Re: Paul R's comments about assault guns/StuGs on the attack and their effectiveness (with or without infantry support). FWIW this was explicitly against German doctrine and that was in place for the whole war. The StuG batteries/abteilung mid to late-war repeatedly complained about their misuse as tanks in offensive operations and the excessive losses they suffered when used that way (especially when used to lead an attack).
They were always highly vulnerable if used offensively (i.e. on the attack) and were intended to either come forward to support infantry against fortifications on ground already secured by the infantry (early war artillery manned StuGs) or to fight from prepared hidden or defensive positions and do a variation of shoot and scoot. In late war PanzerGrenadier Divisions the StuGs were intended to come up or follow the infantry to provide fire support, but not to lead or be in the front rank (just like the early war ones). Anything that put them at risk of exposed flanks (to AT fire) resulted in heavy casualties and infantry support made no difference to this.
I think much of this is covered in the WW2TV Sturmgeschütz episode, but otherwise several good books, etc, are available on StuG doctrine and performance...
P.S. For those who may not know the original JagdPanzer IV (with the 75/48) was originally designated as a Sturmgeschütz before being reclassified as JgdPz partway through its production run. So some StuG units had this for a time.
Really great program, thank you.
Superb points! The German commanders didn't know a LOT of what was going on around them except for when they came into contact with the enemy. Great idea to write it the way he has! Good job again gents 💯👍❗
Skorzeny career after the war is really crazy.
Great presentation !
Interestingly enough, and is one of the great things in this channel, the Ardennes offensive is seen in the context of the V2 offensive the Bodenplate operación (LW attack january 1st 1945) and the offensive against Alsace. Great presentation.
Thanks again. I’ll def be checking this out. Reading Retreat from Moscow by Stahel and Island Infernos by McManus.
Hello folks. The presentation on a different perspective of the Bulge is one of the top 5 shows so far. Well done. As they say in sports, The other team gets paid too.
This was a great show; lots of interesting information from a different perspective; the maps were brilliant. Thank you, Paul and Anthony for an informative presentation. I look forward to a future show with Anthony on the Falaise Gap.
Anthony’s, presentation tonight was one of the best I’ve listened too on the Battle of the Bulge. So marvellous to hear from the German side. This channel Paul as I’ve said before is number one for me, always some new slants on known subjects. Keep it coming Paul, thank you both for tonight’s show.
Glad you enjoyed it!
I stand in complete agreement with you, Kevin
In no way disagree with Mr. Tucker-Jones assessment, but I am often fascinated by the phrase "above his pay grade", in this case pointing at Dietrich. I'm taken back to a remark Alan Brooke made concerning the period after the Allies had moved off the beaches when he wrote the British Army lacked a sufficient number of officers qualified to be division level commanders. That is not a knock on the British Army, not my point at all. Rather it highlights the fact that there is a universal lack of people who really, seriously have much of an idea how to handle 10,000, or 40,000, or 100,000 soldiers at a time. If we were to be serious about leadership and command, I think we would find the number of people who are genuinely good at much beyond a brigade are a very rare lot. Much of what we look back at in history as "pretty good" was actually only "adequate". Again, a universal thing, and they should be honored as the best of what was available.
Had the pleasure of being around one or two persons who made it to the 3 or 4-star level who had leadership qualities that absolutely stood out. Been around some that, well, "being above their pay grade" is a bit more common than we let on.
I enjoyed the way Anthony said the word artillery. Very informative talk.
Sending best wishes to Peter Caddick-Adams and hoping we get to see him again soon on this channel.
Great show. Thank you both 👍
Glad you enjoyed it
Very enlightening show! Interesting to hear Anthony’s presentation of the offensive from the German point of view! I look forward to reading Anthony’s new book on the subject! Thanks very much Paul & Anthony!
Glad you enjoyed it!
I have put my points and thoughts on the vid in separate posts.
If Hitler had put all his resources on the Oder and Rhine, that is purely defensive, which would not alter the alliance.
To get a peace and Germany not occupied, as was the case in WW1 to a degree, he had to gamble. The gamble was to split the British and US armies in an attempt to get to Antwerp, cutting the allied armies off to the north from supplies. Market Garden drove a 60 mile wedge in a few days into German lines, splitting German armies. Market Garden split the German armies, I am sure this operation must have been an influence. Hitler also gambled in the Ardennes in 1940. He was a gambler. Prof Adam Tooze covers this well.
Prof Adam Tooze, _Wages of Destruction_
Page 371.
_The German army that invaded France in May 1940 _*_was far from being a carefully honed weapon of modern armoured warfare._*_ Of Germany's 93 combat ready divisions on May 10 1940, only 9 were Panzer divisions, with a total of 2.438 tanks between them. These units faced a French army that was more heavily motorised, with 3,254 tanks in total._
_....Half the German tanks that invaded the west were armed only with a machinegun!! The German Army was not on equal footing with the French when in fact it was vastly inferior._
Tooze, page 371/372.
_Nor should one accept unquestioningly the popular idea that the concentration of the Germans tanks in specialised tank divisions gave them a decisive advantage. Many French tanks were scattered amongst the infantry units, but with their ample stock of vehicles the French could afford to do this. The bulk of France's best tanks were concentrated in armoured units, that, on paper at least, were every bit a match for the Panzer divisions._
Page 378
_if Allied bombers had penetrated the German fighter screen over the Ardennes they could have wreaked havoc amongst the slow moving traffic with highly inflammable fuel tankers were interspersed with the fighting vehicles at the very front with the armoured fighting vehicles. The plan called for the German armoured columns to drive for three days and nights without interruption._
.....The drivers were put on speed pills.
Page 380
_because it involved such a concentrated use of force, Manstein's plan was a_ *_one-shot affair._* _If the initial assault had failed, and it could have failed in many ways,_ *_the Wehrmacht as an offensive force would have been spent. The gamble paid off._* _But contrary to appearances, the Germans had not discovered a patent recipe for military miracles. The overwhelming success of May 1940, resulting in the defeat of a major European military power in a matter of weeks, was not a repeatable outcome._
Tooze, page 373:
_In retrospect, it suited neither the Allies nor the Germans to expose the amazingly haphazard course through which the Wehrmacht had arrived at its most brilliant military success. The myth of the Blitzkrieg suited the British and French because it provided an explanation other than military incompetence for their pitiful defeat. But whereas it suited the Allies to stress the alleged superiority of German equipment, Germany's own propaganda viewed the Blitzkrieg in less materialistic terms._
Tooze page 380:
_In both campaigns [France and Barbarossa], the Germans gambled on achieving decisive success in the opening phases of the assault. _*_Anything less spelled disaster._*
Great interview. Amazing channel!
One of the main feelings on the part of the allies was once they had the forces in place they failed to use their air power to cut all of the bridges to block all of the retreat routes of the German forces the same thing happened in Normandy when they tried to trap the German army just a failure to block properly they could have bagged up all of the German forces and shorten the war very considerably in both instances
Excellent presentation. great guest. Really interesting.
Glad you enjoyed it!
Regarding the StuG IIIs. Depending on the version they can be either offensive of defensive weapons.
The early short barrelled versions (Ausf. A etc) were assault guns (offensive) in that they were armoured mobile howitzers that could keep up with the advancing infantry and provide them with (HE mainly) support.
Later versions with the longer gun - as used in the Ardennes - were, in effect, tank destroyers & not assault guns. These are not ideal for either hunting enemy armour or providing infantry support in the close confines of this location.
That's my pedantic understanding at least.
The Market Garden 60 mile long salient (Noord Brabant) created a buffer for Antwerp. The more direct route from Germany to Antwerp was through the southern part of the salient. The Germans decided to get to Antwerp via the most difficult route, through the Ardennes forest. Market Garden's value is understated.
I have never read any real convincing reasons why the Germans chose to go through a forest get to Antwerp. Some hint that the US troops were an easier opponent than the British that were in and below the Market Garden salient. A line further south to Antwerp, truly splits the British and US armies leaving the British isolated for supplies. But I am sure there is more to it than that.
Paul,
Thanks a lot for this interesting and well-researched programme. Good talk by Anthony on Battle of the Bulge and its origins in post D-Day Normandy and on the great lack of intelligence the Germans had to contend with.
Stugs were _cheap,_ that is why they were made. They were a large assault gun on an early war Mk III chassis. They held guns way too big to go in turrets on Mk IIIs. The allied assault guns had the crews open to the atmosphere. Stugs had a vital layer of protection over the crew. The Soviets made a version. Stugs were effective because there was lots of them.
awesome
One thing that is not often mentioned is the Wehrmacht hadn’t altered its tactics sufficiently enough after the disastrous campaigns in late ‘42.
Some Generals like Manstein and Model etc wanted to employ new tactics and methods like elastic defence, the backhanded slap, etc to best deal with a more effective Red Army, to use their strengths of Bewegungskrieg, tactical superiority and organisation; sadly instead they largely continued to fight as they had trained just before the war with slight changes in tactics like the PaK front, tank wedge and new technology; but from early ‘43 the offensive combined arms tactics remained largely unchanged, making their attacks predictable.
If there was one thing they had control over it was updating and developing new strategy and tactics to blunt the Soviet spearheads, to pull back until a Schwerpunkt could be unleashed.
Instead it was an internal struggle between Hitler’s romantic Darwinian approach and influential Generals trying to sell tactics that would preserve German combat strength whist whittling down the enemies.
The Red Army became so much more effective because it evolved and studied its mistakes, as well as working towards the comprehensive goal of deep battle.
As for the Western Allies, they were less imaginative and relied on overwhelming force.
The Germans could have preserved enough men and materiel sacrificed at Tunis, Courland, Falaise, etc to have been able to at least maintain a strong defence with limited offensive operations.
Hitler had a obsession with bigger is better. So he brought in all of these Tiger tanks which had great armor and fire power. But were heavy fuel hogs. At a time when Germany hade a fuel shortage and during when the ground was saturated. And German units spent more time pulling Tigers out of the mud. Than they did fighting them. These units Hitler sacrificed at the bulge. Would have made crossing the Rhine much more deadly and costly for the allies. But you can expect this when Generals cower to a Corporal.
We seem to always mention how surprising well these certain strategies work initially. It's not surprising, because when militaries attempt unexpectedly stupid strategies, they usually have short term success because they are a surprise. That doesn't mean they aren't stupid. The attempt to get to Antwerp wasn't going to happen even if everything went perfectly.
It was a close call of 15 minutes or the Port of Antwerp hadn't been open before the start of 'The Battle of the Bulge'.
Instead of sending German Parachute Rgt.6 straight to the Walcheren-Causeway via Benedensas and Zijpe on the eve of Oct.31 straight away as planned, it was sent to Numansdorp.
To avoid severe consequences from Berlin a second attempt was planned the next evening on Nov.1 , but by then the Canadians crossed the Walcheren Causeway before this FJR.6 convoy was sent from Numansdorp via Zijpe to bolster North-Beveland and Walcheren.
Student managed to let all proof 'disapear' and only the evacuation of the rearguard III./FJR.6 and Kampfgruppe Chill is reported for Nov.4 and 5.
Until 2008 nobody knew exactly how Germany 1st Parachute Army was composed or looked at the big picture from the German perspective.
Richard Binkhuysen aka 'A.C.E. van T.'
If Hitler had been more realistic about it and had gone with a smaller scale offensive that Von Runstedt and Model put together, How many more months would Germany have lasted? What would be odds of success for a smaller operation?
Success or failure in a smaller operation in the west doesn't matter much in this stage of the war. The soviets are coming hard and fast from the east. The germans can't delay that.
Dietrich relied heavily on his Chief of Staff, F. Kramer, a Heer officer who had transferred to the Waffen SS. Kramer was experienced due to his training as a staff grade officer, and service on the Eastern Front. One of the reasons for 1st SS Pz Korps prolonged defense in Normandy.
Great discussion. Now I had the impression that artillery was key to stopping the Germans at Elsenborn Ridge regardless of weather. And, Steven Zaloga's thesis seems to be that that region was the schwerpunkt of the attack. If valid, does that meant the Germans were defeated regardless of weather and Bastogne? And if so, is it possible the bad weather actually helped the Americans (channel German formation along poor roads, into built up areas) in that part of the offensive?
why was the prestart reconnaissance so poor-they needed to seize allied fuel stocks a s a first priority-skorzeny's men should have reconnoitred the fuel dumps and von der Hedyte men should have seized the big ones like the 4 million gallons at Stavelot
Can a Tiger Tank Run on schnapps?
How much did operation nordwind add to the reduction of German forces also?
❤
Maybe I'm just a bit cranky today, and I'm enjoying the show immensely, but could you please slip your guests the hint that they should really take a precious 30 minutes out of their life's work of writing 50+ books, and practice pronouncing the top 10 to 20 German names that keep coming up?
I know they're writers so they mainly talk to walls, ghosts and cats, but I find it a little bit jarring that someone who spends a year researching a book can't pronounce the name of the small cast of characters he writes about.
I don't mean this as criticism of mr. Tucker-Jones but come on: isn't being able to pronounce "Von Manteuffel" a reward in itself?
Relax bro my day sucked too no need to knit pick. You ain’t Saving the world with your comment. Shit happens. Could be worse
@@misterbaker9728 You should follow your own advice.
Mislabeled battlefields - like alligator creek/tenaru on Guadalcanal
I spoke to a former Waffen SS man who had an autographed picture of Adolph Hitler he carried in a pocket next to his heart. This was in 1970. He told me we made Hitler look bad.
Brainwashed fool
@@WW2TV SS were loyal to Hitler, not Germany. They were fools.
Interesting about the events relating to Antwerp, as Antwerp was key in Market Garden and the Bulge. Americans go on about that Monty never cleared the Antwerp approaches. Well Eisenhower stopped that, not Monty.
Eisenhower's communication to Montgomery on September 7th 1944:
_"My intention is INITIALLY to occupy the Saar and the Ruhr and BY THE TIME WE HAVE DONE THIS, Le Havre and Antwerp should be available..."_
_‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorized to defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted.'_
- CRUSADE IN EUROPE by EISENHOWER, 1948. Page 336
If Eisenhower had let Monty go for a Rhine crossing in late August/early September they could have got coastal Rotterdam and maybe Amsterdam. Antwerp was an awkward port, being 80 km from the sea, with a maze of low-lying tidal inlets, islands and estuaries on its approaches, which would take considerable time to clear. Many armies had come to grief in the Scheldt, even a British army in 1809. All of this Monty was well aware of. Bypassing Antwerp and gaining Rotterdam on the sea, near directly ahead would be a good call.
The First Allied Airborne Army were readied with fuel in the tanks with Rotterdam ahead. Stopping to open up Antwerp was always going to take considerable time. Eisenhower's initial optimism was blunted, reasoning that it was better to consolidate concentrating on Antwerp as the supply head before pressing on.
Supplies were coming via Le Havre, Mulberry harbours and Cherbourg. Le Havre was not much further than Antwerp to supply the US Third Army stuck in Lorraine, which was operational well before Antwerp, from 9 October 1944. The allies were not moving anywhere fast as the broad front strategy slowed movement, so there was no need to quickly get supplies to them from Antwerp to supply the advance - because there was *no* advance. All the US attack operations of autumn 1944 were well equipped and well supplied - they stalled not because of supplies.
Eisenhower's caution allowed the Germans breathing space to reinforce gifting them an opportunity to strike back. Eisenhower's caution did accumulate supplies to force the Germans back when they did counter attack.
Getting back to Antwerp. SHAEF regarded Antwerp as vital as it was taken intact. Well they had port facilities not a working port. A prime strategic problem for SHAEF in September 1944 was opening up the approaches to Antwerp then keeping it from German counter-attack - the logistics problem to supply all allied armies. It was:
*1)* Take Noord Brabant, the land to the north and northeast of Antwerp, or;
*2)* Take the Schedlt.
Market Garden was offered as the offensive SHEAF wanted to secure Antwerp, to be a prime port for logistics for *all* allied armies. *Everything up to Nijmegen was needed if you wanted to do anything at all.* That is, protect Antwerp and have a staging point to move into Germany. Gaining Noord Brabant, was vital, and was successfully seized. Fighting in the low lying mud and waterways of the Schedlt, which will take time, with the Germans a few miles from Antwerp and still holding Noord Brabant made no sense whatsoever. Monty added Arnhem to form a bridgehead over the Rhine to fall in line with Eisenhower's priority Northern Thrust strategy at the time. It made complete sense in establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine as an extra to the operation.
SHEAF got what they wanted from a strategic point of view.
Antwerp is a red herring. Antwerp was fully opened by late November yet still Operation Queen failed.
Contrary to the myth, Antwerp was not crucial to the westwall battles. The Americans were well supplied in late September, October and early-mid November. Antwerp not open did not make a blind bit of difference. The Lorraine, Hurtgen Forest and Operation Queen did not fail because Antwerp was not open. These operations failed because of poor strategy and poor tactical decisions, plus stubborn German resistance. Nothing to do with Antwerp. Antwerp WAS crucial for the next stage, the advance across Germany however. A port nearer to Germany was vital for a continued advance across Germany, but it was never crucial for operations prior to that, and in truth Le Havre was not a great deal further from Patton's 3rd Army than Antwerp was.
@@lyndoncmp5751
Eisenhower and Hitler had fixations about Antwerp. Monty never, wanting to bypass the awkward port up a 40 mile river, and go for Amsterdam or Rotterdam.
I have had a lot to do with the German - shall we call it "psyche"?
I hoped to see this from that ethnographical viewpoint rather than the more superficial (though important) view of the major actors. German culture from my experience [and from the very disparate history of what only became a country in 1871] is an attempt to unite a varied populace.
There is Hoch Deutsch, which everyone can speak over the multitude of dialects. Think about it: a high level language, the adoption of higher authority in how you speak in public. It's far from trivial. So the attempts to unify these vast lands result in adherence to authority.
Sepp Dietrich didn't fancy the Ardennes attack? So said one commentator on WW2TV recently. That was post hoc rationalisation: all the German people followed the "Leader" - "Fueher Kommand, wir folgen" and he was an adherent of course. The lack of discussion, the belief in leadership, the atrocities, all point in he same direction. Don't forget the ethnic cleansing in what is now Namibia by German administrators - not army types - and the murder of Belgian civilians in WWI.
We are not dealing with a rational entity here, and views from the side are based on second or third hand reports. Sadly, the analysis based on some kind of Anglo-Saxon based rationality does not fit. German history, German culture, and German life which is very different from our experience. Twelve million slaves were used by the State apparatus according to WW2 TV presenter Caddick-Adams.
Can you imagine the culture of a folk which initiated and then promulgated such a situation? Who happily manned the multitude of camps? What kind of adherence to distant authority does that represent?
Finally - an example: when I tried to cross a road in Germany while the red light was on - I was pulled back by a little old lady! My friends approached folk washing their cars or using lawnmowers on a Sunday.
There is a host of issues about the attitude and actions of German troops which needs far more incisive reportage.
Best of luck with that, Anthony! Best wishes to all. Neil
Total waste of lives ...model was a shocker . Absurd Prussian militarism
Maps look like theyre right out of United States 2nd Armored Division history book.
Excellent history on the TRUTH about what happened in the Bulge.
Very few were printed as they were sold almost exclusively to the WW2 2nd armored soldiers and only printed enough to fill the orders.
Pretty rare & hard to find book. 😊
But an excellent source.😊.
WHY you didnt use the SAME source of maps for the final map is obvious.
The last map is absolutely wrong, and absolutely a british "version" map.
2nd armored was on the tip of the bulge at Ciney Belgium. Not alongside 3rd Armored.
US 2nd armored wiped out 2nd ss panzer at Celles, then moved southeast to Humain and wiped out 2nd panzer, then moved on to Houffalitze.
How can ANYONE TRY to deny all that happened. And 30 corp or monty was no where near it.
No wonder so many brits think monty saved the day. They even made their own fake maps to show it. 😂 " dont give them everything" 😂. Clearly. 😂
Loved 95% the show until you switched to a false map mr. jones.
You certainly had the correct one.
Very dissapointed in you as a historian sir. You are part of the problem.
Erine Harmon and Joe Collins would be pretty pissed at you guys right about now. 🤬.
Great show as always Woody. 👍
Thanks for the comment, we will have to agree to disagree on some things. No-one is claiming the British were the major force, but the 53rd Welsh, 6th Airborne and elements of 7th Armoured were there and part of the counter-attacks
@@WW2TV is that why he used a fake map right at the end showing US 2nd armored 30 miles east of where they were actually at?
Why didnt he just continue with the maps he was using straight out of the 2nd armd division history?
We both know WHY.
Because it shows where 30 Corp was actually at. Sitting west of the Meuse guarding the bridge.
30 Corp wasnt even allowed across the Meuse into 2nd armd sector until AFTER the battle at Celles , and AFTER 2nd armd moved southeast to Humain.
I take it you guys also dont know about the British scout car that crossed into 2nd armd sector after the battle at Celles, and was promptly blown up by 2nd armd tanks? Because they were NOT suppose to be there?
A British liaison officer stated to Collins, " I think some of your boys just browned some of my boys " .
After the battle at " Celles pocket, 2nd armd went south east to Humain,
At which time 30 Corp units crossed the Meuse and moved straight south to mop up scattered German units west of Bastone. (Which they did get in a few nasty fights. Nobody said they didnt help).
But make no mistake, it was US 2nd armd , with generals Ernie Harmon and Joe Collins who blunted the bulge by destroying both 2nd panzer and 2nd ss panzer. They were the German armor spearhead.
Switching to a fake map at the last minute to show 30 Corp covering the whole west & north of the bulge,,,moving 2nd armd 30 miles east,,,,,
Come on fella. That's just being straight up dishonest. And perpetuating the GIGANTIC MYTH that Monty & 30 Corp saved the day.
The only thing it seems we disagree on is, I only want the truth & unfortunately, you prefer to use a great platform continue to perpetuate a myth.
Sorry to hear that. I expected more out if you. My bad.
History is opinions and interpretations. Tucker-Jones presented his version, you have another. You, like him use sources, and as we all know they differ. Boundaries of units in combat are fluid, there are overlaps and gaps. Personally I avoid absolutes in history. I'm working on a Falaise project right now and across the different maps I have, there is much variation. Commanders within the same unit refer to crossing bridges in towns miles apart, yet I'm fairly certain they crossed in just one place. Which commander is wrong? It's complicated.
Saying a map is fake implies a deliberate intention to deceive, which is not the case. Tucker-Jones is a professional historian and security analyst who has drawn conclusions. You are hiding behind a name. Present your work, cite your sources etc. I look forward to seeing your work on this battle
@@WW2TV Jone intentionally used a fake map. That was already already explained.
Jones had the correct map, that was also explained since he used copyrighted material maps right from the 2nd armored division history book maps.
That was certainly an intentional attempt to deceive people.
Cite my sources? I already did that. 2nd armored division history. 3rd armored division history. Courtney Hodges, Ernie Harmon, Joe Collins war diarys.
All accompanied by after action reports.
All fact, by the men who were there, including veteran soldiers,
All which also agree.
You cant white wash this to side with jones. So stop trying.
Trying to give 30 Corp all the credit for what 2nd armd did by intentionally using a fake map right at the very end is just wrong.
It cannot be explained away.
Jones had the correct map and choose not to use it. And we both know why.
There is NO excuse.
The truth is the truth. It dont matter how many Monty peep riders wish it was different to save the Monty myth.
That's EXACTLY why he used a fake map. And you know it.
I'm not the least bit surprised that Jones pulled that little stunt. By using the correct factual map in his possession, he would have proven the "Monty saved the day" myth wrong. He dont want to piss off his fellow country men. I get it. Imo, 98% of British WW2 historians will lie right straight through their teeth to keep the Monty myths alive. And yes, we also have American patton worshipers who also lie.
And to be clear, I'm not saying jones lied, because I heard NONE.
The interview was great. I really enjoyed it.
But he intentionally did use a fake misleading map when he had the correct map.
What does surprise me is this channel making his excuses, trying to explain it away, and defending it.
Very dissapointing.😢
I'm not trying to side with anyone. History is complex. I have the 2nd Armored Division history and I can definitely say it's wrong about some Normandy locations in Cobra. Or rather, information since it was published has refined the details. Thank you for your comments, I try to be a peacemaker here and see the best in everyone, I don't think any historians I have as guests are out to deceive, maybe they make mistakes - sure.
Thank heavens Monty sorted it out.