I suppose the 46th (North Midland) Division would be quite surprised to learn that they had not broken through the Hindenburg Line at the end of September 1918 but had merely followed up an orderly and, presumably, voluntary withdrawal of the German Army on the Western Front.
On a strategic level, I am always amazed at the level of "grasp" the top brass had on the effects of appalling lack of actual command and control they had over the tactical situation. Particularly the very poor tactical communications at battalion and lower levels. No doubt that is why they eventually went for bite and hold operations and limited objectives. Imagine what they could have achieved with smaller usable radios.
Voice radio was impossible until after the war. John Terraine never tired of pointing out that WW1 was the only major war fought without voice control. That being said, they never stopped looking for ways for forward troops to communicate with those behind.
This is quite interesting. Any chance to name some sources for further reading on the topic of British strategy and operational planning before the war?
I wonder if Sir John French’s appointment was precisely because he wasn’t up to the task, that Kitchener saw in French somebody malleable to his will but more palatable to the establishment than having Kitchener in direct command
Regarding the last slide ... I'm surprised by 1) the emphasis on "attritional" warfare (with it's high casualty rate) and how this is acceptable; and 2) that there wasn't a "low casualty rate" option ... though this may be 6 and 7 (but I'd've thought it worth emphasizing the lower casualty rate reasoning).
What 'low casualty' option would you suggest? This is the problem. People go on about the high casualties, and decry the Generals, but none of them, not one, can give a viable low casualty alternative. Unfortunately there is a very simple reason for that. A viable low casualty option simply did not exist. A major war between powers of roughly equal strength will turn into a war of attrition. Setting aside the why, just take a look at Ukraine and see what is happening there. A brutal, grinding war of attrition. WWI was worse because of the sheer scale, but the principle is still the same. The powers involved were largely roughly equal in ground combat power, and in ability, tactics and doctrine. So it rapidly bogged down into a war of attrition.
Excellent, thoroughly enjoyed that.
"A Starmer government with Jacob Rees-Mogg in the cabinet" - love it.
Excellent talk - very enlightening
Very interesting presentation. thank you.
I suppose the 46th (North Midland) Division would be quite surprised to learn that they had not broken through the Hindenburg Line at the end of September 1918 but had merely followed up an orderly and, presumably, voluntary withdrawal of the German Army on the Western Front.
On a strategic level, I am always amazed at the level of "grasp" the top brass had on the effects of appalling lack of actual command and control they had over the tactical situation. Particularly the very poor tactical communications at battalion and lower levels. No doubt that is why they eventually went for bite and hold operations and limited objectives. Imagine what they could have achieved with smaller usable radios.
Radio
Voice radio was impossible until after the war. John Terraine never tired of pointing out that WW1 was the only major war fought without voice control.
That being said, they never stopped looking for ways for forward troops to communicate with those behind.
fascinating stuff. I consider myself fairly knowledgeable about ww1 and i'd never heard of willie Robertson.
1:09:20 what was he referring to regarding silver revolvers?
This is quite interesting. Any chance to name some sources for further reading on the topic of British strategy and operational planning before the war?
I wonder if Sir John French’s appointment was precisely because he wasn’t up to the task, that Kitchener saw in French somebody malleable to his will but more palatable to the establishment than having Kitchener in direct command
I think that Sir John French's appointment as FM C-in-C of the BEF predated that of Kitchener's as Secretary of State for War.
Regarding the last slide ... I'm surprised by 1) the emphasis on "attritional" warfare (with it's high casualty rate) and how this is acceptable; and 2) that there wasn't a "low casualty rate" option ... though this may be 6 and 7 (but I'd've thought it worth emphasizing the lower casualty rate reasoning).
What 'low casualty' option would you suggest?
This is the problem. People go on about the high casualties, and decry the Generals, but none of them, not one, can give a viable low casualty alternative.
Unfortunately there is a very simple reason for that. A viable low casualty option simply did not exist.
A major war between powers of roughly equal strength will turn into a war of attrition. Setting aside the why, just take a look at Ukraine and see what is happening there.
A brutal, grinding war of attrition.
WWI was worse because of the sheer scale, but the principle is still the same. The powers involved were largely roughly equal in ground combat power, and in ability, tactics and doctrine. So it rapidly bogged down into a war of attrition.
WWI was siege warfare. Siege warfare is always expensive to the attackers.