So, another way to break this "Two Faces, One Point" doctrine all the way down to Barney Style is to use a TV Trope. Imagine you're sneaking around a dark parking garage, trying to avoid or ambush the Bad Guy/guard/etc. So you throw your car keys one direction to draw their attention while you go the other to accomplish your main goal (escape, ambush, sneak past, etc.) The Platonic Essence seems to be *misdirection* to allow a locally inferior force to gain an advantageous position surreptitiously, without the distraction effort getting decisively engaged. As for the US Army of the 1980s, you pretty much nailed it. The US Army had been referred to be more "agile" (not just ohysically), and was quite capable of conducting COIN if needed. But *nobody* was willing to risk the commitment of major combat forces to a long, drawn out COIN effort - we were going to revert back to the pre-Gulf of Tonkin plan of equipping, training, and advising local allied forces without US combatant forces becoming decisively engaged. Everything else was geared towards two primary threats - Soviets invading Western Europe through Germany, and (often over looked) a Rapid Deployment Force response to a Soviet (and later including Iranian) threat in North Africa or the Near East. One of the reasons the deployment setup for the 1991 Gulf War was so textbook was that had (by that point) been the US military's *second* highest priority contingency. And many military leaders felt it was actually *more* likely and likely to *precede* any Soviet moves in Europe. We organized entire divisions around those two possibilities- effectively zero notice deployments to either the Middle East or to Germany. (Korea was pretty much on its own initially, as the feeling was no North Korean invasion would occur without Soviet blessing, and probably as a prelude distraction to Soviet invasions in Europe or the Near East.) Heck, thus focus on these theaters are why the "Chocolate Chip" desert camo of Desert Storm was chosen - while it sucks in sandy deserts like the Arabian Peninsula, it was felt *ideal* for the rockier Sinai Peninsula, large parts of northern Egypt, and the broken terrain of northwestern Iran. And since almost all US desert operations at the time were conducted with Bright Star in Egypt, the Sinai peacekeeper force in the Sinai, and exercises in deserts adjacent to the Rocky Mountains... whuch have similar terrain for the purposes of camouflage. So, "chocolate chip" worked great everywhere we were using it.
@@geodkyt Plus, chocolate chip camo was just SOO darned cool. My brother, you really rate a channel of your own, but please don't make one--youre much too valuable here for us to spare
The battle of Dien Bien Phu has always been one of my favorite battles that has captivated me from the first time I learned about it. I just can't wait to see what amazing insights Prof. Clower can bring to the amazing tale of Dien Bien Phu!
I’m looking forward to what I hope are some examples of the PLA application of these small unit tactics in Korea. It will also be interesting to contrast these tactical concepts with Western or more specifically US small unit tactics. From long ago experience it seems, because the US has an abundance of firepower, our maneuver elements rely more on suppression of an enemy position than on stealth. Anyway, fascinating episode. Looking forward to future content.
Yea so about these tactics in Korea, the PLA didn't have "officers" or a official military ranking system and on the frontline command and control .....didn't exist. No one had authority to call off these "short attacks" unless it came from higher. Nobody had radios to call higher. They got handed their orders and that's it. If these 3 man groups were getting cut down during an attack from the American GI defender perspective this would appear as fanatical human wave attacks where a endless stream of 3 man squads would approach them over and over again. Nobody would stop it.Nobody could stop it. The casualties were horrifying
My understanding is the average Chinese person was semi starved and the current version of the regime is propped up by flooding the people with pork after the 80s or 90s. So Americans back then were bigger and could easily carry 20 percent more ammo. Then you have the adoption of the M16 and the M249, which made our ammo like 66 percent as heavy as Chinas. And then you can often helicopter or airdrop canvas bandoleers of more ammo.
@@Seth9809 Field rations in the Korean war wasn't good and while food in China during that time was also low due to its substances farming economy, the average Soldier still carried 30-60 lbs of gear in to battle. The real reason for the lack of fire power was logistics. Most logistic have be done by mules, donkeys, little trucks, and the Soldiers themselves, which is why they have such a heavy load. Trains and other logistical supply lines were going to be the first target of American airpower and China's industrial base is minuscule compared to the U.S.
Love the page and insight, it’s the highlight of my day coming home and checking for an upload! Really makes me want to go back and finish my undergrad properly!
jason I might not be the best commenter with good info but i try to be that commenter that always spreads love and support for the channel in a very bad latin american english, every video is a blessing thanks so much!
Creating dilemmas for your enemy is ideal, since they will be forced to pick one problem over another they will suffer the problem they couldn't choose and can be exploited. Ryan Macbeth discusses this too in modern tactics, I'm impressed to see that it's also a favored maneuver of the PLA.
My understanding from reading wargame magazines of the period and looking at military journals was that the US was fairly sure that something was going to be go horribly wrong in the middle east and they'd have to do proto-GWOT era medium infantry brigades that could be airlifted in to fight Iran or Iraq. But yes, most of the focus was on the Fulda Gap.
A brief overview of this episode: Professor: quit thinking American geometry (for it to be correct on test the answer has to look like an example from a text book) and think Chinese snake (two faces one point prinicpal) TH-cam students: oh, we'll try to look like Chinese snake Professor: No, Chinese snake is a principal that commanders and subordinates follow TH-cam students: what does that look like? Professor: facepalms and marks our Grades with a D Professor: you are halfway there TH-cam students: oh, so, are the two faces Half of the point? Professor sighs and looks towards the sky in bewilderment.
China's role in the Korean War was always taught to me as just mass infantry assaults without much military thought put into it. Between this channel and Indy Neidell's "The Korean War" series, I've been rethinking how I've understood how China fought that war. My uncle was near the Chinese-Korean border when he encountered the Chinese. He described it as a "human wave attack," but the Chinese had already been infiltrating Korea well before that. So, maybe he was dealing with just one of the "faces" while other the "faces" were fighting further south?
I am almost certain that Sun Tsu himself advised against total encirclements of enemies for the reasons discussed in the video. For a very present example you can see the Russian Army's activities in Southern Donetsk where they have passed up the opportunity to fully encircle a chain of villages northwest of Vugledar, probably because they'd prefer the AFU leave than fight to the last man. I understand the Germans used to call this sort of operational semi-encirclement by the name kessel, or boiler, as in you're boiling the enemy out of the position.
The 一点两面 actually represent a way more classic series of tactic/strategy in psychological level. If you are history nerd enough you might heard a story where a man playing his music instrument and successfully make an army retreat while the city this man suppose to guard is actually have no guard enough. But the Chad zhugeliang 诸葛亮 is (thinking) two step by using people’s mind to accomplish his target. This is tactic to attack someone’s heart 攻心计 or attack people’s mind. Modern military do have some psychological warfare but it seems more about propaganda, but the smart tactician know how people think and know how to change people’s idea. When your enemy’s reaction is expected or can be expect in a certain range, there will be enough of way for you to solve the problem. Tactic, is always the game between brain, which is your biggest weapon, subjective initiative.
For some reason, I’m thinking of Custer dividing his forces at Little Big Horn. Had he used one point-two faces style tactics, would he have had a chance of success?
Well, he would have had to truly realize how many Indians were in the area. It's glossed over how all the Sioux said afterwards that they were surprised by Custer. Custer was surprised at how many Indians he was actually fighting, though. So he lost.
These tactics require intimate knowledge of enemy strengths and positions. Custer rode himself into a cluster fuck ambush and stayed blind until he was destroyed.
Do these tactics require intimate knowledge of enemy strengths and positions. Otherwise you're risking destruction in detail of each disparate element?
Im native Chinese and I find your content very resourceful, may I ask can you share some Chinese (or English) sources on this topic? In particular Im also curious how did PLA tactics influence other communist insurgent tactics, thanks in advance
Furthermore I want to add your content helps me further understanding of 一點兩面, reading Lin Biao's direct text I interpreted it more as defeat in detail, but the aspect of distraction I only learnt it from you
Also in the future can you make content about how the PLA transformed from guerilla tactics to more conventional tactics? Such as when it confronted a much stronger and experienced force and engaged in positional warfare, or after the gulf war they underwent a transformation and nowadays they are a strong force, guerilla warfare isnt suitable anymore and what is their doctrine now?
Welcome to the course! Thank you for your kind words, and the answer to all your questions is an enthusiastic "yes!" We just completed Unit 1 of the course, and the next post will consist of reading recommendations for the material up to this point. Then the next unit will cover the PLA's decision to reinvent itself as a relatively modern combined arms force, tailored to a particular battle plan. That's coming soon! Til then, welcome again.
Love the page and insight, it’s the highlight of my day coming home and checking for an upload! Really makes me want to go back and finish my undergrad properly!
Dien Bien Phu has been mentioned. My excitement for this course continues to skyrocket.
OMG me too!!!
So, another way to break this "Two Faces, One Point" doctrine all the way down to Barney Style is to use a TV Trope.
Imagine you're sneaking around a dark parking garage, trying to avoid or ambush the Bad Guy/guard/etc. So you throw your car keys one direction to draw their attention while you go the other to accomplish your main goal (escape, ambush, sneak past, etc.)
The Platonic Essence seems to be *misdirection* to allow a locally inferior force to gain an advantageous position surreptitiously, without the distraction effort getting decisively engaged.
As for the US Army of the 1980s, you pretty much nailed it. The US Army had been referred to be more "agile" (not just ohysically), and was quite capable of conducting COIN if needed. But *nobody* was willing to risk the commitment of major combat forces to a long, drawn out COIN effort - we were going to revert back to the pre-Gulf of Tonkin plan of equipping, training, and advising local allied forces without US combatant forces becoming decisively engaged.
Everything else was geared towards two primary threats - Soviets invading Western Europe through Germany, and (often over looked) a Rapid Deployment Force response to a Soviet (and later including Iranian) threat in North Africa or the Near East. One of the reasons the deployment setup for the 1991 Gulf War was so textbook was that had (by that point) been the US military's *second* highest priority contingency. And many military leaders felt it was actually *more* likely and likely to *precede* any Soviet moves in Europe.
We organized entire divisions around those two possibilities- effectively zero notice deployments to either the Middle East or to Germany. (Korea was pretty much on its own initially, as the feeling was no North Korean invasion would occur without Soviet blessing, and probably as a prelude distraction to Soviet invasions in Europe or the Near East.)
Heck, thus focus on these theaters are why the "Chocolate Chip" desert camo of Desert Storm was chosen - while it sucks in sandy deserts like the Arabian Peninsula, it was felt *ideal* for the rockier Sinai Peninsula, large parts of northern Egypt, and the broken terrain of northwestern Iran. And since almost all US desert operations at the time were conducted with Bright Star in Egypt, the Sinai peacekeeper force in the Sinai, and exercises in deserts adjacent to the Rocky Mountains... whuch have similar terrain for the purposes of camouflage. So, "chocolate chip" worked great everywhere we were using it.
@@geodkyt Plus, chocolate chip camo was just SOO darned cool. My brother, you really rate a channel of your own, but please don't make one--youre much too valuable here for us to spare
The battle of Dien Bien Phu has always been one of my favorite battles that has captivated me from the first time I learned about it. I just can't wait to see what amazing insights Prof. Clower can bring to the amazing tale of Dien Bien Phu!
I’m looking forward to what I hope are some examples of the PLA application of these small unit tactics in Korea. It will also be interesting to contrast these tactical concepts with Western or more specifically US small unit tactics. From long ago experience it seems, because the US has an abundance of firepower, our maneuver elements rely more on suppression of an enemy position than on stealth. Anyway, fascinating episode. Looking forward to future content.
Yea so about these tactics in Korea, the PLA didn't have "officers" or a official military ranking system and on the frontline command and control .....didn't exist.
No one had authority to call off these "short attacks" unless it came from higher. Nobody had radios to call higher. They got handed their orders and that's it.
If these 3 man groups were getting cut down during an attack from the American GI defender perspective this would appear as fanatical human wave attacks where a endless stream of 3 man squads would approach them over and over again. Nobody would stop it.Nobody could stop it. The casualties were horrifying
My understanding is the average Chinese person was semi starved and the current version of the regime is propped up by flooding the people with pork after the 80s or 90s.
So Americans back then were bigger and could easily carry 20 percent more ammo. Then you have the adoption of the M16 and the M249, which made our ammo like 66 percent as heavy as Chinas.
And then you can often helicopter or airdrop canvas bandoleers of more ammo.
@@Seth9809 Field rations in the Korean war wasn't good and while food in China during that time was also low due to its substances farming economy, the average Soldier still carried 30-60 lbs of gear in to battle. The real reason for the lack of fire power was logistics. Most logistic have be done by mules, donkeys, little trucks, and the Soldiers themselves, which is why they have such a heavy load. Trains and other logistical supply lines were going to be the first target of American airpower and China's industrial base is minuscule compared to the U.S.
I'm very glad that you put these episodes out so frequently.This has become a part of my normal morning routine 😂
Love the page and insight, it’s the highlight of my day coming home and checking for an upload! Really makes me want to go back and finish my undergrad properly!
jason I might not be the best commenter with good info but i try to be that commenter that always spreads love and support for the channel in a very bad latin american english, every video is a blessing thanks so much!
Creating dilemmas for your enemy is ideal, since they will be forced to pick one problem over another they will suffer the problem they couldn't choose and can be exploited. Ryan Macbeth discusses this too in modern tactics, I'm impressed to see that it's also a favored maneuver of the PLA.
These are really great man
Thank you so much. Day = made.
New deep lore of the PLA just dropped
Looking forward to a Dien Bien Phu lecture.
Most informative.
We must get word to Ian at Forgotten Weapons. He can parachute in with the visual aid reinforcements.
Thank you for another great video
Looking forward to Dien bien phu lecture and really would love some analysis of myanmar guerilla tactics - might be a fun contemporary illustration
They have the same kind of hodge podge armoury
Semester for me is coming to an end I hope Dr. Clower will continue to upload more.
Fuck yeah two uploads in one day
Please do an episode on Dien Bien Phu my guy
My understanding from reading wargame magazines of the period and looking at military journals was that the US was fairly sure that something was going to be go horribly wrong in the middle east and they'd have to do proto-GWOT era medium infantry brigades that could be airlifted in to fight Iran or Iraq.
But yes, most of the focus was on the Fulda Gap.
Want to hear later how they diverge from Vietnamese tactics.
A brief overview of this episode:
Professor: quit thinking American geometry (for it to be correct on test the answer has to look like an example from a text book) and think Chinese snake (two faces one point prinicpal)
TH-cam students: oh, we'll try to look like Chinese snake
Professor: No, Chinese snake is a principal that commanders and subordinates follow
TH-cam students: what does that look like?
Professor: facepalms and marks our Grades with a D
Professor: you are halfway there
TH-cam students: oh, so, are the two faces
Half of the point?
Professor sighs and looks towards the sky in bewilderment.
@@atradeandsomehobbies7264 This is a modern Zen koan. A+
@Type56_Ordnance_Dept
😊🙏
China's role in the Korean War was always taught to me as just mass infantry assaults without much military thought put into it. Between this channel and Indy Neidell's "The Korean War" series, I've been rethinking how I've understood how China fought that war. My uncle was near the Chinese-Korean border when he encountered the Chinese. He described it as a "human wave attack," but the Chinese had already been infiltrating Korea well before that. So, maybe he was dealing with just one of the "faces" while other the "faces" were fighting further south?
Dude love it
Really interested in how the PLA adapted the load bearing equipment practices of the time to their hyper mobile style of warfare.
From what I understand the Mongols would ensure there was a path of escape to induce a rout. Not a total encirclement.
I am almost certain that Sun Tsu himself advised against total encirclements of enemies for the reasons discussed in the video.
For a very present example you can see the Russian Army's activities in Southern Donetsk where they have passed up the opportunity to fully encircle a chain of villages northwest of Vugledar, probably because they'd prefer the AFU leave than fight to the last man.
I understand the Germans used to call this sort of operational semi-encirclement by the name kessel, or boiler, as in you're boiling the enemy out of the position.
I learned that from The Seven Samurai.
That is NOT my voiceover
The 一点两面 actually represent a way more classic series of tactic/strategy in psychological level.
If you are history nerd enough you might heard a story where a man playing his music instrument and successfully make an army retreat while the city this man suppose to guard is actually have no guard enough. But the Chad zhugeliang 诸葛亮 is (thinking) two step by using people’s mind to accomplish his target.
This is tactic to attack someone’s heart 攻心计 or attack people’s mind.
Modern military do have some psychological warfare but it seems more about propaganda, but the smart tactician know how people think and know how to change people’s idea.
When your enemy’s reaction is expected or can be expect in a certain range, there will be enough of way for you to solve the problem.
Tactic, is always the game between brain, which is your biggest weapon, subjective initiative.
The event you are thinking of might be Zhuge Liang and the Empty Fort Strategy. A very risky move.
For some reason, I’m thinking of Custer dividing his forces at Little Big Horn. Had he used one point-two faces style tactics, would he have had a chance of success?
Well, he would have had to truly realize how many Indians were in the area. It's glossed over how all the Sioux said afterwards that they were surprised by Custer. Custer was surprised at how many Indians he was actually fighting, though. So he lost.
These tactics require intimate knowledge of enemy strengths and positions. Custer rode himself into a cluster fuck ambush and stayed blind until he was destroyed.
Do these tactics require intimate knowledge of enemy strengths and positions. Otherwise you're risking destruction in detail of each disparate element?
YES!!
Im native Chinese and I find your content very resourceful, may I ask can you share some Chinese (or English) sources on this topic? In particular Im also curious how did PLA tactics influence other communist insurgent tactics, thanks in advance
Furthermore I want to add your content helps me further understanding of 一點兩面, reading Lin Biao's direct text I interpreted it more as defeat in detail, but the aspect of distraction I only learnt it from you
Also in the future can you make content about how the PLA transformed from guerilla tactics to more conventional tactics? Such as when it confronted a much stronger and experienced force and engaged in positional warfare, or after the gulf war they underwent a transformation and nowadays they are a strong force, guerilla warfare isnt suitable anymore and what is their doctrine now?
Welcome to the course! Thank you for your kind words, and the answer to all your questions is an enthusiastic "yes!" We just completed Unit 1 of the course, and the next post will consist of reading recommendations for the material up to this point. Then the next unit will cover the PLA's decision to reinvent itself as a relatively modern combined arms force, tailored to a particular battle plan. That's coming soon! Til then, welcome again.
Two facets? Is this a better translation?
1st
Love the page and insight, it’s the highlight of my day coming home and checking for an upload! Really makes me want to go back and finish my undergrad properly!