Quine on the Limits of Knowledge (1973)
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 3 ก.ค. 2021
- Willard Van Orman Quine discusses the question of whether there are any limits to knowledge. This is another re-upload from the previous channel. Details will be added later.
#Philosophy #Quine #Epistemology
more QUINE...!!!... o, dear sweet gentle tender Philosophy Overdose... may i yet live in hope of QUINE to come?... o, prithee, say that it will be so... and how my heart will rejoice!...
You okay fam?
Love this comment. I shall share in your rejoice when the sweet day comes for more... Quine!
Surely the ancient Greeks had the same ‘empirical language’ Quine attributes to a hypothetical tribe, and yet these Greeks seemed to manage quite well posing unanswerable, yet entirely intelligible metaphysical questions
Great thinker Quine.
Socrates himself is particularly missed; a lovely little thinker but a bugger when he's pissed!
Actually an idiot
1:20 for the start
Maybe if there were
no unobservable there would be no observable...
no immeasurable no measurable...
All I can say is,, "All I can say is"
Quine on a early Wittgenstein?
Knowing the limit of anything means knowing both sides. But how could you possibly know both the knowable and the unknowable ? If you knew the unknowable, it would not really be unknowable,. Therefore, you cannot possibly know the limits of knowledge.
We can be aware of our own ignorance. To recognize phenomena X doesn’t necessarily imply that we understand it
@@user-hu3iy9gz5j Being aware of your own ignorance is different from having a knowledge of the limits of what it is possible to know. A person might be aware of his own ignorance of Calculus, for example. He might know of it: that it is a study of higher mathematics. But he does not understand any of its symbols, or its operations, or how to solve any of its problems. Therefore, he does not understand Calculus. So, his awareness of his ignorance necessarily includes an awareness of that of which he is ignorant, as well as an awareness that he lacks an understanding of it. But, does he also know the limits of what it is possible for him to know ? Does he know, for example, that it is impossible for him to ever know Calculus? No, he cannot possibly know this because he does not understand Calculus, and, therefore, he does not know what is mentally required in order to understand this mathematical science. In order for him to know whether or not he was capable of understanding Calculus -- and not just having momentary difficulty in understanding it -- he must not only know what his mind is potentially capable of knowing, he must know that Calculus meets the criteria for surpassing his potential mental ability. But how can he possibly know whether or not Calculus meets these criteria without understanding Calculus in the first place ?
@@user-hu3iy9gz5j Philosophers who attempt to set the limits of human knowledge presume that they have a sufficient understanding of the potentiality of human understanding (mental capability), as well as a sufficient understanding of the nature of the unknowable. If ever there was any justification for skepticism with regard to a philosophical presumption, it is certainly justified in the case of those philosophers who presume themselves to be in a position to set a limit on the potentiality of our human knowledge.
Agreed. Kant tried to draw the line between what we do not know and do know, and then Nietzche later said the distinction was absurd.
@@alwaysgreatusa223 I would argue then, that what is relevant about human ignorance isn't the precise limitations of our understanding as it is the frank admission that for every satisfying answer a subsequent question will likely soon arise.
We DO NOT comprehend everything, even if we could.
Philosophers could if anything, attempt to pin down the limits of human perception and cognition (time if nothing else), ia the human ability to understand (hard as it is), without having to necessarily deal with the data it relies upon
It is presumptive to assume that all knowledge is necessarily derived by means of observation. For it can be asked, what observations were taken to justify (to know) this 'truth' about the exclusive means for deriving all knowledge. If it is not itself known by means of any conclusive observations, then it fails to meet its own criterion for being knowledge -- in, which case, it is, according to its own criterion, a mere assumption. No doubt, that in a great many cases, observation is necessary to knowing. But where is the proof that it is always necessary ? Consider carefully whether such a proof itself could be derived by mere observation.
Yes but it would be presumptive to infer that they are known through some other means. Quine believes all human experience is a function of our reasoning plus sense data and the cause of such experience is that if physical objects
@@hanshaofei2248 How do you know that you exist ? You observe your body, of course -- its movements, its appearance, its relations to other things, etc. But how do you know this is your body ? What observations did you make to confirm the belief that this body is your body ? Of course, you can say that when you will your arm to move it moves, and your legs and head movements appear to similarly be controlled by your will-power. But what about this will that has the power to move a body you claim to be your own ? Is this will itself something that you observe ? You can say you observe its effects, but that is not quite the same thing as observing the will itself, therefore, it is an unjustified assumption to conclude that the movements you observe are the effects of your own will-power, rather than having some other cause that merely coordinates with your will - or with your thoughts. It might seem impossible to you that these movements could come from any other source but your own will, however, you do not observe your will directly -- at least not in the way you are observing what you are claiming to be its effects. At any rate, as soon as we start talking about observing the will -- supposing such kind of observation is even possible-- we are already talking about 'observation' in a way very different from the sense-experience of material objects or sense-data that is so cherished by the empiricist. One must stretch the bounds of the normal meaning of 'observation' to conclude that the will -- or the self (yourself) -- is something you know exists because you have 'observed' its existence. But such a stretching is done only to save the empiricists pet notion that all knowledge is derived from sense-experience. Indeed, the self is not know by any empirical means whatsoever. Only the effects of the self are known in that way. The self itself is known in a way that is a' priori, or else it is not known at all ! But who would be so absurd to claim that they did not know whether they existed or not ?
@@hanshaofei2248 Moreover, it is something of an evasion to attempt to defend the belief that all knowledge is derived from observation by saying it is also a presumption to suppose it is known by any other means. The real point here is that the belief that all knowledge is derived from observation cannot itself be derived by observation, therefore, it cannot be known to be true by that means, therefore, it is a self-refuting belief.
the philosophies of maths and logics are NOT asking not-answerable questions.
still the answer is not really the problem, but the right way of ASKING the question, which is not the same then disqualifing the subject to begin with itself.
i still feel a bit like no one really understood, or wanted to understand #wittgenstein
auf deutsch würde ich sagen: den sinn und zweck der tatsachen ausserhalb der empirischen konstrukte.
in the very hard sense: no moral question can be answered!
Quine is just a student of the use of language
😆