I loved the title. great lecture. thank you. 46:26 what distinguishes a man from word? 39:20 realism ( 39:32 example of the deaf and blind men both perceiving a murder )
great lecture yet misinterprets Kant in some substantial regards: eg. min 24: the principles shaping our experience are not intuitively given to us: a priori forms of perception and of judgment act tacitly. their reflexive discovery as an apriori foundation of transcendental philosophy is an intellectual enterprise,not an intuitive given. yet, we use them intuitively when forming the objects of our perception. in a similar sense as you talk about "inferences" which, i suppose, are not being explicitly present in our thinking. Kant's theory relies on euclidian space, but it is possible rethinking the a priori of space and time to fit their post-kantian notions and the current theoretical physics. we can reason about these forms beyond the constraints of our direct experience as long as there is a potential empirical use of such reasonings - which current physics proves there is. the kantian synthetic apriori thus extends far beyond what he conceived possible - yet will within the boundaries of his method.
No, inner intuition is the idea that we can deduce things about the world from our head without experiencing it. In one sense we can of course - logical truths for instance - but any such thing would be true of all possible worlds. Contingent facts about our world cannot be so deduced. Inner intuition is a term coined by Roger Bacon who thought it was a way of perceiving revelations etc
tone? what sort? music? or something else? does "sensible inference" really make sense? if so, it assumes something else. What? what is inferring? something other than the sensible? or an aspect of the sensible itself? or the sensible itself which does not need that particular "aspect"? if that, then does it [the sensible] have no aspects at all? it's just "one" rather than "many"? if it is "many" then only some -- or one -- of the many aspects is the basis of this -- or enables -- this "inferring" [in which case, which? "does" or "enables"?] These are some of Husserl's questions. But he could not really answer them.
I feel joy nclined to Husserl but I find him hella difficult. Have you by chance encountered the thinking of the 20tu century Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd?
To speak of probable knowledge is to speak of hypothetical knowledge, for it must be that whereas you have some knowledge of the probability that x is true, you have no knowledge that x is in fact true. But having knowledge of a probability, and not a fact, is not knowledge of the actual world, it is merely knowledge of the likelihood of a possibility. Now, we might be satisfied with this kind of second-hand 'knowledge' which is merely hypothetical and does not tell us anything about the actual world, except it would not even have any real credibility unless this knowledge of the likelihood of possibilities was empirically based upon our actual knowledge of past facts -- that is, a first-hand knowledge (aka, real knowledge) of the facts as they have occurred up until the present moment, and which serves as the basis for determining the likelihood of probabilities.
All knowledge of the world is more or less probable knowledge, hypothetical knowledge. Empirical knowledge of the world simply never reaches the level of absolute 100% certainty. That's an impossibly high standard. Indeed, it would make knowledge impossible!
@@Philosophy_Overdose To the contrary, knowledge is always certain. What is uncertain is proof of knowledge. The fundamental epistemological mistake is to think that knowledge requires proof, when in fact it is proof that always requires knowledge. You cannot start with proof, then try to derive knowledge from it. Knowledge always comes first, and if you begin to doubt what you know, then try to prove it, how will you prove it? Must you not seek for some more fundamental source of knowledge. But if you now doubt this more fundamental source, your problem repeats itself in a spiral of doubt... soon you will be down the rabbit-hole with Alice ! Best to remember that the real opposite of knowledge is not doubt, but ignorance.
Chuck lost his mind somewhere along the way; he should have taken up boxing -- then he would have encountered at least one aspect of the reality of things, and could have extrapolated from that LOL
In what sense does he lose his mind? Our instructor alluded to the 'stone in the shoe'as something Pierce would consider real. Is not a 'punch to the face' not simply a more forceful (and literally more 'significant') version of the same thing?
I think probably you are mistaken. The speaker is not. For further reading, interested persons only, TL Short's magnificent book on CSP theory. And relisten to this for encouragement as you go.
Why? Or, in what sense 'should'? (From a Maslowian sense of self actualization? Because riffing in class is at odds with effective teaching? Because he could make more money playing the comedy clubs? I can, here, only guess at your point )
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A great lecture. Thank you, Charles Sanders, for piquing my interest in C. S. Peirce.
Excellent lecture. Thanks for sharing
So good. Gratitude.
I loved the title. great lecture. thank you.
46:26 what distinguishes a man from word?
39:20 realism ( 39:32 example of the deaf and blind men both perceiving a murder )
That example @ 40 mins, of the deaf and blind men both perceiving a murder, is an absolutely excellent piece of thinking. Loved it
Excellent. Kiitos. 🌹
We don't impose the form, we impose the repetition of forms.
Speaker is hilarious. "Believe in it? Hell, I've seen it done" and "until his thinker was sore... thus Kant arrived at Pure Reason".
Was this deleted and re-uploaded?
He lost his channel
@@lordmozart3087 Thanks for the info.
@@lordmozart3087 Good heavens. Do you know why?
@@zapazap copyright crap
@@lordmozart3087 Thx
great lecture
yet misinterprets Kant in some substantial regards:
eg. min 24: the principles shaping our experience are not intuitively given to us: a priori forms of perception and of judgment act tacitly. their reflexive discovery as an apriori foundation of transcendental philosophy is an intellectual enterprise,not an intuitive given. yet, we use them intuitively when forming the objects of our perception. in a similar sense as you talk about "inferences" which, i suppose, are not being explicitly present in our thinking.
Kant's theory relies on euclidian space, but it is possible rethinking the a priori of space and time to fit their post-kantian notions and the current theoretical physics. we can reason about these forms beyond the constraints of our direct experience as long as there is a potential empirical use of such reasonings - which current physics proves there is. the kantian synthetic apriori thus extends far beyond what he conceived possible - yet will within the boundaries of his method.
very good
Longitude 127 Seoul Okinawa Soul Axis -- Bahai Faith Rael
Jesus Huh kyung young
Great aletheia
I couldn’t get the optical illusion to work
If you have three eyes you have to cover one.
we don't have inner intuition? why not? when I'm reading a novel, isn't that exactly what is "gripping" me? if not, then what?
No, inner intuition is the idea that we can deduce things about the world from our head without experiencing it. In one sense we can of course - logical truths for instance - but any such thing would be true of all possible worlds. Contingent facts about our world cannot be so deduced. Inner intuition is a term coined by Roger Bacon who thought it was a way of perceiving revelations etc
tone? what sort? music? or something else? does "sensible inference" really make sense? if so, it assumes something else. What? what is inferring? something other than the sensible? or an aspect of the sensible itself? or the sensible itself which does not need that particular "aspect"? if that, then does it [the sensible] have no aspects at all? it's just "one" rather than "many"? if it is "many" then only some -- or one -- of the many aspects is the basis of this -- or enables -- this "inferring" [in which case, which? "does" or "enables"?] These are some of Husserl's questions. But he could not really answer them.
I think he is speaking to something like musical tone. Probably with definite pitch. Not the sense of the tone of a book, say, or a painting.
I think Nietzsche would have liked Pierce.
The audience is rather easily amused, isn't it?
inference is the wrong idea; Husserl later explored these things, with somewhat better ideas. But in his case not completely correct either.
I feel joy nclined to Husserl but I find him hella difficult. Have you by chance encountered the thinking of the 20tu century Dutch philosopher Herman Dooyeweerd?
Langan completed it
To speak of probable knowledge is to speak of hypothetical knowledge, for it must be that whereas you have some knowledge of the probability that x is true, you have no knowledge that x is in fact true. But having knowledge of a probability, and not a fact, is not knowledge of the actual world, it is merely knowledge of the likelihood of a possibility. Now, we might be satisfied with this kind of second-hand 'knowledge' which is merely hypothetical and does not tell us anything about the actual world, except it would not even have any real credibility unless this knowledge of the likelihood of possibilities was empirically based upon our actual knowledge of past facts -- that is, a first-hand knowledge (aka, real knowledge) of the facts as they have occurred up until the present moment, and which serves as the basis for determining the likelihood of probabilities.
All knowledge of the world is more or less probable knowledge, hypothetical knowledge. Empirical knowledge of the world simply never reaches the level of absolute 100% certainty. That's an impossibly high standard. Indeed, it would make knowledge impossible!
@@Philosophy_Overdose To the contrary, knowledge is always certain.
What is uncertain is proof of knowledge. The fundamental epistemological mistake is to think that knowledge requires proof, when in fact it is proof that always requires knowledge. You cannot start with proof, then try to derive knowledge from it. Knowledge always comes first, and if you begin to doubt what you know, then try to prove it, how will you prove it? Must you not seek for some more fundamental source of knowledge. But if you now doubt this more fundamental source, your problem repeats itself in a spiral of doubt... soon you will be down the rabbit-hole with Alice ! Best to remember that the real opposite of knowledge is not doubt, but ignorance.
real real real real TWADDLE
Chuck lost his mind somewhere along the way; he should have taken up boxing -- then he would have encountered at least one aspect of the reality of things, and could have extrapolated from that LOL
In what sense does he lose his mind? Our instructor alluded to the 'stone in the shoe'as something Pierce would consider real. Is not a 'punch to the face' not simply a more forceful (and literally more 'significant') version of the same thing?
You speak of dualism in Plato. Obviously you have not read Plato, or you have not understood this most lucid and profoundest thinker.
I think probably you are mistaken. The speaker is not. For further reading, interested persons only, TL Short's magnificent book on CSP theory. And relisten to this for encouragement as you go.
lecturers in philosophy who want to do stand-up should just do the latter
Why? Or, in what sense 'should'? (From a Maslowian sense of self actualization? Because riffing in class is at odds with effective teaching? Because he could make more money playing the comedy clubs? I can, here, only guess at your point )