Voepass Flight 2283 Animation Explained by ATR Instructor
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 24 ก.ย. 2024
- CENIPA has released an animation showing the moments the aircraft lost control and entered a flat spin. In this video, an experienced ATR 72 instructor explains what happened.
#voepass #atraircraft #flywithmagnar #aviation #aviationaccident #atr72
Magnar your approach to this topic and the insights you give are absolutely necessary and respectful. As a pilot and a Brazilian I can say that we appreciate your work and you are doing a very important work for the safety of all of us that are flying. Thank you so much
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From the first moment of stall until they enter the flat spin is terrifyingly quick. If you ever needed an example as to why you should take early action and not ever let it get to the stall in the first place, this is it.
A respectfull explanation! Thank you! I’m a private pilot who lives at the city where de flight have departed, Cascavel, Brazil. We here are very sad about this tragic event. God Bless you and always give you safe flights and motivation to continue sharing with us your experience and great technical proficiency.
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This channel is by far the most respectful and technically accurate data source from ATR related topics. All the other channels regarding the Brazilian crash are absolute rubbish.
agreed.
can't agree more!
You are wrong. "Branco Aviação" did a excellent report about the crash.
not all but most indeed!
The blancolirio channel is a very high level of professionalism as well
WOW - just WOW! Thank you very much for this exceptionally clear and detailed explanation, Magnar! This is the best aviation-video I have seen for ages!
My very best regards!
Andreas (Norwegian Air Traffic Controller)
As a former ATR72 captain, I've found the preliminary report a very hard read.
I have no explanation as to why they continued the flight after the first Airframe de-ice fault. Diverting back to the departure airport was clearly the best course of action (and decision I have had to make numerous times).
But to continue the flight and ignore multiple ice detector indications and all the APM warnings with seemingly no corrective action is gross negligence at best and criminal at worst.
They had many opportunities to avoid this accident. It is something that should have never occurred.
I cannot understand why the pilots would blatantly ignore such warnings when their own lives were at stake. Maybe we should be more careful than to use expressions such as 'gross negligence' and 'criminal' when referring to them. We still don't know why this happened nor do we know what the ambience in the company is.
@@NathalieV-c6c Yes, indeed, their lives were at stake. I believe they were negligent in this regard, and the pilot did not declare an emergency because, once on the ground, he would have to refrain from flying until an investigation was completed and he was... afraid? I wonder if he understood the gravity of the mistake he was making, if this had not been done before, and if he was overwhelmed with work, since he was not supposed to be flying that day. Many signs were ignored, signs that appeared even before departure.
My best guess is bad training, normalization of deviance, and get-there-itis. They likely thought they had time as they were expecting ATC descent into destination at any moment.
How many times were they confronted with similar situations previously and how did they react? How many times were they assessed in training for similar situations and how did they react? The problem with abnormal situations is they are abnormal so there may be little practice.
@@user-xu5vl5th9n Normalization of deviance happens when you get confronted with a situation, do wrong things, and nothing bad happens. Given the local weather, they are likely dealing with icing all the time and have learned to ignore it rather than deal with emergency descents, etc. Proper stall procedures are part of basic flight training and upset training in the simulator. That they did not reflexively do the right things points to deeply flawed airline training and I think the airline needs to be shut down by the regulators until their training has been fully reviewed.
You are the best!! You are an unbelievable source of knowledge for a father whose boy is going to flight school next year. God bless you!! Keep sharing your unique experiences.
I'm visiting this channel after a recommendation from Mentour Pilot.
Certainly the pilots made the mistake by not take actions to avoid the accident! Many lifes were lost! Trainning and Trainning until failure never be an option! Best explanation I have seen from someone expert!
Brilliant discussion on stalls, and stall prevention. A master-class level breakdown of this terrible tragedy. You are indeed an expert aviator, educator, and seasoned pilot. Thanks.
These two videos on the accident are very, very good. So clear and well put together. For the first time I under stood the tragic flat spin. Thank you. BR, Per (Denmark) PS: This type of plane is used on our local routes…
Incredible walkthrough! Your knowledge and methodical teaching skills are as always Top Notch! Thanks Magnar & Fly Safe!
Wow... Great and clear explanation about kinetically the flat spin as achieved! Impressive. Thanks!
Really interesting review Magnar. It must be hard for families of all who died to hear this was something that didn't need to happen. I hope it will at least be a nice reminder for other ATR pilots who might get into the same circumstances. I can also imagine that severe icing might be more rare in Brasil but that's why you train such rare events in a simulator. Sad for everyone involved.
This is how you intentionally initiate a spin for aerobatics: pull to stall and use rudder. Then instead of power idle, use full power like they did and you can get a flat spin. For non pilots it may seem that this is happening too fast, but it's not. In smaller general aviation planes this will be much faster and you should react immediately, like steering a car when about to leave your lane. Everything happened in the clouds with no visual references and when they saw the land they were already in a flat spin.
You can see the pilots not only making mistakes but reacting late, behind what is happening, so most probably their upset recovery training was poor. It looks similar to AF447 except that in this case the plane worked with no issues.
For flat spin you need CG aft that is normal in combat airplanes (unstable) but abnormal in transport airplanes
In this case the plane had a de-icing fault. With how it departed I'm a little surprised how long it kept flying, to be honest. There must have been some horrific ice buildup, I wonder if they really had much tail authority at all & I'd hate to guess what the effective trim really was just before it departed.
At face value this does seem a case of acknowledging the situation & blindly carrying on anyway - it will be interesting to see how much training they had around icing conditions & whether that really impressed just how much of a danger it is.
Wouldn't it be quite different to AF447 aside from the stall aspect? If I recall, the Air France flight crew spent minutes misunderstanding everything that was going on and pitching the nose up into a stall - caused by faulty AoA due to frozen pitot tubes, whereas it appears that this crew just failed to react in time to the ice and low speed and stalled.
@@theearthwillshake8706 AF447 reacted( poorly ) when the right thing to do was basically do nothing - these guys seem to have done basically nothing when the right thing to do would be fly somewhere else.
Gracias Senor Magnar. Lupe Bernal. Mexico.
Thanks a lot captain. From a Brazilian new sub you got. and 737 driver.
Hi, Magnar! Again, thanks for your necessary and respectful videos that are amazing contributions to aviation safety. Considering the asymmetric thrust, I do believe they where flying with some rudder trim to compensate, I do believe it also may be a factor on the "fast" loss of performance, considering that it increase the drag. Would be nice to have your thoughts on it.
That speed tape at 0 is the stuff of nightmares
Thank you!
It seems to me that regardless of the cause, in several recent disasters in which an aircraft reaches a stall situation, the pilots seem to act only instinctively trying to pull the nose of the plane up instead of lowering the nose to regain speed and control, as they should. The same reaction can be seen in the tragic accident of Air France Flight 447, where the pilots in command ignored the instruments and stall alarms and kept pulling the stick up until they completely lost control. First there is some confusion in understanding the situation, and then failure to follow the proper procedure. The same thing seems to have happened in this disaster. Of course, looking at it from the outside seems like an obvious flaw, as it's just a matter of the laws of physics, but it's intriguing how common this loss of situational awareness is in these disasters. They seem to completely forget that they have altitude, that they have room for maneuver, that they can ask traffic control to clear the way. Very intriguing.
The stabilizer stalls before wing afaik, to pull up is checking for authority. They had none. It's not the mistake.
@@foobarf8766 Of course pulling up is a mistake in a stalling situation, especially for planes with a T-Tail.
Although I'm not a pilot I have to wonder, why would you ever check for authority in a stall? To check whether or not you are already in a deep stall, and pretty screwed?
AFAIK, any stall recovery procedure requires you to reduce the AOA immediately, and not check if your elevator is already stalled, and why would you? Also, I believe that most simulators are poor at simulating the stall characteristics of a plane, icing will only make it more unpredictable, as the accumulation changes the stall characteristics.
The stabilizer usually does not stall before the wing does, because their airfoils are different, and symmetrical airfoils, the ones used for the horizontal stab, have a higher critical AOA.
If the stab had stalled first, we would have expected a sharp pitch-down moment, but we just don't see that here.
It looks like the wing is stalled first and they enter the spin by applying right rudder.
After that the nose pitches down, as is expected in a spin.
@@TheOnePurpleGuy idk of course, all speculation but the pull up could also be dual control conflict. I don't know. But the stab size is smaller. The lift is function of area, if I had ATR in XP id try it (does laminar flow the new msfs still puts 172 into 'brick' stalls). Speaking of the c172 it has massive stab because it's a trainer. The stab is not main lift device ofc but does have +ve (not zero). CoG would determine pitch when losing it and it would be aft afaik? So pilot's intertial frame is experiencing
@@TheOnePurpleGuy pitch up not down if it stalled first because normal force
Thank you for the video!
lack of training, take a look at the training background of those pilots, there will be the answer
@FlywithMagnar assuming you find yourself in an ATR in a flat spin, would differential thrust on the engines help to arrest it? How much time do you need to recover?
Excellent commentary and explanation with a succint statement on actions to recover from an impending stall.
I wonder if severe icing being an emergency is not being emphasized enough. Certainly the statement "no aircraft types certified before 2015 are approved for flight in severe icing" tells us that a severe icing encounter requires action to escape, since it is a situation the aircraft is not designed or demonstrated to handle. But on the other hand, I can imagine a pilot being reluctant to declare mayday because of ice, especially if other aircraft nearby seem to be getting away with it. Even having read the report on American Eagle 4184, "severe icing is an emergency" was a bit of an eyebrow-raiser. It makes sense, of course, but it does emphasize the urgency of the situation more than "flight in severe icing has not been demonstrated, nor is it required under the certification rules" or something similar...
You make some good points.
Having watched many videos relating to flying into severe icing I would like to see ATR change the APM 'Increase Speed' advisory to an emphatic 'Increase Speed NOW!'
I don't see how a "lack of training" will be avoided on the final report...
Mentour Pilot channel brought me here. Now I´m hooked!
I wonder if this was a case of "normalisation of deviance" by the pilots. Perhaps they had flown close to the edge of the envelope in icing many times, and got away with it. With time that led to complacency, and a blasé attitude to icing. And eventually this caught up with them.
Concordo com Voce, Eu acho que já eram acostumados, e sempre deu certo...
Mas , Eu acredito que tenha algum agravante. tipo....
De Repente, uma Das Bolsas que arrebenta o Gelo , pode não ter funcionado...
imagina , fazendo Gelo somente em uma das asas, no vooo inteiro...
e Eles sem perceber...
Normalization of deviance. 100% on the nose. It’s the only explanation for them not reacting to all the alerts.
I agree, both from complacency and maybe lack of training
@@MrCaiobrz Eram muito treinados, aqui no Brasil o treino é severo...
@@carlosfernandes8919 I think it happened due to the culture of tomorrow (manãna) of most of Latin America, that is doing nothing and hope for the best outcome. Complacency
I really dont understand that much as Im not from Aviation, but this incident fascinates me so that I want to understand things. Thanks for the upload!
Great explanation, Captain
Great analysis of this accident.
Thanks for the higher res animation. Do we now have stick and rudder imput data as well? Could it be that the horizontal stabilizer was already shaddowed by the main wings before entering the flat spin? ie the pilots/pusher could no longer initiate a dive? And why is there no more voice data towards the end if we still have flight data. Is there a lag in recording or just not released yet?
Caveat I'm not an aviator but I think so, yes, the stab stalls before wing does in most traditional ampenages. You lose elevator authority in sims at least, have more roll. Except blended body elevons they stall different
Just escape from icing immediately. Especially when anti icing is hving issues!
As blancorolio reminds us- a wing can stall at any speed but only one critical AOA. ...Nose down, escape!
Thank you very much for your very informative video and explanation Captain. Cheers!
Thank You Captain
As a former pilot this is very hard to stomach as all the warning signs were there and yet it got to a point where it never had to get too. Swiss cheese model in full effect here sadly.
Obviously this raises some questions about pilot training and/or airline safety culture (did they not know how to respond to the performance warnings, or were they habituated to ignore them?), but I think it's also fair to ask whether it should really be considered normal for an autopilot to happily trim a plane all the way into stick shaker and then unceremoniously dump the controls of the mistrimmed aircraft into the hands of a startled pilot. Is it really too much to ask for an autopilot to prioritize keeping the airplane within its flight envelope over whatever was requested through the mode control panel? Surely it could have noticed (or even predicted) the AoA approaching stick shaker and reduced bank angle to avoid it?
I think ideally an autopilot (in the absence of a serious fault) should also avoid sudden disconnects and instead would *warn* the pilot if it is has trouble executing the commands from the pilot (e.g. due to approaching control limits), but continue to fly the plane to the best of its ability to allow the pilot to assess the situation and physically take the controls _before_ disconnecting the autopilot.
The aircraft is trimmed by the autopilot to a full nose up setting and the wing and control surface performance is degraded by ice accumulation. Then the autopilot hands back control to the pilots, who have perhaps ten seconds at best to recognise the situation, trim nose down and gain control of the aircraft with degraded controls. With the element of confusion and disorientation, it was never going to happen. The airframe de-icing fault was undoubtably a distraction that contributed to the confusion when the autopilot disconnected.
hello , j'adore vos videos , bonne description et premiers commentaires techniques de ce malheureux crash ...une question me vient à l'esprit : " pourquoi les pilotes ont ils laissé l'avion dans cette compsosante de givrage sévère et ne sont pas intervenus selon la procédure de chez ATR en pareil cas ? " l'enquête le dira certainement ..merci de vos informations claires et précises ..fly safe captain 😉✈🤙
excellent analysis,
Objective analysis without subjective opinion.
Just the facts and their relevance.
Sou do Brasil , não sou Piloto , mas Voce Explica muito bem...
Como é impressionante, que já cairam muitos Avioes , por motivos Semelhantes...
2 Boings 737-Max, Airbus A-330 Air France e Vários ATR-72
Os 737 MAX não foram stall.
The other crashes happened very quickly (less than a minute for the Max crashes, and 1-2 minutes for Air France). This accident happened very slowly and with lots of warnings that were completely ignored.
The MAX crashes where based software after a AOA sensor failure, the AF 447 where bad training in reacting to a temporary pitot sensor fault, and some ATR due to icing. Not at all similar
@@Antonio-lt1sp Verdade, alta velocidade e Nariz embaixo, Por falha Eletrônica, mas é muito Rápido pra se ferrar...nisso é tudo igual...
@@MrCaiobrz Parecido na Rapidez do Acidente...e Falta de conciencia da situação...
Magnar is a gentleman to not say this, but it is clear that the pilots caused the crash.
The underlying question is WHY - were they under-trained, were they complacent? What is the safety culture at their airline? Were they under pressure to stick to schedule?
@@dougfraser77 So far only speculations. They could be undertrained for ice conditions considering that
s a rare situation you encounter in brazil. Or maybe they were suffering from fatigue. I also heard from a brazilian pilot that in Brazil if you declare an emergency then you have to go through a lot of bureocracy with the government once youre on the ground to explain what happened etc. So pilots feel more aprehensive about declaring an emergency. I know sounds messed up, but again these are just speculations. Final report might help clear things up.
Remember the swiss cheese model. Of course the pilots crashed it, but that's the obvious thing, what made them so complacent?
@@babyfloppa173
'They could be undertrained for ice conditions considering that
s a rare situation you encounter in brazil.' Nope.
In one of Magnar's older videos he describes flying into a region of severe icing. In Thailand.
Great presentation! Thanks!
I wonder what would be the purpose of an alarm that "you should never see in flight because you have to act before you see it"... Shouldn't it be changed from "Increase Speed" to "You're dead"?
Well in this case they had about 1 minut from that indicator until the stick shaker activated, much more until stall entry. As he said, "you still have time to save the day."
Great report
Very sad what happened. Seems like the aircraft could have recovered if they just let the stick pusher do its job.
If the stab stalled that shaker is just an ornament
Thanks.
It seems to me that the autopilot should automatically disconnect when the degraded performance indicator is illuminated. The autopilot continuing to attempt control of a compromised aircraft only made matters worse. The pilots were likely confused by the unexpected feeling of the flight controls at the point in time when the autopilot was finally disconnected. Clearly, the continued flight in icing conditions is likely to be the biggest contributing factor to the crash. However, in order to prevent a similar crash from ever occurring again, it would be wise to find any point at which the chain of events could be stopped. In the interest of human factors engineering, the manufacturer should also consider making the “increase speed” indicator red in color to reinforce the concept of an impending catastrophic failure.
I'm no pilot but I disagree. Disengaging the AP has to be a conscious decision.
The AP may be masking unequal aileron loads.
That's why it has to be disengaged prior to entering a region of severe icing.
Manually controlling the plane will allow the pilot to better sense imbalances that indicate ice accretion.
Hello Magnar, thank you for this great explanation
Thank you sir for the explanations ! Bye !
Another misconception is that if the pilot has been rated in Airbus or Boeing, he would perform better flying an ATR. They have different operational techniques and different philosophies of operation. In the past, I had the opportunity to train many experienced Boeing 767 Captains on the ATR42. It was not easy for them to understand the manufacturer's operation philosophy.
I really don't understand why this critical Decreased Performance alarm does not trigger a million sounds on the cockpit and just do a small "Beep" and turn its light on. Also, cleary the pilots did not take this warning seriously so this is a hard lack of training as Magmar cleary stated that this is a mayday warning that needs immediatly action
Maybe I missed it, but where does the "cruise speed low" get its info from? Do you enter planned cruise speed in the 'computer' (FMS or MCDU equivalent for ATR)?
just get so angry watching this every time.
It's concerning to know you may be in a flight commanded by pilots like that anytime.
Hi Magnar, this might sounds like a very stupid question, "What were the manufacturers thinking when they decided to install an inflatable boot on the wings instead of using the engine bleed air to warm up the wings to prevent icing?"
I don't know of a regional turboprop that doesn't have boots. There's probably a reason for that. Perhaps not enough heat coming from the engines.
Excellent thanks very much. If you were there what would you have done differently Magnar?
I'm sure he would have reacted much earlier to the initial issues with the de-icing system -- certainly not flying into icing with the de-icing switched off -- and never got into the situation in the first place.
He would have followed his correct training. Training clearly lacking here.
The deceleration when it went flat against the wind was massive. I am surprised it didn't break up
Edit: I thought about it. peak deceleration should be:
peak deceleration =((speed when they went flat against the wind)^2/ (flat spin vertical terminal velocity speed)^2) ×9,81m/s^2
So peak deceleration wasn't too high
Wooow❤❤❤❤
That stall and spin happened quick after AP disconnect!
I understand better now, how a distracted cockpit crew (radio and approach discussion) was cought by surprise.
No excuse, but we are only humans....
On the severe icing checklist, firmly grasp the horns and disconnect the AP is the second action. First is max continuous thrust.
"Increase Speed" is the last warning you get ... before you and your passengers die ...!
Is not this exact scenario not trained in the simulator? If not why? and if so, did these pilots do not receive it?
The pilot was on autopilot. 😂
I wonder if the g forces combined with startle prevented flap 15 from being selected
Very strange decision-making by the pilots in response to the icing and supposed anti ice faults. I am curious on what basis they make the assertion that the system is faulty, are there any indicators for it in the cockpit? And also, very strange control response by the pilots during the onset of the stall, I am reminded of AF447 and the MCAS crashes that pilot response to unusual control situations is sometimes or even often absolutely not in line with what the regulations and aircraft certification expects.
At this point, the analysis should be mainly psychological. How did the flight crew not decide it is a bad idea to fly through and remain in severe icing, with faulty de-icing and air compression? How did they not immediately act on degraded performance and draw a connection to severe icing? It also seems they had no idea and awareness off stall speeds and maintaining a stable flight in critical situations. Button pushers in a shirt.
Is this the first time an ATR has been spun?
I don't understand why both pilots failed to take quick action to fly at a lower altitude immediately and call for an emergency. Their mistake was turning off the icing system at 17k feet altitude.
Can anyone clarify if the pilots commanded it off? I thought arinc data only gave you bus state and fault present, so it went off by itself (faulty)
The autopilot almost drove them to the stall condition , leaving them seconds to react it should have disengaged after the message of degradation of speed
ATR procedure is to disengage the autopilot before entering a icing region. It's high up on the list of memeory items.
Excellent captain MAGNAR. Nice to know the data but a lot of data is missing. A lot of things weird. Pitch attitude before bank 4 degrees. On bank the pitch never increases above 4 degrees. Why? The AOA started to increase without pitch. I think the aircraft was stalled at that point before stick shaker activation. REALLY WEIRD. When the spin was developing, the data is unreliable. Pitch down, climbing at more than 6000 FPM and decreasing speed to zero. Inconsistent. The aircraft have 3 sensors of everyone so we need the more accurate. At some point, we can see right rudder but left input in the joke. Thats contradictory. Who move the controls. The pilots? Or aerodynamics forces. Some years ago I level off and landed reaching 12,4 AOA in the process and never had STICK SHAKER (ATR42)
Pitching down, decreasing air speed, but increasing altitude. After long time trying to understand...
I think the plane did like a surf movement, climbing over the wings, sliding transversally.
This, could explain the decreasing speed fast.
I think
Pilots FAULTS
They were very overconfidently stupid pilots
I'm not a pilot but if your plane is stalling, rudder and ailerons neutral and pitch down
Very SAD.
The regulators need to shut down the airline immediately pending a full review of their training procedures.
Lockman Locks
So these pilots were completely out of their standard procedure when in a stall situation is that right?
Well...their mistake cost their lives and a lot of other people's lives as well.
I think a possible explanation of the behaviour of the pilots could be pressure from an almost brokendown company like Passaredo Voepass.
The pilot didn't call mayday, why? may be instructions not to waist fuel, time, money.
On top there was a SIGMET with severe icing enroute.
An ATR 500 SHOULD NOT FLY at 170 in those conditions. NEVER.😢
Faulty deicing system
Fly lower or divert flight means more fuel, time money.
The pilots decided to go on until the descent point indicated by ATC.
But 2 minutes and low speed were too much
RIP for all of them.
Mckenzie Green
What was the passengers feeling in the beginning of the stall till?????? Would one pass out at some point of the aircraft’s movements or did they know all the way down they were in trouble. I can’t imagine the g forces they all went through.
They didn’t go through any significant g forces, and other from panicking too hard they wouldn’t have passed out
A Tragedy
Poor airmanship, possible poor CRM and deficient training, like AF447.
So they disregarded multiple warnings? Unprofessional behavior from professional pilots.
3
They should be herding cows, not flying an aircraft...
Total incompetence
Not the pilots fault. Aircraft unsafe in ice. Wing modification required. Ground until modified
Of course it will be unsafe IF the systems to handle it fails and no action gets taken to mitigate it. Any plane can get compromised by ice under those conditions.
And it's safe, or several would fall every day. We'll have to wait for the final report. But at the moment everything indicates that the pilots' lack of action was the most likely cause.
So ignoring the stall warning is completely acceptable? Got it.
As far as I can find out there have been about 4 fatal accidents like this killing about 250 people and In airline safety viewpoint very very unsafe. I would not fly in it, risk is too high
@@keithwalker6892
Five actually, and with the exception of Flight 4184 in October 1994, every other accident and incident has been the result of pilot error and sometimes shockingly bad airmanship. The APM is so simple to understand, yet these two pilots completely ignored two cues and an advisory.
Stay off Silver Airways!
They only fly ATR's!!
And?
Did you actually watch the video or just jump straight into the comments? The pilots knowingly flew into icing conditions with an inoperative deicing system. They then proceeded to ignore the APM cues.
I think the pilots didnt decent because they were going to land anyway, they were about to decent anyway so they thoguht wouldnt stay in icing for long, but the plane didnt make it
I would like to ask the instructor about something that, for me, wasn't clear in the explanation. When the airplane goes from 130kt to 0kt in less than 1 second, does this indicate a sudden deceleration of the airplane relative to the ground (which would lead to a force of more than 7G), or is it simply an indication of airspeed on the sensors? I ask this because 7G of force could have, at that moment, surprised everyone and injured many occupants, including the crew. Would I be correct? Thank you very much for your excellent work in this video and on this channel.
(Portuguese) Eu gostaria de fazer uma pergunta ao intrutor, sobre um fato que, para mim, não ficou claro na explicação. No momento que o avião vai de 130kt a 0kt em menos de 1 segundo, isso indica uma desacereação brusca do avião em relação solo (o que levaria a uma força de mais de 7G) ou é apesar um indicação de velocidade de ar nos sensores? Pergunto isto, pois 7G de força poderia ter surpreendido a todos e ferido muitos ocupantes, inclusive a tripulação, eu estaria correto? Muito obrigado pelo seu excelente trabalho neste vídeo e neste canal.
There's something really off about that crazy 17000!! FPM momentary climb. That has to be a bug in the animation. That's nearly 200kt vertically upwards.
Very nice video. This video should be mandatory viewing for all current and future ATR pilots.
It should also be mandatory for all people who certified this aircraft for flight into icing knowing that the only response to a severe-icing encounter is, to fly out of the icing. They are saying it's safe to fly into icing, but if you encounter it, you must fly out of it. Heck, by that reasoning, any aircraft in the world could be certified for flight into icing by just adding a line in the manual that says, "if icing is encountered, fly out of it"!
I'll wait for the final report before I blame the pilots for this.
Can be the pack malfunction and de-icing system fault somehow related? Like problem with valves control on one side of aircraft, on same engine for example? Of course, its only speculation, but we have two failed systems which can be traced to the engine hot air source. Thanks for video.
As far as the preliminary report can show, departing from the animation point of view, poor flight management and assessment of a degrading situation might have played a substantial role in the accident.
Corporate culture, decision making and maybe also some upset simulator training could have some impact on avoiding this accident.
Is there any possibility the horizontal stab is stalled too? It seems hard to believe they would have the strength to oppose both the stick pusher and the aircraft's natural tendency to want to pitch down into the now downward vertical flight path.
Magnar is one pilot I can listen to anytime regarding ATR plane as he's speaking from experience not from opinion like the rest and he doesn't sensationalize matters for views