Well done Al for telling the true reason for the failure of the operation-Gavins obsession with the Groesbeek Heights and Brownings failure to realise the huge blunder of not using the surprise to grab the bridge immediately. Many historians have avoided this inconvenient truth in favour of selling their books in America.
The real reason was Browning's obsession with making sure that the area around his HQ was completely cleared of enemy forces. He diverted a significant part of Gavin's forces away from the advance to ensure his safety, thus losing momentum. Browning was both the architect of the operation and the architect of its downfall. There are many other things that he mismanaged before and during the operation, this is but one example.
Yes. It was Boy Browning's decision to expend significant 82 AA troops to secure those heights. He was convinced that the Heights contained German troops.
@@jimmarnell3964 sorry that is just not true. Gavin himself admitted that it was his personal decision to prioritise the ridge at the expense of the main bridge
That is one reason for the failure but far from the only reason. The Operations are under pressure from the start. Hell’s Highway is closed by German counterattacks as often as it’s open. Thirty Corps has to reverse direction to help reopen the route. The reason for the failure of the Operations is the Allied underestimation of the Germans’ ability and will to resist. Thunder runs are always high risk. The speed of the advance leave your flanks exposed, logistics are problematic and your advanced elements are always at risk of being cut off. If things go your way you’ve got Guderian reaching the channel ports; if not you’ve got 1st Airborne at Arnhem.
The real reason was the caution of the air commanders, Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst for not flying double missions on day one (Brereton and Williams) and not dropping closer to the Arnhem bridge (Hollinghurst) plus Brereton preventing tactical ground attack air support.
My Uncle (Royal Engineers) was at the bridge at Nijmegen. He took a small tug boat from the Power Station and went backwards and forwards (during the battle for the bridge) and rescued British and American troops that were trapped on the riverbank as the German counterattack took place, at night. Apparently the whole place was lit up like daylight with all the fires and explosions going on. He was an Architect and Artist, and painted a picture of it just after the battle.
I worked in the Elizabeth hospital in the 1980's never knowing how much fighting took place there. Respect for all those soldiers who fought in this battle
The week I spent in Arnhem for the 80th was just absolutely priceless. I have been to this special place three times, and of all three the 2024 trip was the most emotional one for me. Watching the internment of Private Moon and Lt. Anderson (GPR) at the Oosterbeek Cemetery was incredible. And on Saturday, September 21st - before I left for my return to the States, I spent time at the Rhenen General Cemetery paying my respects at the grave of Captain James Ogilvie. What an incredible week.
Was a great pleasure to be apart of Pte Henry Moons funeral. First time in Arnhem, will definitely be back. The young soldiers with me took so much away from there.
Went to Arnhem in June (dragging my girlfriend to the last ever Eagles concert was the sweetener) Hell of a thing to be stood on the bridge trying to imagine the carnage of Frost’s perimeter. There was a memorial on at the Oosterbeek cemetery with young Dutch and British cadets taking part. Beautiful place.
I'm old enough to have sat transfixed as a little boy listening to many of my relatives and neighbors trading their war stories among each other. And later I found out that the mother of a high school classmate was a little girl when the war came to the streets of her hometown of Arnhem. I am so glad that you two are putting this important history on video for the current and future generations who won't be able to learn it from the people who lived it.
I sure am going to enjoy this after listening through the whole story on the podcast. I think this will be an excellent companion piece to the deep dive of the podcast. Now that you've heard the story in great depth, you can now visualize and see how it all fits together in the real locations. Well done on all this! Really has been a fantastic series.
Rode across Holland last year with my eldest son just so I could show him the bridge and walk the ground. What an amazing place. Great podcast series btw Al and James.
My grandad faught up to Bemmel on the island, going over the nijmegen railway bridge with the 5th east Yorkshire's. Can't wait for this series. You're doing amazing things to keep these stories and memories alive ❤
James Holland - a fine military historian, I have his books on my shelves - is 'treading on egg shells' when touching on Gen James Gavin's role at Nijmegen..
Least of all was Gavin having to deal with order to hold the heights first from the narcissist that was General Browning and his ridiculous use of precious gliders to carry his entourage. How different would it have been if Ridgeway commanded? I never did get a good answer on why Browning was in command if two US Airborne divisions.
@@user-mc4sq3fk5dbecause he was the most experienced airborne officer going by a long shot and ridgeway had the army command when the army was formed ridgeway was given command and I believe he even suggested browning be given command of the corps Browning had jumped at Salerno and Sicily unlike Gavin the other option was Maxwell Taylor who had only been promoted to division command just before Normandy Browning unlike the rest had fought as an infantry officer in WW1 and WW2 before becoming a paratrooper and was considered a safe pair of hands
My Grandad was in the Navy, me Merchant Navy down south in 82 just turned 18 on the way to war on a RFA tanker OLNA. I hope as you talked about the harbours. That how they moved fuel ammo food, the squaddie fought but needed the other stuff to fight. I am loving this series.
My interest in Market Garden and Arnhem sprung from watching the film “A Bridge Too Far” with my uncle and him saying he was part of the convoy sent to evacuate the survivors from 1st Airborne after the battle. I made a Pilgrimage to both the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges in 2017.
How you are totally correct in saying how personal and important this battle is for so many families around the UK. For me a member of my family dropped in with the air landing brigade, treated wounded over the next nine days and then was eventually captured by the SS. Of course that wasn't the end of it there was the eventual escape meet up with The resistance smuggled to the SA S and then the escape back over the Rhine.
The real reason was the caution of the air commanders Brereton and Williams of the USAAF for refusing to fly double missions on day one and Hollinghurst of the RAF for not dropping closer to the Arnhem bridge. Also Brereton preventing tactical ground attack air support.
Looking forward to this guys. Loving the book Al. Was a bit nervous when James and Woody gave you a reach around but it's brilliant. Incidentally I was in Arnhem in 84 went on a massive bender with a guy from 9 sqn. May have disgraced myself but the Dutch still loved me
OMG OMG OMG 😮 In my job I have been on battlefield studies of Nijmegen with the Grenadier Guards & since then I have read the trilogy of Route Club by Tim Saunders, “HELLS HIGHWAY”, “NIJMEGEN” & “THE ISLAND” So excited for this guys 😀😃😄😁🇬🇧
What a wonderful view of Arnhem Bridge very excited to watch and listen to your factual coverage especially with Al having DNA in the game in such an important battle in British history.. 😎
All this took place pretty much in my back yard. It'll be interesting to see you visit all the places that are so familiar to me. I hope you had fun today at Ginkel Heath as well.
It was late August, 1976, I bought the paperback A Bridge to Far at the local hospital gift shop while visiting my grandfather in the hospital. "Soon to be a major motion picture" was featured on the front cover and that caught my attention. A great book and went to the theater in the summer of 1977 to see the movie.
Cannot wait to read your book Mr. Murray. I have been totally intruiged with this battle ever since reading Cornelious Ryans book and seeing A bridge too far. I would be interested in yours and Mr. Hollands thoughts on General Browning needing 35 gliders to carry his H.Q to Nijmegan on the day of the assault as per Anthony Beevors book "Arnhem".By the way Mr.Holland book " Brothers in arms" is un put downable.
My Grandfather was there 80 years ago with The Kings own Scottish Borderers, PTE Reginald T Hamilton 14437879 was captured at Oosterbeek, he remained a POW till the end of the war, i did hear a few stories of his time there, but looking back i wish i had the chance to learn more before he passed in 2004
read "arnhem lift", a war diary written by an soldier who survived the whole ordeal and wrote it down a few weeks after it actually happened. the Oosterbeek part in Ryan's book an thus the film are based on this book. absolutely amazing
Can't wait for the rest of these - just got back from dragging the other half around Arnhem and it's such a fantastic city to visit. I can't wait to see what things I missed in this series! (Hopefully I didn't miss the duo but I won't be surprised to see myself looking clueless in the background at some point...)
Me and my brother drove from France across to the Ardennes and then into Germany to go back across to Holland to drive across the Arnhem bridge with a bridge to far music playing all to find out they had it closed to paint the railings that lovely airborne red that you see in the clip haha
One fact mostly forgotten is that XXX corps and the 101th Airborne had 3 times very high casualties engagements with several German infantry, tank and a panzergrenadeer divison around Veghel. (2 road 1 railway bridge crossing the South Willem canal ) The route got blocked 3 times due to big German counter offensives, the biggest delay of the entire timetable of the ground operation. XXX corps got depleted and exhausted due to the severe fighting along the route to Arnhem and could't get on time to support the para's there. We mostly tell the story of the airborne troops but the ground troops fought and suffered along the entire route.
There's a small museum inside an old German bunker in front of the Grave bridge, if you walk into the wooded area next to it you can still find the bullet casings strewn around the ground. Would love to see you both exploring there.
You're in luck as we do go to Grave Bridge and walk the approach towards the bridge. We do look at the bunkers, but sadly they were both locked up the day we visited.
One thing about the initial assault on the Arnhem bridges that confuses me is that the area south of the Rhine was considered unstable for drops on day 1 but the Polish brigade were scheduled to drop there on day 3. A battalion or 2 of parachutists dropping there in the initial assault would have made the German position much more difficult.
The Yanks didn't fail to grab Nijmegen bridge, to fail is to be foiled in an attempt and on that crucial first day after all troops from GOC's to latrine orderlies had been briefed on how vital seizing their own bridges was Gavins division set up shop on the Groesbeek heights and ignored their bridge allowing the enemy to massively reinforce it. Nobody knows why.
before 740 men had even arrived at the last intact bridge in Arnhem area (rail bridge 4 miles/6k from LZ Z), 82nd had captured the 500m bridge north of Grave and the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders, capacity about 1,000 infantrymen. when scout cars of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day 3 they were still 28 miles/40 k (on current maps) from Arnhem, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset. on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water.
@@nickdanger3802 Browning and his colossal staff were indeed useless mouths. However the entire operation was predicated on the swift capture of the road bridges and Gavin knew that so while securing the heights is obviously important of far more importance was the bridge. Rumours of '400 German tanks' in the Reichswald a couple of miles away were rapidly disproven by a recce in force report of empty forest and it remains a mystery to this day why Gavin sent only 1/9 of his infantry to capture the vital bridge before the Germans threw everything they had at the north end. This is not to denigrate the US paras performance, only Gavins.
@@antonrudenham3259 "Rumours of '400 German tanks' in the Reichswald a couple of miles away were rapidly disproven" British AO, British intel. "of far more importance was the bridge." 82nd had two major rivers to secure bridges for, a major canal bridge and the Heights for day one objectives and accomplished three. 1st AB was supposed to capture 3 bridges and secure the future landings zones. 1st AB started losing LZ's on day two and blocked one bridge for four days during the entire op. look at any map of Arnhem AO that has landing zones and a scale of miles/km and you will see LZ Z is 4 miles/6k from the rail bridge. "the first of those bound for LZ-Z came in at 13:19. This lift contained Major-General Urquhart's Headquarters and approximately half of the Divisional Units, included amongst which were the Jeeps of the Reconnaissance Squadron, two batteries of the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment, and also the 1st Parachute Brigade's vehicles and anti-tank guns." Pegasus Archive The First Lift (Sunday 17th September) Urquhart took all of his arty and AT guns and Bren carriers and jeeps to tow them on day one even though the interpretation of the intel had it taking at least 24 hours for German armor to react.
Appreciate you, can I add that Gavin had no faith in this plan, 30 corps or Montgomery and wasn’t interested in becoming martyrs like the British paras, god bless them
@@johnwhitney2431 He was a soldier given clear orders by his superiors and as a div cdr was in a position to make his misgivings clear during his briefing, he chose not to and therefore accepted those orders. Then he failed to try to carry them out. Whether he 'liked' Montgomery, 30 Corp, the plan or the Boston Red Sox is totally irrelevant. It's inexplicable.
Green on mucker lots of memories from a oldswet my self an ex'service AB ALL THE WAY BROTHER FROM A EX'PARA from 2PARA i had 4'uncle's who was in this rade an only 2came out 😊 top info on the show n channel guy's keep this up n rolling out 😊 top info lads! See u ob the DZ today m8 😊
Did they go to that tunnel they discovered that you can just about fit a truck through you spoke about on the pod , to save them bouncing stuff over the railway lines ? Or is it even still there ? I really wanted to see that after hearing it described , bit random I know 😅
@@Ziabeedee - if you mean the tunnel under the railway embankment just east of Wolfheze you can just fit a Jeep through, the Google map co-ordinates for the tunnel is 52.00366 5.80299 and the tunnel is marked on the map as "De Duiker". The track on the north side of the tunnel entrance is also the approximate location of the Reconnaissance Squadron ambush by Krafft's SS training battalion, which had an extension of his Wolfhezerweg blocking line along the rail embankment and in the woods to the Northeast in a classic L-shape ambush position.
@@lyndoncmp5751 A 70 to 100 meter wide river with a bailey bridge? Easy ? In peacetime Ok but in wartime? They would have needed pontoons or in tact piers.
Westervoort is a good question because the Royal Engineers had those bridges (Westervoort has road and rail bridges side by side) on their list of tasks for checking and removing any demolitions. I don't have any information on the specific plans for 3rd Parachute Battalion's deployment, had it been able to reach the Arnhem bridge - they were tasked with occupying the eastern sector of the town. 2nd Battalion was to occupy the western sector, with A Company at the highway bridge, B Company at the pontoon bridge, and C Company either the southern end of the highway bridge after crossing the Oosterbeek rail bridge, or failing that, the secondary objective of occupying the German Ortskommandantur (town military headquarters). 1st Battalion were to occupy the high ground north of Arnhem, with Company strong points on the Amsterdam and Apeldoorn roads, until relieved by the 4th Parachute Brigade on D+1. So, that whole eastern sector that was supposed to be occupied by the Polish Parachute Brigade on D+2 that included the Westervoort bridges (and there is a map overlay of the Polish deployment plan in Karel Margry's Operation Market Garden Then and Now, 2002) is an area not very well researched, because it didn't happen, so 3rd Battalion's intended layout in particular is a bit of a mystery I'm afraid. The Ijssel bridges, or bridging sites if blown, at Deventer and Zutphen were intended to be occupied by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, and the Ijssel bridge at Doesburg by the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division. I believe the Doesburg bridge was a civilian 'ship bridge' (as was the so-called 'pontoon' bridge at Arnhem and not military bridges), was blown by the Germans, and units from 10.SS-panzer-Division heading for Arnhem had to use Zutphen to cross the Ijssel.
@@davemac1197 The 12th of april 1945 (!) allied forces crossed towards the Westervoort fortress that protects the Westervoort bridges. This fortress is still in place.
it is a big misunderstanding that getting over the Rhine river on this spot opens the way to Germany. In between is still the fast running and considerable river IJssel. just look for yourselves.
The Ijssel bridges were part of the plan for operation GARDEN and not the airborne operation MARKET, except perhaps for the bridges at Westvoort that were within the designated sector of the planned 1st Airborne Division perimeter around Arnhem assigned to the Polish Parachute Brigade. It's also possible the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Parachute Brigade were to seize these bridges with a forward Company, as they were designated to be responsible for the eastern sector of the town until the Poles arrived, but the Royal Engineers certainly had the Westervoort bridges included in their tasks to disarm any demolitions. The Ijssel bridges didn't need to be captured intact in any case as the operation was to terminate on the Zuider Zee (Ijsselmeer) coast with the Guards Division, and 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division were to seize deep bridgeheads over the Ijssel at Deventer and Zutphen, and the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division at Doesburg, making assault river crossings if the bridges were blown. If the bridges had to be replaced with Bailey bridges, there would be plenty of time to do that, since the exploitation operation of an advance into Germany was only to be done after the US 1st Army had established their own Rhine crossings between Cologne and Bonn (they were currently stuck west of Aachen in September), and the intention was to conduct a pincer operation on the Ruhr with both armies. It was also understood that multiple advances into Germany along Eisenhower's 'broad front' strategy would not be possible until the port of Antwerp was open to supply them, so that's another reason the Ijssel crossings were not going to be exploited immediately. A pause was needed for the Americans to cross the Rhine, and for the Canadians to clear the Scheldt estuary west of Antwerp, as the existing logistics capacity had to be switched from one priority to another in sequence and could not supply everyone at the same. The reason historians never touch on this is because that part of operation GARDEN could not be carried out, so all these points get neglected.
@@davemac1197 i dont think you know the situation very well. It is impossible to span the ijssel river with a bailey bridge. The current bridge at Westervoort is now at least 150m long. It is a wild river with very strong current. My statement comes from quotes of the book from christer bergstrom - arnhem 1944- - looks to me a meticulously written book. Futhermore if you just look at the distances it looks impossible to me to take these bridges as well (and hold them) or the planning had to be not optimistic as it was, but just totally unrealistic.
@@marcel-y8c - I take the information from Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps in Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2021), part of his series of books on MARKET GARDEN Engineers. The XXX Corps deployments north of the Rijn are also shown on maps in the Vrienden Airborne Museum and on their web site. Bailey bridges could be constructed across wide rivers and were in fact constructed across the Waal at Nijmegen in case the Germans managed to damage or destroy the road and rail bridges (the road bridge was holed by an aerial bomb and a rail span dropped by Kriegsmarine commandos), as well as the Rijn at Arnhem with two bridges in 1945 (one high level using the bridge piers and a low level pontoon bridge to the east, used until the highway bridge was rebuilt in 1950. Every crossing point involved in the operation was meticulously planned to have replacement bridges and pre-planned bridge columns assigned in advance in case they were needed. The Royal Engineers in the Guards Division were responsible for crossings south of the Maas, and the British and Canadian Army Group Royal Engineers for the Maas, Waal, Rijn and Ijssel. The 43rd (Wessex) Division was also prepared to carry out an assault crossing of the Waal with one or two brigades (operations BESSIE and BASIL), and were on a warning order to carry out BASIL at Nijmegen, but Gavin had intervened insisting his own troops be used if XXX Corps could supply the boats and the original plans were not put into operation. I also have Christer Bergström's two volumes on Arnhem, and although it has some detail errors I was not aware that he said it was "impossible" to bridge the Ijssel. Perhaps you misread it? If you can give me a page reference I will have a look at the quote and see if I can understand what he was saying.
@@marcel-y8c Nothing is impossible to him who will try - Alexander the Great. Bill Slim in Burma managed to deal with the WIDEST river in Asia, some 2,000 yards long, and he didn't even have pontoon bridges and boats, he cut down forest trees to build 550 10 tonne barges and ferried 600,000 men across the Irrawaddy river. The ijssel River could have been crossed. It's not some impossible barrier.
@@davemac1197 Even Slim in Asia demonstrated a wide river could be tackled in his operation at Meiktila and Mandalay, the sheer length of the rivers in Asia made the rivers in northern europe look like a swimming pool.
That monument by the Arnhem bridge is a 25-pounder field gun, so I think it represents the 1945 liberation rather than the 1944 airborne battle - it was not a gun that was used by the airborne.
Not literally the only building left. THe big church and many buildings around that bottom right side of the picture are still there. James does a lot of improv, doesnt he? :)
I hope you will also explain the one thing that always boggled me..... you say "the last water obstacle before the Reich"..... but it isnt. Getting over the Arnhem one takes you into an area where the river Ijssel seperates you from Germany. SO what was Montgomory thinking???
Agree. It is often mentioned that Frost held the Arnhem bridge. He controlled more or less the Northern entrance, but did not manage to secure the southern part from where germans kept attacking. Only a fraction of the British forces managed to reach the bridge. Secondly: what was the backup plan in case something went wrong. What if the Nazis had blown up the Nijmegen bridges (road bridge and rail bridge)? The Waal river is about 150 meters wide. the Rhine is a friendly 80 meter wide stream compared to the situation in Nijmegen. You cannot build a bailey bridge at Nijmegen.
@@jandenijmegen5842 The Germans had already planned a counter offensive towards Antwerp to take it in October ( i found this out from an experienced poster on the Market Garden subject called davemac1197 ) so there was no reason for them to blow the bridges since they NEEDED THEM for that.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Then why were the bridges in Nijmegen and Grave prepared for blowing up? Indeed Model did not want the bridges to be blown up. But why prepare them? Answer: you never know with Hitler as the prime commander.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Another clarification: Just a number of days after Market Garden the German army launched a large number of attacks on the Nijmegen bridge. Late september by dive bombers, first junkers, then Focke Wulf. Early october Nijmegen was bombed. Also the railroad bridge was attacked by divers (Kampfschwimmer) using a torpedomine, which was succesfull. In short: Model was indeed thinking of a counteer offensive using the Nijmegen bridges but this idea did not live very long. The german efforts to destroy the nijmegen bridges had cost them about 46 planes.
In an era of flying boats, I wonder if they could have landed gliders with sea plane floats on the river, to get right into the objective straight away
Had the airborne division tasked with capturing and securing the Arnhem bridge been successful in accomplishing all of their objectives could they have been able to hold out long enough so that the delay at Nijmegen wouldn't have doomed the division?
Always amazing to see how little the British understand of river estuaries. If you want to invade Germany from Arnhem you also need a bridge over the river IJssel. Never heard anybody speaking about this. They always say if we had conquered the Arnhem bridge we could have just walked to Berlin, which is of course nonsense.
It doesn't get spoken about enough, we agree. The longterm Market Garden plan is for the Polish to secure Ijssel crossing, with the 2nd Army then bringing in Bailey bridges to supplement the crossing.
@@WW2WalkingTheGround : Which makes it more understandable why the British gave up immediately after the Allies had secured the Waal-bridge in Nijmegen. There was no chance anymore to conquer a crossing over the IJssel.
@@WW2WalkingTheGround Why make a surprise attack using airborne troops to secure the bridges and then cross the IJssel in the slowest way possible? The waal river is 150 meters wide, the Rhine at Arnhem is about 80 meters wide and the average width of the IJssel is about 70 - 140 meters. Furthermore in those days rivers could freeze and the ice could cause severe damage to pontoon supported bridges. Crossing the IJssel remains a mystery to me and so is the aim of Market Garden.
Perhaps you've never heard of British subterfuge..the aim was never to turn right into Germany after Arnhem but to turn left and trap and destroy a huge Proportion of the German Army in the Amsterdam region. It never fails to amaze me how the rest of the world underestimates the British 😉
The plan for the operation GARDEN ground forces was to advance to the Zuider Zee (Ijsselmeer) coast to cut off German forces west of the corridor, and the 43rd and 50th Infantry Divisions were to secure bridgeheads over the Ijssel at Deventer, Zutphen and Doesburg. The Westervoort Ijssel bridges were also in the Polish sector of the planned 1st Airborne Division perimeter around Arnhem as WW2WTG said, but obviously they were not able to occupy it. If the Ijssel bridges were demolished by the Germans, the 43rd Division was to make river assault crossings to secure bridgeheads and the Royal Engineers were to build replacement Bailey bridges. There was no hurry for this phase as the exploitation of the Ijssel crossings were only to be carried out after the US 1st Army had crossed the Rhine between Bonn and Cologne, and they were currently stuck west of Aachen, then Eisenhower intended a pincer operation on the Ruhr with both armies after Antwerp had been opened by the Canadians to supply his 'broad front' strategy into Germany. That's why the Ijssel bridges were not targeted in the airborne operation MARKET - they were not required to get the Guards quickly to the Ijsselmeer coast. So the planners understood the geography very well, but historians never talk about this phase of the operation because it didn't happen.
@@johnrussell3961 The Americans were obviously drinking coffee on Groesbeek Ridge for three whole days! Did you know the Americans installed 32 mobile trailer-mounted, coffee-roasting units in July 1944, producing 90,000 lbs of coffee each and every day? I bet you failed to acknowledge that.
Montgomery was nothing like the meat-grinder that Patton was. He was aware that he needed to preserve British lives as we had a severe manpower shortage following on from WW1 and the early years of WW2
Looking forward to the new book. I’ve felt for a long time that it’s naive to think that the delay at Nijmegen was the sole reason that Market/Garden failed. It’s tempting to believe that Market/Garden almost succeeded largely because of the sort of counterfactual belief that if the Allies had crossed the Rhine they would have easily encircled the Ruhr and the war would be over. That belief is attractive but relies on far too many assumptions. It’s also very self satisfying to pinpoint one event and/or one individual for the failure of an Operation(s). The British can blame it all on Gavin and be satisfied that their hero Montgomery’s plan was genius and would have ended the war, showered him and Britain in glory except for the failings of that idiot American. Likewise the Americans can blame the failure on the miscalculation of Browning or the poor planning of Montgomery knowing Patton could have pulled it off if the situations were reversed. My own belief is that the plan was flawed with blame passed around amongst SCHAEF with Eisenhower and Montgomery responsible in equal measure. The main short coming was Allied hubris resulting in the gross underestimation of the German’s ability and will to resist.
There's an argument to suggest that if the Western Allies got into the Ruhr in late 1944 the Germans may have collapsed given the alternative was the Russians. They fought hard in 1945 because they needed to keep the Russians out of Prussia to allow time to evacuate as many civilians as possible. Certainly it's highly unlikely the Wehrmacht would have fought a shard to keep the Americans out of Berlin as they did the Soviets.
@@stewartjohnson5053General Blumentritt was adamant that a concentrated allied push to the Ruhr in September/October would have finished the Germans. Instead Eisenhower was supplying forces down in the Lorraine and the Operation Dragoon forces coming to the Alsace. Montgomery argued for everything to be concentrated in the north, aimed at the Ruhr.
@@lyndoncmp5751 20/20 hindsight is of course a wonderful thing of course. It is worth remembering the time it took from Normandy through to the surrender of the Germans took the Western Allies less time than the Gaza War. So were mistakes made? Yes. Could we all have done better? Doubtful.
So large scale British Armour elements need a complete escort by lightly armed and under supplied US Airborne Infantry who, at great cost, captured both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge?
The British Grenadier Guards tanks raced across the Nijmegen road bridge and captured the north end of the bridge. The 82nd troopers weren't there. They were still at the railway viaduct in Lent, one km north of the road bridge. Sgt Peter Robinson lead tank in the platoon, had to go all the way to Lent before he saw any paratroopers. It was the Guards tanks that actually took the bridge. Captain Carrington then followed and guarded the north end of the bridge alone for about an hour until he received support. A Bridge Too Far shows this inaccurately.
To be honest I don´t really understand the fuzz the Brits are making out of this battle. It was a shameful and absolutely embarrassing defeat. Elite crack British parachute units receive a proper hiding and a bloody nose from a bunch of German ragtag units that are 2nd and even 3rd class. And this is what the Market Garden / the battle of Arnhem in fact was, another proof of German military prowess. The Germans reaction was exemplary. It was fast, it was swift, it was vigorous, it was determined. No other army in the world could have done it like that, that´s for sure and certainly not the British army as we we have seen on Crete where it failed miserably. Instead of a quick decisive battle the Brits and other allies were locked into a ferocious fight. German units performed heroically especially considering they were ragtag units lacking proper training, proper equipment, and were inferior in number. The Germans succeeded in inflicting heaviest casualties on their opponents (higher casualties than they, the Germans, suffered) despite the fact the Brits/allies had the initiative, were vastly superior on people and materials, had complete air superiority AND used elite crack troops.
Well that didn't actually happen so..... A lot of the Germans were very good indeed for a start. The Paras didn't get a good hiding but held on for far longer than was anticipated. And the Allies didn't have air superiority.
@@stewartjohnson5053 "The Paras didn't get a good hiding but held on for far longer than was anticipated." They did not just receive a good but a VERY good hiding. How else do you want to call it. And it is even more embarrassing for the Brit paratroopers that they received a bloody nose by German troops that were 2nd and 3rd rate. Arnhem and Crete are both examples for German military prowess. They captured Crete against all odds and against 1st rate British troops who had numerical superiority. This is how a succesful airborne operation needs to be carried out. In Arnhem they foiled an airborne operation against all odds with 2nd and 3rd rate ragtag units against elite troops with numerical superiority. In both cases the Germans were simply outstanding whereas the Brits svcked royally. "And the Allies didn't have air superiority." :-D
@@kodor1146 I think the fact you called the Wehrmacht 'heroic' shows what kind of person you are, but the fact you think the German troops involved were 3rd rate shows how utterly ignorant you are of the entire battle.
@@stewartjohnson5053 "I think the fact you called the Wehrmacht 'heroic' shows what kind of person you are" What is wrong calling the Wehrmacht defenders of Arnhem heroic? I don´t get it. " but the fact you think the German troops involved were 3rd rate shows how utterly ignorant you are of the entire battle." Most German troops at Arnhem were 2nd and 3rd rate. As I wrote before the German response to the airborne assault was outstanding. Everything that had legs and could hold a weapon was brought to Arnhem within a very short time. Railway workers, men from the Labor Service, boys of the Hitler Youth, soldiers from butchery and bakery companies and so on. The Germans didn´t even wait for orders from their superiors, they acted completely on their own and without any knowledge where the paratroopers had landed. They oriented themselves to the noise of battle. Again the German response was simply marvellous and outstanding. No army in the world would have been able to sth. similiar and certainly not the Brits. Especially the Brits never would have been able to a similar swift can do approach.
@@kodor1146 Hmm... yes the Germans responded very quickly to the assault - but the whole 'mission tactics' idea was widespread at the time and certainly the British had driven the Wehrmacht out of Normandy using exactly those same methods. The British paras held on for days until they simply ran out of ammunition. I don't see that as a sign they were anything other than the elite troops they claimed to be. The fault was with the Americans. The British took their bridge and held it for days. The Americans didn't. And no, I don't think calling the Wehrmacht heroic is a good idea given their long record of war crimes in the period.
before 740 men had even arrived at the last intact bridge in Arnhem area (rail bridge 4 miles/6k from LZ Z), 82nd had captured the 500m bridge north of Grave and the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders, capacity about 1,000 infantrymen. when scout cars of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day 3 they were still 28 miles/40 k (on current maps) from Arnhem, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset. on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water.
Really the guy with 5 combat jumps and went on to turn things around in Korea is the reason why this faulty plan failed and not Montgomery, also having your plans captured doesn’t help
@@nickdanger3802 ironically 504th PIR were the only section inadvertently able to execute the British-proposed coup de main plans that Brereton removed. That's why they took Grave Bridge so quickly, but fair play. Why didnt they go for Nijmegen Bridge? It's ok securing your own safety but neglecting the exit route so vital for the safety of the next airborne division along the route is inexcusable. 30 Corps arrived at Nijmegen at 10am, 42 hours after Brereton permitted them to move. It might have been on Day 3 but it was less than two days from their permitted commencement. They travelled 50 miles in less time than Gavin's units moved 4 miles to Nijmegen Bridge! 82nd Division landed just 4 miles from Nijmegen Bridge an hour before 30 Corps started on their drive 50 miles south. Let that sink in before you criticise 30 Corps.
@@OldWolflad " ironically 504th PIR were the only section inadvertently able to execute the British-proposed coup de main plans that Brereton removed." "Under normal circumstances a coup de main raid would have been attempted, whereby a small number of paratroopers or glider troops would land alongside the objective and to capture and hold it until more substantial forces could arrive to relieve them. The Royal Air Force, however, refused to land any troops so close to Arnhem, and so Lathbury sought an alternative. His solution was to take Major Gough's 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron under his command and charge them with undertaking a coup de main. This unit, consisting of one hundred and eighty men, were all mounted on Jeeps which were vulnerable to enemy fire but armoured with powerful twin-Vickers "K" Machine Guns. Although completely unsuited to the purpose, the Squadron was expected to face only minimal opposition and so should have little difficulty in racing to the Bridge, as soon as their vehicles had been unloaded from their gliders, and holding it until the leading elements of the 1st Parachute Brigade arrived several hours later." Pegasus Archive The Plan 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron was decimated.
@@nickdanger3802 Ah but you omitting the key reason why 'coup de main' was ruled out. That was because Brereton and Williams ruled out morning drops, OR double day drops with one at dawn and one in the evening. Once they made the decision that airborne troops were only to be dropped in broad daylight, this effectively ruled out coup-de main near most objectives due to flak positioning. RAF and American planners then redefined where safe LZs could be. This fundamental change changed the whole operation so that only 16,600 airborne troops were landed on Day One as opposed to over 30,000 in Linnet 1 and 2. So don't blame this change on the Limeys, this was all Brereton and Williams doing, who decided that because of 50 minutes less daylight between 3rd Sept 1044 and 17th Sept 1944, double drops could no longer be executed, despite the fact that the first flight was to depart at 5am in Linnet........... in darkness. I'm well aware of Gough's attempt to compensate by a 'mini coup de main' at Arnhem. The concept of coup de main was undoubtedly British - Browning and Montgomery insisted on it as part of Operation Sixteen Plan that was transformed into Operation Market by Brereton. It was also a key aspect of Operation Linnet 1 and 2 and Operation Comet. The critical change was that Brereton then decided only a single drop could be made in broad daylight in Operation Market.
Eisenhower didn't like Montgomery or think much of him as a general, but was forced to give him a leading role because Churchill loved him, the British needed a "hero" general, and Ike had to preserve the alliance. Monty never actually won anything, in fact his record was one of failure that he falsely spun as brilliance. El Alamein was won because Allied air and naval power left Rommel with no fuel, ammo, food, and reinforcements. Montgomery was the "genius" who came up with and insisted on Market Garden which anyone could see was a ridiculous plan. Ike didn't like it and wanted to give the supplies to Patton's push in the south but politics forced him to support Martinet... oops... Monty. If Patton got the fuel and ammo from Market Garden, the US 3rd Army would've been in Berlin before Christmas. Many believe that's why Monty came up with Market Garden and insisted on it... so Patton wouldn't have the resources to continue and Monty would be the conquering general. Instead, his poor strategic vision, terrible execution, and hesitation caused many thousands of allied casualties, just like in Normandy. Remember, Montgomery's own plan for D-Day, and his constant promises, said he would take Caen DAY ONE. It actually took 3 MONTHS because of Monty's legendary hesitency and inability to execute or adapt to changing conditions, and Caen was only taken because of major assistance from other forces. Montgomery was the most arrogant and biggest self-promoter in WW2 and has by far the biggest difference between peoples' perceptions and reality. Yes, Patton was arrogant and a self-promoter... but he WON constantly, always adapted, never made excuses, and was proven right about pretty much everything he said, from the Bulge offensive coming, to his cutoff northern maneuver, to Market Garden, and the Soviets. Monty was a charlatan.
I know you are writing this as a total asshole and to wind people up, but lets examine what you said: - 1) Eisenhower didn't like Montgomery - possibly not personally, not many people did, but that didn't matter, Eisenhower insisted on Montgomery's Market Garden plan. Its a shame Montgomery's plan wasn't executed - it was fundamentally changed by a very cautious pair of American commanders called Brereton and Williams. 2) Montgomery never actually won anything - hmmm, I think this is where you have managed to make yourself look a total uneducated asshole. Others can provide the list of battles he actually did win. Its a long list BTW! 3) Supplies denied to Patton - Patton in fact had come to a grinding halt by 2nd September, and then began receiving adequate supplies by 4th September. Supplies for MG were not drawn away from a struggling US Army. 4) Montgomery's hesitation caused thousands of lives -no, in fact it was Patton's approach that cost thousands of lives. Britain and its Commonwealth lost a high number of men in WW1, and had not recovered. Also we had fought top quality German troops early in the WW2 when admittedly Britain was not ready (nor was US but they stayed out). This was the type of German opposition that would have undoubtedly exposed Patton. Hurtgen Forest showed the world what happens when faced with reasonable German units. 5) Montgomery recognised that the British had a containment role at Normandy, he said this when he explained Op Overlord in April 1944, consequently the British and Canadians fought 660 German tanks and seven Panzer Divisions, whilst the Americans faced a little over 100 tanks and one Panzer Division. 6) With that huge American might behind him, aerial power and huge artillery back up, Patton was always likely to look good. Maybe he was a good general, but was he ever really tested? You can only fight what is in front of you of course, and for Patton that was usually young teenagers and old men.
Utter Rubbish. The Americans in Normandy faced far fewer Armoured divisions than the British and Canadian Armies ( half of which was British) . 90% of German Armour was in the British sector. 10 divisions faced the British on a 60 mile front. To put that in perspective there was more German armour in that sector from the Baltics to Byelorussia. Get your facts right before spiting off. The Americans had literally bugger all against them.
'Never won anything'. Won at El Alamenin and was architect of the victory of the Normandy campaign. Caen was never going to be taken once Rommel places 21st Panzer Division there. 12th SS Panzer was also nearby, just a day's march from Caen. The Gemans committed 8 panzer divisions to defend Caen, which was Monty's intention and would allow the US forces to capture Cherbourg, then turn 180 degrees to capture St Lo and then breakout.
For the love of all that is good in the World when is this series actually going to start proper? I'm on tenderhooks... tenterhooks? I'm excited for this series to start. Please start.
![[LIVE] : ONE ลุมพินี 91 | คู่เอก "คมอาวุธ vs อเล็กเซย์"](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/V0RkEfYFsgM/mqdefault.jpg)
Well done Al for telling the true reason for the failure of the operation-Gavins obsession with the Groesbeek Heights and Brownings failure to realise the huge blunder of not using the surprise to grab the bridge immediately. Many historians have avoided this inconvenient truth in favour of selling their books in America.
The real reason was Browning's obsession with making sure that the area around his HQ was completely cleared of enemy forces. He diverted a significant part of Gavin's forces away from the advance to ensure his safety, thus losing momentum. Browning was both the architect of the operation and the architect of its downfall. There are many other things that he mismanaged before and during the operation, this is but one example.
Yes. It was Boy Browning's decision to expend significant 82 AA troops to secure those heights. He was convinced that the Heights contained German troops.
@@jimmarnell3964 sorry that is just not true. Gavin himself admitted that it was his personal decision to prioritise the ridge at the expense of the main bridge
That is one reason for the failure but far from the only reason. The Operations are under pressure from the start. Hell’s Highway is closed by German counterattacks as often as it’s open. Thirty Corps has to reverse direction to help reopen the route. The reason for the failure of the Operations is the Allied underestimation of the Germans’ ability and will to resist. Thunder runs are always high risk. The speed of the advance leave your flanks exposed, logistics are problematic and your advanced elements are always at risk of being cut off. If things go your way you’ve got Guderian reaching the channel ports; if not you’ve got 1st Airborne at Arnhem.
The real reason was the caution of the air commanders, Brereton, Williams and Hollinghurst for not flying double missions on day one (Brereton and Williams) and not dropping closer to the Arnhem bridge (Hollinghurst) plus Brereton preventing tactical ground attack air support.
My Uncle (Royal Engineers) was at the bridge at Nijmegen. He took a small tug boat from the Power Station and went backwards and forwards (during the battle for the bridge) and rescued British and American troops that were trapped on the riverbank as the German counterattack took place, at night. Apparently the whole place was lit up like daylight with all the fires and explosions going on. He was an Architect and Artist, and painted a picture of it just after the battle.
I worked in the Elizabeth hospital in the 1980's never knowing how much fighting took place there. Respect for all those soldiers who fought in this battle
The week I spent in Arnhem for the 80th was just absolutely priceless. I have been to this special place three times, and of all three the 2024 trip was the most emotional one for me. Watching the internment of Private Moon and Lt. Anderson (GPR) at the Oosterbeek Cemetery was incredible. And on Saturday, September 21st - before I left for my return to the States, I spent time at the Rhenen General Cemetery paying my respects at the grave of Captain James Ogilvie. What an incredible week.
Was a great pleasure to be apart of Pte Henry Moons funeral. First time in Arnhem, will definitely be back. The young soldiers with me took so much away from there.
Went to Arnhem in June (dragging my girlfriend to the last ever Eagles concert was the sweetener) Hell of a thing to be stood on the bridge trying to imagine the carnage of Frost’s perimeter. There was a memorial on at the Oosterbeek cemetery with young Dutch and British cadets taking part. Beautiful place.
I'm old enough to have sat transfixed as a little boy listening to many of my relatives and neighbors trading their war stories among each other. And later I found out that the mother of a high school classmate was a little girl when the war came to the streets of her hometown of Arnhem. I am so glad that you two are putting this important history on video for the current and future generations who won't be able to learn it from the people who lived it.
RG Poulussen's books are fairly comprehensive on this subject of Nijmegen, and Gavin's decisions not to prioritise the bridge overe the Waal.
Just enjoyed your Normandy walks. Looking forward to this set.
I sure am going to enjoy this after listening through the whole story on the podcast.
I think this will be an excellent companion piece to the deep dive of the podcast. Now that you've heard the story in great depth, you can now visualize and see how it all fits together in the real locations.
Well done on all this! Really has been a fantastic series.
Rode across Holland last year with my eldest son just so I could show him the bridge and walk the ground. What an amazing place. Great podcast series btw Al and James.
My grandad faught up to Bemmel on the island, going over the nijmegen railway bridge with the 5th east Yorkshire's. Can't wait for this series. You're doing amazing things to keep these stories and memories alive ❤
It's always good to see hardcore historians giving history some love!!
James Holland - a fine military historian, I have his books on my shelves - is 'treading on egg shells' when touching on Gen James Gavin's role at Nijmegen..
Least of all was Gavin having to deal with order to hold the heights first from the narcissist that was General Browning and his ridiculous use of precious gliders to carry his entourage. How different would it have been if Ridgeway commanded? I never did get a good answer on why Browning was in command if two US Airborne divisions.
@@user-mc4sq3fk5dbecause he was the most experienced airborne officer going by a long shot and ridgeway had the army command when the army was formed ridgeway was given command and I believe he even suggested browning be given command of the corps Browning had jumped at Salerno and Sicily unlike Gavin the other option was Maxwell Taylor who had only been promoted to division command just before Normandy Browning unlike the rest had fought as an infantry officer in WW1 and WW2 before becoming a paratrooper and was considered a safe pair of hands
Can't wait, looking forward to the Sherman action!
What a great and fascinating channel. Thanks guys for putting this together.
My Grandad was in the Navy, me Merchant Navy down south in 82 just turned 18 on the way to war on a RFA tanker OLNA. I hope as you talked about the harbours. That how they moved fuel ammo food, the squaddie fought but needed the other stuff to fight. I am loving this series.
My interest in Market Garden and Arnhem sprung from watching the film “A Bridge Too Far” with my uncle and him saying he was part of the convoy sent to evacuate the survivors from 1st Airborne after the battle. I made a Pilgrimage to both the Nijmegen and Arnhem bridges in 2017.
How you are totally correct in saying how personal and important this battle is for so many families around the UK. For me a member of my family dropped in with the air landing brigade, treated wounded over the next nine days and then was eventually captured by the SS. Of course that wasn't the end of it there was the eventual escape meet up with The resistance smuggled to the SA S and then the escape back over the Rhine.
The real reason was the caution of the air commanders Brereton and Williams of the USAAF for refusing to fly double missions on day one and Hollinghurst of the RAF for not dropping closer to the Arnhem bridge. Also Brereton preventing tactical ground attack air support.
Looking forward to this guys. Loving the book Al. Was a bit nervous when James and Woody gave you a reach around but it's brilliant. Incidentally I was in Arnhem in 84 went on a massive bender with a guy from 9 sqn. May have disgraced myself but the Dutch still loved me
OMG OMG OMG 😮
In my job I have been on battlefield studies of Nijmegen with the Grenadier Guards & since then I have read the trilogy of Route Club by Tim Saunders, “HELLS HIGHWAY”, “NIJMEGEN” & “THE ISLAND”
So excited for this guys 😀😃😄😁🇬🇧
What a wonderful view of Arnhem Bridge very excited to watch and listen to your factual coverage especially with Al having DNA in the game in such an important battle in British history.. 😎
All this took place pretty much in my back yard. It'll be interesting to see you visit all the places that are so familiar to me. I hope you had fun today at Ginkel Heath as well.
Cant wait for the whole series!
It was late August, 1976, I bought the paperback A Bridge to Far at the local hospital gift shop while visiting my grandfather in the hospital. "Soon to be a major motion picture" was featured on the front cover and that caught my attention. A great book and went to the theater in the summer of 1977 to see the movie.
Real event, or Big Budget Hollywood production...a train wreck....
Cannot wait to read your book Mr. Murray. I have been totally intruiged with this battle ever since reading Cornelious Ryans book and seeing A bridge too far. I would be interested in yours and Mr. Hollands thoughts on General Browning needing 35 gliders to carry his H.Q to Nijmegan on the day of the assault as per Anthony Beevors book "Arnhem".By the way Mr.Holland book " Brothers in arms" is un put downable.
Will be looking forward to these.
Another amazing part of the series 👍👍🙏🙏
Can’t wait for this series 😊
My Grandfather was there 80 years ago with The Kings own Scottish Borderers, PTE Reginald T Hamilton 14437879 was captured at Oosterbeek, he remained a POW till the end of the war, i did hear a few stories of his time there, but looking back i wish i had the chance to learn more before he passed in 2004
read "arnhem lift", a war diary written by an soldier who survived the whole ordeal and wrote it down a few weeks after it actually happened. the Oosterbeek part in Ryan's book an thus the film are based on this book. absolutely amazing
Brilliant guys looking for to this one 👌
Just excellent 👌
Can't wait for the rest of these - just got back from dragging the other half around Arnhem and it's such a fantastic city to visit. I can't wait to see what things I missed in this series! (Hopefully I didn't miss the duo but I won't be surprised to see myself looking clueless in the background at some point...)
I was there last Tuesday, bought the book. Loving it. Looking forward to the series.
Wonderful stuff guys . Al ,I am getting your book for Xmas . :)
Well done gents, loving the series
Would love to go back and visit again, absoulutley pissed it down my whole trip lol
My father was stationed at Ramstein in the 80s we took a family trip to England and we took that highway to Pas De Callie for the ferry to Dover,
Actual commentary on a bridge to far from Jim and al would both funny and informative.
Me and my brother drove from France across to the Ardennes and then into Germany to go back across to Holland to drive across the Arnhem bridge with a bridge to far music playing all to find out they had it closed to paint the railings that lovely airborne red that you see in the clip haha
Frost nailed it, he said, we lost Arnhem at Nijmegen.
Cracking, can’t wait 😊
Really enjoyed the video mate can't wait to see next part
A Bridge too Far was very influential
One fact mostly forgotten is that XXX corps and the 101th Airborne had 3 times very high casualties engagements with several German infantry, tank and a panzergrenadeer divison around Veghel. (2 road 1 railway bridge crossing the South Willem canal )
The route got blocked 3 times due to big German counter offensives, the biggest delay of the entire timetable of the ground operation.
XXX corps got depleted and exhausted due to the severe fighting along the route to Arnhem and could't get on time to support the para's there.
We mostly tell the story of the airborne troops but the ground troops fought and suffered along the entire route.
There's a small museum inside an old German bunker in front of the Grave bridge, if you walk into the wooded area next to it you can still find the bullet casings strewn around the ground. Would love to see you both exploring there.
You're in luck as we do go to Grave Bridge and walk the approach towards the bridge. We do look at the bunkers, but sadly they were both locked up the day we visited.
One thing about the initial assault on the Arnhem bridges that confuses me is that the area south of the Rhine was considered unstable for drops on day 1 but the Polish brigade were scheduled to drop there on day 3.
A battalion or 2 of parachutists dropping there in the initial assault would have made the German position much more difficult.
The Yanks didn't fail to grab Nijmegen bridge, to fail is to be foiled in an attempt and on that crucial first day after all troops from GOC's to latrine orderlies had been briefed on how vital seizing their own bridges was Gavins division set up shop on the Groesbeek heights and ignored their bridge allowing the enemy to massively reinforce it.
Nobody knows why.
before 740 men had even arrived at the last intact bridge in Arnhem area (rail bridge 4 miles/6k from LZ Z), 82nd had captured the 500m bridge north of Grave and the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders, capacity about 1,000 infantrymen.
when scout cars of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day 3 they were still 28 miles/40 k (on current maps) from Arnhem, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset.
on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water.
@@nickdanger3802 Browning and his colossal staff were indeed useless mouths.
However the entire operation was predicated on the swift capture of the road bridges and Gavin knew that so while securing the heights is obviously important of far more importance was the bridge.
Rumours of '400 German tanks' in the Reichswald a couple of miles away were rapidly disproven by a recce in force report of empty forest and it remains a mystery to this day why Gavin sent only 1/9 of his infantry to capture the vital bridge before the Germans threw everything they had at the north end.
This is not to denigrate the US paras performance, only Gavins.
@@antonrudenham3259 "Rumours of '400 German tanks' in the Reichswald a couple of miles away were rapidly disproven"
British AO, British intel.
"of far more importance was the bridge."
82nd had two major rivers to secure bridges for, a major canal bridge and the Heights for day one objectives and accomplished three.
1st AB was supposed to capture 3 bridges and secure the future landings zones. 1st AB started losing LZ's on day two and blocked one bridge for four days during the entire op.
look at any map of Arnhem AO that has landing zones and a scale of miles/km and you will see LZ Z is 4 miles/6k from the rail bridge.
"the first of those bound for LZ-Z came in at 13:19. This lift contained Major-General Urquhart's Headquarters and approximately half of the Divisional Units, included amongst which were the Jeeps of the Reconnaissance Squadron, two batteries of the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment, and also the 1st Parachute Brigade's vehicles and anti-tank guns."
Pegasus Archive The First Lift (Sunday 17th September)
Urquhart took all of his arty and AT guns and Bren carriers and jeeps to tow them on day one even though the interpretation of the intel had it taking at least 24 hours for German armor to react.
Appreciate you, can I add that Gavin had no faith in this plan, 30 corps or Montgomery and wasn’t interested in becoming martyrs like the British paras, god bless them
@@johnwhitney2431
He was a soldier given clear orders by his superiors and as a div cdr was in a position to make his misgivings clear during his briefing, he chose not to and therefore accepted those orders.
Then he failed to try to carry them out.
Whether he 'liked' Montgomery, 30 Corp, the plan or the Boston Red Sox is totally irrelevant.
It's inexplicable.
Green on mucker lots of memories from a oldswet my self an ex'service AB ALL THE WAY BROTHER FROM A EX'PARA from 2PARA i had 4'uncle's who was in this rade an only 2came out 😊 top info on the show n channel guy's keep this up n rolling out 😊 top info lads! See u ob the DZ today m8 😊
How do you watch the new series?
Launching this week. Subscribe and turn on notifications for alerts as to when each one drops.
Cant wait good job guys keep the videos coming
Did they go to that tunnel they discovered that you can just about fit a truck through you spoke about on the pod , to save them bouncing stuff over the railway lines ? Or is it even still there ? I really wanted to see that after hearing it described , bit random I know 😅
@@Ziabeedee Not random at all! And we do go there…and walk through it.
@@WW2WalkingTheGround brilliant cheers massive fan
Forgot to ask where do I find that ? 🤦♂️soz
@@Ziabeedee - if you mean the tunnel under the railway embankment just east of Wolfheze you can just fit a Jeep through, the Google map co-ordinates for the tunnel is 52.00366 5.80299 and the tunnel is marked on the map as "De Duiker". The track on the north side of the tunnel entrance is also the approximate location of the Reconnaissance Squadron ambush by Krafft's SS training battalion, which had an extension of his Wolfhezerweg blocking line along the rail embankment and in the woods to the Northeast in a classic L-shape ambush position.
@@davemac1197 oh wow nice one thats really helpful cheers sir 🫡🤝
I met the grandson of one of the aircrew’s that bomed it
Just to add another bridge: what was the plan for the bridge across the IJssel at Westervoort?
That could easily be Bailey Bridged if Arnhem was taken.
@@lyndoncmp5751 A 70 to 100 meter wide river with a bailey bridge? Easy ? In peacetime Ok but in wartime? They would have needed pontoons or in tact piers.
Westervoort is a good question because the Royal Engineers had those bridges (Westervoort has road and rail bridges side by side) on their list of tasks for checking and removing any demolitions. I don't have any information on the specific plans for 3rd Parachute Battalion's deployment, had it been able to reach the Arnhem bridge - they were tasked with occupying the eastern sector of the town. 2nd Battalion was to occupy the western sector, with A Company at the highway bridge, B Company at the pontoon bridge, and C Company either the southern end of the highway bridge after crossing the Oosterbeek rail bridge, or failing that, the secondary objective of occupying the German Ortskommandantur (town military headquarters). 1st Battalion were to occupy the high ground north of Arnhem, with Company strong points on the Amsterdam and Apeldoorn roads, until relieved by the 4th Parachute Brigade on D+1.
So, that whole eastern sector that was supposed to be occupied by the Polish Parachute Brigade on D+2 that included the Westervoort bridges (and there is a map overlay of the Polish deployment plan in Karel Margry's Operation Market Garden Then and Now, 2002) is an area not very well researched, because it didn't happen, so 3rd Battalion's intended layout in particular is a bit of a mystery I'm afraid.
The Ijssel bridges, or bridging sites if blown, at Deventer and Zutphen were intended to be occupied by 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division, and the Ijssel bridge at Doesburg by the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division. I believe the Doesburg bridge was a civilian 'ship bridge' (as was the so-called 'pontoon' bridge at Arnhem and not military bridges), was blown by the Germans, and units from 10.SS-panzer-Division heading for Arnhem had to use Zutphen to cross the Ijssel.
@@davemac1197 The 12th of april 1945 (!) allied forces crossed towards the Westervoort fortress that protects the Westervoort bridges. This fortress is still in place.
@@jandenijmegen5842 - I know, so what's your point?
Why are these vids so short?
it is a big misunderstanding that getting over the Rhine river on this spot opens the way to Germany. In between is still the fast running and considerable river IJssel. just look for yourselves.
The Ijssel bridges were part of the plan for operation GARDEN and not the airborne operation MARKET, except perhaps for the bridges at Westvoort that were within the designated sector of the planned 1st Airborne Division perimeter around Arnhem assigned to the Polish Parachute Brigade. It's also possible the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Parachute Brigade were to seize these bridges with a forward Company, as they were designated to be responsible for the eastern sector of the town until the Poles arrived, but the Royal Engineers certainly had the Westervoort bridges included in their tasks to disarm any demolitions.
The Ijssel bridges didn't need to be captured intact in any case as the operation was to terminate on the Zuider Zee (Ijsselmeer) coast with the Guards Division, and 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division were to seize deep bridgeheads over the Ijssel at Deventer and Zutphen, and the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry Division at Doesburg, making assault river crossings if the bridges were blown. If the bridges had to be replaced with Bailey bridges, there would be plenty of time to do that, since the exploitation operation of an advance into Germany was only to be done after the US 1st Army had established their own Rhine crossings between Cologne and Bonn (they were currently stuck west of Aachen in September), and the intention was to conduct a pincer operation on the Ruhr with both armies.
It was also understood that multiple advances into Germany along Eisenhower's 'broad front' strategy would not be possible until the port of Antwerp was open to supply them, so that's another reason the Ijssel crossings were not going to be exploited immediately. A pause was needed for the Americans to cross the Rhine, and for the Canadians to clear the Scheldt estuary west of Antwerp, as the existing logistics capacity had to be switched from one priority to another in sequence and could not supply everyone at the same.
The reason historians never touch on this is because that part of operation GARDEN could not be carried out, so all these points get neglected.
@@davemac1197 i dont think you know the situation very well. It is impossible to span the ijssel river with a bailey bridge.
The current bridge at Westervoort is now at least 150m long. It is a wild river with very strong current.
My statement comes from quotes of the book from christer bergstrom - arnhem 1944- - looks to me a meticulously written book. Futhermore if you just look at the distances it looks impossible to me to take these bridges as well (and hold them) or the planning had to be not optimistic as it was, but just totally unrealistic.
@@marcel-y8c - I take the information from Special Bridging Force - Engineers Under XXX Corps in Operation Market Garden, John Sliz (2021), part of his series of books on MARKET GARDEN Engineers. The XXX Corps deployments north of the Rijn are also shown on maps in the Vrienden Airborne Museum and on their web site.
Bailey bridges could be constructed across wide rivers and were in fact constructed across the Waal at Nijmegen in case the Germans managed to damage or destroy the road and rail bridges (the road bridge was holed by an aerial bomb and a rail span dropped by Kriegsmarine commandos), as well as the Rijn at Arnhem with two bridges in 1945 (one high level using the bridge piers and a low level pontoon bridge to the east, used until the highway bridge was rebuilt in 1950.
Every crossing point involved in the operation was meticulously planned to have replacement bridges and pre-planned bridge columns assigned in advance in case they were needed. The Royal Engineers in the Guards Division were responsible for crossings south of the Maas, and the British and Canadian Army Group Royal Engineers for the Maas, Waal, Rijn and Ijssel. The 43rd (Wessex) Division was also prepared to carry out an assault crossing of the Waal with one or two brigades (operations BESSIE and BASIL), and were on a warning order to carry out BASIL at Nijmegen, but Gavin had intervened insisting his own troops be used if XXX Corps could supply the boats and the original plans were not put into operation.
I also have Christer Bergström's two volumes on Arnhem, and although it has some detail errors I was not aware that he said it was "impossible" to bridge the Ijssel. Perhaps you misread it? If you can give me a page reference I will have a look at the quote and see if I can understand what he was saying.
@@marcel-y8c Nothing is impossible to him who will try - Alexander the Great.
Bill Slim in Burma managed to deal with the WIDEST river in Asia, some 2,000 yards long, and he didn't even have pontoon bridges and boats, he cut down forest trees to build 550 10 tonne barges and ferried 600,000 men across the Irrawaddy river.
The ijssel River could have been crossed. It's not some impossible barrier.
@@davemac1197 Even Slim in Asia demonstrated a wide river could be tackled in his operation at Meiktila and Mandalay, the sheer length of the rivers in Asia made the rivers in northern europe look like a swimming pool.
Is that a 6pdr? I just got a fabulous demo on a Mk IV 6pdr this weekend.
That monument by the Arnhem bridge is a 25-pounder field gun, so I think it represents the 1945 liberation rather than the 1944 airborne battle - it was not a gun that was used by the airborne.
@@davemac1197 Thanks so much.
Not literally the only building left. THe big church and many buildings around that bottom right side of the picture are still there. James does a lot of improv, doesnt he? :)
The Eusebius church (the big one) was in ruins. The area around the north side was completely ruined.
@@jandenijmegen5842 ruined, yes. But it's still there, so James was factually wrong, as was my point.
I hope you will also explain the one thing that always boggled me..... you say "the last water obstacle before the Reich"..... but it isnt. Getting over the Arnhem one takes you into an area where the river Ijssel seperates you from Germany. SO what was Montgomory thinking???
Agree. It is often mentioned that Frost held the Arnhem bridge. He controlled more or less the Northern entrance, but did not manage to secure the southern part from where germans kept attacking. Only a fraction of the British forces managed to reach the bridge. Secondly: what was the backup plan in case something went wrong. What if the Nazis had blown up the Nijmegen bridges (road bridge and rail bridge)? The Waal river is about 150 meters wide. the Rhine is a friendly 80 meter wide stream compared to the situation in Nijmegen. You cannot build a bailey bridge at Nijmegen.
@@jandenijmegen5842 The Germans had already planned a counter offensive towards Antwerp to take it in October ( i found this out from an experienced poster on the Market Garden subject called davemac1197 ) so there was no reason for them to blow the bridges since they NEEDED THEM for that.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Then why were the bridges in Nijmegen and Grave prepared for blowing up? Indeed Model did not want the bridges to be blown up. But why prepare them? Answer: you never know with Hitler as the prime commander.
@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Another clarification: Just a number of days after Market Garden the German army launched a large number of attacks on the Nijmegen bridge. Late september by dive bombers, first junkers, then Focke Wulf. Early october Nijmegen was bombed. Also the railroad bridge was attacked by divers (Kampfschwimmer) using a torpedomine, which was succesfull.
In short: Model was indeed thinking of a counteer offensive using the Nijmegen bridges but this idea did not live very long. The german efforts to destroy the nijmegen bridges had cost them about 46 planes.
That could easily be Bailey Bridged.
In an era of flying boats, I wonder if they could have landed gliders with sea plane floats on the river, to get right into the objective straight away
Only got one issue with these videos, they are way to short lol great job though 👍
Had the airborne division tasked with capturing and securing the Arnhem bridge been successful in accomplishing all of their objectives could they have been able to hold out long enough so that the delay at Nijmegen wouldn't have doomed the division?
Always amazing to see how little the British understand of river estuaries. If you want to invade Germany from Arnhem you also need a bridge over the river IJssel. Never heard anybody speaking about this. They always say if we had conquered the Arnhem bridge we could have just walked to Berlin, which is of course nonsense.
It doesn't get spoken about enough, we agree. The longterm Market Garden plan is for the Polish to secure Ijssel crossing, with the 2nd Army then bringing in Bailey bridges to supplement the crossing.
@@WW2WalkingTheGround : Which makes it more understandable why the British gave up immediately after the Allies had secured the Waal-bridge in Nijmegen. There was no chance anymore to conquer a crossing over the IJssel.
@@WW2WalkingTheGround Why make a surprise attack using airborne troops to secure the bridges and then cross the IJssel in the slowest way possible?
The waal river is 150 meters wide, the Rhine at Arnhem is about 80 meters wide and the average width of the IJssel is about 70 - 140 meters.
Furthermore in those days rivers could freeze and the ice could cause severe damage to pontoon supported bridges. Crossing the IJssel remains a mystery to me and so is the aim of Market Garden.
Perhaps you've never heard of British subterfuge..the aim was never to turn right into Germany after Arnhem but to turn left and trap and destroy a huge Proportion of the German Army in the Amsterdam region. It never fails to amaze me how the rest of the world underestimates the British 😉
The plan for the operation GARDEN ground forces was to advance to the Zuider Zee (Ijsselmeer) coast to cut off German forces west of the corridor, and the 43rd and 50th Infantry Divisions were to secure bridgeheads over the Ijssel at Deventer, Zutphen and Doesburg. The Westervoort Ijssel bridges were also in the Polish sector of the planned 1st Airborne Division perimeter around Arnhem as WW2WTG said, but obviously they were not able to occupy it.
If the Ijssel bridges were demolished by the Germans, the 43rd Division was to make river assault crossings to secure bridgeheads and the Royal Engineers were to build replacement Bailey bridges. There was no hurry for this phase as the exploitation of the Ijssel crossings were only to be carried out after the US 1st Army had crossed the Rhine between Bonn and Cologne, and they were currently stuck west of Aachen, then Eisenhower intended a pincer operation on the Ruhr with both armies after Antwerp had been opened by the Canadians to supply his 'broad front' strategy into Germany. That's why the Ijssel bridges were not targeted in the airborne operation MARKET - they were not required to get the Guards quickly to the Ijsselmeer coast.
So the planners understood the geography very well, but historians never talk about this phase of the operation because it didn't happen.
Still waiting gents…anytime you’re ready
@@seanbradley2134 Starting today and arriving weekly from then
Stop beating around the bush, y'all want to blame Gavin. H-Minus!
Monty was like Patton. A Cannon fodder general.
Patton would have got there. The British stopped for tea.
@@johnrussell3961 did you actually watch the video? Try watching it again and this time pay attention
@@johnrussell3961 The Americans were obviously drinking coffee on Groesbeek Ridge for three whole days! Did you know the Americans installed 32 mobile trailer-mounted, coffee-roasting units in July 1944, producing 90,000 lbs of coffee each and every day? I bet you failed to acknowledge that.
Montgomery was nothing like the meat-grinder that Patton was. He was aware that he needed to preserve British lives as we had a severe manpower shortage following on from WW1 and the early years of WW2
Incredibly wrong statement
Looking forward to the new book. I’ve felt for a long time that it’s naive to think that the delay at Nijmegen was the sole reason that Market/Garden failed. It’s tempting to believe that Market/Garden almost succeeded largely because of the sort of counterfactual belief that if the Allies had crossed the Rhine they would have easily encircled the Ruhr and the war would be over. That belief is attractive but relies on far too many assumptions. It’s also very self satisfying to pinpoint one event and/or one individual for the failure of an Operation(s). The British can blame it all on Gavin and be satisfied that their hero Montgomery’s plan was genius and would have ended the war, showered him and Britain in glory except for the failings of that idiot American. Likewise the Americans can blame the failure on the miscalculation of Browning or the poor planning of Montgomery knowing Patton could have pulled it off if the situations were reversed.
My own belief is that the plan was flawed with blame passed around amongst SCHAEF with Eisenhower and Montgomery responsible in equal measure. The main short coming was Allied hubris resulting in the gross underestimation of the German’s ability and will to resist.
There's an argument to suggest that if the Western Allies got into the Ruhr in late 1944 the Germans may have collapsed given the alternative was the Russians.
They fought hard in 1945 because they needed to keep the Russians out of Prussia to allow time to evacuate as many civilians as possible.
Certainly it's highly unlikely the Wehrmacht would have fought a shard to keep the Americans out of Berlin as they did the Soviets.
@@stewartjohnson5053General Blumentritt was adamant that a concentrated allied push to the Ruhr in September/October would have finished the Germans.
Instead Eisenhower was supplying forces down in the Lorraine and the Operation Dragoon forces coming to the Alsace.
Montgomery argued for everything to be concentrated in the north, aimed at the Ruhr.
@@lyndoncmp5751 20/20 hindsight is of course a wonderful thing of course.
It is worth remembering the time it took from Normandy through to the surrender of the Germans took the Western Allies less time than the Gaza War.
So were mistakes made? Yes. Could we all have done better? Doubtful.
So not a bridge too far but a penultimate bridge too slow. Not as snappy but more accurate
So large scale British Armour elements need a complete escort by lightly armed and under supplied US Airborne Infantry who, at great cost, captured both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge?
The British Grenadier Guards tanks raced across the Nijmegen road bridge and captured the north end of the bridge. The 82nd troopers weren't there. They were still at the railway viaduct in Lent, one km north of the road bridge. Sgt Peter Robinson lead tank in the platoon, had to go all the way to Lent before he saw any paratroopers.
It was the Guards tanks that actually took the bridge. Captain Carrington then followed and guarded the north end of the bridge alone for about an hour until he received support.
A Bridge Too Far shows this inaccurately.
greenfire6924
All clear now?
Its a shame so many ugly block buildings were build surrounding the bridge.
Is it possible to have too much Arnhem...nope.
To be honest I don´t really understand the fuzz the Brits are making out of this battle. It was a shameful and absolutely embarrassing defeat. Elite crack British parachute units receive a proper hiding and a bloody nose from a bunch of German ragtag units that are 2nd and even 3rd class. And this is what the Market Garden / the battle of Arnhem in fact was, another proof of German military prowess.
The Germans reaction was exemplary. It was fast, it was swift, it was vigorous, it was determined. No other army in the world could have done it like that, that´s for sure and certainly not the British army as we we have seen on Crete where it failed miserably.
Instead of a quick decisive battle the Brits and other allies were locked into a ferocious fight. German units performed heroically especially considering they were ragtag units lacking proper training, proper equipment, and were inferior in number. The Germans succeeded in inflicting heaviest casualties on their opponents (higher casualties than they, the Germans, suffered) despite the fact the Brits/allies had the initiative, were vastly superior on people and materials, had complete air superiority AND used elite crack troops.
Well that didn't actually happen so.....
A lot of the Germans were very good indeed for a start. The Paras didn't get a good hiding but held on for far longer than was anticipated.
And the Allies didn't have air superiority.
@@stewartjohnson5053 "The Paras didn't get a good hiding but held on for far longer than was anticipated."
They did not just receive a good but a VERY good hiding. How else do you want to call it. And it is even more embarrassing for the Brit paratroopers that they received a bloody nose by German troops that were 2nd and 3rd rate. Arnhem and Crete are both examples for German military prowess. They captured Crete against all odds and against 1st rate British troops who had numerical superiority. This is how a succesful airborne operation needs to be carried out. In Arnhem they foiled an airborne operation against all odds with 2nd and 3rd rate ragtag units against elite troops with numerical superiority. In both cases the Germans were simply outstanding whereas the Brits svcked royally.
"And the Allies didn't have air superiority."
:-D
@@kodor1146 I think the fact you called the Wehrmacht 'heroic' shows what kind of person you are, but the fact you think the German troops involved were 3rd rate shows how utterly ignorant you are of the entire battle.
@@stewartjohnson5053 "I think the fact you called the Wehrmacht 'heroic' shows what kind of person you are"
What is wrong calling the Wehrmacht defenders of Arnhem heroic? I don´t get it.
" but the fact you think the German troops involved were 3rd rate shows how utterly ignorant you are of the entire battle."
Most German troops at Arnhem were 2nd and 3rd rate. As I wrote before the German response to the airborne assault was outstanding. Everything that had legs and could hold a weapon was brought to Arnhem within a very short time. Railway workers, men from the Labor Service, boys of the Hitler Youth, soldiers from butchery and bakery companies and so on. The Germans didn´t even wait for orders from their superiors, they acted completely on their own and without any knowledge where the paratroopers had landed. They oriented themselves to the noise of battle. Again the German response was simply marvellous and outstanding. No army in the world would have been able to sth. similiar and certainly not the Brits. Especially the Brits never would have been able to a similar swift can do approach.
@@kodor1146 Hmm... yes the Germans responded very quickly to the assault - but the whole 'mission tactics' idea was widespread at the time and certainly the British had driven the Wehrmacht out of Normandy using exactly those same methods.
The British paras held on for days until they simply ran out of ammunition. I don't see that as a sign they were anything other than the elite troops they claimed to be.
The fault was with the Americans. The British took their bridge and held it for days. The Americans didn't.
And no, I don't think calling the Wehrmacht heroic is a good idea given their long record of war crimes in the period.
So what you're saying gents is........ It's all Gavin's fault 🤣
before 740 men had even arrived at the last intact bridge in Arnhem area (rail bridge 4 miles/6k from LZ Z), 82nd had captured the 500m bridge north of Grave and the last intact bridge over the Maas Waal canal and the Heights for Brownings' useless HQ brought in by 38 of 1st AB's gliders, capacity about 1,000 infantrymen.
when scout cars of XXX Corps arrived at Grave at 0820 on day 3 they were still 28 miles/40 k (on current maps) from Arnhem, well over 1/3 the distance from Joes Bridge to Arnhem with 11 hours to sunset.
on day four Frosts' men ran out of food, ammo and water.
Really the guy with 5 combat jumps and went on to turn things around in Korea is the reason why this faulty plan failed and not Montgomery, also having your plans captured doesn’t help
@@nickdanger3802 ironically 504th PIR were the only section inadvertently able to execute the British-proposed coup de main plans that Brereton removed. That's why they took Grave Bridge so quickly, but fair play. Why didnt they go for Nijmegen Bridge? It's ok securing your own safety but neglecting the exit route so vital for the safety of the next airborne division along the route is inexcusable.
30 Corps arrived at Nijmegen at 10am, 42 hours after Brereton permitted them to move. It might have been on Day 3 but it was less than two days from their permitted commencement. They travelled 50 miles in less time than Gavin's units moved 4 miles to Nijmegen Bridge! 82nd Division landed just 4 miles from Nijmegen Bridge an hour before 30 Corps started on their drive 50 miles south.
Let that sink in before you criticise 30 Corps.
@@OldWolflad " ironically 504th PIR were the only section inadvertently able to execute the British-proposed coup de main plans that Brereton removed."
"Under normal circumstances a coup de main raid would have been attempted, whereby a small number of paratroopers or glider troops would land alongside the objective and to capture and hold it until more substantial forces could arrive to relieve them. The Royal Air Force, however, refused to land any troops so close to Arnhem, and so Lathbury sought an alternative. His solution was to take Major Gough's 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron under his command and charge them with undertaking a coup de main. This unit, consisting of one hundred and eighty men, were all mounted on Jeeps which were vulnerable to enemy fire but armoured with powerful twin-Vickers "K" Machine Guns. Although completely unsuited to the purpose, the Squadron was expected to face only minimal opposition and so should have little difficulty in racing to the Bridge, as soon as their vehicles had been unloaded from their gliders, and holding it until the leading elements of the 1st Parachute Brigade arrived several hours later."
Pegasus Archive The Plan
1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron was decimated.
@@nickdanger3802 Ah but you omitting the key reason why 'coup de main' was ruled out. That was because Brereton and Williams ruled out morning drops, OR double day drops with one at dawn and one in the evening. Once they made the decision that airborne troops were only to be dropped in broad daylight, this effectively ruled out coup-de main near most objectives due to flak positioning. RAF and American planners then redefined where safe LZs could be. This fundamental change changed the whole operation so that only 16,600 airborne troops were landed on Day One as opposed to over 30,000 in Linnet 1 and 2.
So don't blame this change on the Limeys, this was all Brereton and Williams doing, who decided that because of 50 minutes less daylight between 3rd Sept 1044 and 17th Sept 1944, double drops could no longer be executed, despite the fact that the first flight was to depart at 5am in Linnet........... in darkness.
I'm well aware of Gough's attempt to compensate by a 'mini coup de main' at Arnhem. The concept of coup de main was undoubtedly British - Browning and Montgomery insisted on it as part of Operation Sixteen Plan that was transformed into Operation Market by Brereton. It was also a key aspect of Operation Linnet 1 and 2 and Operation Comet. The critical change was that Brereton then decided only a single drop could be made in broad daylight in Operation Market.
Eisenhower didn't like Montgomery or think much of him as a general, but was forced to give him a leading role because Churchill loved him, the British needed a "hero" general, and Ike had to preserve the alliance. Monty never actually won anything, in fact his record was one of failure that he falsely spun as brilliance. El Alamein was won because Allied air and naval power left Rommel with no fuel, ammo, food, and reinforcements. Montgomery was the "genius" who came up with and insisted on Market Garden which anyone could see was a ridiculous plan. Ike didn't like it and wanted to give the supplies to Patton's push in the south but politics forced him to support Martinet... oops... Monty. If Patton got the fuel and ammo from Market Garden, the US 3rd Army would've been in Berlin before Christmas. Many believe that's why Monty came up with Market Garden and insisted on it... so Patton wouldn't have the resources to continue and Monty would be the conquering general. Instead, his poor strategic vision, terrible execution, and hesitation caused many thousands of allied casualties, just like in Normandy. Remember, Montgomery's own plan for D-Day, and his constant promises, said he would take Caen DAY ONE. It actually took 3 MONTHS because of Monty's legendary hesitency and inability to execute or adapt to changing conditions, and Caen was only taken because of major assistance from other forces. Montgomery was the most arrogant and biggest self-promoter in WW2 and has by far the biggest difference between peoples' perceptions and reality. Yes, Patton was arrogant and a self-promoter... but he WON constantly, always adapted, never made excuses, and was proven right about pretty much everything he said, from the Bulge offensive coming, to his cutoff northern maneuver, to Market Garden, and the Soviets. Monty was a charlatan.
I know you are writing this as a total asshole and to wind people up, but lets examine what you said: -
1) Eisenhower didn't like Montgomery - possibly not personally, not many people did, but that didn't matter, Eisenhower insisted on Montgomery's Market Garden plan. Its a shame Montgomery's plan wasn't executed - it was fundamentally changed by a very cautious pair of American commanders called Brereton and Williams.
2) Montgomery never actually won anything - hmmm, I think this is where you have managed to make yourself look a total uneducated asshole. Others can provide the list of battles he actually did win. Its a long list BTW!
3) Supplies denied to Patton - Patton in fact had come to a grinding halt by 2nd September, and then began receiving adequate supplies by 4th September. Supplies for MG were not drawn away from a struggling US Army.
4) Montgomery's hesitation caused thousands of lives -no, in fact it was Patton's approach that cost thousands of lives. Britain and its Commonwealth lost a high number of men in WW1, and had not recovered. Also we had fought top quality German troops early in the WW2 when admittedly Britain was not ready (nor was US but they stayed out). This was the type of German opposition that would have undoubtedly exposed Patton. Hurtgen Forest showed the world what happens when faced with reasonable German units.
5) Montgomery recognised that the British had a containment role at Normandy, he said this when he explained Op Overlord in April 1944, consequently the British and Canadians fought 660 German tanks and seven Panzer Divisions, whilst the Americans faced a little over 100 tanks and one Panzer Division.
6) With that huge American might behind him, aerial power and huge artillery back up, Patton was always likely to look good. Maybe he was a good general, but was he ever really tested? You can only fight what is in front of you of course, and for Patton that was usually young teenagers and old men.
Utter Rubbish. The Americans in Normandy faced far fewer Armoured divisions than the British and Canadian Armies ( half of which was British) . 90% of German Armour was in the British sector. 10 divisions faced the British on a 60 mile front. To put that in perspective there was more German armour in that sector from the Baltics to Byelorussia. Get your facts right before spiting off. The Americans had literally bugger all against them.
'Never won anything'. Won at El Alamenin and was architect of the victory of the Normandy campaign. Caen was never going to be taken once Rommel places 21st Panzer Division there. 12th SS Panzer was also nearby, just a day's march from Caen. The Gemans committed 8 panzer divisions to defend Caen, which was Monty's intention and would allow the US forces to capture Cherbourg, then turn 180 degrees to capture St Lo and then breakout.
@@walkingwithstephen well said
The Al alemein plan wasn’t Montgomeries. It was his predecessors.
For the love of all that is good in the World when is this series actually going to start proper? I'm on tenderhooks... tenterhooks? I'm excited for this series to start. Please start.