This is one on the best videos on this subject. Seeing the area’s and the details make the stories much more deeper and understandable. Just amazing thanks
Thank you so much for this Video. My late Grandfather, Reg Hasler was the driver of the second Jeep that was ambushed. He was shot 3 times across the chest and became a POW held in a Polish concentration camp until the end of the war. like many veterans he didn't mention much about his ordeal so i am very grateful that you have done the research and put together this video so Myself and my family can visit the site.
My grandfather Trooper George Adams, was a member of Recce squadron, D troop, 12 section under Lt. Pascal and Capt. Park. Aged 20/21 at the time, he flew with the jeeps in horsa glider from Tarrant Rushton airfield. He was shot in the wrist at some point and later captured around the 24/25th September and sent to Stalag 11b (Fallingbostel in saxony I think) until the camp was liberated. He survived the war to eventually go on and serve in Palestine with the 21st Independent parachute company, and later coming back to work at Tarrant Rushton airfield itself in the 60's. I never got the chance to meet him, but I've done all I can to learn about him and his friends and comrades. Videos like these are important to remember the borderline impossible tasks that were asked of these young men. Thank you very much for making this!
My uncle Sidney Whitlock jumped at Arnhem, fought and captured and survived the war, married my mum's sister and attended my King's Squad pass out the Commando Training Centre when I completed recruit training in 1986. He was treated like a king and never bought a drink!! Per Mare Per Terram, Utrinque Paratus
Beyond wonderful. This is the kind of "show and tell" That those who would study this history need so badly. There have been many fine books, and pages after pages of maps, but they do not work to make the places and the history come to life. You have done something very wonderful indeed by making these places and the men more than dots on a map. Your efforts have made them real people in real places that can be seen and felt. They live on and history lives on because you have walked in their path. Thank you beyond words for doing something that needs to be done so much, and for doing it so well.
I can only agree with other comments. An excellent video. Thank you for taking the time to make the video. I'm sure many British people are thankful to our Dutch neighbours in continuing to look after all of the boys who fell at Arnhem.
This video is really excellent, thank you for making it. My Grandfather was a Para. He fought at Arnhem was captured and reported missing presumed killed. He was a very placid man and never saw the point of getting into an argument. Nor did he ever spoke of his wartime experiences and when asked he would simply reply, it's in the past. So despite having fought at Tabrok and Arnhem, we know very little of what he did. This video has helped to stitch together much of what I've read and documentaries I've seen. It has also given a new and more personal perspective on what was such a huge part of the market garden operation.
thankyou mate for a honest story of the dangers the lads encountered at that time.bless them all and thankyou for your time in making this brilliant real time documentary. bless them .
Having been to these sites back some years ago, I still get a chill thinking about the losses. You did an excellent job describing the Operation. Thank you.
First of all, what a great detailed video! All the credits to you! I live in Arnhem and I it’s really amazing how many hidden stories there still are about Market Garden. Currently reading ‘it never snows in September, great book’! I will pass al this information on to my children just like my father and grandfather did so we will never forget what these heroes have done for our freedom, paying the ultimate price!
Thank you Joris, this explanation puts a lot into perspective for me. I've long wanted to return to Arnhem/Oosterbeek and follow the battles. The proudest day of my life was when I jumped on DZ Y in 1991. Our brother Polish Paras jumped with us for the first time since 1944. I'm very grateful to learn the area where Captain Queripel earned his VC. He crossed and re-crossed a road under fire, carrying casualties. Wounded in the face and arms, if I recall right. He then stayed behind with his pistol and grenades to cover the withdrawal of his men. I'm assuming that that road was behind the trees? I knew two Arnhem veterans when I first joined Para Regt. They worked in Amity Grove, West Wimbledon, opposite each other. I used to spend a lot of time chatting with Peter who was 1 PARA. The other man worked in the post office - he was Recce Sqn. Unfortunately, he couldn't sit and chat at work. I don't know the Recce man's story but Peter had fought in North Africa, Sicily and Italy before he was captured opposite the brickworks. 1 PARA came up against the Spindler(?) line and were ambushed from all directions, totally exposed across the river were Grabner's men were firing AA cannon into them. Peter and two others his age managed to get into cover of the nearby buildings. They were isolated, could hear activity close by but didn't know what was going on. After some time, it was their turn to be cleared out the building by the Germans. They were invited to surrender. To convince them, the Germans demonstrated a flame thrower across the outside of the window. They did the only sensible thing. Peter and the other two lads were 19 years old when they fought at Arnhem. Even in my middle age, I can't get my head around that... 5:22 - I think he was Driver Evans.
What's not to like? You are a guardian of these brave men's story. You have not allowed them to be forgotten. So yes I have given this video a like. Thank you so much for making this.
I agree with all the positive comments added previously. I too was in the area from 24/09/19 onwards and discovered the Johannahoeveweg quite by accident as I raced on a bicycle back from the cemetery, in the dark, to Wolfheze. I walked in the reverse direction, in daylight, the next day and saw the crosses and wreaths left the week before. That was all very informative but I wish I'd seen your video first. I had no idea, for example, that the site was that involving Queripel. Gough's recce squadron WERE planned to be a quick force to reach the bridge. They switched to their more traditional role ahead of the different battalions once it was clear they could not serve as a coup de main. Of course, some Dutch were Nazis or even SS - I suspect many Brits would have done the same, judging by Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts - but it is ridiculous to ignore the many more who were in the resistance and/or supporting Allied troops. They pleaded to join the fight but were not entirely trusted, on the one hand, or there were concerns about Nazi reprisals on the other. The Dutch continue to remember these events to this day. I know many Brits who are ignorant of Operation Market Garden.
This is the best video on the Arnhem battle itself. The 1977 film tried to compress too much - this video puts it all in perspective. Thank you for your work. I knew an Arnhem veteran, who always maintained "the Germans were either lucky or knew we were coming." He said the German heavy machine guns were very effective in the open fields and woods, much more so than the armour.
I agree about the film struggling to fit things in so as to be fully comprehensible. It's a fine film and one of the great late 20th C war movies in the English language (primarily, I mean), but one of the things which bugged me a little was how much context was omitted. So, for example, Grabner's dash across the bridge made very little sense to me when younger; why were they doing that? Of course, the very fact that they were trying to link up with their own forces and cross with the advantage of surprise on their side (trying) was not clear in the movie, but makes sense now. Much like the British jeeps, they didn't have much of a surprise advantage and most of them charged into heavy fire instead. Brave men on both sides, I suppose.
A very enlightening and revealing account, superbly explained and expressed. Thank you for this, and to the wonderful Dutch people for maintaining the graves and for the respect shown. Many British Paras feel eternally guilty that they were not able to free the wonderful Dutch people, and feel they almost betrayed them as well as demolishing their town in the process. The level of forgiveness from the Dutch people is wonderful.
My uncle Ron was at Arhnem in 1944. I wasn't a full Para, myself. Unlike him, dad & cousins. I trained to become a Reserve Paratrooper. But at over 40, couldn't quite make the required fitness. Despite an extraordinary, effort. Still. I spent 2 years working for Airborne Veterans. But the stuff he experienced there was beyond belief. So violent the struggle became.
Beautiful and respectfully produced documentary. I have always wondered why the jeep attack was unsuccessful. You have explained it perfectly. Well done and thank you.
Good to see your research is spot on. Not only from the British side but the German as well. You also got it correct with the fact that most of the Jeeps did arrive.
What a fanatstic video. Actually walking the route taken has made it easier to understand the difficulties faced by the recce sqn than looking at maps and photographs. Your tone was respectful and your knowledge first class. Well done, I've subscribed and look forward to watching further videos.
The railway tunnel is the finishing point of the first week of the Dutch Air Assault Leadership Course. Everyone comes out of that tunnel a changed man.
i've been through there, i'm british but live in holland, actually i was north of that tunnel in the woods today roaming around where 4 para division hq was back then
You're always the same man, you never change. What changed were the skills learned and the perspectives gained. Military training isn't magical; there is no mysticism to preparedness. All that is false bravado, and useless chest thumping. You are still the same person.
I would like to say thank you for this history video. I’m British and Iv a big interest in historical events. It nice to learn about the individuals who took part. Thank you again, a very informative film, done with respect.
Excellent description of the Recces attempt to reach the Bridge, I have visited Arnhem & Oosterbeek a couple of times but never managed to get to the Landing Zones, Thank you for giving me that chanced to view a different perspective of the battle area.
I had an Uncle that took part in Operation Market Garden. He was so traumatised by the battle, he spent ten months in Psychiatric care. He mentioned the war to me until I received orders to Camp New Amsterdam in 1976, making me promise to visit the military cemetary. Which I did more than once. Excellent job, thank you for your work.
Have just found this video and have to say thank you, its amazing. I was doing research for a friend whose grandad (Trooper Garwood) was the driver in one of the jeeps in Section 7 , he was injured and taken PoW. We had some photo's of where we believed this all happened but thanks to your video and google maps we can actually see and pinpoint where it happened. Thank you so much for allowing us to connect with what they went through.
Great research, presentation and video. Thank you. Dank u wel. Have worked in the Netherlands often over the years and I have great respect for the country. Been to many war sites to pay respects. Best wishes from England. 'Lest we forget.'
Having lived in the Netherlands I traveled many, many times through Arnhem on my way to Germany and never knew THIS was "A Bridge Too Far." I would have loved to have explored it. Thank you.
Thankyou Sir, what a professional film and I note particularly your respectful commentary. I will be staying in the area next week for a couple of nights and after seeing your film, intend to walk in that section of the road near that embankment tunnel. May all those blokes rest in peace, lest we forget.
Market Garden was badly planned. Not the overall concept (Montgomery's concept of a narrow deep thrust was sound) but in the detailed planning it was flawed . Primarily the fault of Fredrick Browning, commander of 1st Allied Airborne army (played by Dirk Bogarde in the film) 1. 82nd Airborne should have concentrated soley on Nijmegen bridge (and not the Grosbeek heights). 2. The RAF and USAAF should have dropped at least part of 1st airborne division closer to the bridge. There was an area south of the bridge that could have been used by at least part of 1st Airborne. What is now more built up and known as Malburgen. There is also an area on the north bank of the river just west of the rail bridge that could have been used for at lest one battalion and another on the south side of the river between Driel and the rail bridge that the poles later used that could have accommodated 2 or more battalions. 3. The radios should have been checked two or three days before. I've heard it said that the wrong crystals were fitted. On day 3 or 4 (19th or 20th) even carrier pigeons could have been used to inform 2nd army and RAF of the revised resupply drop zones. 4. More use should have been made of fighter-bombers, especially against tanks and AFVs. 5. The entire plan with maps was found on the body of a dead American officer. He shouldn't have been carrying the entire plan. How anyone thought a handful of unarmored jeeps stood any chance against the almost certainty of MG42 machine guns (spitting out up to 25 rounds per second) somewhere along the route I will never know. Even universal carriers (bren carriers) stood a far better chance. A 'coup de main force' of two companies or maybe a whole battalion could have been dropped / landed about half a mile south of the road bridge. 10 minutes on foot. But the RAF wouldn't fly on a route taking them over Deelen airfield - a few miles further north where it was thought there were flak guns (there were NO flak guns at Deelen) If John Frost could have got through to 1 Para and 3 Para they could have quickly diverted their route to the southern river route previously taken by 2 para and got through during the evening/night but unfortunately the radios didn't work. Another screw up - who was supposed to test them ?
I agree the detailed planning was flawed, but Browning's original concept for Operation COMET, cancelled at the last minute by Montgomery when he was informed II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the area, was compromised by Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army for the expanded operation MARKET. Any objections Browning had to the compromises were already neutralised by the LINNET II affair in which he threatened to resign over the lack of time to print and distribute maps to the troops, but LINNET II was thankfully cancelled before Brereton could accept his resignation and carry out his plan to replace Browning with Matthew Ridgeway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation. One of the compromises Brereton made, at the behest of Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command, was to delete the double airlift on the first day in order to carry out the operation entirely in daylight, and this in turn removed Browning's planned dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, as they would be too risky in broad daylight. They were to be carried out in 'Pegasus Bridge' style raids using six gliders each to carry the 'D' Companies of the three battalions from 1st Airlanding Brigade. Indeed, the lead pilot on Operation DEADSTICK in Normandy, Sergeant Jim Wallwork, was to pilot the lead glider on the Nijmegen mission carrying 'D' Company 7th KOSB. The coup de main mission to be carried out by the Reconnaissance Squadron at Arnhem was obviously an alternate plan, and their commander was not happy with that role or the Jeep armament. Major Gough first requested a platoon of airborne Tetrarch tanks as used in Normandy by 6th Airborne, then .50 cal guns on the Jeeps, then twin Vickers MGs instead of single Vickers actually fitted, but they were all refused. Your point 1) concentrating on the Nijmegen bridge - in fact Gavin planned to have the 508th send its 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing, and the fact this was not done was a command failure at the top of the 508th that compromised the whole operation, because it allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce the undefended bridges at Nijmegen before Gavin could intervene personally and order the 508th to get moving. In his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far (1974), he said the British had requested he drop a battalion on the north end of the bridge, and after toying with the idea he eventually dismissed it because of his experiecne in Sicily, where his 505th Regiment was dropped over a huge area and he landed with just four or five men to command. The whole division was disorganised for days, he said. He opted instead to land his three parachute regiments concentratedon three drop zones forming a "power center" and fan out to seize objectives. To me, the geography of the Nijmegen area is the mirror image of the one at Arnhem. Gavin planned to seize the highway bridge with one battalion and hold the ridge with the other two battalions from the 508th. At Arnhem, 1st Parachute Brigade was to send 1st Battalion to hold the high ground north of Arnhem, two were tasked to seize the bridges. 2) Dropping closer to the Arnhem bridge. Not possible as there were no suitable drop zones on D-Day. The Malburgsche Polder south of the bridge designated as the original Drop Zone 'K' for the Poles on D+2 was flanked by two of the heavy batteries of gem.Flak-Abteilung 591 on the Meinerswijk and Malburgsche Polder itself, and the polder was crossed by high tension lines (!!) from the Arnhem power station near the bridge. The zone was only deemed suitable for the Poles because by D+2 it was assumed that the area would be controlled by 1st Parachute Brigade and the Flak would be dealt with and the power cut to the lines. The power station was also the rendezvous for the Royal Engineers after they had completed their intitial tasks and would take control of the station. 3) The British radios worked perfectly well, but it was found that the operational ranges were drastically reduced, and then only on virtually line of sight. It was realised afterwards that the local glacial moraine consisting of sandy soil with a high iron content was responsible. The same problems were suffered by the Germans, who relied on their own telephone networks, both field and Dutch civilian. The wrong crystals were delivered for only the two VHF sets used by the USAAF 306th Fighter Control Squadron teams, which was a distinction not made in the Hollywood film and nicely conflates the VHF problem with all the British Airborne communications, but then a later scene where Frost briefly speaks with Urquhart, which contradicts that impression. In reality, the Royal Artillery sets were still usable because they had more powerful No.18 sets, although still reduced in range like the Battalion No.22 sets, the range was still sufficient for the Battery observer at the bridge to call on artillery fire from the Light Regiment five miles away in Oosterbeek. In fact, the 'MIKE ONE' target (designated primary target for a regimental shoot) was the southern ramp of the Arnhem bridge. Not possible if all the radios were out. Having only the artillery net working (and they were very busy) meant there was little air time available to pass messages for other units. There were carrier pigeons available and there is an amusing story of the first two released settled on a nearby roof and would not budge until encouraged with a few stones thrown at them, which almost echoes the scene in The Longest Day in which the pigeons flew inland towards the Germans and accused of being "traitors!" 4) The Germans found that they could move quite freely on the roads even in daylight since the Dutch had planted trees alongside their main roads since Napoleonic times to give shade for marching troops. Inside the desginated 'boxes' around the Airborne Divisions, only directed air attacks by ground observers was permitted, and those teams were not properly organised and had the VHF radio problems as already mentioned. The main unforced error was that of 1st Allied Airborne Army HQ in England failing to inform 2nd Tactical Air Force in Belgium of when an airlift was delayed by weather. The deconfliction rules meant that the 2nd TAF was grounded when an airlift was due, until the transports had completed their mission, so it was frustrating that the fighter bombers were grounded under sunny skies on the continent while 1st AAA were grounded by early morning fog in England. 5) This is a scene from the Hollywood film using the same maps prop (almost cartoon in their clarity to be understandable by the audience) that Dirk Bogarde used for the earlier briefing scene. In fact, the American officer was the 101st Airborne's lisiaon officer to Browning's Corps HQ and his comms team, which crashed near Vught, which happened to be the headquarters of General Kurt Student's 1.Fallschirm-Armee (1st Parachute Army). The captured documents were logistics documents, not the operational plans or maps, but they did include a resupply schedule for the 101st Airborne, which when translated Student was able as an airborne commander himself to extrapolate the airlift schedules for all three divisions. He tried to warn Model but Model was unconvinced of the significance of the document and dismissed it. Student then alerted his own Luftwaffe chain of command (the German airborne forces were part of the air force) to have fighter aircraft over the drop zones at the appropriate times, but the delayed airlifts worked against them and the fighters were back at their bases in Germany when the transports finally arrived.
Overall, an excellent video - the fate of the Recce squadron is often overlooked or subject to misinformation, so thank you for taking the time to produce this. I do have a couple of comments/corrections/observations. According to the original plan, 28 jeeps would be involved in the race to the bridge; as the 8 jeeps of A Troop were assigned as Divisional reserve, that would have left 26 jeeps ( 6 from HQ and HQ Troop, 4 from Support Troop and 8 each from C and D Troops) - the additional two jeeps would have been the Royal Engineers (two jeeps with trailers, not four - their detachment was only assigned two gliders which came into the same LZ as the Recce Squadron). In the event, only 25 of the squadron's jeeps were available. Three jeeps (1 from HQ troop, 2 from A Troop) failed to arrive on the 17th; they came in the following day on the 2nd lift. A further six jeeps from A Troop were proving very difficult to remove from their gliders (four were recovered by 1900, the other two the following morning). Major Gough decided to leave two jeeps with Lt Collier (the QM) to gather in supplies from the LZ and DZ. That should have left them with 23 jeeps, but Lt Marshall from D Troop took a wrong turn on the way to the RV and had quite an interesting afternoon's drive with Tpr Joe Irala. It's still unclear what happened to the RE detachment. They aren't mentioned in the Recce Squadron war diaries, but the 9 RE Field Company diaries indicate the detachment was still with them on the Monday morning, reporting nil casualties. If they hadn't RV'ed with the Recce on the 17th, that almost certainly would have been noted in the war diary. The delay in assembling at and setting off from the RV seems mostly to be the result of problems unloading gliders, several of which had crashed into one of the woodlands or ploughed heavily into the soft soil. While most of these were from A Troop, there were also jeeps from HQ and D Troop affected. The engagement on Johannahoeveweg actually went on for quite a while; at 1830 HQ, D and Support Troops set off for Div HQ; C Troop followed on at 1900 having been relieved by men of the Gilder Pilot Regiment. It's also worth noting that it wasn't just C Troop engaged - the HQ at Wolfheze station came under mortar fire at 1600; the two Polsten guns of the Support Troop were put into action to drive off some armoured cars which were causing the South Staffs a problem. While the engagement was going on, Major Gough received a radio message at 1630 recalling him to Div HQ as Gen Urquhart wanted an explanation of what had happened to the squadron. He took 2 jeeps and 1 dispatch rider; the party comprised 13 men when it set off at 1645, he had borrowed some men from D Troop as a protective detail. When he got there, he found that Urquhart had left to find 1st Para Bde so the party followed on and eventually reached 1st Para Bde HQ at the rear of 2 Para's column. Along the way, one of the party had fallen off one of the jeeps when they came under fire. Twelve men (3 officers - Gough; Captain Platt , OC HQ Troop; Lt McNabb, Intelligence Officer; nine other ranks including Tpr Charles Bolton of D Troop, one of the handful of black soldiers in the division) eventually made it to the bridge. The dispatch rider, Tpr "Chalky" White returned from the bridge to Div HQ later that night. What does surprise me is that no attempt seems to have been made by the squadron to determine where Krafft's blocking line ended or if there was another route they could take to avoid it. Looking at the maps, it would have been possible to skirt around the North end of Krafft's line using the rides/tracks although they might then have run into the same German forces that 1 Para later encountered. I can only imagine that it was a combination of shock at the sudden heavy opposition and unhappiness with the task they had been assigned, especially when you consider their record in Italy. C Troop were definitely very unlucky, running into another ambush two days later from which only seven or eight of them escaped.
The entire episode of the Reece unit was unfortunate. The plan for the jeeps to race ahead to seize the bridges had no margin to allow for error or delays which eventually arose. The jeeps were landed by glider, but the men by parachute. By the time the jeeps were unloaded, some with great difficulty due to gliders that landed badly, the men assembled to them, and then additional time spent to join up with the Engineers that were to accompany them, any chance for surprise was completely lost. Again, the extremely short time for planning for the operation likely had much to do with this. The official belief by those in charge of planning, that there would be little to no German resistance, probably left too many to assume that inevitable delays that would occur would not be of consequence. Communication and command problems seemed to add to the already difficult situation. Urquhart calling Gough back to the Div HQ is one of several questionable decisions he made during Market-Garden. While one might understand Urquhart wanting information, calling Gough away left his unit without direction. If you want Gough to rush for the bridge, give him that job, and trust him to do it. Don't call him all the way back to HQ to explain what's going on and why he hasn't gotten to the bridge yet. If radio communications had been more reliable and efficient, perhaps Gough could have made his report by radio, while continuing to push forward.
@@dongilleo9743 thanks for the reply. Like much of the plan, the squadron's assigned task on D-Day was a big gamble relying on everything going perfectly and that the Germans would not react to the landings. There does seem to be a bit of a myth about the delay with Captain Heggie's detachment of engineers. Their gliders had arrived on the same LZ as the Recce squadron's and they set off for the RV on the DZ at 1430, over 30 minutes before the recce jeeps left the LZ. I think some of the myth may be down to the RE company's war diary entry which gives the RV point as 6470 - I suspect that this was simply a typo when the handwritten entries were transcribed (I've encountered many others in various war diaries). My own analysis has shown that they must have been there when the squadron was fully assembled, otherwise there could not have been 25 jeeps at the RV (the squadron, less A Troop, should have had 26 jeeps present - one from HQ Troop was on a glider which had problems while still over England; the one from HQ troop in SSM Meadows' glider had to be abandoned as it had ended up 30 foot up a tree; and Lt Marshall's jeep from D Troop had got lost on the way to the RV. That left 23 jeeps of the squadron available for the bridge rush, plus the two RE jeeps bringing it up to the 25. Urquhart's summons to Gough was certainly bizarre, especially as he left the Div HQ very shortly afterwards.
@@tamsinp7711 Urquhart's decision to leave the Division HQ is one of those things I have always had trouble understanding, and have wondered why he doesn't receive more criticism for. In addition, the Division's artillery commander went along for the trip, for no apparent reason, thus leaving two leading officers out of touch with their commands for a crucial time period. It is only shear luck that Urquhart wasn't captured or killed. He was away from his HQ during a critical time, when decisions had to be made, and he wasn't there to make them, and there was no clear-cut line of chain of command. I see it as if a captain of a warship, during battle, decided to leave the bridge of the ship to go check on and see what was going on in one of the gun turrets. I assume the lack of criticism towards him was a feeling that he had been put in an impossible situation, had done as well as expected, and that any criticism would be piling on an otherwise good officer. Could Urquhart have done anything different if he had stayed at his HQ? In his absence, the brigade commanders were reluctant to change or alter the original plan. The 4th Parachute Brigade, landing on day two, was committed piecemeal in an attempt to get to the bridge, something which by that point was impossible given the reaction of the Germans to strongly block the way. The 4th Para was chewed up, suffering heavy losses and expending most of it's available ammunition trying to do something that Airborne troops are not equipped for; fighting through a heavily defended enemy line. The ammunition situation became a major concern very quickly when resupply airdrops were landing outside the division perimeter. Admittedly this is "Monday morning armchair leading" but it was futile to waste troop strength and ammunition in a futile attempt to get to the bridge. A better decision would have been to use the fresh 4th Para, and other division troops, to establish a firm defensive perimeter on the north side of the Rhine. With those battalions at full strength, with full loads of ammo, they might have been able to hold sufficient of a perimeter to allow reinforcements to successfully be brought over the river, thus executing the goal of establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine. In Urquhart's defense, Gavin of the 82nd Division was travelling all around his division area, wherever there was a crisis. The only difference was that Gavin had a much more secure area, far different than Urquhart in Arnhem, and working radio communications to remain in touch with his HQ on a regular basis.
Great video! I really appreciated this tour of the Arnhem battle sites. I am from Canada, but we lived in Germany from 1976-79 and after we saw 'A Bridge Too Far' in 1977 we visited The Netherlands (I was 10 years old at the time). We visited Arnhem, Nijmegen, Eindhoven, and many other places in the country, but we sure could have used a tour guide to really see the battle sites. I do remember visiting the bridges, the Canadian war cemetery in Groesbeek, and the airborne museum at Hartenstein. Thank you SO much for this guided tour ... you did a wonderful job. Now, I can re-watch 'Theirs Is The Glory' with a better understanding of the terrain and distances.
Thanks for posting this video. I grew up in Pennsylvania in the 60's. When I was 15, I went on a trip to the Netherlands, and visited some of these sites. At the time it had very little meaning to me other than that it was a WWII battlefield, and there were many many white crosses in the ground there. About a year later I saw the movie "A Bridge Too Far". It helped to provide some meaning behind what I had seen, but I still didn't really get it. A few years later I read the book from which the movie was made, and it peaked my curiosity. I found myself poring over maps of the region while reading and re-reading, trying to understand how things progressed on each day of the fateful mission. Seeing this video helps fill in some gaps. I had not seen a picture of that tunnel under the RR. Wow.....that is so small. Men under fire trying to rush equipment through there. Whew! Also, I knew the jeep squadron didn't make it, but I didn't know all these details about why, and what had happened. This helps to fill it in. It's all about timing and surprise. If they had started a little sooner, they would have made it to the bridge, but I'm not sure if that would have changed the outcome. Landing on top of a Panzer Division, and a breakdown of virtually all communications equipment. I always wondered, what if all their communication equipment was working? Could they have diverted one of the companies to follow Frost to the bridge? Could they have changed the drop zones? Maybe they could have made the 2nd drop on the south side of the river, taken the south end of the bridge, and reinforced Frost that direction? With communications they could have had more air support to take out critical German positions. Or was it really all doomed from the start?
There are so many "what ifs" in Operation Market Garden, it could have worked but in the end the Germans were able to frustrate the allies at crucial moments.
I believe thr consensus among military historians is that capture of land both sides of the Scheldt estuary would have posed the better risk both wth 20/20 hindsight and at the time. But looking at those headstones makes all the talk seem cheap. Thank you for your efforts and for your service. I'm impressed no end that people take the trouble. But those stones . . .
I knew four men who were in Market Garden. Johnny McKnight and Dick Smullens (an Irishman born in Dublin) were at Arnhem. My uncle Jimmy Rietdyk who was with XXX corps - he helped drag the bodies of the US 82nd men who went across in boats, out of the Waal. And Billy Dixon who was with XXX Corps - he said they were approaching Nijmegen in trucks with 82nd men dropping out of the sky all around them landing in the fields. He said many were running south away from the fighting in Nijmegen.
I look forward to your videos all the time and get excited when I receive a notification of a new one. I must say this one is exceptional! The research you put in was evident in this documentary. Well done sir, again. I learned many new things I had never known. Thank you for your excellent work.
Wonderful video. I was over there last year in 2021 and visited many of the sites in your video including the beautiful cemetery. Thank you for posting this excellent video.
My Uncle, Frederick Groves, was captured at Arnhem and we had always been led to believe that he had been injured by gun fire whilst parachuting, his leg being saved by a German doctor and the rest of the war spent in a camp. Unfortunately he passed away many years ago and would never talk of his experiences as a POW so what actually happened to him, where and when, must remain a mystery. Thanks for the excellent video.
I had read about the jeep ambush in "Remember Arnhem" and "With Recce at Arnhem", but until now, I never fully understood and appreciated the conditions and terrain. Many thanks for this excellent video.
Just came on this video,great job much detail,i have been visiting the area for over thirty years,always pay my respects,i had the privilege of knowing one of the recon soldiers from my town,one day he invited me or a brew and he told me the full story of his military servicethat was after knowing the Man for over two years.
My mother, Jantje Brink, lived in Wolfheze. She was 17 years old in 1944. She was working at the school for the blind on September 17, 1944. I love having a more visual depiction of all the things she has shared with all of our family.
VERY INTERESTING INFORMATIVE VIDEO, THE DETAIL HELPED FORM A PICTURE OF THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE THERE, ARNHEM HOLDS A VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN BRITISH MILITARY HISTORY, A SALUTE THE BRAVE MEN THAT FOUGHT AND DIED THERE. THANKS FOR SHARING.
One of the best and detailed video documentaries I've seen for a while, very accurate and interesting and brilliant commentary...keep up the excellent work! I was a friend of an old 21st Ind Para Coy soldier who jumped onto LZ S with No-3 Platoon, Pte Les 'Jocky' Morgan and the photo you showed of the 21st next to the Stirlings prior to take off was No 3 Platoon...so was delighted to see that...thank you Joris!
@@TheBattlefieldExplorer Very welcome Joris...may I ask if you will ever do a recording of the 21st from the LZ/DZs via Oosterbeek and Operation Berlin please?
A really excellently narrated & filmed and informative film. For someone for whom English is not their native language you put many British historical presenters in the shade.
What truly emotional experience thank you to the author. And an even bigger thank you to all those soldiers of the allied forces who fought to free Europe and those that fought in the east. God bless them all.
Thank you very much for this. I will be visiting Oosterbeek War Cemetery this September to honour a member of the 2nd (Oban) Airlanding Anti Tank Regiment who died from his wounds at the Hartenstein Hotel on 26/9/1944. He was married to my Great Aunt.
All 3 parachute battalions (and probably a company of engineers) should have been dropped south of the main Arnhem bridge. I've read quite a bit about this battle and I recall that Gen Gale (cmdr of 6th Airborne that dropped at Normandy) was quoted as saying if he was the cmdr of 1st Airborne he would have resigned his position if he was not granted permission to drop the para battalions south of the bridge. He was that convinced this was the correct thing to do and I whole heartedly agree. The poor Recce squad yes should have left as soon as they landed and headed to the bridge immediately. Great video and thanks for compiling.
Excellent video sir, thank you for showing these historic locations. I've read everything I could on the Arnhem/Market Garden operations. The actions of the Dutch people helping the allies during the battle were exceedingly brave. Bless them all.
It was the actions of these brave men of the 1st British Airborne and the men of the American and Polish Paratroopers that led me to becoming a Paratrooper in the 82nd Airborne, their exploits are legendary and till this day are held in the highest regards by those of us that followed in their footsteps.
Great informative & respectfully done video. My father was in 2 Para from 1958/1967 he took me to see a bridge too far when I was 8. I’ve always had an interest in operation market garden & the brave men who took part.
Thanks for the great description of the early parts of the battle. It is indeed sad and disheartening to hear how close the British 1st airborne division came to a successful operation, but unfortunately it was not meant to be. It was all timing. Thanks again
This is one on the best videos on this subject. Seeing the area’s and the details make the stories much more deeper and understandable. Just amazing thanks
Thank you so much for this Video. My late Grandfather, Reg Hasler was the driver of the second Jeep that was ambushed. He was shot 3 times across the chest and became a POW held in a Polish concentration camp until the end of the war. like many veterans he didn't mention much about his ordeal so i am very grateful that you have done the research and put together this video so Myself and my family can visit the site.
My grandfather Trooper George Adams, was a member of Recce squadron, D troop, 12 section under Lt. Pascal and Capt. Park.
Aged 20/21 at the time, he flew with the jeeps in horsa glider from Tarrant Rushton airfield. He was shot in the wrist at some point and later captured around the 24/25th September and sent to Stalag 11b (Fallingbostel in saxony I think) until the camp was liberated.
He survived the war to eventually go on and serve in Palestine with the 21st Independent parachute company, and later coming back to work at Tarrant Rushton airfield itself in the 60's.
I never got the chance to meet him, but I've done all I can to learn about him and his friends and comrades.
Videos like these are important to remember the borderline impossible tasks that were asked of these young men.
Thank you very much for making this!
Thank you for your kind words and for sharing your story!
@@TheBattlefieldExplorer thank you for reading!
Then your Grandfather and my father must have fought together.
@@notbaltic280 no kidding! was your grandfather Recce as well?
Or a combatant on the other side of the fence?
My uncle Sidney Whitlock jumped at Arnhem, fought and captured and survived the war, married my mum's sister and attended my King's Squad pass out the Commando Training Centre when I completed recruit training in 1986. He was treated like a king and never bought a drink!! Per Mare Per Terram, Utrinque Paratus
Beyond wonderful. This is the kind of "show and tell" That those who would study this history need so badly. There have been many fine books, and pages after pages of maps, but they do not work to make the places and the history come to life. You have done something very wonderful indeed by making these places and the men more than dots on a map. Your efforts have made them real people in real places that can be seen and felt. They live on and history lives on because you have walked in their path. Thank you beyond words for doing something that needs to be done so much, and for doing it so well.
Thank you very much for your kind words, I'm humbled!
I can only agree with other comments. An excellent video. Thank you for taking the time to make the video. I'm sure many British people are thankful to our Dutch neighbours in continuing to look after all of the boys who fell at Arnhem.
Thank you very much!
Thanks to you and all the Dutch people who keep these men's memories alive. :)
The leaders of operation Market Garden were over confident of the mission, but sorry to say that the same massacred a lot of commandos, how sad!
@@washingtonhidalgo3056 hardly massacred.
This video is really excellent, thank you for making it. My Grandfather was a Para. He fought at Arnhem was captured and reported missing presumed killed. He was a very placid man and never saw the point of getting into an argument. Nor did he ever spoke of his wartime experiences and when asked he would simply reply, it's in the past. So despite having fought at Tabrok and Arnhem, we know very little of what he did. This video has helped to stitch together much of what I've read and documentaries I've seen. It has also given a new and more personal perspective on what was such a huge part of the market garden operation.
Thank you for taking the time to retrace the route & honour these men.
thankyou mate for a honest story of the dangers the lads encountered at that time.bless them all and thankyou for your time in making this brilliant real time documentary. bless them .
Glad you enjoyed it
Having been to these sites back some years ago, I still get a chill thinking about the losses. You did an excellent job describing the Operation. Thank you.
Glad you enjoyed
First of all, what a great detailed video! All the credits to you! I live in Arnhem and I it’s really amazing how many hidden stories there still are about Market Garden. Currently reading ‘it never snows in September, great book’! I will pass al this information on to my children just like my father and grandfather did so we will never forget what these heroes have done for our freedom, paying the ultimate price!
your research is much better than any documentary i have seen.thank you sir
Thank you for your efforts to honour these brave souls retelling their stories in such great detail!
Thank you Joris, this explanation puts a lot into perspective for me. I've long wanted to return to Arnhem/Oosterbeek and follow the battles. The proudest day of my life was when I jumped on DZ Y in 1991. Our brother Polish Paras jumped with us for the first time since 1944.
I'm very grateful to learn the area where Captain Queripel earned his VC. He crossed and re-crossed a road under fire, carrying casualties. Wounded in the face and arms, if I recall right. He then stayed behind with his pistol and grenades to cover the withdrawal of his men. I'm assuming that that road was behind the trees?
I knew two Arnhem veterans when I first joined Para Regt. They worked in Amity Grove, West Wimbledon, opposite each other. I used to spend a lot of time chatting with Peter who was 1 PARA. The other man worked in the post office - he was Recce Sqn. Unfortunately, he couldn't sit and chat at work.
I don't know the Recce man's story but Peter had fought in North Africa, Sicily and Italy before he was captured opposite the brickworks. 1 PARA came up against the Spindler(?) line and were ambushed from all directions, totally exposed across the river were Grabner's men were firing AA cannon into them. Peter and two others his age managed to get into cover of the nearby buildings. They were isolated, could hear activity close by but didn't know what was going on. After some time, it was their turn to be cleared out the building by the Germans. They were invited to surrender. To convince them, the Germans demonstrated a flame thrower across the outside of the window. They did the only sensible thing.
Peter and the other two lads were 19 years old when they fought at Arnhem. Even in my middle age, I can't get my head around that...
5:22 - I think he was Driver Evans.
What's not to like? You are a guardian of these brave men's story. You have not allowed them to be forgotten. So yes I have given this video a like. Thank you so much for making this.
Thank you very much, that means a lot to me!
A well made documentary that you’ve produced. It made it easier to see what really happened at that fateful week in September 1944.
I was in the film 1976 but I didn't know as much about it as you have reveled to me , thanks for the effort
I agree with all the positive comments added previously. I too was in the area from 24/09/19 onwards and discovered the Johannahoeveweg quite by accident as I raced on a bicycle back from the cemetery, in the dark, to Wolfheze. I walked in the reverse direction, in daylight, the next day and saw the crosses and wreaths left the week before. That was all very informative but I wish I'd seen your video first. I had no idea, for example, that the site was that involving Queripel.
Gough's recce squadron WERE planned to be a quick force to reach the bridge. They switched to their more traditional role ahead of the different battalions once it was clear they could not serve as a coup de main.
Of course, some Dutch were Nazis or even SS - I suspect many Brits would have done the same, judging by Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts - but it is ridiculous to ignore the many more who were in the resistance and/or supporting Allied troops. They pleaded to join the fight but were not entirely trusted, on the one hand, or there were concerns about Nazi reprisals on the other. The Dutch continue to remember these events to this day. I know many Brits who are ignorant of Operation Market Garden.
Thankyou. You have added the visuals and the terrain to what I read of. The cemetery footage was very moving. Thankyou for remembering these men.
This is the best video on the Arnhem battle itself. The 1977 film tried to compress too much - this video puts it all in perspective.
Thank you for your work.
I knew an Arnhem veteran, who always maintained "the Germans were either lucky or knew we were coming." He said the German heavy machine guns were very effective in the open fields and woods, much more so than the armour.
Thank you very much for your kind words!
I agree about the film struggling to fit things in so as to be fully comprehensible. It's a fine film and one of the great late 20th C war movies in the English language (primarily, I mean), but one of the things which bugged me a little was how much context was omitted. So, for example, Grabner's dash across the bridge made very little sense to me when younger; why were they doing that? Of course, the very fact that they were trying to link up with their own forces and cross with the advantage of surprise on their side (trying) was not clear in the movie, but makes sense now. Much like the British jeeps, they didn't have much of a surprise advantage and most of them charged into heavy fire instead. Brave men on both sides, I suppose.
A very enlightening and revealing account, superbly explained and expressed. Thank you for this, and to the wonderful Dutch people for maintaining the graves and for the respect shown. Many British Paras feel eternally guilty that they were not able to free the wonderful Dutch people, and feel they almost betrayed them as well as demolishing their town in the process. The level of forgiveness from the Dutch people is wonderful.
Very much enjoyed your commentary. Thank you for all the research you have done.
Thanks, I really appreciate your compliment! It was a big one to research and film but I wanted to do it justice.
My uncle Ron was at Arhnem in 1944. I wasn't a full Para, myself. Unlike him, dad & cousins. I trained to become a Reserve Paratrooper. But at over 40, couldn't quite make the required fitness. Despite an extraordinary, effort. Still. I spent 2 years working for Airborne Veterans. But the stuff he experienced there was beyond belief. So violent the struggle became.
Beautiful and respectfully produced documentary. I have always wondered why the jeep attack was unsuccessful. You have explained it perfectly. Well done and thank you.
Thank you!
Good to see your research is spot on. Not only from the British side but the German as well. You also got it correct with the fact that most of the Jeeps did arrive.
Thank you, Carl!
What a fanatstic video. Actually walking the route taken has made it easier to understand the difficulties faced by the recce sqn than looking at maps and photographs.
Your tone was respectful and your knowledge first class. Well done, I've subscribed and look forward to watching further videos.
Thank you so much. An unbiased factual commentary of a very traumatic event. Looking for more of work now.
The railway tunnel is the finishing point of the first week of the Dutch Air Assault Leadership Course.
Everyone comes out of that tunnel a changed man.
i've been through there, i'm british but live in holland, actually i was north of that tunnel in the woods today roaming around where 4 para division hq was back then
You're always the same man, you never change.
What changed were the skills learned and the perspectives gained.
Military training isn't magical; there is no mysticism to preparedness. All that is false bravado, and useless chest thumping.
You are still the same person.
I would like to say thank you for this history video.
I’m British and Iv a big interest in historical events.
It nice to learn about the individuals who took part.
Thank you again, a very informative film, done with respect.
Excellent description of the Recces attempt to reach the Bridge, I have visited Arnhem & Oosterbeek a couple of times but never managed to get to the Landing Zones, Thank you for giving me that chanced to view a different perspective of the battle area.
I had an Uncle that took part in Operation Market Garden. He was so traumatised by the battle, he spent ten months in Psychiatric care. He mentioned the war to me until I received orders to Camp New Amsterdam in 1976, making me promise to visit the military cemetary. Which I did more than once. Excellent job, thank you for your work.
Thanks for sharing, Bugeater. A side of the war that very few people talk about.
Thank you for such a brilliant commentary. 👍💯🇬🇧
Have just found this video and have to say thank you, its amazing. I was doing research for a friend whose grandad (Trooper Garwood) was the driver in one of the jeeps in Section 7 , he was injured and taken PoW. We had some photo's of where we believed this all happened but thanks to your video and google maps we can actually see and pinpoint where it happened. Thank you so much for allowing us to connect with what they went through.
A great presentation, sir. The detailed information is quite good. These small stories/battles are usually left out. Thank you.
Great research, presentation and video. Thank you. Dank u wel. Have worked in the Netherlands often over the years and I have great respect for the country. Been to many war sites to pay respects. Best wishes from England. 'Lest we forget.'
I have just returned from Arnhem ,infact followed in the footstep of your documentary .excellent
Great video. Always wanted to know more about the story of the Recce Jeeps. You nailed it. Nice to include both sides of the story.
Thank you very much for your kind words!
Having lived in the Netherlands I traveled many, many times through Arnhem on my way to Germany and never knew THIS was "A Bridge Too Far." I would have loved to have explored it. Thank you.
I love the detail. It makes sense of it all.
Excellent video and history lesson. I visited the site of the ambush back in 1995 as part of a tour of the Market Garden battle sites.
Fantastic video, really helps put some geography to the battle, especially the blocking line by that cavalier German officer.
Thank you for this excellent video which explains the unfolding moments so clearly ! Bedankt !
Thank you very much for this excellent and informative video.
Thankyou Sir, what a professional film and I note particularly your respectful commentary. I will be staying in the area next week for a couple of nights and after seeing your film, intend to walk in that section of the road near that embankment tunnel. May all those blokes rest in peace, lest we forget.
My pleasure and enjoy your visit!
Market Garden was badly planned. Not the overall concept (Montgomery's concept of a narrow deep thrust was sound) but in the detailed planning it was flawed . Primarily the fault of Fredrick Browning, commander of 1st Allied Airborne army (played by Dirk Bogarde in the film)
1. 82nd Airborne should have concentrated soley on Nijmegen bridge (and not the Grosbeek heights).
2. The RAF and USAAF should have dropped at least part of 1st airborne division closer to the bridge. There was an area south of the bridge that could have been used by at least part of 1st Airborne. What is now more built up and known as Malburgen. There is also an area on the north bank of the river just west of the rail bridge that could have been used for at lest one battalion and another on the south side of the river between Driel and the rail bridge that the poles later used that could have accommodated 2 or more battalions.
3. The radios should have been checked two or three days before. I've heard it said that the wrong crystals were fitted. On day 3 or 4 (19th or 20th) even carrier pigeons could have been used to inform 2nd army and RAF of the revised resupply drop zones.
4. More use should have been made of fighter-bombers, especially against tanks and AFVs.
5. The entire plan with maps was found on the body of a dead American officer. He shouldn't have been carrying the entire plan.
How anyone thought a handful of unarmored jeeps stood any chance against the almost certainty of MG42 machine guns (spitting out up to 25 rounds per second) somewhere along the route I will never know. Even universal carriers (bren carriers) stood a far better chance.
A 'coup de main force' of two companies or maybe a whole battalion could have been dropped / landed about half a mile south of the road bridge. 10 minutes on foot. But the RAF wouldn't fly on a route taking them over Deelen airfield - a few miles further north where it was thought there were flak guns (there were NO flak guns at Deelen) If John Frost could have got through to 1 Para and 3 Para they could have quickly diverted their route to the southern river route previously taken by 2 para and got through during the evening/night but unfortunately the radios didn't work. Another screw up - who was supposed to test them ?
I agree the detailed planning was flawed, but Browning's original concept for Operation COMET, cancelled at the last minute by Montgomery when he was informed II.SS-Panzerkorps had moved into the area, was compromised by Brereton's 1st Allied Airborne Army for the expanded operation MARKET. Any objections Browning had to the compromises were already neutralised by the LINNET II affair in which he threatened to resign over the lack of time to print and distribute maps to the troops, but LINNET II was thankfully cancelled before Brereton could accept his resignation and carry out his plan to replace Browning with Matthew Ridgeway as his deputy and his US XVIII Airborne Corps HQ for the operation.
One of the compromises Brereton made, at the behest of Paul Williams of US IX Troop Carrier Command, was to delete the double airlift on the first day in order to carry out the operation entirely in daylight, and this in turn removed Browning's planned dawn glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, as they would be too risky in broad daylight. They were to be carried out in 'Pegasus Bridge' style raids using six gliders each to carry the 'D' Companies of the three battalions from 1st Airlanding Brigade. Indeed, the lead pilot on Operation DEADSTICK in Normandy, Sergeant Jim Wallwork, was to pilot the lead glider on the Nijmegen mission carrying 'D' Company 7th KOSB.
The coup de main mission to be carried out by the Reconnaissance Squadron at Arnhem was obviously an alternate plan, and their commander was not happy with that role or the Jeep armament. Major Gough first requested a platoon of airborne Tetrarch tanks as used in Normandy by 6th Airborne, then .50 cal guns on the Jeeps, then twin Vickers MGs instead of single Vickers actually fitted, but they were all refused.
Your point 1) concentrating on the Nijmegen bridge - in fact Gavin planned to have the 508th send its 1st Battalion directly to the bridge after landing, and the fact this was not done was a command failure at the top of the 508th that compromised the whole operation, because it allowed 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce the undefended bridges at Nijmegen before Gavin could intervene personally and order the 508th to get moving. In his 1967 interview with Cornelius Ryan for A Bridge Too Far (1974), he said the British had requested he drop a battalion on the north end of the bridge, and after toying with the idea he eventually dismissed it because of his experiecne in Sicily, where his 505th Regiment was dropped over a huge area and he landed with just four or five men to command. The whole division was disorganised for days, he said. He opted instead to land his three parachute regiments concentratedon three drop zones forming a "power center" and fan out to seize objectives.
To me, the geography of the Nijmegen area is the mirror image of the one at Arnhem. Gavin planned to seize the highway bridge with one battalion and hold the ridge with the other two battalions from the 508th. At Arnhem, 1st Parachute Brigade was to send 1st Battalion to hold the high ground north of Arnhem, two were tasked to seize the bridges.
2) Dropping closer to the Arnhem bridge. Not possible as there were no suitable drop zones on D-Day. The Malburgsche Polder south of the bridge designated as the original Drop Zone 'K' for the Poles on D+2 was flanked by two of the heavy batteries of gem.Flak-Abteilung 591 on the Meinerswijk and Malburgsche Polder itself, and the polder was crossed by high tension lines (!!) from the Arnhem power station near the bridge. The zone was only deemed suitable for the Poles because by D+2 it was assumed that the area would be controlled by 1st Parachute Brigade and the Flak would be dealt with and the power cut to the lines. The power station was also the rendezvous for the Royal Engineers after they had completed their intitial tasks and would take control of the station.
3) The British radios worked perfectly well, but it was found that the operational ranges were drastically reduced, and then only on virtually line of sight. It was realised afterwards that the local glacial moraine consisting of sandy soil with a high iron content was responsible. The same problems were suffered by the Germans, who relied on their own telephone networks, both field and Dutch civilian. The wrong crystals were delivered for only the two VHF sets used by the USAAF 306th Fighter Control Squadron teams, which was a distinction not made in the Hollywood film and nicely conflates the VHF problem with all the British Airborne communications, but then a later scene where Frost briefly speaks with Urquhart, which contradicts that impression. In reality, the Royal Artillery sets were still usable because they had more powerful No.18 sets, although still reduced in range like the Battalion No.22 sets, the range was still sufficient for the Battery observer at the bridge to call on artillery fire from the Light Regiment five miles away in Oosterbeek. In fact, the 'MIKE ONE' target (designated primary target for a regimental shoot) was the southern ramp of the Arnhem bridge. Not possible if all the radios were out. Having only the artillery net working (and they were very busy) meant there was little air time available to pass messages for other units. There were carrier pigeons available and there is an amusing story of the first two released settled on a nearby roof and would not budge until encouraged with a few stones thrown at them, which almost echoes the scene in The Longest Day in which the pigeons flew inland towards the Germans and accused of being "traitors!"
4) The Germans found that they could move quite freely on the roads even in daylight since the Dutch had planted trees alongside their main roads since Napoleonic times to give shade for marching troops. Inside the desginated 'boxes' around the Airborne Divisions, only directed air attacks by ground observers was permitted, and those teams were not properly organised and had the VHF radio problems as already mentioned. The main unforced error was that of 1st Allied Airborne Army HQ in England failing to inform 2nd Tactical Air Force in Belgium of when an airlift was delayed by weather. The deconfliction rules meant that the 2nd TAF was grounded when an airlift was due, until the transports had completed their mission, so it was frustrating that the fighter bombers were grounded under sunny skies on the continent while 1st AAA were grounded by early morning fog in England.
5) This is a scene from the Hollywood film using the same maps prop (almost cartoon in their clarity to be understandable by the audience) that Dirk Bogarde used for the earlier briefing scene. In fact, the American officer was the 101st Airborne's lisiaon officer to Browning's Corps HQ and his comms team, which crashed near Vught, which happened to be the headquarters of General Kurt Student's 1.Fallschirm-Armee (1st Parachute Army). The captured documents were logistics documents, not the operational plans or maps, but they did include a resupply schedule for the 101st Airborne, which when translated Student was able as an airborne commander himself to extrapolate the airlift schedules for all three divisions. He tried to warn Model but Model was unconvinced of the significance of the document and dismissed it. Student then alerted his own Luftwaffe chain of command (the German airborne forces were part of the air force) to have fighter aircraft over the drop zones at the appropriate times, but the delayed airlifts worked against them and the fighters were back at their bases in Germany when the transports finally arrived.
Thanks for your time and effort making this video .Well done.
Thank you!
Overall, an excellent video - the fate of the Recce squadron is often overlooked or subject to misinformation, so thank you for taking the time to produce this.
I do have a couple of comments/corrections/observations.
According to the original plan, 28 jeeps would be involved in the race to the bridge; as the 8 jeeps of A Troop were assigned as Divisional reserve, that would have left 26 jeeps ( 6 from HQ and HQ Troop, 4 from Support Troop and 8 each from C and D Troops) - the additional two jeeps would have been the Royal Engineers (two jeeps with trailers, not four - their detachment was only assigned two gliders which came into the same LZ as the Recce Squadron).
In the event, only 25 of the squadron's jeeps were available. Three jeeps (1 from HQ troop, 2 from A Troop) failed to arrive on the 17th; they came in the following day on the 2nd lift. A further six jeeps from A Troop were proving very difficult to remove from their gliders (four were recovered by 1900, the other two the following morning). Major Gough decided to leave two jeeps with Lt Collier (the QM) to gather in supplies from the LZ and DZ. That should have left them with 23 jeeps, but Lt Marshall from D Troop took a wrong turn on the way to the RV and had quite an interesting afternoon's drive with Tpr Joe Irala.
It's still unclear what happened to the RE detachment. They aren't mentioned in the Recce Squadron war diaries, but the 9 RE Field Company diaries indicate the detachment was still with them on the Monday morning, reporting nil casualties. If they hadn't RV'ed with the Recce on the 17th, that almost certainly would have been noted in the war diary.
The delay in assembling at and setting off from the RV seems mostly to be the result of problems unloading gliders, several of which had crashed into one of the woodlands or ploughed heavily into the soft soil. While most of these were from A Troop, there were also jeeps from HQ and D Troop affected.
The engagement on Johannahoeveweg actually went on for quite a while; at 1830 HQ, D and Support Troops set off for Div HQ; C Troop followed on at 1900 having been relieved by men of the Gilder Pilot Regiment. It's also worth noting that it wasn't just C Troop engaged - the HQ at Wolfheze station came under
mortar fire at 1600; the two Polsten guns of the Support Troop were put into action to drive off some armoured cars which were causing the South Staffs a problem.
While the engagement was going on, Major Gough received a radio message at 1630 recalling him to Div HQ as Gen Urquhart wanted an explanation of what had happened to the squadron. He took 2 jeeps and 1 dispatch rider; the party comprised 13 men when it set off at 1645, he had borrowed some men from D Troop as a protective detail. When he got there, he found that Urquhart had left to find 1st Para Bde so the party followed on and eventually reached 1st Para Bde HQ at the rear of 2 Para's column. Along the way, one of the party had fallen off one of the jeeps when they came under fire. Twelve men (3 officers - Gough; Captain Platt , OC HQ Troop; Lt McNabb, Intelligence Officer; nine other ranks including Tpr Charles Bolton of D Troop, one of the handful of black soldiers in the division) eventually made it to the bridge. The dispatch rider, Tpr "Chalky" White returned from the bridge to Div HQ later that night.
What does surprise me is that no attempt seems to have been made by the squadron to determine where Krafft's blocking line ended or if there was another route they could take to avoid it. Looking at the maps, it would have been possible to skirt around the North end of Krafft's line using the rides/tracks although they might then have run into the same German forces that 1 Para later encountered. I can only imagine that it was a combination of shock at the sudden heavy opposition and unhappiness with the task they had been assigned, especially when you consider their record in Italy.
C Troop were definitely very unlucky, running into another ambush two days later from which only seven or eight of them escaped.
Thank you very much for your feedback, I love the fact that this video stirs up new information completing the picture!
The entire episode of the Reece unit was unfortunate. The plan for the jeeps to race ahead to seize the bridges had no margin to allow for error or delays which eventually arose. The jeeps were landed by glider, but the men by parachute. By the time the jeeps were unloaded, some with great difficulty due to gliders that landed badly, the men assembled to them, and then additional time spent to join up with the Engineers that were to accompany them, any chance for surprise was completely lost. Again, the extremely short time for planning for the operation likely had much to do with this. The official belief by those in charge of planning, that there would be little to no German resistance, probably left too many to assume that inevitable delays that would occur would not be of consequence.
Communication and command problems seemed to add to the already difficult situation. Urquhart calling Gough back to the Div HQ is one of several questionable decisions he made during Market-Garden. While one might understand Urquhart wanting information, calling Gough away left his unit without direction. If you want Gough to rush for the bridge, give him that job, and trust him to do it. Don't call him all the way back to HQ to explain what's going on and why he hasn't gotten to the bridge yet. If radio communications had been more reliable and efficient, perhaps Gough could have made his report by radio, while continuing to push forward.
@@dongilleo9743 thanks for the reply. Like much of the plan, the squadron's assigned task on D-Day was a big gamble relying on everything going perfectly and that the Germans would not react to the landings.
There does seem to be a bit of a myth about the delay with Captain Heggie's detachment of engineers. Their gliders had arrived on the same LZ as the Recce squadron's and they set off for the RV on the DZ at 1430, over 30 minutes before the recce jeeps left the LZ. I think some of the myth may be down to the RE company's war diary entry which gives the RV point as 6470 - I suspect that this was simply a typo when the handwritten entries were transcribed (I've encountered many others in various war diaries).
My own analysis has shown that they must have been there when the squadron was fully assembled, otherwise there could not have been 25 jeeps at the RV (the squadron, less A Troop, should have had 26 jeeps present - one from HQ Troop was on a glider which had problems while still over England; the one from HQ troop in SSM Meadows' glider had to be abandoned as it had ended up 30 foot up a tree; and Lt Marshall's jeep from D Troop had got lost on the way to the RV. That left 23 jeeps of the squadron available for the bridge rush, plus the two RE jeeps bringing it up to the 25.
Urquhart's summons to Gough was certainly bizarre, especially as he left the Div HQ very shortly afterwards.
@@tamsinp7711 Urquhart's decision to leave the Division HQ is one of those things I have always had trouble understanding, and have wondered why he doesn't receive more criticism for. In addition, the Division's artillery commander went along for the trip, for no apparent reason, thus leaving two leading officers out of touch with their commands for a crucial time period. It is only shear luck that Urquhart wasn't captured or killed. He was away from his HQ during a critical time, when decisions had to be made, and he wasn't there to make them, and there was no clear-cut line of chain of command. I see it as if a captain of a warship, during battle, decided to leave the bridge of the ship to go check on and see what was going on in one of the gun turrets. I assume the lack of criticism towards him was a feeling that he had been put in an impossible situation, had done as well as expected, and that any criticism would be piling on an otherwise good officer.
Could Urquhart have done anything different if he had stayed at his HQ? In his absence, the brigade commanders were reluctant to change or alter the original plan. The 4th Parachute Brigade, landing on day two, was committed piecemeal in an attempt to get to the bridge, something which by that point was impossible given the reaction of the Germans to strongly block the way. The 4th Para was chewed up, suffering heavy losses and expending most of it's available ammunition trying to do something that Airborne troops are not equipped for; fighting through a heavily defended enemy line. The ammunition situation became a major concern very quickly when resupply airdrops were landing outside the division perimeter. Admittedly this is "Monday morning armchair leading" but it was futile to waste troop strength and ammunition in a futile attempt to get to the bridge. A better decision would have been to use the fresh 4th Para, and other division troops, to establish a firm defensive perimeter on the north side of the Rhine. With those battalions at full strength, with full loads of ammo, they might have been able to hold sufficient of a perimeter to allow reinforcements to successfully be brought over the river, thus executing the goal of establishing a bridgehead over the Rhine.
In Urquhart's defense, Gavin of the 82nd Division was travelling all around his division area, wherever there was a crisis. The only difference was that Gavin had a much more secure area, far different than Urquhart in Arnhem, and working radio communications to remain in touch with his HQ on a regular basis.
Great video! I really appreciated this tour of the Arnhem battle sites. I am from Canada, but we lived in Germany from 1976-79 and after we saw 'A Bridge Too Far' in 1977 we visited The Netherlands (I was 10 years old at the time). We visited Arnhem, Nijmegen, Eindhoven, and many other places in the country, but we sure could have used a tour guide to really see the battle sites. I do remember visiting the bridges, the Canadian war cemetery in Groesbeek, and the airborne museum at Hartenstein. Thank you SO much for this guided tour ... you did a wonderful job. Now, I can re-watch 'Theirs Is The Glory' with a better understanding of the terrain and distances.
Thankyou so much for this superb and thoughtful video and to all the Dutch people who continue to respect these sites and war graves
Thanks for posting this video. I grew up in Pennsylvania in the 60's. When I was 15, I went on a trip to the Netherlands, and visited some of these sites. At the time it had very little meaning to me other than that it was a WWII battlefield, and there were many many white crosses in the ground there. About a year later I saw the movie "A Bridge Too Far". It helped to provide some meaning behind what I had seen, but I still didn't really get it.
A few years later I read the book from which the movie was made, and it peaked my curiosity. I found myself poring over maps of the region while reading and re-reading, trying to understand how things progressed on each day of the fateful mission. Seeing this video helps fill in some gaps. I had not seen a picture of that tunnel under the RR. Wow.....that is so small. Men under fire trying to rush equipment through there. Whew!
Also, I knew the jeep squadron didn't make it, but I didn't know all these details about why, and what had happened. This helps to fill it in. It's all about timing and surprise. If they had started a little sooner, they would have made it to the bridge, but I'm not sure if that would have changed the outcome. Landing on top of a Panzer Division, and a breakdown of virtually all communications equipment.
I always wondered, what if all their communication equipment was working? Could they have diverted one of the companies to follow Frost to the bridge? Could they have changed the drop zones? Maybe they could have made the 2nd drop on the south side of the river, taken the south end of the bridge, and reinforced Frost that direction? With communications they could have had more air support to take out critical German positions. Or was it really all doomed from the start?
There are so many "what ifs" in Operation Market Garden, it could have worked but in the end the Germans were able to frustrate the allies at crucial moments.
I believe thr consensus among military historians is that capture of land both sides of the Scheldt estuary would have posed the better risk both wth 20/20 hindsight and at the time.
But looking at those headstones makes all the talk seem cheap. Thank you for your efforts and for your service. I'm impressed no end that people take the trouble.
But those stones . . .
I knew four men who were in Market Garden. Johnny McKnight and Dick Smullens (an Irishman born in Dublin) were at Arnhem. My uncle Jimmy Rietdyk who was with XXX corps - he helped drag the bodies of the US 82nd men who went across in boats, out of the Waal. And Billy Dixon who was with XXX Corps - he said they were approaching Nijmegen in trucks with 82nd men dropping out of the sky all around them landing in the fields. He said many were running south away from the fighting in Nijmegen.
Shut up you bullshit artist
Many thanks to you for the respect you show to both sides.
I look forward to your videos all the time and get excited when I receive a notification of a new one. I must say this one is exceptional! The research you put in was evident in this documentary. Well done sir, again. I learned many new things I had never known. Thank you for your excellent work.
Wow, thank you very much indeed!
Very informative! I always thought the jeep recon squadron never arrived so it was interesting to see what happened 👍
This was wonderful, such dedication to laying it all out. Very sobering to see all the graves, thank you for such a fine job telling this story.
Very good! Thanks for all the effort you put in - I can now picture these places and events much better now.
Wonderful video. I was over there last year in 2021 and visited many of the sites in your video including the beautiful cemetery. Thank you for posting this excellent video.
Glad you enjoyed it
My Uncle, Frederick Groves, was captured at Arnhem and we had always been led to believe that he had been injured by gun fire whilst parachuting, his leg being saved by a German doctor and the rest of the war spent in a camp. Unfortunately he passed away many years ago and would never talk of his experiences as a POW so what actually happened to him, where and when, must remain a mystery. Thanks for the excellent video.
My pleasure, Tim! Thank you for sharing your story with us!
Very indepth and a great way to show just how confusing ot could without someone shooting at you. The fog of war.
Amazing video. Thanks for letting those of us who will never get to be there in person actually see the places where these events occurred.
Thank you for the time and effort you put in to making these videos! I enjoy every single one and hope you continue to make them in the future!
Thank you for providing this video. It certainly enhanced my recent visit to Arnhem.
Really amazing story and so well told, I visited the museums in the Nijmegen area and was struck by how close the bridgers were to each other.
Excellent commentary. Very understandable. Thank you.
Thanks so much for this. Extraordinarily informative. An excellent video that really helps make sense of what happened.
I had read about the jeep ambush in "Remember Arnhem" and "With Recce at Arnhem", but until now, I never fully understood and appreciated the conditions and terrain. Many thanks for this excellent video.
Great film. Thank you for sharing this fascinating story and the tragic events.
Told in a very clear and understandable way! Compliments!
Thanks!
Another great detailed video and would love to see more from within the Arnhem area. Many thanks for your efforts.
excellent documentary....well done and thanks.
A wonderful video, thank you. 🇬🇧
Just came on this video,great job much detail,i have been visiting the area for over thirty years,always pay my respects,i had the privilege of knowing one of the recon soldiers from my town,one day he invited me or a brew and he told me the full story of his military servicethat was after knowing the Man for over two years.
This is absolutely excellent - what brilliant research. Thank you very much for posting.
My mother, Jantje Brink, lived in Wolfheze. She was 17 years old in 1944. She was working at the school for the blind on September 17, 1944. I love having a more visual depiction of all the things she has shared with all of our family.
A very well-produced video. Helps to make sense of an enduring Arnhem myth. There really is no substitute for 'walking the ground'.
I first visited the cemetary back in the summer of 2002. And found it touching to see how well the locals had kept it. Great vid.
WOW! That was really interesting & informative to hear about what happened & from the German side too, THANK YOU!
My pleasure and thank you for your kind words!
Beautifully and tastefully done .
VERY INTERESTING INFORMATIVE VIDEO, THE DETAIL HELPED FORM A PICTURE OF THE EVENTS THAT TOOK PLACE THERE, ARNHEM HOLDS A VERY SPECIAL PLACE IN BRITISH MILITARY HISTORY, A SALUTE THE BRAVE MEN THAT FOUGHT AND DIED THERE. THANKS FOR SHARING.
An excellent presentation that I found posted by one of my Linkedin contacts. I've liked and subscribed. I'm looking forward to watching more.
One of the best and detailed video documentaries I've seen for a while, very accurate and interesting and brilliant commentary...keep up the excellent work! I was a friend of an old 21st Ind Para Coy soldier who jumped onto LZ S with No-3 Platoon, Pte Les 'Jocky' Morgan and the photo you showed of the 21st next to the Stirlings prior to take off was No 3 Platoon...so was delighted to see that...thank you Joris!
Thanks!
@@TheBattlefieldExplorer Very welcome Joris...may I ask if you will ever do a recording of the 21st from the LZ/DZs via Oosterbeek and Operation Berlin please?
Richy Clatworthy k. Hope we
Thanks very much for incite !! and effort am sure the boys would appreciate it !!
A really excellently narrated & filmed and informative film. For someone for whom English is not their native language you put many British historical presenters in the shade.
As a U.S. Army disabled veteran living in Denmark, I need to make a trip to Arnhem.
Please visit also the airborn museum at the HQ of gen. Urquehart at Hartenstein
Good luck sir.
What truly emotional experience thank you to the author. And an even bigger thank you to all those soldiers of the allied forces who fought to free Europe and those that fought in the east. God bless them all.
Thank you very much for this. I will be visiting Oosterbeek War Cemetery this September to honour a member of the 2nd (Oban) Airlanding Anti Tank Regiment who died from his wounds at the Hartenstein Hotel on 26/9/1944. He was married to my Great Aunt.
All 3 parachute battalions (and probably a company of engineers) should have been dropped south of the main Arnhem bridge. I've read quite a bit about this battle and I recall that Gen Gale (cmdr of 6th Airborne that dropped at Normandy) was quoted as saying if he was the cmdr of 1st Airborne he would have resigned his position if he was not granted permission to drop the para battalions south of the bridge. He was that convinced this was the correct thing to do and I whole heartedly agree.
The poor Recce squad yes should have left as soon as they landed and headed to the bridge immediately. Great video and thanks for compiling.
Excellent video sir, thank you for showing these historic locations. I've read everything I could on the Arnhem/Market Garden operations.
The actions of the Dutch people helping the allies during the battle were exceedingly brave.
Bless them all.
Excellent video. Thank you for uploading.
Absolutly superb, thank you so much, so much knowlage in your vidios. Please keep it up.
Thanks, will do!
Very informative video, thanks.
Glad it was helpful!
It was the actions of these brave men of the 1st British Airborne and the men of the American and Polish Paratroopers that led me to becoming a Paratrooper in the 82nd Airborne, their exploits are legendary and till this day are held in the highest regards by those of us that followed in their footsteps.
Great informative & respectfully done video. My father was in 2 Para from 1958/1967 he took me to see a bridge too far when I was 8.
I’ve always had an interest in operation market garden & the brave men who took part.
Thanks for the great description of the early parts of the battle. It is indeed sad and disheartening to hear how close the British 1st airborne division came to a successful operation, but unfortunately it was not meant to be. It was all timing. Thanks again
Glad you enjoyed it
Great detail in this video.
~ Harley
Great informative & balanced video, many thanks.
excellent- many thanks
A Bloody Excellent Video That Was!
Thanks!
thankyou sir for the good film.
Great documentary! More please!!