Great observation by Chomsky about the theory of Rawls, how abstract it is in relation to the actual complex reality and practice of capitalist, uneven relations in the modern liberal state such as the U.S.A.
No you don't. The business about Hume and applying linguistic models is very intriguing but Chomsky does not elaborate. Do you have any idea what he's talking about? I don't.
Whatever. He answered a question that I have had for about ten years. But since you don't know what he's talking about in this clip, it must be impossible that I do. Thanks for the correction and rhetorical question.
I like Chomsky, but I think he misses the point a bit here. I wrote my dissertation on Rawls (many years ago) and I interpreted his Original Position thesis as an attempt to underpin Natural Rights Theory, which in the real world, we would call Human Rights. Chomsky dismisses it as being "abstract" - well, I guess ideas are abstract - but ideas are necessary to give credence to socio-political movements or human concerns. Chomsky alludes to this but basically says that Rawls has no interest in US politics/society. I would argue that Rawls has a greater concern - to establish universal bases for rights theory across the world: China, the Arab world and other parts of the globe simply deny that there is a basic human right to free speech, for example. I'm surprised that Chomsky doesn't acknowledge this.
Philosophers are not out there to always provide us 'real' solutions. They engage with ideas, and ideas make their presence in our lives, in a variety of ways. In a way Chomsky is smartly dismissive of Rawls, who was a profounder thinker than him. And yet Chomsky admires Kant, whose work is as 'impractical' as Rawls'!
I agree. It is strange that Chomsky doesn't acknowledge that ideas can transmit from the abstract to the real, especially given how Marx's Dialectic critique of history impacted the real world or indeed his own linguistic theory, i.e. Universal Grammar is rather like Rawls' OP - an innate system that manifests itself in the real world.
I think both you and Idrees Kanth misunderstood Chomsky's remarks. The problem is not that the abstract ideas/theories are not important but, rather Rawls himself sets such preconditions for his ideas to work that are not applicable to social realities. Fulfillment of preconditions for Original Position almost seems to require not human but some other species and social conditions which can never be realized in practice. Having said this, it does not mean that one cannot learn from Rawls. His way of reasoning is a powerful tool to understand the ways we, as a human beings, can deal with ethical problems, it can guide our reasoning through the problems of values and moral judgments (which are the hardest ones to deal with) in policy and society more broadly.
I would agree with you, though only partly. I was reading somewhere [have forgotten where, but I can provide evidence if you want me to] that Rawls is one of the most frequently quoted among political philosophers, particularly in legal cases. So not all of Rawls lacks practical relevance! Secondly, I am wondering how viable and practical is Chomsky's own anarchistic political community that he so loves to celebrate? On a lighter note if a person writes 150 books, as Chomsky has done [on an average he writes two books a year on US foreign policy], and keeps saying the same thing, it is a bit weird, and I guess self serving. While his politics is right, he tends to play this modest man, which he doesn't appear to be. Rawls was his contemporary and I guess a profounder thinker than him, and perhaps that may be one reason why Chomsky is obliquely dismissive of Rawls. [I mention this earlier as well]. I do intimate histories and I look into people's motivations!
Would thoroughly recommend Charles Mills' Black Rights/White Wrongs where he does exactly that. He critiques Rawls' ideal theory in a similar(ish) vein to Chomsky here, but claims you can construct a non-ideal Rawlsian theory of Liberalism that is actually compatible with radical politics.
I'm surprised Chomsky didn't mention that Rawls in his later work considered as consistent with his theory of justice only social democracy or democratic socialism (the latter taken in the traditional sense in which it is not equivalent to the former). A number of socialists have argued for socialism on Rawlsian grounds. I think perhaps Chomsky is being unfair in expecting abstract political philosophies to yield determinate answers to concrete and complex political developments. There is a role both for political philosophy and real-world politics. I've been unfortunate enough myself to have to study lots of contemporary analytic political philosophy - there are oustanding political philosophers on the left, such as Gerald Cohen, J. Roemer, J. Elster and the various 'left-libertarians' (in the technical philosophical sense). I'm often brought back to a remark Cohen made of his early thinking before he decided that engagement in political philosophy was necessary - namely, that he thought that pretty much whatever abstract moral or political philosophical theories you accepted (utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, value-pluralism, virtue-ethics, etc.) his conviction in socialism could be justified in those terms. Cohen came to doubt this for peculiar Marxist reasons (Marxism being suspicious of unrooted ideological theorising from the get-go) concerning self-ownership and he did political philosophy primarily to excorcise the ghosts of the likes of Nozick and Isaiah Berlin in their views that equality threatened meaningful liberty. But I think Cohen's earlier intuitions are broadly correct. If you're a Rawlsian, a communitarian, a 'democratic egalitarian', a neo-Kantian deontologist, a utilitarian, etc. then a case for radical leftist politics can still be made out in those terms. Take, for instance, the standard dichotomy in moral philosophy between consequentialists and deontologists: Hermann Kohen, a neo-Kantian, argued for democratic socialism on deontological grounds; James Mill argued for egalitarian resource distributions on utilitarian grounds, as did J. S. Mill later in life when he advocated for cooperatives. There is increasing awareness in philosophy departments of the fact that varying moral theories, if suitably interpreted and qualified, tend to converge on a common moral core. The practical implication is indeed that moral philosophy is practically irrelevant. But it would be unwise to think that it is irrelevant in the real world - not only is it worth undertaking for its own sake, but the elite in training often study fragments of moral philosophy as a justification for the status quo. It's worth academics in the relevant fields drawing attention to the fact that moral philosophies accross the board tend to provide no, or at best very little, justification for the status quo.
@@kellymartin1099 If you are referring to Chomsky then I invite you to examine his remarks concerning Marx and Einstein which are along the following lines: an individual may be a valuable source of insights whose ideas are worthy of study, but deference to authority in intellectual matters is a pernicious form of religion.
Seeking to build a wall against the Mexican people tells us a great deal about the 'frightened country' that the U.S. is but it also suggests that the fear is of an unusual type. The indigenous population was not known for their fear (even though they had so many opportunities to show it)and also those who emigrated to the U.S. did so with considerable courage. Yet a strange fear is there all the same. America is so ingenious and inventive in entertainment and technology, perhaps the cultural imagination just 'goes out there.'
_"I suppose the fact that America is a country with a Spanish name that is seeking to build a wall against Spanish-speaking people tells us a great deal about the 'frightened country'"_ you aren't a very rational person, if you deem this an actual argument, or a comment that carries any weight. Europe is, als myth has it, named after a virgin which Zeus abducted from Asia minor -- does that or should that have *any* impact *whatsoever* on political interactions between European nations and Turkey? Iran is named after the "Arians" (it originally meant, literally: "land of the Arians") - does that mean, that any white nationalist has to have sympathetic feelings for the mullahs? Africa derives it name from a [comparatively] small region in what today we consider *northern* Africa (Tunisia most of all), -- it was the name given to that speck of land by the Romans, when they made it into a province of theirs (land that was previously the center of Carthaginian civilization). - does that mean that all "Africans" are therefore descendants of Phoenician culture??? No, No and no! - it just does not follow! smh
Stuart Vernon I have an opposing opinion on culture. America has a great culture which allows girls to go to school and through its sheer prosparity it's people have touched the edge of space if you want to talk about multiculturalism in America you have to talk about the ramifications of operating outside of the American cultural framework. General Mattis seems to express a belief that the greatest enemies of the west are people whose interests run vertical to the horizontal lines we need for cooperation. If you want to talk about multiculturalism in the sence of sharing food and dance I will agree with you all day, but when a culture seeks to infringe on the rules of a country I see its influence as a negative force. In order to appreciate the belief that I hold you need look no further than the Horrors that we see in the East. People loose their lives for adultery and girls are prevented from going to school due to some leadership styles that are not in line with our own. Islamic principles, when they enter the political realm might as well be communist, fascist or monarchist principles when you consider that each of these political attitudes don't sit in line with our advanced democratic principles. There is endless room for ethnic diversity and the public dialogue should never be extinguished when speaking of new ideas but the standard of living in the West has no room for the oppression of hardened religous attitudes which would stand on the toes of our current freedom. That is my belief anyway. All things considered, our living standards are pretty good. Maybe picture how different your life would be if you lived in Saudi Arabia
I know what you mean about living in a part of the world where the constraints would be too much to bear. But what has to be borne in in mind is that the very best future depends on the most civilised of us coming together regardless of the differences in our cultures. The question of how two people can meet without their two cultures intervening, is, I think the challenge of our age. The injustices towards people in so many parts of the world is appalling but if a chemist born in the Sudan must at all costs work with a chemist in the U.S. to develop a new drug then we see the problem. Also, but oddly, and in these days of the internet, many people may agree wholeheartedly on web-forums without knowing much about their respective cultures. I am not a natural commentator on TH-cam, as you may have noticed, having already got many facts wrong. In this regard can I reply to Pyrrovonhperborea (whom I can't seem to find mean to reply to) that he is quite correct when he says that the name of a country can have no strong influence on the population that live there. Names are after all those things, like our own, that we cannot do very much about. I am more of a poetic thinker in the main, which can sometimes be a recipe for disaster in strategic or political matters.
Stuart Vernon Yeah, I'm admittedly not poetic in an abstract sence. even my artistic side is a utilitarian tool against nature. I do agree that good societies run on cooperation though. Sam Harris has raised the point that ideas inform behavior, ultimately I agree with this sentiment. its my observation that, in the West we tend to argue about 'left' and 'right-wing politics' but ultimately our vison of the future tends to look vary much like our present, except better in different ways. The trouble is that the framework for our society contains basic truths that we don't question. Our Western societies were largely built up from the roots by amalgamating successful social structures to form the civilization that we recognize. Without question, the mayor, trash man and firefighter are typically a part of everyone's idea of the future. Objectively speaking, our Culture is largely geared towards our civic duties more than religion. If people come to America with the idea of helping us improve our medical system, I am happy to see them enter. I just want people to understand that our country doesn't succeed by the grace of God, it succeeds on the back of our laws, values and hard work.
Chomsky is fundamentally mistaken. Rawls outlines four aspects to political philosophy, one of which is its practicability. Additionally Rawls claims that the purpose of an ideal theory is to use it as a measure against which the political structuring of society can be assessed. The argument that the theory of justice is too abstract fundamentally misses the point of the purpose of an ideal theory. Another point I have seen is that Rawls was a neo-liberal and sought to defend and entrench neo-liberalism. Not only is neo-liberalism not defined in this context, but to claim that Rawls was a neo-liberal is to do so in complete contradiction to what Rawls wrote. I would invite people to read Rawls rather than take Chomsky’s interpretation as true.
Ambesh Pratik Your statement would have much more force if you backed your claim with anything resembling argument. And a rehash of a Chomsky sound byte on another comment doesn’t quite count.
I concur that if you really want to know what Rawls thinks, you need to read him. Chomsky, who is commenting off the cuff here (though I do largely agree) isn't enough - it's a bit of an appeal to authority. I guess the issue would then be though - is what Rawls proposes practical? Is his theory - as he precisely outlines it - to abstract (we might think that and still accept his idea we need an ideal theory to assess what society we want to work towards)? You can't say a theory is not too abstract simply because it clearly demarcates "ideal theory" and non-ideal theory" Calling Rawls a neoliberal is wrong - but he wouldn't necessarily be against neoliberals if they could accept the basic liberal rights, and human rights at home and abroad. They are a type of liberal, after all. And for some people - such as myself - saying Rawls is a liberal is criticism enough. For those who haven't read Rawls - ideal theory is the model of society we construct assuming that everyone is going to go along with the constitution and the laws. Non-ideal theory is then what we should do when faced with others not going along with the constitution and the laws already determined.
Ross H To your first question: practical as to what end? Practical in the sense it could be perfectly replicated in the real world and could demonstrably better the whole of society? I’m not sure that that is really the purpose of a political theory, nor is it possible for any theory to really do this. And I don’t quite see the issue with a political theory being abstract, if it deals with abstract things.
I thought Habermas really showed why Rawls' thought experiment doesn't work: "The decisive issue in the justification of the two highest principles of justice is less the deliberations in the original position than the intuitions and basic concepts that guide the design of the original position itself. Rawls introduces normative contents into the very procedure of justification, above all those ideas he associates with the concept of the moral person: the sense of fairness and the capacity for one’s own conception of the good. Thus, the concept of the citizen as a moral person, which also underlies the concept of the fair cooperation of politically autonomous citizens, stands in need of a prior justification." , edited by James Gordon Finlayson, and Fabian Freyenhagen, Taylor & Francis Group, 2010. pg 53
@@stupididietmoron9996 Habermas' language is normal for the field he is in. You don't open a book in another language and complain that it's not written with you in mind, do you? Why would you do that with a philosophical language?
@heraclitusblacking1293 - if you are writing for a general audience, a translation would have been nice so you are clearly understood. Chomsky, Cornell West don't speak like that to general audiences.
Read up on Lakoff and Johnson's work on Conceptual Metaphor Theory as well as how we conceive of morality metaphorically. Also read John Gibbs' work on Moral Psychology and its claim that human social morality is based on the twin principles of the Good (empathy) and the right (justice/fairness).
I'm not sure I understand your question. I mean obviously things have followed from theories. There are so many examples it is hard to know where to start. The modern digital computer is one. It followed from Turing's theoretical work on a rather obscure problem in logic called the Entscheidungsproblem. To solve that problem (actually to prove it had no solution) he developed a new mathematical model called the Turing machine which was the theoretical foundation for all digital computers from the ENIAC to your smart phone. Similarly modern computers resulted from theoretical work in quantum physics that enabled the creation of transistors: very small circuits that could accurately hold and change states. That is what enabled computers that didn't require a whole room full of vacuum tubes and also enabled computers that were smaller and smaller while at the same time more and more powerful. If your question is about political theory, that is another issue. Chomsky believes (and I agree) that our understanding of what are called the "soft sciences" from psychology to sociology and political science are so immature that there is little in those areas that can be called theory in the scientific sense. I agree with him and I also agree that "theories" such as postmodernism are essentially pseudoscience that may say correct things but do so in a convoluted way and that nothing has ever or will ever result from such theories that couldn't be derived faster and more clearly by simple common sense, scholarship, and attention to facts. But there is some real theory starting to be made in these fields. Definitely in psychology but also in other domains but it is slow going. Actually, my work is an extension of the work that Rawls did in some ways but more influenced by Chomsky's approach to Linguistics but attempting to apply it to Morality, to define a rigorous scientific testable model for human ethics. That is why I (and others) use the phrase Universal Moral Grammar to emphasize our starting point was Chomsky's approach to Linguistics and Universal Grammar. But this work is in its infancy.
@@Only4gangsta To begin with, I don't really recognize any meaningful distinction between natural science and soft science (Chomsky feels the same btw). To me it is all just science. For example, would you consider psychology to be a "soft science"? Biology, chemistry (understanding the way neurons work for example), evolution, and mathematical models all play a major role in psychology. I think the main differentiator between the two is that: 1) Because most things in the soft sciences have to do with problems that are primarily related to humans we can't do the kinds of invasive experiments we do on other animals and 2) For various ideological reasons religions and even academics (e.g., many modern philosophers) have promulgated the idea that certain problems such as ethics can't be studied scientifically. For these reasons, I agree with you, we haven't made nearly as much progress in the "soft sciences" as in what people call the natural sciences. But there have been results in the soft sciences. In clinical psychology we've mostly done away with pseudoscientific approaches such as Freudianism and have both therapies (e.g., Cognitive Behavioral Therapy) and medicines that mean people with schizophrenia and other mental health diseases can often live productive happy lives. Game theory and statistics provide models that can predict and explain how people act in various social situations such as elections. The field that I work in is Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence which have had immense impact on our world and are I think reasonably considered part of the "soft" sciences.
@@michaeldebellis4202 Very interesting point of view! Thank you for your reply. Please tell my where I can read about what you do. Have you published any books, papers or articles?
I don't know of any direct comments, but Chomsky has talked about this right-wing "libertarianism" that Nozick advocated in AS&U. th-cam.com/play/PLHZGTTZG6HcKCDDQ7Ve_D-BO0djPFM8jQ.html
Chomsky's Philosophy I got in touch with Professor Chomsky. I asked him the question in particular Robert and his views on Israel. He didn't have much to say about the subject but he made it clear that Robert was a huge huge huge supporter of the Israeli state
My Jimmies Remain Unrustled "Nozick, who I knew, was a clever philosopher. He did call himself a libertarian but it was fraud. He was a Stalinist-style supporter of Israeli power and violence. People who knew him used to joke that he believed in a two-state solution: Israel, and the US government because it had to support Israeli actions." Reference: leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2009/08/chomsky-on-libertarianism-and-its-meaning.html
3rdEarlRussell yes I've seen that before. I was hoping to find something where Chomsky articulated his arguments & refuted them. howeverhe said that Nozick presented no arguments, only was a very strong supporter. I tried to get more out of him but he wouldn't really say much
Wha???? This is like an undergraduate's half-baked and confused understanding, actually a not very good undergraduate, who then has to remind us he's more radical than thou by going off on an irrelevant rant about the business class and the allegedly frightened government in foreign policy. First, Chomsky, the theory, to remind YOU of the obvious, is a theory of what justice requires. You wouldn't be able to complain precisely about the class nature of the U.S. or anything else in American society without an implicit background theory of justice or rights or morality. Rawls tried to work out the bare abstract principles of justice, not to analyse all the current power dynamics of contemporary U.S. society. It's a philosophical theory of justice, not a socio-political treatise on power relations in the U.S. He does think the principles he identifies as just are compatible with both a kind of social democratic property- owning economy as well as with a full-blown socialist democracy, but whether that is right or wrong, whether he has correctly identified the principles of justice, and whether his method of determining them is sound or not, is entirely independent of Chomsky's irrelevant rant about business, Reagan, and Granada. It's frankly embarrassing to have to point this out. Regarding linguistics, this is even more embarrassing. First, the relevant concept is "intuition", not "instinct", as Chomsky misstates like a freshmen who just heard these ideas for the first time in this afternoon's lecture. Yes, there's a big difference; intuitions can be influenced by considerable schooling and historical experience and can change through reflection; they aren't like putting out your hands when you fall. Secondly, Rawls just mentions a parallel to linguistic intuitions once in passing: just as one has intuitions about whether a newly heard sentence is grammatical, one can have moral intuitions about some moral situation or problem. Big freaking deal. The analogy plays no significant role anywhere in Rawls' work, nor could it. The meta-ethical notion of an intuition isn't necessarily Hume's; both subjectivists like Hume, who spoke of "passions" or "sentiment" as the basis of moral judgments (not "intuitions") and famously people who reject subjectivism (such as Kant in one respect, Rawls in another) see importance in intuitions. Indeed leading realists like Ross and Prichard were considered intuitionists. Chomsky's remarks here are embarrassingly superficial and confused, but try to tell that to the know-nothing acolytes here (as usual).
@@heraclitusblacking1293 You mean you worship Chomsky like a mindless sheep but actually don't understand 90% of what anyone is talking about, so lack anything serious to say? Yes, I agree, thanks for asking.
@@sheilamacdougal9948 I thought Habermas really showed why Rawls' thought experiment doesn't work: "The decisive issue in the justification of the two highest principles of justice is less the deliberations in the original position than the intuitions and basic concepts that guide the design of the original position itself. Rawls introduces normative contents into the very procedure of justification, above all those ideas he associates with the concept of the moral person: the sense of fairness and the capacity for one’s own conception of the good. Thus, the concept of the citizen as a moral person, which also underlies the concept of the fair cooperation of politically autonomous citizens, stands in need of a prior justification."
@@heraclitusblacking1293 What Habermas says there is true, but I don't agree that it shows "why Rawls' thought experiment doesn't work". (I think other considerarions do). First, Rawls is entirely explicit that he is relying on moral intuitions in formulating and shaping the contours of the Original Position. So it's not as if Habermas is revealing something not acknowledged by Rawls. Secondly, if the conception of a moral person, with the moral capacities cited by Rawls, is appealing (or correct), that leaves open the question of whether it is underpinned by intuitions that can't be further justified (in the way that Habermas wants) or not. If some relevant intuitions are basic, rock bottom, as it were, then further justification might not be possible (but also not be required). But thirdly, even if further justification can be supplied, that does not necessarily show that the thought experiment is a failure. It is entirely possible, say, that one can justify this conception of a moral person with further argumentation (say an elaboration of how each person has a capacity to frame or revise their own conception of the good), but still learn important insights from the thought experiment. So one justifies the Original Position with elaborate argumentation (as Rawls in fact does in an entire chapter), then once it is set up as encapsulating the basic moral capacities, one lets the hypothetical parties, as it were, determine the principles of justice and their prioritization. One discovers (again as it were) that they would prioritize maximum equal liberty (or the basic liberties), then equal distribution, modified only by the difference principle. For the record I don't agree with any of this, but for different reasons than Habermas.
@@sheilamacdougal9948 In the main chapter of "A Theory of Justice," Rawls says that the thought experiment only works if we assume a very narrow definition of rationality, one from economics, which is defined as simply finding efficient means to ends. From A Theory of Justice: "Moreover, the concept of rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends. I shall modify this concept to some extent, as explained later (§25), but one must try to avoid introducing into it any controversial ethical elements. The initial situation must be characterized by stipulations that are widely accepted." I think Habermas' critique that Rawls is actually sneaking in normative content behind the veil is telling, because Rawls is trying to work with a very narrow idea of rationality, and to avoid sneaking in "controvesial ethical elements." So I guess I disagree when you say that Rawls is "entirely explicit that he is relying on moral intuitions in formulating and shaping the contours of the Original Position." What Rawls is really doing is trying to dress up certain contingent, historical, *liberal* values as in fact universal values.
The characterization of Rawls as arguing for an instinctual basis for moral judgments on the model of Chomskian universal grammar is laughably distorted.
This is quite superficial, there are serious problems with Rawlsian framework. Firstly, it's not intended to be a prescriptive blueprint, it is a work of normative political theory. It's just stating the obvious to say it's abstract and insufficient to address the problems of practical politics. I get the feeling if Noam vomited on a plate people would applaud it as profound.
I don't get it. If I am libertarian than I think basically a lot of things you think are problems are actually fine. This is about what one considers just, not about how to solve inequities. Also look at Andrew Yang. The ultra rich powerful, bogeyman are just other people in society. Chomsky takes it conspiratorial extremes. He seems on his political positions to be unyielding, would never change his mind. Not impressed. Great linguist and advocate of his politics, never the less never had his science hat on in politics. Also he's linguistic school failed.
@@heraldojacques8386 Sir, corporations are well beyond your "almost". They exert complete dominance. Governments are incapable of acting...except this virus has shown that they can when pushed. Watch Brian Eno and Yanos Varoufakis on DiEM25 channel here. th-cam.com/video/J7ei1-rYHMU/w-d-xo.html
@@kellymartin1099 My biggest problem is saying critiquing corruption implies leftism... I mean am I free to work for companies? Am I free to kill animals in the jungle for food? Is capitalism the core of our problems?... or is it that our crony capitalism descends from feudalism (with sprinkles of imperialism)? I honestly have so little idea on what would make society better or worse, I would rather not choose, I'd rather government couldn't choose absolutely anything for me or anyone so long as people aren't actively hurting me. I just want everyone to keep out of others business and if everybody wants to live in a commune great, and if everybody keeps selling and buying and a guy decides to sell his stuff for way more than I'd like to give, great. That doesn't mean I think people are allowed to enjoy our resources as humans, like land and oil and water and everything, we all deserve a dividend of the basic resources taken away from us by the social contract, our community, and we deserve it because of those lost opportunities. And yeah its wicked important to fight the current corruption and move to the right direction, I'm only and only not onboard the reactionary social movement akin to a religion we call leftism, with all its different sects and moral superiority and only when it gives government more power over our social lives. From dating to commerce to religion, its non of the states business, so long as nobody's raping anyone, which coincidentally happens a lot in all of them!
Great observation by Chomsky about the theory of Rawls, how abstract it is in relation to the actual complex reality and practice of capitalist, uneven relations in the modern liberal state such as the U.S.A.
Chomsky was friends with every intellectual in the 2nd half of the 20th century & I find that so cool.
Who were some of the other ones?
@@Wesker10000 Hilary Putnam. Vikki Weisskopf. Norman Finkelstein. Lawrence Krauss. Michael Albert. Alex Cockburn. Robert Fisk.
@@Wesker10000 Jerry Fodor, Thomas Kuhn, Colin Mcginn, Stephen Jay Gould
Except Thomas Sowell.
@@AFitSouthernGent He said intellectual, not libertarian hacks.
I have always wondered what Noam thinks about Rawls. Now I know!
No you don't. The business about Hume and applying linguistic models is very intriguing but Chomsky does not elaborate. Do you have any idea what he's talking about? I don't.
Whatever. He answered a question that I have had for about ten years. But since you don't know what he's talking about in this clip, it must be impossible that I do. Thanks for the correction and rhetorical question.
Now you KNo-am hahaha hahaha
I've never thought about it but it is an interesting thought.
I like Chomsky, but I think he misses the point a bit here. I wrote my dissertation on Rawls (many years ago) and I interpreted his Original Position thesis as an attempt to underpin Natural Rights Theory, which in the real world, we would call Human Rights. Chomsky dismisses it as being "abstract" - well, I guess ideas are abstract - but ideas are necessary to give credence to socio-political movements or human concerns. Chomsky alludes to this but basically says that Rawls has no interest in US politics/society. I would argue that Rawls has a greater concern - to establish universal bases for rights theory across the world: China, the Arab world and other parts of the globe simply deny that there is a basic human right to free speech, for example. I'm surprised that Chomsky doesn't acknowledge this.
Philosophers are not out there to always provide us 'real' solutions. They engage with ideas, and ideas make their presence in our lives, in a variety of ways. In a way Chomsky is smartly dismissive of Rawls, who was a profounder thinker than him. And yet Chomsky admires Kant, whose work is as 'impractical' as Rawls'!
I agree. It is strange that Chomsky doesn't acknowledge that ideas can transmit from the abstract to the real, especially given how Marx's Dialectic critique of history impacted the real world or indeed his own linguistic theory, i.e. Universal Grammar is rather like Rawls' OP - an innate system that manifests itself in the real world.
Rawls wasn't writing for some vague oriental despots or whatever.
I think both you and Idrees Kanth misunderstood Chomsky's remarks. The problem is not that the abstract ideas/theories are not important but, rather Rawls himself sets such preconditions for his ideas to work that are not applicable to social realities. Fulfillment of preconditions for Original Position almost seems to require not human but some other species and social conditions which can never be realized in practice. Having said this, it does not mean that one cannot learn from Rawls. His way of reasoning is a powerful tool to understand the ways we, as a human beings, can deal with ethical problems, it can guide our reasoning through the problems of values and moral judgments (which are the hardest ones to deal with) in policy and society more broadly.
I would agree with you, though only partly. I was reading somewhere [have forgotten where, but I can provide evidence if you want me to] that Rawls is one of the most frequently quoted among political philosophers, particularly in legal cases. So not all of Rawls lacks practical relevance! Secondly, I am wondering how viable and practical is Chomsky's own anarchistic political community that he so loves to celebrate? On a lighter note if a person writes 150 books, as Chomsky has done [on an average he writes two books a year on US foreign policy], and keeps saying the same thing, it is a bit weird, and I guess self serving. While his politics is right, he tends to play this modest man, which he doesn't appear to be. Rawls was his contemporary and I guess a profounder thinker than him, and perhaps that may be one reason why Chomsky is obliquely dismissive of Rawls. [I mention this earlier as well]. I do intimate histories and I look into people's motivations!
I love Chomsky, man. Maybe we could vindicate Rawls by applying Rawls within the context of radical politics.
Would thoroughly recommend Charles Mills' Black Rights/White Wrongs where he does exactly that. He critiques Rawls' ideal theory in a similar(ish) vein to Chomsky here, but claims you can construct a non-ideal Rawlsian theory of Liberalism that is actually compatible with radical politics.
Rawlsian thought and radical politics are at inherent tension
I'm surprised Chomsky didn't mention that Rawls in his later work considered as consistent with his theory of justice only social democracy or democratic socialism (the latter taken in the traditional sense in which it is not equivalent to the former). A number of socialists have argued for socialism on Rawlsian grounds.
I think perhaps Chomsky is being unfair in expecting abstract political philosophies to yield determinate answers to concrete and complex political developments. There is a role both for political philosophy and real-world politics.
I've been unfortunate enough myself to have to study lots of contemporary analytic political philosophy - there are oustanding political philosophers on the left, such as Gerald Cohen, J. Roemer, J. Elster and the various 'left-libertarians' (in the technical philosophical sense). I'm often brought back to a remark Cohen made of his early thinking before he decided that engagement in political philosophy was necessary - namely, that he thought that pretty much whatever abstract moral or political philosophical theories you accepted (utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, value-pluralism, virtue-ethics, etc.) his conviction in socialism could be justified in those terms. Cohen came to doubt this for peculiar Marxist reasons (Marxism being suspicious of unrooted ideological theorising from the get-go) concerning self-ownership and he did political philosophy primarily to excorcise the ghosts of the likes of Nozick and Isaiah Berlin in their views that equality threatened meaningful liberty. But I think Cohen's earlier intuitions are broadly correct. If you're a Rawlsian, a communitarian, a 'democratic egalitarian', a neo-Kantian deontologist, a utilitarian, etc. then a case for radical leftist politics can still be made out in those terms. Take, for instance, the standard dichotomy in moral philosophy between consequentialists and deontologists: Hermann Kohen, a neo-Kantian, argued for democratic socialism on deontological grounds; James Mill argued for egalitarian resource distributions on utilitarian grounds, as did J. S. Mill later in life when he advocated for cooperatives. There is increasing awareness in philosophy departments of the fact that varying moral theories, if suitably interpreted and qualified, tend to converge on a common moral core. The practical implication is indeed that moral philosophy is practically irrelevant. But it would be unwise to think that it is irrelevant in the real world - not only is it worth undertaking for its own sake, but the elite in training often study fragments of moral philosophy as a justification for the status quo. It's worth academics in the relevant fields drawing attention to the fact that moral philosophies accross the board tend to provide no, or at best very little, justification for the status quo.
But, the whole argument is completely beside the point
@@kellymartin1099 Beside what point? And, even if so, why does that invalidate anything I said?
Because it's just irrelevant
@@Samgurney88 unlike your bloated ego, I, do not diene to challenge the finest mind of the human race! Currently living, M Theory notwithstanding
@@kellymartin1099 If you are referring to Chomsky then I invite you to examine his remarks concerning Marx and Einstein which are along the following lines: an individual may be a valuable source of insights whose ideas are worthy of study, but deference to authority in intellectual matters is a pernicious form of religion.
Seeking to build a wall against the Mexican people tells us a great deal about the 'frightened country' that the U.S. is but it also suggests that the fear is of an unusual type. The indigenous population was not known for their fear (even though they had so many opportunities to show it)and also those who emigrated to the U.S. did so with considerable courage. Yet a strange fear is there all the same. America is so ingenious and inventive in entertainment and technology, perhaps the cultural imagination just 'goes out there.'
Thank you for helping me with that. I think that my assumption was based on the Spanish and Portuguese empires.
_"I suppose the fact that America is a country with a Spanish name that is seeking to build a wall against Spanish-speaking people tells us a great deal about the 'frightened country'"_ you aren't a very rational person, if you deem this an actual argument, or a comment that carries any weight. Europe is, als myth has it, named after a virgin which Zeus abducted from Asia minor -- does that or should that have *any* impact *whatsoever* on political interactions between European nations and Turkey?
Iran is named after the "Arians" (it originally meant, literally: "land of the Arians") - does that mean, that any white nationalist has to have sympathetic feelings for the mullahs?
Africa derives it name from a [comparatively] small region in what today we consider *northern* Africa (Tunisia most of all), -- it was the name given to that speck of land by the Romans, when they made it into a province of theirs (land that was previously the center of Carthaginian civilization). - does that mean that all "Africans" are therefore descendants of Phoenician culture???
No, No and no! - it just does not follow!
smh
Stuart Vernon
I have an opposing opinion on culture. America has a great culture which allows girls to go to school and through its sheer prosparity it's people have touched the edge of space
if you want to talk about multiculturalism in America you have to talk about the ramifications of operating outside of the American cultural framework.
General Mattis seems to express a belief that the greatest enemies of the west are people whose interests run vertical to the horizontal lines we need for cooperation.
If you want to talk about multiculturalism in the sence of sharing food and dance I will agree with you all day, but when a culture seeks to infringe on the rules of a country I see its influence as a negative force.
In order to appreciate the belief that I hold you need look no further than the Horrors that we see in the East.
People loose their lives for adultery and girls are prevented from going to school due to some leadership styles that are not in line with our own.
Islamic principles, when they enter the political realm might as well be communist, fascist or monarchist principles when you consider that each of these political attitudes don't sit in line with our advanced democratic principles.
There is endless room for ethnic diversity and the public dialogue should never be extinguished when speaking of new ideas but the standard of living in the West has no room for the oppression of hardened religous attitudes which would stand on the toes of our current freedom.
That is my belief anyway. All things considered, our living standards are pretty good.
Maybe picture how different your life would be if you lived in Saudi Arabia
I know what you mean about living in a part of the world where the constraints would be too much to bear. But what has to be borne in in mind is that the very best future depends on the most civilised of us coming together regardless of the differences in our cultures. The question of how two people can meet without their two cultures intervening, is, I think the challenge of our age. The injustices towards people in so many parts of the world is appalling but if a chemist born in the Sudan must at all costs work with a chemist in the U.S. to develop a new drug then we see the problem. Also, but oddly, and in these days of the internet, many people may agree wholeheartedly on web-forums without knowing much about their respective cultures. I am not a natural commentator on TH-cam, as you may have noticed, having already got many facts wrong. In this regard can I reply to Pyrrovonhperborea (whom I can't seem to find mean to reply to) that he is quite correct when he says that the name of a country can have no strong influence on the population that live there. Names are after all those things, like our own, that we cannot do very much about. I am more of a poetic thinker in the main, which can sometimes be a recipe for disaster in strategic or political matters.
Stuart Vernon Yeah, I'm admittedly not poetic in an abstract sence. even my artistic side is a utilitarian tool against nature.
I do agree that good societies run on cooperation though.
Sam Harris has raised the point that ideas inform behavior, ultimately I agree with this sentiment.
its my observation that, in the West we tend to argue about 'left' and 'right-wing politics' but ultimately our vison of the future tends to look vary much like our present, except better in different ways.
The trouble is that the framework for our society contains basic truths that we don't question. Our Western societies were largely built up from the roots by amalgamating successful social structures to form the civilization that we recognize. Without question, the mayor, trash man and firefighter are typically a part of everyone's idea of the future. Objectively speaking, our Culture is largely geared towards our civic duties more than religion.
If people come to America with the idea of helping us improve our medical system, I am happy to see them enter. I just want people to understand that our country doesn't succeed by the grace of God, it succeeds on the back of our laws, values and hard work.
Chomsky is fundamentally mistaken. Rawls outlines four aspects to political philosophy, one of which is its practicability. Additionally Rawls claims that the purpose of an ideal theory is to use it as a measure against which the political structuring of society can be assessed. The argument that the theory of justice is too abstract fundamentally misses the point of the purpose of an ideal theory.
Another point I have seen is that Rawls was a neo-liberal and sought to defend and entrench neo-liberalism. Not only is neo-liberalism not defined in this context, but to claim that Rawls was a neo-liberal is to do so in complete contradiction to what Rawls wrote.
I would invite people to read Rawls rather than take Chomsky’s interpretation as true.
Ambesh Pratik Your statement would have much more force if you backed your claim with anything resembling argument. And a rehash of a Chomsky sound byte on another comment doesn’t quite count.
I concur that if you really want to know what Rawls thinks, you need to read him. Chomsky, who is commenting off the cuff here (though I do largely agree) isn't enough - it's a bit of an appeal to authority.
I guess the issue would then be though - is what Rawls proposes practical? Is his theory - as he precisely outlines it - to abstract (we might think that and still accept his idea we need an ideal theory to assess what society we want to work towards)? You can't say a theory is not too abstract simply because it clearly demarcates "ideal theory" and non-ideal theory" Calling Rawls a neoliberal is wrong - but he wouldn't necessarily be against neoliberals if they could accept the basic liberal rights, and human rights at home and abroad. They are a type of liberal, after all. And for some people - such as myself - saying Rawls is a liberal is criticism enough.
For those who haven't read Rawls - ideal theory is the model of society we construct assuming that everyone is going to go along with the constitution and the laws. Non-ideal theory is then what we should do when faced with others not going along with the constitution and the laws already determined.
Ross H To your first question: practical as to what end? Practical in the sense it could be perfectly replicated in the real world and could demonstrably better the whole of society? I’m not sure that that is really the purpose of a political theory, nor is it possible for any theory to really do this. And I don’t quite see the issue with a political theory being abstract, if it deals with abstract things.
I thought Habermas really showed why Rawls' thought experiment doesn't work:
"The decisive issue in the justification of the two highest principles of justice is less the deliberations in the original position than the intuitions and basic concepts that guide the design of the original position itself. Rawls introduces normative contents into the very procedure of justification, above all those ideas he associates with the concept of the moral person: the sense of fairness and the capacity for one’s own conception of the good. Thus, the concept of the citizen as a moral person, which also underlies the concept of the fair cooperation of politically autonomous citizens, stands in need of a prior justification."
,
edited by James Gordon Finlayson, and Fabian Freyenhagen, Taylor &
Francis Group, 2010. pg 53
or you could just speak in normal language like chomsky does, the fuck is normative contents
@@stupididietmoron9996 Habermas' language is normal for the field he is in. You don't open a book in another language and complain that it's not written with you in mind, do you? Why would you do that with a philosophical language?
Humes law. How does one validly justify a normative conclusion without a normative premise?
So Rawls gives individuals a sense of morality without explaining why they have it in the first place(?)
@heraclitusblacking1293 - if you are writing for a general audience, a translation would have been nice so you are clearly understood. Chomsky, Cornell West don't speak like that to general audiences.
My query was “chomsky habermas” so I was confused that this was one of the results.
I now see, in the remark on Rawles’ “linguistic framework”
Read up on Lakoff and Johnson's work on Conceptual Metaphor Theory as well as how we conceive of morality metaphorically. Also read John Gibbs' work on Moral Psychology and its claim that human social morality is based on the twin principles of the Good (empathy) and the right (justice/fairness).
Chomsky, as always, is great.
Would be nice to have alternative links to the source. I noticed on some of the videos that the source has been taken down. This one is an example.
review this audio, remind me of chaotic events across us
Lol, do I know you from Phil Twitter?
Has anything ever followed from theory? What does Chomsky use to settle moral questions? Neither is clear to me.
The latter interests me as well.
I'm not sure I understand your question. I mean obviously things have followed from theories. There are so many examples it is hard to know where to start. The modern digital computer is one. It followed from Turing's theoretical work on a rather obscure problem in logic called the Entscheidungsproblem. To solve that problem (actually to prove it had no solution) he developed a new mathematical model called the Turing machine which was the theoretical foundation for all digital computers from the ENIAC to your smart phone. Similarly modern computers resulted from theoretical work in quantum physics that enabled the creation of transistors: very small circuits that could accurately hold and change states. That is what enabled computers that didn't require a whole room full of vacuum tubes and also enabled computers that were smaller and smaller while at the same time more and more powerful.
If your question is about political theory, that is another issue. Chomsky believes (and I agree) that our understanding of what are called the "soft sciences" from psychology to sociology and political science are so immature that there is little in those areas that can be called theory in the scientific sense. I agree with him and I also agree that "theories" such as postmodernism are essentially pseudoscience that may say correct things but do so in a convoluted way and that nothing has ever or will ever result from such theories that couldn't be derived faster and more clearly by simple common sense, scholarship, and attention to facts. But there is some real theory starting to be made in these fields. Definitely in psychology but also in other domains but it is slow going. Actually, my work is an extension of the work that Rawls did in some ways but more influenced by Chomsky's approach to Linguistics but attempting to apply it to Morality, to define a rigorous scientific testable model for human ethics. That is why I (and others) use the phrase Universal Moral Grammar to emphasize our starting point was Chomsky's approach to Linguistics and Universal Grammar. But this work is in its infancy.
@@michaeldebellis4202 so basically you are saying natural science is capable of achieving anything and soft sciences are not (yet)?
@@Only4gangsta To begin with, I don't really recognize any meaningful distinction between natural science and soft science (Chomsky feels the same btw). To me it is all just science. For example, would you consider psychology to be a "soft science"? Biology, chemistry (understanding the way neurons work for example), evolution, and mathematical models all play a major role in psychology. I think the main differentiator between the two is that: 1) Because most things in the soft sciences have to do with problems that are primarily related to humans we can't do the kinds of invasive experiments we do on other animals and 2) For various ideological reasons religions and even academics (e.g., many modern philosophers) have promulgated the idea that certain problems such as ethics can't be studied scientifically.
For these reasons, I agree with you, we haven't made nearly as much progress in the "soft sciences" as in what people call the natural sciences. But there have been results in the soft sciences. In clinical psychology we've mostly done away with pseudoscientific approaches such as Freudianism and have both therapies (e.g., Cognitive Behavioral Therapy) and medicines that mean people with schizophrenia and other mental health diseases can often live productive happy lives. Game theory and statistics provide models that can predict and explain how people act in various social situations such as elections. The field that I work in is Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence which have had immense impact on our world and are I think reasonably considered part of the "soft" sciences.
@@michaeldebellis4202 Very interesting point of view! Thank you for your reply. Please tell my where I can read about what you do. Have you published any books, papers or articles?
That's it. Bingo
Are there any videos on Chomsky's thoughts on Agamben and Derrida?
th-cam.com/play/PLHZGTTZG6HcLwOSUzIP0slI7JFMSPdPw5.html
Oh my God! dare I say it? read a book He's written about 50 or 60 of them. He doesn't miss much I bet there's something somewhere on them
@@kellymartin1099 I asked for videos, not books.
do you have any of his commentaries, if any exist, on Robert Nozick?
I don't know of any direct comments, but Chomsky has talked about this right-wing "libertarianism" that Nozick advocated in AS&U. th-cam.com/play/PLHZGTTZG6HcKCDDQ7Ve_D-BO0djPFM8jQ.html
Chomsky's Philosophy I got in touch with Professor Chomsky. I asked him the question in particular Robert and his views on Israel. He didn't have much to say about the subject but he made it clear that Robert was a huge huge huge supporter of the Israeli state
My Jimmies Remain Unrustled "Nozick, who I knew, was a clever philosopher. He did call himself a libertarian but it was fraud. He was a Stalinist-style supporter of Israeli power and violence. People who knew him used to joke that he believed in a two-state solution: Israel, and the US government because it had to support Israeli actions." Reference: leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2009/08/chomsky-on-libertarianism-and-its-meaning.html
3rdEarlRussell yes I've seen that before. I was hoping to find something where Chomsky articulated his arguments & refuted them. howeverhe said that Nozick presented no arguments, only was a very strong supporter. I tried to get more out of him but he wouldn't really say much
Too bad. Nozick certainly presents arguments.
Δώσε πόνο, δάσκαλε!
Someone help me out, what is the difference between our business and Europe? Does Europe not have powerful businessmen and woman?
what is one book that you know about the US being a frightened country?
he mentions literature on this .
I'll look for some myself.
jose Sanchez by literature I think Chomsky means peer reviewed study's.
The paranoid style in American politics by Richard Hofstadter?
I am also curious about this. Have you found anything?
Culture of Fear is a good one
Wha???? This is like an undergraduate's half-baked and confused understanding, actually a not very good undergraduate, who then has to remind us he's more radical than thou by going off on an irrelevant rant about the business class and the allegedly frightened government in foreign policy. First, Chomsky, the theory, to remind YOU of the obvious, is a theory of what justice requires. You wouldn't be able to complain precisely about the class nature of the U.S. or anything else in American society without an implicit background theory of justice or rights or morality. Rawls tried to work out the bare abstract principles of justice, not to analyse all the current power dynamics of contemporary U.S. society. It's a philosophical theory of justice, not a socio-political treatise on power relations in the U.S. He does think the principles he identifies as just are compatible with both a kind of social democratic property- owning economy as well as with a full-blown socialist democracy, but whether that is right or wrong, whether he has correctly identified the principles of justice, and whether his method of determining them is sound or not, is entirely independent of Chomsky's irrelevant rant about business, Reagan, and Granada. It's frankly embarrassing to have to point this out.
Regarding linguistics, this is even more embarrassing. First, the relevant concept is "intuition", not "instinct", as Chomsky misstates like a freshmen who just heard these ideas for the first time in this afternoon's lecture. Yes, there's a big difference; intuitions can be influenced by considerable schooling and historical experience and can change through reflection; they aren't like putting out your hands when you fall. Secondly, Rawls just mentions a parallel to linguistic intuitions once in passing: just as one has intuitions about whether a newly heard sentence is grammatical, one can have moral intuitions about some moral situation or problem. Big freaking deal. The analogy plays no significant role anywhere in Rawls' work, nor could it. The meta-ethical notion of an intuition isn't necessarily Hume's; both subjectivists like Hume, who spoke of "passions" or "sentiment" as the basis of moral judgments (not "intuitions") and famously people who reject subjectivism (such as Kant in one respect, Rawls in another) see importance in intuitions. Indeed leading realists like Ross and Prichard were considered intuitionists. Chomsky's remarks here are embarrassingly superficial and confused, but try to tell that to the know-nothing acolytes here (as usual).
Are you ok?
@@heraclitusblacking1293 You mean you worship Chomsky like a mindless sheep but actually don't understand 90% of what anyone is talking about, so lack anything serious to say? Yes, I agree, thanks for asking.
@@sheilamacdougal9948 I thought Habermas really showed why Rawls' thought experiment doesn't work:
"The decisive issue in the justification of the two highest principles of justice is less the deliberations in the original position than the intuitions and basic concepts that guide the design of the original position itself. Rawls introduces normative contents into the very procedure of justification, above all those ideas he associates with the concept of the moral person: the sense of fairness and the capacity for one’s own conception of the good. Thus, the concept of the citizen as a moral person, which also underlies the concept of the fair cooperation of politically autonomous citizens, stands in need of a prior justification."
@@heraclitusblacking1293 What Habermas says there is true, but I don't agree that it shows "why Rawls' thought experiment doesn't work". (I think other considerarions do). First, Rawls is entirely explicit that he is relying on moral intuitions in formulating and shaping the contours of the Original Position. So it's not as if Habermas is revealing something not acknowledged by Rawls. Secondly, if the conception of a moral person, with the moral capacities cited by Rawls, is appealing (or correct), that leaves open the question of whether it is underpinned by intuitions that can't be further justified (in the way that Habermas wants) or not. If some relevant intuitions are basic, rock bottom, as it were, then further justification might not be possible (but also not be required). But thirdly, even if further justification can be supplied, that does not necessarily show that the thought experiment is a failure. It is entirely possible, say, that one can justify this conception of a moral person with further argumentation (say an elaboration of how each person has a capacity to frame or revise their own conception of the good), but still learn important insights from the thought experiment. So one justifies the Original Position with elaborate argumentation (as Rawls in fact does in an entire chapter), then once it is set up as encapsulating the basic moral capacities, one lets the hypothetical parties, as it were, determine the principles of justice and their prioritization. One discovers (again as it were) that they would prioritize maximum equal liberty (or the basic liberties), then equal distribution, modified only by the difference principle.
For the record I don't agree with any of this, but for different reasons than Habermas.
@@sheilamacdougal9948 In the main chapter of "A Theory of Justice," Rawls says that the thought experiment only works if we assume a very narrow definition of rationality, one from economics, which is defined as simply finding efficient means to ends. From A Theory of Justice:
"Moreover, the concept of rationality must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense, standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends. I shall modify this concept to some extent, as explained later (§25), but one must try to avoid introducing into it any controversial ethical elements. The initial situation must be characterized by stipulations that are widely accepted."
I think Habermas' critique that Rawls is actually sneaking in normative content behind the veil is telling, because Rawls is trying to work with a very narrow idea of rationality, and to avoid sneaking in "controvesial ethical elements." So I guess I disagree when you say that Rawls is "entirely explicit that he is relying on moral intuitions in formulating and shaping the contours of the Original Position." What Rawls is really doing is trying to dress up certain contingent, historical, *liberal* values as in fact universal values.
The characterization of Rawls as arguing for an instinctual basis for moral judgments on the model of Chomskian universal grammar is laughably distorted.
This is quite superficial, there are serious problems with Rawlsian framework. Firstly, it's not intended to be a prescriptive blueprint, it is a work of normative political theory. It's just stating the obvious to say it's abstract and insufficient to address the problems of practical politics. I get the feeling if Noam vomited on a plate people would applaud it as profound.
Well he’s pretty fucking old so if he vomited on a plate and managed to do it without keeling over, yeah, I’d be bloody impressed.
all liberal theories start with "lets imagine the world isn't the way it is"
move to north korea
a frightened country - with all due respect, what the fuck does that mean?
He'll answer. Wait for him.
Tardi Grade he doesn't have that much longer left.
Then all you'll need afterward is a Ouija board.
Tardi Grade hahaha, I don't consult the spiritual world, unfortunately.
Plymouth settlers regularly attended church services armed with muskets.
whenever you hear some dude taling about social classes, he is speaking to you about marxist point of view, let that sink in
I don't think Americans are frightened per se. They are smart enough to be frightened when Politicians start sounding off tho!
American Corporatism
READ LENIN
I don't get it. If I am libertarian than I think basically a lot of things you think are problems are actually fine. This is about what one considers just, not about how to solve inequities. Also look at Andrew Yang. The ultra rich powerful, bogeyman are just other people in society. Chomsky takes it conspiratorial extremes. He seems on his political positions to be unyielding, would never change his mind. Not impressed. Great linguist and advocate of his politics, never the less never had his science hat on in politics. Also he's linguistic school failed.
>>The ultra rich powerful, bogeyman are just other people.
Really, now? hahaha Dude, ya canna sea the waves for the ocean. hahaha
There is no denying that powerful corporate interest has almost a complete hold on american politics theres no denying that.
@@heraldojacques8386 Sir, corporations are well beyond your "almost". They exert complete dominance. Governments are incapable of acting...except this virus has shown that they can when pushed. Watch Brian Eno and Yanos Varoufakis on DiEM25 channel here. th-cam.com/video/J7ei1-rYHMU/w-d-xo.html
No deep-diving for you, huh?
@@kellymartin1099 My biggest problem is saying critiquing corruption implies leftism... I mean am I free to work for companies? Am I free to kill animals in the jungle for food? Is capitalism the core of our problems?... or is it that our crony capitalism descends from feudalism (with sprinkles of imperialism)? I honestly have so little idea on what would make society better or worse, I would rather not choose, I'd rather government couldn't choose absolutely anything for me or anyone so long as people aren't actively hurting me. I just want everyone to keep out of others business and if everybody wants to live in a commune great, and if everybody keeps selling and buying and a guy decides to sell his stuff for way more than I'd like to give, great. That doesn't mean I think people are allowed to enjoy our resources as humans, like land and oil and water and everything, we all deserve a dividend of the basic resources taken away from us by the social contract, our community, and we deserve it because of those lost opportunities. And yeah its wicked important to fight the current corruption and move to the right direction, I'm only and only not onboard the reactionary social movement akin to a religion we call leftism, with all its different sects and moral superiority and only when it gives government more power over our social lives. From dating to commerce to religion, its non of the states business, so long as nobody's raping anyone, which coincidentally happens a lot in all of them!