You said the MCAS was not well understood by pilots because it was new, the reality is it was not well understood because the pilots were not told about it. It was intentionally kept secret to avoid the costs of having to retrain pilots.
@@lymancopps5957 not at all. The purpose of MCAS is to let the pilots FEEL like they can fly MAX like older "Next Generation" Because of the new engine, MAX has higher risk of stalling if pilot fly like NG. However Boeing still told pilots that they can fly MAX like NG (to avoid 2 hours training) The only functionality of MCAS is to secretly void pilot's operation if nose pitch is too high
Im disappointed you didnt mention the fact that before the Lion Air crash, Boeing never even informed airlines and pilots about the Existance of Mcas, its a major fact that should be delivered
They all knew. It was in the operators manual. They also knew what runaway trim is and how to react to it. MCAS was designed to work in the background. There is so much disinformation about what it does and why it it is there.
I work underground in a mine. When we change to a new area or machine will sit down for entire days to go through changes and upgrades. Meanwhile with airlines and Boeing deem a 2hr training course for the Max upgrades unsatisfactory. Unbelievable!
The think is that Inside the cockpit everything is the same so you have to do the exact same thinks but if they needed a redesign the would be very different, also I think that a mine is a lot more dangerous that a plane
It's way more than a two hour course. They'd be completely different machines. All the points he brings up about model confusion under stress are valid. He should do a video on actual retraining regimen and costs including simulator and maintaining currency so that information is more accessible to people.
Exactly what I think, especially if you think about that it is a safety upgrade that can help pilots in emergency! If pilots don't want to use it is there decision, with it the pilots can decide to use it or not. But if you don't give it to them when they they need it the pilots just can hope luck is on there side. Hopefully EU or Asia side kicks in and force them to Change the mistake
I agree. If I was Boeing trying to sell the max7, max10 I would offer free training for 2 pilots for every planes they buy. The orders are billions of dollars so $100 million in training costs are a drop in the bucket.
Most updated aircraft come with a simple slideshow walking pilots through differences. Boeing did that with the MAX and got flamed for it because of the accidents, but it's pretty common practice when the changes are minor. Airbus did it with the NEO, and Embraer with the E2 family. There really aren't many differences between the MAX and NG, especially now that MCAS' capabilities have been significantly hampered
As a retired aircraft maintenance technician, I can say this does boil down to money. The airlines don't want to hire more pilots, they want to cross train as many as possible. At the company I worked for, we could go to school on as many of the 5-6 aircraft types/models that we had, HOWEVER we were also expected to be proficient in those types! It can be very confusing and stressful trying to keep that much knowledge and differences training in your head. So in my opinion, this will come back to bite the airlines and government in the tail, it may take awhile since they will be new, but it will happen, just like it did with the Max when it came out, it's a bad design and Boeing knows it.
There are a lot of systems that run autonomously that the pilots don't know about. And that's not the problem either. The problem is that Boeing has kept a lot of details about MCAS from the FAA. For example, it was not stated how much the system intervenes in active flight operations.
This seems more like Airbus Fanboys are spewing allot of hate because of Boeing new huge sale plus the launch of the the Boeing 797. However if you want the truth just look and read all about the Airbus Crashes that out number Boeing with three crashes for every plane. However leads aviations in crashes and remember the Airbus crashed were Airboobs were caught changing the Black Boxes and how about the A330 that crashed halfway to Europe and the pilots no idea there where in flat spin. List of accidents and incidents involving the Airbus A320 family From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For the entire A320 family, 160 aviation accidents and incidents have occurred (the latest accident with fatalities being Pakistan International Airlines Flight 8303 on 22 May 2020),[1] including 37 hull loss accidents,[2] and a total of 1505 fatalities in 17 fatal accidents.
@@kimberlywilliams7543 they're both very safe manufacturers (except 737MAX before the grounding). a320 and 737ng crash statistics are extremely similar. claiming anything otherwise is denying reality to support a manufacturer that (probably) doesn't even pay you
@@kimberlywilliams7543 does it really matter who's company (Boeing/Airbus) is better than others the main focus should be to improve there aircraft so these crashes don't occur in the future
pilots didn't know about MCAS because they didn't receive training about it. Training that Boeing decided to hide away to not hinder sales of the plane because they promised it will operate the same as the previous variant with no new training required.
You do realize it's the airline customers that insist on training commonality, and not Boeing, right? Boeing would happily sell training time/services.
It is in the interest of Boeing to make that happen, though. Otherwise what is the incentive to not say buy an airbus instead, when intensive retraining and different pilot pools are required anyways.
Imagine building an aircraft where the new bigger engines couldn't fit under the wings so had to be hung further forward, unbalancing the aircraft and making it unstable. MCAS was a 'band aid' solution as the new owners were too busy moving the headquarters to Chicago and didn't want to approve the expense of building a new plane to replace the 1960s designed 737. Greed will be the death of the human species.
A friend of mine is a 737 captain and flies the -8 MAX with some regularity. His comment is that the plane needs a little coaxing to start a descent, compared to the -800NG, the 757, and the 767. He attributes that to wing design, which generates a lot of lift.
I fly them too, and I don’t find that to be the case.. however, the newer engines have more residual thrust at idle, and that’s probably what your friend meant. Residual thrust means the idle speed is still producing thrust, and you have to be aware of that as it doesn’t descend as steeply, but there are speed brakes that you could use, or just manage your descent by starting down a few miles sooner. It’s not a big deal. Very easy plane to fly, and handles very nice.. it’s controls seem balanced and more stable than earlier versions.
Most of them are what are called short field performance, very hard to slow them down. But I’m not sure that’s all MAX variants, I only know first hand for the 8200.
It has a laminar flow wing which the airframe was never intended to have, the difference in engine size and weight compounds the C of G and C of L problems, hence all the ridiculous systems to make the damn thing flyable. Best turned into razor blades asap.
@@rorykeegan1895 If you drive a crossover vehicle, there are computers forcing the suspension to make the vehicle behave like a sedan or coupe. If FWD trucks with limited off-road capabilities rolled like crazy on hard, fast turns, people would still buy coupes and sedans like they did 20 years ago. Personally, I have no problem flying on a MAX. My friend thinks that the MAX is still superior to any Airbus, because all Airbuses are over-automated.
"Why did Congress give the MAX a pass?" Because the USA is inherently protectionist when its businesses and corporations are threatened. I don't see the US doing the same sort of exemption if the A321 had some issues like MCAS.
Yep there's definitely leniency with their own. But I'm not surprised when it's a huge business that generates huge amounts of money. Every country does it to an extent
After once again having to fly the 737-800 for 5 hours on a flagship carrier it once again reminded me of how uncomfortable plane it is. The extra couple of inches A320 series cabins are wider, really make a difference. Legroom you can alter but seat width is much harder, and the generally 0,5-1 inch per seat in width makes Airbus so much more comforable to travel in..
Yep. I traveled transatlantic(!) - from Shannon Ireland to Boston Massachusetts - in an Airbus A321 Neo LR. And although I am extremely tall 6' 5 it was a pleasant experience. 4 kudos to Aer Lingus!
"Did the 737 Max just become dangerous again?" I don't see a lot of correlation (if any) between that title and the content in the video. I think you should change the title because in a big part of your video you haven't explained anything dangerous about Congress giving the Max 7 and 10 a waiver but instead you've actually praised Congress for exempting the two Max models.
Safety is compromised at all times, unless you’re flitting through life like the president. However, the video makes a logical case that it was the opposite of what you remark about. Almost Every regulation upgrade has exceptions for cases where the upgrade is unworkable (including cost ). In this case, keeping familiar might be safer.
Flew the 737-200 as a FO . Wow solid aircraft, durable, and safe. That standard is gone down today, despite avionics that can virtually do everything, in auto land. Flying now as a old timer, I just get the feeling that my composite aircraft I fly is an experiment for the engineers, and all about money and saving a buck. Safe enough, but … Just my thoughts as a 20k hour guy . Level Wings crew , CAVOK .
The 737-200 has nowhere been near safe. Under the circumstances of its time it was at most average regarding the safety. According to Wikipedia accident list: B737-100/200: approx. 2900 deaths B737-300/400/500/700/800/Max: approx. 2350 deaths. Regarding the numbers build, number of flights and accidents you can still claim that the B732 is not much unsafer than the 737Max at the current time.
@@andreasfDE the pre-max 737 is also the most flown airliner of all time, by a wide margin. If you look at hull losses per flight hour, you will see it near the bottom. There are some planes that have never had a crash at all, 747-8, 787, A380, A340. If you fly thousands of those for 50 years, you are going to start seeing a loss rate. Obviously the -100 and -200 have more accidents than the newer 737s. Also, flying generally has become safer for all aircraft types with better ATC control and upgrades. Also, how is it useful to count number of deaths? When a cargo plane crashes is that somehow different than a passenger plane because only 2 or 3 people die? Does the 2 crashed planes that killed 550 people in Tenerife somehow outweigh a dozen smaller planes? Do we rate the 747 as a dangerous plane even though the communications screwup could have happened to any plane that day?
Another win for safety is that the waiver came with strings attached. Congress gave Boeing this waiver but in exchange Boeing will have to implement the 3rd AOA sensor and the stickshaker cut-out switch in all factory-new MAXs, and retrofit it at their own cost in all the fleet of US-registered MAX of every version. That was a condition that EASA imposed on Boeing for Europe when they re-certified the MAX, and now the same condition will apply to the US.
It's not another win for safety. They built a plane without redundancy. They are just doing the right thing now... After they literally said the pilots caused the plane to crash.
Granting any kind of waiver whatsoever tells me not one lesson has been learned by the US Government, the FAA, and Boeing. What it tells me is that profits come first, nothing else. Boeing has been utterly trashed to make Wall Street happy, it deserves to go broke and disappear.
That's no win. The AOA sensor should be considered entirely separate and required without strings attached at all. The EICAS should be evaluated completely separately on its own.
Yep, dollars over safety, that's Boeing, Congress, and the FAA. Sigh. Plus Southwest's "We must have a single fleet" policy, which of course was a major factor in the original failure to actually install MCAS safely and train the pilots on the pre-crash MAX.
Nothing wrong with the smash to pass recall system we have on the 73. Many operators will fly the NG and MAX fleets. Going from EICAS back to the old school master caution will create issues. I flew two different jets with EICAS prior to the 73 and while they’re very helpful they’re not a save all alerting system the general public think they are.
@@sncy5303 no you clearly don’t understand how this works. You can’t just force Boeing to retrofit every aircraft with EICAS thus requiring every new pilot on the aircraft to learn the system. 73 pilots don’t really care either way. What is the significance of EICAS in this situation? What do you think EICAS gives us? How has the NG’s exemplary safety record in the past now come into question when this new buzzword most people don’t understand now is brought up? I’m truly puzzled what the general public think EICAS is capable of. It’s a great system but by no means is the 73 fleet any less safe without it. You couldn’t be more wrong in that opinion.
@@sncy5303 but the electronic checklist isn’t necessarily EICAS. EICAS is just engines instrumentation and crew alerting. Aka you will have the status, fault, caution, or warning message displayed on a DU. This will then direct you to the QRH. (For example EICAS typically gives a specific aural to alert of a caution and one to a warning. Similar to how the system works now with the exception of it being light.) EICAS will say “FADEC 2 FAULT” which only directs you to the QRH to respond and clear the message. ECAM is something airbus popularized that implemented an EICAS and electronic checklist/QRH in one allowing you to follow the checklist directly from the screen. This was then copied and implemented on the B777 and B787 fleets with EICAS and an electronic checklist. The B757/767 fleets have EICAS but do not posses the electronic checklist capability.
@@sncy5303 also, what kills people in emergencies is acting too fast and going straight into the checklist without stabilizing the airplane. Fly the jet and get it into a situation you can safely work the checklist. If the electric trim isn’t doing what you want or responding turn it off, same with any automation. I won’t get into the crashes but the response items for a runaway stab is the same on the NG and MAX and both times were done incorrectly and not in line with the memory items prescribed by Boeing.
I've had three round trips on Southwest MAX-7's. Imagine that -- three round trips. How do you suppose I'm still alive? The days I flew Southwest, they also flew hundreds of flights with the MAX along with American and United. NONE of those airplanes crashed. How do you suppose that happened? As a passenger I cannot tell any difference between the NG and the MAX -- there's still not enough leg room.
Actually, the quality control standard ISO9001 states that any change brings with it both opportunities, AND new risks as well. So it is paramount to make a risk analysis that come with the new changes in the cockpit... There are new bennefits, but also things could go wrong as well from all new reasons. So these free discussions are quite useful, they are in fact making a necessary risk analysis , absolutely useful for improvement. If new risks surpass the beneffits, better not to make the change at all
Airbus had that issue once of their planes. One A330 crasched in the woods due to such an issue during a flyby on an airshow. This is something that has to be tested to the limit before implementing it in the fleet.
ISO9000 isn't a "quality control standard", it's about quality _management systems_ . Huuuuge difference. QC is about reactively finding errors (and it doesn't get more reactive than waiting for a plane to crash) whereas a QMS (which incorporates Quality _Assurance_ as well as Quality _Control_ ) is about preventing errors in the first place. Interestingly, the current incarnation of ISO9000, 2015, is the first to embrace the notions of what they term "risk-based thinking"
@@obelic71 except that that's BS, first off it was an A320 not an A330, second off, the pilot didn't study the terrain properly to prepare for the maneuver, as well as completely ignoring all the Airbus and Airline imposed safety regulations on the maneuver and minimums. He sunk way below 100 feet, afaik pitched up too far and then, as evidenced by the black box data, failed to power up the engines quick enough to do a terrain escape maneuver (which was also because he failed to follow procedure and instructions to actually study the surrounding terrain). He crashed the plane into the mountain through sheet incompetence and his disregard of the rules
The problem with ordering more A321s is that Airbus's delivery schedule is full and it would take several more years to get those planes than for Boeing Max aircraft to be delivered. Boeing needs to replace its aging 700-NGs ASAP.
You forgot to mention that once the max10 is certified Boeing has a window to update all Max aircraft with the cockpit warning system.. That way they will still have the same commonality! The amendment allows Boeing three years to retrofit its safety enhancements to all models of the MAX aircraft after the MAX 10 receives certification. From that date, any MAX that is not retrofitted with the improvements will not be able to fly (safely).
I don't think it is possible to do, I remember when 737max was made, they can only make 30% change from 737ng, and they already used that 30%, so if they make more changes, than it will be a brand new type of aircraft, so the pilot will have to study the whole course, not the difference course.
Wouldn't trust Boeing. Seems to me their way of ensuring safety is putting passengers at risk first. Remember the 737 Rudder hardover issues that brought down 2 planes and almost the third, kept saying no problem until the problem is found by investigators and the 2 MAX crashes. Not to mention the issue with the number 3 engine detaching and bringing down number 4 engine along with it (Happened with 707s and 747, the latter flight 1862)
@user-rv3mq4no9j The rudder hardover issue was super hard to catch though, it boggled the investigators for ages until they managed to catch it with a cold switch/hot hydraulic fluid test and then the switch reversing was discovered.. Mind you, I completely agree on Boeing, when they absorbed McDonnell Douglas they really took on their crummy safety culture and the whole penny-wise-pound-foolish pinching attitude that they and so many other companies have embraced does nothing for my confidence. Then again, neither does the self-created pilot shortage or the airlines lobbying for single pilot crews. Brr.
Sorry to be negative, but you have seriously missed the mark. EICAS and MCAS are not related. If you instal EICAS, it is easier to find an issue, but not DOES NOT solve the issue with the original MCAS system. It's not really about the training costs. Airlines didn't want to have two groups of pilots (EICAS and non-EICAS). That's a logistic nightmare for operations. A 737 with the corrected MCAS system is perfectly safe, or it wouldn't still be flying.
EICAS in all four MAX variants should be the safest option? More training of course, but it would keep matching cockpit designs and you have the system everywhere.
I'd like to correct a fallacy presented here. I've been a travel agent for 50+ years and once airlines raise fares, even if the reason for that increase (say, fuel cost) ceases to exist I've never seen any airline anywhere to lower their fares other than temporary fare sales.
You left out one major reason for not requiring the new system on the -7 and -10. The law was never intended to impact these aircraft. The implementation deadline was originally set to 12/27/22 because those MAX aircraft were scheduled to be certified by that date. Covid and supply chain issues extended the development and certification process beyond the laws original deadline.
@@terrycampbell4387 right, because it was Airbus that crashed those 2 planes... Not Booing... We need to fix what's not broken but not what's broken. They gifted a lot of money to Congress. Don't let that fool you.
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True, but Boeing has made a series of attempts to use politics to save chump change while opening up the risk of seriously harming Boeing. The Military MCAS already had redundancy and manual override, Bombardier was pushed into Airbus by Boeing abusing the trade commission. Canada is pissed and bought f35s and the list goes on. Much of these issues end up being about public confidence, which makes a critical difference. Security is at the core of the airline industry and you don't want a reputation of bucks before safety. Perception will not favour Boeing if a couple more MAXs fall for any reason whatsoever.
We're having super progress! Now were talking about safety. Not doing anything about it, but we're talking! Amazing. That silver lining is such a cope. The 737MAX is still as flawed today as the day it was launched, the main difference is that pilots are now aware of the MCAS and the optional extra vane is comes pre-installed. MCAS can still activate right after take-off, which is a terrible, terrible design. But hey. It's a "win for consumers". Good grief.
I'm not a pilot.. i only work on and operate large equipment from a 100,000 lbs to 2 million lbs and anything that makes trouble shooting easier and simpler to explain is a plus.. having one master caution light for 20 different faults or fault codes than an actual fault display showing up in words what it actually is when time is of the essence is way easier..
I operate an ice cream bicycle and whenever I get an equipment upgrade I spend the afternoon reading the manual and learning the differences, which is far more then what Boeing offers 😂
@@CougarCat21 when you are dyslexic they’re are know spelleding mistakes, which is my point, you don’t know who is English as a Second Language or who has Dyslexia just the same as you don’t know that someone is deaf, going around correcting people was your mistake from the beginning and not a productive way to live your life. I will defend being Dyslexic and proud of it
Having flown both airplanes with EICAS and without, I believe EICAS does increases safety and simplicity. On the other hand the change would have to come to ALL MAX aircraft both in the line and new ones, otherwise it would be detrimental to safety and increase workloads and training.
Recently i flew from Bergamo to Valencia as a passenger with this airplane and it was a very turbulent and quick descend to the Valencia Airport.Somehow Ive thought that pilots have more problems to controll this aircraft as it does what it wants at some Point .
Well, here in Australia our flagship carrier is Qantas (who have been recently awarded the safest airline in the world). What's their position on the 737 MAX? They've opted not to purchase the 737 MAX but instead, they're going with the Airbus’ A320neo and A220. That pretty-much sums up how safe Qantas thinks the MAX is.
I doubt that decision is made on safety grounds for it would not be possible to introduce an aircraft with known safety flaws. Quantas' decision was likely owing to the backlog of orders and questioning realistic deliveries of new aircraft. But, let's be real, the A320neo is far superior. Not sure about the A220 compared with Boeing.
@@radhakrishnannair2143 "Greedy decision makers go behind money" - You must be referring to Boeing and their decision not to tell anyone about the problems with the MAX, in order to make money
Use to love Boeing and currently in the process of getting my CPL and I have decided I will be going to the Airbus A320 for my type rating. I just can’t trust Boeing anymore with how dodgy they seem to have gone.
@@sumerdatta1476 not quite.. it’s called a valid opinion on a video about a company which is putting pilots like myself and passengers at risk. how is it self importance because I said my feelings on a matter? Not very bright are you?
Why are Boeing putting you and pilots at risk just because of how Doggy they have become? why should that question you? you should do that to Airbus as well with how dodgy they have also become
Boeing has been captured by Wall Street and is being squeezed like a cash cow. It is no longer a company where quality conscious employees made sure the work was done properly. These days poor quality is the norm and their jets are becoming too dangerous to ride for my taste. I make sure that I choose airlines accordingly.
The real answer would be dangerous STILL. The underlying issue is never addressed. MCAS should just have been taken out and pilots should simply have gone in for retraining.
Wasn't MCAS introduced because of the unavoidable changes in handling resulting from attaching new, more fuel-efficient but also bigger engines onto an airframe that was originally designed with a small ground clearance for ease of maintenance? If I'm right then MCAS has to be in place on the MAXes. Plus, because of pressure from certain airlines, Boeing were determined that extra simulator training would not be proposed under any circumstances. It's all about money saving measures, not technology. Which ultimately, of course, is aabout how much the public are prepared to pay for what degree of safety.
watch full video,, this is just a thumbnail bait for airbus fanbois,,,in this video he didnt talk about safty/deficiency of max rather he talked about certification issues due to cockpit system…thesedays evry aviation channel just using thumbnail bait to attract airbus fanbois😅😅😅
@@michaelg3855 Boeing did screw up big time, they messed up , but saving on pilot training costs is not a bad thing itself, even airbus makes sure little/ no added training is required when moving from the 320ceo to the NEO.
@@michaelg3855 A "Wheelie warning" would have done the same thing, alerting the pilots and allowing them to put the nose down a bit if they felt it was necessary. It's not necessary to ignore pilot input and dive into the ground.
@@michaelg3855 yeah, due to the bigger more fuel efficient engines the plane would pitch up higher than usual because the 737’s where originally not designed with this large engines in mind. So to combat that without airlines needing to train there pilots boeing fitted them with mcas that was supposed to pitch the aircraft down, which it in 2 instances did very effectively. but i agree with you, the pilots should just have gotten thier training instead of boeing claiming it’s not needed.
Actually worse is how they solved the MCAS problem by just letting it deactivate for the rest of the flight after it has been overwritten twice... This software was installed due to the aerodynamic issues it has because of the bigger engine that sits further forward acting with a huge arm when applied full thrust at low speeds.
Tip: it’s not aerodynamically unstable nor does it act like a huge arm You realize a lot of other aircraft have engines that far forward - even with the ground clearance?
It's not the thrust, it's the aerodynamic lift by engine nacelle, And still, it's not unstable, it only reduce the force increment (not reduce the force itself) pilot need to pull back to increase AOA, which is required by part25. But even without MCAS, it would only occurs after AOA already above still warning line.
That’s not why the system was installed. It was installed to meet certification requirements to do with stick force. Btw, the placement of the engines had zero bearing on the max crashes
@@ingulari3977 the system was installed because it pitches up *more*, not that it is aerodynamically unstable in a stall, by that logic, NG would be unstable
There was no surprise, they were always supposed to get an exemption. The original expectation was that they wouldn't need an extension and all the planes would be certified by then. There is next to no way they would have forced a second cockpit and a type split, that creates to many street issues of it's own
I still think that having several different versions of the 737 cockpit in the fleet would be a bad thing. When you realize that Southwest pilots can fly several different versions of 737 in A SINGLE DAY, having several different versions of cockpit annunciators could make the situation MORE DANGEROUS. As long as they have the extra AOA sensors and the neutered MCAS, I think they will be fine.
Although I appreciate the info, the lack of tribal knowledge on how EICAS is actually pronounced is off-putting. It’s like we’re having an outsider tell us our news. But again, good industry info.
@@clevelandaeromotive i guess for the beginners perhaps, new people are introduced to aviation each day..............the newer community will need a thorough up ig, or else they may go on butchering names of aviation terms
@@clevelandaeromotive I don't understand. Your lack of knowledge is off-putting? I guess it can be for anyone. No idea what the outsider comment is about. Best thing for lack of knowledge is education. You're welcome!
I'm not one to comment on a sponsor, but I was given an Ekster wallet for Christmas maybe 5 years ago. It's still in excellent shape and the card pop-up still works like new. It's a legitimately quality product.
Seems your code is only giving me 5% off. I know you said up to 40% but I am not getting that on anything I want. What product is 40% off? Maybe be more specific about your available discounts.
Actually, the flight crew of the LionAir crash **did** correctly diagnose that MCAS was the problem, and they responded per the QRH (by selecting "Stab Trim Cutout" as directed). But among the million or so things that Boeing was either disingenuous about or just flat-out lying, they neglected to mention that if the airspeed was already above a certain dot, it would be physically impossible to manually re-trim the aircraft because of the excessive airflow over the control surfaces. Eventually they gave up and RE-ENGAGED THE MCAS, which of course only made things worse.
"MCAS is designed to automatically pitch the nose of the plane down when it's in danger of stalling" Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) The system was primarily implemented to make the aircraft feel and preform similar enough to a standard 737 as to avoid procuring a different "Type Rating Certificate" which would cause substantial additional expense to airlines in pilot training. This is cause by the fact that the MAX8 uses larger engines which required them to be mounter mor forward and up higher to make ground clearance. This change in engine size and position caused a "pitch up" moment during heavy thrust too far out of character with the regular 737 hence MCAS was born.
I disagree that this makes the fleet safer. I think it's a pretty clear case of money over safety once again, and we all know how that goes. Also just a FYI Coby, usually EICAS is pronounced like ICAS - Eye-CAS, rather than EeCAS
Actually MCAS existed because of the KC46 which is a Boeing 767-200 fuel tanker. It was meant to help the aircraft cope with shifts in CG as it fueled other aircraft on mission.
Ah but on the Max they depended on a single sensor where on the KC's they had multiple inputs. Also they are not even based on the same architecture, the KC46 is a modified wide body 767 while the Max is a narrow body 757. The KC46 being a military craft did not have the energy savings requirements the commercial airlines demanded, and do not have to meet the same certification standards the FAA requires for passenger jets, so the engines are different. Where the new energy efficient engines on the Max passenger jets are much larger and had to be mounted almost entirely forward of the wings and higher to avoid dragging them on the runway, thus changing the aerodynamics entirely to a more unstable configuration that required dependency on MCAS. This is comparing apples to oranges.
@@MAtildaMortuaryserver your all over the place on that. The max is a 737 not a 757. My comment is in response to Coby saying that no other Boeing aircraft used or uses MCAS. The 737 MAX requires MCAS because of the larger heavier engines p Being placed more forward and higher on the main wing due to low ground clearance on the 737. The KC46 needs it due to shifting fuel loads as it does its mission. The 737 max needs it because of the different location of the engines on the max which makes it fly different to the 737NG. MCAS was installed on the 737 Max to make it exhibit the same Flight characteristics as the 737NG.
@@antonyh37 Sorry about that, meant 737, but the bottom line is the configuration of the Max is inherently unstable which is why the MCAS was required. It was just really poor judgement on the part of Boeing to not use redundant sensors, to not require better training for pilots, thought that really was the FAA bowing to pressure to exceed to demands from Boeing and the airlines, as well as certain political entities. Funny what the profit motive can make people do. About the time Boeing shifted it's headquarters to Chicago from Seattle the bean counters took over and profit became the highest priority. Now they are moving to Arlington in Virginia presumably because that is the nexus of corporate/government rule in the US now. It is a sad state when profit takes precedent over people's lives. Sadder when government allows it. I have not flown on a Max and never will. Boeing deserves to go the way of Chrysler.
I sort of agree. I think having a common cockpit across Max variants is the only sane option. I think the mistake was allowing the Max to keep the same cockpit as previous 737s was the critical mistake. Basically, Boeing have does this on every new generation of 737s, so the Max hasn't changed much from a 1960s 737. If they'd been forced to update the Max cockpit from the NG and put in modern safety systems, there would obviously have been training required for NG pilots to move to the Max, but it would placed a clear delineation between the two planes. It would also have meant that there would have been no hidden MCAS deleted from the pilot manuals, so the two crashes would most likely have never happened.
On the other hand the 737 is a really old design. Boeing has trouble completing in today's market against airbus today, so the 737 Max family is probably the last 737 lineup we will see, considering Boeing almost has to move into a clean sheet design, we're they could implement a modern cockpit. Forcing this system into 737 max 7 & 10 would just cut those two off from the rest of the family. Keeping all 737s the same is probably the best option until Boeing maybe strings together a 737 and 757 replacement, completing the modern Boeing lineup (somewhat at least)
@@kalle5548 I mean really, they should have moved to a clean sheet design rather than a quick update of the 737. But having made poor decision to produce another iteration of the 737, they should have been told to make it comply with modern safety standards. But I agree having one set of safety equipment for the 8 & 9, and a different set for the 7 & 10 would make no sense at all.
In my opinion the last justification issn't one. If you think it till the end, Boeing can never upgrade their cockpit of the 737 because thousands of pilots had flown the old layout for years and if you change it they might get confussed,...
Before I flew the 737 I was flying Embraer Aircraft, which has EICAS, and it’s philosophy is very straight forward and easy to use, I haven’t flown Airbus, but it seems like it’s pretty much the same; everybody in the industry mocks Boeing Pilots for the rudimentary cockpit and 1960’s philosophy, back then EICAS wasn’t a thing, but the arrangement in the cockpit to make everything have a logic is pretty ingenious, and every Boeing pilot is trained to use it that way since the 60s, and everyone is pretty much used to fly those airplanes that way. I think you should have explained what the EICAS is about; parto of it is essentially a computer representation of every system malfunction in one screen, or at least, that’s what the 737 lacks in comparison to other “more modern” Aircraft, and not in everything, because the newer models already have the “EI” part of “EICAS” (engine-indicating), it’s the CAS that is not represented on a screen (Crew-Alerting System), but it is represented in two separate panels called the “RECALL” panels/switch. EICAS has the added ability to show any malfunction in a list of items in one screen, where the philosophy on the 737 fleet uses two panels on the glareshield (one for each pilot) with lights that point to a system whether it is malfunctioning or in an abnormal configuration, but it is pretty straight forward to use. Now, in my own experience, I was reluctant when I made the switch from the Embraer more modern cockpit to the 737 cockpit, and I made the switch to the classics (300-500 variant), but the way the 737 cockpit is laid out is very intuitive, so I can see why it could actually be a risk for safety to have different philosophies for flying the same aircraft, they would have to redesign the whole cockpit for something that is not worth it, because the current system works perfectly, it’s not just about placing another screen. Possibly the biggest flaw I see on the 737 MAX is the fact that they use pretty much the same airframe for more powerful and bigger engines, and it relies a lot on computers to calibrate its aerodynamics to make it reliable, which is what went wrong with the whole MCAS fiasco, and the fact that they fixed the system and trained the pilots on it doesn’t make up for the fact that that airframe is old, and relies too much on computers, but nowadays which aircraft is not. Cheers!
A system somewhat similar to MCAS, the stick nudger, had been installed on the B707-400 due to a tendency to pitch up while approaching a stall in Flaps 1 config. Also this system had inputs into the elevator and not the stabilizer, it’s function is similar to MCAS: When active it pushes the control column forward and also reduces the load on the column.
The "stick nudger" on the 707 was nothing at all like MCAS, not even close. Without MCAS the 737 Max "Unflyable Pig Series" is a complete death trap. Ask Lion and Ethiopian.
@@rorykeegan1895 Talkin chit again as the first crashed max had been recovered the previous day by a pilot that knew how to fly a plane, and EASA certified the plane without the MCAS system !!! Know what you are babbling about !!!
Even the A-10 has a system similar to MCAS. It's called SAS for Stability Augmentation System. It's purpose is to compensate for the tendency of the A-10's nose to come up when the gun is fired. Without SAS during a long burst only the first few shots would hit the target. Then as the burst continues the subsequent shots will go higher and higher over the target. SAS senses that the nose is going up and then it flutters the elevator to hold the nose down to keep the gun on target throughout the entire burst. Unlike MCAS SAS uses a gyro to sense the pitch changes instead of using an AOA sensor.
@@rorykeegan1895 Um, Greg Fieth is world's apart on intelligence from you Hoss. Maybe you should hear what he has to say about who crashed these two aircraft.
MCAS has appeared on another Boeing Jet prior to the MAX. It was put on the KC46 (767 tanker) first. It also had built in redundancy and two sensor verification on that application.
There's nothing wrong with MCAS; Boeing just didn't implement it properly on the MAX in a stupid attempt to circumvent pilots needing extra instruction. The unforgivable thing is that Boeing ruthlessly deleted redundancy to be able to circumvent that extra instruction, knowing that they broke the rules with that and therefore just as knowingly put crews and passengers in danger.
@TJ Roelsma the plane doesn't NEED MCAS at all. It was put there to make it perform like thr NGs initially with a g meter reading and AOA. But as you said Boeing pulled a Boeing and the rest is history. The plane can fly perfectly safe without MCAS! As Cobey pointed out the additional training costs associated with the MAX not flying exactly like the NG as Boeing promised is what ultimately drove its inclusion.
@@NovejSpeed3 It does use two AoA sensors now, and an artificial calculated horizon. This gives majority logic to calculate elevator trim to then offset the CG. The center of gravity is no longer neutral due to longer pylons and forward placement of engines. So yes the max does need constant trim.
@@rorykeegan1895 I would have put it a bit more subtle, but yeah, it's far from optimal. Boeing tried one time too many to breathe new life into the old airframe that is the 737 and it backfired on them.
Right move. First, Congress imposed that deadline with the expectation that the Max-7 and MAX10 would be certified by that date and that new aircraft would have this requirement. Extending the deadline keeps that in place. Whether that was a good call is debatable, but if they grandfathering of aircraft was intended, the actual date is irrelevant. BTW, if it's so important, why not make it immediately effective or even mandate older aircraft be retrofitted? Second, they also mandated a third pitot on ALL aircraft, giving about two years for existing aircraft to be retrofitted. This is arguably more important and illustrates how a government requires implementing what they believe to be a truly necessary action/device.
Good luck going full time. A few comments on your video. Differing opinions, not conflicting opinions, because they're from different sources. the millions of dollars spent/required is so small, relative to the billions of dollars of profit airlines and boeing earn annually. The extra hours of training are minimal in the long run when all things are considered. The short term gain may not be a benefit in the long run, especially if safety is involved. A consistent cockpit is probably best for pilots, but when looked at from point of view for safety, maybe the Max 8 and 9s should not have been exempt in the first place. If both Max 8 and 9s cockpits were redesigned, non-exempt, then the 7s and 10s would've been "consistent" with the 8s. Seems like a poor initial decision that caused this splinter.
Exactly this. The Max variants should never have come into existence in the first place and Boeing should have developed a fresh new aircraft to meet the needs of today’s airlines but because that was too expensive for their tastes they slapped the engines on an old and woefully outdated airframe and basically ended up with an aerodynamically flawed Frankenstein aircraft so they decided to address a hardware design flaw with an inadequate software “solution.” Which is still inadequate to this day. Unlike the Airbus A320 variants the 737 max versions only has two AoA sensors that MCAS gets its information from. As I understand it, when MCAS gets two different readings from the two AoA sensors because one is damaged it has no way to know which one is faulty so it hands it back to the human pilots to solve. If there were three, it could just look at which two are given the same data and conclude that the one that isn’t matching up with the other two is malfunctioning. It’s an absolute shambles and a disgrace that by asking for the excemption Boeing was asking for permission to make the Max family less safe than they could be and flashed enough cash at congress to allow it. But I have a personal bias in this situation because some of my best friends are 737 pilots who routinely fly the Max 8 and I’m not okay with this.
A point that wasn't really mentioned is that sure, EICAS will make the aircraft safer, but that doesn't mean that the 737 without EICAS is not safe. The 737 has been flying for decades and is considered an incredibly safe aircraft today.
I understand your point, but your treating all the 737s as the same… they are not. The max had some significant changes from the NG which is why systems like MCAS had to be added. So you have to Treat the Max differently.
It's not an issue with 737 jets in general, just the Max as they are the first (and only to date?) to have the MCAS system, which caused the crashes of the two jets in the first place.
Yes this is true, the max is different, but we're talking about a fault reporting system. The old master caution style fault reporting has been used successfully for decades, even in the 737 classic where there was a lot less automation. My point is just that although EICAS is safer, of course, the current 737 fault reporting is perfectly safe in and of itself.
And not looking out for safety. They just wanna be the best when they can actually compete against the a350. The 777x tried so hard to be a350XII and yet it’s always so far
Southwest relies on commonality in it's fleet, so that any of it's pilots can fly on any flight. That's why MCAS exists - literally. Also, Southwest put a lot of pressure and may have been complicit in the events that lead to those two crashes.
The amount of people that don't understand why MCAS was deemed necessary is crazy to me. You hit the nail on the head, well done. Common aircraft behavior/feel, not aircraft safety.
@@Timpon_Dorz Can certainly blame it on Southwest. It was their insistence that the Max be 'exactly like the 737NG' so that NO pilot simulator time was required, that pushed Boeing into the shitshow that was their implementation of MCAS. Agreed Boeing should not have allowed themselves to be pushed into such a blatant disregard of safe practice by one intransigent customer. Plenty of blame to go around. But MCAS wasn't only 'just' so that Max would feel like a NG. It was essential to permit the Max to be certified - there is an aeronautical requirement that stick forces must increase with deviation from normal flight. With the Max, under certain conditions of high power and steep angle of attack, the nose would continue to rise further without any increased pull on the stick - this is not permissible. Hence MCAS.
@@cr10001 lol you are dumb af... Just because Southwest wants something, Booing didn't have to comply... They complied with southwest to make money... How much money did they make? Sorry SW is not to blame... Booing is the one who wanted the business... Doesn't matter who wishes something, it's the plane makers fault for delivering murdering machines.
No commercial aircraft should need MCAS or anything like it to stay flyable. The crews and passengers of both Lion and Ethiopian never had a chance thanks entirely to Boeing's shortcuts, lying and money grabbing.
@@rorykeegan1895 737s are flyable without MCAS. It was added to make the 737Max react like a 737NG so the pilots needed just a short theoretical training session not expensive hours in the simulator to cope with the differences.
Do you think that Southwest's point to point system was a big part of the problem with the holiday disaster? I've heard that due to the cascading cancellations, pilots and planes were often not where they needed to be and this caused Southwest to have to cancel flights. Were airlines that use the hub and spoke system at an advantage?
Southwest has an old software system that performs rescheduling and it couldn't handle the increased number of reschedulings needed due to the storm and so many employees unable to get to work or get there on time so it crashed. They couldn't do it manually so they shut down totally to reset everything.
Were airlines that use the hub and spoke system at an advantage? Yes! The cascading cancellations were a direct result of the Southwest's point to point scheduling system. Given that we are going to see more frequent and more severe disrutions caused by climate degradation, Sothwest's system will break down more frequently and will cause much more damage than we have seen this time. Improving the scheduling system will never overcome this fundamental flaw.
No. I work in the operations center of a US airline, and I believe this is overrated. Planes don't shuttle back and forth nearly as much as they used to, among any carrier. More importantly to this particular meltdown, CREW don't shuttle back and forth all that much. Southwest's operation collapsing would have happened regardless of whether they operated point-to-point. Their tech stack is completely obsolete and that's the fundamental cause. Plenty of point-to-point operations recovered easily from that storm, and plenty of hub-and-spoke operations had serious issues with it. It all comes down to pre-planning, and then flexibility on the day of. Southwest had neither and paid the price. Some others only had one, and took more time than needed to recover. Others had both and were recovered as soon as the weather was good.
Turns out, folks sitting at the very top, are not really the geniuses we think they are. They are more corrupt, greedy and mean. And public safety and prosperity is definitely not a priority for all the law makers. It is what it is. What a world we live in.
Good stuff, Coby. Southwest OWNS the 737. The flight deck is designed and built for them. And every other carrier has to live with it. As fair as efficiency bringing down prices. That has never happened. Prices will always continue to rise; that's economics.
Pilots can’t misunderstand a system they were never told about. Once we knew about the system, and had a chance to practice the malfunction in the simulator, I was fine flying the Max. Have been practicing various runaway trim scenarios since I flew the 727. We even practiced with the horizontal stab so overloaded that you had to release som e nose up pressure, trim up, pull up, and repeat. Of course if you leave takeoff power set while almost level, the excess speed above Vne will load the manual trim even more.
Practicing for malfunctions is fine but preventing them from happening in the first place is better. Airline pilots shouldn't have to deal with situations where suddenly they see the horizon disappearing above the top of the windscreen when they are just 1,000 feet off the ground. Flying in a simulator or on a training flight isn't the same as a real emergency. In a real emergency you can go from an normal flight situation to a deadly emergency in just a few seconds. At that point you will be in shock and your system will start pumping you full with adrenalin. Different people will react differently in a situation like that. The average airline pilot may be very good but he's not a test pilot like Neil Armstrong. Armstrong was special because he could think at a very high level when he was under intense pressure. His brain would continue to process information and function logically even when his body's natural physiological responses were working against him. During the thruster malfunction on Gemini 8 and during the landing approach on Apollo 11 his respiration and heart rates were about twice what was normal. On Apollo 11 he had to contend with program alarms and navigation errors where he had to overfly a crater and a bolder field while low on propellants. Even with all that pressure he was able to think his way out of trouble and save the mission. Not many people, even an excellent airline pilot, could have done that.
@@joevignolor4u949 your point seems a bit scathed ngl, at the end of it you compared an excellent airline pilot to Neil Armstrong, which I know u were talking about pilots being under pressure, but at that point it kinda differs from what everyone is talking about specifically. Your completely right about how we should proactively fix problems so that emergencies don’t arise, but on your point about pilots reacting to emergencies, the training they get is meant to prepare them for how to react and proceed in an emergency situation, just saying.
I flew in one this past summer. It’s was the smoothest, quietist, most gentle flight from Seattle to Alaska. I was terrified at first, but it went well. 🤷♀️ I had a pilot friend I was messaging the whole time who was sharing safety information and tracking the flight on radar.
I am a trauma physician and a GA pilot. Emergencies always seem to occur at the worst possible times, like too close to the ground. Emergencies are rare and humans become complacent with Mother Nature taking advantage. Aircraft systems should be commonized just like usbc cables.
Not going to sell many of the 7 and 10 versions in Europe as they won't be allowed over here without the Ecas system as I understand it. Do you know any different 😏
@@ingulari3977 did you wear your depends? These planes are extremely safe. The problem with the two crashes were really crews that were not experienced enough to fly these advanced airplanes. The carriers get cheap on purchasing training for the new airplanes and and their crews don't have enough flight hours. Yes, Boeing could have done better. However, does Tesla offer training for their advanced cars? Plenty of crashes there.
@@usnchief1339 This guy comparing cars to planes ... smh. These broken planes were advertised for needing minimum to no additional training to operate it, so Boeing did not mention the new MCAS system. You can't "train" what's not being mentioned. And your so called "extremely safe" planes did not cross-check the faulty sensor data nor had any redundancy, that's some shitty design. And lastly corrupt Boeing overworked their employees which resulted in installing faulty sensors in the first place.
@@SquawkHub ok...lol. 1.3 million die in vehicles annually. Less than 1000 die in aviation accidents. Flying, even in Russian airplanes, is safer than driving.
@@usnchief1339 and why is that car to aviation comparison relevant? Back to aviation: In the last 3 years we had 3 major accidents of bigger commercial aircrafts (> 100 killed) with a technical issue as the main reason for the crash: 1x 737-89P, 2x 737 MAX8 And the 2nd 737 MAX crash was the most tragic accidents of the aviation industry in the last decade. Boeing knew that the MCAS in combination with a missing training/information for the pilots was the reason for the first accident and they did nothing to prevent it from happening again. :(
Actually MCAS was not introduced with the 737-MAX, as it was already installed on the KC-46 (a military 767 variant). The difference is that on the KC-46 it was installed properly with redundancy at data from independent sources.
I fundementally disagree with a number of your comments. First, most pilots were not aware that MCAS had been installed on the 737 MAX until the two tragic accidents. They had had no training to cope with an out of control MCAS activativation. MCAS was installed by Boeing because they had to install larger engines on the MAX. This necessitated moving the enginges forward because of the low ground clearance of the aircraft. As a result the Centre of Gravity was moved forward,leading to increased risk of a pitch up. MCAS was designed to counteract this. You make no mention that the Max had only two Angle of Attack indicators which means if one is defective then you don’t know which one is giving a correct reading. Airbus has three AOAs to give a better indication if one is defective.
The Max Series is a huge piece of pooh. The C of G and C of L are all wrong, hence all the stupid systems to keep the piece of pooh in the air. Personally, I'd rather walk.
@@rorykeegan1895 the Max 8 engines are positioned too forward, a bad design coupled with a flawed MCAS system. The end result is a very dangerous plane, one that I also want to avoid!
@Leo H The engines are MORE forward, not TOO forward. MCAS addressed a handling difference (in very specific circumstances) to be common with the NG. It is not a safety system. The design is stable and safe (the EASA specifically tested stability without MCAS during their recertification process). MCAS is no longer flawed either. I hope you're aware it's 2023 not 2019, they've been flying for 2.5 years accident-free with many more in the skies than before.
Personally, I prefer the 320neo or 321 than the max 8, which is quieter and a little more stable, although the older 737 2013-2018, model is a good aircraft.
I hope that they will slowly develop the new EICAS feature on all variants while the MAXs are still flowing the economy without crashes. And then release training programs before the update was released.
But this would surely involve a phased rollout of the new 737-MAX cockpit physical layout, which in turn would mean the loss of commonality. And some pilots clearly believe (sincerely, one must assume) that they are not mentally equipped to cope with this.
Every modern airliner has an EICAS. Except the 737. You can not "slowly implement" an EICAS it would require a massive rework of the airplanes systems and software, therefore making it a different type of aircraft in terms of type rating because you would handle it differently than the other 737s. That's what the regulation from the FAA initially would've been there for but when they let the 737 slide I unfortunately will never have a system like that
The piece that has really always been missing in flight automation is the ability for flight systems to self diagnose conflicting flight data to pinpoint and highlight exact system malfunction throughout. So this is a money decision that is just another step backward.
The deadline for making these changes was made by Congress with Boeing in mind. They expected that Boeing would be able to certify all 737 Max variants by the deadline. These changes were never intended to apply to the 737 Max family. As mentioned if made to conform pilots would need different type ratings between the variants and no airline wants to deal with that. I don’t believe the threat to cancel the -7 and -10 if an exemption wasn’t made was empty as it would cause a reduction in orders and a dwindling profit margin.
I already said that boeing and airbus have a duopoly in the aviation market and they certainly make it impossible for new players to enter and can do anything to prevent losses . Now safety and consumer is not the biggest priority for boeing .
They faced more scrutiny than any other aircraft in history besides maybe the dc-10. I can assure you that they are the single safest airplanes in the sky now.
Not that pilots not well understood MCAS, but the fact that boeing tried to hid it from everyone in order to market MAX to airlines as perfectly the same to older 737 and assured them there's no need to retrain pilots
I still feel the problem isn't EICAS (although the issues are important), the real problem continues to be MCAS. MCAS is necessary because of a Boeing decision that the plane's default wing configuration should be optimized for cruising flight, but that makes the plane unstable at slower speeds... The speeds when the aircraft is taking off or landing. Perhaps because of the dynamics of flying a plane with high thrust the crashes didn't happen taking off but happened when engines were at low throttle landing. MCAS was installed by default with data input from only 2 sensors which means that when there is a conflict in data received, the computer is unable to resolve the conflict. Boeing engineers actually realized this was a potential problem and reportedly Boeing offered an option to install a 3rd sensor based on generating an artificial attitude calculation for something like $20,000 (likely overpriced) to address this problem of conflicting data and breaking a tie instead of making it a standard and default installation. This means that the plane is least stable and dangerous at the moments during landing when the plane is at low altitude and pilots have little to no reaction time to respond to an unexpected event. Reportedly, installation of the 3rd sensor which was always an option was part of the resolution to the MCAS problem. In the first place, it's shameful that this common sense option wasn't a standard, default part of the system from the beginning. It's not hard to understand how critically important these sensors can be, especially if you're not going to train pilots properly for how to recognize and respond to an MCAS anomaly especially if you have only a second or 2 to recognize and respond to the problem at a very low altitude at low speed. The cost to Boeing to install the sensor is probably next to nothing and nowhere close to the $20,000 charge to an airline to include it. But the other issue is to recognize that MCAS is there to address a fundamental flaw of the plane's design operating at a specific time considered most dangerous in operating the plane. Can we be sure that MCAS is infallible? Would pilot training really be sufficient to save the plane if MCAS failed again? Is there any other combination of anomalies that could doom the aircraft? The point is that MCAS is only a recent development, to make the plane utterly rely on fly-by-wire during takeoff and landing. It will require the type of maintenance usually associated with military aircraft designed to be inherently unstable like the F-16 which has been operating fine for decades but AFAIK has not been designed into commercial aircraft. And, previous Boeing and current Airbus designs AFAIK don't require MCAS or anything like that to operate, plane wingforms have been altered a number of different ways during flight to remain stable and reliable through all stages of flight. Did Boeing introduce an unnecessary new requirement to fly safely?
Cheaper fuel costs never is relayed on to the customer. If fuel returns to pre COVID prices, ticket cost would remain the same and you still would not get one free checked bag.
I think in the end, all 737 MAX planes will get the new EICAS system. Reason: Europe's EASA and China's CAAC will require the upgrade. I expect Boeing to split the cost of the upgrade between itself and the airlines that bought a large number of 737 MAX planes recently, like Delta, United, Southwest, Ryanair and WestJet.
it's funny how EICAS has got soo much attention even thou it's absence had nothing to do with both crashes. EICAS was just a political agenda that wasn't even intended to apply to the 737MAX in the first place , we are only talking about this because of the delays with the 737max program No where has EASA and CAAC required EICAS , according to my knowledge anyways. The upgrades that have been required have dealt more with the MCAS software itself, and the issues that where experienced by the pilots during both incidents. No mention of EICAS
An outstanding PR video on behalf of Boeing. BTW, the 737-MAX did not "suffer" crashes; the suffering belonged to the human victims and their families! As to the commonality issue, the proper approach would have been to keep the -8 and -9 grounded until they also had been retrofitted with modern cockpits. But then Boeing might have had to accept that continually repurposing a 1960's era airframe is not a very good idea.
It's funny how EICAS has got soo much attention even thou its absence had nothing to do with both crashes..... The actual fixes that solve the real problems have been ignored but instead there is uproar about something that would not have made a difference in both MAX incidents
@@mmm0404 I disagree, obviously. We will never know if the more centralised error-reporting system might have led the pilots to react differently. The more obvious point is that the change to requirements for certification arose from the crashes' aftermath.
@@michaelg3855 well both crashes did not happen because the pilots did not know what to do. The pilots of ET302 tried turning off the electronic trim tab system, which did deactivate MCAS for a moment. Proof that they were aware of what was going on Unfortunately deactivating the electronic trim tab only left manual trim cranking with could only be operated by hand, Since the engines were still close to full power, the high speed and aerodynamic forces made cranking very difficult, and the stabilizers could not be brought to neutral position. The only way they could bring the stabilizer to neutral position was by reactivating the electronic trim tab, but that also activated MCAS which pushed the aircraft down even further. A flawed MCAS integration and luck of redundancy is what led to both crashes. Now all that has been fixed. If luck of EICAS was the cause of the crash it could have been mandated by the FAA.
its worth noting the crew did not need to "pin point" mcas as the root cause because it showed itself as a run away trim event and the runaway trim memory items sufficed to fix this issue (its literally the procedure currently used) the crew of the lion air crash did do this, but in the end did reengage the auto trim which crashed the plane. the Ethiopian air crash was just wrong place at the wrong time
It showed itself as more than just the runaway trim. They gave us this in the simulator and even knowing it was coming it was mind numbing. Not only was it trim, but over speed clacker, stick shaker, everyone’s PFDs showing different info… it’s sensory overload for sure. Not just a simple trim wheel spinning away on you.
@@jamessayre865 im very aware, in both crashes the pilots treated it as a run away trim event for several mins then only when the pilots froze up in the lion air crash then the aircraft crashed, in the case of the ethopian air crash they disengaged the auto trim and tried to trim the aircraft but to no avail because they were way to fast. mcas worked as designed, its was the faulty maintence of both airlines that caused the crashes
@@jamessayre865 So you couldn't think to trim it back up with the pickle switch, then if it did it again, trim it back up again and kill the trim? Get serious.
@@alhanes5803 have you been through Max Return to Service Simulator Training and re-enacted the same failures they had? I have… I’d like to think I’d just do the stab trim runaway and ignore the rest but there are many many sensory overloading alarms and indications and not just a simple trim runaway. Combine that with lessor experienced pilots in a country without the robust private aviation industry to come up in and only go right through cadet programs and you start to understand. Hell, the FO in one of them got it right and I think the captain undid it. Also once you get going fast you can’t trim manually anymore even with the switches off given the air loads on the stabilizer.
It's a common misconception that MCAS was added to prevent stalling. That's incorrect. It's the pilot's responsibility to prevent a potential stall. MCAS was added to make the MAX handle the same under high power settings as earlier 737's. This was done to eliminate the need for additional pilot training. The airlines wanted their current 737 pilots to be able to just jump into a MAX and fly it.
It wasn't to prevent stalling but it wasn't as simple as keeping it feel the same. 737 MAX's behavior without MCAS was not certifiable because it had negative maneuvering stability at high angle of attack. MCAS was added to make it feel like its predecessor only in that its predecessor was certifiable without it.
The biggest thing to remember is that anytime the US government gets involved things get worse. I don't want a bunch of politicians deciding what commercial jets should or shouldn't have installed. Politicians are corrupt
One key factor that was a key factor for the Max MCAS troubles. That was South West part in twisting the arms of Boeing to hide the MCAS and allow for no extra pilot training. South West are walking the same mined path as airlines like Valuejet, who worship the low cost model above all else, including safety. It lead directly into the question, what kind of skills set do you need to be CEO of SW? Other than being a miser. and a zeal for short term gains.
All 737 MAX aircraft and every other aircraft with a "Glass" cockpit (digital) has an EICAS. EICAS stands for Engine Indicating Crew Alert System. The proposed change that Boeing got the exemption for was a requirement for new systems to tell the pilot what's wrong and also guide the pilot through the steps to fix it instead of having to dig through a book of checklists commonly called the Quick Reference Handbook. Airbus has similar technology on their newer aircraft. Many aircraft currently in operation just generate a caution message or warning message that alerts the crew to an issue. The pilot then has to find and run the proper checklist in a book where the proposed changes would have the plane generate the warning and also pop up the checklist on a screen saving time and helping the pilot.
I think you might be thinking of ECAM for the checklist thing, which isn't a requirement. 737 MAX has a partially modernized flight deck and engine indications, but it retains the master caution system rather than a centralized crew alert system.
Personally, I would have made it so pilots could easily bypass MCAS. Say that a simple hard pull on the stick would disengage MCAS and give pilots control. Crashes may still happen, but it would be pilot error, not the plane itself, and I think that would ease people's minds much more, and be a much easier solution, than adding another machine to the mix when it was a machine that caused the problem in the first place.
@@wilburfinnigan2142 The problem was that the switch to turn off MCAS was the same switch that disabled the electric pitch trim. There was no second switch to turn off just MCAS. The Ethiopian crew did use the switch to disable the electric pitch trim, which also turned off MCAS. The mistake they made was to keep the engines at a high power setting when MCAS malfunctioned. As the airspeed continued to go up it increased the aerodynamic load on the elevator, which made it more and more difficult for them to crank the nose down manually using the trim wheel. Finally in desperation they turned the electric trim back on again to let it help them crank the nose down. Unfortunately they didn't realize that turning the electric trim back on would also reactivate MCAS, which started the airplane nose diving again.
@@joevignolor4u949 I believe they also had continuous stall warnings thanks to the faulty AoA sensor, plus 'unreliable airspeed' - so cutting power would not be the most obvious thing to do.
Flew it on a Christmas trip with Ryanair (EI HEY) to Carcassone, France. It was one of the craft originally off the line in 2019, but parked up all that time since at Boeing. Even allowing for the fleecing mentality of the carrier, it was the most cramped plane I've ever been on. As for the centrally placed double toilet at the rear of the plane, it was a complete joke. I'm a biggish guy but I've never had to squeeze myself into a loo so badly just to have a pee. The toilet at the front was just as constricted. But, as user-ib2vi8ge9g points out, it's a 1960s fuselage and a design that's coming up to sixty years old which, if you'll pardon the pun, is a ridiculous stretch of time in which to keep a mach going. Thinking back, actually, I realise I've not flown a 737 in years. Speaking of fleecing, I hope Boeing get taken to the cleaners big time and that the families of the victims get all the compensation they deserve. What this once great company got up to was simply criminal, in my opinion.
Criminal indeed. Please view the following documentaries on Boeing's malpractices. Assembled with faulty parts: th-cam.com/video/rvkEpstd9os/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/IaWdEtANi-0/w-d-xo.html
I can see why the MAX has been giving this. Take into consideration that the MAX has been operating safely for a couple of years now, which makes the two variants yet to be certified to keep their commonality more of a no brained.
@@米空軍パイロット Planes have all their systems disclosed and pilot trained on them. MCAS was not even mentioned on any training resource and it was poorly executed. The only thing you could do a trip the braker to the electric motor on the jack screw. But when it is under heavy load like a nose dive, the trim wheel wont help you Yo simply cant turn these wheels. See mentour pilot on the sim. He and a F.O. weren able to move the trim wheel if the jet was plunging. Boeing knows that and there is a procedure to "unload the stab". Good luck when figthing against a hiden system. In any E.Jet you can choose the keep all you power assitance and discard any computers in between. That is, you have access to all the control surface, not with thorugh a prehistoric wheel, but using hidrahulics / electric. The 737 design is seriously outdated.
@@38911bytefree You know very little. The electric trim switch right under the pilot's thumb on the control wheel will instantly stop & reverse any MCAS input. Holding the manual trim wheel will also stop MCAS. A runaway trim in any aircraft must be dealt with in seconds, not minutes, & that's why the procedure is required to be MEMORIZED!
I do think congress made the right move here. Commonality increases safety and minimizes mistakes and the anxiety rhat leads to them. The trucking company I drive for has a similar situation. Our fleet is primarily made up of Freightliners. Whatever truck you hop into, you know what to expect in terms of visibility, steering feel and performance. But Freightliner can't deliver the new trucks we need right now, so the company is buying Internationals and Kenworths to replace aging trucks. For me at least, it's a little nerve wracking to hop into a Kenworth or International. The driver position, visibility, buttons and performance are completely different from one another, even if all the trucks operate with the same powertrains. I'm a safer driver in a Freightliner. 737 Max pilots will be safer knowing each plane they fly won't surprise them with different software.
You said the MCAS was not well understood by pilots because it was new, the reality is it was not well understood because the pilots were not told about it. It was intentionally kept secret to avoid the costs of having to retrain pilots.
I think Cory should re explain that item. It's conflicting.
The purpose of MCAS is to be transparent to the pilot and make the MAX fly like the previous “Next Generation” vintage.
@@lymancopps5957 It was a work-around to obtain certification...nothing more - nothing less...
It also wasn't a safe system in general, it was one computer running off of one sensor. Its crazy how they got away with it
@@lymancopps5957 not at all. The purpose of MCAS is to let the pilots FEEL like they can fly MAX like older "Next Generation"
Because of the new engine, MAX has higher risk of stalling if pilot fly like NG. However Boeing still told pilots that they can fly MAX like NG (to avoid 2 hours training)
The only functionality of MCAS is to secretly void pilot's operation if nose pitch is too high
Im disappointed you didnt mention the fact that before the Lion Air crash, Boeing never even informed airlines and pilots about the Existance of Mcas, its a major fact that should be delivered
Only the american pilots knew
Why didn't they crash in Europe and North America
Me too. I'm so disappointed.
@@tsebomoloi3410
No, all qualified pilot's know what runaway trim is.
They all knew. It was in the operators manual. They also knew what runaway trim is and how to react to it. MCAS was designed to work in the background. There is so much disinformation about what it does and why it it is there.
I work underground in a mine. When we change to a new area or machine will sit down for entire days to go through changes and upgrades.
Meanwhile with airlines and Boeing deem a 2hr training course for the Max upgrades unsatisfactory.
Unbelievable!
The think is that Inside the cockpit everything is the same so you have to do the exact same thinks but if they needed a redesign the would be very different, also I think that a mine is a lot more dangerous that a plane
It's way more than a two hour course. They'd be completely different machines. All the points he brings up about model confusion under stress are valid. He should do a video on actual retraining regimen and costs including simulator and maintaining currency so that information is more accessible to people.
Exactly what I think, especially if you think about that it is a safety upgrade that can help pilots in emergency! If pilots don't want to use it is there decision, with it the pilots can decide to use it or not. But if you don't give it to them when they they need it the pilots just can hope luck is on there side. Hopefully EU or Asia side kicks in and force them to Change the mistake
I agree. If I was Boeing trying to sell the max7, max10 I would offer free training for 2 pilots for every planes they buy. The orders are billions of dollars so $100 million in training costs are a drop in the bucket.
Most updated aircraft come with a simple slideshow walking pilots through differences. Boeing did that with the MAX and got flamed for it because of the accidents, but it's pretty common practice when the changes are minor. Airbus did it with the NEO, and Embraer with the E2 family. There really aren't many differences between the MAX and NG, especially now that MCAS' capabilities have been significantly hampered
As a retired aircraft maintenance technician, I can say this does boil down to money. The airlines don't want to hire more pilots, they want to cross train as many as possible. At the company I worked for, we could go to school on as many of the 5-6 aircraft types/models that we had, HOWEVER we were also expected to be proficient in those types! It can be very confusing and stressful trying to keep that much knowledge and differences training in your head. So in my opinion, this will come back to bite the airlines and government in the tail, it may take awhile since they will be new, but it will happen, just like it did with the Max when it came out, it's a bad design and Boeing knows it.
100% .... On the money, Sir.
No you're not
its always about $$$ :)
How the heck can they put something that controls a plane & NOT tell the pilots is totally beyond me.
There are a lot of systems that run autonomously that the pilots don't know about. And that's not the problem either. The problem is that Boeing has kept a lot of details about MCAS from the FAA. For example, it was not stated how much the system intervenes in active flight operations.
The 2 Max crashes weren't famous. They were infamous.
This seems more like Airbus Fanboys are spewing allot of hate because of Boeing new huge sale plus the launch of the the Boeing 797. However if you want the truth just look and read all about the Airbus Crashes that out number Boeing with three crashes for every plane. However leads aviations in crashes and remember the Airbus crashed were Airboobs were caught changing the Black Boxes and how about the A330 that crashed halfway to Europe and the pilots no idea there where in flat spin. List of accidents and incidents involving the Airbus A320 family
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For the entire A320 family, 160 aviation accidents and incidents have occurred (the latest accident with fatalities being Pakistan International Airlines Flight 8303 on 22 May 2020),[1] including 37 hull loss accidents,[2] and a total of 1505 fatalities in 17 fatal accidents.
@@kimberlywilliams7543 they're both very safe manufacturers (except 737MAX before the grounding). a320 and 737ng crash statistics are extremely similar. claiming anything otherwise is denying reality to support a manufacturer that (probably) doesn't even pay you
@@kimberlywilliams7543 you look like hurted dont you? you just cant handle the truth
@@kimberlywilliams7543 found the Boeing employee.
@@kimberlywilliams7543 does it really matter who's company (Boeing/Airbus) is better than others the main focus should be to improve there aircraft so these crashes don't occur in the future
Coby: "Losing the MAX7 could cripple the airline"
Southwest: "Hold our beer, we can cripple ourselves."
Mega oof
lol
pilots didn't know about MCAS because they didn't receive training about it. Training that Boeing decided to hide away to not hinder sales of the plane because they promised it will operate the same as the previous variant with no new training required.
You do realize it's the airline customers that insist on training commonality, and not Boeing, right? Boeing would happily sell training time/services.
The ghost of Jacob van Zanten haunts Boeing to this day
It is in the interest of Boeing to make that happen, though. Otherwise what is the incentive to not say buy an airbus instead, when intensive retraining and different pilot pools are required anyways.
Imagine building an aircraft where the new bigger engines couldn't fit under the wings so had to be hung further forward, unbalancing the aircraft and making it unstable. MCAS was a 'band aid' solution as the new owners were too busy moving the headquarters to Chicago and didn't want to approve the expense of building a new plane to replace the 1960s designed 737. Greed will be the death of the human species.
@@TheOreamnos55 you do realize that airlines are penny pinchers and want to spend as little as possible right?
A friend of mine is a 737 captain and flies the -8 MAX with some regularity. His comment is that the plane needs a little coaxing to start a descent, compared to the -800NG, the 757, and the 767. He attributes that to wing design, which generates a lot of lift.
I fly them too, and I don’t find that to be the case.. however, the newer engines have more residual thrust at idle, and that’s probably what your friend meant. Residual thrust means the idle speed is still producing thrust, and you have to be aware of that as it doesn’t descend as steeply, but there are speed brakes that you could use, or just manage your descent by starting down a few miles sooner. It’s not a big deal. Very easy plane to fly, and handles very nice.. it’s controls seem balanced and more stable than earlier versions.
Most of them are what are called short field performance, very hard to slow them down. But I’m not sure that’s all MAX variants, I only know first hand for the 8200.
It has a laminar flow wing which the airframe was never intended to have, the difference in engine size and weight compounds the C of G and C of L problems, hence all the ridiculous systems to make the damn thing flyable.
Best turned into razor blades asap.
@@rorykeegan1895 I’ve not seen anything to suggest the wing design is different.
@@rorykeegan1895 If you drive a crossover vehicle, there are computers forcing the suspension to make the vehicle behave like a sedan or coupe. If FWD trucks with limited off-road capabilities rolled like crazy on hard, fast turns, people would still buy coupes and sedans like they did 20 years ago.
Personally, I have no problem flying on a MAX. My friend thinks that the MAX is still superior to any Airbus, because all Airbuses are over-automated.
When I am planning a flight the first thing I do is to make sure that the plane is not a 737 Max.
"Why did Congress give the MAX a pass?"
Because the USA is inherently protectionist when its businesses and corporations are threatened. I don't see the US doing the same sort of exemption if the A321 had some issues like MCAS.
Yep there's definitely leniency with their own. But I'm not surprised when it's a huge business that generates huge amounts of money. Every country does it to an extent
@@oNovoRapido The FAA is tougher on Boeing than EASA is on Airbus. And for good reason.
@@danharold3087 Pretty sure those were on the 737NG
@@danharold3087 That's obviously not true, Airbuses aren't falling out of the sky.
Well you are making assumptions, and this situation has never happened to airbus so who know what the faa will do.
After once again having to fly the 737-800 for 5 hours on a flagship carrier it once again reminded me of how uncomfortable plane it is. The extra couple of inches A320 series cabins are wider, really make a difference. Legroom you can alter but seat width is much harder, and the generally 0,5-1 inch per seat in width makes Airbus so much more comforable to travel in..
Yep. I traveled transatlantic(!) - from Shannon Ireland to Boston Massachusetts - in an Airbus A321 Neo LR. And although I am extremely tall 6' 5 it was a pleasant experience. 4 kudos to Aer Lingus!
We all prefer to sit on a 787 when it comes to Boeing haha. Otherwise it might as well be an airbus
Flew 5 hours to Tenerife in both airbus winning this one
@@narrowistheway77 Ever been on an A350? You wouldn't want to go back to the 787... 😉
The legroom is the airline not the plane. The 737 is still the best plane in the medium haul market from my experience.
"Did the 737 Max just become dangerous again?"
I don't see a lot of correlation (if any) between that title and the content in the video. I think you should change the title because in a big part of your video you haven't explained anything dangerous about Congress giving the Max 7 and 10 a waiver but instead you've actually praised Congress for exempting the two Max models.
Imagine compromising safety for securing a company :D
No way, the economical elites won't allow to do that 😂😂😂😂😂
Safety is compromised at all times, unless you’re flitting through life like the president. However, the video makes a logical case that it was the opposite of what you remark about.
Almost Every regulation upgrade has exceptions for cases where the upgrade is unworkable (including cost ).
In this case, keeping familiar might be safer.
@@ED-es2qv Well the experiences we had especially with the 737 max and Boeing in general prove otherwise.
USA™
The American way!
Flew the 737-200 as a FO . Wow solid aircraft, durable, and safe. That standard is gone down today, despite avionics that can virtually do everything, in auto land. Flying now as a old timer, I just get the feeling that my composite aircraft I fly is an experiment for the engineers, and all about money and saving a buck. Safe enough, but … Just my thoughts as a 20k hour guy . Level Wings crew , CAVOK .
The 737-200 has nowhere been near safe. Under the circumstances of its time it was at most average regarding the safety. According to Wikipedia accident list:
B737-100/200: approx. 2900 deaths
B737-300/400/500/700/800/Max: approx. 2350 deaths.
Regarding the numbers build, number of flights and accidents you can still claim that the B732 is not much unsafer than the 737Max at the current time.
@@andreasfDE the pre-max 737 is also the most flown airliner of all time, by a wide margin. If you look at hull losses per flight hour, you will see it near the bottom.
There are some planes that have never had a crash at all, 747-8, 787, A380, A340. If you fly thousands of those for 50 years, you are going to start seeing a loss rate. Obviously the -100 and -200 have more accidents than the newer 737s. Also, flying generally has become safer for all aircraft types with better ATC control and upgrades.
Also, how is it useful to count number of deaths? When a cargo plane crashes is that somehow different than a passenger plane because only 2 or 3 people die? Does the 2 crashed planes that killed 550 people in Tenerife somehow outweigh a dozen smaller planes? Do we rate the 747 as a dangerous plane even though the communications screwup could have happened to any plane that day?
doing youtube full time is a big thing, i give you respect and hope things work out.
Yes!
Another win for safety is that the waiver came with strings attached. Congress gave Boeing this waiver but in exchange Boeing will have to implement the 3rd AOA sensor and the stickshaker cut-out switch in all factory-new MAXs, and retrofit it at their own cost in all the fleet of US-registered MAX of every version. That was a condition that EASA imposed on Boeing for Europe when they re-certified the MAX, and now the same condition will apply to the US.
It's not another win for safety. They built a plane without redundancy. They are just doing the right thing now... After they literally said the pilots caused the plane to crash.
Granting any kind of waiver whatsoever tells me not one lesson has been learned by the US Government, the FAA, and Boeing.
What it tells me is that profits come first, nothing else.
Boeing has been utterly trashed to make Wall Street happy, it deserves to go broke and disappear.
That's no win.
The AOA sensor should be considered entirely separate and required without strings attached at all.
The EICAS should be evaluated completely separately on its own.
Yeah, what he said.
@@tonysu8860 they need to be evaluated separately and then together for the aircraft functions where the are both involved.
Yep, dollars over safety, that's Boeing, Congress, and the FAA. Sigh.
Plus Southwest's "We must have a single fleet" policy, which of course was a major factor in the original failure to actually install MCAS safely and train the pilots on the pre-crash MAX.
Take the train then
Nothing wrong with the smash to pass recall system we have on the 73. Many operators will fly the NG and MAX fleets. Going from EICAS back to the old school master caution will create issues. I flew two different jets with EICAS prior to the 73 and while they’re very helpful they’re not a save all alerting system the general public think they are.
@@sncy5303 no you clearly don’t understand how this works. You can’t just force Boeing to retrofit every aircraft with EICAS thus requiring every new pilot on the aircraft to learn the system. 73 pilots don’t really care either way. What is the significance of EICAS in this situation? What do you think EICAS gives us? How has the NG’s exemplary safety record in the past now come into question when this new buzzword most people don’t understand now is brought up? I’m truly puzzled what the general public think EICAS is capable of. It’s a great system but by no means is the 73 fleet any less safe without it. You couldn’t be more wrong in that opinion.
@@sncy5303 but the electronic checklist isn’t necessarily EICAS. EICAS is just engines instrumentation and crew alerting. Aka you will have the status, fault, caution, or warning message displayed on a DU. This will then direct you to the QRH. (For example EICAS typically gives a specific aural to alert of a caution and one to a warning. Similar to how the system works now with the exception of it being light.) EICAS will say “FADEC 2 FAULT” which only directs you to the QRH to respond and clear the message. ECAM is something airbus popularized that implemented an EICAS and electronic checklist/QRH in one allowing you to follow the checklist directly from the screen. This was then copied and implemented on the B777 and B787 fleets with EICAS and an electronic checklist. The B757/767 fleets have EICAS but do not posses the electronic checklist capability.
@@sncy5303 also, what kills people in emergencies is acting too fast and going straight into the checklist without stabilizing the airplane. Fly the jet and get it into a situation you can safely work the checklist. If the electric trim isn’t doing what you want or responding turn it off, same with any automation. I won’t get into the crashes but the response items for a runaway stab is the same on the NG and MAX and both times were done incorrectly and not in line with the memory items prescribed by Boeing.
I'd rather cancel or change my departure schedule than I have to fly on this plane.
I've had three round trips on Southwest MAX-7's. Imagine that -- three round trips. How do you suppose I'm still alive? The days I flew Southwest, they also flew hundreds of flights with the MAX along with American and United. NONE of those airplanes crashed. How do you suppose that happened? As a passenger I cannot tell any difference between the NG and the MAX -- there's still not enough leg room.
its actually quiet comfortable to fly on. Very quiet compared to NG. I like it
@@Gabrocol i don't think anyone inside that particular Lion Air flight would agree
@@thewaywardwind548 southwest doesn’t fly the max 7 yet
@@maxsaviation9512 it does and has been. Flew one last night, super smooth
Actually, the quality control standard ISO9001 states that any change brings with it both opportunities, AND new risks as well. So it is paramount to make a risk analysis that come with the new changes in the cockpit... There are new bennefits, but also things could go wrong as well from all new reasons. So these free discussions are quite useful, they are in fact making a necessary risk analysis , absolutely useful for improvement. If new risks surpass the beneffits, better not to make the change at all
Airbus had that issue once of their planes.
One A330 crasched in the woods due to such an issue during a flyby on an airshow.
This is something that has to be tested to the limit before implementing it in the fleet.
ISO9000 isn't a "quality control standard", it's about quality _management systems_ . Huuuuge difference. QC is about reactively finding errors (and it doesn't get more reactive than waiting for a plane to crash) whereas a QMS (which incorporates Quality _Assurance_ as well as Quality _Control_ ) is about preventing errors in the first place. Interestingly, the current incarnation of ISO9000, 2015, is the first to embrace the notions of what they term "risk-based thinking"
@@obelic71 except that that's BS, first off it was an A320 not an A330, second off, the pilot didn't study the terrain properly to prepare for the maneuver, as well as completely ignoring all the Airbus and Airline imposed safety regulations on the maneuver and minimums. He sunk way below 100 feet, afaik pitched up too far and then, as evidenced by the black box data, failed to power up the engines quick enough to do a terrain escape maneuver (which was also because he failed to follow procedure and instructions to actually study the surrounding terrain). He crashed the plane into the mountain through sheet incompetence and his disregard of the rules
@@jimbrownza Yes! How does anyone make that mistake??
@@HandmadeDarcy ~~ poor training - or sheer arrogance (along with ignorance) - or all of the above ..
I feel like Delta should just order more of the A321 Neo’s lol
Yeah, Airbus is actually focusing on innovation just like Boeing back in the day, Boeing is all about maintaining profit margins now.
Although I like the 737's aggressive design a lot better.
I have flown in 737 max some times and to me it is an increadibly good plane as a passenger
@@SulixD Thats because of the interior, not the avionics or safety.
If Airbus added the max internals to the NEO, you'd never bat an eye XD
The problem with ordering more A321s is that Airbus's delivery schedule is full and it would take several more years to get those planes than for Boeing Max aircraft to be delivered. Boeing needs to replace its aging 700-NGs ASAP.
You forgot to mention that once the max10 is certified Boeing has a window to update all Max aircraft with the cockpit warning system.. That way they will still have the same commonality!
The amendment allows Boeing three years to retrofit its safety enhancements to all models of the MAX aircraft after the MAX 10 receives certification. From that date, any MAX that is not retrofitted with the improvements will not be able to fly (safely).
They won’t though, they don’t want to do it at all coz it will cost to much money and it’s not a simple plug and play system
@@deanwood1338 They won't have a choice if they want the Max flying in Europe or Canada.
@@YYZatcboy I like to think so dude, but this is Boeing so they will probably weasel out it some how
Still doesn't maintain commonality with the non maxes
I don't think it is possible to do, I remember when 737max was made, they can only make 30% change from 737ng, and they already used that 30%, so if they make more changes, than it will be a brand new type of aircraft, so the pilot will have to study the whole course, not the difference course.
Wouldn't trust Boeing. Seems to me their way of ensuring safety is putting passengers at risk first. Remember the 737 Rudder hardover issues that brought down 2 planes and almost the third, kept saying no problem until the problem is found by investigators and the 2 MAX crashes.
Not to mention the issue with the number 3 engine detaching and bringing down number 4 engine along with it (Happened with 707s and 747, the latter flight 1862)
Airbus doesn’t seem trustworthy either if they also have safety issues and overlook possible flaws in things such as their landing gears.
@user-rv3mq4no9j The rudder hardover issue was super hard to catch though, it boggled the investigators for ages until they managed to catch it with a cold switch/hot hydraulic fluid test and then the switch reversing was discovered.. Mind you, I completely agree on Boeing, when they absorbed McDonnell Douglas they really took on their crummy safety culture and the whole penny-wise-pound-foolish pinching attitude that they and so many other companies have embraced does nothing for my confidence. Then again, neither does the self-created pilot shortage or the airlines lobbying for single pilot crews. Brr.
Sorry to be negative, but you have seriously missed the mark.
EICAS and MCAS are not related. If you instal EICAS, it is easier to find an issue, but not DOES NOT solve the issue with the original MCAS system.
It's not really about the training costs. Airlines didn't want to have two groups of pilots (EICAS and non-EICAS). That's a logistic nightmare for operations.
A 737 with the corrected MCAS system is perfectly safe, or it wouldn't still be flying.
EICAS in all four MAX variants should be the safest option? More training of course, but it would keep matching cockpit designs and you have the system everywhere.
I don't trust anyone wearing a mask.
I'd like to correct a fallacy presented here. I've been a travel agent for 50+ years and once airlines raise fares, even if the reason for that increase (say, fuel cost) ceases to exist I've never seen any airline anywhere to lower their fares other than temporary fare sales.
You left out one major reason for not requiring the new system on the -7 and -10. The law was never intended to impact these aircraft. The implementation deadline was originally set to 12/27/22 because those MAX aircraft were scheduled to be certified by that date. Covid and supply chain issues extended the development and certification process beyond the laws original deadline.
Correct, it only needs to affect other planes because they are the ones that flew into the ground... Not the Max. 😂
@gojitmal1978 it was intended to affect all aircraft developed after the Max series.
@@terrycampbell4387 right, because it was Airbus that crashed those 2 planes... Not Booing... We need to fix what's not broken but not what's broken.
They gifted a lot of money to Congress. Don't let that fool you.
True, but Boeing has made a series of attempts to use politics to save chump change while opening up the risk of seriously harming Boeing. The Military MCAS already had redundancy and manual override, Bombardier was pushed into Airbus by Boeing abusing the trade commission. Canada is pissed and bought f35s and the list goes on. Much of these issues end up being about public confidence, which makes a critical difference. Security is at the core of the airline industry and you don't want a reputation of bucks before safety. Perception will not favour Boeing if a couple more MAXs fall for any reason whatsoever.
We're having super progress! Now were talking about safety. Not doing anything about it, but we're talking! Amazing. That silver lining is such a cope. The 737MAX is still as flawed today as the day it was launched, the main difference is that pilots are now aware of the MCAS and the optional extra vane is comes pre-installed. MCAS can still activate right after take-off, which is a terrible, terrible design. But hey. It's a "win for consumers". Good grief.
I'm not a pilot.. i only work on and operate large equipment from a 100,000 lbs to 2 million lbs and anything that makes trouble shooting easier and simpler to explain is a plus.. having one master caution light for 20 different faults or fault codes than an actual fault display showing up in words what it actually is when time is of the essence is way easier..
I operate an ice cream bicycle and whenever I get an equipment upgrade I spend the afternoon reading the manual and learning the differences, which is far more then what Boeing offers 😂
Well … get some rest !
Then or Than?
@@CougarCat21 who cares I’m dyslexic. Would you yell at deaf people for being deaf?
So who cares about your story too then! Don't want to admit own mistake yet finding fault with me.
@@CougarCat21 when you are dyslexic they’re are know spelleding mistakes, which is my point, you don’t know who is English as a Second Language or who has Dyslexia just the same as you don’t know that someone is deaf, going around correcting people was your mistake from the beginning and not a productive way to live your life. I will defend being Dyslexic and proud of it
Having flown both airplanes with EICAS and without, I believe EICAS does increases safety and simplicity. On the other hand the change would have to come to ALL MAX aircraft both in the line and new ones, otherwise it would be detrimental to safety and increase workloads and training.
Recently i flew from Bergamo to Valencia as a passenger with this airplane and it was a very turbulent and quick descend to the Valencia Airport.Somehow Ive thought that pilots have more problems to controll this aircraft as it does what it wants at some Point .
Let's make it short: money counts more than safety. 😵💫
Well, here in Australia our flagship carrier is Qantas (who have been recently awarded the safest airline in the world). What's their position on the 737 MAX? They've opted not to purchase the 737 MAX but instead, they're going with the Airbus’ A320neo and A220.
That pretty-much sums up how safe Qantas thinks the MAX is.
I doubt that decision is made on safety grounds for it would not be possible to introduce an aircraft with known safety flaws. Quantas' decision was likely owing to the backlog of orders and questioning realistic deliveries of new aircraft. But, let's be real, the A320neo is far superior. Not sure about the A220 compared with Boeing.
Greedy decision makers go behind money.
Qantas doesn’t have the 737 MAX.
@@radhakrishnannair2143 "Greedy decision makers go behind money"
- You must be referring to Boeing and their decision not to tell anyone about the problems with the MAX, in order to make money
@@Cal90208 Correct. And they never will.
I hope the FAA is requiring triple redundancy of the attitude indicators for certification
Use to love Boeing and currently in the process of getting my CPL and I have decided I will be going to the Airbus A320 for my type rating. I just can’t trust Boeing anymore with how dodgy they seem to have gone.
Quite an inflamed sense of self importance eh? We’re waiting for you to fly us around.
@@sumerdatta1476 not quite.. it’s called a valid opinion on a video about a company which is putting pilots like myself and passengers at risk. how is it self importance because I said my feelings on a matter? Not very bright are you?
Why are Boeing putting you and pilots at risk just because of how Doggy they have become? why should that question you? you should do that to Airbus as well with how dodgy they have also become
With everyone being dodgy might as well travel to places via ships
Boeing has been captured by Wall Street and is being squeezed like a cash cow. It is no longer a company where quality conscious employees made sure the work was done properly. These days poor quality is the norm and their jets are becoming too dangerous to ride for my taste. I make sure that I choose airlines accordingly.
The real answer would be dangerous STILL. The underlying issue is never addressed. MCAS should just have been taken out and pilots should simply have gone in for retraining.
Wasn't MCAS introduced because of the unavoidable changes in handling resulting from attaching new, more fuel-efficient but also bigger engines onto an airframe that was originally designed with a small ground clearance for ease of maintenance? If I'm right then MCAS has to be in place on the MAXes.
Plus, because of pressure from certain airlines, Boeing were determined that extra simulator training would not be proposed under any circumstances. It's all about money saving measures, not technology. Which ultimately, of course, is aabout how much the public are prepared to pay for what degree of safety.
watch full video,, this is just a thumbnail bait for airbus fanbois,,,in this video he didnt talk about safty/deficiency of max rather he talked about certification issues due to cockpit system…thesedays evry aviation channel just using thumbnail bait to attract airbus fanbois😅😅😅
@@michaelg3855 Boeing did screw up big time, they messed up , but saving on pilot training costs is not a bad thing itself, even airbus makes sure little/ no added training is required when moving from the 320ceo to the NEO.
@@michaelg3855 A "Wheelie warning" would have done the same thing, alerting the pilots and allowing them to put the nose down a bit if they felt it was necessary. It's not necessary to ignore pilot input and dive into the ground.
@@michaelg3855 yeah, due to the bigger more fuel efficient engines the plane would pitch up higher than usual because the 737’s where originally not designed with this large engines in mind. So to combat that without airlines needing to train there pilots boeing fitted them with mcas that was supposed to pitch the aircraft down, which it in 2 instances did very effectively. but i agree with you, the pilots should just have gotten thier training instead of boeing claiming it’s not needed.
Actually worse is how they solved the MCAS problem by just letting it deactivate for the rest of the flight after it has been overwritten twice...
This software was installed due to the aerodynamic issues it has because of the bigger engine that sits further forward acting with a huge arm when applied full thrust at low speeds.
Tip: it’s not aerodynamically unstable nor does it act like a huge arm
You realize a lot of other aircraft have engines that far forward - even with the ground clearance?
To misquote JFK, you can't software your way out of a problem you hardwared yourself into.
It's not the thrust, it's the aerodynamic lift by engine nacelle, And still, it's not unstable, it only reduce the force increment (not reduce the force itself) pilot need to pull back to increase AOA, which is required by part25. But even without MCAS, it would only occurs after AOA already above still warning line.
That’s not why the system was installed. It was installed to meet certification requirements to do with stick force. Btw, the placement of the engines had zero bearing on the max crashes
@@ingulari3977 the system was installed because it pitches up *more*, not that it is aerodynamically unstable in a stall, by that logic, NG would be unstable
There was no surprise, they were always supposed to get an exemption. The original expectation was that they wouldn't need an extension and all the planes would be certified by then. There is next to no way they would have forced a second cockpit and a type split, that creates to many street issues of it's own
I still think that having several different versions of the 737 cockpit in the fleet would be a bad thing. When you realize that Southwest pilots can fly several different versions of 737 in A SINGLE DAY, having several different versions of cockpit annunciators could make the situation MORE DANGEROUS.
As long as they have the extra AOA sensors and the neutered MCAS, I think they will be fine.
Toby your channel deserves more attention by anyone. You are awesome man, I appreciate you. And I learned something new now!
Instead of EICAS (pronounced eye-kas), the 737 uses 56 year old backlit stencil technology! It's old, but it works.
Ah yes......the old six-packs. Dating all the way back to the beginning of the 737.
Although I appreciate the info, the lack of tribal knowledge on how EICAS is actually pronounced is off-putting. It’s like we’re having an outsider tell us our news. But again, good industry info.
@@clevelandaeromotive i guess for the beginners perhaps, new people are introduced to aviation each day..............the newer community will need a thorough up ig, or else they may go on butchering names of aviation terms
True statement
@@clevelandaeromotive I don't understand. Your lack of knowledge is off-putting? I guess it can be for anyone. No idea what the outsider comment is about. Best thing for lack of knowledge is education. You're welcome!
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Seems your code is only giving me 5% off. I know you said up to 40% but I am not getting that on anything I want. What product is 40% off? Maybe be more specific about your available discounts.
Yep. Mine too. It's been around the world in and out of my pocket for years.
Actually, the flight crew of the LionAir crash **did** correctly diagnose that MCAS was the problem, and they responded per the QRH (by selecting "Stab Trim Cutout" as directed). But among the million or so things that Boeing was either disingenuous about or just flat-out lying, they neglected to mention that if the airspeed was already above a certain dot, it would be physically impossible to manually re-trim the aircraft because of the excessive airflow over the control surfaces. Eventually they gave up and RE-ENGAGED THE MCAS, which of course only made things worse.
"MCAS is designed to automatically pitch the nose of the plane down when it's in danger of stalling"
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)
The system was primarily implemented to make the aircraft feel and preform similar enough to a standard 737 as to avoid procuring a different "Type Rating Certificate" which would cause substantial additional expense to airlines in pilot training.
This is cause by the fact that the MAX8 uses larger engines which required them to be mounter mor forward and up higher to make ground clearance. This change in engine size and position caused a "pitch up" moment during heavy thrust too far out of character with the regular 737 hence MCAS was born.
I disagree that this makes the fleet safer. I think it's a pretty clear case of money over safety once again, and we all know how that goes.
Also just a FYI Coby, usually EICAS is pronounced like ICAS - Eye-CAS, rather than EeCAS
Actually MCAS existed because of the KC46 which is a Boeing 767-200 fuel tanker. It was meant to help the aircraft cope with shifts in CG as it fueled other aircraft on mission.
Ah but on the Max they depended on a single sensor where on the KC's they had multiple inputs. Also they are not even based on the same architecture, the KC46 is a modified wide body 767 while the Max is a narrow body 757. The KC46 being a military craft did not have the energy savings requirements the commercial airlines demanded, and do not have to meet the same certification standards the FAA requires for passenger jets, so the engines are different. Where the new energy efficient engines on the Max passenger jets are much larger and had to be mounted almost entirely forward of the wings and higher to avoid dragging them on the runway, thus changing the aerodynamics entirely to a more unstable configuration that required dependency on MCAS. This is comparing apples to oranges.
@@MAtildaMortuaryserver your all over the place on that. The max is a 737 not a 757. My comment is in response to Coby saying that no other Boeing aircraft used or uses MCAS. The 737 MAX requires MCAS because of the larger heavier engines p
Being placed more forward and higher on the main wing due to low ground clearance on the 737. The KC46 needs it due to shifting fuel loads as it does its mission. The 737 max needs it because of the different location of the engines on the max which makes it fly different to the 737NG. MCAS was installed on the 737 Max to make it exhibit the same Flight characteristics as the 737NG.
@@antonyh37 Sorry about that, meant 737, but the bottom line is the configuration of the Max is inherently unstable which is why the MCAS was required. It was just really poor judgement on the part of Boeing to not use redundant sensors, to not require better training for pilots, thought that really was the FAA bowing to pressure to exceed to demands from Boeing and the airlines, as well as certain political entities. Funny what the profit motive can make people do. About the time Boeing shifted it's headquarters to Chicago from Seattle the bean counters took over and profit became the highest priority. Now they are moving to Arlington in Virginia presumably because that is the nexus of corporate/government rule in the US now. It is a sad state when profit takes precedent over people's lives. Sadder when government allows it. I have not flown on a Max and never will. Boeing deserves to go the way of Chrysler.
I sort of agree. I think having a common cockpit across Max variants is the only sane option.
I think the mistake was allowing the Max to keep the same cockpit as previous 737s was the critical mistake. Basically, Boeing have does this on every new generation of 737s, so the Max hasn't changed much from a 1960s 737. If they'd been forced to update the Max cockpit from the NG and put in modern safety systems, there would obviously have been training required for NG pilots to move to the Max, but it would placed a clear delineation between the two planes. It would also have meant that there would have been no hidden MCAS deleted from the pilot manuals, so the two crashes would most likely have never happened.
On the other hand the 737 is a really old design. Boeing has trouble completing in today's market against airbus today, so the 737 Max family is probably the last 737 lineup we will see, considering Boeing almost has to move into a clean sheet design, we're they could implement a modern cockpit. Forcing this system into 737 max 7 & 10 would just cut those two off from the rest of the family. Keeping all 737s the same is probably the best option until Boeing maybe strings together a 737 and 757 replacement, completing the modern Boeing lineup (somewhat at least)
@@kalle5548 I mean really, they should have moved to a clean sheet design rather than a quick update of the 737. But having made poor decision to produce another iteration of the 737, they should have been told to make it comply with modern safety standards. But I agree having one set of safety equipment for the 8 & 9, and a different set for the 7 & 10 would make no sense at all.
In my opinion the last justification issn't one.
If you think it till the end, Boeing can never upgrade their cockpit of the 737 because thousands of pilots had flown the old layout for years and if you change it they might get confussed,...
Before I flew the 737 I was flying Embraer Aircraft, which has EICAS, and it’s philosophy is very straight forward and easy to use, I haven’t flown Airbus, but it seems like it’s pretty much the same; everybody in the industry mocks Boeing Pilots for the rudimentary cockpit and 1960’s philosophy, back then EICAS wasn’t a thing, but the arrangement in the cockpit to make everything have a logic is pretty ingenious, and every Boeing pilot is trained to use it that way since the 60s, and everyone is pretty much used to fly those airplanes that way.
I think you should have explained what the EICAS is about; parto of it is essentially a computer representation of every system malfunction in one screen, or at least, that’s what the 737 lacks in comparison to other “more modern” Aircraft, and not in everything, because the newer models already have the “EI” part of “EICAS” (engine-indicating), it’s the CAS that is not represented on a screen (Crew-Alerting System), but it is represented in two separate panels called the “RECALL” panels/switch.
EICAS has the added ability to show any malfunction in a list of items in one screen, where the philosophy on the 737 fleet uses two panels on the glareshield (one for each pilot) with lights that point to a system whether it is malfunctioning or in an abnormal configuration, but it is pretty straight forward to use.
Now, in my own experience, I was reluctant when I made the switch from the Embraer more modern cockpit to the 737 cockpit, and I made the switch to the classics (300-500 variant), but the way the 737 cockpit is laid out is very intuitive, so I can see why it could actually be a risk for safety to have different philosophies for flying the same aircraft, they would have to redesign the whole cockpit for something that is not worth it, because the current system works perfectly, it’s not just about placing another screen.
Possibly the biggest flaw I see on the 737 MAX is the fact that they use pretty much the same airframe for more powerful and bigger engines, and it relies a lot on computers to calibrate its aerodynamics to make it reliable, which is what went wrong with the whole MCAS fiasco, and the fact that they fixed the system and trained the pilots on it doesn’t make up for the fact that that airframe is old, and relies too much on computers, but nowadays which aircraft is not.
Cheers!
I was on a southwest 737 700 last night... It was awesome too.... late flight from Vegas, only 60 people onboard.. got my own whole aisle
A system somewhat similar to MCAS, the stick nudger, had been installed on the B707-400 due to a tendency to pitch up while approaching a stall in Flaps 1 config. Also this system had inputs into the elevator and not the stabilizer, it’s function is similar to MCAS: When active it pushes the control column forward and also reduces the load on the column.
The "stick nudger" on the 707 was nothing at all like MCAS, not even close. Without MCAS the 737 Max "Unflyable Pig Series" is a complete death trap. Ask Lion and Ethiopian.
@@rorykeegan1895 Talkin chit again as the first crashed max had been recovered the previous day by a pilot that knew how to fly a plane, and EASA certified the plane without the MCAS system !!! Know what you are babbling about !!!
Even the A-10 has a system similar to MCAS. It's called SAS for Stability Augmentation System. It's purpose is to compensate for the tendency of the A-10's nose to come up when the gun is fired. Without SAS during a long burst only the first few shots would hit the target. Then as the burst continues the subsequent shots will go higher and higher over the target. SAS senses that the nose is going up and then it flutters the elevator to hold the nose down to keep the gun on target throughout the entire burst. Unlike MCAS SAS uses a gyro to sense the pitch changes instead of using an AOA sensor.
@@rorykeegan1895
Um, Greg Fieth is world's apart on intelligence from you Hoss.
Maybe you should hear what he has to say about who crashed these two aircraft.
@@wilburfinnigan2142
100% correct Wilbur. 👍
MCAS has appeared on another Boeing Jet prior to the MAX. It was put on the KC46 (767 tanker) first. It also had built in redundancy and two sensor verification on that application.
There's nothing wrong with MCAS; Boeing just didn't implement it properly on the MAX in a stupid attempt to circumvent pilots needing extra instruction. The unforgivable thing is that Boeing ruthlessly deleted redundancy to be able to circumvent that extra instruction, knowing that they broke the rules with that and therefore just as knowingly put crews and passengers in danger.
@TJ Roelsma the plane doesn't NEED MCAS at all. It was put there to make it perform like thr NGs initially with a g meter reading and AOA. But as you said Boeing pulled a Boeing and the rest is history. The plane can fly perfectly safe without MCAS! As Cobey pointed out the additional training costs associated with the MAX not flying exactly like the NG as Boeing promised is what ultimately drove its inclusion.
@@tjroelsma Having to have MCAS to make a plane flyable in the first place tells you the basic design is a pigs ear.
@@NovejSpeed3 It does use two AoA sensors now, and an artificial calculated horizon. This gives majority logic to calculate elevator trim to then offset the CG. The center of gravity is no longer neutral due to longer pylons and forward placement of engines. So yes the max does need constant trim.
@@rorykeegan1895 I would have put it a bit more subtle, but yeah, it's far from optimal. Boeing tried one time too many to breathe new life into the old airframe that is the 737 and it backfired on them.
Right move. First, Congress imposed that deadline with the expectation that the Max-7 and MAX10 would be certified by that date and that new aircraft would have this requirement. Extending the deadline keeps that in place. Whether that was a good call is debatable, but if they grandfathering of aircraft was intended, the actual date is irrelevant. BTW, if it's so important, why not make it immediately effective or even mandate older aircraft be retrofitted?
Second, they also mandated a third pitot on ALL aircraft, giving about two years for existing aircraft to be retrofitted. This is arguably more important and illustrates how a government requires implementing what they believe to be a truly necessary action/device.
this video makes 0 sense.
It's sounds more like an advertisement for Boeing.
The plane is "safe and effective"
Good luck going full time. A few comments on your video. Differing opinions, not conflicting opinions, because they're from different sources. the millions of dollars spent/required is so small, relative to the billions of dollars of profit airlines and boeing earn annually. The extra hours of training are minimal in the long run when all things are considered. The short term gain may not be a benefit in the long run, especially if safety is involved. A consistent cockpit is probably best for pilots, but when looked at from point of view for safety, maybe the Max 8 and 9s should not have been exempt in the first place. If both Max 8 and 9s cockpits were redesigned, non-exempt, then the 7s and 10s would've been "consistent" with the 8s. Seems like a poor initial decision that caused this splinter.
Exactly this. The Max variants should never have come into existence in the first place and Boeing should have developed a fresh new aircraft to meet the needs of today’s airlines but because that was too expensive for their tastes they slapped the engines on an old and woefully outdated airframe and basically ended up with an aerodynamically flawed Frankenstein aircraft so they decided to address a hardware design flaw with an inadequate software “solution.” Which is still inadequate to this day. Unlike the Airbus A320 variants the 737 max versions only has two AoA sensors that MCAS gets its information from. As I understand it, when MCAS gets two different readings from the two AoA sensors because one is damaged it has no way to know which one is faulty so it hands it back to the human pilots to solve. If there were three, it could just look at which two are given the same data and conclude that the one that isn’t matching up with the other two is malfunctioning.
It’s an absolute shambles and a disgrace that by asking for the excemption Boeing was asking for permission to make the Max family less safe than they could be and flashed enough cash at congress to allow it. But I have a personal bias in this situation because some of my best friends are 737 pilots who routinely fly the Max 8 and I’m not okay with this.
@@mikoto7693 you sound like an eighth grade Airbus fanboy!
@@sweynforkbeardtraindude oh no we've got a Boeing dickrider here 🤡
@@matphil far from it.
@@sweynforkbeardtraindude that's good to know considering they are literally murderers
A point that wasn't really mentioned is that sure, EICAS will make the aircraft safer, but that doesn't mean that the 737 without EICAS is not safe. The 737 has been flying for decades and is considered an incredibly safe aircraft today.
I understand your point, but your treating all the 737s as the same… they are not. The max had some significant changes from the NG which is why systems like MCAS had to be added. So you have to Treat the Max differently.
It's not an issue with 737 jets in general, just the Max as they are the first (and only to date?) to have the MCAS system, which caused the crashes of the two jets in the first place.
Yes this is true, the max is different, but we're talking about a fault reporting system. The old master caution style fault reporting has been used successfully for decades, even in the 737 classic where there was a lot less automation. My point is just that although EICAS is safer, of course, the current 737 fault reporting is perfectly safe in and of itself.
It is a different aircraft now. That's the problem...
@@Dylanvignola congress and the FAA think they need a better system.
Good job Coby, very well explained. It all boils down to money & politics.
And not looking out for safety. They just wanna be the best when they can actually compete against the a350. The 777x tried so hard to be a350XII and yet it’s always so far
@@RAVIOLIdS Clarify your nonsensical babble, please!
Southwest relies on commonality in it's fleet, so that any of it's pilots can fly on any flight. That's why MCAS exists - literally. Also, Southwest put a lot of pressure and may have been complicit in the events that lead to those two crashes.
The amount of people that don't understand why MCAS was deemed necessary is crazy to me. You hit the nail on the head, well done. Common aircraft behavior/feel, not aircraft safety.
You can't blame it on the airline... You blame the plane maker because they want the money and they lied. Stop simping for Booing.
@@Timpon_Dorz Can certainly blame it on Southwest. It was their insistence that the Max be 'exactly like the 737NG' so that NO pilot simulator time was required, that pushed Boeing into the shitshow that was their implementation of MCAS. Agreed Boeing should not have allowed themselves to be pushed into such a blatant disregard of safe practice by one intransigent customer. Plenty of blame to go around.
But MCAS wasn't only 'just' so that Max would feel like a NG. It was essential to permit the Max to be certified - there is an aeronautical requirement that stick forces must increase with deviation from normal flight. With the Max, under certain conditions of high power and steep angle of attack, the nose would continue to rise further without any increased pull on the stick - this is not permissible. Hence MCAS.
@@cr10001 lol you are dumb af... Just because Southwest wants something, Booing didn't have to comply... They complied with southwest to make money... How much money did they make?
Sorry SW is not to blame... Booing is the one who wanted the business... Doesn't matter who wishes something, it's the plane makers fault for delivering murdering machines.
I have almost 20,000 hours in the 737NG series, not once have I ever had a need for an ECAS system.
No commercial aircraft should need MCAS or anything like it to stay flyable. The crews and passengers of both Lion and Ethiopian never had a chance thanks entirely to Boeing's shortcuts, lying and money grabbing.
@@rorykeegan1895 737s are flyable without MCAS. It was added to make the 737Max react like a 737NG so the pilots needed just a short theoretical training session not expensive hours in the simulator to cope with the differences.
Congrats on doing TH-cam full time, keep it up man, love the videos :)
Do you think that Southwest's point to point system was a big part of the problem with the holiday disaster? I've heard that due to the cascading cancellations, pilots and planes were often not where they needed to be and this caused Southwest to have to cancel flights. Were airlines that use the hub and spoke system at an advantage?
Southwest has an old software system that performs rescheduling and it couldn't handle the increased number of reschedulings needed due to the storm and so many employees unable to get to work or get there on time so it crashed. They couldn't do it manually so they shut down totally to reset everything.
Were airlines that use the hub and spoke system at an advantage? Yes! The cascading cancellations were a direct result of the Southwest's point to point scheduling system. Given that we are going to see more frequent and more severe disrutions caused by climate degradation, Sothwest's system will break down more frequently and will cause much more damage than we have seen this time. Improving the scheduling system will never overcome this fundamental flaw.
No. I work in the operations center of a US airline, and I believe this is overrated. Planes don't shuttle back and forth nearly as much as they used to, among any carrier. More importantly to this particular meltdown, CREW don't shuttle back and forth all that much. Southwest's operation collapsing would have happened regardless of whether they operated point-to-point. Their tech stack is completely obsolete and that's the fundamental cause. Plenty of point-to-point operations recovered easily from that storm, and plenty of hub-and-spoke operations had serious issues with it. It all comes down to pre-planning, and then flexibility on the day of. Southwest had neither and paid the price. Some others only had one, and took more time than needed to recover. Others had both and were recovered as soon as the weather was good.
@@DaveMiller2 Well, maybe the rescheduling problem did not have a solution
@@j11994466s Stop!
Turns out, folks sitting at the very top, are not really the geniuses we think they are. They are more corrupt, greedy and mean. And public safety and prosperity is definitely not a priority for all the law makers. It is what it is. What a world we live in.
Good stuff, Coby. Southwest OWNS the 737. The flight deck is designed and built for them. And every other carrier has to live with it. As fair as efficiency bringing down prices. That has never happened. Prices will always continue to rise; that's economics.
As a mechanic EICAS is unbelievably helpful. I think every plane should have one
Pilots can’t misunderstand a system they were never told about. Once we knew about the system, and had a chance to practice the malfunction in the simulator, I was fine flying the Max. Have been practicing various runaway trim scenarios since I flew the 727. We even practiced with the horizontal stab so overloaded that you had to release som e nose up pressure, trim up, pull up, and repeat. Of course if you leave takeoff power set while almost level, the excess speed above Vne will load the manual trim even more.
Your a 737 pilot?? That’s very cool!
Practicing for malfunctions is fine but preventing them from happening in the first place is better. Airline pilots shouldn't have to deal with situations where suddenly they see the horizon disappearing above the top of the windscreen when they are just 1,000 feet off the ground. Flying in a simulator or on a training flight isn't the same as a real emergency. In a real emergency you can go from an normal flight situation to a deadly emergency in just a few seconds. At that point you will be in shock and your system will start pumping you full with adrenalin. Different people will react differently in a situation like that. The average airline pilot may be very good but he's not a test pilot like Neil Armstrong. Armstrong was special because he could think at a very high level when he was under intense pressure. His brain would continue to process information and function logically even when his body's natural physiological responses were working against him. During the thruster malfunction on Gemini 8 and during the landing approach on Apollo 11 his respiration and heart rates were about twice what was normal. On Apollo 11 he had to contend with program alarms and navigation errors where he had to overfly a crater and a bolder field while low on propellants. Even with all that pressure he was able to think his way out of trouble and save the mission. Not many people, even an excellent airline pilot, could have done that.
@@joevignolor4u949 your point seems a bit scathed ngl, at the end of it you compared an excellent airline pilot to Neil Armstrong, which I know u were talking about pilots being under pressure, but at that point it kinda differs from what everyone is talking about specifically. Your completely right about how we should proactively fix problems so that emergencies don’t arise, but on your point about pilots reacting to emergencies, the training they get is meant to prepare them for how to react and proceed in an emergency situation, just saying.
Trouble is over time these planes will proliferate around the globe under less than ideal scenarios.
The two crashes were not with US based pilots.
You mean when the plane is trimmed in a dive, simply cutting the engines, letting it dive even more and strong arms allows you to undo that trimming.
I have always avoided flying on the 737 max, even if I have to buy a more expensive ticket on an alternate airline.
I flew in one this past summer.
It’s was the smoothest, quietist, most gentle flight from Seattle to Alaska.
I was terrified at first, but it went well. 🤷♀️ I had a pilot friend I was messaging the whole time who was sharing safety information and tracking the flight on radar.
Congratulations! You have earned yourself a new subscriber that is interested the flight industry.
I am a trauma physician and a GA pilot. Emergencies always seem to occur at the worst possible times, like too close to the ground. Emergencies are rare and humans become complacent with Mother Nature taking advantage. Aircraft systems should be commonized just like usbc cables.
Why did Congress approve the change? Campaign $ in the past, $ today, and $ in the future.
Didn't the FAA say that cockpit changes will have to be implemented across all MAXes 3 years after the MAX 10 is certified?
they did all MAX jets will require the cockpit features once the max 10 has spent a few years in service i beleive (or something along those lines)
Yes he forgot to say that!! Which is very important..
I feel like “it might confuse pilots” was used on safety equipment for automobiles at some point.
Not going to sell many of the 7 and 10 versions in Europe as they won't be allowed over here without the Ecas system as I understand it.
Do you know any different 😏
@@ingulari3977 did you wear your depends? These planes are extremely safe. The problem with the two crashes were really crews that were not experienced enough to fly these advanced airplanes. The carriers get cheap on purchasing training for the new airplanes and and their crews don't have enough flight hours. Yes, Boeing could have done better. However, does Tesla offer training for their advanced cars? Plenty of crashes there.
@@ingulari3977 I have worked in the aviation industry for over 40 years. It's not BS.
@@usnchief1339 This guy comparing cars to planes ... smh. These broken planes were advertised for needing minimum to no additional training to operate it, so Boeing did not mention the new MCAS system. You can't "train" what's not being mentioned. And your so called "extremely safe" planes did not cross-check the faulty sensor data nor had any redundancy, that's some shitty design. And lastly corrupt Boeing overworked their employees which resulted in installing faulty sensors in the first place.
@@SquawkHub ok...lol. 1.3 million die in vehicles annually. Less than 1000 die in aviation accidents. Flying, even in Russian airplanes, is safer than driving.
@@usnchief1339 and why is that car to aviation comparison relevant?
Back to aviation: In the last 3 years we had 3 major accidents of bigger commercial aircrafts (> 100 killed) with a technical issue as the main reason for the crash: 1x 737-89P, 2x 737 MAX8
And the 2nd 737 MAX crash was the most tragic accidents of the aviation industry in the last decade. Boeing knew that the MCAS in combination with a missing training/information for the pilots was the reason for the first accident and they did nothing to prevent it from happening again. :(
Actually MCAS was not introduced with the 737-MAX, as it was already installed on the KC-46 (a military 767 variant). The difference is that on the KC-46 it was installed properly with redundancy at data from independent sources.
I fundementally disagree with a number of your comments. First, most pilots were not aware that MCAS had been installed on the 737 MAX until the two tragic accidents. They had had no training to cope with an out of control MCAS activativation. MCAS was installed by Boeing because they had to install larger engines on the MAX. This necessitated moving the enginges forward because of the low ground clearance of the aircraft. As a result the Centre of Gravity was moved forward,leading to increased risk of a pitch up. MCAS was designed to counteract this. You make no mention that the Max had only two Angle of Attack indicators which means if one is defective then you don’t know which one is giving a correct reading. Airbus has three AOAs to give a better indication if one is defective.
I traveled on the MAX 8 three times last month after being a consistent passenger on the a320 series for years. Really enjoyed the experience.
The Max Series is a huge piece of pooh. The C of G and C of L are all wrong, hence all the stupid systems to keep the piece of pooh in the air. Personally, I'd rather walk.
@@rorykeegan1895 the Max 8 engines are positioned too forward, a bad design coupled with a flawed MCAS system. The end result is a very dangerous plane, one that I also want to avoid!
@Leo H The engines are MORE forward, not TOO forward. MCAS addressed a handling difference (in very specific circumstances) to be common with the NG. It is not a safety system. The design is stable and safe (the EASA specifically tested stability without MCAS during their recertification process). MCAS is no longer flawed either. I hope you're aware it's 2023 not 2019, they've been flying for 2.5 years accident-free with many more in the skies than before.
@@rorykeegan1895 You have not a clue what in the he'll you are talking about !!! DUUUUH!!!!!
Personally, I prefer the 320neo or 321 than the max 8, which is quieter and a little more stable, although the older 737 2013-2018, model is a good aircraft.
I hope that they will slowly develop the new EICAS feature on all variants while the MAXs are still flowing the economy without crashes. And then release training programs before the update was released.
But this would surely involve a phased rollout of the new 737-MAX cockpit physical layout, which in turn would mean the loss of commonality. And some pilots clearly believe (sincerely, one must assume) that they are not mentally equipped to cope with this.
Every modern airliner has an EICAS. Except the 737.
You can not "slowly implement" an EICAS it would require a massive rework of the airplanes systems and software, therefore making it a different type of aircraft in terms of type rating because you would handle it differently than the other 737s.
That's what the regulation from the FAA initially would've been there for but when they let the 737 slide I unfortunately will never have a system like that
The piece that has really always been missing in flight automation is the ability for flight systems to self diagnose conflicting flight data to pinpoint and highlight exact system malfunction throughout. So this is a money decision that is just another step backward.
The deadline for making these changes was made by Congress with Boeing in mind. They expected that Boeing would be able to certify all 737 Max variants by the deadline. These changes were never intended to apply to the 737 Max family. As mentioned if made to conform pilots would need different type ratings between the variants and no airline wants to deal with that. I don’t believe the threat to cancel the -7 and -10 if an exemption wasn’t made was empty as it would cause a reduction in orders and a dwindling profit margin.
I already said that boeing and airbus have a duopoly in the aviation market and they certainly make it impossible for new players to enter and can do anything to prevent losses . Now safety and consumer is not the biggest priority for boeing .
Congrats on going full-time Coby. I will do my best to support you going forward.
I don't trust the Max family, avoiding booking flights on them.
They faced more scrutiny than any other aircraft in history besides maybe the dc-10. I can assure you that they are the single safest airplanes in the sky now.
@@Zamboni-ms5iq I wish I shared your enthusiasm, but I don't....
Not that pilots not well understood MCAS, but the fact that boeing tried to hid it from everyone in order to market MAX to airlines as perfectly the same to older 737 and assured them there's no need to retrain pilots
I still feel the problem isn't EICAS (although the issues are important), the real problem continues to be MCAS.
MCAS is necessary because of a Boeing decision that the plane's default wing configuration should be optimized for cruising flight, but that makes the plane unstable at slower speeds... The speeds when the aircraft is taking off or landing. Perhaps because of the dynamics of flying a plane with high thrust the crashes didn't happen taking off but happened when engines were at low throttle landing. MCAS was installed by default with data input from only 2 sensors which means that when there is a conflict in data received, the computer is unable to resolve the conflict. Boeing engineers actually realized this was a potential problem and reportedly Boeing offered an option to install a 3rd sensor based on generating an artificial attitude calculation for something like $20,000 (likely overpriced) to address this problem of conflicting data and breaking a tie instead of making it a standard and default installation.
This means that the plane is least stable and dangerous at the moments during landing when the plane is at low altitude and pilots have little to no reaction time to respond to an unexpected event.
Reportedly, installation of the 3rd sensor which was always an option was part of the resolution to the MCAS problem.
In the first place, it's shameful that this common sense option wasn't a standard, default part of the system from the beginning. It's not hard to understand how critically important these sensors can be, especially if you're not going to train pilots properly for how to recognize and respond to an MCAS anomaly especially if you have only a second or 2 to recognize and respond to the problem at a very low altitude at low speed. The cost to Boeing to install the sensor is probably next to nothing and nowhere close to the $20,000 charge to an airline to include it.
But the other issue is to recognize that MCAS is there to address a fundamental flaw of the plane's design operating at a specific time considered most dangerous in operating the plane. Can we be sure that MCAS is infallible? Would pilot training really be sufficient to save the plane if MCAS failed again? Is there any other combination of anomalies that could doom the aircraft?
The point is that MCAS is only a recent development, to make the plane utterly rely on fly-by-wire during takeoff and landing. It will require the type of maintenance usually associated with military aircraft designed to be inherently unstable like the F-16 which has been operating fine for decades but AFAIK has not been designed into commercial aircraft. And, previous Boeing and current Airbus designs AFAIK don't require MCAS or anything like that to operate, plane wingforms have been altered a number of different ways during flight to remain stable and reliable through all stages of flight. Did Boeing introduce an unnecessary new requirement to fly safely?
Cheaper fuel costs never is relayed on to the customer. If fuel returns to pre COVID prices, ticket cost would remain the same and you still would not get one free checked bag.
I think in the end, all 737 MAX planes will get the new EICAS system. Reason: Europe's EASA and China's CAAC will require the upgrade. I expect Boeing to split the cost of the upgrade between itself and the airlines that bought a large number of 737 MAX planes recently, like Delta, United, Southwest, Ryanair and WestJet.
it's funny how EICAS has got soo much attention even thou it's absence had nothing to do with both crashes.
EICAS was just a political agenda that wasn't even intended to apply to the 737MAX in the first place , we are only talking about this because of the delays with the 737max program
No where has EASA and CAAC required EICAS , according to my knowledge anyways.
The upgrades that have been required have dealt more with the MCAS software itself, and the issues that where experienced by the pilots during both incidents. No mention of EICAS
An outstanding PR video on behalf of Boeing. BTW, the 737-MAX did not "suffer" crashes; the suffering belonged to the human victims and their families!
As to the commonality issue, the proper approach would have been to keep the -8 and -9 grounded until they also had been retrofitted with modern cockpits. But then Boeing might have had to accept that continually repurposing a 1960's era airframe is not a very good idea.
It's funny how EICAS has got soo much attention even thou its absence had nothing to do with both crashes.....
The actual fixes that solve the real problems have been ignored but instead there is uproar about something that would not have made a difference in both MAX incidents
@@mmm0404 I disagree, obviously. We will never know if the more centralised error-reporting system might have led the pilots to react differently. The more obvious point is that the change to requirements for certification arose from the crashes' aftermath.
@@michaelg3855 well both crashes did not happen because the pilots did not know what to do. The pilots of ET302 tried turning off the electronic trim tab system, which did deactivate MCAS for a moment. Proof that they were aware of what was going on
Unfortunately deactivating the electronic trim tab only left manual trim cranking with could only be operated by hand,
Since the engines were still close to full power, the high speed and aerodynamic forces made cranking very difficult, and the stabilizers could not be brought to neutral position.
The only way they could bring the stabilizer to neutral position was by reactivating the electronic trim tab, but that also activated MCAS which pushed the aircraft down even further.
A flawed MCAS integration and luck of redundancy is what led to both crashes. Now all that has been fixed.
If luck of EICAS was the cause of the crash it could have been mandated by the FAA.
its worth noting the crew did not need to "pin point" mcas as the root cause because it showed itself as a run away trim event and the runaway trim memory items sufficed to fix this issue (its literally the procedure currently used) the crew of the lion air crash did do this, but in the end did reengage the auto trim which crashed the plane. the Ethiopian air crash was just wrong place at the wrong time
It showed itself as more than just the runaway trim. They gave us this in the simulator and even knowing it was coming it was mind numbing. Not only was it trim, but over speed clacker, stick shaker, everyone’s PFDs showing different info… it’s sensory overload for sure. Not just a simple trim wheel spinning away on you.
@@jamessayre865 im very aware, in both crashes the pilots treated it as a run away trim event for several mins then only when the pilots froze up in the lion air crash then the aircraft crashed, in the case of the ethopian air crash they disengaged the auto trim and tried to trim the aircraft but to no avail because they were way to fast. mcas worked as designed, its was the faulty maintence of both airlines that caused the crashes
@@jamessayre865
So you couldn't think to trim it back up with the pickle switch, then if it did it again, trim it back up again and kill the trim?
Get serious.
@@mrunlucky4085
Partly right.
@@alhanes5803 have you been through Max Return to Service Simulator Training and re-enacted the same failures they had? I have… I’d like to think I’d just do the stab trim runaway and ignore the rest but there are many many sensory overloading alarms and indications and not just a simple trim runaway. Combine that with lessor experienced pilots in a country without the robust private aviation industry to come up in and only go right through cadet programs and you start to understand. Hell, the FO in one of them got it right and I think the captain undid it. Also once you get going fast you can’t trim manually anymore even with the switches off given the air loads on the stabilizer.
It's a common misconception that MCAS was added to prevent stalling. That's incorrect. It's the pilot's responsibility to prevent a potential stall. MCAS was added to make the MAX handle the same under high power settings as earlier 737's. This was done to eliminate the need for additional pilot training. The airlines wanted their current 737 pilots to be able to just jump into a MAX and fly it.
It wasn't to prevent stalling but it wasn't as simple as keeping it feel the same. 737 MAX's behavior without MCAS was not certifiable because it had negative maneuvering stability at high angle of attack. MCAS was added to make it feel like its predecessor only in that its predecessor was certifiable without it.
The biggest thing to remember is that anytime the US government gets involved things get worse. I don't want a bunch of politicians deciding what commercial jets should or shouldn't have installed. Politicians are corrupt
An other option: EICAS for the whole MAX family and refit the 8s and 9s.
Thanks
👍🏻
I fly the Max. It’s an amazing plane and a great machine to fly! This is a pretty good break down of the exemption.
One key factor that was a key factor for the Max MCAS troubles. That was South West part in twisting the arms of Boeing to hide the MCAS and allow for no extra pilot training. South West are walking the same mined path as airlines like Valuejet, who worship the low cost model above all else, including safety. It lead directly into the question, what kind of skills set do you need to be CEO of SW? Other than being a miser. and a zeal for short term gains.
All 737 MAX aircraft and every other aircraft with a "Glass" cockpit (digital) has an EICAS. EICAS stands for Engine Indicating Crew Alert System. The proposed change that Boeing got the exemption for was a requirement for new systems to tell the pilot what's wrong and also guide the pilot through the steps to fix it instead of having to dig through a book of checklists commonly called the Quick Reference Handbook. Airbus has similar technology on their newer aircraft. Many aircraft currently in operation just generate a caution message or warning message that alerts the crew to an issue. The pilot then has to find and run the proper checklist in a book where the proposed changes would have the plane generate the warning and also pop up the checklist on a screen saving time and helping the pilot.
I think you might be thinking of ECAM for the checklist thing, which isn't a requirement. 737 MAX has a partially modernized flight deck and engine indications, but it retains the master caution system rather than a centralized crew alert system.
Personally, I would have made it so pilots could easily bypass MCAS. Say that a simple hard pull on the stick would disengage MCAS and give pilots control. Crashes may still happen, but it would be pilot error, not the plane itself, and I think that would ease people's minds much more, and be a much easier solution, than adding another machine to the mix when it was a machine that caused the problem in the first place.
All they have to do is turn the switch OFF !!! DUUUUUHH!!!!!!
@@wilburfinnigan2142 The problem was that the switch to turn off MCAS was the same switch that disabled the electric pitch trim. There was no second switch to turn off just MCAS. The Ethiopian crew did use the switch to disable the electric pitch trim, which also turned off MCAS. The mistake they made was to keep the engines at a high power setting when MCAS malfunctioned. As the airspeed continued to go up it increased the aerodynamic load on the elevator, which made it more and more difficult for them to crank the nose down manually using the trim wheel. Finally in desperation they turned the electric trim back on again to let it help them crank the nose down. Unfortunately they didn't realize that turning the electric trim back on would also reactivate MCAS, which started the airplane nose diving again.
@@joevignolor4u949 I believe they also had continuous stall warnings thanks to the faulty AoA sensor, plus 'unreliable airspeed' - so cutting power would not be the most obvious thing to do.
Flew it on a Christmas trip with Ryanair (EI HEY) to Carcassone, France. It was one of the craft originally off the line in 2019, but parked up all that time since at Boeing. Even allowing for the fleecing mentality of the carrier, it was the most cramped plane I've ever been on. As for the centrally placed double toilet at the rear of the plane, it was a complete joke. I'm a biggish guy but I've never had to squeeze myself into a loo so badly just to have a pee. The toilet at the front was just as constricted.
But, as user-ib2vi8ge9g points out, it's a 1960s fuselage and a design that's coming up to sixty years old which, if you'll pardon the pun, is a ridiculous stretch of time in which to keep a mach going. Thinking back, actually, I realise I've not flown a 737 in years.
Speaking of fleecing, I hope Boeing get taken to the cleaners big time and that the families of the victims get all the compensation they deserve.
What this once great company got up to was simply criminal, in my opinion.
Criminal indeed. Please view the following documentaries on Boeing's malpractices.
Assembled with faulty parts: th-cam.com/video/rvkEpstd9os/w-d-xo.html th-cam.com/video/IaWdEtANi-0/w-d-xo.html
GREAT OBSERVATIONS
I can see why the MAX has been giving this. Take into consideration that the MAX has been operating safely for a couple of years now, which makes the two variants yet to be certified to keep their commonality more of a no brained.
Not to mention the years of service before the crashes by airlines with poor maintenance. That’s all been overlooked.
@@stevesmoneypit6137 it wasn't because of that
@@stevesmoneypit6137 And poor training. All planes with electric trim have a runaway trim procedure.
@@米空軍パイロット Planes have all their systems disclosed and pilot trained on them. MCAS was not even mentioned on any training resource and it was poorly executed. The only thing you could do a trip the braker to the electric motor on the jack screw. But when it is under heavy load like a nose dive, the trim wheel wont help you Yo simply cant turn these wheels. See mentour pilot on the sim. He and a F.O. weren able to move the trim wheel if the jet was plunging. Boeing knows that and there is a procedure to "unload the stab". Good luck when figthing against a hiden system. In any E.Jet you can choose the keep all you power assitance and discard any computers in between. That is, you have access to all the control surface, not with thorugh a prehistoric wheel, but using hidrahulics / electric. The 737 design is seriously outdated.
@@38911bytefree You know very little. The electric trim switch right under the pilot's thumb on the control wheel will instantly stop & reverse any MCAS input. Holding the manual trim wheel will also stop MCAS. A runaway trim in any aircraft must be dealt with in seconds, not minutes, & that's why the procedure is required to be MEMORIZED!
It all boils down to cost.I will not fly the Max, the A321 Neo is a much safer way to fly, I'll pay twice the price, my life is worth it.
I do think congress made the right move here. Commonality increases safety and minimizes mistakes and the anxiety rhat leads to them. The trucking company I drive for has a similar situation.
Our fleet is primarily made up of Freightliners. Whatever truck you hop into, you know what to expect in terms of visibility, steering feel and performance. But Freightliner can't deliver the new trucks we need right now, so the company is buying Internationals and Kenworths to replace aging trucks. For me at least, it's a little nerve wracking to hop into a Kenworth or International. The driver position, visibility, buttons and performance are completely different from one another, even if all the trucks operate with the same powertrains.
I'm a safer driver in a Freightliner. 737 Max pilots will be safer knowing each plane they fly won't surprise them with different software.
Well said and sourced