Thanks. Nice overview. Makes me appreciate St. Maximus the Confessor's Christian realism all the more. He's essentially able to say yes to both Aristotelian and Platonic realism, creating a 3rd position.
Some research on Nominalism and Realism is essential. Once you have opened that particular box it's very difficult to close. Now I must source some reliable reading material.
I'm not quite sold on the proportion that in an infinite universe, any particular finitude must occur an infinite amount of times. Why? This certainly doesn't seem to be true for infinite collections of finite objects in general. The set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...} is infinite, but each of its finite members - and it has _only_ finite members - appears only once. Perhaps you believe that the universe has some additional structure on it that just any old infinite set does not have, but which imposes that particular requirement on it? If so, what sort of structure do you have in mind? And more importantly, doesn't invoking the very notion of "structure" beg the question against the nominalist? There can be no "structure" without universals, so the existence of structure is precisely what the nominalist denies. I fear that you may be subtly taking on premises which someone seriously committed to nominalism would dispute. In truth, I don't think that there can be any real "arguing" with a true blue, fully convinced nominalist. All arguments rely on the arrangement of propositions in some sort of logical chain or sequence. That, once again, is a kind of universal structure. But, to repeat, nominalism rejects this. A _real_ nominalist would believe in something like logical pluralism, or logical relativism, which would instantly allow him to undermine any and all arguments for or against anything whatsoever. Nominalism isn't really something you can argue for or against. Ultimately, it's something that you either believe in or don't believe in, and that's really all that there is to be said on the matter. Arguments between realists and nominalists - and halfway positions between the two, like trope theory - all eventually reach impasses where the opposing sides can do nothing but scream their intuitions at each other. In a very real sense, only faith - a pre-rational faith in an ultimate order and coherence that informs every decision and conclusion reached within the nexus of thought - can conquer nominalism. And that ultimate order can only proceed from the Light That Shines Forever.
Sorry about that. I see now. Still - to refer to your reply to Slampropp's comment - to a thoroughgoing nominalist, there is no such thing as a "causally connected space." At bottom, nominalists don't believe that there is any kind of causality that is intrinsic to the universe. All events can only occur as a result of God's direct action (or, to an atheistic nominalist, there is no explanation of why they happen at all). And regarding the example with numbers, nominalists don't believe that there are any sorts of real relations, so the whole issue of "context" in determining the exact nature of a number or a set doesn't matter to them. If there are no relations, then there is no such thing as context. And if there is no such thing as context, then context can't be relevant to determining what an entity is. To use Nietzsche's phrase, context, to a nominalist, is just one of the "seductions of grammar." Whatever assumption about causality you may be referring to, it will have necessarily been made within the scope of some metaphysics that precedes anything that the physicist, as a physicist, can investigate or discover. And a nominalist isn't going to accept that metaphysics, given that he doesn't really believe in causality. He can easily rework the relevant metaphysics to something more to his liking, and reinterpret the physical results within his reworked metaphysics. Since nominalists believe that no two things can be genuinely related, whether causally or otherwise, then it follows that in nominalism, _nothing can occur "an infinite number of times."_ If you're wondering how you can begin arguing against nominalism if even assumptions as basic as _real relations exist_ or _causality exists_ are considered question-begging, that's just it - you can't. That's the kind of profound and thoroughgoing insanity that nominalism is, and as far as I can see, that makes it impervious to conventional intellectual argument. Hence, my comments above on faith.
The only hope when arguing with those influenced (if unconsciously) by nominalism, is to push the implications of the position further and further, and hope that you bump up against an intuition that the person against whom you are arguing is not willing to give up - e.g. _causality exists._ My worry, though, is that the chain of reasoning that goes from denying universals to denying causality is very short and easy to follow, and anyone who finds the general feel of nominalism attractive, and who has any intelligence at all, will quickly reach that conclusion. The chain is: (1) if universals don't exist, relations don't exist, since relations are a type of universal; and (2) if relations don't exist, then causality doesn't exist, since causality is a type of relation. Major figures in Western thought _have_ reached that conclusion. Off the top of my head, I can think of Newton, Hume and Malebranche as having defended it. (Well, maybe Hume arguably didn't deny causality _per se,_ but only our ability to know anything about it, but Newton and Malebranche definitely did deny it. In fact, Newton thought that his discovery of gravity demonstrated the non-existence of causality.) My favorite argument against nominalism is the one given by Bertrand Russell in his book _The Problems of Philosophy._ The argument goes like this. Suppose there are two objects, _A_ and _B,_ which seem to us to be similar in some way - let's say that they're both green. Since the nominalist can't explain this perception of similarity by saying that _A_ and _B_ instantiate the same universal(s), he must appeal to some higher order relation of similarity between the unique green exemplified by _A_ and the unique green exemplified by _B._ The problem is, _this itself would be a universal, and so the nominalist must appeal to an even higher order notion of similarity to explain that_ - *and on, and on, and on, generating an infinite regress.* I like this argument because it brings out the deepest problem of all with nominalism: *its restrictions are so severe that it does not even allow explanatory chains of reasoning to get started.* Nominalism is extremely corrosive. It analyzes _everything_ away. Some people often wonder why modernity is so corrosive. *That's why.*
I know this has been brought up by others by there is a hypothetical system where an infinite universe does not mean eternal recurrence. I don't remember the name of the mathematician, but he devised a system whereby you have 3 wheels and a straight line running through all of them. The straight line represents a particular finitude. If in this system, you span the wheels at specific and separate times and you left them spinning for an infinite amount of time the same particular finitude with which we started, would never recur.
Thanks. Helpful video. Not directly related, but I was thinking about Luther's issue with Aristotle's hylomorphism (and Aristotelian nominalism at large) while simultaneously, albeit somewhat less stated, being sympathetic towards some of Ockham's nominalist theories. Luther wasn't a primarily a "philosopher", but I think his interpretation of Scripture leans toward platonic idealism. I'm now thinking about the possibility for Christianity to provide the synthesis, if one exists, for nominalism and realism.
When Socrates through Plato asks "Is something good because God wills it or does God will something because it is good?" if we affirm the latter would that suggest that God is then posterior to the conception of the good? If nothing is before God, including conceptions and forms, how could the first thing He willed into existence be a concept which is derived from something prior/other than what He essentially is? I think Ockham agrees with the former in Plato's statement as well. Is there an error in my thinking? Asking the crowd.
7:20 what would be the explicit logical contradiction in having a finite universe just happen to be arranged as such as a brute fact? Why would there need to be a universal cause above this universe to account for that arrangement?
I didn't say it was logically impossible. It's just an explanatory deficiency. If my theory involves unexplainable claims and all your claims have explanations, then all else being equal your theory is better than my theory.
The 'mind fo god' is an interesting concept, yet I'm not sure I would equate my version of 'god' with yours. If our perception of god is all-encompassing as you seem to be stating -why would it lead to monotheism? Why not have a force of multitude of energy which creates a multitude of gods working together to create the 'forms' and have them exist all at once? Humans in general come from a perception that when there are 'many' there is conflict. I could see many 'gods' or energy working together to form a dance of sorts. I think I was trying to see your reasoning from a perspective of 'why there is one' in your formula as opposed to many and one as the same? I do think our language is inadequate -but I am very careful with assuming a one mind of god because this is direct correlation to 'what' we want to believe in a Judeo-Christian tradition as opposed to what we 'could' believe.
Why do you reject universals outside materiality? Any organizing properties 'above' extension are unconstrained by space and time, rendering them universal beyond the materiality of the observable. All of which accords with a realist view
I'm not sure what you mean by rejecting "universals outside of materiality". I do accept that universals are superior to particulars and matter is inferior to form.
At 7:21, you note you find it unacceptable to invoke any universals outside materiality. I'm curious as to why (assuming materiality relates to contingency) I agree matter presupposes form, but form may presuppose organization in order to 'be'. These appear to be universals outside materiality
The argument was that if a nominalist assumption, metaphysically, was applied to a finite spacial extention of our cosmology, then no rational could account for why this region of the finite space turned out one way and not another. That inexplicability was what was unnaceptable to me, not the fact that universals precede particulars. I can see why it was confusing though.
"in an infinite universe, any finitude must occur an infinite number of times" Why? In math, it isn't the case. You can construct irrational numbers, an infinite non-repeating decimal expansion, where some parts never repeat. One obvious example is 0.10110011100011110000... where the pattern '101' occurs only once.
Slampropp - Because your example is bounded by what is possible. In an infinite, boundless reality, anything is possible. And anything that is possible will exist given an infinite amount of time and space.
Your deduction that the nominalist must suggest that material reality is self substantiated and infinite is equivalent to my deduction that the relativist must suggest that the underlying reality is analog and continuous. Semantic equivalence detected.
Thanks. Nice overview. Makes me appreciate St. Maximus the Confessor's Christian realism all the more. He's essentially able to say yes to both Aristotelian and Platonic realism, creating a 3rd position.
I am reading St. Maximus right now, but I didn't know that he had such a thing! Awesome!
Some research on Nominalism and Realism is essential. Once you have opened that particular box it's very difficult to close.
Now I must source some reliable reading material.
I'm not quite sold on the proportion that in an infinite universe, any particular finitude must occur an infinite amount of times. Why? This certainly doesn't seem to be true for infinite collections of finite objects in general. The set of natural numbers {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...} is infinite, but each of its finite members - and it has _only_ finite members - appears only once. Perhaps you believe that the universe has some additional structure on it that just any old infinite set does not have, but which imposes that particular requirement on it? If so, what sort of structure do you have in mind? And more importantly, doesn't invoking the very notion of "structure" beg the question against the nominalist? There can be no "structure" without universals, so the existence of structure is precisely what the nominalist denies. I fear that you may be subtly taking on premises which someone seriously committed to nominalism would dispute.
In truth, I don't think that there can be any real "arguing" with a true blue, fully convinced nominalist. All arguments rely on the arrangement of propositions in some sort of logical chain or sequence. That, once again, is a kind of universal structure. But, to repeat, nominalism rejects this. A _real_ nominalist would believe in something like logical pluralism, or logical relativism, which would instantly allow him to undermine any and all arguments for or against anything whatsoever. Nominalism isn't really something you can argue for or against. Ultimately, it's something that you either believe in or don't believe in, and that's really all that there is to be said on the matter. Arguments between realists and nominalists - and halfway positions between the two, like trope theory - all eventually reach impasses where the opposing sides can do nothing but scream their intuitions at each other. In a very real sense, only faith - a pre-rational faith in an ultimate order and coherence that informs every decision and conclusion reached within the nexus of thought - can conquer nominalism. And that ultimate order can only proceed from the Light That Shines Forever.
Sorry about that. I see now.
Still - to refer to your reply to Slampropp's comment - to a thoroughgoing nominalist, there is no such thing as a "causally connected space." At bottom, nominalists don't believe that there is any kind of causality that is intrinsic to the universe. All events can only occur as a result of God's direct action (or, to an atheistic nominalist, there is no explanation of why they happen at all). And regarding the example with numbers, nominalists don't believe that there are any sorts of real relations, so the whole issue of "context" in determining the exact nature of a number or a set doesn't matter to them. If there are no relations, then there is no such thing as context. And if there is no such thing as context, then context can't be relevant to determining what an entity is. To use Nietzsche's phrase, context, to a nominalist, is just one of the "seductions of grammar."
Whatever assumption about causality you may be referring to, it will have necessarily been made within the scope of some metaphysics that precedes anything that the physicist, as a physicist, can investigate or discover. And a nominalist isn't going to accept that metaphysics, given that he doesn't really believe in causality. He can easily rework the relevant metaphysics to something more to his liking, and reinterpret the physical results within his reworked metaphysics.
Since nominalists believe that no two things can be genuinely related, whether causally or otherwise, then it follows that in nominalism, _nothing can occur "an infinite number of times."_
If you're wondering how you can begin arguing against nominalism if even assumptions as basic as _real relations exist_ or _causality exists_ are considered question-begging, that's just it - you can't. That's the kind of profound and thoroughgoing insanity that nominalism is, and as far as I can see, that makes it impervious to conventional intellectual argument. Hence, my comments above on faith.
The only hope when arguing with those influenced (if unconsciously) by nominalism, is to push the implications of the position further and further, and hope that you bump up against an intuition that the person against whom you are arguing is not willing to give up - e.g. _causality exists._ My worry, though, is that the chain of reasoning that goes from denying universals to denying causality is very short and easy to follow, and anyone who finds the general feel of nominalism attractive, and who has any intelligence at all, will quickly reach that conclusion. The chain is: (1) if universals don't exist, relations don't exist, since relations are a type of universal; and (2) if relations don't exist, then causality doesn't exist, since causality is a type of relation.
Major figures in Western thought _have_ reached that conclusion. Off the top of my head, I can think of Newton, Hume and Malebranche as having defended it. (Well, maybe Hume arguably didn't deny causality _per se,_ but only our ability to know anything about it, but Newton and Malebranche definitely did deny it. In fact, Newton thought that his discovery of gravity demonstrated the non-existence of causality.)
My favorite argument against nominalism is the one given by Bertrand Russell in his book _The Problems of Philosophy._ The argument goes like this. Suppose there are two objects, _A_ and _B,_ which seem to us to be similar in some way - let's say that they're both green. Since the nominalist can't explain this perception of similarity by saying that _A_ and _B_ instantiate the same universal(s), he must appeal to some higher order relation of similarity between the unique green exemplified by _A_ and the unique green exemplified by _B._ The problem is, _this itself would be a universal, and so the nominalist must appeal to an even higher order notion of similarity to explain that_ - *and on, and on, and on, generating an infinite regress.*
I like this argument because it brings out the deepest problem of all with nominalism: *its restrictions are so severe that it does not even allow explanatory chains of reasoning to get started.*
Nominalism is extremely corrosive. It analyzes _everything_ away. Some people often wonder why modernity is so corrosive. *That's why.*
I know this has been brought up by others by there is a hypothetical system where an infinite universe does not mean eternal recurrence. I don't remember the name of the mathematician, but he devised a system whereby you have 3 wheels and a straight line running through all of them. The straight line represents a particular finitude. If in this system, you span the wheels at specific and separate times and you left them spinning for an infinite amount of time the same particular finitude with which we started, would never recur.
Thanks. Helpful video.
Not directly related, but I was thinking about Luther's issue with Aristotle's hylomorphism (and Aristotelian nominalism at large) while simultaneously, albeit somewhat less stated, being sympathetic towards some of Ockham's nominalist theories. Luther wasn't a primarily a "philosopher", but I think his interpretation of Scripture leans toward platonic idealism. I'm now thinking about the possibility for Christianity to provide the synthesis, if one exists, for nominalism and realism.
When Socrates through Plato asks "Is something good because God wills it or does God will something because it is good?" if we affirm the latter would that suggest that God is then posterior to the conception of the good? If nothing is before God, including conceptions and forms, how could the first thing He willed into existence be a concept which is derived from something prior/other than what He essentially is? I think Ockham agrees with the former in Plato's statement as well. Is there an error in my thinking? Asking the crowd.
No. Luther was nominalist.
7:20 what would be the explicit logical contradiction in having a finite universe just happen to be arranged as such as a brute fact? Why would there need to be a universal cause above this universe to account for that arrangement?
I didn't say it was logically impossible. It's just an explanatory deficiency. If my theory involves unexplainable claims and all your claims have explanations, then all else being equal your theory is better than my theory.
@@ericorwoll fair enough.
Interesting.
7:45 who says the universe is infinite?
“The comment on this video are mostly crackpot levels of metaphysical speculation” God, quoting from Nietzsche
Interesting. Very much enjoyed this video.
Interesting video.
Did you ever check out E Michael Jones?
'fraid not, but you can always rip the audio from his youtube videos.
The 'mind fo god' is an interesting concept, yet I'm not sure I would equate my version of 'god' with yours. If our perception of god is all-encompassing as you seem to be stating -why would it lead to monotheism? Why not have a force of multitude of energy which creates a multitude of gods working together to create the 'forms' and have them exist all at once? Humans in general come from a perception that when there are 'many' there is conflict. I could see many 'gods' or energy working together to form a dance of sorts. I think I was trying to see your reasoning from a perspective of 'why there is one' in your formula as opposed to many and one as the same? I do think our language is inadequate -but I am very careful with assuming a one mind of god because this is direct correlation to 'what' we want to believe in a Judeo-Christian tradition as opposed to what we 'could' believe.
Hey there,
I'm just curious if your thinking on this subject has changed or stayed the same
Why do you reject universals outside materiality? Any organizing properties 'above' extension are unconstrained by space and time, rendering them universal beyond the materiality of the observable. All of which accords with a realist view
I'm not sure what you mean by rejecting "universals outside of materiality". I do accept that universals are superior to particulars and matter is inferior to form.
At 7:21, you note you find it unacceptable to invoke any universals outside materiality. I'm curious as to why (assuming materiality relates to contingency)
I agree matter presupposes form, but form may presuppose organization in order to 'be'. These appear to be universals outside materiality
The argument was that if a nominalist assumption, metaphysically, was applied to a finite spacial extention of our cosmology, then no rational could account for why this region of the finite space turned out one way and not another. That inexplicability was what was unnaceptable to me, not the fact that universals precede particulars. I can see why it was confusing though.
In that case, yes, nominalism is meaningless outside contingency. Thanks for clarifying
Have you ever read "Anamnesis" from Eric Voegelin? Cause your conception of the consciencious pretty much looks like his.
"in an infinite universe, any finitude must occur an infinite number of times"
Why? In math, it isn't the case. You can construct irrational numbers, an infinite non-repeating decimal expansion, where some parts never repeat. One obvious example is 0.10110011100011110000... where the pattern '101' occurs only once.
Slampropp - Because your example is bounded by what is possible. In an infinite, boundless reality, anything is possible. And anything that is possible will exist given an infinite amount of time and space.
I think you're mixing apples and oranges a bit
Platonics, by all means, proceed
Your deduction that the nominalist must suggest that material reality is self substantiated and infinite is equivalent to my deduction that the relativist must suggest that the underlying reality is analog and continuous.
Semantic equivalence detected.
You’re bad at philosophy - God
Care to elaborate?
Aarvoll what is an meme . google
You’re bad at making jokes - Everyone