Great job. This entire series is fantastic, clear, highly informative. I've always taken Peirce's notion of infinite semiosis (where a sign's interpretant is itself a sign) to be restricted to a certain class of signs (namely symbols). In the case of indices, Peirce seems to say (at times) that they don't have "meaning" in a sense since their job is simply to put you in contact with the object. But, per your example involving the car, yes, signs can produce new signs that then produce new signs.
Great explanation! I do have a request if you can help. Could you help me get a light on how to analyse a metaphor in a semiotic way, keeping in mind the triadic relationship?
Sure! Metaphor has a strict meaning in semiotics. It is a certain kind of relation (firstness of thirdness) between the Sign and Object (2. correlate). Romanini writes: “All types of mental association, as comparisons, are Metaphors. These signs are, therefore, the first moment of any mental representation (…) Metaphors play a much more important role in logic than it is normally supposed. Maybe they could even be considered the lost bond between semiotic and phenomenology, capable of unifying both of them.” So Metaphor divides its nature between the Symbol (thirdness) and the Icon (firstness): “On the one hand, it depends on a habit, familiarity or conventionality (brought by the Symbol) and, on the other hand, depends on a qualitative representation of the object (brought by the Icon). Hence, a Metaphor is the quality or possibility of a general predicate. The Metaphor delivers to the Interpreter possible Information in the form of Connotation.” In other words, Metaphor is a Diagram or an Image - an associative representation. Metaphors have a huge part in perception by enabling the synthetization of the multitude of perceptive impression into an Idea. Metaphor is the bridge between Experience and Thought, between Imagination and Concept, between New and the Known. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have written a lot about metaphors. According to them the essence of it is “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”. Romanini puts its more semiotically by saying that the metaphor is “a hypothetical or merely possible representation of general relations present among objects of a proposition”. Hope this helps! And thank you from your question! It is a great subject for a future video. For more information on Lakoff and Johnson you can watch this video: th-cam.com/video/lYcQcwUfo8c/w-d-xo.html
Thanks again for this series of videos! I have finished watching all of them and benefited a lot. I wonder if you could talk about the “ground” peirce mentioned? This concept seems not to be mentioned in your videos.
Thank you for explaining this so well! I've been having trouble understanding the triadic concept for a while😅It's much clearer now anyways. Though I'd like to ask what would the interpretant's counterpart be in Sausurre's model?
Great question! It is a bit problematic to link Saussure and Peirce directly onto one another as they are fundamentally different notions on the nature of the sign. However, I can share couple of ideas: The usual notion is that signifier=sign and signified=object. However, John Deely says that signifier=sign and signified=interpretant, as the signified has the nature of an idea that the interpreter thinks when confronting the signifier. Deely says that Saussures semiotics is semiotics without an object, as signs (and their meanings) relate only to other signs (and meanings) forming a closed network that can't relate to an object outside of it. This means that meanings are arbitrary as there are no constraining factors for the meanings of signs. That is, there is no object outside of the sign and semiosis limiting the possible interpretations of the sign. Deely says: "In Peircian terms, the Saussurean or, more generally, the semiological notion of sign on its broadest construal is hopelessly deficient, on several counts, for developing any general science (doctrine, rather) of signs. To begin with, the signifiant corresponds more or less to the sign-vehicle, but the signifié corresponds only partially to the notion of interpretant, and the notion of object signified is entirely wanting in the scheme." Hope this helps. :)
![[TH] FS vs BME - VCT Ascension Pacific - Lower Bracket Final](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/wnygqsR2Fig/mqdefault.jpg)
I have launched a SubStack publication. Feel free to check it out and subscribe!
philosign.substack.com/
Thank you so much for the video. I was so confused when reading Peirce’s work. This video clarifies a lot.
The music is so distracting that its getting in the way to understand what you are saying.
Represents is spurious and you should try harder not to use the language of dynamic causality.
Great job. This entire series is fantastic, clear, highly informative. I've always taken Peirce's notion of infinite semiosis (where a sign's interpretant is itself a sign) to be restricted to a certain class of signs (namely symbols). In the case of indices, Peirce seems to say (at times) that they don't have "meaning" in a sense since their job is simply to put you in contact with the object. But, per your example involving the car, yes, signs can produce new signs that then produce new signs.
Great explanation! I do have a request if you can help. Could you help me get a light on how to analyse a metaphor in a semiotic way, keeping in mind the triadic relationship?
Sure! Metaphor has a strict meaning in semiotics. It is a certain kind of relation (firstness of thirdness) between the Sign and Object (2. correlate). Romanini writes: “All types of mental association, as comparisons, are Metaphors. These signs are, therefore, the first moment of any mental representation (…) Metaphors play a much more important role in logic than it is normally supposed. Maybe they could even be considered the lost bond between semiotic and phenomenology, capable of unifying both of them.”
So Metaphor divides its nature between the Symbol (thirdness) and the Icon (firstness): “On the one hand, it depends on a habit, familiarity or conventionality (brought by the Symbol) and, on the other hand, depends on a qualitative representation of the object (brought by the Icon). Hence, a Metaphor is the quality or possibility of a general predicate. The Metaphor delivers to the Interpreter possible Information in the form of Connotation.”
In other words, Metaphor is a Diagram or an Image - an associative representation. Metaphors have a huge part in perception by enabling the synthetization of the multitude of perceptive impression into an Idea. Metaphor is the bridge between Experience and Thought, between Imagination and Concept, between New and the Known.
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have written a lot about metaphors. According to them the essence of it is “understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another”. Romanini puts its more semiotically by saying that the metaphor is “a hypothetical or merely possible representation of general relations present among objects of a proposition”.
Hope this helps! And thank you from your question! It is a great subject for a future video.
For more information on Lakoff and Johnson you can watch this video:
th-cam.com/video/lYcQcwUfo8c/w-d-xo.html
I’m interested in examining a novel fiction within this frame.
Nice peacock!
Thanks again for this series of videos! I have finished watching all of them and benefited a lot. I wonder if you could talk about the “ground” peirce mentioned? This concept seems not to be mentioned in your videos.
Is it signs all the way down?
Yes.
Love your video and the whole series. Thank you for creating and sharing knowledge!
Thank you for explaining this so well! I've been having trouble understanding the triadic concept for a while😅It's much clearer now anyways. Though I'd like to ask what would the interpretant's counterpart be in Sausurre's model?
Great question! It is a bit problematic to link Saussure and Peirce directly onto one another as they are fundamentally different notions on the nature of the sign. However, I can share couple of ideas:
The usual notion is that signifier=sign and signified=object. However, John Deely says that signifier=sign and signified=interpretant, as the signified has the nature of an idea that the interpreter thinks when confronting the signifier. Deely says that Saussures semiotics is semiotics without an object, as signs (and their meanings) relate only to other signs (and meanings) forming a closed network that can't relate to an object outside of it. This means that meanings are arbitrary as there are no constraining factors for the meanings of signs. That is, there is no object outside of the sign and semiosis limiting the possible interpretations of the sign. Deely says:
"In Peircian terms, the Saussurean or, more generally, the semiological notion of sign on its broadest construal is hopelessly deficient, on several counts, for developing any general science (doctrine, rather) of signs. To begin with, the signifiant corresponds more or less to the sign-vehicle, but the signifié corresponds only partially to the notion of interpretant, and the notion of object signified is entirely wanting in the scheme."
Hope this helps. :)