The Centre Cannot Hold: Arras 1918 & the Failure of German Counterattack Doctrine | Dr Bill Stewart
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 16 พ.ย. 2024
- In this presentation, which was delivered 'live' to an online audience Dr Bill Stewart, talks about the German defensive doctrine in 1917-1918.
The centrepiece of this doctrine was that of the counterattack allied with a flexible defence-in-depth to frustrate Allied attacks. The Germans could deliver punishing counter blows that violently overthrew Allied advances.
This presentation examines four case studies of German multi-battalion counterattacks in 1917 and 1918 at Arras based on Canadian and German records. The presentation will explain why, despite favourable circumstances, these counterattack in 1918 failed unlike 1917.
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Met Bill in 2017 at a Vimy Ridge workshop in Calgary. Bill has a book out about the Canadians at the Somme.
Excellent presentation. Thank you.
Fabulous presentation, as always from this website. Thank you.
Great to learn more about what our Canadian heroes did!
Some of the best war maps I've ever seen!
I appreciate that you include the date of the date of the original presentation.
Really informative talk, Dr Bill. The Canadian Corps achieved the seemingly impossible over and over. Impressive outfit. Thanks for the tour.
Do the Battle of Amiens next =)
By 1918 the four Canadian Divisions had some major advantages over a British Division which helps explain someof their success.
First they had retained 12 Battalions per Division, while British Divisions had fallen to 9 per Division due to manpower shortage. Second 5th Canadian Division had been broken up and its men sent to the other Canadian Divisions as Sappers, meaning each Canadian Division had a de facto Sapper Brigade compared to a Battallion for British Divisions.
This meant the Canadian Front Line troops had to spend less time with all the fatigues that were a fact of life for WWI soldiers, and that meant more time training.
Another advantage they had was extra artillery support organic to each Canadian Division as well as the Canadian Corps above and beyond that a Division and Corps usually had. This was a result of the Canadian Divisions being recognised as excellent Assault Divisions, thus requiring more artillery to fulfil their missions.
Of course, the quality of the troops and their leadership also played very important roles, and this is not to denigrate the very real qualities of those troops or their successes. However, it must be realised that the canadian Divisions had those advantages, in part due to the fact that Canada was not digging as deep into the manpower barrel as Britain was by that point in the war, and in the case of the sappers because its easier to supply a Brigade of Sappers to 4 Divisions than it is to supply the same to almost 70!
@@alganhar1 Did the Canadians have British Artillery?
I'd like to see a presentation on that Canadian light rail that they used and also on re-supply, limbering guns, etc. during the various battles... particularly during the latter ones when the war had opened up and the armies were more mobile.
Very enjoyable lecture. Impressive Powerpoint visuals. Thank you very much.
New to this channel. This was brilliant! One of the best of these talks.
Great upload, thanks for sharing.
Excellent..thanks for your hard work
Another example of advancing beyond the artillary is not holding the ground. That was the crux of keeping a rolling barrage going was communication . Actually moving the guns over heavy churned soft ground must have been a nightmare task in itself. The timing systems planned did not cover the advances movements as clockwork, especially when higher ground spotters able to call counter battery fire. Was a wireless used successfully by the Canadians ? Watch film reviews of 1917 alot of smart alec remarks about just send a plane over job done,does not help. Navigation from the air was not GPS, so runners to advanced position ahead of the frontline was the best mean, pigeons could be sent back but not forward.
Excellent
a fine presentation
The Germans hated fighting the Canadians , their spring offensive was proof , they passed by both sides of the Canucks to avoid them , they knew they would be in trouble and would be caught up if they attacked the Canucks, best Army during that mess. God Bless The Canadian Corp. Best record of any Army in WW 1
Or maybe they were up to strength and Canadian Divisions were bigger and had been allotted more artillery than British divisions? ”.........a closer examination of the situation tends to indicate that while the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Divisions fought well in the Hundred Days, so did as many - or more British Divisions, in spite of their manpower handicaps and the mailings they had suffered in the earlier 1918 fighting.
All but seven of the fifty British divisions involved in the Hundred Days had been heavily engaged in the Michael offensive or the Georgette attack on the Lys; seventeen had been involved in both, and five had been involved in the Blucher offensive on the Aisne. This level of commitment to battle continued until the very end of the war; fourteen British divisions each suffered casualties of over 2,500 men in the last six weeks of the war alone....and yet the British offensive did not grind t a halt. It should also be remembered that the Canadian Corps had hardly been engaged at all in the great battles in the spring of 1918, and its divisions were therefore intact and relatively fresh when the great Allied began on 8 August.
Peter Simkins Senior Historian at the Imperial War Museum In London, said as much in a paper presented at a History Conference held at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, in September 1993, and parts of his address lay out the situation clearly.
’Many Australian soldiers were critical of the quality of British troops on the Western Front in 1918 and derogatory comments about the morale, the fighting ability or the command of the ‘Tommies’ are by no means difficult to find....even so, the splendid tactical achievements by Australian soldiers have become somewhat distorted , helping to create the myth of the ‘colonial superman’. As a consequence the contribution of the British soldier to the ultimate victory has been overshadowed.
Simkins goes on to analyze the fighting during the Hundred Days and compares the performance of Australian, British, Canadian and (the single) New Zealand Divisions In opposed attacks; his detailed investigations throw up some interesting statistics. For example, the successful opposed-attack record of the nine British divisions in Rawlinson’s Fourth Army during the Hundred Days was 70.7 per cent - exactly the same as in the five Australian Divisions, and only slightly lower than that of the four, much larger Canadian divisions (72.5 per cent) and well above that of the New Zealand Division (64.5 per cent). Moreover two British divisions - the 19th (Western) and 66th - had success rates of 100 per cent and the 9th (Scottish) Division had a success rate of 93 per cent, this last averaged out over fourteen separate attacks. The 24th Division racked up an 85 per cent success rate and the 16th (Irish) Division 80 per cent. The evidence hardly accords with the popular Dominion opinion that all the British divisions were useless.
There is more, however. Simkins points out that six Dominion divisions (1st, 2nd and 5th Australian and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian) achieved a success rate of between 70 and 80 per cent in opposed attacks, but so, quite apart, from the divisions mentioned above, did five more British Divisions (Guards, 18th [Eastern], 24th, 34, and 38th [Welsh]). From this it is possible to infer that ten British divisions did as well, or better, than the six crack Dominion divisions.
Simkins gives many more examples, and continues. ‘If one then considers the number of attacks carried out by British and Dominion divisions and also the “ battle days” on which each division saw meaningful action, the British units again stand up well in comparison with the Dominion divisions’. In fact, a comparison of successful attacks and ‘battle days’ reveals that during the Hundred Days, most British divisions, ‘in spite of the crisis they experienced earlier in the year, actually made a very weighty contribution to the Allied victory.’ This conclusion would seem to be both accurate and fair, and is reached, not in any attempt to downgrade the reputation of the Dominion divisions, but to point out, yet again, the often-overlooked fact that the British divisions also played a decisive part, whatever is now maintained in Ottawa, Canberra or Wellington.
This view is certain to be challenged and all statistical evidence is subject to the accusation that ‘there are lies, damned lies and statistics.’ Before that old canard is trotted out to refute Peter Simkin’s arguments, it should be pointed out yet again that he presented them, not in the UK, but in a speech to an audience of Australian soldiers and historians In Canberra, where it was received with tolerance and respect.”
-Great War Generals on the Western Front. Robin Neillands.
There were many British troops who were just as feared and effective.
_”.....a closer examination of the situation tends to indicate that while the Australian, Canadian and New Zealand Divisions fought well in the Hundred Days, _*_so did as many - or more British Divisions, in spite of their manpower handicaps and the mailings they had suffered in the earlier 1918 fighting._*
_All but seven of the fifty British divisions involved in the Hundred Days had been heavily engaged in the Michael offensive or the Georgette attack on the Lys; seventeen had been involved in both, and five had been involved in the Blucher offensive on the Aisne. This level of commitment to battle continued until the very end of the war; fourteen British divisions each suffered casualties of over 2,500 men in the last six weeks of the war alone....and yet the British offensive did not grind t a halt. It should also be remembered that the Canadian Corps had hardly been engaged at all in the great battles in the spring of 1918, and its divisions were therefore intact and relatively fresh when the great Allied began on 8 August._
_Peter Simkins Senior Historian at the Imperial War Museum In London, said as much in a paper presented at a History Conference held at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, in September 1993, and parts of his address lay out the situation clearly._
_’Many Australian soldiers were critical of the quality of British troops on the Western Front in 1918 and derogatory comments about the morale, the fighting ability or the command of the ‘Tommies’ are by no means difficult to find....even so, the splendid tactical achievements by Australian soldiers have become somewhat distorted , helping to create the myth of the ‘colonial superman’. As a consequence the contribution of the British soldier to the ultimate victory has been overshadowed._
_Simkins goes on to analyze the fighting during the Hundred Days and compares the performance of Australian, British, Canadian and (the single) New Zealand Divisions In opposed attacks; his detailed investigations throw up some interesting statistics. _*_For example, the successful opposed-attack record of the nine British divisions in Rawlinson’s Fourth Army during the Hundred Days was 70.7 per cent - exactly the same as in the five Australian Divisions, and only slightly lower than that of the four, much larger Canadian divisions (72.5 per cent) and well above that of the New Zealand Division (64.5 per cent). Moreover two British divisions - the 19th (Western) and 66th - had success rates of 100 per cent and the 9th (Scottish) Division had a success rate of 93 per cent, this last averaged out over fourteen separate attacks. The 24th Division racked up an 85 per cent success rate and the 16th (Irish) Division 80 per cent. The evidence hardly accords with the popular Dominion opinion that all the British divisions were useless._*
_There is more, however. Simkins points out that six Dominion divisions (1st, 2nd and 5th Australian and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian) achieved a success rate of between 70 and 80 per cent in opposed attacks, _*_but so, quite apart, from the divisions mentioned above, did five more British Divisions (Guards, 18th [Eastern], 24th, 34, and 38th [Welsh]). From this it is possible to infer that ten British divisions did as well, or better, than the six crack Dominion divisions._*
_Simkins gives many more examples, and continues. ‘If one then considers the number of attacks carried out by British and Dominion divisions and also the “ battle days” on which each division saw meaningful action, the British units again stand up well in comparison with the Dominion divisions’. In fact, a comparison of successful attacks and ‘battle days’ reveals that during the Hundred Days, most British divisions, ‘in spite of the crisis they experienced earlier in the year, actually made a very weighty contribution to the Allied victory.’ This conclusion would seem to be both accurate and fair, and is reached, not in any attempt to downgrade the reputation of the Dominion divisions, but to point out, yet again, the often-overlooked fact that the British divisions also played a decisive part, whatever is now maintained in Ottawa, Canberra or Wellington._
_This view is certain to be challenged and all statistical evidence is subject to the accusation that ‘there are lies, damned lies and statistics.’ Before that old canard is trotted out to refute Peter Simkin’s arguments, it should be pointed out yet again that he presented them, not in the UK, but in a speech to an audience of Australian soldiers and historians In Canberra, where it was received with tolerance and respect.”_
-Great War Generals on the Western Front. Robin Neillands.
This comment makes no sense. Were the Canadians positioned between the Fifth and Third armies in March? No. These were all British divisions. But since you're getting all nationalistic - god bless those British born soldiers that made up 54% of the Canadian Corps. God bless its fine British commanders.
@@willmunny9279Says the guy who obviously didn't notice the nationalistc comment he's arguing over , one which is commonly trotted out, all commonwealth soldiers fought bravely imo.
Great stuff! Could you do a presentation on Second Marne?
Canadian newfoundland 1915 gallipoli war 🇨🇦
sensational ...
What's the song? Mademoiselle from where?
Ah.. I found it. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mademoiselle_from_Armenti%C3%A8res 😁
th-cam.com/video/EtiynnETOlM/w-d-xo.html