The only thing that would make this better would be rough movements of Native forces. I know there’s limited information to base it on, but would be very helpful to show their general tactics throughout the battle
I've been a "Custer buff" since my youth in the 1950s. I've visited the battlefield twice. My compliments on your animation. Not only accurate but moving!
I grew up near the Battlefield. We used to wander the grounds freely. One friend had a Springfield Trapdoor rifle that his Grandfather had found and picked up a few years after the battle when he was a teen.
@@alitlweird Normally we don't know anything. Well, Hollywood has taken it upon itself to change it. And you believe more in the movies than in what the books say. If you want to know your true history... Study foreign books.
Please correct me if I am wrong: 12:40 Reno reaches skirmish line and fires 14:03 Custer reaches Ford B 14:05 Benteen arrives Reno Hill 14:25 Custer and Keogh reach Calhoun Hill 14:41 Weir departs for Weir Point 15:04 Weir arrives Weir Point 1.2 miles required 25 minutes. Sees/hears distant battle -- Calhoun Hill is 2.1 miles north. Last Stand Hill is .65 miles north past Calhoun Hill. 15:04 Paks (with 130 soldiers) arrive Reno Hill 15:17 Custer retreats to Last Stand Hill Benteen could have spent 10 minutes reorganizing Reno's command, left one of his companies (42 men) to bolster Reno but taken the other two companies (83 men) to help Custer, Calhoun and Keogh. The way was clear past Weir point as Weir encountered no hostiles when he arrived at 15:04. Benteen could have been within .8 mile of Calhoun Hill by 14:55. He could have drawn pressure off Calhoun, and Calhoun was the start of Custer's disintegration. Benteen could have instructed the company left behind at Reno Hill to leave to join him as soon as the Paks arrived (15:04). Paks had an additional 130 soldiers. I walked and drove the path from Reno Hill to Weir to Calhoun to Last Stand and my conclusion is that the terrain presented one surprise after another -- the soldiers couldn't tell what was over the next hill or or gully or around the next bend. Was it a defensible position or one that allowed snipers or infiltration? The terrain had so many hilltops, gullies and elevation changes that it didn't allow for an easily defensible position. The Crow scouts declined to accompany Custer and the Crows were the only ones who might have known the terrain.
If the times given are right then the opportunity to save Custer was pretty narrow. Your talking about 10 to 30 minutes or even less. Even minimal opposition by the Sioux would have slowed them down a lot. And of course the idea that Custer was in huge danger probably had not sunk in. Aside from that assuming that if they had gotten their in time. They would have at most saved some of Custer's men and possibly Custer himself. It appears to me that the 7th Calvary would still have gotten a bloody nose. Defeat instead of disaster.
Thank you! I'm working on a novel that requires some specific information about the movements of the US Army troops during the battle and this animation was a godsend. I am amazed at my good fortune in finding your outstanding work. Thanks again.
May be worth it in your book to check out Vlogging Through History's reaction to this video, he gives basically a play by play, amazing from my perspective of a viewer
UNFORTUNATELY CUSTER TURNED OUT TO BE AN ARROGANT BLOWHARD AND FOOL AND IT COST MANY MEN WHO MIGHT HAVE LIVED TO RETURN TO THEIR FAMILIES ALIVE RATHER THAN FOR THEM TO NEVER SEE THEM AGAIN.
Amazing research and animation used in this video. The music choice also gives a sense of foreboding and a sense of helplessness for Custer. RIP to everyone here...
Another great video telling an amazing story. A story of miscalculation I think. Too bad for all those men who road into that battle not knowing their insurmountable disadvantage. I like the way you can follow the four different battalions and I love the accompanying audio especially the Bugler. Excellent job. Thanks so much.
Pretty accurate and well done. I do know that some of the officers could see from Weir Point the hostiles riding around Last Stand Hill shooting "objects on the ground" which to me is literally the end of the Custer part of the battle. At that point the last troops on Last Stand Hill were being finished off and any survivors were racing down to the Deep Ravine to safety but ultimately their deaths.
think you are spot on there Scott, personally i think the " Firing into the ground" could also be interpreted as the Sioux and Cheyenne firing down on to the actual Last Stand in Deep Ravine, which from Weir point would indeed appear to be firing into the ground. A great visualisation of quite a complex encounter!
@@andymason1324 Right. The last shots are down Deep Ravine at 5:30-ish. "Last Stand Hill" troops were finished off by suicide (Custer) or by Indian women with sewing awls and knives. It all happened pretty quick. By the time lots of Indians rode up the hill to join the fight, it was already over.
Amazing to be able to capture history this way and I pray it's accurate. This is a story all people who visit North America should learn. We should do the same to other places we visit out of respect.
I appreciate the work put into this animation . Having never been to the battlefield, I have a hard time visualizing the fight. This definitely clears up questions I have had about who was where and when.
@Steve GA. A genuine question, why do you admire the man ? I know he had what some would say an good record of service in the American civil war but always at a higher cost to his men than his contemporaries. In the plains war against the natives killing mostly women children and non hostiles doesn't seem the act of a great general. Or am I missing something about this man ?
@@wulltaylor He was so vain and ambitious that practically no one liked him with the exception of his wife Elizabeth. He was known for his recklessness and for pushing his men to the limit. The Yellowstone campaign was the one he envisioned would catapult him to the presidency of the United States.
@@wulltaylor He was a publicly funded professional killer. That's what he was hired to do, trained to do, and expected to do. He caused the deaths of 2 of his brothers and a brother-in-law, and he also shot himself to death with his own revolver. So he treated others as he treated himself, and isn't that what the Bible says we should do? Or am I missing something about this man?
Have read Son of the Morning Star and visited the battlefield two times but this presentation has done more for my visualization of the battle than anything else. Thank you for your efforts.
Enjoyed the animation. Any known movements of the Indians would have been nice, but good animation non the less. I recently re-watched the mini series. It is fairly close to the book. Many I have talked to and read on have stated that they feel the depiction of the battle is the closest to be accurate as any they have seen. They do disagree on the manner in which Custer actually dies in the film, as no one knows if he died at the onset of the last stand or more toward the end of the engagement. All that is known is that he suffered 2 wounds to his body, either would have been instantly fatal. One just below the heart and one to the head. Reports show from I believe Benteen's assessment of his body is that he only bled from the chest wound which, if accurate, would mean the head wound was caused after his death and did not result in his actual death. I was required to study 7th cavalry history and Custer in general when I was stationed in Korea at Camp Garry Owen in the 4/7 Cav. I am by no means an expert on the subject, but just go by what I read and form opinions based on that. I have also read some of the accounts taken from Indians after the battle, but many are conflicting. I doubt we would ever know exactly how things went down on either side very precisely though.
Very helpful in understanding what happened with the separate parts of Custer's divided command and where they were while certain events were transpiring.
I don't believe much of that is clearly known, as only the Indians could conclusively answer that, and their actually doing that is impossible because of the mob nature of their force. Based on what the Army forces actually faced, it seems clear most of the Indian combatants first met Reno then abandoned him and pursued Custer, ultimately all converging upon Reno/Benteen after Custer's demise, resulting in a failed attempt to destroy the remaining Army units.
@@caelachyt More is known about their actions than about Custer's actions. They were not a mob (the warriors were broken into organized military units), and most of them (warriors and non-warriors) survived to give witness. We just have a poor record of listening to them. @Jeffrey Wall - Custer's actual whereabouts after about 2:15 (video position, not local time) are speculative, and IMO doubtful. Most accounts from tribal elders that I've heard have him down at Ford B, receiving a fatal gunshot to the chest, though probably not dying until he was shot in the head, possibly by his brother, on Last Stand Hill. To my knowledge, those accounts offer the only available explanation for his chest wound. The tribal and family oral histories are not always in perfect harmony with each other, but they are far too easily dismissed by Euro-American historians. They are the ONLY first-hand accounts of the day, and there were many thousands of them. A disproportionate number of them were recognized as wise elders gathered for a council. They did not come as organized bands. They came as individual elders and their families. It would be like all members of congress gathering with their families, only a lot more of them. The number of warriors is also sharply contested. Oral histories say that there were no more than 2000 warriors in the village. It was not a war council, but a meeting to decide what to do. The elders I've spoken with and those I've heard interviewed say the US Army had its own definition of a warrior, and that seemed to be any man or boy capable of movement, or in Custer's case, any American Indian period. (He had a horrific track record.) The warriors certainly outnumbered the soldiers, but not at all by such a margin as we Euros have been taught. And it's also true that some of the unskilled boys in the camp fought very well in defense of their camp, notably against Reno's charge, in defense of their horses, and repelling the Army at Ford B. And maybe other less-skilled men joined the fray elsewhere, but the number who fought seems to be greatly exaggerated. Don't believe my version just because I wrote it (that would be just stupid), but please do familiarize yourself with the accounts of notable people who were there, some of which are accounts of the primary sources themselves. Black Elk was there as a boy, and he published his account with some professor I think. The following year, shortly before his death, the account of Crazy Horse was published in a newspaper. (I have not studied that account, so I can't comment on its trustworthiness. The US press was worse then than they are now with telling the truth.) Many descendants are also telling the stories they heard from their grandfathers who fought and others who were there, such as Bald Eagle. (He died recently, but there are interviews here on YT.) There is no shortage of first-hand accounts from people who fought at the Greasy Grass (Little Bighorn).
@@warbull888 They sure did! Stealthily, cleverly, effectively, and spiritually, and with honor (according to their own traditions of honor). I don't mean to glamorize or glorify war, but if war comes, I think you can have no better allies than Nature, Mother Earth, wisdom, and a good heart. Yeah, that would certainly go for hunting as well.
The word “mob” might be a bad choice of adjective. They certainly were organized, but their activities that day were not logged into history by anything other than spoken word. I am surprised that the Army didn’t piece together a better after-action accounting of their defensive operations by interviewing those who were there.
I Totally appreciate this I would like to point out that a battle has TWO sides involved at least and there are NO opponents portrayed I know this is how many see the battle or that this is ALL they're interested in but still....
Thank you, I am sure your depiction represents a great deal of study and time. As someone who as a child watched "They Died with Their Boots ON" on a grainy black and white TV during the 1950s the story has always held my interest. I long ago learned that my original movie version was slightly off with the truth. Okay pretty much totally off except Custer died and the way he died and, and, and... I expect the folks who have spent the last 146 years refighting and studying the battle and who are now reduced to counting the blades of grass on each hill will have plenty of *analysis and *complaints to make. **(both seen below in large numbers) I would also think some, many, of their points may be or are valid. That said, to this old movie watcher, reader of a few books, and some articles, your video is much appreciated and I would think probably got it as close to right as anyone can. Again, thank you very much.
The big question here - is why was Custer's Command so scattered? For Reno, Benteen and the Pack train - we know. For the Companies with Custer - we don't. If they'd all been together - they might have survived. Of course they might not have but we know what happened when they did what they did - for whatever reasons they did it. .
They were obviously waiting for Benteen and Custer moved on to find a crossing where non combatants were fleeing. The Indians just had luck on their side and caught the 7th at the right time.
The reason that Custer's command appeared scattered, from what I once read, is that he broke formation, and tried a maneuver that worked for him previously. That is, he tried to capture and hold hostage non combative Indians (women and children). Something about how the Warriors wouldn't attack for sake of breaking tribal beliefs. This time it didn't work.
These videos are some of the best ways to show where all resources were in relation, and something not possible until modern times. This is one of those cases where a plan isn't adhered to and gives an action to study forever.
I appreciate the animation. I do take issue with your timing/chain of events with Keogh and Yates movements. I believe E Company went down to the river and engaged the Native forces without fording, while Custer, Company F and HQ element went further north, looking for the terminal of the village and a suitable ford. At the same time, Keough deployed. I think E company fought until supported by a detachment from F Company. At the same time, Keogh became engaged. The situation becoming untenable and taking fire from three sides, he sent C company to charge and clear Native Forces out of Ravine. Meanwhile, L and I company became increasingly surrounded. C company originally cleared forces from the ravine, but were immediately surrounded by hidden Natives, and routed. They ran back to the ridge while L company covered their "retreat". Increasingly, L and I became surrounded. As E Company and detachment from F retreated back to Custer and remainder of F Co and HQ, it became increasingly obvious that there was to be no junction with Keogh's battalion, and Benteen failed. Remnants of Keogh's battalion, after being overrun, tried to fight their way to Custer. I think the fighting further north was NOT a group of 40 soldiers making a run for it, but Custer, HQ and F Company scouting further north, becoming engaged, and heading back to Last Stand Hill. My theory is also that the intent for Benteen was not "valley hunting" as he tried to say, but to head left, and then strike somewhere in the middle of the village while Custer and his group hit the north. All of this assumed that Reno's holding force would fight longer than 20 minutes. Just my theory.
No expert here, but Custer's recall of Benteen more consistent with Benteen's claim that he had been sent to "valley hunt" as an original order to attack middle of village would have supported Custer's strategy of envelopment and not required a change. As an aside, we do not know if Custer sent other orders or what they were if riders did not get through. Maybe a new order was sent to Reno after Martini left to carry the order to Benteen, but the rider was killed. We will never know. But, that could change our understanding of Custer's defeat.
@@richardloosli5532 Problem I have is that everything Reno and Bentsen testified to has been as proven as can possibly be, to be self-serving and patently inaccurate, if not deliberately untruthful. Bentsen had an axe to grind with Custer, and possibly justifiably so, since before Washita. Reno was derelict, and almost certainly inebriated and hysterical. I’m no Custer apologist by any means, and I’m not certain a victory on that day was possible under any circumstance, but he clearly did not get the support from Benteen that he hoped for. And Reno’s assault failed after 15-20 minutes…not nearly enough time.
@@ericstoner5668 Oh yes, major failings after Benteen and MacDougall rejoined Reno. Unfortunately, we don't know if Custer sent further orders to them and the messengers failed to get through. Further orders would clarify their culpability.
@@richardloosli5532 I've read about two dozen books on it...the last one I read, "The Fights on the Little Horn" by Gordon Harper, is one of the best....he seems to suggest that might have been the case, due to the locations of a couple of bodies....one thing is sure: Custer was waiting on Benteen, and Benteen was derelict.
@@ericstoner5668 Benteen chose to support Reno, as this was whom he first came upon. Custer was farther to the north. Both Reno and Benteen may have had axes to grind, but this was poor planning to begin with from Custer, who had force marched his men ahead of this throughout the night. What happened, happened and there's no changing the result. Had Benteen moved to support Custer both his AND Reno's companies would have been annihilated. Thus, everyone had to do what they needed to do which was necessary to survive. Custer's constant divisioning of his companies, gave the Native tribes the advantage that they needed. Poor strategy by Custer.
Very good . Perfect or not, you have done a great job. I would like to see Benteen's and the Pack train stop at the Morass.. and the 2 messengers that Custer sent... by adding them and other events from witnesses , Maybe a better understanding could be made. Really excellent.
Chris, very well done. I didn't realize that Custer's wing had gone so far beyond Cemetery Ridge. Sorry about all of the know-it-alls lecturing you as if they were there. Must be very easy for those people to go through life without being the least bit hindered by actual facts.
Charles H. It's the nature of the business. They read a couple of books and all of a sudden their experts. I laugh because I have 20 years studying this topic and many of my friends ARE the forgoing researchers and authors on the subject. All you can do is fight ignorance with facts. It might not change their opinion, but for the other students of the battle, they can learn something.
Great job, but I wish the map had a scale on it. Hard to imagine the distances while watching. Last Stand Hill is 4.1 miles from Reno Hill. Think of 4.1 miles from your house down the nearest mile section roads. It's a hell of a distance. I can't imagine seeing or hearing anything from 4.1 miles away from my house.
After 60 years of study I would say I agree with about 90% of your narrative. The points I disagree with are not insignificant, but the outcome was the same. I think a through look at the Rosebud would show the real beginning and are directly linked. Overall there will never be a definitive answer to everything but your presentation here stands the tests and my opinion is it is a good overall picture of this day in History. Having served in combat that old rule that the plan falls apart at fist contact was proven here beyond a doubt.
Your point about the Rosebud is spot on ! Hard to believe that Crook, gave up and turned around one week before this battle at the Little Big Horn and was only 60 miles away. Also, I still have a hard time understanding why the Regimental Commander, Col. Sturgis was not in the field with his command and the whole trip was left to Custer. It doesn't make any sense at all and had he been in command, I would bet none of the coming events would have happened. He, like Crook, were veterans of the Mexican War as well as the Civil War.
General Crook’s defeat on the Rosebud set the stage for coming events. The 7th Cav was just part of a larger operation. Crook had the largest force and he turn back. He did not inform any of the other commanders of his decision.
Chris. Very informative and interesting... thanks for posting... Would it be possible to get a paper map of the troop movements as you displayed in your video..are they available?
everyone loves to rubbish Benteen as the guy who never rushed to Custers aid but by the look of it Custer and his men would have been dead before the rescue mission took off and all Benteen would have achieved in an ill fated charge would have been a higher death toll of US cavalry
Yep, he should not have kept heading north as Reno was being whipped to the south. He got separated so far from his own troops, there was no way anyone was gonna save him with the few numbers of troops on the battlefield that day.
After reading on this event from multiple places, I just can't see how Benteen was gonna save the day. Custer totally miss read the number of the Indians and totally guessed wrong on their actions of fighting instead of running. He probably stuck his nose down into that river once too often and got those thousands of braves pissed off. Without knowing the exact time-lines, Benteen would have probably had only a few minutes at Renos' side before he would have needed to charge off to where he thought Custer was at. Maybe his riding up would have scared the braves back to the river? Maybe, maybe not. Maybe Custer was already slaughtered to a high degree by this time and all Benteen would have accomplished is getting more men killed before he retreated back to Reno? 1) His message to Benteen only said to come quickly. If he knew he was about to get slaughtered, would these have been the words of a man facing death for all his men? 2) Why was Reno left out of this saving ride? 3) Just a guess but maybe Custer was totally unaware of his situation and the Reno and Benteen situation he had left earlier.
@@250txc I think Custer saw an opportunity to win the battle the same as he did at the Washita years before. He had an opportunity to capture the non-combatants and force a surrender. At Washita he used those non-combatants as a human shield to cover his faint and ultimately his retreat from the larger village up river. Sitting Bull, Runs the Enemy and some other Cheyenne and Lakota admitted that Custer came "frighteningly close to winning" the most spectacular victory of his career at Little Bighorn. This despite the fact that Mitch Boyer and other scouts warned him that this village was MUCH larger than Washita and his plan was extremely dangerous. "Custer luck" just seemed to run out on June 25th 1876
@@19MichaelDixon He got all his men killed is realty. Just amazing so many cling to this human who made so many bad decisions and got 200+ men killed in just a few hrs.
Very good. This timeline clearly shows over an hour passing between Benteen arriving at Reno's position and Custer's demise. There was plenty of time for them to go to Custer as he had ordered.
Valion you're forgetting one important detail, the speed at which the pack train could move. Had Reno and Benteen left the packs out of supporting distance, they could have easily been targeted. Ironically, Custer himself left Reno and Benteen out of supporting distance of the two commands and he suffered the consequences of such a gamble.
@@hoffert17 - The pack train was defended by the equivalent of two companies. They were not defenseless. They arrived at Reno's position at about 15:00. Benteen met up with him at about 14:00. It is entirely feasible that a Reno/Benteen force could have met up with Custer around 14:30 and moved back toward the pack train meeting up with them roughly at the time they arrived at Reno Hill. In any case the Indians were not everywhere at once and it is highly uncertain they would have abandoned the Custer position to rush to the pack train. Moreover, losing the two companies worth of pack train was preferable to losing Custer's 220 men.
Valion well Custer's last instructions were to bring the packs, although cryptic in its scribble on the paper, indicates he wanted the packs; so unless you subscribe immediately to the idea that Custer implied he personally wanted them, you have to weigh the possibility that he wasn't requesting them and Benteen to come directly to him. The message says come on, big village, be quick, bring packs, p.s. Bring pacs (sic). How does one come quick and bring the packs--the packtrain can only move at certain speed, which is slow? Also, why the iteration for packs twice? People read too much into the last note. The best deduction I've seen of this is that it was simply an intelligence update. Come on (end your scout and move up), big village (we found the village, its big) bring packs (secure the packtrain) be quick (move your units and the packtrain forwards as quick as possible) p.s. bring pacs (sic) (cut out a few ammunition packs). Now for the over critical analysis of Reno. It's a myth that Weir held conference with Reno. This comes from only two individuals, both of whom are highly suspect and not very credible. Not a single person of credibility ever mentioned such a meeting. Mind you, Reno was still reorganizing his three companies and dealing with wounded. Now 15 minutes after Benteen arrived, firing was heard down stream. This had to be when Custer was in MTC near Ford B. Weir heard the firing and made comment to Gibson that he was going to meet with Reno and gain permission to go to the sound of the firing and asked Gibson if he'd follow him; Gibson of course agreed. Now this meeting never appeared to occur as at this moment Reno was leading a detail trying to recover Hodgson's body. Weir took it upon himself to scout ahead, probably to get a better fix on Custer. Gibson saw this and assumed Weir had gotten permission and lead the company out. Reno returned to the hill and saw Gibson moving out then sent Hare with immediate instructions for Weir to try and make contact with Custer and that the regiment would follow. Roughly 30 minutes from this the packtrain was with supporting distance and several ammunition packs had been cut out and distributed to Reno's depleted companies. They followed immediately thereafter. Weir climbs the point but cannot ascertain Custer's position. It's smoky and dusty and over two miles away. Benteen arrives 10ish minutes after Weir with Reno shortly after. The regiment is strung out in a defensive position along the loaf and bluffs. No one on Weir point can see anything except for a lot of Indians moving up and down MTC. By this point, Calhoun and Harrington had been routed and Keogh would be in his death throes with Custer occupying defensive positions on LSH. No one had any idea where Custer was in the furlough or what was truly happening. 10 minutes after this, a large volume of Indians turn towards Weir point. Seeing that the position isn't defendable, Benteen suggests occupying better terrain in which Reno issued orders to reoccupy Reno Hill. The regiment barely made it back to the hill then quickly became surrounded and the bullets were "thick." It's not as cut and dried as you make it out to be. You're looking at this through hindsight, those guys were making decisions in the heat of the moment with the most minimal information available.
@@hoffert17 - I agree on the hindsight, yet things were known in the moment. Reno/Benteen knew Custer wanted quick reinforcement (and resupply, whether that meant the train or just extra ammo Benteen had). They knew Custer was in a fight. They knew there were a lot of Indians and Custer could not survive that onslaught alone. They were not opposed by Indian forces at the time. They were within about a half hour of reaching Custer's position. They knew the divided command greatly lessened the chances of survival of the entire command. It's not cut and dried but it is clear that if Reno/Benteen moved immediately upon linking up,there is a good chance they could have reached Custer and kept more alive than their inaction did. As Lt. Edgerly wrote: “With the information they had at the time there was no reason not to have tried it.”
Valion Edgerly is as reliable a source as Private Goldin, not even remotely. They knew Custer was engaged but they had no idea where or what his circumstances were--which basically every officer and man present attested to. So what's the reasonable military logic to surrender the high ground to march all your troops into a huge coulee with overlapping high ground all around it? If you're staring at a sizeable force, greater in number than yours, it would make no sense to charge head long into them if you aren't even sure where you are going. I gotta ask, do you have a military combat background? I do, so I can understand things in a military logistic manner. Literally everyone present had no clue what Custer was doing, what his plan was, or what his circumstances were. To most of the enlisted men, they felt Custer had abandoned them. The officers suspected that he had been beaten back as they had been and would backtrack to Terry and bring reinforcements. From a military standpoint, none of your argument makes sense. You don't attack a known sizeable force without knowing your exact strategic goals. Custer was in a fight, sure; but where was his location? Two miles away through dust and smoke, no one could see anything of strategic value. If his position could have been properly fixed, then you have to devise a battle plan and choose a route of travel. What then are the strategic goals and how do you mitigate risk in trying to achieve those goals? You're about to make contact with a superior sized and armed force, not an easy scenario to play out. On top of that, you're dealing with a supply train speed issue and previous casualties--all of which work against achieving your strategic goals. If Reno and Benteen had gone down there, there'd be near 700 markers spread across the field. Far more than just the 210 lost under Custer. Absolutely no terrain passed Nye ridge is defensible, as Custer found out. Then, if they had any success in linking up with Custer, now you have to address another logistic issue--water. Given the much closer proximity to the village and invariably being much further from a water supply, you'd have a much higher casualty and fatality rate, horses wouldn't be rideable, etc. At what point then do the Indians break your back--I would estimate by end of the 26th, and that's if they could have found defensible terrain. Reno and Benteen may have gotten through, but they never would have gotten out. They made the right call; and war really is hell. Military leaders have to make snap decisions, with the least amount of info, and hope for the best--that's from firsthand experience. We can criticize all we want, but those guys were there and all of them were professional officers--personalities aside, they were all competent leaders with varying degrees of experience. Everything just happened to fast for Custer to react to. He got himself out of supporting distance of his subordinate units and he gambled on the natives adhering to historic tactics, and he and those under his command paid the price for him making the wrong call. Maybe if he had developed and communicated his battle plans to his senior officers better, they could have adhered to his intent; but as is, Custer was leading by the seat of his pants and not communicating well with his officers--he had always been like that.
Seeing the movements of Custer and his sub-commanders makes it even more astonishing that Custer ignored his scouting reports about the superior numbers he faced. It's also perplexing that he divided his forces in such a way that it diluted any real offensive punch Custer might have had, and it allowed the indians to defeat them piecemeal. At the very least, it was military incompetence. There was never even a single minute during this entire engagement when either Reno or Custer were not hopelessly being over-run or in a panicked retreat.
Custer made his name in the Civil War doing stuff like this. Benteen had said eventually it would end up getting Custer into trouble he couldn't get out of. Inadequate reconnaissance followed by overextending his units. Thought he was at a roundup and ended up with an actual battle.
This is an excellent clarification of what happened. As a newbie to this topic, it looks like the first thing they were trying to do was just find the Indians. Custer going north, Reno going through the middle and Benteen going south. Then there's so many Indians that they are able to surround both Custer and Reno, keeping them from joining up. Benteen looks like he's stopped for a bit, but that seems to be because he received a message telling him to get more ammo from the pack train and bring it forward. So he's waiting for the pack train to come up and goes forward when he's got the extras. Reno's encircled command is the first one he meets, so he assists Reno first, the the Indians are so numerous he's in danger of encirclement himself, so his first job is to help Reno survive. Reno and Benteen never got to Custer in time. I can see how Benteen got criticized for not going further to save Custer, but it looks like he was too occupied with just keeping Reno alive. He may not even have known where exactly Custer was, given the terrain.
I believe Keogh was the officer shot at the ford "wearing the buckskin" (as was his horse comanche) . He was shot in the knee along with a couple/few other soldiers around him. His boot was found at the ford. This is what the indians initially repulsed, and what put a wrench into the plans, to attack the village from the side immediately to help relieve Reno.
This post is just my ideas regarding what I know of the battle, and I am sort of reasoning with it as I type, as some things just seem weird to me. What I have a hard time processing is that when Custer crested the hill and saw the village below, and saw Reno attacking, how could he not realize just how many combatants were going to be in the village? I understand that his decision making up to that point had been based not only on his past experiences, but army doctrine of the time for fighting on the plains, and perhaps he expected little resistance at the outset. But seeing the size, he had to have a realization at that point of the danger. Did he not equate this with combatants outnumbering him greatly? Perhaps he was trying to capture the non-combatants to draw the warriors away from Reno and complete his objective of forcing the Native Americans onto reservations, but I only see a handful of reasons for pursuing that course of action given the fact that he saw the village's size. One of those reasons is that he potentially realized there was no way he was going to win this fight given the disparity in numbers, his green troops, his strung out positions, outdated weaponry, and terrain that favored the defense, thus this was the only option to complete his mission. He was going to win not by directly beating the enemy combatants, but by going for the jugular and taking hostages, forcing the warriors to capitulate. It is not as if, having killed all the warriors, the non-combatants would be able to escape without being caught shortly thereafter. So obviously he was not attempting to crush all enemy resistance, if in fact he was pursuing the non-combatants with his wide flanking maneuver. If that was not his reasoning, the only other reason would be he was in fact trying to win by forcing the enemy to fight on two fronts. This only makes sense if ford B was the first place to cross the river. I highly doubt this was his reasoning. The idea that he was trying to draw the combatants away from Reno is also hard to fathom considering again the distance he travelled, which he did so while concealing his movements to the enemy, thus probably not trying to draw them away. Also, consider that he need not have crossed the river at all were that his objective. All in all I think it makes the most sense that he was in fact attempting to capture the women and children. It is very clear in my estimation that he never considered abandoning the mission objective for the sake of ensuring that his men could put up a defense. So if the non-combatant theory is true, he had to know he was taking a chance given the village's size, and Reno's predicament, which he had knowledge of. It may be that he knew Reno had retreated to a defensible position, but he could not know that the position was truly defensible given that Reno already had his attack crushed, thus he had only the one option to achieve his mission. And in that instance he had to know that there was the chance the enemy would concentrate solely on his exposed troopers. Given the knowledge that he had, he should have just combined his forces. Napoleon had already established decades prior that you divide your army to maneuver and unite it to fight. Custer had to know how important numbers were since he fought in the Civil War. Unless he just had a really low opinion of his adversary's combat capabilities. But he had to know that combat power, at that time, was solely based on the number of guns you could bring to bear on your adversary. He didn't take gatling guns because he wanted to remain nimble, and he had no reason to believe that he would need them. The fact that he only rushed into an attack in the first place was because he thought he had been compromised. So who knows what would have happened had he been able to carry out his original plan, which would have given him a great advantage in the first part of the battle. I think it is clear from the archaeological evidence that Custer actually divided and sub-divided his forces, all the while maneuvering offensively, right up until he was forced to go on the defensive. He tried to maintain some manner of initiative, but it was hopeless at that point, as his decision to move so far from his only help, and knowing that his help had already been beaten in a fight, meant he had to know what would happen. I personally feel that Reno could have had the time to get to Custer, but it was not feasible given his predicament. Once it was clear that his men were safe from being overrun, it was too late. So I think Custer's decisions alone sealed their fate.
It's always difficult to understand how it is that commanders with a long record of success screw up this badly; and if there are no survivors, it is impossible to know for sure what they were thinking. It may simply be that by the time he realized how much shit he had ridden into that the native warriors were too close upon him to outrun making successful retreat impossible. If he had been able to outrun them I wonder if his best chance would have been to ride south to rejoin Reno, Benteen and the pack train, though that route may have been cut off. A reconsolidated command would have "only" been outnumbered 2-4 to 1, instead of up to 10 to 1.
Reno's men were only safe from being overrun temporarily. They, and Benteen, would have been overrun had it not been for the other column of soldiers coming up the Little Bighorn from the North.
Near right on. Travelled the Rosebud from Yellow rive many time, stopping at the Crows nest, Maras , lone tp and in to last Stan hill. I believe once the Indians attacked Custer it was over in 30 minutes. If you ever get to go to the LBH pay attention to the lay of the land, typography , height of the land from the river. Custer never had a chance.
Correction: Custer's 7th Cavalry attacked the Native tribes.They defended themselves & won the day. Given Custer's foolishness, his command "never had a chance."
@@patrick888881 Look Mittens, it's another Colonizing Boot licking believer of false history. There are no Honorable treaties when you invade and make someone sign a piece of paper. Dumb Ass.
I am curious, are the bugle calls we hear the calls one would expect for retreat, or skirmish? If so that is most excellent! I can't get over the amount of ground covered and involved in the battle.
The bugle calls are accurate albeit none were used or heard during Reno’s fight in the valley. Native testimony does allude that Custer probably used them.
The animation shows that Custer could not have been saved by Weir and Reno. It would have taken more than two hours to get to Custer. It was over by then.
This is the best way of showing troop movements on a battlefield. That yellow 'worm' early on at bottom right (Benteen) appears to be a wild goose chase. What was Custer thinking!? Like many other aspects of this day - we will never know. The orange 'worm' upper left late on, "Custer scouts ford D..." is new to me. Can anyone give references to what it is based on please?
When Custer sent Benteen on the scout to the left, the village’s location has not yet be pinpointed. They knew it was in the area but weren’t sure how far ahead it was. It’s a fair estimate that Custer probably thought it was closer than it was given the instructions he passed to Benteen along the scout. Custer taking E and F company on a scout to Ford D is not new. It’s been a developing theory since the archeological digs of the 1980s began confirming various native eye witness accounts of the battle. John Stands in Timber gave one of the most complete accounts of this. To paraphrase, Custer left Calhoun Hill headed north and disappeared behind battle ridge. He re-emerges momentarily by Last Stand Hill then disappears again still moving north. Several sporadic accounts mention Custer arriving near the Ford D area then Stands in Timber mentions seeing Custer’s two companies crest Cemetery Ridge and eventually moves to Last Stand Hill. So as it stands with the witness accounts and archeology, Custer left Keogh with C, I, & L companies on Calhoun Hill and proceeded north. He moved into the swale, came up the east side of Last Stand Hill, then descended into a coulee system that starts just north of Last Stand Hill parallel to wear the visitor center is, and traversed it to near where the restaurant and gift shop is. The coulee system makes a fairly sharp westerly turn and the gradually fans out as you reach the Ford. Custer saw the Ford and determined what he needed to and then returned. His return route took a more direct coulee system from cemetery ridge which they scaled and it was at this point that they would have seen things weren’t going quite to plan. Under pressure from the north, he advances into Big Basin and then occupies Last Stand Hill.
@@hoffert17 thanks very much for your quick answer, especially that 'Ford D' info. I have been interested in this battle for about, um... 53 years. More pieces for the jigsaw. I don't mean to stir but you don't support some Indian claims that Custer was wounded/killed at Ford B?
@@derekwhitenz the only Native accounts claiming “Custer” was shot or killed at Ford B have pretty much been debunked by others present. White Cow Bull seems to be one of the main sources for this myth but other Cheyenne present largely refute his claims. The rest of the evidence can be found in the tactical disposition in the chain of command as well as the description of Custer’s wounds. The military follows a pretty regimented chain of command system, a system that was very much adhered to in period military structure. First one must look at Custer’s wounds examined post mortem. He was hit in the left temple and left breast. The overall description of his wounds are quite vague and some conjecture exists as to which was inflicted first however the general consensus is that the left breast wound was inflicted first and the head wound was post mortem. There’s only one account which postulated the head wound being delivered first and that’s Private Adams however those that more closely examined the body believed the left temple gunshot wound to have been delivered after he was already dead. It is agreed upon by those who saw the body that the left breast would have been mortal if not fatal. It was close to the heart and certainly penetrated at least one lung possibly both given it entered the left and exited right rear of his back. If he received this wound first it would have been debilitating if not fatal. If he was hit at Ford B with such a wound then the command of the battalion would have fallen to Captain Keogh who was the senior captain and the headquarters element would have then fallen under him. This then leads into the chain of command angle. If Custer had been wounded or killed in such a matter then the disposition of the bodies would be different then what we actually see. Since Keogh would have assumed command then you would have seen the headquarters element killed with him in the swale. We of course don’t see that. The headquarters element was killed with Custer on Last Stand Hill which means that Custer must have still been perfectly fine in the saddle until at least the return from Ford D. All officers that were identified died where you would expect them to based on the chain of command except for Smith who was found on Last Stand Hill. His company was wiped out in the basin area also known as the south skirmish line. The other bit of evidence is simply in the continued offensive movement north. If Custer had been hit, it’s highly unlikely that the battalion would still continue its trip to the north as Native accounts state. Careful examination of the testimony that is reliable in regards to the Ford B fighting does indicate that someone clad in buckskins was hit in the area and their horse bolted towards the river and the rider was then unhorsed and finished off. This person was probably Lieutenant Sturgis. There’s two key pieces to these accounts that put a name to the person. The fact that he was clad in buckskin is one. Sturgis was wearing buckskins on the day of the battle and it was noted that he was one that didn’t take his blouse off. Custer had removed his and tied it to the saddle so Custer was not clad in buckskins, just the pants. The second and more key evidence is a description of a very specific item found on the horse of the man killed at the river and that it was a small wooden box with metal tools inside. Based on this it can more than likely be ascertained that it was an engineer kit and Sturgis was the acting engineer for the regiment.
@Ojibway News Always take the high ground especially if you are facing a far superior force( number wise), never divide your force as you will need them to protect your flanks. Or use the to attack your opponants flanks. A great book to read on this subject is "How Great Generals Win" by Bevin Alexander. The one thing that most of these generals had in common, they ignored what help them win, keeping their forces together. Though out numbered by a greater force and possessing the high ground and having far superior weapons, Custer lost only because he divided his forces. A flanking position is the ability to keep your forces together and creating a crossfire, especially have greater firepower would have taken the will to fight away from the Indians as they would have loss great numbers. Then they could have gone on the attack and finish them off. During Desert Storm H Norman Schwartzkopf had a force that was out numbered 3 to 2 against the Iraqi's. He never divided his force even though he had won the sky's. From the coast of the Person gulf to the east his force was one long train. Even when he sent the bulk of his force to the east for the end round there was no breaks in his lines. Any great leader will tell you that the best way to win a battle is to throw as much firepower down range.
Dividing his forces was a standard technique developed for Cavalry during the Civil War and throughout the Plains Indian Wars. Custer had used this technique before with success,
@@jameswolfbailey3263 This is true, and he did this time. His failure to understand that he was out numbered was the issue, when he divided his forces prior he had the advantage of numbers and advanced weapons. This time he was out numbered and was facing equal weapons. That is why I said you don't divided your forces, and I should have added unless circumstances are in your favor.
@@kenkarish826 You are correct, as they taught us in Ranger School to always know where you are about to do battle, and the inside joke we whispered back and forth was, "is this the hill he will have us die for?" But in regards with the odds being what they were 2500 10 210 well even with Benteen and Reno (who I content was a coward and probably had more than one drink that morning) they would have all died.
Custer had an offensive mindset given that he did not expect the Indians to offer resistance...and least an organized one. Prior engagements resulted in scattering. It's not that you don't divide your forces....you don't separate them from mutual support.....Custer from Kehoe (his rear guard so he could go find the women and children) and Custer from Reno/Benteen/Pack train. Custer was on the Offensive....granting greater distance between forces. Custer thought Reno would delay the Hostiles long enough as to capture the Women and Children....Custer pushed too far north and lost situational awareness on multiple levels....his inability to support Kehoe at the critical time....and order a withdraw back the way he came sealed his fate.....he took too long to make a decision (which was very unlike Custer). Kehoe either din't realize how rapidly the situation was changing ..or he did and situation and circumstance didn't allow him to send word to Custer....who again had put too much distance between the companies. Finally, Custer assumed when Benteen arrived he would threaten the Hostiles ability do infiltrate towards Kehoe's defensive position....or at least make them think twice about it. Custer's message to Benteen assumed he would arrive so that he would have cover to move farther north.....but he failed to assess and evaluate Reno's fight and Benteens progress before moving father north thus allowing himself to be cut off........and Reno's retreat essentially cut off Benteen's trek north to help Custer. Again...divide but keep mutual support via fighting and communication.
Cheers from Australia. Excellent presentation. As a newbie on the Little Bighorn Battle you have further wet my appetite. I am interested whether you have reviewed The Atlas Of The Sioux Wars Second Edition and if so your thoughts on the accuracy of the LBH maps included in that publication.
This was outstanding, I served in US Army in an armored division and cavalry regiment. Basically what the 7th cavalry did was a movement to contact. When Reno made contact first, Custer should have reinforced him. No doubt he heard the gunfire
Had Custer ridden towards the gunfire at around 13:00 he presumably would have seen Reno's situation and provided support for Reno's withdrawal across the river to higher ground. How the battle would have gone from that point is interesting to imagine.
The plan was for Custer to hit the village from the other end. Reno's logic is actually an excuse. Obviously if Custer were to fight from the same position as Reno then Custer would have remained with Reno, instead of traveling down the opposite side of the river. Read Reno's report and attempt to account for his actions from 2:30 to 6:00pm.
If Custer stays on the top of Reno Hill just a minute or two longer he probably makes it out of this battle alive I think. There’s no way he goes north after seeing Reno’s companies get wrecked.
He only saw Reno’s opening skirmish and at the moment, time to swoop in and support the attack was critical. He would have had to wait another 15-20 minutes waiting around to know Reno was in a bad spot-when in contact with the enemy, you don’t just sit around and wait. He had promised to support the attack and he was doing just that. Unfortunately, the situation changed the dynamics of the battle unbeknownst to Custer who continued on the offensive.
@@hoffert17Good explanation. What is seldom noticed is that the terrain contributed to Custer’s defeat. When he divided with Reno he surely thought it would be easy to come to his support. However when he realized he has to do it, it was a very long path to get to the rear of the enemy. At the same time Reno and his men could have thought they are abandoned which contributed to their panic. Everything fell apart
Well assuming your scenario and timeline is accurate ..... Custer was lost , slow , confused, and late to the battle plus constantly dividing his forces , oh and he was wrong or stupid? Both? Excellent presentation. Thx.
Qs; So Reno was already in skirmish mode 1/4 hour before Custer reached the high ground near Reno hill to wave? How long was Reno in the patch of woods before retreating up to Reno hill? I ask because from my readings he was in there 'possibly' longer then shown in the video. Love the concept and video and as for those that complain about some issues, learn to use pause. Its actually quite a fascinating video. Thank you.
@@printolive5512 Custer was doomed from the beginning. He should have never divided his forces before knowing the size of his enemy. Which begs the question, why would he dismiss his scouts warnings that it was a very large camp? He also stated he would back Reno, which he didn't, hence Reno took the brunt of the forces on his own.
Custer, knowing that he was over matched in force size must have known it was suicidal to split his forces. Custer could have ordered MAJ Reno's force to remain saddled and not dismount and act as a feint towards the southern encamped Indians. Once the Indians react to Reno and drew as close as 300m, he would then break contact and withdraw at a gallop to draw the Indians into Custer's set ambush. Custer could have set up a kill zone approx. 600m in diameter using concealed company sized ambush points. One location dominated the river bends east (1.5km) and the other dominated the river bend south east (1km) of the Reno-Benteen memorial. A concealed two Coy sized defensive line running 700m could have been established adjacent the river in the shallow low ground east of the river. This defensive line would cover Reno's withdrawal route and block the Indian advance across the river while the two companies in ambush would have enfilade fire into pursuing Indians. After safely crossing the river, Reno's men would withdraw to the rear and redeploy to act as flank protection to the north-west and south east to prevent the main body from being encircled. Meanwhile Benteen would have arrived at the battlefield and could lead his force along the path Reno took in his initial advance in order to engage the rear and southern flank of the attacking Indians. The terrain affords concealed withdrawal routes from the ambush locations to numerous secondary defensive lines on the eastern side of the river. Had Custer taken the time to assess the risks and the terrain and deployed his forces smartly and defensively, he may have achieved a victory as well as saved his men from needlessly losing their lives.
This was extremely helpful to me. Not to complain, but this could be made even better with additional animation showing the movement of the native forces.
Very good presentation! Most instructive. One question though, how certain would you be as to the movement of Benteen - in your presentation it seems like Benteen only mooved a very short distance westward before he turned back and united with Reno. I suppose that Benteen in reality reached way further westward? Am I right in that assumption. I realize that it is very hard to get all these movements down correctly in.a presentation. Anyways, very good job!
The terrain Benteen traversed was extremely rugged and grueling which made for slow going. He got to the third ridge and seeing nothing ahead of him decided to proceed back to the trail.
Only constructive criticism I have is the speed is too fast. Had to pause and rewind countless times to keep track of things - trying to keep track of all the various elements on the map along with the text on the bottom of the screen. Video would be better if it was slowed down a bit.
Good analysis Chris, the animation helps visualize those few hours. Do you feel the mix of Government horses vs. the more adaptable Indian ponies (quarter horses) was a factor?
@@Roheryn100 It wouldn't have mattered, Guys. The Calvary did not fight on horses (Hollywood myth). At the first indication of a firefight, soldiers would dismount and set up skirmish lines (one company, 75-100 men). The horses were hobbled and placed 200 to 300 yards behind the skirmish lines. The Indian strategy in any conflict was to permanently disable the horses first. The first volleys were always concentrated on the horses. It's much easier riding down a running man on foot armed with a Springfield single-shot carbine (five rounds a minute for an expert rifleman), especially when the Indians had Winchester, Henry, and Spencer repeating rifles. Only cavalry officers were issued pistols.
Great job. Unbelievable I was really cool I just went and did the anniversary visit this was actually January 1 now so June 25. I’m going back 26 on June 25. It will be really cool. You did a really good job. I tattooed myself there this past year. The letter that was sent back to Benteen Big a big bill is spring packs. I tattooed that on my leg cause I’m a tattoo orders, of course but anyways I tattooed that on my leg at the site around the area supposedly handed off at it’s really cool so I can’t wait to go back andexperienced this event again unbelievable buddy good job
Excellent Animation of the Four Battalion's, & the Flow of the Battle. This is just my Own difficulty, of Comprehending or Visualizing how? The Fighting progressed & was, at the different Stages of the Battle?. Like the Commencement of Reno's Attack on the South End of the Encampment. Too the Subsequent attempt by the Custer led Battalion, to Ford The River, at Medicine Tail Coulee. IT'S very easy too Forget? or not realize!! That the Whole Battle, is Fought, on Horse Back, & Foot. By both the 7th Cavalry Trooper's & the Native Warrior's alike. Thus the Battle is in constant Movement. First to the Little Bighorn River. Then it moves North to West, then East to North. Arriving at Last Stand Hill sometime Later. Where the Trooper's made Thier last desperate action. As I tried too mention previously. The Large area The Battlefield Cover's. Is really a Challenge for Myself at Least too Comprehend. I've said Enough here I guess. So I'll close with that was One Helluva A Fight!! Put on by Both Sides.
Custer sees Reno engaged. He then decides to gallop north in an attempt to flank. If he had waited a few more minutes at Reno hill he would have seen the major disengage and fall back.
Custer was detached from the column at the powder river depot and sent over the wood mountains and came in from the Southeast. Terry and Gibbon linked up along the Yellowstone and came in from the north.
thanks for a great video. I've wondered at times had the natives modern bows/arrows and known how the newcomers were going to cheat them how things would have gone around1840 or so,
The only thing that would make this better would be rough movements of Native forces. I know there’s limited information to base it on, but would be very helpful to show their general tactics throughout the battle
Amen.
I've been a "Custer buff" since my youth in the 1950s. I've visited the battlefield twice. My compliments on your animation. Not only accurate but moving!
I grew up near the Battlefield. We used to wander the grounds freely.
One friend had a Springfield Trapdoor rifle that his Grandfather had found and picked up a few years after the battle when he was a teen.
@@dsbmwhacker
That’s amazing.
Americans know absolutely zilch about our own history. It’s shameful. 💔
All he had to do was follow orders and wait for Terry
@@alitlweird Normally we don't know anything. Well, Hollywood has taken it upon itself to change it. And you believe more in the movies than in what the books say. If you want to know your true history... Study foreign books.
@@africanogloriosus7474
I believe more in the movies for my history than what I’ve studied? I did not know that about myself. Thanks, man! 😃
Please correct me if I am wrong:
12:40 Reno reaches skirmish line and fires
14:03 Custer reaches Ford B
14:05 Benteen arrives Reno Hill
14:25 Custer and Keogh reach Calhoun Hill
14:41 Weir departs for Weir Point
15:04 Weir arrives Weir Point 1.2 miles required 25 minutes. Sees/hears distant battle -- Calhoun Hill is 2.1 miles north. Last Stand Hill is .65 miles north past Calhoun Hill.
15:04 Paks (with 130 soldiers) arrive Reno Hill
15:17 Custer retreats to Last Stand Hill
Benteen could have spent 10 minutes reorganizing Reno's command, left one of his companies (42 men) to bolster Reno but taken the other two companies (83 men) to help Custer, Calhoun and Keogh. The way was clear past Weir point as Weir encountered no hostiles when he arrived at 15:04. Benteen could have been within .8 mile of Calhoun Hill by 14:55. He could have drawn pressure off Calhoun, and Calhoun was the start of Custer's disintegration. Benteen could have instructed the company left behind at Reno Hill to leave to join him as soon as the Paks arrived (15:04). Paks had an additional 130 soldiers.
I walked and drove the path from Reno Hill to Weir to Calhoun to Last Stand and my conclusion is that the terrain presented one surprise after another -- the soldiers couldn't tell what was over the next hill or or gully or around the next bend. Was it a defensible position or one that allowed snipers or infiltration? The terrain had so many hilltops, gullies and elevation changes that it didn't allow for an easily defensible position. The Crow scouts declined to accompany Custer and the Crows were the only ones who might have known the terrain.
If the times given are right then the opportunity to save Custer was pretty narrow. Your talking about 10 to 30 minutes or even less. Even minimal opposition by the Sioux would have slowed them down a lot. And of course the idea that Custer was in huge danger probably had not sunk in. Aside from that assuming that if they had gotten their in time. They would have at most saved some of Custer's men and possibly Custer himself. It appears to me that the 7th Calvary would still have gotten a bloody nose. Defeat instead of disaster.
Working a skirmish line up around there, you have NO cover. Scary scenario, even with an M4 or any other modern weapon.
@@makinapacal Agree
This is the best graphic animation of the battle that I have ever seen. I really appreciate the time and effort you put into this. Thank you!
You haven’t seen much have you.
Thank you! I'm working on a novel that requires some specific information about the movements of the US Army troops during the battle and this animation was a godsend. I am amazed at my good fortune in finding your outstanding work. Thanks again.
let us know where to get a copy of your novel pls!
May be worth it in your book to check out Vlogging Through History's reaction to this video, he gives basically a play by play, amazing from my perspective of a viewer
@@shakybill3 Thanks for the tip!
That animation format was amazing, accurate, and impressively specific. I look forward to more of these videos.
UNFORTUNATELY CUSTER TURNED OUT TO BE AN ARROGANT BLOWHARD AND FOOL AND IT COST MANY MEN WHO MIGHT HAVE LIVED TO RETURN TO THEIR FAMILIES ALIVE RATHER THAN FOR THEM TO NEVER SEE THEM AGAIN.
Amazing research and animation used in this video. The music choice also gives a sense of foreboding and a sense of helplessness for Custer. RIP to everyone here...
Another great video telling an amazing story. A story of miscalculation I think. Too bad for all those men who road into that battle not knowing their insurmountable disadvantage. I like the way you can follow the four different battalions and I love the accompanying audio especially the Bugler. Excellent job. Thanks so much.
Miscalculations? Was there a calculation? The movements seem totally random
@@gdiwolverinemale4th-taking on top many Indians without enough troopers.
Thanks so much for posting this, it really does a great job explaining movements and timelines.
Pretty accurate and well done. I do know that some of the officers could see from Weir Point
the hostiles riding around Last Stand Hill shooting "objects on the ground" which to me is literally the end of the Custer part of the battle. At that point the last troops on Last Stand Hill were being finished off and any survivors were racing down to the Deep Ravine to safety but ultimately their deaths.
think you are spot on there Scott, personally i think the " Firing into the ground" could also be interpreted as the Sioux and Cheyenne firing down on to the actual Last Stand in Deep Ravine, which from Weir point would indeed appear to be firing into the ground. A great visualisation of quite a complex encounter!
@@andymason1324 Right. The last shots are down Deep Ravine at 5:30-ish. "Last Stand Hill" troops were finished off by suicide (Custer) or by Indian women with sewing awls and knives. It all happened pretty quick. By the time lots of Indians rode up the hill to join the fight, it was already over.
Flanagan had field glasses next to weir. But George Wylie, Edgerly, and Faye rode a little further than weir.
@@waqqas800 Rode further, but still miles away?
@@zipperpillow yes that's very true, but there eyes were sharp without the field glasses
Amazing to be able to capture history this way and I pray it's accurate. This is a story all people who visit North America should learn. We should do the same to other places we visit out of respect.
I appreciate the work put into this animation . Having never been to the battlefield, I have a hard time visualizing the fight. This definitely clears up questions I have had about who was where and when.
Exactly what I've been looking for. Very well done.
Great animation. It really provides context to what happened and when.
Nice work! It's really great to be able to see how battles unfolded. Thank you.
Big Custer buff and admirer here too. Your animation is excellent. Makes a complex and not very well understood battle scenario clearer.
@Steve GA. A genuine question, why do you admire the man ? I know he had what some would say an good record of service in the American civil war but always at a higher cost to his men than his contemporaries. In the plains war against the natives killing mostly women children and non hostiles doesn't seem the act of a great general. Or am I missing something about this man ?
@@wulltaylor He was so vain and ambitious that practically no one liked him with the exception of his wife Elizabeth. He was known for his recklessness and for pushing his men to the limit. The Yellowstone campaign was the one he envisioned would catapult him to the presidency of the United States.
@@wulltaylor He was a publicly funded professional killer. That's what he was hired to do, trained to do, and expected to do. He caused the deaths of 2 of his brothers and a brother-in-law, and he also shot himself to death with his own revolver. So he treated others as he treated himself, and isn't that what the Bible says we should do? Or am I missing something about this man?
Have read Son of the Morning Star and visited the battlefield two times but this presentation has done more for my visualization of the battle than anything else. Thank you for your efforts.
is the television miniseries fatihful to the novel?
@@andreascala2663 It has been many years since I watched the miniseries but I think it was very faithful to the book if memory serves.
Enjoyed the animation. Any known movements of the Indians would have been nice, but good animation non the less.
I recently re-watched the mini series. It is fairly close to the book. Many I have talked to and read on have stated that they feel the depiction of the battle is the closest to be accurate as any they have seen. They do disagree on the manner in which Custer actually dies in the film, as no one knows if he died at the onset of the last stand or more toward the end of the engagement. All that is known is that he suffered 2 wounds to his body, either would have been instantly fatal. One just below the heart and one to the head. Reports show from I believe Benteen's assessment of his body is that he only bled from the chest wound which, if accurate, would mean the head wound was caused after his death and did not result in his actual death. I was required to study 7th cavalry history and Custer in general when I was stationed in Korea at Camp Garry Owen in the 4/7 Cav. I am by no means an expert on the subject, but just go by what I read and form opinions based on that. I have also read some of the accounts taken from Indians after the battle, but many are conflicting. I doubt we would ever know exactly how things went down on either side very precisely though.
Very helpful in understanding what happened with the separate parts of Custer's divided command and where they were while certain events were transpiring.
Not the video I was looking for, but certainly better than what I've seen.
Some commentary about what the Indians were doing - what their movements were and how they attacked - would add significant value to the animation
I don't believe much of that is clearly known, as only the Indians could conclusively answer that, and their actually doing that is impossible because of the mob nature of their force. Based on what the Army forces actually faced, it seems clear most of the Indian combatants first met Reno then abandoned him and pursued Custer, ultimately all converging upon Reno/Benteen after Custer's demise, resulting in a failed attempt to destroy the remaining Army units.
@@caelachyt More is known about their actions than about Custer's actions. They were not a mob (the warriors were broken into organized military units), and most of them (warriors and non-warriors) survived to give witness. We just have a poor record of listening to them.
@Jeffrey Wall - Custer's actual whereabouts after about 2:15 (video position, not local time) are speculative, and IMO doubtful. Most accounts from tribal elders that I've heard have him down at Ford B, receiving a fatal gunshot to the chest, though probably not dying until he was shot in the head, possibly by his brother, on Last Stand Hill. To my knowledge, those accounts offer the only available explanation for his chest wound.
The tribal and family oral histories are not always in perfect harmony with each other, but they are far too easily dismissed by Euro-American historians. They are the ONLY first-hand accounts of the day, and there were many thousands of them. A disproportionate number of them were recognized as wise elders gathered for a council. They did not come as organized bands. They came as individual elders and their families. It would be like all members of congress gathering with their families, only a lot more of them.
The number of warriors is also sharply contested. Oral histories say that there were no more than 2000 warriors in the village. It was not a war council, but a meeting to decide what to do. The elders I've spoken with and those I've heard interviewed say the US Army had its own definition of a warrior, and that seemed to be any man or boy capable of movement, or in Custer's case, any American Indian period. (He had a horrific track record.) The warriors certainly outnumbered the soldiers, but not at all by such a margin as we Euros have been taught. And it's also true that some of the unskilled boys in the camp fought very well in defense of their camp, notably against Reno's charge, in defense of their horses, and repelling the Army at Ford B. And maybe other less-skilled men joined the fray elsewhere, but the number who fought seems to be greatly exaggerated.
Don't believe my version just because I wrote it (that would be just stupid), but please do familiarize yourself with the accounts of notable people who were there, some of which are accounts of the primary sources themselves. Black Elk was there as a boy, and he published his account with some professor I think. The following year, shortly before his death, the account of Crazy Horse was published in a newspaper. (I have not studied that account, so I can't comment on its trustworthiness. The US press was worse then than they are now with telling the truth.) Many descendants are also telling the stories they heard from their grandfathers who fought and others who were there, such as Bald Eagle. (He died recently, but there are interviews here on YT.) There is no shortage of first-hand accounts from people who fought at the Greasy Grass (Little Bighorn).
The Natives fought like they huntted!
@@warbull888 They sure did! Stealthily, cleverly, effectively, and spiritually, and with honor (according to their own traditions of honor). I don't mean to glamorize or glorify war, but if war comes, I think you can have no better allies than Nature, Mother Earth, wisdom, and a good heart. Yeah, that would certainly go for hunting as well.
The word “mob” might be a bad choice of adjective. They certainly were organized, but their activities that day were not logged into history by anything other than spoken word. I am surprised that the Army didn’t piece together a better after-action accounting of their defensive operations by interviewing those who were there.
I Totally appreciate this
I would like to point out that a battle has TWO sides involved at least
and there are NO opponents portrayed
I know this is how many see the battle or that this is ALL they're interested in
but still....
Problem is no one is sure who was where and when for sure on the native side.
Currently reading The Last Stand by Nathaniel Philbrick. Thanks for this video, it gave me a visual. Great job.
Andrew McCammon
Read it too a while ago. Now reading “A Terrible Glory” by James Donovan. Worth looking into.
I have that book too!
Thank you, I am sure your depiction represents a great deal of study and time. As someone who as a child watched "They Died with Their Boots ON" on a grainy black and white TV during the 1950s the story has always held my interest. I long ago learned that my original movie version was slightly off with the truth. Okay pretty much totally off except Custer died and the way he died and, and, and... I expect the folks who have spent the last 146 years refighting and studying the battle and who are now reduced to counting the blades of grass on each hill will have plenty of *analysis and *complaints to make. **(both seen below in large numbers) I would also think some, many, of their points may be or are valid. That said, to this old movie watcher, reader of a few books, and some articles, your video is much appreciated and I would think probably got it as close to right as anyone can. Again, thank you very much.
It's so nice to be able to visualize events of the battle in time. It's difficult to do it in your head as you read.
Thank you for sharing this video! Really enjoyed it and it was very well done! Helps to put things into perspective and how quick everything was.
Very interesting. One suggestion would be a map scale to get a sense of the distances involved.
Impressive work. I've documented a number of large re-enactments. You make this VERY clear.
Mr. Hoffert, great work! It would also be very interesting to see the same kid of animation using the information available in the book Lakota Noon.
The big question here - is why was Custer's Command so scattered?
For Reno, Benteen and the Pack train - we know.
For the Companies with Custer - we don't.
If they'd all been together - they might have survived. Of course they might not have but we know what happened when they did what they did - for whatever reasons they did it.
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They were obviously waiting for Benteen and Custer moved on to find a crossing where non combatants were fleeing. The Indians just had luck on their side and caught the 7th at the right time.
The reason that Custer's command appeared scattered, from what I once read, is that he broke formation, and tried a maneuver that worked for him previously. That is, he tried to capture and hold hostage non combative Indians (women and children). Something about how the Warriors wouldn't attack for sake of breaking tribal beliefs. This time it didn't work.
These videos are some of the best ways to show where all resources were in relation, and something not possible until modern times. This is one of those cases where a plan isn't adhered to and gives an action to study forever.
Beautiful work sir!
I appreciate the animation. I do take issue with your timing/chain of events with Keogh and Yates movements. I believe E Company went down to the river and engaged the Native forces without fording, while Custer, Company F and HQ element went further north, looking for the terminal of the village and a suitable ford. At the same time, Keough deployed. I think E company fought until supported by a detachment from F Company. At the same time, Keogh became engaged. The situation becoming untenable and taking fire from three sides, he sent C company to charge and clear Native Forces out of Ravine. Meanwhile, L and I company became increasingly surrounded. C company originally cleared forces from the ravine, but were immediately surrounded by hidden Natives, and routed. They ran back to the ridge while L company covered their "retreat". Increasingly, L and I became surrounded. As E Company and detachment from F retreated back to Custer and remainder of F Co and HQ, it became increasingly obvious that there was to be no junction with Keogh's battalion, and Benteen failed. Remnants of Keogh's battalion, after being overrun, tried to fight their way to Custer. I think the fighting further north was NOT a group of 40 soldiers making a run for it, but Custer, HQ and F Company scouting further north, becoming engaged, and heading back to Last Stand Hill. My theory is also that the intent for Benteen was not "valley hunting" as he tried to say, but to head left, and then strike somewhere in the middle of the village while Custer and his group hit the north. All of this assumed that Reno's holding force would fight longer than 20 minutes. Just my theory.
No expert here, but Custer's recall of Benteen more consistent with Benteen's claim that he had been sent to "valley hunt" as an original order to attack middle of village would have supported Custer's strategy of envelopment and not required a change.
As an aside, we do not know if Custer sent other orders or what they were if riders did not get through. Maybe a new order was sent to Reno after Martini left to carry the order to Benteen, but the rider was killed. We will never know. But, that could change our understanding of Custer's defeat.
@@richardloosli5532 Problem I have is that everything Reno and Bentsen testified to has been as proven as can possibly be, to be self-serving and patently inaccurate, if not deliberately untruthful. Bentsen had an axe to grind with Custer, and possibly justifiably so, since before Washita. Reno was derelict, and almost certainly inebriated and hysterical. I’m no Custer apologist by any means, and I’m not certain a victory on that day was possible under any circumstance, but he clearly did not get the support from Benteen that he hoped for. And Reno’s assault failed after 15-20 minutes…not nearly enough time.
@@ericstoner5668 Oh yes, major failings after Benteen and MacDougall rejoined Reno. Unfortunately, we don't know if Custer sent further orders to them and the messengers failed to get through. Further orders would clarify their culpability.
@@richardloosli5532 I've read about two dozen books on it...the last one I read, "The Fights on the Little Horn" by Gordon Harper, is one of the best....he seems to suggest that might have been the case, due to the locations of a couple of bodies....one thing is sure: Custer was waiting on Benteen, and Benteen was derelict.
@@ericstoner5668 Benteen chose to support Reno, as this was whom he first came upon. Custer was farther to the north. Both Reno and Benteen may have had axes to grind, but this was poor planning to begin with from Custer, who had force marched his men ahead of this throughout the night. What happened, happened and there's no changing the result. Had Benteen moved to support Custer both his AND Reno's companies would have been annihilated. Thus, everyone had to do what they needed to do which was necessary to survive. Custer's constant divisioning of his companies, gave the Native tribes the advantage that they needed. Poor strategy by Custer.
Chris, this video is amazing! Thank you for making it!
Thank you! All those other "yahoos" pointing and talking were useless. This was so well done.
Very good graphic of the battle. i would only suggest a legend giving distance to the map face.
Google earth has a measuring method see my project earth.google.com/earth/d/1g0JJyT_-hhnusu71foxIg8wsWm7z7YAW?usp=sharing
Very good . Perfect or not, you have done a great job. I would like to see Benteen's and the Pack train stop at the Morass.. and the 2 messengers that Custer sent... by adding them and other events from witnesses , Maybe a better understanding could be made. Really excellent.
Chris, very well done. I didn't realize that Custer's wing had gone so far beyond Cemetery Ridge. Sorry about all of the know-it-alls lecturing you as if they were there. Must be very easy for those people to go through life without being the least bit hindered by actual facts.
Charles H. It's the nature of the business. They read a couple of books and all of a sudden their experts. I laugh because I have 20 years studying this topic and many of my friends ARE the forgoing researchers and authors on the subject. All you can do is fight ignorance with facts. It might not change their opinion, but for the other students of the battle, they can learn something.
@@hoffert17 its called Armchair Expert Syndrome.
@@250txc
Which were .......?
thx 4 this timeline animation - GREAT job
Great job, but I wish the map had a scale on it. Hard to imagine the distances while watching. Last Stand Hill is 4.1 miles from Reno Hill. Think of 4.1 miles from your house down the nearest mile section roads. It's a hell of a distance. I can't imagine seeing or hearing anything from 4.1 miles away from my house.
Well done. Mule-skinner's warning to Custer in the film, "Little Big Man", though fictional, hits me each time I ponder that strategic debacle.
The soundtrack to this are well done and hauntingly appropriate
I would like to see research involving rosebud
Watching the video in real time on the Anniversary. It's crazy how fast it happened.
After 60 years of study I would say I agree with about 90% of your narrative. The points I disagree with are not insignificant, but the outcome was the same. I think a through look at the Rosebud would show the real beginning and are directly linked. Overall there will never be a definitive answer to everything but your presentation here stands the tests and my opinion is it is a good overall picture of this day in History. Having served in combat that old rule that the plan falls apart at fist contact was proven here beyond a doubt.
Your point about the Rosebud is spot on ! Hard to believe that Crook, gave up and turned around one week before this battle at the Little Big Horn and was only 60 miles away. Also, I still have a hard time understanding why the Regimental Commander, Col. Sturgis was not in the field with his command and the whole trip was left to Custer. It doesn't make any sense at all and had he been in command, I would bet none of the coming events would have happened. He, like Crook, were veterans of the Mexican War as well as the Civil War.
General Crook’s defeat on the Rosebud set the stage for coming events. The 7th Cav was just part of a larger operation. Crook had the largest force and he turn back. He did not inform any of the other commanders of his decision.
Chris. Very informative and interesting... thanks for posting...
Would it be possible to get a paper map of the troop movements as you displayed in your video..are they available?
everyone loves to rubbish Benteen as the guy who never rushed to Custers aid but by the look of it Custer and his men would have been dead before the rescue mission took off and all Benteen would have achieved in an ill fated charge would have been a higher death toll of US cavalry
Yep, he should not have kept heading north as Reno was being whipped to the south. He got separated so far from his own troops, there was no way anyone was gonna save him with the few numbers of troops on the battlefield that day.
Also Custer divided and thinned out this forces, just making it easier to be defeated in force.
After reading on this event from multiple places, I just can't see how Benteen was gonna save the day. Custer totally miss read the number of the Indians and totally guessed wrong on their actions of fighting instead of running. He probably stuck his nose down into that river once too often and got those thousands of braves pissed off.
Without knowing the exact time-lines, Benteen would have probably had only a few minutes at Renos' side before he would have needed to charge off to where he thought Custer was at. Maybe his riding up would have scared the braves back to the river? Maybe, maybe not. Maybe Custer was already slaughtered to a high degree by this time and all Benteen would have accomplished is getting more men killed before he retreated back to Reno?
1) His message to Benteen only said to come quickly. If he knew he was about to get slaughtered, would these have been the words of a man facing death for all his men?
2) Why was Reno left out of this saving ride?
3) Just a guess but maybe Custer was totally unaware of his situation and the Reno and Benteen situation he had left earlier.
@@250txc I think Custer saw an opportunity to win the battle the same as he did at the Washita years before. He had an opportunity to capture the non-combatants and force a surrender. At Washita he used those non-combatants as a human shield to cover his faint and ultimately his retreat from the larger village up river.
Sitting Bull, Runs the Enemy and some other Cheyenne and Lakota admitted that Custer came "frighteningly close to winning" the most spectacular victory of his career at Little Bighorn. This despite the fact that Mitch Boyer and other scouts warned him that this village was MUCH larger than Washita and his plan was extremely dangerous. "Custer luck" just seemed to run out on June 25th 1876
@@19MichaelDixon He got all his men killed is realty. Just amazing so many cling to this human who made so many bad decisions and got 200+ men killed in just a few hrs.
Very good. This timeline clearly shows over an hour passing between Benteen arriving at Reno's position and Custer's demise. There was plenty of time for them to go to Custer as he had ordered.
Valion you're forgetting one important detail, the speed at which the pack train could move. Had Reno and Benteen left the packs out of supporting distance, they could have easily been targeted. Ironically, Custer himself left Reno and Benteen out of supporting distance of the two commands and he suffered the consequences of such a gamble.
@@hoffert17 - The pack train was defended by the equivalent of two companies. They were not defenseless. They arrived at Reno's position at about 15:00. Benteen met up with him at about 14:00. It is entirely feasible that a Reno/Benteen force could have met up with Custer around 14:30 and moved back toward the pack train meeting up with them roughly at the time they arrived at Reno Hill. In any case the Indians were not everywhere at once and it is highly uncertain they would have abandoned the Custer position to rush to the pack train. Moreover, losing the two companies worth of pack train was preferable to losing Custer's 220 men.
Valion well Custer's last instructions were to bring the packs, although cryptic in its scribble on the paper, indicates he wanted the packs; so unless you subscribe immediately to the idea that Custer implied he personally wanted them, you have to weigh the possibility that he wasn't requesting them and Benteen to come directly to him. The message says come on, big village, be quick, bring packs, p.s. Bring pacs (sic). How does one come quick and bring the packs--the packtrain can only move at certain speed, which is slow? Also, why the iteration for packs twice? People read too much into the last note. The best deduction I've seen of this is that it was simply an intelligence update. Come on (end your scout and move up), big village (we found the village, its big) bring packs (secure the packtrain) be quick (move your units and the packtrain forwards as quick as possible) p.s. bring pacs (sic) (cut out a few ammunition packs).
Now for the over critical analysis of Reno. It's a myth that Weir held conference with Reno. This comes from only two individuals, both of whom are highly suspect and not very credible. Not a single person of credibility ever mentioned such a meeting. Mind you, Reno was still reorganizing his three companies and dealing with wounded. Now 15 minutes after Benteen arrived, firing was heard down stream. This had to be when Custer was in MTC near Ford B. Weir heard the firing and made comment to Gibson that he was going to meet with Reno and gain permission to go to the sound of the firing and asked Gibson if he'd follow him; Gibson of course agreed. Now this meeting never appeared to occur as at this moment Reno was leading a detail trying to recover Hodgson's body. Weir took it upon himself to scout ahead, probably to get a better fix on Custer. Gibson saw this and assumed Weir had gotten permission and lead the company out. Reno returned to the hill and saw Gibson moving out then sent Hare with immediate instructions for Weir to try and make contact with Custer and that the regiment would follow.
Roughly 30 minutes from this the packtrain was with supporting distance and several ammunition packs had been cut out and distributed to Reno's depleted companies. They followed immediately thereafter. Weir climbs the point but cannot ascertain Custer's position. It's smoky and dusty and over two miles away. Benteen arrives 10ish minutes after Weir with Reno shortly after. The regiment is strung out in a defensive position along the loaf and bluffs. No one on Weir point can see anything except for a lot of Indians moving up and down MTC. By this point, Calhoun and Harrington had been routed and Keogh would be in his death throes with Custer occupying defensive positions on LSH. No one had any idea where Custer was in the furlough or what was truly happening.
10 minutes after this, a large volume of Indians turn towards Weir point. Seeing that the position isn't defendable, Benteen suggests occupying better terrain in which Reno issued orders to reoccupy Reno Hill. The regiment barely made it back to the hill then quickly became surrounded and the bullets were "thick."
It's not as cut and dried as you make it out to be. You're looking at this through hindsight, those guys were making decisions in the heat of the moment with the most minimal information available.
@@hoffert17 - I agree on the hindsight, yet things were known in the moment. Reno/Benteen knew Custer wanted quick reinforcement (and resupply, whether that meant the train or just extra ammo Benteen had). They knew Custer was in a fight. They knew there were a lot of Indians and Custer could not survive that onslaught alone. They were not opposed by Indian forces at the time. They were within about a half hour of reaching Custer's position. They knew the divided command greatly lessened the chances of survival of the entire command.
It's not cut and dried but it is clear that if Reno/Benteen moved immediately upon linking up,there is a good chance they could have reached Custer and kept more alive than their inaction did.
As Lt. Edgerly wrote: “With the information they had at the time there was no reason not to have tried it.”
Valion Edgerly is as reliable a source as Private Goldin, not even remotely. They knew Custer was engaged but they had no idea where or what his circumstances were--which basically every officer and man present attested to. So what's the reasonable military logic to surrender the high ground to march all your troops into a huge coulee with overlapping high ground all around it? If you're staring at a sizeable force, greater in number than yours, it would make no sense to charge head long into them if you aren't even sure where you are going. I gotta ask, do you have a military combat background? I do, so I can understand things in a military logistic manner. Literally everyone present had no clue what Custer was doing, what his plan was, or what his circumstances were. To most of the enlisted men, they felt Custer had abandoned them. The officers suspected that he had been beaten back as they had been and would backtrack to Terry and bring reinforcements.
From a military standpoint, none of your argument makes sense. You don't attack a known sizeable force without knowing your exact strategic goals. Custer was in a fight, sure; but where was his location? Two miles away through dust and smoke, no one could see anything of strategic value. If his position could have been properly fixed, then you have to devise a battle plan and choose a route of travel. What then are the strategic goals and how do you mitigate risk in trying to achieve those goals? You're about to make contact with a superior sized and armed force, not an easy scenario to play out. On top of that, you're dealing with a supply train speed issue and previous casualties--all of which work against achieving your strategic goals.
If Reno and Benteen had gone down there, there'd be near 700 markers spread across the field. Far more than just the 210 lost under Custer. Absolutely no terrain passed Nye ridge is defensible, as Custer found out. Then, if they had any success in linking up with Custer, now you have to address another logistic issue--water. Given the much closer proximity to the village and invariably being much further from a water supply, you'd have a much higher casualty and fatality rate, horses wouldn't be rideable, etc. At what point then do the Indians break your back--I would estimate by end of the 26th, and that's if they could have found defensible terrain.
Reno and Benteen may have gotten through, but they never would have gotten out. They made the right call; and war really is hell. Military leaders have to make snap decisions, with the least amount of info, and hope for the best--that's from firsthand experience. We can criticize all we want, but those guys were there and all of them were professional officers--personalities aside, they were all competent leaders with varying degrees of experience.
Everything just happened to fast for Custer to react to. He got himself out of supporting distance of his subordinate units and he gambled on the natives adhering to historic tactics, and he and those under his command paid the price for him making the wrong call. Maybe if he had developed and communicated his battle plans to his senior officers better, they could have adhered to his intent; but as is, Custer was leading by the seat of his pants and not communicating well with his officers--he had always been like that.
Seeing the movements of Custer and his sub-commanders makes it even more astonishing that Custer ignored his scouting reports about the superior numbers he faced. It's also perplexing that he divided his forces in such a way that it diluted any real offensive punch Custer might have had, and it allowed the indians to defeat them piecemeal. At the very least, it was military incompetence. There was never even a single minute during this entire engagement when either Reno or Custer were not hopelessly being over-run or in a panicked retreat.
Excellent job on the animation and descriptions
Custer made his name in the Civil War doing stuff like this. Benteen had said eventually it would end up getting Custer into trouble he couldn't get out of. Inadequate reconnaissance followed by overextending his units. Thought he was at a roundup and ended up with an actual battle.
This is an excellent clarification of what happened. As a newbie to this topic, it looks like the first thing they were trying to do was just find the Indians. Custer going north, Reno going through the middle and Benteen going south. Then there's so many Indians that they are able to surround both Custer and Reno, keeping them from joining up. Benteen looks like he's stopped for a bit, but that seems to be because he received a message telling him to get more ammo from the pack train and bring it forward. So he's waiting for the pack train to come up and goes forward when he's got the extras. Reno's encircled command is the first one he meets, so he assists Reno first, the the Indians are so numerous he's in danger of encirclement himself, so his first job is to help Reno survive. Reno and Benteen never got to Custer in time. I can see how Benteen got criticized for not going further to save Custer, but it looks like he was too occupied with just keeping Reno alive. He may not even have known where exactly Custer was, given the terrain.
Cool man! This makes me feel like I just watched a short film in a museum!
I believe Keogh was the officer shot at the ford "wearing the buckskin" (as was his horse comanche) . He was shot in the knee along with a couple/few other soldiers around him. His boot was found at the ford. This is what the indians initially repulsed, and what put a wrench into the plans, to attack the village from the side immediately to help relieve Reno.
the attack at ford B by Keogh happened faster than you have animated. It happened while Reno was still in his skirmish line.
This reinforces what I've always thought: Custer was wiped out by the time Benteen reached Reno on the hill.
This post is just my ideas regarding what I know of the battle, and I am sort of reasoning with it as I type, as some things just seem weird to me. What I have a hard time processing is that when Custer crested the hill and saw the village below, and saw Reno attacking, how could he not realize just how many combatants were going to be in the village? I understand that his decision making up to that point had been based not only on his past experiences, but army doctrine of the time for fighting on the plains, and perhaps he expected little resistance at the outset. But seeing the size, he had to have a realization at that point of the danger. Did he not equate this with combatants outnumbering him greatly?
Perhaps he was trying to capture the non-combatants to draw the warriors away from Reno and complete his objective of forcing the Native Americans onto reservations, but I only see a handful of reasons for pursuing that course of action given the fact that he saw the village's size. One of those reasons is that he potentially realized there was no way he was going to win this fight given the disparity in numbers, his green troops, his strung out positions, outdated weaponry, and terrain that favored the defense, thus this was the only option to complete his mission. He was going to win not by directly beating the enemy combatants, but by going for the jugular and taking hostages, forcing the warriors to capitulate. It is not as if, having killed all the warriors, the non-combatants would be able to escape without being caught shortly thereafter. So obviously he was not attempting to crush all enemy resistance, if in fact he was pursuing the non-combatants with his wide flanking maneuver.
If that was not his reasoning, the only other reason would be he was in fact trying to win by forcing the enemy to fight on two fronts. This only makes sense if ford B was the first place to cross the river. I highly doubt this was his reasoning. The idea that he was trying to draw the combatants away from Reno is also hard to fathom considering again the distance he travelled, which he did so while concealing his movements to the enemy, thus probably not trying to draw them away. Also, consider that he need not have crossed the river at all were that his objective.
All in all I think it makes the most sense that he was in fact attempting to capture the women and children. It is very clear in my estimation that he never considered abandoning the mission objective for the sake of ensuring that his men could put up a defense. So if the non-combatant theory is true, he had to know he was taking a chance given the village's size, and Reno's predicament, which he had knowledge of. It may be that he knew Reno had retreated to a defensible position, but he could not know that the position was truly defensible given that Reno already had his attack crushed, thus he had only the one option to achieve his mission. And in that instance he had to know that there was the chance the enemy would concentrate solely on his exposed troopers.
Given the knowledge that he had, he should have just combined his forces. Napoleon had already established decades prior that you divide your army to maneuver and unite it to fight. Custer had to know how important numbers were since he fought in the Civil War. Unless he just had a really low opinion of his adversary's combat capabilities. But he had to know that combat power, at that time, was solely based on the number of guns you could bring to bear on your adversary. He didn't take gatling guns because he wanted to remain nimble, and he had no reason to believe that he would need them. The fact that he only rushed into an attack in the first place was because he thought he had been compromised. So who knows what would have happened had he been able to carry out his original plan, which would have given him a great advantage in the first part of the battle. I think it is clear from the archaeological evidence that Custer actually divided and sub-divided his forces, all the while maneuvering offensively, right up until he was forced to go on the defensive. He tried to maintain some manner of initiative, but it was hopeless at that point, as his decision to move so far from his only help, and knowing that his help had already been beaten in a fight, meant he had to know what would happen. I personally feel that Reno could have had the time to get to Custer, but it was not feasible given his predicament. Once it was clear that his men were safe from being overrun, it was too late. So I think Custer's decisions alone sealed their fate.
It's always difficult to understand how it is that commanders with a long record of success screw up this badly; and if there are no survivors, it is impossible to know for sure what they were thinking. It may simply be that by the time he realized how much shit he had ridden into that the native warriors were too close upon him to outrun making successful retreat impossible. If he had been able to outrun them I wonder if his best chance would have been to ride south to rejoin Reno, Benteen and the pack train, though that route may have been cut off. A reconsolidated command would have "only" been outnumbered 2-4 to 1, instead of up to 10 to 1.
Reno's men were only safe from being overrun temporarily. They, and Benteen, would have been overrun had it not been for the other column of soldiers coming up the Little Bighorn from the North.
Nice for an overview, but "custer apollo" goes in detail, THAT is rearly impressive!
Going in-depth and being accurate are entirely different things. That’s all I’ll say.
Custer Apollois much more in line with the books more recently published. It follows along with teh time line I cited above.
Why dont you do more battle timelines?
This is amazing
Near right on. Travelled the Rosebud from Yellow rive many time, stopping at the Crows nest, Maras , lone tp and in to last Stan hill. I believe once the Indians attacked Custer it was over in 30 minutes. If you ever get to go to the LBH pay attention to the lay of the land, typography , height of the land from the river. Custer never had a chance.
do you not know we know you have been drinking?
Correction: Custer's 7th Cavalry attacked the Native tribes.They defended themselves & won the day. Given Custer's foolishness, his command "never had a chance."
What a scary battle for those soldiers, I couldn't imagine being in that situation, I feel for the horses as well thanks 🙏
Scarier for the Indians who were minding their own business
Celts are famous for attacking like mad, then panicking and retreating like mad. Just ask the Romans.
@@striperking6083
😆🤣
@@striperking6083 "minding their own business" by invading and attacking other Indian tribes in the treaty zone.
@@patrick888881 Look Mittens, it's another Colonizing Boot licking believer of false history. There are no Honorable treaties when you invade and make someone sign a piece of paper. Dumb Ass.
Absolutely excellent. Bravo & T/y.
Very nicely done, sir!
Those were some fast horses.
Greg H there's a time acceleration factor. 1 second = 1 minute.
I have to say this was pretty God damn good.
I am curious, are the bugle calls we hear the calls one would expect for retreat, or skirmish? If so that is most excellent! I can't get over the amount of ground covered and involved in the battle.
The bugle calls are accurate albeit none were used or heard during Reno’s fight in the valley. Native testimony does allude that Custer probably used them.
Was there last Fall..they need more videos etc like this to explain the events as they unfolded.
The animation shows that Custer could not have been saved by Weir and Reno. It would have taken more than two hours to get to Custer. It was over by then.
This is the best way of showing troop movements on a battlefield. That yellow 'worm' early on at bottom right (Benteen) appears to be a wild goose chase. What was Custer thinking!? Like many other aspects of this day - we will never know. The orange 'worm' upper left late on, "Custer scouts ford D..." is new to me. Can anyone give references to what it is based on please?
When Custer sent Benteen on the scout to the left, the village’s location has not yet be pinpointed. They knew it was in the area but weren’t sure how far ahead it was. It’s a fair estimate that Custer probably thought it was closer than it was given the instructions he passed to Benteen along the scout.
Custer taking E and F company on a scout to Ford D is not new. It’s been a developing theory since the archeological digs of the 1980s began confirming various native eye witness accounts of the battle. John Stands in Timber gave one of the most complete accounts of this. To paraphrase, Custer left Calhoun Hill headed north and disappeared behind battle ridge. He re-emerges momentarily by Last Stand Hill then disappears again still moving north. Several sporadic accounts mention Custer arriving near the Ford D area then Stands in Timber mentions seeing Custer’s two companies crest Cemetery Ridge and eventually moves to Last Stand Hill.
So as it stands with the witness accounts and archeology, Custer left Keogh with C, I, & L companies on Calhoun Hill and proceeded north. He moved into the swale, came up the east side of Last Stand Hill, then descended into a coulee system that starts just north of Last Stand Hill parallel to wear the visitor center is, and traversed it to near where the restaurant and gift shop is. The coulee system makes a fairly sharp westerly turn and the gradually fans out as you reach the Ford. Custer saw the Ford and determined what he needed to and then returned. His return route took a more direct coulee system from cemetery ridge which they scaled and it was at this point that they would have seen things weren’t going quite to plan. Under pressure from the north, he advances into Big Basin and then occupies Last Stand Hill.
@@hoffert17 thanks very much for your quick answer, especially that 'Ford D' info. I have been interested in this battle for about, um... 53 years. More pieces for the jigsaw. I don't mean to stir but you don't support some Indian claims that Custer was wounded/killed at Ford B?
@@derekwhitenz the only Native accounts claiming “Custer” was shot or killed at Ford B have pretty much been debunked by others present. White Cow Bull seems to be one of the main sources for this myth but other Cheyenne present largely refute his claims.
The rest of the evidence can be found in the tactical disposition in the chain of command as well as the description of Custer’s wounds. The military follows a pretty regimented chain of command system, a system that was very much adhered to in period military structure.
First one must look at Custer’s wounds examined post mortem. He was hit in the left temple and left breast. The overall description of his wounds are quite vague and some conjecture exists as to which was inflicted first however the general consensus is that the left breast wound was inflicted first and the head wound was post mortem. There’s only one account which postulated the head wound being delivered first and that’s Private Adams however those that more closely examined the body believed the left temple gunshot wound to have been delivered after he was already dead. It is agreed upon by those who saw the body that the left breast would have been mortal if not fatal. It was close to the heart and certainly penetrated at least one lung possibly both given it entered the left and exited right rear of his back. If he received this wound first it would have been debilitating if not fatal. If he was hit at Ford B with such a wound then the command of the battalion would have fallen to Captain Keogh who was the senior captain and the headquarters element would have then fallen under him.
This then leads into the chain of command angle. If Custer had been wounded or killed in such a matter then the disposition of the bodies would be different then what we actually see. Since Keogh would have assumed command then you would have seen the headquarters element killed with him in the swale. We of course don’t see that. The headquarters element was killed with Custer on Last Stand Hill which means that Custer must have still been perfectly fine in the saddle until at least the return from Ford D. All officers that were identified died where you would expect them to based on the chain of command except for Smith who was found on Last Stand Hill. His company was wiped out in the basin area also known as the south skirmish line.
The other bit of evidence is simply in the continued offensive movement north. If Custer had been hit, it’s highly unlikely that the battalion would still continue its trip to the north as Native accounts state.
Careful examination of the testimony that is reliable in regards to the Ford B fighting does indicate that someone clad in buckskins was hit in the area and their horse bolted towards the river and the rider was then unhorsed and finished off. This person was probably Lieutenant Sturgis. There’s two key pieces to these accounts that put a name to the person. The fact that he was clad in buckskin is one. Sturgis was wearing buckskins on the day of the battle and it was noted that he was one that didn’t take his blouse off. Custer had removed his and tied it to the saddle so Custer was not clad in buckskins, just the pants. The second and more key evidence is a description of a very specific item found on the horse of the man killed at the river and that it was a small wooden box with metal tools inside. Based on this it can more than likely be ascertained that it was an engineer kit and Sturgis was the acting engineer for the regiment.
Remember children, Never divide your forces it's the quickest way to defeat.
@Ojibway News Always take the high ground especially if you are facing a far superior force( number wise), never divide your force as you will need them to protect your flanks. Or use the to attack your opponants flanks.
A great book to read on this subject is "How Great Generals Win" by Bevin Alexander.
The one thing that most of these generals had in common, they ignored what help them win, keeping their forces together.
Though out numbered by a greater force and possessing the high ground and having far superior weapons, Custer lost only because he divided his forces.
A flanking position is the ability to keep your forces together and creating a crossfire, especially have greater firepower would have taken the will to fight away from the Indians as they would have loss great numbers.
Then they could have gone on the attack and finish them off.
During Desert Storm H Norman Schwartzkopf had a force that was out numbered 3 to 2 against the Iraqi's. He never divided his force even though he had won the sky's.
From the coast of the Person gulf to the east his force was one long train. Even when he sent the bulk of his force to the east for the end round there was no breaks in his lines.
Any great leader will tell you that the best way to win a battle is to throw as much firepower down range.
Dividing his forces was a standard technique developed for Cavalry during the Civil War and throughout the Plains Indian Wars. Custer had used this technique before with success,
@@jameswolfbailey3263 This is true, and he did this time. His failure to understand that he was out numbered was the issue, when he divided his forces prior he had the advantage of numbers and advanced weapons. This time he was out numbered and was facing equal weapons.
That is why I said you don't divided your forces, and I should have added unless circumstances are in your favor.
@@kenkarish826 You are correct, as they taught us in Ranger School to always know where you are about to do battle, and the inside joke we whispered back and forth was, "is this the hill he will have us die for?" But in regards with the odds being what they were 2500 10 210 well even with Benteen and Reno (who I content was a coward and probably had more than one drink that morning) they would have all died.
Custer had an offensive mindset given that he did not expect the Indians to offer resistance...and least an organized one. Prior engagements resulted in scattering. It's not that you don't divide your forces....you don't separate them from mutual support.....Custer from Kehoe (his rear guard so he could go find the women and children) and Custer from Reno/Benteen/Pack train. Custer was on the Offensive....granting greater distance between forces. Custer thought Reno would delay the Hostiles long enough as to capture the Women and Children....Custer pushed too far north and lost situational awareness on multiple levels....his inability to support Kehoe at the critical time....and order a withdraw back the way he came sealed his fate.....he took too long to make a decision (which was very unlike Custer). Kehoe either din't realize how rapidly the situation was changing ..or he did and situation and circumstance didn't allow him to send word to Custer....who again had put too much distance between the companies. Finally, Custer assumed when Benteen arrived he would threaten the Hostiles ability do infiltrate towards Kehoe's defensive position....or at least make them think twice about it. Custer's message to Benteen assumed he would arrive so that he would have cover to move farther north.....but he failed to assess and evaluate Reno's fight and Benteens progress before moving father north thus allowing himself to be cut off........and Reno's retreat essentially cut off Benteen's trek north to help Custer. Again...divide but keep mutual support via fighting and communication.
Cheers from Australia. Excellent presentation. As a newbie on the Little Bighorn Battle you have further wet my appetite.
I am interested whether you have reviewed The Atlas Of The Sioux Wars Second Edition and if so your thoughts on the accuracy of the LBH maps included in that publication.
This was awesome.
This was outstanding, I served in US Army in an armored division and cavalry regiment. Basically what the 7th cavalry did was a movement to contact. When Reno made contact first, Custer should have reinforced him. No doubt he heard the gunfire
Had Custer ridden towards the gunfire at around 13:00 he presumably would have seen Reno's situation and provided support for Reno's withdrawal across the river to higher ground. How the battle would have gone from that point is interesting to imagine.
Agreed.
The plan was for Custer to hit the village from the other end. Reno's logic is actually an excuse. Obviously if Custer were to fight from the same position as Reno then Custer would have remained with Reno, instead of traveling down the opposite side of the river. Read Reno's report and attempt to account for his actions from 2:30 to 6:00pm.
If Custer stays on the top of Reno Hill just a minute or two longer he probably makes it out of this battle alive I think. There’s no way he goes north after seeing Reno’s companies get wrecked.
He only saw Reno’s opening skirmish and at the moment, time to swoop in and support the attack was critical. He would have had to wait another 15-20 minutes waiting around to know Reno was in a bad spot-when in contact with the enemy, you don’t just sit around and wait. He had promised to support the attack and he was doing just that. Unfortunately, the situation changed the dynamics of the battle unbeknownst to Custer who continued on the offensive.
@@hoffert17Good explanation. What is seldom noticed is that the terrain contributed to Custer’s defeat. When he divided with Reno he surely thought it would be easy to come to his support. However when he realized he has to do it, it was a very long path to get to the rear of the enemy. At the same time Reno and his men could have thought they are abandoned which contributed to their panic. Everything fell apart
Enjoyed you work.
Well assuming your scenario and timeline is accurate ..... Custer was lost , slow , confused, and late to the battle plus constantly dividing his forces , oh and he was wrong or stupid? Both? Excellent presentation. Thx.
This is excellent. Thanks.
Qs; So Reno was already in skirmish mode 1/4 hour before Custer reached the high ground near Reno hill to wave? How long was Reno in the patch of woods before retreating up to Reno hill? I ask because from my readings he was in there 'possibly' longer then shown in the video. Love the concept and video and as for those that complain about some issues, learn to use pause. Its actually quite a fascinating video. Thank you.
Yep, 'pause is good'.
30-45 minutes in the battle in the woods from dismounting, then the stampede to get back at Reno Hill. By that point, Custer was doomed.
@@printolive5512 Custer was doomed from the beginning. He should have never divided his forces before knowing the size of his enemy. Which begs the question, why would he dismiss his scouts warnings that it was a very large camp? He also stated he would back Reno, which he didn't, hence Reno took the brunt of the forces on his own.
You get what you ask for. Does anyone know why Crook didn't warn Terry that he had been struck at the Rosebud?
Custer, knowing that he was over matched in force size must have known it was suicidal to split his forces.
Custer could have ordered MAJ Reno's force to remain saddled and not dismount and act as a feint towards the southern encamped Indians. Once the Indians react to Reno and drew as close as 300m, he would then break contact and withdraw at a gallop to draw the Indians into Custer's set ambush. Custer could have set up a kill zone approx. 600m in diameter using concealed company sized ambush points. One location dominated the river bends east (1.5km) and the other dominated the river bend south east (1km) of the Reno-Benteen memorial. A concealed two Coy sized defensive line running 700m could have been established adjacent the river in the shallow low ground east of the river. This defensive line would cover Reno's withdrawal route and block the Indian advance across the river while the two companies in ambush would have enfilade fire into pursuing Indians.
After safely crossing the river, Reno's men would withdraw to the rear and redeploy to act as flank protection to the north-west and south east to prevent the main body from being encircled. Meanwhile Benteen would have arrived at the battlefield and could lead his force along the path Reno took in his initial advance in order to engage the rear and southern flank of the attacking Indians.
The terrain affords concealed withdrawal routes from the ambush locations to numerous secondary defensive lines on the eastern side of the river.
Had Custer taken the time to assess the risks and the terrain and deployed his forces smartly and defensively, he may have achieved a victory as well as saved his men from needlessly losing their lives.
Great graphic. Helps tidy things up.
Brilliant stuff.....thank you
well done
This was extremely helpful to me. Not to complain, but this could be made even better with additional animation showing the movement of the native forces.
Very good presentation! Most instructive.
One question though, how certain would you be as to the movement of Benteen - in your presentation it seems like Benteen only mooved a very short distance westward before he turned back and united with Reno.
I suppose that Benteen in reality reached way further westward?
Am I right in that assumption.
I realize that it is very hard to get all these movements down correctly in.a presentation.
Anyways, very good job!
The terrain Benteen traversed was extremely rugged and grueling which made for slow going. He got to the third ridge and seeing nothing ahead of him decided to proceed back to the trail.
@@hoffert17 Thank you. Very informative and interesting answer.
I’d like to find out what you think about Frank Finkel aka Frank Hall, who claimed to have survived the battle. Have you researched him?
Aerial Eggbeater this argument has been had many times over, the consensus of all reputable historians is that the answer is unequivocally, no.
Only constructive criticism I have is the speed is too fast. Had to pause and rewind countless times to keep track of things - trying to keep track of all the various elements on the map along with the text on the bottom of the screen. Video would be better if it was slowed down a bit.
Lt. Winfield S. Edgerly stated there were 7,000 warriors at the battle, and Cpt. Frederick Benteen stated there were 8,000 warriors at the battle.
Good analysis Chris, the animation helps visualize those few hours. Do you feel the mix of Government horses vs. the more adaptable Indian ponies (quarter horses) was a factor?
There’s conflicting eye witness accounts as to the state of government horses, TBH it probably didn’t factor in too much.
Quarter horses have a large dose of Thoroughbred. Indian ponies didn’t.But they had stamina as opposed to speed.
@@Roheryn100 It wouldn't have mattered, Guys. The Calvary did not fight on horses (Hollywood myth). At the first indication of a firefight, soldiers would dismount and set up skirmish lines (one company, 75-100 men). The horses were hobbled and placed 200 to 300 yards behind the skirmish lines. The Indian strategy in any conflict was to permanently disable the horses first. The first volleys were always concentrated on the horses. It's much easier riding down a running man on foot armed with a Springfield single-shot carbine (five rounds a minute for an expert rifleman), especially when the Indians had Winchester, Henry, and Spencer repeating rifles. Only cavalry officers were issued pistols.
WELL DONE!! 👍🏻
Excellent! THe last blood spats!
if it happened in modern times this video would be the special news broadcast on abc
what's the title of the music used?
Good one.
Great job. Unbelievable I was really cool I just went and did the anniversary visit this was actually January 1 now so June 25. I’m going back 26 on June 25. It will be really cool. You did a really good job. I tattooed myself there this past year. The letter that was sent back to Benteen Big a big bill is spring packs. I tattooed that on my leg cause I’m a tattoo orders, of course but anyways I tattooed that on my leg at the site around the area supposedly handed off at it’s really cool so I can’t wait to go back andexperienced this event again unbelievable buddy good job
Excellent Animation of the Four Battalion's, & the Flow of the Battle.
This is just my Own difficulty, of Comprehending or Visualizing how? The Fighting progressed & was, at the different Stages of the Battle?. Like the Commencement of Reno's Attack on the South End of the Encampment.
Too the Subsequent attempt by the Custer led Battalion, to Ford The River, at Medicine Tail Coulee. IT'S very easy too Forget? or not realize!! That the Whole Battle, is Fought, on Horse Back, & Foot. By both the 7th Cavalry Trooper's & the Native Warrior's alike. Thus the Battle is in constant Movement. First to the Little Bighorn River. Then it moves North to West, then East to North.
Arriving at Last Stand Hill sometime Later. Where the Trooper's made Thier last desperate action. As I tried too mention previously. The Large area The Battlefield Cover's. Is really a Challenge for Myself at Least too Comprehend. I've said Enough here I guess. So I'll close with that was One Helluva A Fight!! Put on by Both Sides.
Where's Ford 'C'?
It only shows Ford A, B, and D.
At 13:02, Custer watched Reno being over run. Yet Custer advanced. Not very wise.
Custer did not see Reno overrun, it isn’t feasible for the timeline of events that he could of known.
Custer sees Reno engaged. He then decides to gallop north in an attempt to flank. If he had waited a few more minutes at Reno hill he would have seen the major disengage and fall back.
Excellent!!!
didn't the custer terry colmn come from the north east instead of the south?
Custer was detached from the column at the powder river depot and sent over the wood mountains and came in from the Southeast. Terry and Gibbon linked up along the Yellowstone and came in from the north.
thanks for a great video. I've wondered at times had the natives modern bows/arrows and known how the newcomers were going to cheat them how things would have gone around1840 or so,
Good animation. My only criticism is that it runs too quickly to follow or even read the subtitles
Exactly what I said in my comment. Creator should have slowed the video speed by half at least.
Great animation.