Fascinating to contemplate these ideas through current memory research. Appreciate the conversation and still pondering...I especially appreciate the ways Beyond Dichotomy offered here in various places such as around the section at 1:22:00 and the thought experiment regarding 'buying'.
This was an enlightening elucidation! Personally, I got a lot from, and very much appreciated, the contrasting of certain Buddhist and Advaita positions.
Thank you! We got a lot out of the session too and are very grateful. It's always rewarding to explore the contrasts between these schools of thought.😊
there is no difference between Buddhism and Advaita; Nirguna Brahman is just an expression for 'not something', just as No Self is an expression for conceptless emptiness without any idea of emptiness or 'not something', so the difference exists only in terminology. Terms are just a finger pointing to the moon, if we forget the finger then Nirguna Brahman and No Self refer to the same conceptless emptiness. Much like both sunya and purna refer to exactly the same 'not something'. Contradiction is a property of the mind ... from the point of view of the absolute there are no contradictions, only the mind reads them that way due to its 'limited' properties
@@desertusful Please don't conflate two distinct metaphysical systems. Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta have fundamentally different views on reality. In Advaita, Nirguna Brahman is an eternal, unchanging essence, while in Buddhism, there's a clear denial of any eternal or unchanging substance. These differences aren't just terminological; they represent two separate understandings of existence.
@@philosophybabble when the understanding of the essence or the true nature of reality goes from the mind we always come to the same situation. those on one side of the mountain say the peak is to the east (Atman), while those on the other side of the mountain say the peak is to the west (Anatman). therefore, both are right, each from their own point of view, however, observing from the top of the mountain, when we do not observe from the point of view, then both are wrong ...
@@desertusful These aren’t just different views from different sides of the mountain; they represent two distinct metaphysical claims. In Buddhism, there is no peak that corresponds to an eternal self, while in Advaita Vedanta, that peak is the realization of an unchanging unity. The differences here are not merely a matter of perspective but reflect two separate philosophical foundations. Please stop conflating the two-they are fundamentally different. 01:45:43 - It's like a Christian claiming that atheists believe in the same God. 😁
"How does the apple appear just on it's own regardless of whether you're a bee, a person or a dog. What you realize when you ask that question is that there is no way the apple just appears, only the way it appears to a particular subjectivity. When you realize that, that there is no actual perceptible characteristic that the apple has you realize that the apple is empty with respect to characteristics. And that is the first of the three emptiness' in Yogacara."
Thank you for the talk Mr. Garfield, loved your new book. Many guests tried to smuggle the Atman here, Jay was not allowing any of that. Though this philosophical academic discussions are still needed, I think the modern world needs to get the best of them and use them as a practical tool leaving aside metaphysics (religions did that for centuries already), that is why Mindfulness is the most promising aspect of Buddhism, not emptiness. Not to say that the whole emptiness enterprise is wrong, but may be useless in practice for the average lay person of today.
Mindfulness in its Buddhist context is directed precisely at realizing emptiness/selflessness. Mindfulness without insight into emptiness is just another instrumentalist life hack. You can’t decouple it from the metaphysical claims.
mindfulness is just non-forgetting the nature of reality. how things are. mindfulbess without understanding of nature of reality is pointless or can be harmful. I can be mindful of how great I am and above everyone or mindful of hatred to others
"... most Buddhists in India, familiar with the Abhidharma, felt that the Madhyamaka position was tantamount to nihilism for the simple reason that it is incoherent to maintain that _all_ are merely conceptual constructs. It is, we might say, part of the meaning of 'secondary, conceptual existence' that there is primary, substantial existence. It makes no sense to talk of all things being secondary existents. If all things were secondary existents then all things would be constructs with nothing for them to be constructed out of" (Paul Williams, Buddhist Thought). If there was no ground of being, no substratum, then there could be no 'things' (tables, chairs, atoms, persons) at all; but there are things, therefore there must be a substratum.
@@James-ll3jb I think the best way to answer that is with a question: if Madhyamaka is claiming that there is only a continuous flow of causes and conditions without any ground of being, first cause (Aristotle), or substratum, then what exactly is doing the flowing? If all things are conceptual constructs, as Nagarjuna claims, then what are the constructs constructed out of? Constructions all the way down? All the way down to what? To infinity? For me, its comparable to claiming that there is only the wave but no ocean. If one were to analyse x, one could continually deconstruct that x, but not to infinity; at some point one would come to a foundation of that x, even if the x itself is not permanent.
@@bayreuth79 Understood. But a vacant-headed, anachronistically imaged materialism is no longercan answer either. To us, some sort of emergent physicality may APPEAR responsible for the phenomena of causation; but then again, as Nietzsche noted, "No one has ever even SEEN a 'cause'!"
@@James-ll3jb Nothing I wrote presupposes metaphysical materialism (or, if you prefer, physicalism or naturalism). The fact that we cannot perceive causation, such as fire burning cotton, is obviously not proof that there is no causation. We infer causation on the basis of the conduction of x and y leading to z (I apply fire to cotton and the cotton burns). That cannot prove that fire burns the cotton but we can infer as much; and its not unreasonable to do so. I think that consciousness (not my personal consciousness but 'mind at large') is the substratum. It seems to me that Yogācāra does indeed teach that consciousness is indeed the substratum, and indeed most of the Madhyamikas understood it that way too. I broadly accept the analytic idealism of Bernardo Kastrup. Time, space and physical objects are qualia within consciousness (again, not my personal consciousness).
@@bayreuth79 No one is claiming causation utterly nonexistent (not even Nietzsche!) I hope you realize. And I agree that NO inference is intrinsically unreasonable. Abd I agree with you that (speaking loosely) "consciousness is the substratum." I find the work of Don Hoffman particularly illuminating in this regard...What say ye? th-cam.com/video/yqOVu263OSk/w-d-xo.html
Would be interesting to have a debate between Prof. Garfield and Swami Sarvapryananda, who was a university student of Prof Garfield and maintaines his position, that the two systems are pointing to the same reality...
Swami Sarvapriyananda argues on the basis of a minor view in Tibet called Shentong of Dolpopa ultimately rooted in the 11th century Yogācāra Master of Vikramaśilā, Ratnākaraśānti. Gelug,Nyingma, Sakya or Kagyu Masters would not equate Advaita Vedānta with Madhyamaka. Prof. Garfield completed his Buddhist studies under the Geluk School and as such he has more clarity over the nuances between the two systems.
@@rationalguy2615 interesting thank you... the way I understood the Swami was, that the different systems are different language games helping the aspirant to point his attention to whatever reality ultimately is. The reality itself being beyond words has to be one and the same (simply the nature of what is) independently of the language games of the different philosophies.
@@rationalguy2615 Madhyamika seems more sophisticated and refined than Advaita Vedanta... but maybe also a bit confusing and therefore less useful for common people.
@@Atmasai While Madhyamaka's analysis of emptiness can seem complex, its goal is to deconstruct deeply ingrained conceptual attachments and misconceptions, making it highly practical. For those who engage with it, Madhyamaka's method (like Nagarjuna's dialectic) offers profound clarity by cutting through false views. The idea that it is "less useful" for common people overlooks how it addresses everyday suffering by showing that clinging to fixed identities and concepts is the root of dissatisfaction.
@@Atmasai Madhyamaka and Advaita Vedanta are not merely linguistic differences; they propose fundamentally different metaphysical views. These are not just different words for the same thing but represent distinct philosophical positions. 01:45:43 - Here what Prof. Garfield said at the end of the discussion. Hope this helps
Why hasn't any scholar in Buddhism had a major impact on the western concept of consciousness yet? There is no widespread distinction between consciousness and what precedes it, in the West. This allows the research to continue in what has come to a standstill.
paused around 16 min, agreed that self is not an object but experiencing an object of time called now, that is separated from their life time as an object, where humanity has a life span that is an object with subdivisions of individual experiences...or time? Then Zeno with the question of what can be divided, so it's the dividing by that person that moves and the moving inseparable, as experience...something like that?
Yes, while Zeno's paradox comes from a different tradition, it's interesting to see how various philosophies explore the nature of time and experience in their own ways
@@yurimilyutin9219 I'll take that as pointing in, where one points in the mortar around bricks in a wall. Where the physical material is like sleep or attention span, as a buffer for "switch bounce" from a switch or signal from a higher "level". This allows coherence.
@@projectmalus my teacher used a useful analogy of cookie cutter. we just use conceptualization as a cookie cutter applied to suchness to create objects and subjects
at 30 min I start to deviate since the time has a beginning, allows experience and apparently can be divided, with experience positive and nothingness as negative. Does this mean that material is a slowing of time or rather, that material is a buffer for distortion so as to not interfere with process, space for the distortion to subside and allow experiencing as process. This way material has a beginning, not time. This fits if emotion isn't transferred only the mechanism and that taken up, which streamlines experience variation. Humans entered a grass/herd/pack triangle by eating grass, and while pulling out lawns, cows and dogs as human also entered halfway into that hard to escape from triangle. There's a process in the human body and the one material enters that many, and objectifies the person, who can manipulate material as objects and think of this as objectified time chunks to play with, which replaces the lost pow edit: finished watching the next day and enjoyed the expert presentation, thanks. A similarity between east and west is investment in a knowledge pool. Another thing that came up was the second emptiness and how it seemed like language ambiguity, for English anyway. If there's being and moving as suggested by the language, which is which, nouns and verbs or nouns/adjectives and verbs/adverbs, or as I think adjectives as moving and adverbs as being and the other two are language placeholders. "red balls roll quickly" where the red is a shade of red where red itself is moving as expressions of red, as the life of red and this is a part moving within that; adverb as being in the placement of relation, the catch and release of the moving redness. Great ending, experience regarding experience yay.
If the śūnyatāvāda would have us believe that there is no substratum underlying phenomenal existence then I think to that extent its irrational. The Yogācarins more sensibly recognised that there _must_ be a substratum and for them of course it is consciousness itself, the field of subjectivity. Śūnyatā cannot mean that every x is only a result of causes and conditions with no underlying reality, no ground of being. Its like saying: there are only waves, but no ocean.
In Madhyamaka (Śūnyatāvāda), śūnyatā doesn't necessarily deny an underlying reality but suggests that phenomena lack inherent, independent existence. It's about interdependence rather than a concrete substratum. The Yogācāra view of consciousness as a substratum offers a different take, which can feel more intuitive for some. Both perspectives provide valuable insights into the nature of reality.
@@philosophybabble I understand what you are saying but it seems to me (and I get this from some of the academic books on Mahayana philosophy) that Nagarjuna really was denying any underlying substrate and I get that impression from Candrakirti too. These thinkers even claim that Nirvana is 'empty'. Yes; I think that one can derive useful insights from the Madhyamaka but if taken as a whole I think it becomes incoherent.
Just begs the question though. Why assume there needs to be a concrete substratum, construing it as a wave on ocean, rather than dependently designated phenomena all the way down?
@@bayreuth79 This is a common critique of Madhyamaka philosophy. Nagarjuna and Candrakirti do deny any underlying substrate. While this perspective can offer deep insights into the nature of reality and avoid conceptual extremes, it can seem incoherent to those who seek an absolute foundation. It's challenging to reconcile with the desire for a more concrete metaphysical grounding.
@@philosophybabble I believe that anyone familiar with the 'spookiness' of quantum physics would find it quite compatible with the idea of universal 'emptiness'. Also consider the thesis that our universe itself arose from 'nothing'! Would you agree?
I do not understand why on Madhyamaka philosophy there is something rather than nothing? Why are there 'things' (tables, chairs, electrons, stars, etc) at all? It is not sufficient to say: there are only 'things' and those things are 'empty' of intrinsic existence. There seems to be zero basis for 'things' in Madhyamaka. This ceaseless flow of causes and conditions just is? But aren't these causes and conditions just emptiness too? Nagarjuna even claims that Nirvana is 'emptiness'. I think this is incoherent.
@@philosophybabble I suppose what I was asking is this: if there is nothing that has intrinsic existence, as Nagarjuna seems to be saying, then it follows that there is no explanation for existence as such. And, more importantly, no explanation or rationale for the whole flow of becoming. If one analyses any x, one discovers that it can be broken down into different non-x components; and all of these non-x components can be broken down even further... but on Nagarjuna's philosophy this would have to go on to infinity since there is no underlying reality.
@@bayreuth79 yeah in fac scholars like Jan Westerhoff defend this non-foundationalist view and it is as the 8th Karmapa said that it's illusions behind illusions all the way down. There is really nothing inconsistent about this, never seen an argument that actually tackles this non-foundationalism. You may like to check out his work "Non Existence of the Real World"
@@Hikyo3451 I have not only read Westerhoff but I have also corresponded with him via email. If it is "illusions behind illusions all the way down" then it would have to be infinite. But, according to Hilbert, an actual infinite series is impossible (since it leads to actual contradictions). If x depends on y and y depends on z and z depends on p, all the way to infinity, then there is a sense in which there is no explanation for anything. And, moreover, nothing is made of anything: I say this because Nagarjuna is claiming that you can keep on deconstructing the constituents of things ad infinitum. If it is not ad infinitum then there is a foundation. Now, I ask you: how would you prove that its illusions all the way down?
@@bayreuth79 Are you referring to the Hilbert Hotel stuff? Many people like Alex Malpass have already addressed those seeming paradoxes which are actually sterile. There's really nothing inconsistent there. Check out Majesty of Reason's videos on it. He has made a bunch of them. Actual infinities aren't a problem.
the absence of intrinsic identity at 23 min, where things are such because they are made human, like lawns, dogs and cats but not roads, and this is chunked time and can be seen in a loss of freedoms as objectified experience, it seems.
@@projectmalus I'd say loss of genine community and mutual understanding. Americans have tons of freedom de jure but are perhaps de facto the loneliest people in the world.
There's a notion that mind can be reactive (habitual, driven, samsaric) or else creative (more or less awaked); this creativity/freedom is maybe why people practice.
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Yes… really excellent. Thankyou 👍
Thank you for tuning in!
Wow. Many thanks for arranging this podcast with Professor Jay Garfield. ❤
Thanks for this session. Profound. How eloquent Prof. Garfield is on a complex subject. Respects.
Fascinating to contemplate these ideas through current memory research. Appreciate the conversation and still pondering...I especially appreciate the ways Beyond Dichotomy offered here in various places such as around the section at 1:22:00 and the thought experiment regarding 'buying'.
~1:05:00 thanks for the erudite explication of how samsara and nirvana can be understood/parsed/experienced
This was an enlightening elucidation! Personally, I got a lot from, and very much appreciated, the contrasting of certain Buddhist and Advaita positions.
Thank you! We got a lot out of the session too and are very grateful. It's always rewarding to explore the contrasts between these schools of thought.😊
there is no difference between Buddhism and Advaita; Nirguna Brahman is just an expression for 'not something', just as No Self is an expression for conceptless emptiness without any idea of emptiness or 'not something', so the difference exists only in terminology. Terms are just a finger pointing to the moon, if we forget the finger then Nirguna Brahman and No Self refer to the same conceptless emptiness. Much like both sunya and purna refer to exactly the same 'not something'. Contradiction is a property of the mind ... from the point of view of the absolute there are no contradictions, only the mind reads them that way due to its 'limited' properties
@@desertusful Please don't conflate two distinct metaphysical systems. Buddhism and Advaita Vedanta have fundamentally different views on reality. In Advaita, Nirguna Brahman is an eternal, unchanging essence, while in Buddhism, there's a clear denial of any eternal or unchanging substance. These differences aren't just terminological; they represent two separate understandings of existence.
@@philosophybabble when the understanding of the essence or the true nature of reality goes from the mind we always come to the same situation. those on one side of the mountain say the peak is to the east (Atman), while those on the other side of the mountain say the peak is to the west (Anatman). therefore, both are right, each from their own point of view, however, observing from the top of the mountain, when we do not observe from the point of view, then both are wrong ...
@@desertusful These aren’t just different views from different sides of the mountain; they represent two distinct metaphysical claims. In Buddhism, there is no peak that corresponds to an eternal self, while in Advaita Vedanta, that peak is the realization of an unchanging unity. The differences here are not merely a matter of perspective but reflect two separate philosophical foundations. Please stop conflating the two-they are fundamentally different. 01:45:43 - It's like a Christian claiming that atheists believe in the same God. 😁
"How does the apple appear just on it's own regardless of whether you're a bee, a person or a dog. What you realize when you ask that question is that there is no way the apple just appears, only the way it appears to a particular subjectivity. When you realize that, that there is no actual perceptible characteristic that the apple has you realize that the apple is empty with respect to characteristics. And that is the first of the three emptiness' in Yogacara."
34:00 three natures
Thank you for the talk Mr. Garfield, loved your new book. Many guests tried to smuggle the Atman here, Jay was not allowing any of that. Though this philosophical academic discussions are still needed, I think the modern world needs to get the best of them and use them as a practical tool leaving aside metaphysics (religions did that for centuries already), that is why Mindfulness is the most promising aspect of Buddhism, not emptiness. Not to say that the whole emptiness enterprise is wrong, but may be useless in practice for the average lay person of today.
Mindfulness in its Buddhist context is directed precisely at realizing emptiness/selflessness. Mindfulness without insight into emptiness is just another instrumentalist life hack. You can’t decouple it from the metaphysical claims.
mindfulness is just non-forgetting the nature of reality. how things are. mindfulbess without understanding of nature of reality is pointless or can be harmful. I can be mindful of how great I am and above everyone or mindful of hatred to others
"... most Buddhists in India, familiar with the Abhidharma, felt that the Madhyamaka position was tantamount to nihilism for the simple reason that it is incoherent to maintain that _all_ are merely conceptual constructs. It is, we might say, part of the meaning of 'secondary, conceptual existence' that there is primary, substantial existence. It makes no sense to talk of all things being secondary existents. If all things were secondary existents then all things would be constructs with nothing for them to be constructed out of" (Paul Williams, Buddhist Thought). If there was no ground of being, no substratum, then there could be no 'things' (tables, chairs, atoms, persons) at all; but there are things, therefore there must be a substratum.
Thus, Nietzsche. But how does the existence of a 'substratum' follow from that???
@@James-ll3jb I think the best way to answer that is with a question: if Madhyamaka is claiming that there is only a continuous flow of causes and conditions without any ground of being, first cause (Aristotle), or substratum, then what exactly is doing the flowing? If all things are conceptual constructs, as Nagarjuna claims, then what are the constructs constructed out of? Constructions all the way down? All the way down to what? To infinity? For me, its comparable to claiming that there is only the wave but no ocean. If one were to analyse x, one could continually deconstruct that x, but not to infinity; at some point one would come to a foundation of that x, even if the x itself is not permanent.
@@bayreuth79 Understood. But a vacant-headed, anachronistically imaged materialism is no longercan answer either. To us, some sort of emergent physicality may APPEAR responsible for the phenomena of causation; but then again, as Nietzsche noted, "No one has ever even SEEN a 'cause'!"
@@James-ll3jb Nothing I wrote presupposes metaphysical materialism (or, if you prefer, physicalism or naturalism). The fact that we cannot perceive causation, such as fire burning cotton, is obviously not proof that there is no causation. We infer causation on the basis of the conduction of x and y leading to z (I apply fire to cotton and the cotton burns). That cannot prove that fire burns the cotton but we can infer as much; and its not unreasonable to do so.
I think that consciousness (not my personal consciousness but 'mind at large') is the substratum. It seems to me that Yogācāra does indeed teach that consciousness is indeed the substratum, and indeed most of the Madhyamikas understood it that way too. I broadly accept the analytic idealism of Bernardo Kastrup. Time, space and physical objects are qualia within consciousness (again, not my personal consciousness).
@@bayreuth79 No one is claiming causation utterly nonexistent (not even Nietzsche!) I hope you realize. And I agree that NO inference is intrinsically unreasonable. Abd I agree with you that (speaking loosely) "consciousness is the substratum."
I find the work of Don Hoffman particularly illuminating in this regard...What say ye?
th-cam.com/video/yqOVu263OSk/w-d-xo.html
Would be interesting to have a debate between Prof. Garfield and Swami Sarvapryananda, who was a university student of Prof Garfield and maintaines his position, that the two systems are pointing to the same reality...
Swami Sarvapriyananda argues on the basis of a minor view in Tibet called Shentong of Dolpopa ultimately rooted in the 11th century Yogācāra Master of Vikramaśilā, Ratnākaraśānti.
Gelug,Nyingma, Sakya or Kagyu Masters would not equate Advaita Vedānta with Madhyamaka.
Prof. Garfield completed his Buddhist studies under the Geluk School and as such he has more clarity over the nuances between the two systems.
@@rationalguy2615 interesting thank you... the way I understood the Swami was, that the different systems are different language games helping the aspirant to point his attention to whatever reality ultimately is. The reality itself being beyond words has to be one and the same (simply the nature of what is) independently of the language games of the different philosophies.
@@rationalguy2615
Madhyamika seems more sophisticated and refined than Advaita Vedanta... but maybe also a bit confusing and therefore less useful for common people.
@@Atmasai While Madhyamaka's analysis of emptiness can seem complex, its goal is to deconstruct deeply ingrained conceptual attachments and misconceptions, making it highly practical. For those who engage with it, Madhyamaka's method (like Nagarjuna's dialectic) offers profound clarity by cutting through false views. The idea that it is "less useful" for common people overlooks how it addresses everyday suffering by showing that clinging to fixed identities and concepts is the root of dissatisfaction.
@@Atmasai Madhyamaka and Advaita Vedanta are not merely linguistic differences; they propose fundamentally different metaphysical views. These are not just different words for the same thing but represent distinct philosophical positions. 01:45:43 - Here what Prof. Garfield said at the end of the discussion. Hope this helps
Very interesting mostly over my head. Guess i shoulda been sober 😂
Most Madhayamikas appear to have thought that the Yogacarins were in fact idealists. Certainly, Candrakirti thought so.
Why hasn't any scholar in Buddhism had a major impact on the western concept of consciousness yet? There is no widespread distinction between consciousness and what precedes it, in the West. This allows the research to continue in what has come to a standstill.
paused around 16 min, agreed that self is not an object but experiencing an object of time called now, that is separated from their life time as an object, where humanity has a life span that is an object with subdivisions of individual experiences...or time? Then Zeno with the question of what can be divided, so it's the dividing by that person that moves and the moving inseparable, as experience...something like that?
Yes, while Zeno's paradox comes from a different tradition, it's interesting to see how various philosophies explore the nature of time and experience in their own ways
Ship of Theseus would be somehow pointing in interdependece-emptiness
@@yurimilyutin9219 I'll take that as pointing in, where one points in the mortar around bricks in a wall. Where the physical material is like sleep or attention span, as a buffer for "switch bounce" from a switch or signal from a higher "level". This allows coherence.
@@projectmalus my teacher used a useful analogy of cookie cutter. we just use conceptualization as a cookie cutter applied to suchness to create objects and subjects
at 30 min I start to deviate since the time has a beginning, allows experience and apparently can be divided, with experience positive and nothingness as negative. Does this mean that material is a slowing of time or rather, that material is a buffer for distortion so as to not interfere with process, space for the distortion to subside and allow experiencing as process. This way material has a beginning, not time. This fits if emotion isn't transferred only the mechanism and that taken up, which streamlines experience variation.
Humans entered a grass/herd/pack triangle by eating grass, and while pulling out lawns, cows and dogs as human also entered halfway into that hard to escape from triangle. There's a process in the human body and the one material enters that many, and objectifies the person, who can manipulate material as objects and think of this as objectified time chunks to play with, which replaces the lost pow
edit: finished watching the next day and enjoyed the expert presentation, thanks. A similarity between east and west is investment in a knowledge pool. Another thing that came up was the second emptiness and how it seemed like language ambiguity, for English anyway. If there's being and moving as suggested by the language, which is which, nouns and verbs or nouns/adjectives and verbs/adverbs, or as I think adjectives as moving and adverbs as being and the other two are language placeholders. "red balls roll quickly" where the red is a shade of red where red itself is moving as expressions of red, as the life of red and this is a part moving within that; adverb as being in the placement of relation, the catch and release of the moving redness.
Great ending, experience regarding experience yay.
If the śūnyatāvāda would have us believe that there is no substratum underlying phenomenal existence then I think to that extent its irrational. The Yogācarins more sensibly recognised that there _must_ be a substratum and for them of course it is consciousness itself, the field of subjectivity. Śūnyatā cannot mean that every x is only a result of causes and conditions with no underlying reality, no ground of being. Its like saying: there are only waves, but no ocean.
In Madhyamaka (Śūnyatāvāda), śūnyatā doesn't necessarily deny an underlying reality but suggests that phenomena lack inherent, independent existence. It's about interdependence rather than a concrete substratum. The Yogācāra view of consciousness as a substratum offers a different take, which can feel more intuitive for some. Both perspectives provide valuable insights into the nature of reality.
@@philosophybabble I understand what you are saying but it seems to me (and I get this from some of the academic books on Mahayana philosophy) that Nagarjuna really was denying any underlying substrate and I get that impression from Candrakirti too. These thinkers even claim that Nirvana is 'empty'. Yes; I think that one can derive useful insights from the Madhyamaka but if taken as a whole I think it becomes incoherent.
Just begs the question though. Why assume there needs to be a concrete substratum, construing it as a wave on ocean, rather than dependently designated phenomena all the way down?
@@bayreuth79 This is a common critique of Madhyamaka philosophy. Nagarjuna and Candrakirti do deny any underlying substrate. While this perspective can offer deep insights into the nature of reality and avoid conceptual extremes, it can seem incoherent to those who seek an absolute foundation. It's challenging to reconcile with the desire for a more concrete metaphysical grounding.
@@philosophybabble I believe that anyone familiar with the 'spookiness' of quantum physics would find it quite compatible with the idea of universal 'emptiness'. Also consider the thesis that our universe itself arose from 'nothing'! Would you agree?
I do not understand why on Madhyamaka philosophy there is something rather than nothing? Why are there 'things' (tables, chairs, electrons, stars, etc) at all? It is not sufficient to say: there are only 'things' and those things are 'empty' of intrinsic existence. There seems to be zero basis for 'things' in Madhyamaka. This ceaseless flow of causes and conditions just is? But aren't these causes and conditions just emptiness too? Nagarjuna even claims that Nirvana is 'emptiness'. I think this is incoherent.
You would need to ask the question, empty of what?
@@philosophybabble I suppose what I was asking is this: if there is nothing that has intrinsic existence, as Nagarjuna seems to be saying, then it follows that there is no explanation for existence as such. And, more importantly, no explanation or rationale for the whole flow of becoming. If one analyses any x, one discovers that it can be broken down into different non-x components; and all of these non-x components can be broken down even further... but on Nagarjuna's philosophy this would have to go on to infinity since there is no underlying reality.
@@bayreuth79 yeah in fac scholars like Jan Westerhoff defend this non-foundationalist view and it is as the 8th Karmapa said that it's illusions behind illusions all the way down.
There is really nothing inconsistent about this, never seen an argument that actually tackles this non-foundationalism.
You may like to check out his work "Non Existence of the Real World"
@@Hikyo3451 I have not only read Westerhoff but I have also corresponded with him via email. If it is "illusions behind illusions all the way down" then it would have to be infinite. But, according to Hilbert, an actual infinite series is impossible (since it leads to actual contradictions). If x depends on y and y depends on z and z depends on p, all the way to infinity, then there is a sense in which there is no explanation for anything. And, moreover, nothing is made of anything: I say this because Nagarjuna is claiming that you can keep on deconstructing the constituents of things ad infinitum. If it is not ad infinitum then there is a foundation.
Now, I ask you: how would you prove that its illusions all the way down?
@@bayreuth79 Are you referring to the Hilbert Hotel stuff? Many people like Alex Malpass have already addressed those seeming paradoxes which are actually sterile. There's really nothing inconsistent there.
Check out Majesty of Reason's videos on it. He has made a bunch of them.
Actual infinities aren't a problem.
the absence of intrinsic identity at 23 min, where things are such because they are made human, like lawns, dogs and cats but not roads, and this is chunked time and can be seen in a loss of freedoms as objectified experience, it seems.
???wha-???😅
@@James-ll3jb Loneliness can be traced to a loss of freedoms.
@@projectmalus I'd say loss of genine community and mutual understanding. Americans have tons of freedom de jure but are perhaps de facto the loneliest people in the world.
Does Buddhist philosophy believe in free will
There's a notion that mind can be reactive (habitual, driven, samsaric) or else creative (more or less awaked); this creativity/freedom is maybe why people practice.
Sorry- meant 'awakened'