As a maritime consultant, i have been involved with Major Incident investigations within the marine industry and have been following media reports on this unfortunate incident and have also been sharing my comments after filtering out media clutter. As events have unfolded, the story developing seems all too familiar as i suspect that this incident is deeply routed and there would be a chain of relatively minor incidents and near misses that would lead up for this particular major incident to occur. An audit of the Quality Management System of the Indian Railways would most likely highlight major non conformities including non compliance of Standard Operating Procedures. The fact that there was a Disconnection Memo & Reconnection Memo issued by the Station Master, we are assuming that the railways team had become aware that there was some problem with the facing point machine on up-loop line x-over and basis the high risk status, a Disconnection Memo was issued by declaring the point Failed, requiring immediate repair & maintenance. The was a serious breach in the implementation of standard operating procedures after issuing the Disconnection Memo until issuance of the Re-connection Memo because if procedures as laid down by the Indian Railways was followed with due diligence this unfortunate incident would never have taken place. In context, the standard operating procedures require that maintenance repair or replacement of the point is carried out by a joint team comprising of experienced personnel from the engineering & signalling dept under the station masters command. Standard practice after boxing up the point and reconnecting the terminal wiring, testing and commissioning requires the point to be function tested from Normal locked position to Reverse locked position and vice versa, ensuring point gets locked at each end position, i.e. tongue rail makes full contact with the stock rail which requires total travel distance of tongue rail to be measured for a pre-determined value and if required the throw slide of the machine is adjusted after confirming self-locking of lock slides at its end positions. During these tests, the point is operated locally by hand cranking the manual lever and thereafter the remote operation is checked from control room. AS PER IR RULES, IT IS MANDATORY FOR STATION MASTER TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT AT LOCAL SITE TO WITNESS TESTING OF THE POINT, AND ONCE SATISFIED WITH FUNCTION TESTING OF POINT AND SIGNALLING SYSTEM, the station manager is then able to issue a re-connection memo. We are in the dark on the nature of "repairs effected", and what was the specific reason (why, when and for how long) for issuing a Connection & Re-Connection Memo because this signifies an abnormal condition which would affect up main line traffic therefore timings for issual of these memos would be a source of key information. Normally for failed point, the complete point machine should be replaced with a new spare machine. The time re-connection memo was issued and ETA ( estimated time of arrival )of UP Coromandel Express would also shed some light if the repairs were undertaken under stress as working under tight schedules, there is always the temptation to take short cuts and a tendency to overlook basics, therefore we cannot eliminate the possibility of incorrect wiring connections made after boxing up the point machine, effectively reversing the contact terminals for a given position, i.e. when the point was mechanically locked at the Normal position, the feedback signal indicated the Reverse position and vice versa. There is a always a possibility for basic mistakes to go undetected especially when working under tight schedule which could have led to the disaster. In context, there was media reports regarding ongoing renewal of the electric barrier at the level x-ing however contrary to several opinions, as a layman's inference, cannot see this as root cause of the incident because as per logical sequence this electric barrier unit should serve as an interlock for the two mail lines irrespective of the position of the point.
Bro.... double YELLOW🟡🟡 means... in next two signels (every km will have one signel in railway) i.e, in next 2 signels will be either YELLOW🟡 (to stop at 4th signel it will be RED🔴) or GREEN🟢 (to clear/proceed)... this Is the meaning of DOUBLE YELLOW.... just remember guys... whenever your TRAIN crosses DOUBLE YELLOW it starts slowing down... until it gets GREEN
A couple of corrections (though let me know if I am mistaken, as I am familiar with UK practice as opposed to Indian practice - but I presume they are very similar): 1. A route indicator must be proven lit before a proceed aspect can be shown so that the driver knows which route they will be taking and can adjust their speed accordingly (to avoid potential derailment). In this video the junction signal shows a proceed aspect prior to the route indicator being lit. 2. A double yellow should never be followed immediately by a red signal, as shown early on in the video. The aspect sequence for 4 aspect signalling is G-YY-Y-R. In fact, regardless of whether it is 2, 3, or 4 aspect signalling, the signal immediately before a red signal must always show a single yellow. The example at the end was correct however! 3. When a train passes a signal, the signal should almost always immediately return to red once the wheels pass the detection point associated with that signal (the exception to this being the use of last wheel replacement) in order to protect the rear of the train from any other train following it. In the video the signals remain at proceed even when the entire train passes.
YY means the next signal is Y. YY means speed is almost like G, so obviously the next one should not be R. The next one should be YY or Y. This is followed in all Indian railway sections. When a train passes the signal automatically turns R in most sections.
The video explains the purpose of various indicating lights like red,green,yellow,white..etc. But How these indicating lights gets Signals is not explained. The interlocks provided between track point machine and indicating lights are also to be explained for better understanding of signalling system. Hope it will be covered in next video.
Your explanation is good, let me give one suggestion. In the station, after getting green signal, the train will move. Here l want to mention one thing. The train engine, After crossing the train green signal, the green signal automatically off and the red colour signal will come immediately. How the public will know that the train moves after getting the correct signal. So l hereby request you to inform to your superior, glow the green signal upto the last compartment to see!
It is good and simple for a simple beginner learner But the system is very complex and not well understood by many The system is based on robust safety principles the foremost being fail safe principle That is why We are able to run more and more faster and faster trains with same infrastructure The system is a symbol of safety with speed It provides for human error equipment error too But none no system can provide for careless disregard or malicious procedures and multiple simultaneous errors KVenkataramani
Before 1980 Simple Interest Simple life Simple Machines After 2000 Compound Interest Complex machines complex lifestyle computing Human Error Human is an Error to the whole Universe.
No doubt the logic circuit of the auto interlock system is failsafe . It has to be as per compliance . I am from the merchant navy and on board ships there are several critical safety system that are classed as failsafe as per statutory regulations and follow a strict regime of periodical inspections and tests. However, majority, in-fact all failsafe systems cannot be classed at tamper proof as in most cases its a futile and an extremely costly exercise . The only way to control any tampering is to ensure all standard procedures and in place and strictly adhered to. Believe same applies for the Indian Railways
@@sugatoroy1254 If I get you right you are saying the same mostly in your words Is there a hint that Railways have no SOP ? For your information Railways are pioneers in laying down safety principles rules, procedures ,manuals , local in situ routines and robust training system /institutionalised systems - were in place They don’t call it by grandiloquent names and abbreviations. Probsbly now they do! And the Railway system is far more complex in the sense the variables are many ,critical situations faced by ground staff are challenging logistics have many constraints ang the spread of geography enormous I am not much in touch with current situation I wonder if they have operation simulators accident simulators for rolling stock track signalling interlocking etc .Some youngster can comfirm In my times isome -3 decades and more -simulation in Railwaynwas just an idea in my mind similar to radar simulators dynamic response analysers for military civili aviation etc So sir Railways have no reason to have inferiorty complex but complacency there should not be
@@kvenkataramani7681There should be clarity and logic in the thought process for accurate inference. Assuming information made available by the media & govt is accurate, the logical inference basis sequence of events would indicate “some kind of unauthorised interference of the facing point machine controlling the x-over to the loop line . Are we all agreeable here or not! Now, there are some gents e.g. Mr Ayub, who don’t seem to agree to our inference therefore must be privy to some confidential information! Assuming goods train was shunted on to loop line to clear the main line for approaching UP Howrah Chennai Coromandel Express and prior executing the t shunt operation, the facing point machine was set and locked to reverse position, causing the point signal to turn Yellow. Once the goods train had passed the point and entered the loop line, the point signal must have changed from Yellow to Red. In order set the main line for approaching Coromandel Express, the facing point machine set and locked to normal position and once point signal changed from Red to Green, interlocking system cleared the mainline for fast approaching Coromandel Express. The period between signal turning Yellow to Red and thereafter tuning Red to Green would have indicated defective point machine unless the Station Master and his am were already aware of this defect and on both counts standard work procedures of Indian Railways were not followed which requires urgent reporting to senior management seeking for disconnection memo, padlocking and clamping of the point at normal position, seek written approval for temporary modification of the point , 24 hours monitoring locking clamp and padlock , implement permanent repairs including mandatory testing, etc. etc. Doubt this was done and believe this lack of due diligence by railway personnel is systemic and deep routed hence CBI is taking their time. Also, interchanging the wiring ND contacts would reverse the feedback signal. Delinking of tongue rail is sabotage and would take a long time and by creating a gap between tongue rail and main rail would not serve the purpose as the location direction guide bars would remain mechanically interlocked ensuring correct point signal for corresponding point position. Let’s see what the CBI comes up as suspect it won’t be good.
1:10 that information was wrong loop line signal always yellow & red also fouling mark besides the every loop line tracks green signal set only main line or home signal & advance starter signal
Suspect the system could be fooled by reversing the corresponding 60VDC signal cable for Normal and Reverse point directions, i.e. by effectively inter changing the directional lock feedback signal from point machine to relay room. These cable connections are provided at the terminal assembly located inside the motor housing of the point machine therefore can be easily accessed after removing the housing cover, breaking the seal to remove plastic cover of the terminal assembly. A broken seal would indicate the cable connection were tampered with.
V difficult time consuming and can't go undetected, simple obstruction during track change done ,main line green mail line unoccupied ok as soon as switch motor starts put obstruction partial in track , signal remain s green but switch reverses to loop line causing train accident coramandal
@@ILbhopal1973 sorry dont agree. The signal should changing from Red to Green ( not the other way round) and how can the switch reverse without the motor coming to its end position enabling the direction control rods to get mechanically locked ,,,,, this is the mechanical interlock provided and only after this interlock position is achieved will the feedback loop signal be energized ...Also if this accident can happen just by physically obstructing the movement of the tongue rail, then YOU HAVE A DISASTER OF A SYSTEM AND NOT A FAILSAFE SYSTEM
, There should be clarity and logic in the thought process for accurate inference. Assuming information made available by the media & govt is accurate, the logical inference basis sequence of events would indicate that there was “some kind of unauthorised interference “ with the facing point machine for x-over to loop line . Are we all agreeable here or not Mr Ayub, as you don’t seem to agree to our inference therefore you must be privy to some confidential information and since you have not clarified, my further understanding of the sequence of events as follows ….. Assuming goods train was shunted on to loop line in order to clear main line for fast approaching UP Howrah Chennai iCoromandel Express . Prior to the shunting operation, the facing point machine was set and locked at reverse position, causing the signal to turn Yellow. Once the goods train had passed the point and entered the loop line, the signal must have changed over from Yellow to Red. To set main line for fast approaching Up Coromandel Express, the facing point machine was again set and locked to normal position and once signal changed from Red to Green, signal interlocking system would have cleared the mainline for fast approaching Coromandel Express. The time period between point signal turning Yellow to Red and thereafter turning Red to Green would have definitely indicated a defective point machine unless the Station Master and his team were already aware of some malfunction and under both counts the standard work operating procedures of Indian Railways were not followed .which would have required urgent incident reporting to senior management and seeking for disconnection memo, padlocking and clamping of the point at normal position, seek written approval for temporary bypass of the point , engage guard for 24 hours local monitoring of the locking clamp and padlock , implement permanent repairs including mandatory checks of all cabling / adjustment of travel bars and finally test the operation of the point machine to the satisfaction of the SM, etc. etc. Sincerely doubts if I any of these was actually carried outand believe this lack of due diligence by railway personnel is systemic and deep routed hence CBI is taking their time to investigate Likely cause of incorrect point signal not matching point position was probably in authorised tampering of wiring by an unauthorised personnel not familiar with the system . .Likely wiring for ND contacts were interchanged … Let’s see what the CBI comes up with as suspect it won’t be good.
The signalling system over Indian Railways are depends upon the system of working. The subject is a vast chapter, you have given a little idea only. . A rly worker connected with the rly signalling system directly can narrate the subject correctly.
Basis piecemeal information reported by the news media on the CRS investigation report on the Coromandel Express disaster , it would seem that the automatic interlocking system was compromised since 2018 until the accident occurred on 2nd June 2023, due to some blotched up repair on facing point machine by sectional engineers from the Signal Dept and as incredible as it may sound, it seems that this team comprising of the Snr Sectional Engineer, Jr Sectional Engineer and technician had been discretely tampering with the point switch signal. Hard to believe that these guys never felt the need to rectify the defective point and resorted to an unauthorised stop gap solution, thereby compromising safety, and compounding operational risk for traffic on UP main line for a period of five long years. Its mind boggling to comprehend how these guys could keep on manually tampering with the signalling system without getting caught and sheds some light on the quality of some skilled railwaymen responsible for maintaining safe operation of railway traffic. In this particular case the responsible sectional engineers were fully aware of this discrete "unauthorised tampering" which probably had become a habit since undetected for such a long time. These actions highlight a unsafe team and unfit for purpose, especially since they seemed completely ignorant on how their reckless actions could have compromised safety and unable to comprehend how such compromised operations with the passage of time was like a ticking time bomb ready to explode. We should take note that its only because of the high number of fatalities, skeletons in the closet are being uncovered and in context on 25th June there was another similar collision incident involving two goods train causing derailment of 12 bogies took place at Ondagram railway station, Bankura, West Bengal and although no fatalities this major incident bears significance as the sequence of events leading to the incident very similar to the Coromandel Express disaster. The railway authorities now claim that the Bankura goods train accident was due to both loco driver and the assistant loco driver of moving goods train were ' micro sleeping" therefore brakes was not applied causing the train overshoot and collide with a stationary train. The railway inquiry team concluded declaring the loco driver and assistant driver as the guilty party as they were " micro sleeping" on duty and unable to apply brakes before the red home signal thereby overshooting and colliding with stationary train on loop line. Although both injured loco drivers were hospitalised after the collision, the railways have been rather quick to sack both drivers as charged with sole responsibility of causing the accident not having checked/ confirmed these drivers work schedule complies with minimum rest hours and have conveniently closed out the case without any further investigation which leaves several pending questions unanswered as to why the duty officer in control room was not monitoring the incoming goods train and why he was not able to alert the loco driver on walkie talkie, why was this incoming goods train not cleared for the main line with green home signal after resetting the point switch to normal position since the stationary goods was parked on the loop line , instead providing red home signal when there was nil reported obstruction on up main line, Was any anti-collision device fitted on these goods trains as there must be remote emergency stop function as a contingency in case the loco pilot gets incapacitated or falls asleep due to insufficient rest hours which is now a fairly common phenomenon due to shortage of skilled man power and has contributed to a systemic rise the number of accidents and near misses thereby compromising on safety. We have listed a few important comments highlighting concerns of the common man on the loss of nearly 300 innocent lives due to sheer negligence therefore feel extremely insecure to travel by rail. . a) The automatic interlock system which is basically a safety device for railway operations was compromised since 2018, i.e. for five years until this accident occurred, b) The signalling system had lost its automatic online status due to the manual fingering of the system by the engineers. As per media, CRS reports suggests tampering of the signal system based on the statement of Mr Mohanta, Senior Sectional Engineer that immediately after the accident, he had rushed over to the control room to find the point signal still indicating Green when in fact the collision and derailment had led to railway tracks being ripped open leaving the point machine completely destroyed, therefore suggesting this was a dummy signal from external source. This suggestion makes sense if we consider the operation of this point switch was being manually manipulated ever since blotched repair in 2018. Considering the last set position of the point switch was in Reverse direction with point signal Yellow, thereby allowing the goods train to enter Up loop line in order to clear the Up main line for incoming Up Coromandel Express. We are also aware of the ongoing works for the past few days for renewal of the automatic boom barrier at the unmanned railway crossing located a fair distance away from the point switch. We are now assuming that in order to function test the boom barrier, the automatic interlock system was logically sequenced for boom barrier to close only when the facing point switch was set at Normal position to main line, i.e. Green point signal, therefore when function testing boom barrier, the same reckless team of signal engineers & technician engaged in yet another unsafe act of manually bypassing the point signal from Yellow to Green. Basis available information seems the unauthorised tampering was carried out from nearby junction box and probably due to time constraints and the inconvenient distance separating the boom barrier and the point switch. (c) Indian Railways require every railway station to carry an updated and approved version of the SWR and the SWRD. The SWR or Safe Working Rule book, is issued every 5 years and signed by Sr DOM and Sr DSTE and is the official book of rules and regulations issued for the purpose of the safe operations of trains under normal and abnormal conditions, customised to suit a particular railway station with the updated version of the SWRD or Safe Working Rule Diagram providing location details of signalling systems, interlocking systems, relay room, signalling equipment, etc. Specific procedures for working on boom barrier at level crossing are detailed under an appendix listed in the SWR which also includes the job description of he station master and his team therefore requires all parties to go through the SWR & the SWRD and sign confirming their understanding of their job descriptions and with standard operating procedures under normal / abnormal conditions which should serve as reference material for CBI in order to verify compliance. Media reports on existing plans not updated to include system modifications insinuates the SWRD not being updated for which the Sr DOM, Sr DSTE and their superiors should be held directly responsible. (d) These sectional engineers and the technician from signal dept were an unsafe bunch, not fit for purpose, capable of only " jugaar" and as they lacked the knowledge and skill set to understand the inherent risk and the possible outcome of highly unprofessional behaviour. (e) Since the same team members from the signal engineering department was responsible for the routine inspections and checks, planned maintenance and major overhaul of all signalling equipment and systems, we can safely assume that SBR was ignored thereby increasing the risk of equipment / system failure. (f) It seems highly improbable that the Station Master and the Assistant Station Manager were completely ignorant of the fact that their technical support teams could tamper around with signalling system and able to hide these blotched up repairs. It’s very evident that they regularly ignored tell-tale signs and red alerts and did not themselves comply to standard operating procedures provided under the SBR. It’s obvious that they were not monitoring the repair & maintenance being undertaken within their jurisdiction as procedures under SBR requires them to witness the final testing & commissioning to their satisfaction prior signing the re-connection memo therefore either they were privy to these blotched repairs or contrary to standard procedures they personally never attended which complemented the unsafe practices being undertaken. (g) There was another major incident involving collision of two goods train resulting in serious damage to property including the derailment of 12 bogies at Ondagram railway station, Bankura district on the 25th June 2023, and the incident has been closed in a unsatisfactory manner which requires the railways to come up with several unanswered questions as it seems a deliberately exercise to quickly and quietly close out the incident.
Hello sir. Well clear explanation? I have one another doubt sir. What is the purpose of the top white light indication? What is usage in signalling? Please answer this ot sir. Thanks for the video ❤❤
top white light means train change to a loop line ahead.. if there is double white indicator right and left of the main signal.. right means loop line at loco piolet right side ahead (or) left means loop line at loco piolet left side ahead.. in some cases two white signal indicates are in left (or) right of the main signal.. this means there are two loop lines at left (or) right of the loco piolet.. same principle to the two or more number of white at top of home signal.. 👍
Very nice video. But better to arrange someone else to speak, whose English speaking skills is much better. Else very hard to understand, and the impact of the impressive video is totally lost due to the unimpressive speech.
It is rather absurd hearing a person narrating using pidgin english. Ridiculous indeed keeping in mind that millions read the same. In future i beg that such horrible speaking of an International language ought to be avoided. 😢😢😢😢
simply the signal for main line was green BUT the track was STILL connected to the loop line. Automatically the wheel will lead to loop line. if the goods train was not there the impact would be more. There is something fishy about the loop line signal, main line signal and track connection.
At the start of video , the route indicater is shown for loop line with green signal which is not correct one ; it should be yellow only ; for loop line , train has to proceed with caution only
There has been information overflow on root cause and unfortunately by providing incorrect or incomplete information, digital media has created a lot of confusion. The very fact that CBI investigation is still ongoing does indicate foul play. Please note that for any accident investigation to be successful, data verification and data accuracy, clarity of thought process, logical data evaluation for root cause is mandatory. In context, assuming information made available by the media & govt is accurate, logical inference basis sequence of events would indicate towards “some kind of unauthorised interference “ with the facing point machine for x-over from main line to loop line . An event summary on the sequence of events ( to be verified by the data logger) as follows: (a) There was a slow-moving goods train running ahead of UP Howrah Chennai Coromandel Express. (b) In order to clear main line for the fast-approaching passenger train, standard procedure was followed by shunting the goods train on to loop line. (c) The facing point machine for loop line x-over should have been remotely set and locked at reverse position, triggering the point signal to turn Yellow. (d) Once the goods train had passed the point and entered the loop line, the signal would automatically changed over from Yellow to Red. (e) For the automatic signal interlock system to clear main line for fast approaching Up Coromandel Express at speed of nearly 130 kmph, the facing point machine would have to be remotely re-set and locked at normal position triggering point signal to automatically change over from Red to Green. (f) The time in between signal change over from Yellow to Red and thereafter from Red to Green, is the time range within which the automatic signal interlock system would have indicated an abnormal point signal which in turn should have triggered an emergency response by the station master where the point machine should have been locally checked for any external obstruction, apply key to lock supply and test the point by manual crank handle and if the point movemen still defective, the point should be considered declared failed and follow up emergency procedures should be folowed. d(g) If emergency situation described under (f) never occurred, it would insinuate railway team were aware of the point malfunctioning and not taken corrective action or the point malfunctioned after maintenence work due to incorrect adjustment of the control rods or unauthorized tampering with the electrical wiring at either local site or the signal room whereby standard company emergency procedures were completely ignored . Refer link for video on Station Masters responsibility when a point fails. th-cam.com/video/bbI6MKYWmwQ/w-d-xo.html .In context, please note although the system may be rated as failsafe, by no means can the system be considered as tamper proof. (h) It may be possible to fool the automatic signal interlock system by simple alteration of the feedback circuit, i.e. either by interchanging wiring to feedback signal relays located inside the point machine motor housing or by swapping the signal relays located in the relay room. (i) Irrespective, whether case (f) or ( g), under both counts emergency operating procedures issued by the Indian Railways was not followed. Normally under these circumstances, standard procedures would entail incident reporting to senior management seeking for disconnection memo, padlock and clamp point at normal position, seek written approval for temporary electrical bypass of the point , employ 24 hours sentry duty at local site to monitor status, carry out permanent repairs, check insulation, measure / adjust distance of travel bars, test for local and remote operation of point machine to the satisfaction of attending Station Master, etc. Serious doubts on due diligence by the railway staff. (j) Please note that before any serious incident, there are tell tale indicators including related minor incidents and near misses and we suspect CBI is taking their sweet time with the investigation as suspect on going through historical data they may have come across serious breach of safety management system , negligence and non-compliance of standard operating procedures . The Railway Board have reported repeated occurrences of similar nature which should have been taken into consideration during the CBI investigation .
हि भारतीय रेल्वे असल्याने क्रुपया मराठीत सांगा.ह्यामध्ये सर्वात महत्वाचे म्हणजे मागच्या रूळाचा सप्लाय पुढील रूळात जाऊ नये म्हणून फायबर टाकून ब्लॉक जाईंट बनवला जातो तो दाखवलाच नाही. ??
In my view the driver of coromandel train see segnal only half portion the green one but not see another half the side signal that's why the accident happened
Mr Narrator you have given one wrong ihfor mation to the viewers when a train is taken to the loop line by the ca bin master point to be adjusted and the lights of the signals will be yelliw in the middle and 3 to 4 small iights show ing side towords loop line But your animation showing signal at the top of the post Rectify it
BUT WHAY ACD ? IN ATS SYSTEM MUST BE MECHENICAL INTER LOCKING FIRST WORK THEN ELECTRIC INTERLOCKING WORK MEACENICAL INTER LOCKING IS FAILL THEN ALL SYSTEM IS OFF POSTATION . TUNG RAIL TO MAIN RAIL MECHENICAL CONNECTION MAKE BREAK SWITCHING IS WORKING . THEN POINT MOTOR OPERATIONAL POSTATION .
Bro your bengali accent English is to a next level ....!
😂😂😂😂
😂😂😂
😂😂😂
Bengali nahi odia accent hai
English is not our national language.
I always got amazed by seeing multiple signals in track during journey, today I got to know the reason behind it....!!!... THANK YOU....!!!🙂😊
Your explanation, and your english... Is excellent... 👌👌👌👌👌
😂😂
As a maritime consultant, i have been involved with Major Incident investigations within the marine industry and have been following media reports on this unfortunate incident and have also been sharing my comments after filtering out media clutter. As events have unfolded, the story developing seems all too familiar as i suspect that this incident is deeply routed and there would be a chain of relatively minor incidents and near misses that would lead up for this particular major incident to occur. An audit of the Quality Management System of the Indian Railways would most likely highlight major non conformities including non compliance of Standard Operating Procedures. The fact that there was a Disconnection Memo & Reconnection Memo issued by the Station Master, we are assuming that the railways team had become aware that there was some problem with the facing point machine on up-loop line x-over and basis the high risk status, a Disconnection Memo was issued by declaring the point Failed, requiring immediate repair & maintenance. The was a serious breach in the implementation of standard operating procedures after issuing the Disconnection Memo until issuance of the Re-connection Memo because if procedures as laid down by the Indian Railways was followed with due diligence this unfortunate incident would never have taken place. In context, the standard operating procedures require that maintenance repair or replacement of the point is carried out by a joint team comprising of experienced personnel from the engineering & signalling dept under the station masters command. Standard practice after boxing up the point and reconnecting the terminal wiring, testing and commissioning requires the point to be function tested from Normal locked position to Reverse locked position and vice versa, ensuring point gets locked at each end position, i.e. tongue rail makes full contact with the stock rail which requires total travel distance of tongue rail to be measured for a pre-determined value and if required the throw slide of the machine is adjusted after confirming self-locking of lock slides at its end positions. During these tests, the point is operated locally by hand cranking the manual lever and thereafter the remote operation is checked from control room. AS PER IR RULES, IT IS MANDATORY FOR STATION MASTER TO BE PHYSICALLY PRESENT AT LOCAL SITE TO WITNESS TESTING OF THE POINT, AND ONCE SATISFIED WITH FUNCTION TESTING OF POINT AND SIGNALLING SYSTEM, the station manager is then able to issue a re-connection memo.
We are in the dark on the nature of "repairs effected", and what was the specific reason (why, when and for how long) for issuing a Connection & Re-Connection Memo because this signifies an abnormal condition which would affect up main line traffic therefore timings for issual of these memos would be a source of key information. Normally for failed point, the complete point machine should be replaced with a new spare machine.
The time re-connection memo was issued and ETA ( estimated time of arrival )of UP Coromandel Express would also shed some light if the repairs were undertaken under stress as working under tight schedules, there is always the temptation to take short cuts and a tendency to overlook basics, therefore we cannot eliminate the possibility of incorrect wiring connections made after boxing up the point machine, effectively reversing the contact terminals for a given position, i.e. when the point was mechanically locked at the Normal position, the feedback signal indicated the Reverse position and vice versa. There is a always a possibility for basic mistakes to go undetected especially when working under tight schedule which could have led to the disaster. In context, there was media reports regarding ongoing renewal of the electric barrier at the level x-ing however contrary to several opinions, as a layman's inference, cannot see this as root cause of the incident because as per logical sequence this electric barrier unit should serve as an interlock for the two mail lines irrespective of the position of the point.
2:07 😊
Very educative video abt signalling.Hats off to u.
Bro.... double YELLOW🟡🟡 means... in next two signels (every km will have one signel in railway) i.e, in next 2 signels will be either YELLOW🟡 (to stop at 4th signel it will be RED🔴) or GREEN🟢 (to clear/proceed)... this
Is the meaning of DOUBLE YELLOW.... just remember guys... whenever your TRAIN crosses DOUBLE YELLOW it starts slowing down... until it gets GREEN
th-cam.com/video/z3HPZuSZ12Y/w-d-xo.html
Yes your are correct
Absolutely right
A couple of corrections (though let me know if I am mistaken, as I am familiar with UK practice as opposed to Indian practice - but I presume they are very similar):
1. A route indicator must be proven lit before a proceed aspect can be shown so that the driver knows which route they will be taking and can adjust their speed accordingly (to avoid potential derailment). In this video the junction signal shows a proceed aspect prior to the route indicator being lit.
2. A double yellow should never be followed immediately by a red signal, as shown early on in the video. The aspect sequence for 4 aspect signalling is G-YY-Y-R. In fact, regardless of whether it is 2, 3, or 4 aspect signalling, the signal immediately before a red signal must always show a single yellow. The example at the end was correct however!
3. When a train passes a signal, the signal should almost always immediately return to red once the wheels pass the detection point associated with that signal (the exception to this being the use of last wheel replacement) in order to protect the rear of the train from any other train following it. In the video the signals remain at proceed even when the entire train passes.
#3 happening in I R promptly
YY means the next signal is Y. YY means speed is almost like G, so obviously the next one should not be R. The next one should be YY or Y. This is followed in all Indian railway sections.
When a train passes the signal automatically turns R in most sections.
which software do you use to make these tracks, please tell.
Which application you use for this type of videos
The video explains the purpose of various indicating lights like red,green,yellow,white..etc. But How these indicating lights gets Signals is not explained. The interlocks provided between track point machine and indicating lights are also to be explained for better understanding of signalling system.
Hope it will be covered in next video.
sure
Your explanation is good, let me give one suggestion. In the station, after getting green signal, the train will move. Here l want to mention one thing. The train engine, After crossing the train green signal, the green signal automatically off and the red colour signal will come immediately. How the public will know that the train moves after getting the correct signal. So l hereby request you to inform to your superior, glow the green signal upto the last compartment to see!
Nice explanation..
Keep it up
At time 0:08 the signal is green with lunar loopline which is not possible in signalling system.. kindly correct it.
Sir, Which software do you use?
Nice animation and explanation
Let's grow up ✌️ never stop ✋️ learning ✌️ ✋️ 🥳 👍 ✨️ 💪💪
It is good and simple for a simple beginner learner
But the system is very complex and not well understood by many
The system is based on robust safety principles the foremost being fail safe principle
That is why We are able to run more and more faster and faster trains with same infrastructure
The system is a symbol of safety with speed
It provides for human error
equipment error too
But none no system can provide for careless disregard or malicious procedures and multiple simultaneous errors
KVenkataramani
Before 1980
Simple Interest
Simple life
Simple Machines
After 2000
Compound Interest
Complex machines
complex lifestyle
computing
Human Error Human is an Error to the whole Universe.
No doubt the logic circuit of the auto interlock system is failsafe . It has to be as per compliance . I am from the merchant navy and on board ships there are several critical safety system that are classed as failsafe as per statutory regulations and follow a strict regime of periodical inspections and tests. However, majority, in-fact all failsafe systems cannot be classed at tamper proof as in most cases its a futile and an extremely costly exercise . The only way to control any tampering is to ensure all standard procedures and in place and strictly adhered to. Believe same applies for the Indian Railways
@@sugatoroy1254 If I get you right you are saying the same mostly in your words
Is there a hint that Railways have no SOP ?
For your information Railways are pioneers in laying down safety principles rules, procedures ,manuals , local in situ routines and robust training system /institutionalised systems - were in place
They don’t call it by grandiloquent names and abbreviations. Probsbly now they do!
And the Railway system is far more complex in the sense the variables are many ,critical situations faced by ground staff are challenging logistics have many constraints ang the spread of geography enormous
I am not much in touch with current situation
I wonder if they have operation simulators accident simulators for rolling stock track signalling interlocking etc
.Some youngster can comfirm
In my times isome -3 decades and more -simulation in Railwaynwas just an idea in my mind similar to radar simulators dynamic response analysers for military civili aviation etc
So sir Railways have no reason to have inferiorty complex but complacency there should not be
@@kvenkataramani7681There should be clarity and logic in the thought process for accurate inference. Assuming information made available by the media & govt is accurate, the logical inference basis sequence of events would indicate “some kind of unauthorised interference of the facing point machine controlling the x-over to the loop line . Are we all agreeable here or not! Now, there are some gents e.g. Mr Ayub, who don’t seem to agree to our inference therefore must be privy to some confidential information! Assuming goods train was shunted on to loop line to clear the main line for approaching UP Howrah Chennai Coromandel Express and prior executing the t shunt operation, the facing point machine was set and locked to reverse position, causing the point signal to turn Yellow. Once the goods train had passed the point and entered the loop line, the point signal must have changed from Yellow to Red. In order set the main line for approaching Coromandel Express, the facing point machine set and locked to normal position and once point signal changed from Red to Green, interlocking system cleared the mainline for fast approaching Coromandel Express. The period between signal turning Yellow to Red and thereafter tuning Red to Green would have indicated defective point machine unless the Station Master and his am were already aware of this defect and on both counts standard work procedures of Indian Railways were not followed which requires urgent reporting to senior management seeking for disconnection memo, padlocking and clamping of the point at normal position, seek written approval for temporary modification of the point , 24 hours monitoring locking clamp and padlock , implement permanent repairs including mandatory testing, etc. etc. Doubt this was done and believe this lack of due diligence by railway personnel is systemic and deep routed hence CBI is taking their time. Also, interchanging the wiring ND contacts would reverse the feedback signal. Delinking of tongue rail is sabotage and would take a long time and by creating a gap between tongue rail and main rail would not serve the purpose as the location direction guide bars would remain mechanically interlocked ensuring correct point signal for corresponding point position. Let’s see what the CBI comes up as suspect it won’t be good.
Hello, in which software you make these videos. Please tell
1:10 that information was wrong loop line signal always yellow & red also fouling mark besides the every loop line tracks green signal set only main line or home signal & advance starter signal
Good
great video, do you mind sharing the animation you used("without the water marks") ???
at which software can we get such animations..
Which software is using for animation please share name
Please explain with all the practical examples for the working of Advance Starter, starter and Home signals working... Would be very helpful.
Loop line starter doesn't shows green aspect because none trains can go through from loop line
Excellent next time you explain how train is accident in wrong signals
2:34wrong information when two yellow lights glow near signal will be one yellow and finally red signal
Nice video thank you❤
What was the case in Coromondal Express dated 2/6/2023? The signal was green and the point/home switch set to loop line. How?
Suspect the system could be fooled by reversing the corresponding 60VDC signal cable for Normal and Reverse point directions, i.e. by effectively inter changing the directional lock feedback signal from point machine to relay room. These cable connections are provided at the terminal assembly located inside the motor housing of the point machine therefore can be easily accessed after removing the housing cover, breaking the seal to remove plastic cover of the terminal assembly. A broken seal would indicate the cable connection were tampered with.
V difficult time consuming and can't go undetected, simple obstruction during track change done ,main line green mail line unoccupied ok as soon as switch motor starts put obstruction partial in track , signal remain s green but switch reverses to loop line causing train accident coramandal
Уже обманули
th-cam.com/video/QXybuZ3Ig-8/w-d-xo.html
@@ILbhopal1973 sorry dont agree. The signal should changing from Red to Green ( not the other way round) and how can the switch reverse without the motor coming to its end position enabling the direction control rods to get mechanically locked ,,,,, this is the mechanical interlock provided and only after this interlock position is achieved will the feedback loop signal be energized ...Also if this accident can happen just by physically obstructing the movement of the tongue rail, then YOU HAVE A DISASTER OF A SYSTEM AND NOT A FAILSAFE SYSTEM
@@sugatoroy1254dilinking of tongue rail/loosening linking plate nuts and bolt will create gap between main rail and tongue rail
,
There should be clarity and logic in the thought process for accurate inference. Assuming information made available by the media & govt is accurate, the logical inference basis sequence of events would indicate that there was “some kind of unauthorised interference “ with the facing point machine for x-over to loop line . Are we all agreeable here or not Mr Ayub, as you don’t seem to agree to our inference therefore you must be privy to some confidential information and since you have not clarified, my further understanding of the sequence of events as follows ….. Assuming goods train was shunted on to loop line in order to clear main line for fast approaching UP Howrah Chennai iCoromandel Express . Prior to the shunting operation, the facing point machine was set and locked at reverse position, causing the signal to turn Yellow. Once the goods train had passed the point and entered the loop line, the signal must have changed over from Yellow to Red. To set main line for fast approaching Up Coromandel Express, the facing point machine was again set and locked to normal position and once signal changed from Red to Green, signal interlocking system would have cleared the mainline for fast approaching Coromandel Express. The time period between point signal turning Yellow to Red and thereafter turning Red to Green would have definitely indicated a defective point machine unless the Station Master and his team were already aware of some malfunction and under both counts the standard work operating procedures of Indian Railways were not followed .which would have required urgent incident reporting to senior management and seeking for disconnection memo, padlocking and clamping of the point at normal position, seek written approval for temporary bypass of the point , engage guard for 24 hours local monitoring of the locking clamp and padlock , implement permanent repairs including mandatory checks of all cabling / adjustment of travel bars and finally test the operation of the point machine to the satisfaction of the SM, etc. etc. Sincerely doubts if I any of these was actually carried outand believe this lack of due diligence by railway personnel is systemic and deep routed hence CBI is taking their time to investigate
Likely cause of incorrect point signal not matching point position was probably in authorised tampering of wiring by an unauthorised personnel not familiar with the system . .Likely wiring for ND contacts were interchanged … Let’s see what the CBI comes up with as suspect it won’t be good.
Bro after attention signal is not red rather caution or starter.
Very good and knowledgeable video. Thank you.
1% knowledge about signalling system of Indian railway😅😅
लुप लाईन मे ग्रीन सिग्नल नही hota yalow और... Red.... Rahta hai
Can you explain the Shunting Signal too, the signal with a disk or three white lights, I know about it but don't know what it mean and how it works.
Sir please reply using genaretar train
All ready electricity line use
Great ❤❤
Railway accident responsibility is railway minister..loco pilots ko 15-16 hr duty... compulsory...dete hai
Bro loop line me green lamp nhi hota he only red or yellow hota he
The signalling system over Indian Railways are depends upon the system of working. The subject is a vast chapter, you have given a little idea only. . A rly worker connected with the rly signalling system directly can narrate the subject correctly.
Basis piecemeal information reported by the news media on the CRS investigation report on the Coromandel Express disaster , it would seem that the automatic interlocking system was compromised since 2018 until the accident occurred on 2nd June 2023, due to some blotched up repair on facing point machine by sectional engineers from the Signal Dept and as incredible as it may sound, it seems that this team comprising of the Snr Sectional Engineer, Jr Sectional Engineer and technician had been discretely tampering with the point switch signal. Hard to believe that these guys never felt the need to rectify the defective point and resorted to an unauthorised stop gap solution, thereby compromising safety, and compounding operational risk for traffic on UP main line for a period of five long years. Its mind boggling to comprehend how these guys could keep on manually tampering with the signalling system without getting caught and sheds some light on the quality of some skilled railwaymen responsible for maintaining safe operation of railway traffic. In this particular case the responsible sectional engineers were fully aware of this discrete "unauthorised tampering" which probably had become a habit since undetected for such a long time. These actions highlight a unsafe team and unfit for purpose, especially since they seemed completely ignorant on how their reckless actions could have compromised safety and unable to comprehend how such compromised operations with the passage of time was like a ticking time bomb ready to explode. We should take note that its only because of the high number of fatalities, skeletons in the closet are being uncovered and in context on 25th June there was another similar collision incident involving two goods train causing derailment of 12 bogies took place at Ondagram railway station, Bankura, West Bengal and although no fatalities this major incident bears significance as the sequence of events leading to the incident very similar to the Coromandel Express disaster. The railway authorities now claim that the Bankura goods train accident was due to both loco driver and the assistant loco driver of moving goods train were ' micro sleeping" therefore brakes was not applied causing the train overshoot and collide with a stationary train. The railway inquiry team concluded declaring the loco driver and assistant driver as the guilty party as they were " micro sleeping" on duty and unable to apply brakes before the red home signal thereby overshooting and colliding with stationary train on loop line. Although both injured loco drivers were hospitalised after the collision, the railways have been rather quick to sack both drivers as charged with sole responsibility of causing the accident not having checked/ confirmed these drivers work schedule complies with minimum rest hours and have conveniently closed out the case without any further investigation which leaves several pending questions unanswered as to why the duty officer in control room was not monitoring the incoming goods train and why he was not able to alert the loco driver on walkie talkie, why was this incoming goods train not cleared for the main line with green home signal after resetting the point switch to normal position since the stationary goods was parked on the loop line , instead providing red home signal when there was nil reported obstruction on up main line, Was any anti-collision device fitted on these goods trains as there must be remote emergency stop function as a contingency in case the loco pilot gets incapacitated or falls asleep due to insufficient rest hours which is now a fairly common phenomenon due to shortage of skilled man power and has contributed to a systemic rise the number of accidents and near misses thereby compromising on safety.
We have listed a few important comments highlighting concerns of the common man on the loss of nearly 300 innocent lives due to sheer negligence therefore feel extremely insecure to travel by rail. .
a) The automatic interlock system which is basically a safety device for railway operations was compromised since 2018, i.e. for five years until this accident occurred,
b) The signalling system had lost its automatic online status due to the manual fingering of the system by the engineers. As per media, CRS reports suggests tampering of the signal system based on the statement of Mr Mohanta, Senior Sectional Engineer that immediately after the accident, he had rushed over to the control room to find the point signal still indicating Green when in fact the collision and derailment had led to railway tracks being ripped open leaving the point machine completely destroyed, therefore suggesting this was a dummy signal from external source. This suggestion makes sense if we consider the operation of this point switch was being manually manipulated ever since blotched repair in 2018. Considering the last set position of the point switch was in Reverse direction with point signal Yellow, thereby allowing the goods train to enter Up loop line in order to clear the Up main line for incoming Up Coromandel Express. We are also aware of the ongoing works for the past few days for renewal of the automatic boom barrier at the unmanned railway crossing located a fair distance away from the point switch. We are now assuming that in order to function test the boom barrier, the automatic interlock system was logically sequenced for boom barrier to close only when the facing point switch was set at Normal position to main line, i.e. Green point signal, therefore when function testing boom barrier, the same reckless team of signal engineers & technician engaged in yet another unsafe act of manually bypassing the point signal from Yellow to Green. Basis available information seems the unauthorised tampering was carried out from nearby junction box and probably due to time constraints and the inconvenient distance separating the boom barrier and the point switch.
(c) Indian Railways require every railway station to carry an updated and approved version of the SWR and the SWRD. The SWR or Safe Working Rule book, is issued every 5 years and signed by Sr DOM and Sr DSTE and is the official book of rules and regulations issued for the purpose of the safe operations of trains under normal and abnormal conditions, customised to suit a particular railway station with the updated version of the SWRD or Safe Working Rule Diagram providing location details of signalling systems, interlocking systems, relay room, signalling equipment, etc. Specific procedures for working on boom barrier at level crossing are detailed under an appendix listed in the SWR which also includes the job description of he station master and his team therefore requires all parties to go through the SWR & the SWRD and sign confirming their understanding of their job descriptions and with standard operating procedures under normal / abnormal conditions which should serve as reference material for CBI in order to verify compliance. Media reports on existing plans not updated to include system modifications insinuates the SWRD not being updated for which the Sr DOM, Sr DSTE and their superiors should be held directly responsible.
(d) These sectional engineers and the technician from signal dept were an unsafe bunch, not fit for purpose, capable of only " jugaar" and as they lacked the knowledge and skill set to understand the inherent risk and the possible outcome of highly unprofessional behaviour.
(e) Since the same team members from the signal engineering department was responsible for the routine inspections and checks, planned maintenance and major overhaul of all signalling equipment and systems, we can safely assume that SBR was ignored thereby increasing the risk of equipment / system failure.
(f) It seems highly improbable that the Station Master and the Assistant Station Manager were completely ignorant of the fact that their technical support teams could tamper around with signalling system and able to hide these blotched up repairs. It’s very evident that they regularly ignored tell-tale signs and red alerts and did not themselves comply to standard operating procedures provided under the SBR. It’s obvious that they were not monitoring the repair & maintenance being undertaken within their jurisdiction as procedures under SBR requires them to witness the final testing & commissioning to their satisfaction prior signing the re-connection memo therefore either they were privy to these blotched repairs or contrary to standard procedures they personally never attended which complemented the unsafe practices being undertaken.
(g) There was another major incident involving collision of two goods train resulting in serious damage to property including the derailment of 12 bogies at Ondagram railway station, Bankura district on the 25th June 2023, and the incident has been closed in a unsatisfactory manner which requires the railways to come up with several unanswered questions as it seems a deliberately exercise to quickly and quietly close out the incident.
Super brother 🎉
Well explained ❤
What is the software used to model this video ?..Track and Turnouts to be specific.. which program is used to model this track crossing area ?
SCADA
Hello sir. Well clear explanation? I have one another doubt sir. What is the purpose of the top white light indication? What is usage in signalling? Please answer this ot sir. Thanks for the video ❤❤
top white light means train change to a loop line ahead.. if there is double white indicator right and left of the main signal.. right means loop line at loco piolet right side ahead (or) left means loop line at loco piolet left side ahead.. in some cases two white signal indicates are in left (or) right of the main signal.. this means there are two loop lines at left (or) right of the loco piolet.. same principle to the two or more number of white at top of home signal.. 👍
How does the point machine operate the station master and what is the relation between the point and the signal?
Reply to below.
Loop line and main line on same signal??
Loop line pe 2aspect signal me green and red shown in video. .how this possible
Nice 👌
Khela hobe ❤
Bro i use you video?
Very good
Amazing signal system by railways
Very complicated. I am able to understand why accidents happen. Had it been stopped with Red, Yellow and Green, it would have been simple. 😊
pls give some info about calling indicator signal .. and more about silver cross mark on the top of signal post ,,,,
Well explained in bengali
Very nice video. But better to arrange someone else to speak, whose English speaking skills is much better. Else very hard to understand, and the impact of the impressive video is totally lost due to the unimpressive speech.
I don't know what English you have learnt , but i understood everything he said , and also English is not our mother tounge
It is rather absurd hearing a person narrating using pidgin english. Ridiculous indeed keeping in mind that millions read the same.
In future i beg that such horrible speaking of an International language ought to be avoided.
😢😢😢😢
@@BHARATHA-SAMPRAJYA
Speaking English is not the question but doing it the right way is essential.
The spelling of tongue isnt correct.
If you're not well versant, then speak Hindi our mother TONGUE!
😂😂😂
@@BhaskaradasChennamkulath sorry brother , even Hindi isn't my mother tounge , my language is Malayalam
Nice
simply the signal for main line was green BUT the track was STILL connected to the loop line. Automatically the wheel will lead to loop line. if the goods train was not there the impact would be more. There is something fishy about the loop line signal, main line signal and track connection.
At the start of video , the route indicater is shown for loop line with green signal which is not correct one ; it should be yellow only ; for loop line , train has to proceed with caution only
You mainly missed the IB(Intermediate Block Section) signals between the two Stations 🤔🤔🤔🤔🤔
How signalling work on a single mail line
Like a konkan railway
Excellent
There has been information overflow on root cause and unfortunately by providing incorrect or incomplete information, digital media has created a lot of confusion. The very fact that CBI investigation is still ongoing does indicate foul play. Please note that for any accident investigation to be successful, data verification and data accuracy, clarity of thought process, logical data evaluation for root cause is mandatory. In context, assuming information made available by the media & govt is accurate, logical inference basis sequence of events would indicate towards “some kind of unauthorised interference “ with the facing point machine for x-over from main line to loop line .
An event summary on the sequence of events ( to be verified by the data logger) as follows:
(a) There was a slow-moving goods train running ahead of UP Howrah Chennai Coromandel Express.
(b) In order to clear main line for the fast-approaching passenger train, standard procedure was followed by shunting the goods train on to loop line.
(c) The facing point machine for loop line x-over should have been remotely set and locked at reverse position, triggering the point signal to turn Yellow.
(d) Once the goods train had passed the point and entered the loop line, the signal would automatically changed over from Yellow to Red.
(e) For the automatic signal interlock system to clear main line for fast approaching Up Coromandel Express at speed of nearly 130 kmph, the facing point machine would have to be remotely re-set and locked at normal position triggering point signal to automatically change over from Red to Green.
(f) The time in between signal change over from Yellow to Red and thereafter from Red to Green, is the time range within which the automatic signal interlock system would have indicated an abnormal point signal which in turn should have triggered an emergency response by the station master where the point machine should have been locally checked for any external obstruction, apply key to lock supply and test the point by manual crank handle and if the point movemen still defective, the point should be considered declared failed and follow up emergency procedures should be folowed.
d(g) If emergency situation described under (f) never occurred, it would insinuate railway team were aware of the point malfunctioning and not taken corrective action or the point malfunctioned after maintenence work due to incorrect adjustment of the control rods or unauthorized tampering with the electrical wiring at either local site or the signal room whereby standard company emergency procedures were completely ignored . Refer link for video on Station Masters responsibility when a point fails. th-cam.com/video/bbI6MKYWmwQ/w-d-xo.html .In context, please note although the system may be rated as failsafe, by no means can the system be considered as tamper proof.
(h) It may be possible to fool the automatic signal interlock system by simple alteration of the feedback circuit, i.e. either by interchanging wiring to feedback signal relays located inside the point machine motor housing or by swapping the signal relays located in the relay room.
(i) Irrespective, whether case (f) or ( g), under both counts emergency operating procedures issued by the Indian Railways was not followed. Normally under these circumstances, standard procedures would entail incident reporting to senior management seeking for disconnection memo, padlock and clamp point at normal position, seek written approval for temporary electrical bypass of the point , employ 24 hours sentry duty at local site to monitor status, carry out permanent repairs, check insulation, measure / adjust distance of travel bars, test for local and remote operation of point machine to the satisfaction of attending Station Master, etc. Serious doubts on due diligence by the railway staff.
(j) Please note that before any serious incident, there are tell tale indicators including related minor incidents and near misses and we suspect CBI is taking their sweet time with the investigation as suspect on going through historical data they may have come across serious breach of safety management system , negligence and non-compliance of standard operating procedures . The Railway Board have reported repeated occurrences of similar nature which should have been taken into consideration during the CBI investigation .
You explain distance (permissive signal)and double distance.
I object !
If the Train wants to change track then the signal should be Caution Signal with Home Signal at above
Great
This. Ur right vidio speed lup line accident
So nice
हि भारतीय रेल्वे असल्याने क्रुपया मराठीत सांगा.ह्यामध्ये सर्वात महत्वाचे म्हणजे मागच्या रूळाचा सप्लाय पुढील रूळात जाऊ नये म्हणून फायबर टाकून ब्लॉक जाईंट बनवला जातो तो दाखवलाच नाही. ??
What is loop signal?
Very good content for knowledge.. but please change the narrator.. because of extremely poor pronunciation it sounds very bad
Что значит зелёный с красным? Почему вместо него нельзя поставить жёлтый?
Are you from झारसुगुड़ा 😂
Signalling system can be improved still as double yellow is similar to caution to locopilots with single yellow signal. 😅😅
In my view the driver of coromandel train see segnal only half portion the green one but not see another half the side signal that's why the accident happened
Mr Narrator you have given one wrong ihfor mation to the viewers when a train is taken to the loop line by the ca bin master point to be adjusted and the lights of the signals will be yelliw in the middle and 3 to 4 small iights show ing side towords loop line But your animation showing signal at the top of the post Rectify it
❤❤❤
BUT WHAY ACD ? IN ATS SYSTEM MUST BE MECHENICAL INTER LOCKING FIRST WORK THEN ELECTRIC INTERLOCKING WORK MEACENICAL INTER LOCKING IS FAILL THEN ALL SYSTEM IS OFF POSTATION . TUNG RAIL TO MAIN RAIL MECHENICAL CONNECTION MAKE BREAK SWITCHING IS WORKING . THEN POINT MOTOR OPERATIONAL POSTATION .
Who is the mistake of this accident? Track system, station master, signal automatic control
track point changer
Yes right, Light is changing done but track point line is not change, this main mistake of accident.
👏👏👏👏👏👏
Bonglish at a totally different level!
😂😂😂
The way he says "light"
Are you bengalee?
Dost apna language bol letey to tumari aawaj ke sath language set kartiiii.....pr na chod diye tum video ki
I thing, you r from Puruliya 😁
Station name #Balasore ❤ Odisha
First provide Kavach Anti collision device in all indian railways trains.
👌👌👌🇮🇳
There are many Mistakes.
Viewers please don't use this to start piloting trains please. For Coromandel Sake
Loop line always yellow and red
tere english mast hai
Your explained wrong way ..loopline don't have green signal it has yellow and re only..
radio indian train simulator download to explain
I thought he said kala light ( black light )
Get your facts correct. Lots of errors
upni 1kjon bangali ami buja nea6e upnar language suna .
Please give me this games link please 🥺
Dont misguide others with wrong information. A little knowledge is a dengarous thing. 🤔
God bless you