Take nothing away from the Imperial Japanese Navy, they were well trained, dedicated and skilful. And at that time, they had us out-classed. Lest we Forget. 🇭🇲🇺🇲
Great stuff as always AA. Those Counties are some fine looking cruisers. I love the contemporary newsclip inserts that is some very interesting footage!
This time it's not news clips. It's the post-war documentary series "Victory at Sea" and the Marine Corp's promotional film "Uncommon Valor". But, yes, I found far more relevant and useful footage than I expected for this one. Episode two, however, is a bit more of a challenge. Fortunately the game developers of Task Force Admiral are being generous enough to run the scenario through their CGI artist so I can get some clips to provide illustration/perspective of this night battle.
I'm always amazed at how articulate, measured and descriptive almost all of these verbal accounts are. Without that, I'd not have a series! Do you know if his website has been preserved on Wayback Machine or elsewhere?
Nice video, but hoo-EEE, do the Aussies hold a grudge against Fletcher! All I'll say in the man's defense is hindsight is always 20/20, and the American Navy was down to 2.5 fleet carriers against 4, plus what was assumed to be a larger surface fleet plus land-based planes. Fletcher felt the invasion force was under good care with Admiral Crutchley. The American admiral who REALLY deserves any ire IMO was Robert Ghormley.
Fletcher comes in for a lot of flack in the books Neptune's Inferno and Morning Star, Midnight Sun. Especially for his conduct in the briefings before the invasion. But he had been on the "front line" since day one of the US war. And he had already been sunk in two carriers. This, along with battle fatigue, probably made him somewhat paranoid about losing another one at his tenuous stage of the war. On the other hand, they were there to be used. And that was a lot of Marines, transports and warships he left sitting on the water without even formally telling them he'd leave 12 hours before his previous indicated departure time.
Ghormley was, like Fletcher, in a very fragile position. He was in the middle of nowhere. He had nothing. No facilities. No staff. No reserves. And the instant they began to arrive - he had to launch the first US full-scale invasion of the war. He had to deal with General MacArthur. He had to deal with Admiral King. And that was before he had to balance the demands of Turner and Fletcher. He seems to have been overly worried about being a "micromanager" (as King was) of his command team. So he placed too much faith in the judgement of Fletcher where he should have been providing oversight. He and the units under his command managed to cobble together enough resilience to win at the end of the day. But "it was a damned close-run thing!"
It has advantages and disadvantages. Less topweight so more available for other systems. Less damage control risk. And US destroyers carried quite a number of tubes anyway.
The books Neptune's Inferno and especially Morning Star, Midnight Sun have some extraordinary accounts of his behaviour in the conferences leading up to the action. It seems he was hyper-paranoid about losing another carrier. To be fair, he had been in the thick of it non-stop for months. Battle fatigue and the trauma of being sunk twice would take its toll on anyone.
Take nothing away from the Imperial Japanese Navy, they were well trained, dedicated and skilful.
And at that time, they had us out-classed.
Lest we Forget. 🇭🇲🇺🇲
Great stuff as always AA. Those Counties are some fine looking cruisers. I love the contemporary newsclip inserts that is some very interesting footage!
This time it's not news clips. It's the post-war documentary series "Victory at Sea" and the Marine Corp's promotional film "Uncommon Valor".
But, yes, I found far more relevant and useful footage than I expected for this one.
Episode two, however, is a bit more of a challenge. Fortunately the game developers of Task Force Admiral are being generous enough to run the scenario through their CGI artist so I can get some clips to provide illustration/perspective of this night battle.
Mac ( RIP) had a great website and his narration of this is superb.
I'm always amazed at how articulate, measured and descriptive almost all of these verbal accounts are.
Without that, I'd not have a series!
Do you know if his website has been preserved on Wayback Machine or elsewhere?
@@ArmouredCarriers Thanks but sorry I cannot find it.
God bless our Australian family.🇬🇧🌟🎚️. Happy Easter.
Argh. Sorry. Too many default advert slots inserted again. Have cut them back to one every 15 minutes.
Nice video, but hoo-EEE, do the Aussies hold a grudge against Fletcher! All I'll say in the man's defense is hindsight is always 20/20, and the American Navy was down to 2.5 fleet carriers against 4, plus what was assumed to be a larger surface fleet plus land-based planes. Fletcher felt the invasion force was under good care with Admiral Crutchley. The American admiral who REALLY deserves any ire IMO was Robert Ghormley.
Fletcher comes in for a lot of flack in the books Neptune's Inferno and Morning Star, Midnight Sun. Especially for his conduct in the briefings before the invasion.
But he had been on the "front line" since day one of the US war. And he had already been sunk in two carriers. This, along with battle fatigue, probably made him somewhat paranoid about losing another one at his tenuous stage of the war.
On the other hand, they were there to be used. And that was a lot of Marines, transports and warships he left sitting on the water without even formally telling them he'd leave 12 hours before his previous indicated departure time.
Ghormley was, like Fletcher, in a very fragile position. He was in the middle of nowhere. He had nothing. No facilities. No staff. No reserves. And the instant they began to arrive - he had to launch the first US full-scale invasion of the war.
He had to deal with General MacArthur. He had to deal with Admiral King. And that was before he had to balance the demands of Turner and Fletcher.
He seems to have been overly worried about being a "micromanager" (as King was) of his command team. So he placed too much faith in the judgement of Fletcher where he should have been providing oversight.
He and the units under his command managed to cobble together enough resilience to win at the end of the day.
But "it was a damned close-run thing!"
@@JeffreyWilliams-dr7qe A thing called "chain of command".
@@JeffreyWilliams-dr7qe Luck had nothing to do with it.
great series
Ура, новое видео. Спасибо.
When were these interviews originally conducted as it’s now 2024 and many of these men would be on their mid 90’s ?
They were done as museum and university projects, some as early as the 80s but mostly 90s and 3000s.
Great video! Is part two available anywhere?
Not yet. I have the audio track cut. But assembling enough footage to match it is taking much longer than expected, sorry!
@@ArmouredCarriers All good, thank you!
U.S. cruisers didn’t even have torpedo tubes! Unique concept.
Never mind torpedoes that even worked!!
It has advantages and disadvantages. Less topweight so more available for other systems. Less damage control risk. And US destroyers carried quite a number of tubes anyway.
@@DaveSCameron right duds that got people killed
The ‘there’s nothing wrong with our torpedoes’ idiots had a full year in charge after Savo.
British county class cruisers like the Canberra very hard to sink.
Ghormely was incompetent
Rather negative perspectives on Fletcher in this action from interviewees.
The books Neptune's Inferno and especially Morning Star, Midnight Sun have some extraordinary accounts of his behaviour in the conferences leading up to the action. It seems he was hyper-paranoid about losing another carrier. To be fair, he had been in the thick of it non-stop for months. Battle fatigue and the trauma of being sunk twice would take its toll on anyone.
Gehts auch auf deutsch? Danke
The original audio recordings were English. And I'd have to rely on Google Translate for German text ...