737Max UPDATE 24 Sept 2020
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 20 ต.ค. 2024
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Congratulations on everything that you have had to overcome to be qualified for recertification for flight!
And as always, thanks for the intelligent informative updates!
May I make a comment about replies. Please DO read the Congress report before commenting. Even if you only read the Executive Summary from page 13 onwards, rather than all 245 pages, it gives a very stark view of Boeing & the FAA's failures to act on safety concerns long before the 2 fatal crashes. It does not blame pilot error. It does clearly state that Boeing misled airlines, pilots & the FAA about the problems with MCAS & the fact that they had supplied over 200 aircraft without the required "Disagree Alert" being operative & without telling airlines of this situation.
Every time you look at Lt. Pete, the look of pride is so obvious on your face. You’re a good dad.
Pete is so cute....
Actually, Juan, YOU make these reports possible! AND make them real and to the point and accurate!
Lots of research goes into your reports as well.
Thank You!
I would not bother if it was not for the Patrons on Patreon that support this channel!
www.patreon.com/user?u=5295000&fan_landing=true
William Boeing once remarked that he would rather close his shop than send out inferior work. Having read the report I think he would probably close the shop if he were still alive. He would be appalled. This is a truly damming report. I assume that Boeing’s customers will be reading this and may want a ‘full and frank exchange of views’.
This is not a new situation. I worked in final assembly on the 737 in 1968 (starting with serial number 016 or so, as I recall) The aircraft was a mess. Unauthorized rework and "fabricobbling" was so rampant that at one point our senior inspector hung a rejection tag on the nose gear of an aircraft in the final position on the line. In the description of item rejected he wrote "One 737-100 assembly, complete" The pressure to "get it across the street" ( the final assembly was across south Marginal Way from the flight line in Seattle.) was so high that very dangerous aircraft were being moved out the door and "fixed in the field" Numerous problems were rampant, but one that I really remember was panels falling off the horizontal stabilizer in flight. All sorts of engineering fixes (vortex generators, etc) were tried, but the real cause was the screw holes in the panels didn't quite match the holes in the support structure. The "Wichita Fix" (reference to numerous employees brought in from the Wichita KS plant to try and speed up production) was to run a tap through the hole. The effect of this was to destroy the locking nut plates that were supposed to keep in-flight vibration from backing out the screws. There were numerous other problems that were finally addressed by sending "blue streak" crews around the world to fix aircraft in situ as they had layovers.
@@garyhall2126 That's a scary story. I met an old guy years ago who was on the mock-up team for the 747-100. He said the same thing, that it was a mess and pressure to finish it was immense. They were hammering parts into place on the production airplane. No wonder Pan Am threatened to sue Boeing. They ordered 25 of them and they quickly realized they were lemons. But it gave Boeing enough capital to start work on the much more successful 200 model.
@@garyhall2126 According to a SoCal Boeing worker, when 737's started coming into the Long Beach plant for various work after the MDC merger, long-time former Douglas Aircraft employees were aghast at the sorts of things they found underneath the cabin interior panels. Things like runs of tubing which were just tie-wrapped into place, vs metal brackets. Likewise for the cockpit experience: A pilot friend with years in both DC-10's and 737's remarked that the DC-10 cockpit was nice to be in, but it seemed like there was always something to get cut or snagged on the the 737 cockpit [of course, a bit apples to oranges since the DC-10 flight deck is more spacious, and widebodies presumably get better accouterments than single-aisles]
@@garyhall2126 I used to be relieved when I was told my flight would be on a B737. In my mind, they were the safe ones. Glad I'm not flying anymore.
When I worked in aerospace as a flight test engineer (mainly Grumman, but GD and Lockheed some as well) one of my jobs was to review code. Not just the design documents, but the actual CODE. Because I was one of the few guys who not only was a pilot with military experience, but I knew how to code in several languages (including assembler - what can I say, bit of a techno geek).
Some of the things I found were really scary. Because none of the SW engineers knew much about flying and none of them knew anything about military flying. Same for a lot of the designers. Wow did we have some meetings over that. But back then, Flight Test ruled and what we said went. Period.
I look at this and I still can not believe that they went with only one AOA and had no failure modes for it. Or alerts to the pilots. Yeah, the two crashes had a lot to do with piss pour training, as we saw in Pakistan recently, a LOT of foreign pilots are really poorly trained.
But still, I have to wonder where the hell Boeing's test team was, and why they didn't catch this and why they didn't bitch about it.
Guess I'll have to read the report. The guys I used to know who worked at Boeing all retired years ago. I can just imagine what they have to say about all this.
I still contend that the poorly trained foreign crews committed "Pilot Error" in not recognizing the runaway trim condition and disabiling electric trim when the problem first presented itself. To hell with Boing's Politically correctness excuses, trying to not embarrass or upset their international clients. Tell it like it is: Those pilots were clearly not qualified to fly any airplane.
@@tomclark6271 I agree
I wonder why the FAA signed off ?
@@tomclark6271 the captain of the Ethiopian flight had more than 8000 flight hours, and more than 1400 on the 737. Is that not good enough for you? Also, the Ethiopian crew recognized the runway trim condition, but were still unable to save the aircraft because of aerodynamic forces on the stabilizer preventing manual horizontal trim adjustment. You clearly don't understand enough about the topic, and are just making a lame defense of Boeing that goes against the actions and opinions of officials from aviation safety authorities all over the world.
RM, your statement “aerodynamic forces on the stabilizers” was created by leaving the throttles full on power (lack of proper training). They hit the ground at near supersonic speed!
Juan, I am extremely happy that you got your medical back and are heading back to recurrent on the mighty 777! I was long under the impression that you had taken an early retirement when this mess started. I can't wait for the industry to ramp back up and be recalled from my furlough (effective October 1st). AA Strong!
I am a retired AA Mechanic . I don't like that so much effort has to be put into correcting something that should never happen in the first place . If the Airline industry can't afford to upgrade training for pilots , how are we , the public , to trust our level of safety on any flight in (any) type of aircraft . I saw the shortcuts corporate forced in maintaining those winged buses.
I used to fly with an F/E years ago who said the same thing about AA when Crandall was CEO. Shuffling maintenance logs from base to base when the FAA guys came around for inspections and more specific stories I won't tell here.
@@nightshift5201 AA was hiding facts from Crandle as much as from the FAA .
You're mechanic, not an engineer or pilot
Juan, you state that nobody knew that MCAS had been 'beefed up'. That was true for the pilots flying the aircraft in airline service, who initially at least, didn't know MCAS existed. The House report makes it clear that Boeing knew that there was a potential problem with MCAS from it's own test pilot reports, but deliberately hid this from the FAA to prevent more detailed scrutiny of the system, which might mean the need for pilot simulator training, which they wanted to avoid at all costs.
not even the folks at Boeing had a clear understanding of it...
@@blancolirioHow could MCAS have been beefed up when it was a brand new modification to fine tune a problem specific to the 737Max?
BOEING ADMINISTRATORS COULD NOT AND CAN NOT BE TRUSTED .THEY LIED IN THE FIRST PLACE PUBLICALLY TO SELL A PLANE THAT WAS NOT BUILT YET....THE DISPLAY WAS A HOLLOW WOODEN MODEL OF PROPOSED PLANE......THEY HAD TO MAKE EXCUSES OF WHY THEY HAD NONE TO DELIVER....THAT SALES BOSS GOT JOB SHIFTED TO ANOTHER AREA....I DO NOT WANT FAMILY TO USE 737 MAX 8 EVER.
In order to get beefed up it would have to go through rigorous change control process and risk assessment. Talking about such a major change as if it was something discovered like the Dead Sea Scrolls is an invitation to ridicule.
@@davidtuer5825 If I recall correctly, it was a modification to the already present speed trim system
I believe Pete summed it all up perfectly with the oldest and wisest of aviation adages. I also like Detective Terry Hoitz's approach..."I'M A PEACOCK YOU GOTTA LET ME FLY!!" Nice report JB!
I've downloaded the report, and am slowly reading thru it. I had the same concerns that you did - Congress, but I'm glad to hear you think it's good.
Unfortunately, it's now almost impossible to explain to people that the 737 Max is STABLE, all MCAS was supposed to do was change the amount of force on the column for a very narrow range of angle of attack in certain flight conditions so that it was identical to the NG. Obviously, MCAS was EXTREMELY FLAWED. I keep reading that EASA will require additional changes, but I don't know any details.
Given that all of the decisions made by Boeing leaders was to drive the costs down for developing the Max, this failure, much like the decisions made by the same Boeing leaders that resulted in the 787 having cost over runs of over $30B shows that Boeing has serious problems with leadership. I don't think these problems have been fixed.
Unfortunately, most of the public does not understand what airplane stability really means, or in this case, longitudinal stability. When an airplane is flying along straight and level at a specific trimmed airspeed, it takes some force on the stick to displace the airplane away from that condition......to say, 5 degrees nose up. To further displace it to say, 10 degrees nose up, it should take even more force. The stick forces must increase as the airplane is displaced further from the trimmed condition. If the stick force levels off as that happens, that is a relaxed longitudinal stability, and under FAR Part 25 (Airworthiness Standards for Transport Category Airplanes), a manufacturer can't get a standard type certificate for an airplane that exhibits that condition. So, Boeing had no choice. They had to do something about it. If the airplane were a fly-by-wire aircraft, that problem would likely have been fixed in software, by changing flight control laws. But the 737s have manual controls, so Boeing needed a different approach. Boeing chose to use the airplane's electric stabilizer trim system. It was actually pretty clever. Any pilot knows that you can artificially create a "heavy stick" by dialing in some nose-down trim. That's what MCAS was meant to do. Unfortunately, the proper controls and safeguards were never built into that system, so in the event of a single failure of an AoA sensor, it basically presented the crew with a form of a runaway stabilizer emergency. Boeing screwed up big-time. I personally think it was a major failure of Boeing's management. They created a management structure in which one hand apparently didn't know what the other hand was doing. Stupid.
That said, the people on these airplanes did not have to die. Malfunctions happen. Airplanes are not perfect and never have been. That's why we have pilots and why most good airlines have very high standards for hiring them. This was a recoverable emergency. Runaway stabilizer trim is a problem that pilots of large transports have trained for for decades. When the airplane is autonomously trimming aggressively against the desired flight attitude, you don't play tug-of-war with the airplane, you shut off the electric stabilizer trim (before the airplane goes supersonic!!!!), trim the airplane manually, and land as soon as possible.
For all the old school fish rod trim wheel adjusting.... I think it’s just better to buy an A320. And let the remaining 737 Max’s be flown only on Cargo with parachutes & a escape hatch for the pilots. This plane is seriously not meant for congested skies and bad weather conditions.
I think Pete makes it all worthwhile! Watching a great mentor like dad sure helps! Keep
Up the great work
Juan.
Totally agree! Seeing Pete's little pop ins and his interaction with his dad brings a smile to my face!
The Congressional Report on the 737 MAX catastrophe is a scathing review of how Boeing rushed this version of the 737 through design, certification and manufacturing and it ended in the death of nearly 400 people, in two separate crashes, Ethiopian and Lyon Air. Congress did an excellent job of getting to the facts and delivering a comprehensive report of this debacle.
Turned out to be a really expensive way to save on training costs!
It was the airlines and the FAA that put the pressure on Boeing to have no further training requirements on the next gen 737. All the scenarios for the problems with the Max that resulted in the two accidents were programmed into most of the flight simulators. They just weren't utilized by the airlines.
@@fposmith *"All the scenarios for the problems with the Max that resulted in the two accidents were programmed into most of the flight simulators. They just weren't utilized by the airlines."* Really? All of them? Then of course surely the crux of the matter is that there was no requirement for additional simulator time? While you are here please explain additional angle of attack indicators being on the optional extra list?
Amazing to think that simulators were used more and more because training on real aircraft was getting too expensive. Now the simulators are getting too expensive to use, so training is done on Ipads. And at the same time the aircraft are getting more complicated and automated. Which sounds great, unless they suddenly go wrong and give the pilots only a few seconds to react. Maybe someone could build a much simpler, cheaper to use simulator to practice procedures - again and again. That's how anyone learns how to react quickly to problems.
@@fposmith what the fk are you talking about, simp? don't spread fake news. Boeing in order to compete with Airbus fast track regulation for the 737 max,that's why they didn't tell FAA about MCAS. and since FAA was in bed with Boeing, they don't bother to check the airplane. if boeing didnt tell anyone about MCAS,who would install them in the fking simulator
Again, too much reliance on Computers and Automation. Where is the human factor. What is training for? Would I fly in an Airliner that is without a Pilot? Controlled by computers. Which is the way things appear to be going. No!!!! I am elderly so won't see that day anyway.
Glad you're back. Was just wondering how you and the family have been.
Holy mackerel JB, as you know I'm just a wannabe, but those multiple tasks during trying to re-trim makes my head spin. All those actions to be executed while trying to keep the MAX in the air especially the part of slowing the craft down to allow easier maneuverability of the trim controls thus requiring left seat or right seat to watch ALL the other guages and alarms AND possibly helping each other should the trim control require both seats.
I think you're going to be online before the MAX. Continued success on your refresher. Take care and fly safe. 🖖🏽🤟🏽
Lets hear it for Pilot Pete!!!! Thanks for the update Juan! Keep up the awesome work!
Phew that report is quite a read Jaun. I’m going to read it again in the next couple of days once this feeling of anger has subsided. Thanks for all your insight and sharing 👍🏻🏴
Another ace report Juan!
I thought the three rules were “Get your homework done, do your chores and get to bed.”
Oh wait, flying rules. Righhhht.
I hope we don't get distracted getting the 737 Max "airworthy" and loose focus on the root causes. One being the lack of FAA oversight. Safety culture at Boeing being another.
The root cause is commercial pilots losing their basic stick and rudder abilities. And nobody will fix that here, because electro-mechanical devices don't fight back when they're blamed. More will die because of this critical error. Other electro-mechanical systems will be blamed and the death will continue until somebody has the courage to solve the real problems here. The same problems killed both 737 Max crews and their passengers that killed the 228 souls on board Air France flight 447, an Airbus A330.
It isn't FAA oversight. It isn't Boeing "greed." It's aircrews lacking basic flying skills, not remaining proficient in basic stick and rudder technique. The Mighty Luscombe isn't a frivolous hobby. It's saving lives. All pilots should be required to keep their stick and rudder skills sharp by regularly flying general aviation planes that require manual flying.
@@RockinRobbins13 That's not the only root cause, it's a factor. I've been studying disasters and their causes since I was young, and there were clearly structural problems at Boeing and with the FAA. Self-regulation is essentially self-interest. The root of most disasters is the lack of an effective external moderating influence.
@@herseem Interesting comment. But I'd say that fixing all the other factors wouldn't keep the human cause from crashing, but fixing only the human cause would render most all the electro-mechanical and software problems moot.
You're right, more than one factor is involved here. But fixing the human element would make the plane safe from the problems we are aware of in the other systems.
Humans need to have the skills to hand fly airliners. That's all there is to it, just basic aviation seat of the pants ability. It's the bedrock on which all other systems are built. When it falters, other systems aren't able to fix that. Reference Air France flight 447. Same cause as the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines crashes.
The automatic systems and override systems worked as designed. Human ingenuity crashed all three flights. With 20-20 hindsight, you can fix the avionics and hardware of the plane so those pilots wouldn't have crashed those planes. But that does nothing to prevent the next crash where the next crew is more inventively thinking.... No automatic system will be so safe that human ingenuity can't crash the plane anyway.
@@RockinRobbins13 I think there's a lot valid in what you say, and it's interesting that you mention AF447. I agree with your last sentence, and at the same time, there is increasing recognition, and the airline industry is one of those that is near the front of the curve, that human beings have a range of widespread vulnerabilities where in certain situations or where combinations of factors are present, a percentage of people will not do what they 'should' do. In the same way that planes have performance envelopes, so do human beings. So, careful staff selection to be more suited to the task is one thing, and so is adequate training, and then adequate support during employment so fatigue doesn't become a dangerous performance-limiting factor, for example, One of the performance-limiting characteristics is called cognitive bandwidth - give people too much to cope with at one time and they may prioritise incorrectly and perhaps become excessively focused on one issue to the exclusion of other concerns, for example. Or they may be overwhelmed by a whole range of stimuli and be unable to rationally work out what the issue is at the root of everything. Becoming disoriented is another cause of incorrect factors that has caused several accidents, where someone's internal perceptions become too out of step with their instruments and when they have to choose one or the other, they choose their internal perceptions.
I think this is what happened with AF447, for instance. Mechanically, what caused the crash was that the co-pilot kept pulling back on the sidestick, and the other pilot wasn't aware until too late. According to Sully, the problem was that the position of the sidestick was too subtle, and the other pilot couldn't see that the guy who caused the crash was pulling back on it, compared to what he'd have seen if it had a Boeing style control. But that doesn't address the root issue, which is why he was pulling back. In my view, it was because in the dark of night and with at least one of the instruments giving a misleading reading, his resorted to his internal feelings about how up or down they were pointing overriding some of the other instruments, and in fear of diving into the sea, his unconscious mind was commanding him to pull back, which was causing the stall and thus directly caused what he was trying to avoid. A universal vulnerability is that if there is a conflict between what our conscious, cerebral part of our brain says, versus what our unconscious mind says, almost always the unconscious mind will win, and it has direct control of our body, (our conscious mind is only allowed to have control to the extent that the unconscious mind allows) so it does what it feels is necessary. And you can argue what he SHOULD have done until you are blue in the face - I'm telling you that's a fundamental flaw with human being that is often activated, and that kind of problem can be widespread. There comes a point where no amount of training will get your cerebral consideration of what is probably going on to override your unconscious mind's fear of falling from a great height.
So training is only part of the issue. If you have a complex system that, because of it's own characteristics, it will have the tendency every now and then to put crews in situations where there are excessive demands on them such that a significant proportion will not be able to make the right decisions in time to avoid disaster, then you are going to get more disasters - it's as simple as that. Just to point out, Sully himself credited the systems within the Airbus he landed on the Hudson for preventing it from stalling, as it gave them time to consider all their options and took some of the workload off them. Had the plane given them extra work to do and made it harder to work out what was going on, as the 737 Max did, the eventual 'miracle on the Hudson' might have been known as the 'catastrophe on the Hudson' instead. So, yes, let's make sure training is adequate, but the factors that will minimise the overall number of deaths per passenger-mile for the least cost are multifactorial, and making the systems pilots have to interact with so that they are least likely to make mistakes in doing so is an important part of that. And the root of that issue is the structural problems within Boeing, and between Boeing and the FAA.
@@herseem 100% agree. Don't read my position as "blame the aircrew--end of problem!" Every plane out there has potential problems that can result in similar crashes. The situations we are aware of are dwarfed by the situations not anticipated or planned for.
Apollo 13 blew up its service module, and in spite of all the mechanical systems trying to kill them, people mitigated the problems and came up with procedures to get the spacecraft back to Earth with 3 healthy astronauts.
Airliners are no different. Malfunctions, including software logical errors happen. We need crews to be ready to handle that and come back with everyone healthy. They will need help to make that happen.
It''s going to be really cool to have Juan reporting from the cockpit of a 777 while in flight!
The report is far more damning than you are indicating. It is worth reading.
Best aviation life lesson to share with Junior Airman Pete...Aviate, Navigate, Communicate. Well Done Juan!!
Also the PIOSEE is a great working method for any kind of problems, not only for flying an aircraft. (Problem? Information? Options? Select. Execute. Evaluate!)
It warms my heart to see how much you love your son Pete. Good Daddy
The Max-7 was here at YVR (Vancouver Canada) for a few days in early September apparently allowing for EASA officials to test the aircraft
Pete with the THREE RULES may well save hundreds of lives over the years. Thanks, Juan. What a wonderfully succinct synopsis of the MCAS situation. Good luck to you and yours.
A very experienced pilot told me "never fly an aeroplane just on trim setting." What he was saying was once you run out of trim you run out of control authority. You fligh the plane and then you trim it.
The 737 trim system has inherently more control authority than the pilots elevator controls. It moves the entire horizontal tail.
@@allangibson8494 That's pitch control, trim is via small flaps in the all moving elevator.
What he meant was - the trim isn't a primary flight control. It's there to take the pressure off the yoke so that the pilot doesn't have to constantly push or pull in order to maintain a particular airspeed or attitude. You should make your pitch changes using the yoke and once you've stabilized at the desired speed, trim the pressure off so that you can relax your arm. The airplane is now trimmed to fly at the new airspeed without any input from the pilot..
I dance for pennies Not on the 737 or most airliners. The entire tail leading edge is moved for trim with a screw jack. The flap at the back is the elevator (with a tiny balance flap).
www.b737.org.uk/flightcontrols.htm
Jason Bowman Which is why either runaway trim or a mechanical failure of the trim jack (both of which have caused crashes in 737’s) are such a critical failure.
Reading the history portion of the report gave me chills as I was a sideline observer (still working the 747-8 program) to much of these discussions. It was clearly all about money and competition with the assumption that all of the engineering would just fall into place, very quickly.
It will be interesting to see what the international authorities say about the return to service.
R S Timmerman - I’ve read that the EU’s agency is threatening to deny approval to fly in Europe. I haven’t heard why.
Given the tension between China, Russia and USA, I wouldn't bet on their recertification. BTW 1st and 3rd largest countries in the world. It could make international flights a problem. Canada will cave like usual.
Airbus engines are made under license with G E. I wondsr what kind of arm twisting is going on behind the scenes?
Money Talks...
@@GH-oi2jf An FAA approved and flying Max will jumpstart the EU economy once the chinavirus is wrangled.
Glad you're getting back up in the air! Great reporting Juan! Maybe the FAA and Boeing need you as a consultant!
When I learned to fly in a PA38 my instructor stressed look out of the window and note where the horizon is. Then draw a line on the windshield with a Chinagraph pencil. Foolproof.
Nice summary reporting Juan. Keep up the good work and for condensing the info for all of us viewers.
Sounds like a lot of extra pilot training would have been easier than doing it this way, and ultimately, it probably would have been cheaper too! What a bad decision!
Well really they could’ve just not totally failed at programming MCAS. Something really funky was going on for them to allow a system like that to operate with no redundancy. Just allowing it to check for deviation between both AOA sensors and shut off if a significant conflict arose would have prevented these accidents and saved Boeing this trouble. The pilots would’ve had no trouble flying the plane without MCAS in these rare situations, certainly less trouble than when MCAS decided to trim them into the earth... I mean wtf was happening that they ever thought this would be okay? AOA sensors fail relatively often, it was not going to take long for this to down a plane (or two as we saw, and almost 3). It’s like they had multiple teams working on MCAS and none of them talked to each other and no one inspected the final product to check it made sense. It was such a simple issue to avoid and had they avoided it no one would’ve cared, no additional mandated training would’ve been needed (maybe a manufacturer recommended web training to clarify what changes when MCAS shuts itself off, but no one outside the industry would’ve thought anything of that). I hope this becomes a case study for executive types on why convoluted cost saving measures and strict no-questions deadlines are fucking stupid, Boeing probably could’ve made a whole new aircraft for the monetary and reputational costs of this debacle. Not to mention the blood on their hands...
@@MrMattumbo It sorta is a whole new airplane. Too bad they couldn't have called it something else and told (trained) the pilots it pitches up when you hammer the throttle, be aware of it. Learn to fly the new plane for what it is, no computer augmentation needed.
Remember, a commercial air carrier pilot can only have one current type rating at a time. This is not about extra training so much as having all pilots able to fly all 737 variants. For low cost carriers there is a HUGE incentive not to have two different batches of pilots that cannot fly each others planes.
@@johnmiller8884 True that!
@@johnmiller8884
I don't think that is correct. Check this out: aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/1784/how-many-type-ratings-are-pilots-allowed-to-hold-at-once
Great update thank you Juan. Appreciate the graphics and the link. Blessings from New Zealand
Manufacturers should not be allowed to use 50+ year-old type certificates to certify new "models" that have only visual resemblance to the certified type.
But this is what the manufacturers are being pressured to do, because the airlines dont want to pay to certify their pilots in a new airframe. One could assume Boeing would rather save the money spent on designing and installing systems that eliminate the need for recertification.
@@ee4231 Good point. It all starts and ends with the type certificate. If the FAA says a type certificate is only good for, say, 25 years then the customers will just have to deal with it.
@@ee4231 Nonsense!
Build the better aircraft and airlines are happy to certify pilots.
@@peterebel7899 Oh yeah, airlines are just thrilled to spend more money!
@@bazonka1 ... on kerosine ....
Way to go Pete! Thanks Juan. Great job! Good luck on the 777 check ride. See ya here!
Good luck Juan! Can't wait to see you flying heavies again.
Great to hear that you get to fly again...many happy returns. Thanks also for the many excellent videos which must take a lot of time to get right.
Seems like the whole control feel issue was done as part of the greedy and dangerous desire to avoid simulator training, especially after hearing the CEO talking about it and saying MCAS was not an anti-stall system. Right before he got binned. Chief Pilot was also fully onside..when MCAS was still set at the lower trim movement.
(from page 152) Furthermore, in a May 2014 email to a Boeing colleague discussing an upcoming briefing to the FAA regarding pilot training issues, Mr. Forkner, wrote: “We definitely want to emphasize how similar the MAX will be to the NG with regards to handling characteristics/qualities, as opposed to different/changed.”
They may have done this with the Elevator Feel Computer, except that they needed MCAS to trim the STAB so it all ended up in Speed Trim. When MCAS was set to 0.6 it may have been more about feel, but when they powered it up to 2.7 it was all about avoiding stalls in a lower speed, wind-up turn...flaps up, bank angle, g maybe on the airplane, all of which reduce the stall margin. Amazing that the AD also failed to mention the column (and trim button) cutout which normally happened with Speed Trim on the NG, but they could not use on the MAX since they needed help not to stall the airplane, so if the conditions dictated (in error or not), it would keep right on trimming 2.7 degrees each time. It really behaved like a stick pusher...sadly. Plus they've made the STAB bigger and the trim wheel smaller.
What a ridiculous mess...and MBAs are happily ruining the world, as long as they can make $14...the hard way. Condolences to all those affected. My Dad flew Boeing airplanes for many years (B-29, KC-97, KC-135, B-52) and thankfully Boeing could get the stabilizer right back in the day. Do you think we will see problems on the B777X...?
Best wishes...and shiny side up...!
When I was at Hamilton Standard as a Systems Engineer in gas turbine fuel controls we did an FMEA on each control. The single input AOA would have never passed muster. I wonder if an FMEA was ever done, or if the control kids at Boeing ever heard the term!
Russ Bell
FMEA - failure mode and effects analysis.
My understanding was that the FMEA was done, but then the design was changed and the process was not repeated.
Aviate, Navigate, Communicate!
Fly the jet until the noise stops!
Great video Juan. Show 'em your stuff at KDFW!
Pilot training should also include muscle building to be able to turn those trim wheels at high air speeds. The small pilot and FO in the ET302 crash did not have the physiognomy of weight lifters . Even with high adrenaline they did not have the force to manual trim this AC. I will never fly in these AC unless the pilot and FO cannot beat me at arm wresling .
It would have helped if early on in the accident sequence, either pilot had thought to retard the thrust levers. In the US, I think that's one of the first things most airline pilots would have instinctively done, not only because it's been drilled into them during unusual attitude recovery training, but simply to avoid busting the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000 ft. I find it unbelievable that neither ET pilot gave any consideration to retarding power, even though they were going downhill at near supersonic speed. They went into the dirt at takeoff power.
Kevin Madore another victim blamer
@@kevinmadore1794 According to the recovered data on the ET flight the auto throttle limited to the max speed .
No A/C should have controls that require an olympic weight lifter force to operate ,even at high speed.
On my SUV I have an electric power steering which assit my manual force to steer when stopped.
These have torque sensors that detect manual torque on the steering wheel and over a determine max manuel torque will provide electric motor torque to assit the driver. This system would prevent these crashes. I lost faith in Boeing for having botched the design of this flying disaster.
@@danmain7624 Basic airmanship, my friend. When the airplane is going downhill, with the airspeed is pushing the "barber pole" and the throttles are still at the firewall, you reach down and pull them back to idle. From very early on in the training process, pilots practice unusual attitude recoveries. The goal is to burn the correct instincts into the pilot's brain, so when something bad happens, their immediate reactions will be the correct ones. One of the problems that aviation is going to face in the future is the need for more pilots and we have to be careful that we don't rush these people into the cockpit. Pilots need more than just training. Experience builds airmanship and it doesn't happen overnight.
@@kevinmadore1794 At the beginning they were to close to the ground to reduce throttle and when they had reached higher ground clearance the pilot struggled with two arms on the stick and the FO was riveted to the stab trim wheels trying to keep the stab trim from running away. This video claims that the stab trim actuators were slipping and that this actuator was never upgraded for higher loads from larger control surfaces. Current requirement for these actuators is that they must not slip at any speed , Boeing did not have to meet this requirement because it was not considered a new AC design .
th-cam.com/video/zEG2vPA1Isk/w-d-xo.html
(select translator)
Very well done Juan! Thank you very much.
Pete is the coolest!
What a great young man.
Nicely-done as always, Juan. The question that keeps coming for me is: Why does Boeing insist on keeping MCAS? Why not just admit MCAS is a flop, delete it, and pay for the requisite additional pilot certification and training MCAS tried and failed to circumvent? All this elaborate re-design and certification could be avoided. The result would be much simpler and proven and would restore confidence in the 737, which has otherwise been extremely reliable. Pilots would be better-trained, too. Is this somehow still about cost? Is it about Boeing having to eat crow, write off 'sunk cost' and admit MCAS is a failure? Or?? I must be missing something and would be grateful for an explanation. Thanks in advance for any response.
From reading among the posts here, it looks like keeping pilots certified to fly multiple aircraft types is very costly and can create airline scheduling and pilot-confusion safety issues. Is that what it's about?
They will keep MCAS because it is a FEATURE...not a liability. Seatbelts in cars were first treated as nuisances by the general public, but after many public service commercials they became more acceptable. But there are still people who reject using them and still live to a ripe , old age. Let BOEING tweak it and it will become a useful feature, couple that with changing the publics mind and all will go back to a NEW NORMAL.
Juan,'Thank you for that report and link. I hope you will return to the skies as a 777 FO soon.
God bless
Paul (in MA)
Imagine the lives, trouble and money that would have been saved had Boeing done it correctly the first time
or if the pilots had done it right the second time...
@@blancolirio I agree that training seems to have been an issue, but I wrote a long reply on a previous comment about human factors also
@@blancolirio Humm, that's not the best approach to the issue. And what, let Boeing get away with it and not address the problem and hope for the best?
@@blancolirio Or the third time. They (sorta) did it right the first time, but the media loves to ignore that.
@@blancolirio - Finally a qualified professional agrees with what I have been getting hammered for saying from the beginning!
Again Juan thank you for a great report on the 737 max. I just love how Pete knows the aviation lingo LoL God bless you and your family 🙏 and see you here.
FAA should have force Boeing to remove MCAS from the MAX and make a new certification type rating mandatory. Wouldn't that be easier?
If I understand the info, the authority of MCAS is now limited to the point where the stab cutouts wouldn't ever need to be used because of MCAS (not that there couldn't be another source of trim runaway), and that pilot control authority will always be able to counteract the degree of input commanded by MCAS with normal manual inputs (pulling up).
12:01 Notes:
1. A Two-Pilot-Effort may be used to correct an out of trim condition.
So basically it means you better have 2 very strong pilots on board flexing their muscles before take off.
Does that mean that 73 pilots will have to be able to bench press a certain number of lbs. Hmmm. Hope the gals are up to the job here. Should two diminutive pilots be paired together?
Means they shouldn't be at 560 knots...
Thanks a million Pete and Mr Browne. Great report. Hopefully the Max will be back, the Covid craziness will be over and 2021 will be a better year. 👍👍🇺🇸🇺🇸✈️✈️✈️
MY bet is on you before the max
You'll be first back in the air Juan, no worries! Great video.
Thanks for the update!
Pete is going to be at least a GOOD pilot because he has a GREAT pilot father.
Thank you for some of the BEST videos on You Tube.
Pete, those are THE rules to live by!
The Chair of the Transportation & Infrastructure Committee (Peter DeFazio) represents my district (4th) here in Oregon. Historical context is always important and I will take a read of the document. Thanks for the suggestion.
I run into issues like this all the time in industrial process controls. Designs with shortcomings or potential issues get a fix with software. One example - careful and precise pump sizing is often replaced with the use of adjustable frequency drives and software that can 'turn the pump down.' The net result is a pump that never runs in the heart of its efficiency zone and extra installation expense and wasted energy. And, you never know when you will stumble on a corner case in that more sophisticated software or an instrument will let you down and bad things will happen.
I'm saddened that Boeing seems to have lost their 'Do it right' attitude -- which I hear a lot from others here in Seattle that used to work for the company. I remember in the 1990s that there were concerns that the regulators were too close to the airlines to be part of the QC process (look for defects and potential issues) and settled for being only QA (check evidence that the process was followed) and that it would eventually lead to problems and deaths. It is too bad that seems to be the net result in the manufacture also. I hope that they are willing to learn and adjust.
Bottom line -- you can't test-in quality. You must start with intent and follow up with the hard work of designing, implementing, and supporting a quality product. That includes not taking financial or schedule short-cuts.
...and thanks! I'm a proud Patreon supporter and really appreciate and enjoy what you do.
In my office we call that "kill it with controls". Client's process engineer(?) throws together any old mess of pumps, valves and broken old junk from another plant, then wants us to bodge software to make it run like a decent system. I've had many verbal altercations in meetings from refusing to kill it with controls and insisting the process people fix it properly... Meh. Looking forward to retirement. Nobody seems to want to do it right anymore. "Quick, cheap, right. Which 2 do you choose?"
It’s going to get worse before it gets better. People in 40s and younger were brought up with computers doing more and more of their thinking for them. College stoped teaching people how to think but “what” to think (which just means which “app” to get).
Besides that, the sky really is falling.
I tell you what Juan - I am much more excited about your upcoming 777 check ride. Will you be able to video it? I you are able, me and my chums have a drinks and nibbles party planned to celebrate on your behalf!
This certainly doesn't make me feel safe in a Boeing!! We're told that the Max is not a basically unstable plane and the MCAS was just a fine tuning of the planes attitude as it had a tendency to drop it's nose, especially on takeoff. Why didn't they just take MCAS out of the Max? The instructions on how to over-ride MCAS seem to be very complicated especially as a reaction time to rectify a recurring MCAS intervention is 10 secs, max (sorry for the pun). Boeing used 1967 standard wiring systems which had been modified since 1967 numerous times. 21 hours of training is still necessary for a plane that is supposed to be essentially the same as the 737 and this training is of such a nature that the cost involved is sufficient to impact on the sales of this plane. Who in their right mind is going to trust the assurances of either Boeing or the FAA?
Thanks for your time on this topic. What you have told here, give's a clear picture that Boeing engineers are going to do a sufficient fix, and time will tell. One that will work together with flight crews and leaves no informed flier in the dark. On the matter of where this problem originates inside Boeing (or the FAA or or or...), it does you credit to refer to the report. It's a different topic all upon it's own. Best of luck on your return to the 777, I'll be looking forward to your trip(le) reports :).
Around 12 minutes into the movie Juan, you make an IMPORTANT note; "unless you fail to fly the aircraft". Not a moment do I doubt the misconception of the MCAS. But people did not had to die if only the flightcrew knew their 737 AND MEMORY ITEMS (or RECALL as you named it). Pilots bacame operators of a computer these last years. We need "drivers" not "IT operators".
I'm not a pilot.... but... I thought the pilots *did* keep flying but MCAS kept forcing the nose down anyway, resulting in an undulating descent into the ground. If true, then, based on the meager "training" the pilots were given re MCAS, yeah, people were bound to die. This was a Boeing fuck-up. Can't really blame the pilots on this.
Boeing made a major software change and did not bother to tell the pilots. When the MCAS failed the pilots did not know how to turn it off so they could fly the plane. Apparently it is simply but not obvious how to disable the system.
Wrong. Read up on the piloting in both cases.
Quidisi Agree on the Boeing f..ck up. Not agree on the outcome. I fly and instruct almost 15 years on this machine and the result of a faulty MCAS is what Boeing calls “runaway stabiliser”. This is what 737 pilots refer to as a “memory items”. i.e an action that needs to be done without taking a checklist first. There is a certain timepressure in it, hence the need for memory. The 737 has around 13 memory items that pilots MUST KNOW BY HEAD. For your info: the 737 MAX that crashed in Indonesia had the same problem the day before the fatal flight and those pilots performed the memory items by switching the stabiliser off. Landed normally afterwards.
@@Quidisi You should read the final report on the first crash, there's a lot to unpack there. Let's start with the first three items in the Cockpit Voice Recorder transcript:
The FO advised the Captain that this flight was not his actual schedule. The FO was called at 4 o’clock in the morning and informed the revision of the original schedule.
The Captain advised the FO that he was having flu. The CVR recorded the Captain coughed about 15 times within an hour during the preflight.
Engineer came to cockpit and advised the Captain that he would be on board the aircraft to Pangkal Pinang. The engineer explained that he had not rated for Boeing 737-8 (MAX) and not authorized to release the aircraft.
So the FO is tired, the Captain is sick, and... what even? Is there something lost in translation here or did the engineer interpret "not allowed to release the aircraft" to mean to stay with the aircraft in flight rather than keeping it on the ground?
Then as problems start there's just a serious lack of cockpit resource management. The captain was continuously counteracting MCAS (which would activate 5 seconds after the last manual trim command) with manual nose-up trim commands, typically interrupting the nose-down trim of MCAS and each time fully undoing it, but this continuous fight with automatic trim evidently did not trigger him to think about runaway stabilizer trim proceduces nor did he say a _single_ _word_ about this to the FO. Meanwhile the FO was fumbling with checklists, did not know memory items, and took more than a minute to find the "Airspeed Unreliable" checklist in the QRH, which is the second item in the Quick Action Index on the cover page of the QRH. Eventually the Captain asked the FO to take the controls, and in response to the first MCAS nose-down trim he remarked the controls were heavy but gave a completely ineffectual amount of manual nose-up trim, which just served to allow MCAS to reset and give a second dose of nose-down trim, overpowering the FO and resulting in a crash.
Oh and the mechanic who installed the faulty AoA sensor logged having done the required tests but clearly didn't (since the calibration offset was so large that it would be impossible to pass any sort of test) and later tried to falsify photographic evidence to back up his lie.
Thanks for always getting straight to the point. Live long and prosper.
If a simulator training will be required why do they need MCAS? Given that it's only job is to avoid the need for such training?
That was my thought when I heard that. Perhaps it’s about limiting the training that’s needed and not requiring a full type rating.
Mainly because MCAS is required for certification purposes. The airplane exhibited a relaxed longitudinal stability at high angle of attack and high power, and Part 25 rules don't allow an airplane with that condition to receive a standard type certificate in the Transport Category. Regardless of whether or not the airplane handled like any other 737, they could not certify the MAX with that condition. In a fly-by-wire airplane, the problem would have been fixed in software by changing flight control laws. The MAX has manual controls, so it had to be fixed in another way. Boeing decided to use the electric stabilizer trim to artificially create a "heavier stick" in the area where the relaxed stability existed. It was a reasonable idea. They just completely failed to place appropriate controls on the conditions under which it would activate and the amount of authority the system had.
Juan, thank you for a fact-filled and insightful view into the 737 Max shambles. I think it sure has destroyed a lot of trust. Good luck with your re-qual and safe flying. All the best, Rob
With air travel worldwide at circa 30-35% of the levels a year ago I guess their isn’t a rush now.
I still, for the life of me, can't figure out how everyone at Boeing thought "I know we've build redundancy into nearly every system we've been putting into our planes for about as long as we've been building them...but what if we tried a single point of failure for the AoA sensors...just to change it up a bit?". It just doesn't make any sense.
It might be a good idea to put three pedals, a steering wheel and a stickshift in the Max. Than it might feel and handle like my old Volkswagen Beetle.
Maarten Visser comment of the YEAR
Juan....nice to see you. Thanks for this update. Appreciate your research.
They fixed MCAS finally. But I think that Boeing still hasn't fixed the manual trim issue. Over time the trim wheels (and therefore the lever) became smaller and smaller while the stabilizer was growing. This results in enormous forces one have to apply when manually trimming back from out of trim conditions.
I still don't get it why they didn't install two levels of trim cutout swichtes. One that cuts all inputs from automated systems (MCAS, AP, Speedtrim) and one that also cuts the whole power to the trim motors. So you don't have to give away a perfectly fine electrical trim when one of the automated system that obviously haven't been designed with the neccessary redundancy and fail safe operations in mind go haywire.
+1 I have been saying this for months! You NEVER want to kill (cutout switches) a perfectly good jackscrew motor when the problem is in the automation.
@@shoersa Absolutely! And from looking at the schematics this would be feasible without a huge effort.
I thought that’s how it is designed. Why are there two trim cutout switches? Which one does what?
@@tomcorwine3091 Apparently the NG was designed that way (one switch disabled auto trim, other disabled the trim motor) BUT Boeing changed the logic in the Max so that either switch killed the motor.
aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/64442/how-the-stabilizer-cutout-switch-functionality-has-changed-from-boeing-737-ng-to
www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-altered-key-switches-in-737-max-cockpit-limiting-ability-to-shut-off-mcas/
Your son is terrific! Well done, Juan!
I found this in the report:
"Greg Travis, the software engineer and private pilot who wrote about MCAS in the
IEEE’s Spectrum magazine last year put the Boeing design and development process in stark terms:
Boeing produced a dynamically unstable airframe, the 737 Max"
The 737 Max is not and unstable airframe.
Yea! I SAW that! A PRIVATE pilot makes a WILD ASS Claim and the rest of the MSM and others JUMP on it as gospel!
Not to worry, I'm sure IEEE Spectrum was "peer reviewed"
@@blancolirio It fit the narrative. I HATE it when "experts" make unsubstantiated comments (opinion) to gain favor with the hacks in the media at the expense of others.
The lie repeated becomes truth and the bigger the lie the more likely it is to be believed.
PS you channel is GREAT!
No different than MSM jumping on Covid papers from the JAMA site that haven’t been reviewed yet basically having their Feet in their Mouths not long after.
roflchopter11 the things academic journals publish these days is insane, I’ve read journal articles that cite nothing but partisan news articles and demonstrably partisan nonprofits to make a partisan claim. Then someone else can go and cite that “peer-reviewed” article in their work creating a rabbit hole of citations that just lead back to some article from a biased news publication. It’s disturbing to say the least and I suspect it’s not just my discipline (international relations/security) that’s infested with it.
Wow the complexity! Without your explanation of the changes , very few would have been able to understand the proposed modifications.
Thanks for the very nice presentation, you’re awesome
Thanks Juan for the detailed briefing.
- I heard they were considering a third AOA sensor, in case of a dual failure. I guess they elected otherwise.
- you are right, always fly the aircraft.
- I will try to read the report to be able to evaluate it.
Keep up the good work, thanks as always.
Juan did you have any thoughts about the announcement that Boeing was gong to move alll future 787 production to South Carolina? Is this the beginning of the end of aircraft production in Washington state?
That will be a big QA mistake.
Thanks Juan for another concise and informative video. And good luck on your check out ride !
Still rubbish if two hands are needed to trim, will two women manage it together.
Blancolirio I do not envy the task ahead of you and your fellow pilots, professionalism aside I hope you all the best.
“Will throw out the failing AOA”
How will the computers know which one has failed. Airbus has 3 to provide a cross reference but with 2 unless one says 90 degrees how will it know what is correct?
In that case, the MCAS will be shut off.
I think that it was one of the requirements to pass EASA certification.
@@bloodguard41 did not answer the question "How will it know . . . "
@@Alex-kf7tm did not answer the question "How will it know . . . "
"In that case, the MCAS will be shut off."
That doesn't answer the question.
You have insufficient redundancy to know which has failed, so "throwing out the failing AOA" becomes a matter of flipping a coin, unless you have more information, for example some form of "dead reckoning" to judge which sensor has failed, or some other reference (GPS or whatever) that can substitute for the missing information to figure out which sensor failed.
Assume both sensors appear to the system to be working, but one (or indeed both) may be providing spurious information.
"If the senors disagree by 5 degrees or more, mcas will not activate", but if it has activated prior to the failure, how does it know?
Does it de-activate if the 5 degree discrepancy occurs after MCAS engages. What if both have failed in the same or similar manner, both have flipped to 90 degrees at the same time? Dual similar failure may be unlikely, but not impossible. The other changes to the system cover this. The system no longer can command the nose down to the point where it wont recover.
If MCAS has failed, how do you know? Answer. Generally, the AOA disagree light. This was an "optional enhancement" previously if I understand the situation. Now it has been identified as a necessity. If I were on the design team, I would have pushed for a third AOA sensor. Belt, braces, extra belt and braces. You can never have too many backups, but one or less backups is too few. If both AOA sensors fail, then the system should be flyable. The startle factor of having no reliable AOA may prove this not to be the case.
Finally, all possible scenarios must have been simulated, and tested in real world flight before the system can be considered sufficiently tested to be safe. This is where the previous testing regime failed to meet requirements. Lets hope this time, they have done the donkey work.
FYI: There has been activitie in the Spirit MAX storage yard. But any movement of fuselages has not started as of now.
Aviate, Navigate, Communicate... but when talking to the FAA man, remember the three D's: Deny, Deny, Deny
Good luck Juan with your 777 check ride, it will probably be a little different then the luscombe 8a.
So will Pete get certified on the 737 super max gen 31?
The B737 has always had "speed trim" and "elevator feel" mechanisms to adjust the loading on the flight controls in various flight regimes. One could have labeled the "MCAS" as an "enhanced speed trim". Obviously in its original development design it had only limited authority, however, after flight tests showed the need for additional supplemental input to mimic the flight control loads on earlier models, additional trim authority was implemented. Somehow the engineers, seemed to have lost the collective memory of the load issues on the jack screw mechanism which lead to its jamming on the B707. This was not a single point of failure, as we know, every mishap involves a chain of events, any of which could be disrupted by intervention to change the final outcome. Thus, this involved management, engineers, designers, the FAA, airline training, maintenance, crews, marketing/sales and a host of other parties.
When the max has overcome the problems Juan I think the media will focus on the 787 and specifically the South Carolina facility More hard times for Boeing on the horizon
The 787 from South Carolina's only problem is that it lacks made by union sticker. Last I checked that only changed the W&B by 3 grams.
Chris Hull www.flightglobal.com/safety/faa-launches-probe-into-787-production-issues/140067.article
Chris Hull www.businessinsider.com/boeing-787-dreamliner-aircraft-grounded-face-faa-review-reports-2020-9?amp
Juan, with the new software, an MCAS override is defined as trim against MCAS input, not just the stab trim cutout. This action will disable MCAS for the remainder of the flight & will set a Stab Trim Fail after landing.
Thanks.
Very interesting and informative, thanks. I think we may disagree a bit in that I don't think the role of MCAS was expanded just to simulate the old air frame geometry. I think the test pilots complained that it felt light, a problem in how this plane felt to them and not a comparison.
I don't think the role of MCAS was casually increased, or increased for the sole purpose of making the Max feel like the old 737s. I think it was forced to morph from a very rarely triggered safety system to software regularly interacting with the pilot for reasons involving safety and stability threats.
Touting how much MCAS has been limited and neutered makes it sound like MCAS itself was the whole problem, some virus. Why not just rip it out then? If these planes fly again, we shall see what neutering the once-required MCAS does, and it might not be good.
And if anyone thinks a bit of processing and looking at both AOA sensors will fix things, let's remember XL Airways Germany Flight 888T. That plane had three AOA sensors, not just two. And when two froze, the software went with the majority rule and tossed the signal from the good sensor. Killed them all.
My philosophy (and in the past, Boeing's) is to watch over the plane and warn the pilot of problems. Light up a caution or warning light. Sound an audible alert. Shake the control column, nudge it back with a stick pusher. Warn. You don't say, "Stupid pilot!" and grab the controls from him with the software.
Great Vlog, Highly Technical as a non pilot but a great insight into how the industry learns about changes in aeroplane design and software, thanks
Thanks for the update Juan! Looking forward to seeing the MAX back in service. :)
I flew twice on one before the grounding. SAT to LAS route with Southwest. Great plane !
Sounds like the kids built the code so that it functioned as long as the hardware functioned. When the transducer common connection was lost, or the output, curtains... Somewhere in this story there is a 63 year old guy who is taking the fall for it. We are all fortunate that there wasn’t a big demand for aircraft recently. Thanks for the links, I look forward to reading the reports. Great job on this story Juan.
An area that does not seem to have been addressed are all of the erroneous and conflicting warning lights, warning bells, whistles and aural announcements that can be very confusing. I believe that this was a major factor in the prior two crashes. Had the crew correctly done the "runaway trim" checklist recall items (which have changed very little under the new QRH guidance) they could have relatively easily dealt with the problem. I flew the B707 and we were keenly aware that the stabilizer jack screw had to be unloaded, through relaxation of control pressures in a runaway nose down scenario. As you point out, this also should be part of the training re the stab trim.
Boeing made a major software change to the MCAS. They did not bother to inform any pilots flying for anyone how to turn off the MCAS orthatthere was a change. Someone at Boeing is guilty of at least criminal negligence and manslaughter.
Boeing made a major software change to the MCAS. They did not bother to inform any pilots flying for anyone how to turn off the MCAS or that there was a change. Someone at Boeing is guilty of at least criminal negligence and manslaughter.
@@markhorton3994 Mark, There is no dedicated switch to turn off the MCAS system. It is a required item to dispatch the aircraft. It is designed to operate in the background to adjust loads on the flight controls. The only switch is the "cutoff switch" for the main electric trim on the center console. This switch has been on all B737's from the earliest 100 series. The procedure for the uncommanded movement of the trim, in this case by the MCAS, has remained essentially unchanged since the aircraft was first introduced in the late 60's. If the Pilots had followed the correct procedure for a "run-a-way trim" as prescribed in their emergency checklist (QRH) this would have been a non-event . It should be noted that on the same Lion Air aircraft, the day prior, that they experienced the identical failure, followed the correct procedure, and continued onto their destination.
@@shenandoahhills7263 My information comes from several articles published at various times since the grounding. Including Juan Brown's video. His latest update showing the FAA's required changes report states that handling run away trim adjustment is to be added to the flight manual by replacing a paragraph. Most pilots were never given the information that the problem was possible let alone how to deal with it.
@@markhorton3994 "Run-a-way trim" has been around from the earliest B707's, There are various mechanism's , not just the MCAS, that can cause the trim to move in an uncommanded direction. On the earliest aircraft the trim switch on the Pilot's yoke had a single lever. This switch jammed on a Sabena flight causing a run-a-way full up trim condition on short final and the aircraft crashed. The switch was later redesigned to have two small levers to correct the problem. The recall items on the MAX are little changed from the 1960's, the only thing changed was a subsequent/belated enhanced explanation of how and when the MCAS will function. The Pilot's have no direct control or input as to its function, under normal conditions they will not even be aware that it is installed since it operates in the high angle of attack flight regime not normally encountered during routine operations. Boeing should have included an explanation as to its operation, but would that have prevented the prior two accidents? Even with this amplified explanation, if the crew failed to follow the established Max emergency checklist memory items, as in these two cases, they still would have likely crashed.
Hey Pete, great safety message, well said young man! :)
TAKE US ALONG WITH YOU ON YOUR CHECK RIDE!!!!
All the best for your check ride & thanks for all your great posts.....
Juan flies first. I will be a passenger with Juan. Not so sure about being a passenger in the Max.
Just avoid the "Ubangi International" types and you will be just fine.
Great Reporting! Looking good Captain,always pulling for you!👍💪🙏👏🏻👌😳
Thanks Juan.
Another great update! Thanks Brown-ee! I go to the sim next month for recurrent..I was hoping to get some MAX training or at least updates about getting them back online!
Who are you with? I all three US carriers have the sims ready.
2020 kinda threw the 737 Max issue under the table....and everybody forgot.
I really don't think so. Watching Boeing go down the tubes is actually pretty important to a lot of people.
I almost forgot that the 737 MAX ever existed. Hopefully the same will happen with COVID-19 once a successful vaccine/cure becomes available.
Then again maybe Boeing who was going to lose Billions had covid in their back pocket for a resulting economic bailout package which would be the result of worldwide infection...and it got away from them...well that would be a great book anyway... corporate manipulation of virus exposure... This scenario if at all true worked. Of course it's all fiction right?
Very interesting one Juan,sounds to me as a back to basics scenario in this case.
Good luck with your checkride.