I first came across his work while working as post grad in philosophy of science looking into Wittgenstein in 1989: Wittgenstein A Critique. A great book. Then in the 1990's I was working on Kant and found his book on Kant: Kant and the Transcendental Object was great too. Then early 2000's I worked on Husserl and his introduction to Husserl was one of the rare works to actually try and explain it rather than most that just repeat and deepen the obscurity. In the late 2000's i started to do post grad work on Hegel in a continental philosophy department. Now most of my post grad colleagues had little time for analytical philosopher's work on continental philosophy, and with good reason in most cases. But the Hegelian Lecturer there just said his book on Hegel was great! i said he's written on everybody, and he said "yea most philosophers can only be experts on one of these and he is an expert on all of them". Yea! it would have been good have had chance to have studied with him not least because he didn't just do great interpretation but also engaged with his contemporaries on and within their terms and arguments. I guess this lecture will be interesting.
Part 1 Spot on introduction to the problem of science and human life/existence/consciences. At 3:40mins, I think he is foregrounding the etymological link between Category and Market Place that i understand, from a conversation many years ago I had with an Heideggerian colleague, is from Aristotle's original use. I explored this and the link is clearly implied in Anscombe's "Intention" sections 30-40ish, where she talks of a shopping basket of goods in a supermarket (which would have been new then). Following up on this turned out to very revealing, when you think of the view of goods from the supermarket audit and the view from a person. it has turned out very revealing for the problem of thinking the economic sciences with respect to the firm in the market in the vocabulary of supply and demand for individual goods and their myth of the unity of goods as the synthetic unity of manifold of multiple differential S/D curves. Here for me is one key way of addressing the scientific image of man and the manifest image (Sellars). the economic sciences seems to have a possible point of exchange even for people with no goods what so ever the myth of making a contract when you have nothing, my Heideggerian collage put this nicely "its as if two dead people come together in a contract and become alive". let alone that the notion of the shopping basket of human needs is a mere empirical accident for the company audit, while that company must have its own existence as necessary in its audit, as a priori. Scientific analysis and then attempted synthesis is after the fact of this firms presupposition. My metaphor here for the error of the framing terms of the philosophical problem here is: they divide up a Gladiator's action into a sequence of separate abilities ie a set of decathlon events and then think they have a genuine problem of how to synthesise the decathlon events back into the Gladiator. The decathlon events are symmetrically appropriate for metrication and mathematical comparison even by the contender with themselves. the "privileging" (2:00mins) of the metric space (Symmetry, category, group theory, conservation etc) in the traditional framing here then generates pseudo problems. We can get a glimpse of the human in the audits but rather we need to turn the problem around. how is the image of metric symmetry produced out of the human possible. and for me the phenomenology leads to the position that answer must lie in that these abstract symmetries are framed by actual physical frames, a smooth straight track etc rather than a post facto symbolic axiom. You know a competent driver needs a competent car and a competent road. the wheel was not invented before flat ground was affordable. As with Galileo, you still need self control the virtues to do the timing, and later rules and an institution. we cannot get this view out of thinking of these as genuinely separate sue generic entities. see Beatrice Han Pile on Bachelard and also philosophical externalism. it means there cannot be a genuine is/ought problem since this images a certain factual valueless content. Anscombe also brings out the role of public and private with this regard.
This is wonderful! Don't recall it from the previous channel you had. So glad You've successfully re-uploaded and maintained your content without the troublesome confusion of the TH-cam workers, for whom I hold no ire (lol).
Nice lecture! I was very much impress by the animosity of the q&a section. I had taken for granted that these ideas were already in circulation. Perhaps they were, but there was clearly a strong physicalism bias at that time. I guess that today the cake is more evenly divided to include not only physicalists but also dualist of different and very sophisticated shades... Nowadays, I guess a physicalist knows she has to tackle those issues laid down here by Findlay. I believe that bringing about a common ground between parts can be seen as a kind of philosophical progress... Thank you, @Philosophy Overdose!
Part 2 at 19:00mins JNF raises the issue of metaphysics in regard to "subjective" or interpretive positionality and the scientific behavioural image. To expand on my part 1 then the metaphysical (propositions) are possible only upon a certain "already organ-ised" environment and person inner and outer public private states. that is as propositions they are as such, dependent on that constitution. but the hermetic standpoint here means such an "order" is not out of anarchic dots or points put into a whole order, rather we are already in this order and it is already then environment sensitive and bodily/habitually shaped. Thus we can say we are already with the ethical and deontic (c.f. Sellars) the myth that drives this is that of myopic sensibility (Adorno) that thinks there is a task of putting together atoms of sense into an object intended. its like thinking that space is made up by analogy with putting separate bricks together into a wall. of course with space the bricks as separate presupposes a space they are separate "in". for behaviourism, it is thinking an array of reflexes, twitches if you will, have to be integrated into a dance or a walk. rather the question is how can a dance and a walk be "actualised" (or reduced) into a set of separate reflex's and twitches. metaphysics of the proposition and object's "having" depositions is the symbolic idea of this "actualisation" at its conclusion of a process of disenchantment. As Husserl put it in "The Crisis", it is a task for science. so the metaphysics of causal determinism and the pure subject of sue generic consciousness are imagined end points for competing scientific tasks. Metaphysics then are the ideas expression of a task internally reflective and regulative for science. it is then the derivative symbolic counterpart to the scientist in the projects of limiting a closing down degrees of freedom to asymptotically zero. Scientists are in the buisness of constructing frames and limits to make the idea of a causal substance into a realty, they deal with apparatus in the most general sense. the end point must mean a kind of living death for the human and the scientist. it is where everything is taken care of externally and so no need for grace or virtue or duty. like how the clock took over (alienated) the heart beat for Galileo. Galileo before the clock has a space of freedom very different semantically from Galileo using a clock. (See Sellars and David Webb on error and accident. Anyway it is clear that "empirical propositions are fraught with metaphysical propositions. Metaphysical propositions are fraught with themselves, and i propose fraught with empirical content. Kant's point i hope to think in his "apparent" disjunctive tabling of these. i hold a certain modesty here that we are not trying to explain stuff from a point outside of virtue and institutional rules. the task is how is the myth of human science possible for the human not how is the human possible from the standpoint of science. (c.f. McDowell's Mind and World). there is no genuine problem of how meaning and intentionality are possible in a conception of a dead universe, rather how does the idea of a dead universe even appear as a genuine human independent point of view. the limits of objects are not empirical or metaphysical, but rather are the imagined end points of experience where we react or feel pain at a bright light, we don't "see" we reflex. and also the idea that there is a passive response to no sense data. there is no such thing as non sensuousness close your eyes you feel your own eyes not a an object. (C.f. instruments measuring radiation like photomultiplier tubes.) Just like our senses, all instruments are as such in the world and finite wr.t full scale deflection and detector noise. eg economic data does not exist in a collapsed state, and if too funded it begins to be a play in what it is trying to represent. all this is clearer in the political legal economic vocabulary, c.f Peter Suber on Russell paradox and constitutional rights. he has it that hey are meta laws. i hold they are both tautologies and contradiction when put in this idiom. in reality they are negative laws for the application of negative laws. rights are the formal expression of the immediacy of some laws to some laws. ie as if rights, unlike common law are not interpreted. questions of freedom of speech ect imagine a universal problem of freedom expressed as atomist right natural law, is isomorphic and to the understanding of freedom in natural life. the metaphysics of representation can glimpse this link at points but generally life is ruled out in the semantic (axiomatic) requirement of legal terms for symmetry and universality. we think we have to make sense of human life and freedom in and under the privileging of freedom as it is in science law and right representation. that is why the legal concept wants to deny its "superveniance" upon life, and in fact wants to eliminate the notion of pre legal life altogether in the name of its conception of freedom positive or negative. it ids doing stuff and has taken over the frame for debate about this into is semantics of conceptual representation not the already ethical moral world of the nominal. representational legal concepts oppositions like black/white, male/female are constrained by all manner of semantic structures necessary for its application by institutions and their agent reach. they try to force us to deal with these constative issues of the legitimacy of the state wholly within a vocabulary of their construction. I think it was Pritchard's paper "Is Moral philosophy based on a mistake?" the mistake is starting with atoms of self interest with a external task of order. where i am represented as self interested for the sake of science and law. this is not the same as when i reflect on a twitch or a reflex for air in a dive. this is a limit to legitimacy not a ontological state of being. it means science is in a process of removing its own ground of legitimacy, where even the behavioural scientists are entirely captured by their own behavioural representations. the oddity of this is clear" The experiment showed us "that P" because i needed to have enough food to eat and this is how i get paid. i must be in a Chicken Box of my own or someone else's.
I'm sorry, but the screed about identifying with the cortex is so artificial. He chooses to parse cortical function as epiphenomenal and then goes on about how nonsensical it is to identify with an epiphenomena. Let's just interpret cortical function differently, to get clear how pseud this reasoning is: take an organisms modelling capacity of it's external world, and apply it to itself, such that it may predict what it will do at any given time, and make decisions based on those predictions. Distinctly not epiphenomenal (try different self-models where say, you don't have legs, etc. It will be deliterious to the quality of the organism.); it seems reasonable to identify with a self-model than an epiphenomena, moreso than the screen of perceptions that just occur incident to it. It should be clear now that his idea of a cortex being functionally epiphenomenal was _his_ choice, and not reflective of it's nature.
And how would a person in 1971 be familiar with the cybernetics theoretical development. You are using self and model as conceptual tools but he was in a time where reductive materialism was much more prevalent (still is). If you go with the free energy paradigm it is not straight forwardly reductive. Karl friston even claimed the Markov blankets are metaphysical and can work on different scales however that is supposed to work. Try to reductively explain self and model and see how far you reach
@@ReflectiveJourney I just used self-model for illustrative purposes. It's painfully obvious that, no matter how you choose to frame it, cortical function _isn't_ an epiphenomena - and especially not the faculty of identification, or self-identification. The consequences of an erronious self-ID faculty should be very clear. And while incidental to my point, I'm pretty sure the Macy conferences were in the 1940s, so cybernetics would have been on its feet by the '70s. And you can draw a Markov Blanket around any Markov process so long as it has correlated states, so the formalism can be applied to non-metaphysical examples - it's just a formalism that can partition objects even if we assume the world is essentially a stochastic process i.e. fuzzy. And I imagine concepts around a fuzzy type of homeomorphism, where there's an injection between real and modelled states but no surjection gives you a way to reduce the extension of "model".
My old Professor at Boston University! I was his assistant in 1983-84! Thank you for uploading!
I first came across his work while working as post grad in philosophy of science looking into Wittgenstein in 1989: Wittgenstein A Critique. A great book. Then in the 1990's I was working on Kant and found his book on Kant: Kant and the Transcendental Object was great too. Then early 2000's I worked on Husserl and his introduction to Husserl was one of the rare works to actually try and explain it rather than most that just repeat and deepen the obscurity. In the late 2000's i started to do post grad work on Hegel in a continental philosophy department. Now most of my post grad colleagues had little time for analytical philosopher's work on continental philosophy, and with good reason in most cases. But the Hegelian Lecturer there just said his book on Hegel was great! i said he's written on everybody, and he said "yea most philosophers can only be experts on one of these and he is an expert on all of them". Yea! it would have been good have had chance to have studied with him not least because he didn't just do great interpretation but also engaged with his contemporaries on and within their terms and arguments. I guess this lecture will be interesting.
Part 1 Spot on introduction to the problem of science and human life/existence/consciences. At 3:40mins, I think he is foregrounding the etymological link between Category and Market Place that i understand, from a conversation many years ago I had with an Heideggerian colleague, is from Aristotle's original use. I explored this and the link is clearly implied in Anscombe's "Intention" sections 30-40ish, where she talks of a shopping basket of goods in a supermarket (which would have been new then). Following up on this turned out to very revealing, when you think of the view of goods from the supermarket audit and the view from a person. it has turned out very revealing for the problem of thinking the economic sciences with respect to the firm in the market in the vocabulary of supply and demand for individual goods and their myth of the unity of goods as the synthetic unity of manifold of multiple differential S/D curves. Here for me is one key way of addressing the scientific image of man and the manifest image (Sellars). the economic sciences seems to have a possible point of exchange even for people with no goods what so ever the myth of making a contract when you have nothing, my Heideggerian collage put this nicely "its as if two dead people come together in a contract and become alive". let alone that the notion of the shopping basket of human needs is a mere empirical accident for the company audit, while that company must have its own existence as necessary in its audit, as a priori. Scientific analysis and then attempted synthesis is after the fact of this firms presupposition. My metaphor here for the error of the framing terms of the philosophical problem here is: they divide up a Gladiator's action into a sequence of separate abilities ie a set of decathlon events and then think they have a genuine problem of how to synthesise the decathlon events back into the Gladiator. The decathlon events are symmetrically appropriate for metrication and mathematical comparison even by the contender with themselves. the "privileging" (2:00mins) of the metric space (Symmetry, category, group theory, conservation etc) in the traditional framing here then generates pseudo problems. We can get a glimpse of the human in the audits but rather we need to turn the problem around. how is the image of metric symmetry produced out of the human possible. and for me the phenomenology leads to the position that answer must lie in that these abstract symmetries are framed by actual physical frames, a smooth straight track etc rather than a post facto symbolic axiom. You know a competent driver needs a competent car and a competent road. the wheel was not invented before flat ground was affordable. As with Galileo, you still need self control the virtues to do the timing, and later rules and an institution. we cannot get this view out of thinking of these as genuinely separate sue generic entities. see Beatrice Han Pile on Bachelard and also philosophical externalism. it means there cannot be a genuine is/ought problem since this images a certain factual valueless content. Anscombe also brings out the role of public and private with this regard.
This is wonderful! Don't recall it from the previous channel you had. So glad You've successfully re-uploaded and maintained your content without the troublesome confusion of the TH-cam workers, for whom I hold no ire (lol).
Nice lecture! I was very much impress by the animosity of the q&a section. I had taken for granted that these ideas were already in circulation. Perhaps they were, but there was clearly a strong physicalism bias at that time. I guess that today the cake is more evenly divided to include not only physicalists but also dualist of different and very sophisticated shades... Nowadays, I guess a physicalist knows she has to tackle those issues laid down here by Findlay. I believe that bringing about a common ground between parts can be seen as a kind of philosophical progress... Thank you, @Philosophy Overdose!
58:20 Findlay goes full sigma.
Listening. No comment. ❤️
Hey, what happened to the video by Robert Pippin? He's my favorite philosopher and now he's gone :(?
I have been reading Robert Pippin's stuff closely for nearly 20 years now. Which Robert Pippin video do you mean?
@@harveyyoung3423 His talk on Reason's Form.
Part 2 at 19:00mins JNF raises the issue of metaphysics in regard to "subjective" or interpretive positionality and the scientific behavioural image. To expand on my part 1 then the metaphysical (propositions) are possible only upon a certain "already organ-ised" environment and person inner and outer public private states. that is as propositions they are as such, dependent on that constitution. but the hermetic standpoint here means such an "order" is not out of anarchic dots or points put into a whole order, rather we are already in this order and it is already then environment sensitive and bodily/habitually shaped. Thus we can say we are already with the ethical and deontic (c.f. Sellars) the myth that drives this is that of myopic sensibility (Adorno) that thinks there is a task of putting together atoms of sense into an object intended. its like thinking that space is made up by analogy with putting separate bricks together into a wall. of course with space the bricks as separate presupposes a space they are separate "in". for behaviourism, it is thinking an array of reflexes, twitches if you will, have to be integrated into a dance or a walk. rather the question is how can a dance and a walk be "actualised" (or reduced) into a set of separate reflex's and twitches. metaphysics of the proposition and object's "having" depositions is the symbolic idea of this "actualisation" at its conclusion of a process of disenchantment. As Husserl put it in "The Crisis", it is a task for science. so the metaphysics of causal determinism and the pure subject of sue generic consciousness are imagined end points for competing scientific tasks. Metaphysics then are the ideas expression of a task internally reflective and regulative for science. it is then the derivative symbolic counterpart to the scientist in the projects of limiting a closing down degrees of freedom to asymptotically zero. Scientists are in the buisness of constructing frames and limits to make the idea of a causal substance into a realty, they deal with apparatus in the most general sense. the end point must mean a kind of living death for the human and the scientist. it is where everything is taken care of externally and so no need for grace or virtue or duty. like how the clock took over (alienated) the heart beat for Galileo. Galileo before the clock has a space of freedom very different semantically from Galileo using a clock. (See Sellars and David Webb on error and accident. Anyway it is clear that "empirical propositions are fraught with metaphysical propositions. Metaphysical propositions are fraught with themselves, and i propose fraught with empirical content. Kant's point i hope to think in his "apparent" disjunctive tabling of these. i hold a certain modesty here that we are not trying to explain stuff from a point outside of virtue and institutional rules. the task is how is the myth of human science possible for the human not how is the human possible from the standpoint of science. (c.f. McDowell's Mind and World). there is no genuine problem of how meaning and intentionality are possible in a conception of a dead universe, rather how does the idea of a dead universe even appear as a genuine human independent point of view.
the limits of objects are not empirical or metaphysical, but rather are the imagined end points of experience where we react or feel pain at a bright light, we don't "see" we reflex. and also the idea that there is a passive response to no sense data. there is no such thing as non sensuousness close your eyes you feel your own eyes not a an object. (C.f. instruments measuring radiation like photomultiplier tubes.) Just like our senses, all instruments are as such in the world and finite wr.t full scale deflection and detector noise. eg economic data does not exist in a collapsed state, and if too funded it begins to be a play in what it is trying to represent. all this is clearer in the political legal economic vocabulary, c.f Peter Suber on Russell paradox and constitutional rights. he has it that hey are meta laws. i hold they are both tautologies and contradiction when put in this idiom. in reality they are negative laws for the application of negative laws. rights are the formal expression of the immediacy of some laws to some laws. ie as if rights, unlike common law are not interpreted. questions of freedom of speech ect imagine a universal problem of freedom expressed as atomist right natural law, is isomorphic and to the understanding of freedom in natural life. the metaphysics of representation can glimpse this link at points but generally life is ruled out in the semantic (axiomatic) requirement of legal terms for symmetry and universality. we think we have to make sense of human life and freedom in and under the privileging of freedom as it is in science law and right representation. that is why the legal concept wants to deny its "superveniance" upon life, and in fact wants to eliminate the notion of pre legal life altogether in the name of its conception of freedom positive or negative. it ids doing stuff and has taken over the frame for debate about this into is semantics of conceptual representation not the already ethical moral world of the nominal. representational legal concepts oppositions like black/white, male/female are constrained by all manner of semantic structures necessary for its application by institutions and their agent reach. they try to force us to deal with these constative issues of the legitimacy of the state wholly within a vocabulary of their construction. I think it was Pritchard's paper "Is Moral philosophy based on a mistake?" the mistake is starting with atoms of self interest with a external task of order. where i am represented as self interested for the sake of science and law. this is not the same as when i reflect on a twitch or a reflex for air in a dive. this is a limit to legitimacy not a ontological state of being. it means science is in a process of removing its own ground of legitimacy, where even the behavioural scientists are entirely captured by their own behavioural representations. the oddity of this is clear" The experiment showed us "that P" because i needed to have enough food to eat and this is how i get paid. i must be in a Chicken Box of my own or someone else's.
Also wondering about the pippin video
Awesome. Every psychiatrist should listen to this lecture. And then quit.
Wasn’t expecting the little “scientists are demonic” rant lol
That outburst reveals, if you ask me, an astounding level of arrogance, wounded pride, and an inability to relinquish ancient superstitions.
@@martinmills135 Cope
@@PessimisticIdealism Pessimistic Idealism? lol
I'm sorry, but the screed about identifying with the cortex is so artificial. He chooses to parse cortical function as epiphenomenal and then goes on about how nonsensical it is to identify with an epiphenomena. Let's just interpret cortical function differently, to get clear how pseud this reasoning is: take an organisms modelling capacity of it's external world, and apply it to itself, such that it may predict what it will do at any given time, and make decisions based on those predictions. Distinctly not epiphenomenal (try different self-models where say, you don't have legs, etc. It will be deliterious to the quality of the organism.); it seems reasonable to identify with a self-model than an epiphenomena, moreso than the screen of perceptions that just occur incident to it. It should be clear now that his idea of a cortex being functionally epiphenomenal was _his_ choice, and not reflective of it's nature.
And how would a person in 1971 be familiar with the cybernetics theoretical development. You are using self and model as conceptual tools but he was in a time where reductive materialism was much more prevalent (still is). If you go with the free energy paradigm it is not straight forwardly reductive. Karl friston even claimed the Markov blankets are metaphysical and can work on different scales however that is supposed to work. Try to reductively explain self and model and see how far you reach
@@ReflectiveJourney I just used self-model for illustrative purposes. It's painfully obvious that, no matter how you choose to frame it, cortical function _isn't_ an epiphenomena - and especially not the faculty of identification, or self-identification. The consequences of an erronious self-ID faculty should be very clear.
And while incidental to my point, I'm pretty sure the Macy conferences were in the 1940s, so cybernetics would have been on its feet by the '70s. And you can draw a Markov Blanket around any Markov process so long as it has correlated states, so the formalism can be applied to non-metaphysical examples - it's just a formalism that can partition objects even if we assume the world is essentially a stochastic process i.e. fuzzy. And I imagine concepts around a fuzzy type of homeomorphism, where there's an injection between real and modelled states but no surjection gives you a way to reduce the extension of "model".
@@Eta_Carinae__ "And you can draw a Markov Blanket around any Markov process so long as it has correlated states"
This is specious
@@ashiok That's my point. Claims about metaphysics shouldn't be specious.