1:40: Obviously, what p, p*, p**, etc. have in common is that they all begin with the letter p. It follows that all propositions that begin with the letter p are true.
The suavest philosophy move I have ever seen was a paper that basically said that the problem of the criterion is self-resolving because knowing that the problem of the criterion is a problem is a known proposition which can then be used to infer criteria for evaluating other propositions. My mind was absolutely blown.
@@pandawandas I'm not. I'm saying that it is a problem or that it isn't a problem. If it isn't a problem, then we don't need to worry about it. If it is a problem, then it resolves itself. Either way we win.
0:21 Question 1: What’s True? Question 2: How do I know the answer is True? 2:33 If you don’t know What’s True, you won’t know how to answer What’s True. 3:44 Goodness Settled Independently • Particularism - Answer 1 first, Answer 2 second • Methodism, Answer 2 first, answer 1 second • Skepticism - there’s no answer 5:34 Lets assume we can give an answer. 8 7:31 Skepticism - Idk ydk wdk and never will 10:07 Justification is Assumption Method - Justification is Method/Criteria proposed Skepticism - Justification is ??? Unfounded • Academic Sketpicism (Hard Atheism, Mind Hardened) • Pyrrhonian Skepticism (Soft Atheism, Agnostic, Uncommitted) 17:13 Coherentism 18:30 21:09 Trust and Test - Does this desert have water 💧? Is it your average desert? Is it a special desert? 24:27 Build up a coherent system. Start where you are Formulate & Revise 25:40 Isn’t this a form of Methodism though? 27:07 Lets form an incoherent system, lets form a beautiful system of order and chaos 29:32 Coherentists also _beg the question_ 32:25 The Problem of The Criterion • Doesn’t go away 33:57 1. What counts as sensory experience? 2. What is the criterion for whether something is sensory experience? Propositions and Justifications
It seems to me that in coherentism, one assumes beliefs to be true (particularism) and methods to be valid (methodism) at the same time. Once can imagine natural selection operating on these beliefs and methods with the result that some beliefs and methods will be more common than others. For example contradiction usually indicates error. Why? Perhaps because this sort coherence criterion was adaptive. We tend to believe things we see, even when it is wrong. Perhaps this is because running from imaginary predators is adaptive if *sometimes* they are not imaginary. False positives exert only a minor stress on survival while It only takes one false negative to remove your genes from the pool.
Currently reading through the Qu'ran, and just discovered it has another name, al-Furqan (Surah 25), which means "the Criterion." A muslim friend once said to me that Islam encourages its adherents to go and learn all they can, knowing that all paths lead back to the Qu'ran and will conform with it, which at the time seemed patently wrong and intellectually obnoxious to me. But I think I'm beginning to understand the appeal/power of beleiving in an independently "revealed" criterion, solving problems you didn't know you had.* For a book that's had such a lasting impact on the world, it's an incredibly frustrating read without this insight, but cool to see epistemology at work in the field. *This is not an endorsement: don't do religion, kids.
I'm not sure if the skeptic position is like self defeating, because if the proposition "no propositions or criteria are independently justified" is not independently justified, they may still find motivation to accept it. Like it may not be the case that holding the skeptic's view motivates you to reject the skeptic's view, or that the skeptic's propositions and criteria will always cause them to reject the skeptic view. I guess they can't justify their position objectively in an argument, but they can still try to say things that motivate the other person to accept the skeptic view, or maybe say things that, from the other person's propositions and criteria, lead to the skeptic's view.
The fact that particularism and methodism both exist implies that beliefs exist that particularists accepted at one time but no longer do, leading some to question particularism, with some of these opting for methodism. That methodism is not the sole system implies that methods exist that were once accepted by methodists as true, but which are no longer. This has led some to question the validity of methodism as well. A question now arises. Has a contradictory statement believed to be false every been shown to be true while the contradiction still remains? If no such statement exists, then a system based on contradiction could be valid. Isn't this what coherentism is?
Is there a view that claims to answer both questions, but where it is stated as a higher-level particular? Say, someone states beliefs and criteria are interdependent, and the way we start the process of inquiry is by grasping some universal, knowledge -- given the term 'knowledge' here is taken to be relatively primitive but clearly refers to something. On this view, the process of inquiry starts with a belief that is simultaneously a criterion for further beliefs. We accumulate further beliefs by attempting to "align them" with our primitive notion and from this, we start to develop a clearer, non-primitive criterion of knowledge, which then further revises our beliefs as we get set on more and more aspects of said criterion. So, this view claims to simultaneously provide a particular and a method, but the view itself is like a higher-level particular (belief in the universal, *knowledge*).
much of philosophy is a pokemonstyle rock,paper,scissor battle for grounding. The same problem seems to appear when it comes to pragmatists, idealists, realists and sceptics or whatever you want to call them-
The Problem of Criterion is a classic example of a pseudo-problem that we create for ourselves by insisting on metaphysics. We may not know which propositions are true, but we are none the worse for that. We know which propositions we find "justified" because justification is a wholly human endeavor. If we disagree on what propositions we find justified and why, so be it. If agreement on a proposition is useful at all, then agreement will eventually be reached, to some extent, but there is no reason to declare any proposition to be "true" at all. If we can't identify "truth" by way of our justifications, then we can't identify it at all. Which may not appease our hunger for metaphysics, but that's ok. We'll live. Pragmatism.
What if I disagree with you? If justification is merely a fanciful term for a psychological need that may or not be present, then we have lost the epistemic discussion and centered around a psychological one. Is that what you endorse or am I misunderstanding you?
@@natanaellizama6559 Yes, that's a fair assessment, but I think I disagree with your implication that "psychology" is a problem. Because epistemology is psychological in practical terms no matter what we assume about "reality." In other words, regardless of what "reality really is" and regardless of the extent of our "connection" to this reality, all we actually do in practical terms is share our experiences and make justifications to each other. Therefore we don't need to discuss "epistemology" in anything other than those terms, and calling this "merely" psychology is just to complain about our situation. If you disagree with me, so be it. If our disagreement is of any practical consequence, we will continue to hash it out. And if not, we are free to live in disagreement. This is just a description of what actually happens. The point is, neither of us needs to insist upon some "metaphysical, objective truth" in order to keep doing what we are already doing. And much of the traditional "problems" in philosophy are just us lamenting that we had something "better" than psychology.
There's no need to resort to the psychologization of philosophical positions, even if you accept a pragmatist stance; that is in the case of the problem of the criterion at least. It is a pseudo-problem only as long as one accepts a foundationalist epistemology and assumes that knowledge has to be founded on... well absolutely true knowledge. I'm not endorsing relativism, but coherentism seems to be a much more appealing stance when confronted with such problems, insofar as foundational truths amount to either axioms or dogmas; (partial or local) skepticism is useful in these cases. You don't need to assume a foundation if you consider knowledge to consist simply in a web or rationally justified beliefs; sure we may not know if the initial beliefs we assume are effectively true (that is, they correspond to what is "really real") but insofar as the aquisition of knowledge is a process (and a dialectical one at that) the social nature of rationality by virtue of aquisition of new data is indispensable for... well rationality itself. As a framework it is much more useful with regards to empirical enquiry (banally science) and philosophical discussion. There is no need to insist on a metaphysical objective truth but at the same kind the belief in the existence of some kind of truth (of course whether it amounts to something metaphysical is debatable) - or rather true belief, is somewhat necessary for discussion, simply because I personally think that it is impossible to believe something that we regard to be false. We do not need to be absolutely sure about what we believe, but some degree of supposed reliablity of certain beliefs is required for them to work in any epistemic and/or psychological framework; that amounts to adopting a stance along of the lines of "this _may_ be true so I assume the _actual state of affairs_ to be such and so" and then go about to justify such beliefs by agreed upon criteria and norms; once we face a deadlock either our beliefs are shown to be false by engagement in discussion/skepticism and hence to be discarded in the name of intellectual honesty, all that in that very same framework which we began with; or the criteria and norms have to be revised as a whole. My point here is that rationality in the broad sense is both the capacity to discuss and doubt positions and the possibility to revise and modify criteria by which we select _other_ criterions and beliefs at the "meta" level. Belief in the efficacy of belief itself (and the respective concomitant justification) for the aquirement of knowledge of some kind is a basic disposition required for subjective, rational agents to engage in discourses about knowledge. Disagreement is crucial because it reveals dogmas and is the primary condition for falsifiability - to know that something is false is to know that _it is true_ that that something is false. That's why coherence, or better, internal consistency is paradoxically fundamental for any conception of objectivity at all: contradiction always points out to the fact that there's always something more, something that we're missing. Otherwise we would all just be trivialists. I think this means that pragmatism entails some kind (certainly a weird one!) of realism.
@@scriabinismydog2439 I agree that coherence is a more appropriate heuristic than correspondence when contemplating epistemology, but I don't follow to your conclusion that we should think of this "web of rationally justified beliefs" as being "real" in some metaphysical sense. I think you loose me here: "the belief in the existence of some kind of truth (of course whether it amounts to something metaphysical is debatable) - or rather true belief, is somewhat necessary for discussion" - this seems to be a variation on the classic metaphysical conceit that "truth" must "exist" in order for us to "believe" it. I don't think that's how it works - I think "truth" is just a word we use to describe the conclusion we come to AFTER we have come to believe them for whatever reasons we do. And whatever these reasons are, are enough to engage in "discussion," so I don't see the reason to posit anything further. So... Yes, I agree that "it is impossible to believe something that we regard to be false," but that seems to me to be another way of saying that I can't tell the difference between what I "believe" and what I call "true" - these two things always look the same to me, which it is folly to insist they are different. I don't see how phrasing it as you do as opposed to the way I do makes any difference to the "reliability of certain beliefs required for them to work in any epistemic and/or psychological framework." Clearly there is no harm in thinking and speaking of our beliefs as pertaining to "the actual state of affairs" in a colloquial sense. But the insight of pragmatism is that this colloquial sense is all that is necessary to do what we are already doing. There is no reason to be disturbed by our recognition that "philosophy" offers no further insight to the matter, beyond pointing out that, as far we can tell, we have no guarantee of any access to the "actual state of affairs," but so what? For we don't need such guarantee to have the "capacity to discuss and doubt positions and the possibility to revise and modify criteria." We can do that all by ourselves. So... I don't understand what you mean by "Belief in the efficacy of belief itself" because "efficacy" is not something I "believe," but rather something I experience. It is palpable, something I feel, or see, something I can explain to others, etc. For example... It seems silly to say that I have to "believe in the efficacy of food in order to eat," right? Rather I experience the efficacy of food, which is why I eat it. So I don't understand what you think I am "believing" in when I experience the efficacy of whatever I believe. I understand what you are trying to do here - provide some reconciliation between traditional epistemology and pragmatism, but I don't see how such reconciliation is desirable. I don't see how it helps anything and I find it more confusing that simply pragmatism. If I may hypothesize, it seems the value you find in it is what you perceive as an avoidance of "relativism." But I don't see why "relativism" is something I should strive to avoid. It seems to be feature of the human condition, not a bug. You seem to want to have your cake and eat it too - you recognize that traditional metaphysics are problematic, and yet you want to keep whatever you find valuable about them, which is certainly understandable. But, for me, I think a clean break from tradition is what is called for. I don't think we have anything to fear from "relativism," which is why I don't see the value in discussion epistemology the way that you do. But nice post. Maybe try some white space, but very well written, thank you.
I think Rorty's neopragmatism solves this problem pretty neatly and coherently. A proposition is true if the consequences of that proposition being true are useful in practice. This criterion for truth is true because it is the most useful in practice. The criterion is self-justifying. Problem solved.
I don't think the second part is justified. A criterion of truth where "something being useful means it's true" might be less useful than others, which might not even seek to be practical, but end up so as a "by-product". Of course those criteria themselves might not solve the problem either, but that was to be expected (?)
This may lead to 'quasi-truths', approximations of actually true statements. So, usefulness may be sufficient in some cases, but not enough to get an accurate picture. There may also be unknown numbers of true things that are usefulness to us, yet are true nonetheless, thus usefulness would not be necessary or sufficient to acquire them. It remains me of the difference between efficacy and efficiency. Usefulness may have efficacy in reaching some truths, but it won't ever be efficient acquiring them.
You would still have to answer the question of what is pragmatic? If it just based off of societies needs then it seems truth is relative. I would argue relativism is self defeating in nature.
This is a restatement of methodism in which the criterion of usefulness is arbitrarily chosen. It begs the question on particularists and skeptics. It also falls into murky ground on what proves 'useful' and to whom. One could say that witches exist because killing persons thought to be witches seems to be useful to the community or some authority.
WTF!!!!!! This is blasphemous. Even if we give shenanigans of Mr. James a serious thought. There will still be many cases where you will have to decide between alternative scenarios as to which one is more useful than others. You will need a criterion to determine usefulness.
Why do academics use “she” now instead of he? I hate living in a revolutionary society. Also, Plato already dealt with this problem in the Meno, though in your time stamps it seems like you don’t even address this. In the Meno, Meno objects to Socrates’ inquiry into virtue, saying that it is impossible to search for something one does not know (a rather more elegant way of phrasing your autistic “criterion problem”). Socrates responds that knowledge is recollection; in our past lives we were in direct acquaintance with the Forms, that’s why we can know such things as virtue and inquire into them. He uses this to prove the pre-existence of souls. Now of course someone who uses “she” to refer to the general person will not consider this a viable option. Souls, essences, Forms, pre-existence? That’s bigoted superstition! We are merely bags of meat, and nothing else, and so if I want to chop my willy off and say I’m a woman it means I am!
@@KaneB This “criterion problem”, like all “problems” and “paradoxes” in modern philosophy, is merely a reductio ad absurdum of your naturalist materialist presuppositions. It wasn’t a problem for Plato, whom you refuse to even mention, even though he offered the only viable solution to it. And yes, I am butthurt that all my professors speak like this and this is the academic environment I have to live in. Patriarchy is natural and good; almost all philosophers and religions in history agree with this.
![[TH] 2024 PMSL SEA W1D5 | Fall | เก็บแต้มของจริง คือวันนี้](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/EciIAlCXg5k/mqdefault.jpg)
1:40: Obviously, what p, p*, p**, etc. have in common is that they all begin with the letter p. It follows that all propositions that begin with the letter p are true.
Lets goooo, Kane back at it again being more helpful than any teacher I've ever had.
Thanks dawg
@@KaneB No problemo, bro-choch-cho..
@@athlios7179 It’s ”professor bro-choch-cho” now. Gotta respect the man’s PhD.
@@robinsarchiz ahhh yes my mistake.
hi athlios
The suavest philosophy move I have ever seen was a paper that basically said that the problem of the criterion is self-resolving because knowing that the problem of the criterion is a problem is a known proposition which can then be used to infer criteria for evaluating other propositions. My mind was absolutely blown.
but that's beggign the question. on the basis of what criterion are we saying that it's a problem?
@@pandawandas Well if it isn't a problem, then we can just ignore it.
@@Salsmachev On the basis of what criterion are you saying that it's not a problem?
@@pandawandas I'm not. I'm saying that it is a problem or that it isn't a problem. If it isn't a problem, then we don't need to worry about it. If it is a problem, then it resolves itself. Either way we win.
@@Salsmachev On the basis of what criterion are you saying that we don't need to worry about it/it resolves itself?
I am a cinephile and was gravely disappointed by the content of this video
I've been gravely disappointed by The Criterion Collection itself recently. It just isn't the same.
@@unknownknownsphilosophy7888 why?
0:21
Question 1: What’s True?
Question 2: How do I know the answer is True?
2:33 If you don’t know What’s True, you won’t know how to answer What’s True.
3:44 Goodness Settled Independently
• Particularism - Answer 1 first, Answer 2 second
• Methodism, Answer 2 first, answer 1 second
• Skepticism - there’s no answer
5:34 Lets assume we can give an answer.
8
7:31 Skepticism - Idk ydk wdk and never will
10:07 Justification is Assumption
Method - Justification is Method/Criteria proposed
Skepticism - Justification is ??? Unfounded
• Academic Sketpicism (Hard Atheism, Mind Hardened)
• Pyrrhonian Skepticism (Soft Atheism, Agnostic, Uncommitted)
17:13 Coherentism
18:30
21:09 Trust and Test
- Does this desert have water 💧?
Is it your average desert?
Is it a special desert?
24:27 Build up a coherent system.
Start where you are
Formulate & Revise
25:40 Isn’t this a form of Methodism though?
27:07 Lets form an incoherent system, lets form a beautiful system of order and chaos
29:32 Coherentists also _beg the question_
32:25 The Problem of The Criterion
• Doesn’t go away
33:57
1. What counts as sensory experience?
2. What is the criterion for whether something is sensory experience?
Propositions and Justifications
It seems to me that in coherentism, one assumes beliefs to be true (particularism) and methods to be valid (methodism) at the same time. Once can imagine natural selection operating on these beliefs and methods with the result that some beliefs and methods will be more common than others. For example contradiction usually indicates error. Why? Perhaps because this sort coherence criterion was adaptive.
We tend to believe things we see, even when it is wrong. Perhaps this is because running from imaginary predators is adaptive if *sometimes* they are not imaginary. False positives exert only a minor stress on survival while It only takes one false negative to remove your genes from the pool.
Currently reading through the Qu'ran, and just discovered it has another name, al-Furqan (Surah 25), which means "the Criterion."
A muslim friend once said to me that Islam encourages its adherents to go and learn all they can, knowing that all paths lead back to the Qu'ran and will conform with it, which at the time seemed patently wrong and intellectually obnoxious to me. But I think I'm beginning to understand the appeal/power of beleiving in an independently "revealed" criterion, solving problems you didn't know you had.* For a book that's had such a lasting impact on the world, it's an incredibly frustrating read without this insight, but cool to see epistemology at work in the field.
*This is not an endorsement: don't do religion, kids.
Interesting comment.
Very good video, I’ll likely spend the next few days/weeks considering this
The word "assumption" is doing a lot of work.
I'm not sure if the skeptic position is like self defeating, because if the proposition "no propositions or criteria are independently justified" is not independently justified, they may still find motivation to accept it. Like it may not be the case that holding the skeptic's view motivates you to reject the skeptic's view, or that the skeptic's propositions and criteria will always cause them to reject the skeptic view.
I guess they can't justify their position objectively in an argument, but they can still try to say things that motivate the other person to accept the skeptic view, or maybe say things that, from the other person's propositions and criteria, lead to the skeptic's view.
Great video. I'm leading a discussion on epistomolgy in a couple days and this was helpful.
Lol, I firstly thought this video was going to be about the problem of "criterion", the film Channel and video distribution
Thanks Dr.
The fact that particularism and methodism both exist implies that beliefs exist that particularists accepted at one time but no longer do, leading some to question particularism, with some of these opting for methodism.
That methodism is not the sole system implies that methods exist that were once accepted by methodists as true, but which are no longer. This has led some to question the validity of methodism as well.
A question now arises. Has a contradictory statement believed to be false every been shown to be true while the contradiction still remains? If no such statement exists, then a system based on contradiction could be valid. Isn't this what coherentism is?
What's your position?
Is there a view that claims to answer both questions, but where it is stated as a higher-level particular?
Say, someone states beliefs and criteria are interdependent, and the way we start the process of inquiry is by grasping some universal, knowledge -- given the term 'knowledge' here is taken to be relatively primitive but clearly refers to something. On this view, the process of inquiry starts with a belief that is simultaneously a criterion for further beliefs. We accumulate further beliefs by attempting to "align them" with our primitive notion and from this, we start to develop a clearer, non-primitive criterion of knowledge, which then further revises our beliefs as we get set on more and more aspects of said criterion.
So, this view claims to simultaneously provide a particular and a method, but the view itself is like a higher-level particular (belief in the universal, *knowledge*).
much of philosophy is a pokemonstyle rock,paper,scissor battle for grounding. The same problem seems to appear when it comes to pragmatists, idealists, realists and sceptics or whatever you want to call them-
6:38
* Moore entered the chat *
I got recommended this video because I watch reviews of the Critereon Collection :(
Epistemological decisionism to the rescue.
Kane, what is your favorite area of Mathematics
Your mom
W Dr very pro video
I finally found home.
😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍😍
The Problem of Criterion is a classic example of a pseudo-problem that we create for ourselves by insisting on metaphysics. We may not know which propositions are true, but we are none the worse for that. We know which propositions we find "justified" because justification is a wholly human endeavor. If we disagree on what propositions we find justified and why, so be it. If agreement on a proposition is useful at all, then agreement will eventually be reached, to some extent, but there is no reason to declare any proposition to be "true" at all. If we can't identify "truth" by way of our justifications, then we can't identify it at all. Which may not appease our hunger for metaphysics, but that's ok. We'll live. Pragmatism.
What if I disagree with you? If justification is merely a fanciful term for a psychological need that may or not be present, then we have lost the epistemic discussion and centered around a psychological one. Is that what you endorse or am I misunderstanding you?
@@natanaellizama6559 Yes, that's a fair assessment, but I think I disagree with your implication that "psychology" is a problem. Because epistemology is psychological in practical terms no matter what we assume about "reality." In other words, regardless of what "reality really is" and regardless of the extent of our "connection" to this reality, all we actually do in practical terms is share our experiences and make justifications to each other. Therefore we don't need to discuss "epistemology" in anything other than those terms, and calling this "merely" psychology is just to complain about our situation.
If you disagree with me, so be it. If our disagreement is of any practical consequence, we will continue to hash it out. And if not, we are free to live in disagreement. This is just a description of what actually happens. The point is, neither of us needs to insist upon some "metaphysical, objective truth" in order to keep doing what we are already doing. And much of the traditional "problems" in philosophy are just us lamenting that we had something "better" than psychology.
There's no need to resort to the psychologization of philosophical positions, even if you accept a pragmatist stance; that is in the case of the problem of the criterion at least. It is a pseudo-problem only as long as one accepts a foundationalist epistemology and assumes that knowledge has to be founded on... well absolutely true knowledge. I'm not endorsing relativism, but coherentism seems to be a much more appealing stance when confronted with such problems, insofar as foundational truths amount to either axioms or dogmas; (partial or local) skepticism is useful in these cases. You don't need to assume a foundation if you consider knowledge to consist simply in a web or rationally justified beliefs; sure we may not know if the initial beliefs we assume are effectively true (that is, they correspond to what is "really real") but insofar as the aquisition of knowledge is a process (and a dialectical one at that) the social nature of rationality by virtue of aquisition of new data is indispensable for... well rationality itself. As a framework it is much more useful with regards to empirical enquiry (banally science) and philosophical discussion. There is no need to insist on a metaphysical objective truth but at the same kind the belief in the existence of some kind of truth (of course whether it amounts to something metaphysical is debatable) - or rather true belief, is somewhat necessary for discussion, simply because I personally think that it is impossible to believe something that we regard to be false. We do not need to be absolutely sure about what we believe, but some degree of supposed reliablity of certain beliefs is required for them to work in any epistemic and/or psychological framework; that amounts to adopting a stance along of the lines of "this _may_ be true so I assume the _actual state of affairs_ to be such and so" and then go about to justify such beliefs by agreed upon criteria and norms; once we face a deadlock either our beliefs are shown to be false by engagement in discussion/skepticism and hence to be discarded in the name of intellectual honesty, all that in that very same framework which we began with; or the criteria and norms have to be revised as a whole. My point here is that rationality in the broad sense is both the capacity to discuss and doubt positions and the possibility to revise and modify criteria by which we select _other_ criterions and beliefs at the "meta" level. Belief in the efficacy of belief itself (and the respective concomitant justification) for the aquirement of knowledge of some kind is a basic disposition required for subjective, rational agents to engage in discourses about knowledge. Disagreement is crucial because it reveals dogmas and is the primary condition for falsifiability - to know that something is false is to know that _it is true_ that that something is false. That's why coherence, or better, internal consistency is paradoxically fundamental for any conception of objectivity at all: contradiction always points out to the fact that there's always something more, something that we're missing. Otherwise we would all just be trivialists. I think this means that pragmatism entails some kind (certainly a weird one!) of realism.
@@scriabinismydog2439 I agree that coherence is a more appropriate heuristic than correspondence when contemplating epistemology, but I don't follow to your conclusion that we should think of this "web of rationally justified beliefs" as being "real" in some metaphysical sense. I think you loose me here:
"the belief in the existence of some kind of truth (of course whether it amounts to something metaphysical is debatable) - or rather true belief, is somewhat necessary for discussion" - this seems to be a variation on the classic metaphysical conceit that "truth" must "exist" in order for us to "believe" it. I don't think that's how it works - I think "truth" is just a word we use to describe the conclusion we come to AFTER we have come to believe them for whatever reasons we do. And whatever these reasons are, are enough to engage in "discussion," so I don't see the reason to posit anything further. So...
Yes, I agree that "it is impossible to believe something that we regard to be false," but that seems to me to be another way of saying that I can't tell the difference between what I "believe" and what I call "true" - these two things always look the same to me, which it is folly to insist they are different. I don't see how phrasing it as you do as opposed to the way I do makes any difference to the "reliability of certain beliefs required for them to work in any epistemic and/or psychological framework."
Clearly there is no harm in thinking and speaking of our beliefs as pertaining to "the actual state of affairs" in a colloquial sense. But the insight of pragmatism is that this colloquial sense is all that is necessary to do what we are already doing. There is no reason to be disturbed by our recognition that "philosophy" offers no further insight to the matter, beyond pointing out that, as far we can tell, we have no guarantee of any access to the "actual state of affairs," but so what? For we don't need such guarantee to have the "capacity to discuss and doubt positions and the possibility to revise and modify criteria." We can do that all by ourselves. So...
I don't understand what you mean by "Belief in the efficacy of belief itself" because "efficacy" is not something I "believe," but rather something I experience. It is palpable, something I feel, or see, something I can explain to others, etc. For example...
It seems silly to say that I have to "believe in the efficacy of food in order to eat," right? Rather I experience the efficacy of food, which is why I eat it. So I don't understand what you think I am "believing" in when I experience the efficacy of whatever I believe.
I understand what you are trying to do here - provide some reconciliation between traditional epistemology and pragmatism, but I don't see how such reconciliation is desirable. I don't see how it helps anything and I find it more confusing that simply pragmatism. If I may hypothesize, it seems the value you find in it is what you perceive as an avoidance of "relativism." But I don't see why "relativism" is something I should strive to avoid. It seems to be feature of the human condition, not a bug.
You seem to want to have your cake and eat it too - you recognize that traditional metaphysics are problematic, and yet you want to keep whatever you find valuable about them, which is certainly understandable. But, for me, I think a clean break from tradition is what is called for. I don't think we have anything to fear from "relativism," which is why I don't see the value in discussion epistemology the way that you do.
But nice post. Maybe try some white space, but very well written, thank you.
I think Rorty's neopragmatism solves this problem pretty neatly and coherently. A proposition is true if the consequences of that proposition being true are useful in practice. This criterion for truth is true because it is the most useful in practice. The criterion is self-justifying. Problem solved.
I don't think the second part is justified. A criterion of truth where "something being useful means it's true" might be less useful than others, which might not even seek to be practical, but end up so as a "by-product". Of course those criteria themselves might not solve the problem either, but that was to be expected (?)
This may lead to 'quasi-truths', approximations of actually true statements. So, usefulness may be sufficient in some cases, but not enough to get an accurate picture.
There may also be unknown numbers of true things that are usefulness to us, yet are true nonetheless, thus usefulness would not be necessary or sufficient to acquire them.
It remains me of the difference between efficacy and efficiency. Usefulness may have efficacy in reaching some truths, but it won't ever be efficient acquiring them.
You would still have to answer the question of what is pragmatic? If it just based off of societies needs then it seems truth is relative. I would argue relativism is self defeating in nature.
This is a restatement of methodism in which the criterion of usefulness is arbitrarily chosen. It begs the question on particularists and skeptics.
It also falls into murky ground on what proves 'useful' and to whom. One could say that witches exist because killing persons thought to be witches seems to be useful to the community or some authority.
WTF!!!!!! This is blasphemous.
Even if we give shenanigans of Mr. James a serious thought.
There will still be many cases where you will have to decide between alternative scenarios as to which one is more useful than others. You will need a criterion to determine usefulness.
Philosophical skeptics are very happy to tell you that you know nothing.
You don't know that
@@justinlevy274 Do you disagree that sceptics say this?
@@drewzi2044 whoosh
@@justinlevy274 It’s not a whoosh.
@@drewzi2044 it was a joke
Why do academics use “she” now instead of he? I hate living in a revolutionary society.
Also, Plato already dealt with this problem in the Meno, though in your time stamps it seems like you don’t even address this. In the Meno, Meno objects to Socrates’ inquiry into virtue, saying that it is impossible to search for something one does not know (a rather more elegant way of phrasing your autistic “criterion problem”). Socrates responds that knowledge is recollection; in our past lives we were in direct acquaintance with the Forms, that’s why we can know such things as virtue and inquire into them. He uses this to prove the pre-existence of souls.
Now of course someone who uses “she” to refer to the general person will not consider this a viable option. Souls, essences, Forms, pre-existence? That’s bigoted superstition! We are merely bags of meat, and nothing else, and so if I want to chop my willy off and say I’m a woman it means I am!
Lol this has to be a troll response; nobody could be this butthurt
@@KaneB This “criterion problem”, like all “problems” and “paradoxes” in modern philosophy, is merely a reductio ad absurdum of your naturalist materialist presuppositions. It wasn’t a problem for Plato, whom you refuse to even mention, even though he offered the only viable solution to it.
And yes, I am butthurt that all my professors speak like this and this is the academic environment I have to live in. Patriarchy is natural and good; almost all philosophers and religions in history agree with this.
@@ubermensch4304 ratio
@@jrams4145 Is your dull mind capable of forming arguments?
@@ubermensch4304 go back to 4chan fuckin pseud