When Bonevac is talking about possible worlds and replacing Nixon with an alien it makes me remember Shelly Kagan's lectures on death and personal identity. I can't wrap my head around the ontology.
5:24 I don't get this thing about names as rigid designators accross possible world. Surely one possible world is a world just like ours except where Aristotle was named Plato and Plato was named Aristotle.
There's one thing about this that confuses me, maybe I just don't understand it enough: We can assume that Aristotle is a rigid designator, that is, Aristotle refers to the same in every possible world. But Nichomacus was the father of Aristotle. Nicomachus is also a rigid designator, that is, when we refer to the name Nicomachus we refer to the same thing in all possible worlds. Now one of the descriptions of Nicomachus, presumably, is that he was the person who named Aristotle. But that is a description, in other words, we can imagine a world in which Nicomachus named his son something else, for example, Joe. So how would Kripke deal with the argument that we can imagine a world that was exactly the same as ours, with the sole exception that Nicomachus named his child Joe? Would Aristotle still be a rigid designator?
45:47 a unicorn needs to be biologically the same as a horse but with a narwahl tusk coming out of its head. There is a lot known about unicorns and there behavior, including how to successfully hunt them. Seems to me that their non existence has to be necessary (e.g. because a narwahl tusk is too heavy for the neck muscles of a horse to support).
What about the possibility that there is only one possible world, which is the real world? Why is this not taken into consideration in the two Kripke lectures? Why is there just some ambiguous plurality of possible worlds? Infinite? Finite? Is that considered unimportant rather than a failure of the system of thought? He spoke of all past events as just being unnecessary and coincidental or contingent, as if they might not have happened since something else could have occurred instead. That's not a good way to think all of the time, is it? Also, the theoretical denial of the real world is not considered, which is a serious but abnormal way of thinking for some with Cotard syndrome. Kripke bases his entire framework on the concepts of real and unreal coincidence. However, he does so in a way that fails to consider the other opposing systems of thought. So, his contributions are likely to merely remain in one system and to be advocated by thinkers in that system. This brings setbacks for methodologies.
A logical framework isn’t required to rebut every idea that doesn’t fit within it. That would be impossible. I don’t think he’s under any obligation whatsoever to give reasoning that there are contingent facts in the world that we could easily imagine otherwise. Why am sitting in this chair and not the one right next to me?
Do "rigid designators " act like a patent or copyrights on naming? Where use or misuse of a name would cause a counter reaction on the level of a lawsuit. infringement of names are in cases the wrong way to use a name, and whom can claim definition of a name. Is it something that others have to agree with? Who owns the definition. By owning I mean a way of claiming a definition of a name?
I find it perplexing that Kripke's conception has become received wisdom within philosophy. The idea of a Rigid Designator is founded on the obvious fallacy that you can identify fixed objects within multiple possible universes. If the universe is difference then ever object in it is different. Designators are not even rigid within our own time line: if you said "Water is H2O" to a medieval person they would probably go look for a stake and some kindling!
Can an act be a rigid designator? The reason I ask is that given Divine Simplicity, God's essence is identical to his act of creation and thus his act of creation is necessary (across all possible worlds).
Contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori are totally self defeating concepts. Kripke should be understood as the person who decisively proved that the causal theory of reference is untenable. It's beyond me how analytic philosophers manage to draw any other lesson from all this.
@Jordan Karausky David Lewis should be revered as a genius. His theory of concrete possible worlds is much more expressive (in terms of predicate logic) than Kripke's rejection of it.
It very much appears to be mumbo jumbo. They try to get everyone to think that there is an unclear plurality of possible worlds somewhere between two and infinity. They will not say how many, though. They say it's more than one just so that they can have a greater distinction between the "real world" and the "possible world", but it always remains possible that they are just one and the same. It's mumbo jumbo because it is useless in other fields that use theories for the generation of hypotheses, and mumbo jumbo cannot generate any hypotheses that would allow us to attain knowledge via some process.
@Jordan Karausky So, you are saying that the past event (putting keys in the right pocket) happened but might not have happened? You assume that it was just a real coincidence and an unnecessary event. Is it not possible that it was a necessary event, though? Is it not a viable way to think that if something really happened, then it is not possible that it did not occur? I tend to think that these popular philosophers in W Europe and North America overemphasize the importance of the concept of unnecessary events and underemphasize the importance of the known past events. The majority of the works via Elsevier, Wiley Blackwell and Springer from W Europe and NA are publishing that way of thinking with which you agree, but the rest of the world does not bother to do so. What has this accomplished for other fields? Do these philosophers use any other discipline for confirmation of such conclusions? When you have a look at their bibliographies, the answer is a resounding no.
Thank you for helping me get to gripke with Kripke today :)
When Bonevac is talking about possible worlds and replacing Nixon with an alien it makes me remember Shelly Kagan's lectures on death and personal identity. I can't wrap my head around the ontology.
Very interesting
5:24 I don't get this thing about names as rigid designators accross possible world. Surely one possible world is a world just like ours except where Aristotle was named Plato and Plato was named Aristotle.
There's one thing about this that confuses me, maybe I just don't understand it enough:
We can assume that Aristotle is a rigid designator, that is, Aristotle refers to the same in every possible world.
But Nichomacus was the father of Aristotle. Nicomachus is also a rigid designator, that is, when we refer to the name Nicomachus we refer to the same thing in all possible worlds.
Now one of the descriptions of Nicomachus, presumably, is that he was the person who named Aristotle. But that is a description, in other words, we can imagine a world in which Nicomachus named his son something else, for example, Joe.
So how would Kripke deal with the argument that we can imagine a world that was exactly the same as ours, with the sole exception that Nicomachus named his child Joe? Would Aristotle still be a rigid designator?
I don't think I see the problem. I guess we just say that in that world Aristotle isn't named "Aristotle".
The name is the rigid designator, and not a specific name (name x), therefore rigid-designatorness survives no matter what specific name.
45:47 a unicorn needs to be biologically the same as a horse but with a narwahl tusk coming out of its head. There is a lot known about unicorns and there behavior, including how to successfully hunt them. Seems to me that their non existence has to be necessary (e.g. because a narwahl tusk is too heavy for the neck muscles of a horse to support).
What about the possibility that there is only one possible world, which is the real world? Why is this not taken into consideration in the two Kripke lectures? Why is there just some ambiguous plurality of possible worlds? Infinite? Finite? Is that considered unimportant rather than a failure of the system of thought?
He spoke of all past events as just being unnecessary and coincidental or contingent, as if they might not have happened since something else could have occurred instead. That's not a good way to think all of the time, is it?
Also, the theoretical denial of the real world is not considered, which is a serious but abnormal way of thinking for some with Cotard syndrome. Kripke bases his entire framework on the concepts of real and unreal coincidence. However, he does so in a way that fails to consider the other opposing systems of thought. So, his contributions are likely to merely remain in one system and to be advocated by thinkers in that system. This brings setbacks for methodologies.
A logical framework isn’t required to rebut every idea that doesn’t fit within it. That would be impossible.
I don’t think he’s under any obligation whatsoever to give reasoning that there are contingent facts in the world that we could easily imagine otherwise. Why am sitting in this chair and not the one right next to me?
Do "rigid designators " act like a patent or copyrights on naming? Where use or misuse of a name would cause a counter reaction on the level of a lawsuit. infringement of names are in cases the wrong way to use a name, and whom can claim definition of a name. Is it something that others have to agree with? Who owns the definition. By owning I mean a way of claiming a definition of a name?
I find it perplexing that Kripke's conception has become received wisdom within philosophy. The idea of a Rigid Designator is founded on the obvious fallacy that you can identify fixed objects within multiple possible universes. If the universe is difference then ever object in it is different. Designators are not even rigid within our own time line: if you said "Water is H2O" to a medieval person they would probably go look for a stake and some kindling!
Can an act be a rigid designator? The reason I ask is that given Divine Simplicity, God's essence is identical to his act of creation and thus his act of creation is necessary (across all possible worlds).
Not sure how much one's inability to make univocal positive statements about God in classical theism would affect the answer to this question.
Contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori are totally self defeating concepts.
Kripke should be understood as the person who decisively proved that the causal theory of reference is untenable.
It's beyond me how analytic philosophers manage to draw any other lesson from all this.
How is the causal theory of reference untenable?
I'm fascinated that American academics keep mentioning their daughters. Really odd.
This any world rhetoric seems like a lot of mumbo jumbo to me
Yes it does now thanks, but why not just say possible situation then?
@Jordan Karausky -Thanks a lot I needed the clarification too
@Jordan Karausky David Lewis should be revered as a genius. His theory of concrete possible worlds is much more expressive (in terms of predicate logic) than Kripke's rejection of it.
It very much appears to be mumbo jumbo. They try to get everyone to think that there is an unclear plurality of possible worlds somewhere between two and infinity. They will not say how many, though. They say it's more than one just so that they can have a greater distinction between the "real world" and the "possible world", but it always remains possible that they are just one and the same.
It's mumbo jumbo because it is useless in other fields that use theories for the generation of hypotheses, and mumbo jumbo cannot generate any hypotheses that would allow us to attain knowledge via some process.
@Jordan Karausky So, you are saying that the past event (putting keys in the right pocket) happened but might not have happened? You assume that it was just a real coincidence and an unnecessary event. Is it not possible that it was a necessary event, though? Is it not a viable way to think that if something really happened, then it is not possible that it did not occur?
I tend to think that these popular philosophers in W Europe and North America overemphasize the importance of the concept of unnecessary events and underemphasize the importance of the known past events. The majority of the works via Elsevier, Wiley Blackwell and Springer from W Europe and NA are publishing that way of thinking with which you agree, but the rest of the world does not bother to do so. What has this accomplished for other fields? Do these philosophers use any other discipline for confirmation of such conclusions? When you have a look at their bibliographies, the answer is a resounding no.