It's been 3 years, but maybe... I'm not a philosopher, merely a math student with some interest in logic and by extension in analytic philosophy, but if I understand correctly, Quine here argues that we actually derive our logic from the experience of the world and that's why we have no chance of getting a clear cut between analytic and synthetic. I'm no expert, but it seems to me that in philosophy of mathematics at least, which I am trying to study a little bit, nobody rejects that. That generally we observe the world, get some simple or not that simple patterns or at least "something" that then we formalize into an axiomatic system and that's the exact point where it becomes analytic and we have no idea how well it actually describe the world, just that IF it's (system) adequate THEN everything we say is a truth about the world. After that we observe that there are other similar systems, but with different axioms and that becomes a question of convention, because we can't just claim that we "guessed" the reality. And it seems to me that's true of logic as well. And semantics in general, but I have a little less then none experience in linguistics and so wouldn't claim that. Is that's in essence what Quine is doing here and doesn't this reasoning of observation→ formalization→convention makes a criterion for analyticity? Or at least a basis for it. P.S. Just a random thought on Math=Logic+membership. Not my idea, but I heard that in a sense there's little to no logic beyond propositional. That logic is a system that operates with statements based on the idea of "inference" and "truth", whatever that means. And math is what you get after you pick your logic (probably a classical one) and take some axioms on top of it. In a sense, if logic is topic neutral, or rather it's about inferences, then every branch of math is about something, not about HOW to infer something from axioms, but about WHAT you infer. Content, not the form. It seems to me that saying that math is about content, at least in some way, isn't very controversial, but I'm not sure that logic is topic-neutral in the sense. Still, if that's the case, then the two are rather distinct.
It's been 3 years, but maybe...
I'm not a philosopher, merely a math student with some interest in logic and by extension in analytic philosophy, but if I understand correctly, Quine here argues that we actually derive our logic from the experience of the world and that's why we have no chance of getting a clear cut between analytic and synthetic. I'm no expert, but it seems to me that in philosophy of mathematics at least, which I am trying to study a little bit, nobody rejects that. That generally we observe the world, get some simple or not that simple patterns or at least "something" that then we formalize into an axiomatic system and that's the exact point where it becomes analytic and we have no idea how well it actually describe the world, just that IF it's (system) adequate THEN everything we say is a truth about the world. After that we observe that there are other similar systems, but with different axioms and that becomes a question of convention, because we can't just claim that we "guessed" the reality. And it seems to me that's true of logic as well. And semantics in general, but I have a little less then none experience in linguistics and so wouldn't claim that. Is that's in essence what Quine is doing here and doesn't this reasoning of observation→ formalization→convention makes a criterion for analyticity? Or at least a basis for it.
P.S. Just a random thought on Math=Logic+membership. Not my idea, but I heard that in a sense there's little to no logic beyond propositional. That logic is a system that operates with statements based on the idea of "inference" and "truth", whatever that means. And math is what you get after you pick your logic (probably a classical one) and take some axioms on top of it. In a sense, if logic is topic neutral, or rather it's about inferences, then every branch of math is about something, not about HOW to infer something from axioms, but about WHAT you infer. Content, not the form. It seems to me that saying that math is about content, at least in some way, isn't very controversial, but I'm not sure that logic is topic-neutral in the sense. Still, if that's the case, then the two are rather distinct.
Love from Canada
its bonevac on quine on carnap on logical truth
Which makes this comment... carnap2 on bonevac on quine on carnap1 on logical truth :P
Great lectures
I watched almost all your videos and it made it much easier to understand very very difficult articles.
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thank you for uploading these videos!
Great stuff, Dr. B!
Bless you
What would happen to Quine, when he heard about Category theory?! You don't need set-theory or logic, by CT you can describe them both and much more!
If you add subtitles it would be helpful a native keralite whose language is not english
What school was this recorded at? I go to UTA In Texas!
Cameron Bodenstab The University of Texas at Austin.
I watched and did not watch this lecture.