Agree with Loki. This structure can limit the depth we go to in examining possible causes. We start with an idea like needing a bolt tightened to a specific torque. We can say the failure mode is that the bolt does not reach it's torque, and the cause would then be the torque gun did not achieve ITS torque, but the FMEA limits us exploring WHY the torque gun failed (simultaneous compressor usage, wear in the torque gun.) So we are somewhat broad in defining a failure cause, and miss some nuanced details. We can still capture them, but then our controls are a little harder to link back to the original failure mode. I've often found that in my FMEA's I say torque gun loses torque BECAUSE, or DUE TO. In other situations, if I'm doing a family FMEA, I set the failure mode as the torque gun's torque, and this allows a deeper level of cause. If we don't push for that deeper level, we can find ourselves contented with our current controls, or we simply miss possible causes because we don't ask why again. Trying to harmonize our desire to have a clearly linked control plan and our desire to use FMEA to improve our processes is a real struggle sometimes.
Very well presented. The AIAG VDA Fault tree structure limits us engineer to really focus on all potential troublemaker on root cause level. They call it Failure cause column but they only show Failure Events. Perhaps this comes from the limited Fault tree thinking. A Fault tree only shows Failure events and this is misinterpreted as reasons or Failure Cause. Not answered WHY questions demonstrate that this VDA AIAG FMEA approach can not succeed.
Great presentation. Fascinating history of how the VDA approach came about.
Agree with Loki. This structure can limit the depth we go to in examining possible causes. We start with an idea like needing a bolt tightened to a specific torque. We can say the failure mode is that the bolt does not reach it's torque, and the cause would then be the torque gun did not achieve ITS torque, but the FMEA limits us exploring WHY the torque gun failed (simultaneous compressor usage, wear in the torque gun.) So we are somewhat broad in defining a failure cause, and miss some nuanced details. We can still capture them, but then our controls are a little harder to link back to the original failure mode. I've often found that in my FMEA's I say torque gun loses torque BECAUSE, or DUE TO. In other situations, if I'm doing a family FMEA, I set the failure mode as the torque gun's torque, and this allows a deeper level of cause. If we don't push for that deeper level, we can find ourselves contented with our current controls, or we simply miss possible causes because we don't ask why again. Trying to harmonize our desire to have a clearly linked control plan and our desire to use FMEA to improve our processes is a real struggle sometimes.
Very well presented. The AIAG VDA Fault tree structure limits us engineer to really focus on all potential troublemaker on root cause level. They call it Failure cause column but they only show Failure Events. Perhaps this comes from the limited Fault tree thinking. A Fault tree only shows Failure events and this is misinterpreted as reasons or Failure Cause. Not answered WHY questions demonstrate that this VDA AIAG FMEA approach can not succeed.
Could you pls share the PPT of this webinar training
Send a business email address to richard.harpster@harpcosystems.com
Hi