That challenger was wonderful because he represented the best version of a main stream academic. And the discussion demonstrates how weak the mainstream position really is when you sit with it for a little while.
Being okay with there being no actual explanations just as long as you can extract the power to build the iphones (and to live in the pod) is not just to be wrong, it's obviously to be a bad and spiritually dead person.
Or perhaps even worse, the guy is totally "fine" with the world being unintelligible and yet still thinks we can have explanations and understanding about the world. Sheer incoherence
Trying to wrap my head around Feser's critique of occasionalism. If I understand him, he says that our experience of a law-like universe is inconsistent with the idea that the patterns found in nature have been directly decreed by God, because they would then cease to be actual laws, but rather the product of the divine mind's will. But doesn't this assume God wouldn't act consistently in His operation of nature? What reason do we have to think that God wouldn't produce regular patterns in nature if He were directly responsible for its operation? Would the "laws" of nature cease to be true laws simply because they are the direct result of God's activity? What if this God was a law-like God who willed the operation of nature in a law-like fashion, so that it behaved according to discernable patterns that could then be used as the basis for predictions? In response, one could say that if the operation of nature were the direct result of God's will, then we couldn't be sure that He would choose to operate nature in the future in the same manner that He has in the past, making induction and scientific predictions impossible. Firstly, one could say that, at the very least, we are not able to infer that God doesn't directly cause the behavior of nature simply by observation, as Feser seems to think we can, since the laws of nature would behave in the same manner as they do now if God has in fact chosen to directly operate nature in a law-like way. Secondly, if God has imbued nature with certain inherent properties such that only His sustaining activity is required for nature's laws to operate, are we any closer to certainly about their continual operation? For surely it was by God's will that nature came to have its inherent properties in the first place. And if this is the case, then how do we know that He won't choose to alter nature's inherent properties in the future? Could He not do so if He so willed? Thus, even on this account one is forced to rely on God's word that He will maintain the laws of nature as they are. And if this is true, then it would seem to succumb to the same criticism Feser advanced against the occasionalist view.
I think that on a deeper level occasionalism is wrong because it has a naive conception of a material object. An Aristotelian would say that there`s no object without nature, which causes a set of dispositions in it (which we codify as "laws of nature"). There cannot be an object without nature, even the inert matter of Newton has mass, tends to go with constant velocity without outside influence, etc. That is its nature. So even tho Newton seems to have an occasionalist conception of matter he still didn`t except positing some nature to matter (because it`s inescapable if you would like to explain anything occuring in the world). But for the occasionalist matter is "inert" and he excludes inherent causal powers as a special thing which is worse than the geometric properties he likes. The truth is they`re as much or even more abstract than colors, causal powers, forms and potencies and some would argue that positing some dynamics for these geometric objects presupposes they have inherent tendencies. So the occasionalist falls pray to his narrow view of what the laws of nature say based on mathematical abstraction (abstraction consists subtracting non-geometric properties from the object of study) and believes its a complete description of the objects and thus the laws of nature must describe some activity extrinsic to them. So my critique would be - geometry is arbitrarily chosen by an occasionalist as the only nature inherent to matter so attributing everything else to God is unfounded. Also when you look at the geometry closely you see that it presupposes spatial relations between some things. You cannot reduce an object to mere relations between objects. That`s why Newton needs material points and these are very very toy models of what we expect from the ontology physics gives us. I would say they are incomplete objects (in Meinongian sense) wrt to predicates we suppose to be true about the objects in the world. And their explanatory power is not all-encompassing precisely because of that. So - no such things as pure matter without nature. It directly contradicts our experience of ourselves. We are not Cartesian ghosts reigning our matter. We ARE our bodies (at least in part). We have other properties than geometric. And you would have to make a divorce of consciousness from bodily experience to deny that (which some of course do and then are able to explain pain and color in terms of constant miracles only - that`s not very explanatory or scientific). Aristotle`s hylemorphism at least allows there to be other things than material points with dynamics reigned by constant miracle. The conception of inherent potencies which are actualized by substantial form and this causal structure determines the passage of time and extension in space by the way.
I've just seen the lecture and it's very interesting. I'm rereading Maimonides Guide and having second thoughts about Aristotelianism. However, I fail to understand how to go from object-immanent essences to generalizations which is so common to science. You look at an object, and by experimentation you somehow determine its essence. How do you justify the notion that other objects have the same behavior and can be lumped under the same name or category?
You go from essences to generalizations by understanding species as universals. The essences have the property of being the type of thing that they are. A dog has dogness in its essence. Dogness is real and not just my subjective idea. Check the article 'universal' in the Catholic Encyclopedia. Hope that helps.
@@antoniomoyal Thanks, but aren't we assuming some kind of mild Platonism? Instead of Forms you have Essences. I don't think Aristotle was a nominalist.
@@EliAbramzonno, I suggest looking into structural realism (with regards to laws of nature). No platonism is required on this view. Since mathematics is on the side of prime matter and is only realized in substance. If you go as far as Max Tegmark, then you are a kind of platonist (ontic structural realism).
The analogy to half pregnancy is not convincing to me. He would have to provide better arguments. The world can be partly accessible to the principle of sufficient cause and partly not. For example, the universe as a whole or at its core (quantum stuff) could legitimately be called brute. The quantum realm also seems to imply a causality of spontaneity, that is, a causality where cause and effect are not distinct objects to each other, but where both are, so to speak, united within one and the same.
>> principle of sufficient cause and partly not. For example, the universe as a whole or at its core (quantum stuff) could legitimately be called brute. > The quantum realm also seems to imply a causality of spontaneity, that is, a causality where cause and effect are not distinct objects to each other, but where both are, so to speak, united within one and the same.
@@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns "Brute as in “lacking explanation and intelligibility.” Maybe, but Feser gave arguments for why that’s not likely. You didn’t even mention the arguments." You could be right. I was mainly referring to the analogy Feser makes in the panel discussion at the end. It seemed to me that he meant that the universe would either be completely and in all respects explainable by a sufficient cause/reason or not explainable at all and thus completely and in all respects brute. Nothing in between, because the in-between would be like half a pregnancy, which would be absurd. That did not convince me. Perhaps he has made real arguments elsewhere. At least I don't see any problem that there may be aspects of the universe that are immune to the principle of sufficient cause/reason, so where it is pointless to ask why.
@@demergent_deist I think Feser is right. You may have missed his brief defense of PSR (sufficient reason rather than sufficient cause btw). But for a lengthy defense see the chapter titled “Rationalist proof” in his 2017 Five Proofs. He also has a good defense in his Aristotle’s Revenge. I have issues with his Five Proofs book, but his defense of PSR is among the best in the literature. It seems that denial of PSR leads to absurd consequences and so should be avoided unless absolutely necessary- although, as he’s also shown, rationally criticizing PSR ends up making background assumptions that seem to imply PSR!
@@demergent_deist PS. His defense of PSR is much more than simply appealing to the pregnancy analogy, which is actually a fitting illustration *given* the serious arguments for PSR. The analogy itself isn’t among the arguments, I’d say.
"Metaphysics has so far not been able to prove a priori [...] the principle of sufficient reason[.]" (Kant - Prolegomena) There is no positive justification of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason. Feser brings only negative arguments for the principle along the lines of questions like: What follows if we do not accept it? However, there still remains a knowledge gap. In my opinion, the science of today should recognize the world as a mystery for which there is no explanation in principle. All so-called single findings would consequently not be completely sure. What stands in the way of this is the self-assurance of the sciences, which already borders on megalomania. Science must admit to itself that it cannot exclude something like astrology with certainty.
@Jay Gee In any case, it is not arbitrary. If I decided to become a serial killer, my life would necessarily become hell in many ways. In nihilistic pandeism, the world and one's ego are not ends in themselves in the sense of life-affirming and intensifying animalistic feelings. One must pay a high price for such feelings. This is somehow rooted in the nature of things. But there is no absolutely objective judge and executioner in or outside the world. Therefore, morality has only a relative importance from my point of view.
@Jay Gee Nihilistic Pandeist morality incorporates elements of Stoic natural law, Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue ethics, and Buddhist karma teachings, but all, as mentioned, without a divine judge coexisting with the world. So, in a sense, there is an objective foundation. For God has transformed himself into the world or nature, which is as it is and no one can shake that. Also, if someone came to me and said that he was happy of heart to be a serial killer and his actions were therefore to be called good, then I can only deny that because of the Pandeist nihilistic philosophy. I would have to say to this person: If you were honest with yourself, then you will have to admit that you are only fooling yourself. The nihilistic pandeistic morality basically addresses every individual in private, so to speak.
@Jay Gee I'm not making this up. It is just a pandeistic God. Derived from deism and pantheism. This concept really exists. So there was a God who is defined as being able to transform into the world, and did so.
You know, I really prefer that people, when giving talks, actually give talks instead of mechanically reading their material. Otherwise we might as well hire a better reader.
@@safedba Yeah, if your limited intellectual capacities don't get to the point that in a scientific lab you might discuss about essential scientific issues, you might find it outerly disturbing. The matter, by the way, cannot have those features.
He has no clue on the real, original Natural Law or Laws of Nature. In the Platonic texts, is this phrase "according to nature" (Kata physus). What are they refering to? Yet, what Feser talks about is in NO relation to what the Greeks meant! Both phrases 'natural law', 'laws of nature' in the Greek mean the same thing yet Catholics seek to create a distinction! There is no distinction, and how can the Greeks know, and 'be according to nature' before the scientific age? They mean something totally different! Yet, this 'philosopher' doesn't know them? Strange!
That challenger was wonderful because he represented the best version of a main stream academic. And the discussion demonstrates how weak the mainstream position really is when you sit with it for a little while.
Itbisxweak becsuse scientism is just used to flee from God and moral accountability.
Excellent points.
Being okay with there being no actual explanations just as long as you can extract the power to build the iphones (and to live in the pod) is not just to be wrong, it's obviously to be a bad and spiritually dead person.
Or perhaps even worse, the guy is totally "fine" with the world being unintelligible and yet still thinks we can have explanations and understanding about the world. Sheer incoherence
Comment for traction. Really enjoyed Aristotle’s Revenge
Wow, what a great talk.
Great talk !
Brillant as always
Brilliant and lackluster are RELATIVE. 😉
@@ReverendDr.Thomas of course they are relative
@@antoniomoyal although I would go as far as to say that the lecture was SOMEWHAT brilliant. 😁
@@ReverendDr.Thomas Of course. He can´t be perfect.
Trying to wrap my head around Feser's critique of occasionalism. If I understand him, he says that our experience of a law-like universe is inconsistent with the idea that the patterns found in nature have been directly decreed by God, because they would then cease to be actual laws, but rather the product of the divine mind's will. But doesn't this assume God wouldn't act consistently in His operation of nature? What reason do we have to think that God wouldn't produce regular patterns in nature if He were directly responsible for its operation? Would the "laws" of nature cease to be true laws simply because they are the direct result of God's activity? What if this God was a law-like God who willed the operation of nature in a law-like fashion, so that it behaved according to discernable patterns that could then be used as the basis for predictions?
In response, one could say that if the operation of nature were the direct result of God's will, then we couldn't be sure that He would choose to operate nature in the future in the same manner that He has in the past, making induction and scientific predictions impossible. Firstly, one could say that, at the very least, we are not able to infer that God doesn't directly cause the behavior of nature simply by observation, as Feser seems to think we can, since the laws of nature would behave in the same manner as they do now if God has in fact chosen to directly operate nature in a law-like way.
Secondly, if God has imbued nature with certain inherent properties such that only His sustaining activity is required for nature's laws to operate, are we any closer to certainly about their continual operation? For surely it was by God's will that nature came to have its inherent properties in the first place. And if this is the case, then how do we know that He won't choose to alter nature's inherent properties in the future? Could He not do so if He so willed? Thus, even on this account one is forced to rely on God's word that He will maintain the laws of nature as they are. And if this is true, then it would seem to succumb to the same criticism Feser advanced against the occasionalist view.
I think that on a deeper level occasionalism is wrong because it has a naive conception of a material object. An Aristotelian would say that there`s no object without nature, which causes a set of dispositions in it (which we codify as "laws of nature"). There cannot be an object without nature, even the inert matter of Newton has mass, tends to go with constant velocity without outside influence, etc. That is its nature. So even tho Newton seems to have an occasionalist conception of matter he still didn`t except positing some nature to matter (because it`s inescapable if you would like to explain anything occuring in the world). But for the occasionalist matter is "inert" and he excludes inherent causal powers as a special thing which is worse than the geometric properties he likes. The truth is they`re as much or even more abstract than colors, causal powers, forms and potencies and some would argue that positing some dynamics for these geometric objects presupposes they have inherent tendencies. So the occasionalist falls pray to his narrow view of what the laws of nature say based on mathematical abstraction (abstraction consists subtracting non-geometric properties from the object of study) and believes its a complete description of the objects and thus the laws of nature must describe some activity extrinsic to them. So my critique would be - geometry is arbitrarily chosen by an occasionalist as the only nature inherent to matter so attributing everything else to God is unfounded. Also when you look at the geometry closely you see that it presupposes spatial relations between some things. You cannot reduce an object to mere relations between objects. That`s why Newton needs material points and these are very very toy models of what we expect from the ontology physics gives us. I would say they are incomplete objects (in Meinongian sense) wrt to predicates we suppose to be true about the objects in the world. And their explanatory power is not all-encompassing precisely because of that. So - no such things as pure matter without nature. It directly contradicts our experience of ourselves. We are not Cartesian ghosts reigning our matter. We ARE our bodies (at least in part). We have other properties than geometric. And you would have to make a divorce of consciousness from bodily experience to deny that (which some of course do and then are able to explain pain and color in terms of constant miracles only - that`s not very explanatory or scientific). Aristotle`s hylemorphism at least allows there to be other things than material points with dynamics reigned by constant miracle. The conception of inherent potencies which are actualized by substantial form and this causal structure determines the passage of time and extension in space by the way.
I've just seen the lecture and it's very interesting. I'm rereading Maimonides Guide and having second thoughts about Aristotelianism.
However, I fail to understand how to go from object-immanent essences to generalizations which is so common to science.
You look at an object, and by experimentation you somehow determine its essence.
How do you justify the notion that other objects have the same behavior and can be lumped under the same name or category?
You go from essences to generalizations by understanding species as universals. The essences have the property of being the type of thing that they are. A dog has dogness in its essence. Dogness is real and not just my subjective idea.
Check the article 'universal' in the Catholic Encyclopedia.
Hope that helps.
@@antoniomoyal Thanks, but aren't we assuming some kind of mild Platonism? Instead of Forms you have Essences. I don't think Aristotle was a nominalist.
@@EliAbramzon Aristotelianism is usually described as a moderate realism. It is a middle position between realism and nominalism.
@@EliAbramzonno, I suggest looking into structural realism (with regards to laws of nature). No platonism is required on this view. Since mathematics is on the side of prime matter and is only realized in substance. If you go as far as Max Tegmark, then you are a kind of platonist (ontic structural realism).
Well, that gentleman asking a question towards the end was unpleasant as can be.
The analogy to half pregnancy is not convincing to me. He would have to provide better arguments. The world can be partly accessible to the principle of sufficient cause and partly not. For example, the universe as a whole or at its core (quantum stuff) could legitimately be called brute. The quantum realm also seems to imply a causality of spontaneity, that is, a causality where cause and effect are not distinct objects to each other, but where both are, so to speak, united within one and the same.
>> principle of sufficient cause and partly not. For example, the universe as a whole or at its core (quantum stuff) could legitimately be called brute. > The quantum realm also seems to imply a causality of spontaneity, that is, a causality where cause and effect are not distinct objects to each other, but where both are, so to speak, united within one and the same.
@@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns
"Brute as in “lacking explanation and intelligibility.” Maybe, but Feser gave arguments for why that’s not likely. You didn’t even mention the arguments."
You could be right. I was mainly referring to the analogy Feser makes in the panel discussion at the end.
It seemed to me that he meant that the universe would either be completely and in all respects explainable by a sufficient cause/reason or not explainable at all and thus completely and in all respects brute. Nothing in between, because the in-between would be like half a pregnancy, which would be absurd.
That did not convince me. Perhaps he has made real arguments elsewhere.
At least I don't see any problem that there may be aspects of the universe that are immune to the principle of sufficient cause/reason, so where it is pointless to ask why.
@@demergent_deist I think Feser is right. You may have missed his brief defense of PSR (sufficient reason rather than sufficient cause btw). But for a lengthy defense see the chapter titled “Rationalist proof” in his 2017 Five Proofs. He also has a good defense in his Aristotle’s Revenge.
I have issues with his Five Proofs book, but his defense of PSR is among the best in the literature. It seems that denial of PSR leads to absurd consequences and so should be avoided unless absolutely necessary- although, as he’s also shown, rationally criticizing PSR ends up making background assumptions that seem to imply PSR!
@@demergent_deist PS. His defense of PSR is much more than simply appealing to the pregnancy analogy, which is actually a fitting illustration *given* the serious arguments for PSR. The analogy itself isn’t among the arguments, I’d say.
@@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns Okay, then I'll take a look at his real arguments sometime.
"Metaphysics has so far not been able to prove a priori [...] the principle of sufficient reason[.]" (Kant - Prolegomena)
There is no positive justification of the validity of the principle of sufficient reason. Feser brings only negative arguments for the principle along the lines of questions like: What follows if we do not accept it? However, there still remains a knowledge gap.
In my opinion, the science of today should recognize the world as a mystery for which there is no explanation in principle. All so-called single findings would consequently not be completely sure.
What stands in the way of this is the self-assurance of the sciences, which already borders on megalomania. Science must admit to itself that it cannot exclude something like astrology with certainty.
@Jay Gee Sure, but not in an absolute sense
@Jay Gee Important for peace of heart, for coherence of consciousness.
Beyond that, no importance at all.
@Jay Gee In any case, it is not arbitrary. If I decided to become a serial killer, my life would necessarily become hell in many ways. In nihilistic pandeism, the world and one's ego are not ends in themselves in the sense of life-affirming and intensifying animalistic feelings. One must pay a high price for such feelings. This is somehow rooted in the nature of things.
But there is no absolutely objective judge and executioner in or outside the world. Therefore, morality has only a relative importance from my point of view.
@Jay Gee Nihilistic Pandeist morality incorporates elements of Stoic natural law, Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue ethics, and Buddhist karma teachings, but all, as mentioned, without a divine judge coexisting with the world.
So, in a sense, there is an objective foundation. For God has transformed himself into the world or nature, which is as it is and no one can shake that. Also, if someone came to me and said that he was happy of heart to be a serial killer and his actions were therefore to be called good, then I can only deny that because of the Pandeist nihilistic philosophy. I would have to say to this person: If you were honest with yourself, then you will have to admit that you are only fooling yourself. The nihilistic pandeistic morality basically addresses every individual in private, so to speak.
@Jay Gee I'm not making this up. It is just a pandeistic God. Derived from deism and pantheism. This concept really exists. So there was a God who is defined as being able to transform into the world, and did so.
You know, I really prefer that people, when giving talks, actually give talks instead of mechanically reading their material. Otherwise we might as well hire a better reader.
I prefer people thst focus on the matter abd not on the way it is given.
@@antoniomoyal The matter was pedantic, slow and uninspired. A musical piece if not played according to the right timing is not music, it's garbage.
@@safedba Yeah, if your limited intellectual capacities don't get to the point that in a scientific lab you might discuss about essential scientific issues, you might find it outerly disturbing. The matter, by the way, cannot have those features.
He has no clue on the real, original Natural Law or Laws of Nature. In the Platonic texts, is this phrase "according to nature" (Kata physus). What are they refering to? Yet, what Feser talks about is in NO relation to what the Greeks meant! Both phrases 'natural law', 'laws of nature' in the Greek mean the same thing yet Catholics seek to create a distinction! There is no distinction, and how can the Greeks know, and 'be according to nature' before the scientific age? They mean something totally different! Yet, this 'philosopher' doesn't know them? Strange!