Another great video detroyer. Your voice was as deep, soulless and monotone as ever and your style of writing as dry as the deserts of Arrakis , just the way i like it :)
You really should have provided an outline to your video. I cannot tolerate it's length, at the moment, especially with the verbal format you have with a lack of graphics.
Your response to the begging the question issue is utterly bizzare. "Begging the question" doesn't mean "To assume a premise that someone else would reject", but rather means roughly something like "To put forward an argument which contains a premise that one doesn't have epistemic reasons to accept unless one already accepts the conclusion of the argument" (that's roughly how begging the question is defined by most people writing on this issue, e.g. Fischer). If we use THAT definition of begging the question, as we should, then it's of course utter nonsense to say that begging the question is an ubiquitous feature of philosophy. The point is that you are supposedly unjustified in assuming P over not-P, not simply that someone else believes not-P. What you say in the video completely misses the point.
I didn't get into different understandings of begging the question in the video, that's true. I probably should have. In my experience, though, "begging the question" isn't clearly defined by most people writing on this issue (although, to be honest, I didn't find all that much writing on it in the first place). Regardless, there's not a lot more to add on this version. Whatever it means for my belief that P-over-not-P to be good/justified, I can report whether I think that my belief that P-over-not-P qualifies. Like with the rest of my remarks, the specifics of my answer will depend on what it means for a belief to be good/justified.
I'll add, on my reading of Chisholm, at least, I understand him as having in mind something closer to my construal. I also interpret Empiricus along these lines, although in different terms. Still, there's no harm in exploring the various ways the worry might be presented, and I'll grant that it would have been useful to include the sort of thing you suggested. Had I done that, I would have said something along the lines of my previous comment, although in more detail.
One more thing on begging the question in particular. Depending on how we are understanding "epistemic reasons", I would argue that BTQ in this sense is a ubiquitous feature in philosophy/disagreement in general, at least when it comes to cases of deep disagreement. But I'd need some clarity on what epistemic reasons are in order to be sure.
I don't understand your response to the problem. The problem is that we want to decide which criteria is reliable in order to come to reliable beliefs, but we don't know how to decide on the reliability of a criteria without already having knowledge to begin with. Your response seems to just beg the question. You are just assuming Methodism is correct, but how do you know your method is correct without already having knowledge of what methods are good, but then it seems that you are a particularist because you have at least one thing you know that you dont need to apply your method on to know (since if you simply knew it based on applying the method you advocate, then that supposed knowledge of the method being correct will always be in question).
Nowhere did I assume methodism. I do believe that certain criteria are reliable (and so good, if that's how we're understanding "good"). But thinking that there are good criteria is not sufficient for methodism. Whether my view counts as methodist will turn on whether I think that there are independently good criteria, and whether I think that the goodness of certain beliefs depends on said criteria. And that's hard to answer without further clarity on what "goodness" means, especially as it relates to beliefs. If a criterion being "good" means that it's reliable and a belief being good means that it's the output of a good criteria, for example, then I would be a methodist because I think that (1) there are good criteria, (2), them being good is not epistemically posterior to the goodness of any beliefs, and (3), there are good beliefs, the goodness of which is dependent on the goodness of certain criteria. Of course, anyone is free to disagree with me on one or more of these views, and on that I would respond as I do in the video. If something else is meant by "good" (as it relates to beliefs or criteria), then I would adjust my response accordingly.
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Another great video detroyer. Your voice was as deep, soulless and monotone as ever and your style of writing as dry as the deserts of Arrakis , just the way i like it :)
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Great presentation! I hope you'll proceed making more of those on interesting topics
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Good content as always
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You really should have provided an outline to your video. I cannot tolerate it's length, at the moment, especially with the verbal format you have with a lack of graphics.
Fair enough, but you can see the chapters of the video in the description. Hopefully that helps
Your response to the begging the question issue is utterly bizzare. "Begging the question" doesn't mean "To assume a premise that someone else would reject", but rather means roughly something like "To put forward an argument which contains a premise that one doesn't have epistemic reasons to accept unless one already accepts the conclusion of the argument" (that's roughly how begging the question is defined by most people writing on this issue, e.g. Fischer). If we use THAT definition of begging the question, as we should, then it's of course utter nonsense to say that begging the question is an ubiquitous feature of philosophy. The point is that you are supposedly unjustified in assuming P over not-P, not simply that someone else believes not-P. What you say in the video completely misses the point.
I didn't get into different understandings of begging the question in the video, that's true. I probably should have. In my experience, though, "begging the question" isn't clearly defined by most people writing on this issue (although, to be honest, I didn't find all that much writing on it in the first place). Regardless, there's not a lot more to add on this version. Whatever it means for my belief that P-over-not-P to be good/justified, I can report whether I think that my belief that P-over-not-P qualifies. Like with the rest of my remarks, the specifics of my answer will depend on what it means for a belief to be good/justified.
I'll add, on my reading of Chisholm, at least, I understand him as having in mind something closer to my construal. I also interpret Empiricus along these lines, although in different terms. Still, there's no harm in exploring the various ways the worry might be presented, and I'll grant that it would have been useful to include the sort of thing you suggested. Had I done that, I would have said something along the lines of my previous comment, although in more detail.
One more thing on begging the question in particular. Depending on how we are understanding "epistemic reasons", I would argue that BTQ in this sense is a ubiquitous feature in philosophy/disagreement in general, at least when it comes to cases of deep disagreement. But I'd need some clarity on what epistemic reasons are in order to be sure.
BTQ is used in both the technical and non-technical way by philosophers, in my experience
I don't understand your response to the problem. The problem is that we want to decide which criteria is reliable in order to come to reliable beliefs, but we don't know how to decide on the reliability of a criteria without already having knowledge to begin with. Your response seems to just beg the question. You are just assuming Methodism is correct, but how do you know your method is correct without already having knowledge of what methods are good, but then it seems that you are a particularist because you have at least one thing you know that you dont need to apply your method on to know (since if you simply knew it based on applying the method you advocate, then that supposed knowledge of the method being correct will always be in question).
Nowhere did I assume methodism. I do believe that certain criteria are reliable (and so good, if that's how we're understanding "good"). But thinking that there are good criteria is not sufficient for methodism.
Whether my view counts as methodist will turn on whether I think that there are independently good criteria, and whether I think that the goodness of certain beliefs depends on said criteria. And that's hard to answer without further clarity on what "goodness" means, especially as it relates to beliefs. If a criterion being "good" means that it's reliable and a belief being good means that it's the output of a good criteria, for example, then I would be a methodist because I think that (1) there are good criteria, (2), them being good is not epistemically posterior to the goodness of any beliefs, and (3), there are good beliefs, the goodness of which is dependent on the goodness of certain criteria.
Of course, anyone is free to disagree with me on one or more of these views, and on that I would respond as I do in the video. If something else is meant by "good" (as it relates to beliefs or criteria), then I would adjust my response accordingly.
JEJ
KEK
Kane B's video is better.
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