Im surprised Al didn't mention that Brereton prevented tactical ground attack air support because he wanted the skies clear for his planned 3 days of drops which ballooned into a week due to the weather. Even down at Aalst near Eindhoven on the second day, no tactical air support helped the Guards Armoured Division deal with the German anti tank gun position. Vandeleur requested air support but was told there wasn't any. That had nothing to do with distance and everything to do with Brereton not wanting ground attack bombers in the way of his drops.
There is a much deeper conversation to be had around the tactical space in Market Garden. Distance wasn't an issue for the US drop zones and even Arnhem would have allowed decent loiter for 2TAF, not that a cab-rank style would have been used by that point. The personalities involved and their spotty track records deserve an episode of their own. Will add it to the list!
@@damcasterspod That will be interesting yes. I also don't think distance was a problem to Arnhem. It's only 60 miles from the Belgian border. The more I learn about Brereton the more I dislike him. He also put USAAF Troop Carrier Command crews getting tired over the well being of his own paratroopers by backing Williams of the USAAF refusing double missions on day one, and preventing the RAF from flying double missions and double glider tows at Arnhem. After the war Brereton blamed XXX Corps and 1st Airborne and accepted no culpability himself for his own fatal decisions. Cheers.
Overall distance isn't tricky for the heavier stuff like Typhoon, Thunderbolt and Mossie. 83 Group with their Typhoons at Eindhoven were 95 miles away, which was well within their range for the Bomphoons which, with 2x 1000lbs bombs, happily could do double that. It is a very weird, very broken Op.
@@damcasterspod This is from 21 Army Group Operation Market Garden XXX Corp Operating 18th September section15 Air Support "During the whole day the weather was the limiting factor, as it was bad both over airfields and the battle area, consequently, the ground troops of the leading brigades of the Guards Armoured Division did not get the same close and intimate support that they had received on the previous day. in addition, the ground situation lacked the clarity which the previous day had enabled the degree of intimate support already described to achieved. This made rapid progress difficult against the enemy continued to hold his position, well dug in and with weapons well sited with great determination."
I hadn’t thought about it, but it’s interesting how we view air support in hindsight, but thru the lens of modern capabilities supported by modern military movie cinematography!! For the allies it’s still an evolving concept forged by learning & experience. It seems it was missing the vital Three pillars of modern air support (all of which are in their infancy); • Cooperation & Communication, • Availability & loitering and • Accuracy of firepower
Arnhem Rail Bridge look at any map of Arnhem AO that has landing zones and a scale of miles/km and you will see LZ Z is 4 miles/6k from the rail bridge. "the first of those bound for LZ-Z came in at 13:19. This lift contained Major-General Urquhart's Headquarters and approximately half of the Divisional Units, included amongst which were the Jeeps of the Reconnaissance Squadron, two batteries of the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment, and also the 1st Parachute Brigade's vehicles and anti-tank guns." Pegasus Archive The First Lift (Sunday 17th September)
What I don't get it's that hundreds of plains were used to drop the Airborne units, but after that, no air support was allowed to help those Airborne units. I know Brereton made this decision but why?
It was an added complexity to already complex plans. For air support, at this point of the war, to work, they would have needed Forward and Visual Control Posts operated embedded with the paratroopers. Coupled with this, they'd need ground-air VHF radios to communicate with the lead aircraft. As this system was still being ironed out, there hadn't been the training required by September '44. The usual system by this point was a request being sent to the Brigade level for air support. This was passed to the 2TAF liason, then to the Group assigned to that unit. Group would then assign to a Wing who would brief the squadron tasked with the strike. Time on target averged between 45 mins to an hour. At Arnhem, the confusion on the ground and lack of comms would have succupered this, even with aircraft loitering, the target identification would have been tricky at best. FCP/VCP would have been workable had forward controllers been trained and dropped, with decent radios etc. A lot of ifs and buts in that statement I realise.
Fot a completely different perspective read 'It never snows in september' by Robert Kershaw . It tells the story of the battle of Arnhem from the German side. And therefore you will have to see Arnhem and keep the Ardennes in mind. Arnhem gives the Germans confidence to fight for more than 10 more months. If Ike had concerntrated on Antwerp and logistics, the Allies could have pushed harder and further before the winter. Arnhem is a complete failure and Ike failed, he didn't have the strategic insight and lacked the guts to cut Montgommery to size and ignore him.
Kershaw is a must read for any student of Arnhem. As for Ike, he was very much a politician by this point to my mind and the fact he had created First Allied Airborne Army which was unused for the most part, meant likely felt compelled to roll the dice. August and September 1944 is a great series of "what-ifs" to play over a few drinks with friends.
"By the time the German opposition had solidified on D+1, with mortars, light flak and armoured vehicles, there was really no chance of relieving Frost at the bridge, even with communications at their best." page 51 Canadian Military History Volume 16 Issue 1 Article 4 2007 Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden David Bennett
The succes of the Normandy break out was logistics. The failure of the allies to push deep into Germany in the fall of '44 (autumn for you Brits) was also logistics, the failure to secure the entry to antwerp over thr schelde estuary in the first week of September. All you maybe a personality historian, I am an economic historian (boring long view of history) with militay background. Again and again its logistics that wins campaigns an and economies that win wars. The only thing is its people that screw up just too often. In this case Ike.
I'm Canadian so fall it is! Antwerp lives rent free in our family as we lost one on the crossing of the Ghent Canal with the Lake Superior Regiment on 11th Sept 1944.
Thanks awfully for thinking of us Brits old chap but I can confirm that the leaves "fall" off of British deciduous trees at a certain time of year just like they do in the USA. "Autumn" is our usual go to word for the season between Summer and Winter but we fully grasp the concept of "in the fall". 😂😂😂🤣🤣🤣
![เจ็บที่ยังฮัก - ม่อน วรวิทย์ [ Official Mv ] จอนนี่มิวสิค](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/KALIGSRSjFs/mqdefault.jpg)
Good show ❤ Al Murray
Love his war documentaries as you get the real perspective.
Im surprised Al didn't mention that Brereton prevented tactical ground attack air support because he wanted the skies clear for his planned 3 days of drops which ballooned into a week due to the weather. Even down at Aalst near Eindhoven on the second day, no tactical air support helped the Guards Armoured Division deal with the German anti tank gun position. Vandeleur requested air support but was told there wasn't any. That had nothing to do with distance and everything to do with Brereton not wanting ground attack bombers in the way of his drops.
There is a much deeper conversation to be had around the tactical space in Market Garden. Distance wasn't an issue for the US drop zones and even Arnhem would have allowed decent loiter for 2TAF, not that a cab-rank style would have been used by that point. The personalities involved and their spotty track records deserve an episode of their own. Will add it to the list!
@@damcasterspod That will be interesting yes. I also don't think distance was a problem to Arnhem. It's only 60 miles from the Belgian border.
The more I learn about Brereton the more I dislike him. He also put USAAF Troop Carrier Command crews getting tired over the well being of his own paratroopers by backing Williams of the USAAF refusing double missions on day one, and preventing the RAF from flying double missions and double glider tows at Arnhem.
After the war Brereton blamed XXX Corps and 1st Airborne and accepted no culpability himself for his own fatal decisions.
Cheers.
Overall distance isn't tricky for the heavier stuff like Typhoon, Thunderbolt and Mossie. 83 Group with their Typhoons at Eindhoven were 95 miles away, which was well within their range for the Bomphoons which, with 2x 1000lbs bombs, happily could do double that. It is a very weird, very broken Op.
@@damcasterspodYes a lot of fatal decisions were made by the higher command (not Montgomery).
@@damcasterspod This is from 21 Army Group Operation Market Garden XXX Corp Operating 18th September section15 Air Support
"During the whole day the weather was the limiting factor, as it was bad both over airfields and the battle area, consequently, the ground troops of the leading brigades of the Guards Armoured Division did not get the same close and intimate support that they had received on the previous day. in addition, the ground situation lacked the clarity which the previous day had enabled the degree of intimate support already described to achieved. This made rapid progress difficult against the enemy continued to hold his position, well dug in and with weapons well sited with great determination."
I hadn’t thought about it, but it’s interesting how we view air support in hindsight, but thru the lens of modern capabilities supported by modern military movie cinematography!!
For the allies it’s still an evolving concept forged by learning & experience.
It seems it was missing the vital Three pillars of modern air support (all of which are in their infancy);
• Cooperation & Communication,
• Availability & loitering and
• Accuracy of firepower
Arnhem Rail Bridge look at any map of Arnhem AO that has landing zones and a scale of miles/km and you will see LZ Z is 4 miles/6k from the rail bridge.
"the first of those bound for LZ-Z came in at 13:19. This lift contained Major-General Urquhart's Headquarters and approximately half of the Divisional Units, included amongst which were the Jeeps of the Reconnaissance Squadron, two batteries of the 1st Airlanding Light Regiment, and also the 1st Parachute Brigade's vehicles and anti-tank guns."
Pegasus Archive The First Lift (Sunday 17th September)
What I don't get it's that hundreds of plains were used to drop the Airborne units, but after that, no air support was allowed to help those Airborne units. I know Brereton made this decision but why?
It was an added complexity to already complex plans. For air support, at this point of the war, to work, they would have needed Forward and Visual Control Posts operated embedded with the paratroopers. Coupled with this, they'd need ground-air VHF radios to communicate with the lead aircraft. As this system was still being ironed out, there hadn't been the training required by September '44. The usual system by this point was a request being sent to the Brigade level for air support. This was passed to the 2TAF liason, then to the Group assigned to that unit. Group would then assign to a Wing who would brief the squadron tasked with the strike. Time on target averged between 45 mins to an hour. At Arnhem, the confusion on the ground and lack of comms would have succupered this, even with aircraft loitering, the target identification would have been tricky at best. FCP/VCP would have been workable had forward controllers been trained and dropped, with decent radios etc. A lot of ifs and buts in that statement I realise.
Great book, but I'm struggling to find out where 'Den Brink' is on the maps, can anyone help please?
Please call the RASC Lads Air Despatchers as that is what they where .
Fot a completely different perspective read 'It never snows in september' by Robert Kershaw . It tells the story of the battle of Arnhem from the German side. And therefore you will have to see Arnhem and keep the Ardennes in mind. Arnhem gives the Germans confidence to fight for more than 10 more months. If Ike had concerntrated on Antwerp and logistics, the Allies could have pushed harder and further before the winter. Arnhem is a complete failure and Ike failed, he didn't have the strategic insight and lacked the guts to cut Montgommery to size and ignore him.
Kershaw is a must read for any student of Arnhem. As for Ike, he was very much a politician by this point to my mind and the fact he had created First Allied Airborne Army which was unused for the most part, meant likely felt compelled to roll the dice. August and September 1944 is a great series of "what-ifs" to play over a few drinks with friends.
"By the time the German opposition had solidified on D+1, with mortars, light flak and armoured vehicles, there was really no chance of relieving Frost at the bridge, even with communications at their best."
page 51
Canadian Military History Volume 16 Issue 1 Article 4 2007 Airborne Communications in Operation Market Garden David Bennett
If you google John Frost this is your life maybe a pleasant surprise and well worth watching.
It is a brilliant watch!
The succes of the Normandy break out was logistics. The failure of the allies to push deep into Germany in the fall of '44 (autumn for you Brits) was also logistics, the failure to secure the entry to antwerp over thr schelde estuary in the first week of September. All you maybe a personality historian, I am an economic historian (boring long view of history) with militay background. Again and again its logistics that wins campaigns an and economies that win wars. The only thing is its people that screw up just too often. In this case Ike.
I'm Canadian so fall it is! Antwerp lives rent free in our family as we lost one on the crossing of the Ghent Canal with the Lake Superior Regiment on 11th Sept 1944.
Thanks awfully for thinking of us Brits old chap but I can confirm that the leaves "fall" off of British deciduous trees at a certain time of year just like they do in the USA. "Autumn" is our usual go to word for the season between Summer and Winter but we fully grasp the concept of "in the fall". 😂😂😂🤣🤣🤣
Great.....!