"Exploration of the Perceived World: Sensible Objects", the third of Merleau-Ponty's 1948 radio lecture series. Translated and subtitled by Kris Pender
to Merleau-Ponty there's no clear distinction between object and subject in experience, cause we're deep-seated in the world. only in reflexion that distinction is made clear. The arguments are much longer, and obviously the best way for you to get to know it is by reading the Phenomenology of Perception. These radio lecture are pretty good, but they're extremely simplified.
But he qualities aprehended in these fields are all connected by a "meaningful core", which garantees the "intersensorial unity" of experience. For instance, in this case the meaningful core could be that it is a lemon (jointly with any other specific meanings a lemon might have to you). He specifically states that no experience can be reduced to a "quality", thus I'm pretty sure he would agree with you that there's more to lemon than yellow.
I don't think he means yellow as an abstract quality, I think what he means is that the experience of the yellow in the lemon is not "abstractable" from the experience of the lemon itself. Merleau-Ponty argues for an continued experience through the senses, redefining the senses as recognizable "fields" in our perception of the world, defined in relation to parts of our body (e.g. there's a visual field, defined in relation to our eyes).
the border is not erased, it's just not determined. his argument for this takes something like 200 pages, I don't think I'd be able to reduce it in a comment here LOL. I can say it's related to meaning, cause perception is not separable of the meaning that is aprehended, and the meaning depends on the subject, but it's also related with the dissolution of the body/mind partition, and with the capacity of the body of making things into instruments.
.not to Merleau-Ponty.it's a bit difficult for me to explain this in english, but I'll try. to him the experience happens in the relation of an "incarnated subject" and the "factual world" (which through experience is transformed in the "cultural world"), while the abstraction of qualities or representations happen after the experience, as a reflexion, as a conscious way of remembering it or recreating it.
you're not disagreeing with what I said. and also, to conceive "seeing a lemon" is to reflect on the experience, therefore I guess M-P would say you're creating an object in your conscience, thus again, you're not disagreeing.
the difference is that experience cannot be "objectified" (turned into an object) since we are immersed in it, while reflexion frequently "objectify" the remembered experience.
you misunderstood me again, I did not say it doesn't exist the I or the thing, they obviously exist as you said. I had just said that to M-P there is a factual world, his an existentialist. and obviously "incarnated subjects" are sentient (that's what it means to be deep-seated in the world) and inteligent (that's what it means beeing able to reflect and abstract "fields" from experience).
yeah, you can abstract it, but then it's not the yellow you see in the lemon anymore, it's a representation, that's the point. there's difference between experience - our way of coping with the world -, and representation - the product of reflexion. and yes, Merleau-Ponty does think there is a factual world inalienable and not reducible to representations.
![ตรงที่เดิม - ฝน พรสุดา [ต้นฉบับ :เบส ขวางหวัน]](http://i.ytimg.com/vi/c5YnbGEztI8/mqdefault.jpg)
Super performans bravo dear
Ο ΠΟΛΤΟΣ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΩΝ ΜΕ ΕΦΕΡΕ ΕΔΩ.
Κι εμένα. Σου άρεσε;
@@mediogabalus πολύ καλό
to Merleau-Ponty there's no clear distinction between object and subject in experience, cause we're deep-seated in the world. only in reflexion that distinction is made clear. The arguments are much longer, and obviously the best way for you to get to know it is by reading the Phenomenology of Perception. These radio lecture are pretty good, but they're extremely simplified.
Honeyed is one the best metaphors I've heard for heideggers 'care'...
@fildisenia As far as I know there is no video footage of M-P...but I'm always searching!
But he qualities aprehended in these fields are all connected by a "meaningful core", which garantees the "intersensorial unity" of experience. For instance, in this case the meaningful core could be that it is a lemon (jointly with any other specific meanings a lemon might have to you). He specifically states that no experience can be reduced to a "quality", thus I'm pretty sure he would agree with you that there's more to lemon than yellow.
I don't think he means yellow as an abstract quality, I think what he means is that the experience of the yellow in the lemon is not "abstractable" from the experience of the lemon itself. Merleau-Ponty argues for an continued experience through the senses, redefining the senses as recognizable "fields" in our perception of the world, defined in relation to parts of our body (e.g. there's a visual field, defined in relation to our eyes).
the border is not erased, it's just not determined. his argument for this takes something like 200 pages, I don't think I'd be able to reduce it in a comment here LOL. I can say it's related to meaning, cause perception is not separable of the meaning that is aprehended, and the meaning depends on the subject, but it's also related with the dissolution of the body/mind partition, and with the capacity of the body of making things into instruments.
.not to Merleau-Ponty.it's a bit difficult for me to explain this in english, but I'll try. to him the experience happens in the relation of an "incarnated subject" and the "factual world" (which through experience is transformed in the "cultural world"), while the abstraction of qualities or representations happen after the experience, as a reflexion, as a conscious way of remembering it or recreating it.
you're not disagreeing with what I said. and also, to conceive "seeing a lemon" is to reflect on the experience, therefore I guess M-P would say you're creating an object in your conscience, thus again, you're not disagreeing.
the difference is that experience cannot be "objectified" (turned into an object) since we are immersed in it, while reflexion frequently "objectify" the remembered experience.
you misunderstood me again, I did not say it doesn't exist the I or the thing, they obviously exist as you said. I had just said that to M-P there is a factual world, his an existentialist. and obviously "incarnated subjects" are sentient (that's what it means to be deep-seated in the world) and inteligent (that's what it means beeing able to reflect and abstract "fields" from experience).
yeah, you can abstract it, but then it's not the yellow you see in the lemon anymore, it's a representation, that's the point. there's difference between experience - our way of coping with the world -, and representation - the product of reflexion. and yes, Merleau-Ponty does think there is a factual world inalienable and not reducible to representations.
Turned philosophy on its head. Bad attempt at punning :p He was an amazing lecturer!
Tiil the jeus rus down my leg....pullthe other one, marty.
Thanks god we also have the analyticals