Why was the German Army so Combat Effective in WW2?
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 30 ส.ค. 2018
- Why was the Wehrmacht so effective? Many contemporaries considered the Wehrmacht to be a very effective fighting force. Similarly, many historians consider it combat effective as well. What are the reasons for this perception and assessment? Was it training? Technology? Doctrine? Strategy? Operational Warfare? Prussian tradition? And also did this combat effectiveness at a price?
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Military History NOT Visualized is a support channel to Military History Visualized with a focus personal accounts, answering questions that arose on the main channel and showcasing events like visiting museums, using equipment or military hardware.
» SOURCES «
Citino, Robert M.: The German Way of War. From the Thirty Years’ War to the Third Reich. University Press of Kansas: USA, 2005.
Corum, James S.: The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918-1941. In: The Journal of Military History, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan., 1995), p. 53-76
Murray, Williamson: The Luftwaffe Experience, 1939-1941. In: Cooling, Benjamin Franklin (ed.): Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support. Office of Air Force History: Washington DC, United States (1990), p. 71-113
Müller, Rolf-Dieter (Hrsg.); Volkmann, Hans-Erich (Hrsg.): Die Wehrmacht - Mythos und Realität.
Showalter, Dennis: Frederick the Great. A Military History. Frontline Books: London, 2016.
Fröhlich, Paul: Der unterirdische Kampf. Das Wehrwirtschafts- und Rüstungsamt 1924-1943. Ferdinand Schöningh: Paderborn, Germany (2018)
Citino, Robert M.: The Wehrmacht’s Last Stand. The German Campaigns of 1944-1945. University Press of Kansas: USA, 2017.
Poeppel, Hans (Hrsg.); W.-K. Prinz von Preußen(Hrsg.); von Hase, K.G. (Hrsg.): Die Soldaten der Wehrmacht. Herbig: München, Germany (1998)
Searle, Alaric (Ed.): Genesis, Employment, Aftermath: First World War Tanks and the New Warfare, 1900-1945. Helion & Company Limited: Solihull, UK (2015)
Clark, Christopher: The Iron Kingdom. The Rise and Downfall of Prussia 1600-1947. Penguin Books: London, 2007 (2006).
Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Hrsg.): Friedrich der Große und das Militärwesen seiner Zeit. Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte - Band 8. E. S. Mittler & Sohn: Herford - Bonn, 1987.
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Song: Ethan Meixsell - Demilitarized Zone
#ww2 #wehrmacht #MilitaryHistory
![[Barbarossa] The Major Errors and Blunders - Or why Barbarossa Failed](/img/n.gif)
For those that confuse the terms Wehrmacht & German Army, see this video: th-cam.com/video/5DvuPalVZfg/w-d-xo.html
hilariously ironic thought that kept running through my mind throughout this video: Israel's Army has become one of the most effective for the same reasons (and some blank checks from the US; truth is important) but the causes/ necessity for that level of war preparedness is an issue for Israel *to this very day* .I mean if anyone would understand what its like dealing with Islamic people it would be europeans. The only country getting it right imo: Finland, where they openly have a policy of only 1 muslim family for every 2 blocks of finns. And they simply are not allowed to organize in groups larger than 20 people. Keeping their mosques small and seperated just like the families. So they just integrate like normal people. 4 once...
I am surprised you can get away with treating a minority group like that in Finland w/o having all the EU pressure groups attack the govt. Or is Finland getting a rude awakening from Sweden's situation?
That is not at all accurate and would be against the finnish constitution, as well as numerous international treaties Finalnd is a part of. It would be illegal to stop people from gathering together based on their religion or ethnicity and Finland does have an old population of cossacks that are muslim and have gotten along fine with everybody. It is true though, that there is an effort to spread people out when neighbourhoods are planned, but this is not really restricted to immigrants of any religion or ethnicity. So in my own Helsinki neighbourhood, there is social housing, student housing and privately owned condos, deliberately so to avoid neighbourhoods homogenizing into affluent and trouble neighbourhoods.
But its for certain that you will fing islamic congregations bigger than twenty people and there is no policy of one muslim family/ 2 blocks of Finns. How would that even work? Not all condo's are owned by the state or city, so how could that ever be enforced? Even if it was illegal. As an european I do understand that dealing with islamic people is rather like dealing with any sort of people. They will always find an excuse to act violently, religion or no religion, if the context is right. Similarly, content people rarely make a big fuss, no matter their religion or ideology. This is a general guideline and there are exceptions, as there are very many different sorts of people in the world. But the muslim population is predominantly calm.
I think the historian Niall Ferguson came to the conclusion, that the French were, although they are from a germanic tribe as well. But I think you're mixing up the germanic people with the germans and further with Germany, which was a nation that has only existed from the 19th century and what this question is about. And generally, real historians try to find real reasons instead of trying to explain things with some sort of racial magic of germaniness being somehow better at war. It doesn't really pan out in any case, as one can see that they were not at all victorious consistently, in antiquity or after that.
Astonishing that this video has gotten such a low attention - while HETZER from last week has already gotten 75% of the views.
Great topic and very well explained in all the details - and viewed again now for the 3rd time already.
You should make a video on motorcycle use in the German army. They were used to great effect. For example, each convoy section would have a few motorcycles assigned. One of them would drive behind the convoy, and if a vehicle in the convoy malfunctioned, the motorcyclist would notify a repair truck and the officers. Another motorcyclist would scout ahead of the convoy while looking for any potential obstacles. This had a big impact on the convoy's efficiency. Motorcyclists were also used as couriers along the front. Since the motorcycle could have an optional sidecar, the effectiveness of the unit was greatly increased. The passenger could focus on details during scouting, and is likely to have a mounted machine gun which allowed for harassing tactics. During combat, the motorcyclists engage the enemy before the rest of their forces, and then return back to relay what they encountered in order to give the officers an idea of what to expect. A strategy sometimes used was to shell a town, and then after the shelling the motorcyclists would swarm in within minutes, denying the defenders a chance to even leave the shelters and return to their positions. The motorcycles were sturdy, reliable, and in case of a malfunction the driver and the passenger were trained and equipped to fix it.
Well, support him on Patreon, his patreons give him a great deal of ideas for his videos.
Domi The kradschutzen battalions would be great to cover.
I recommend supporting him on Patreon as well. It helps him keep this awesome history channel going. There is a lot of time and work that goes into making these videos.
One thing that was lacking though: ... Motorcycles with sidecarts armed with MG-42's. That would've been awesome!
Reichsangels
Still the best history channel on TH-cam
After TIK's coming out - definitely.
TIK?
@Peter Slack: Lewis Barton alias The Imperator Knight, also a historian. He goes really in-depth on fewer subjects (Market Garden, Stalingrad, Compass), however he is sometimes rather subjective and recently hit hard with many viewers with his video about German national socialism.
@@vaclav_fejt cheers, :)
@@Seven_FM I enjoy TIK
William S. Lind explains the effectiveness of German forces in a slightly different way. He draws a distinction between "second-generation warfare" and "third-generation warfare." Second-generation warfare means using artillery (or, later, bombers) to pummel the enemy forces, then sending in troops to occupy the more or less vacated ground. Third-generation warfare is also called "maneuver warfare," where fast-moving ground-forces are used to capture objectives without relying so much on preliminary bombardment. Lind says that the Germans were already using maneuver-warfare in the First World War. That's what Lind says.
The Germans coped with the Entente's bombardments by going underground and waiting for that phase of the attack to end, knowing that it would be followed by a movement of infantry across No Man's Land -- which, when the Germans had not been badly harmed by the bombardment, would turn out to be suicidal.
This second-generation warfare would seem to be an appealing form of warfare for a state that (1) has a lot of wealth to pay for expensive artillery-shells and bombs, and (2) has little confidence in its soldiers. The Germans were generally in the opposite situation on both points, lacking munitions to squander but having highly competent and dutiful soldiers.
Honestly, out of all of your points I think the "training" that was the remilitarisation of the Rheinland, the Anschluss of Austria, the annexation of the Sudetenland and especially the annexation of Czechoslovakia is probably the most important one from a "learning" perspective. I can't think of any military that was basically able to practice invading whole countries in an environment and scale that was far more realistic than anything possible with regular exercises, not just once but at least 3-4 times.
Markus Fuchs and spain. Dont forget spain
Good point
I honestly think that Spain is a little overrated when it comes to influence on the future performance of the Wehrmacht as by that metric the Italians should have been far more effective in WW2. They weren't. While Spain was certainly an interesting opportunity in the form of a testing bed for certain new concepts plenty of countries developed very similar concepts independently at roughly the same time.
The British Army was probably the best, man for man, at the very beginning of WW1, the result of many of the officers, a lot of senior NCOs and even some of the men having seen action in multiple colonial campaigns (including the Boer war). Imagine if the British had had sixty divisions in the field in August 1914 instead of six; Germany would have been stopped cold long before it was, and probably beaten before it had time to dig in properly. Kitchener tried to build those sixty divisions and then some, but they were needed in the field way before they were really ready, with results we all know.
The Italians drew an accurate assessment and a sound doctrine from their experience in Spain. However, their top and bottom levels were disconnected. While they went through a major reorganization, their economy couldn't support the logistical and research investment of retooling for a new concept of war in time for WWII.
German generals focused on winning battles at the operational level and actively avoided learning about economics or the overall strategic picture? That explains why Hitler feuded with the generals on taking Soviet resources during Barbarossa over winning battles. They didn't understand that you couldn't just beat the Red Army in the field and he realized Germany needed more stuff if they were to prevail in the long term.
Good point. The entire aim of the war was to beat the soviet union in a short time using blitzkrieg tactics. It is why they fought this way because germany did not have the necessary resources to complete with the soviet union. When it was clear germany would not be able to beat them in 2 years it became a problem
Problem with Hitler was he understood the economics but as a result he pursued battles that really couldn't be won in the first place. The generals was winning battles but wasn't winning the battles that was needed for a long war. The decision couldn't be made with a one-sided approach. Someone with both economic and military background is needed.
>Someone with both economic and military background is needed.
Stalin.
Alexander Seven stalin didn't have a military background
Stalin had no official military education but he had serious military command experience during the civil war.
Amazing work and explanation! Keep it up!
Outstanding. I can’t believe how much insight into WWII German army thinking I got from a 15 minute video.
You‘re just awesome!
So much Detail, Research, and so on!
Absolutely amazing.
Beste Grüße
🇩🇪🇩🇪🇩🇪🇩🇪🇩🇪
Great series of lectures sir. Thanks.
I really enjoy both of your channels, but I’ve developed a preference for the Not Visualized version ... getting things done while listening!
Keep up the good work. This is an easy recommendation for best WWII military history channel on TH-cam.
7:24 'Mit der' Heeresdienstvorschrift. Soooo relatable for other germans :P
Excellent video.
Impressive work! Good quote.
Great video. Thanks.
As always gret video ^^
I only just discovered this channel and I'm already loving it
Can you please make a video on operations - why did they exist, the differences between operations and strategy? It seems as a super important topic and I doubt I am the only one that has problems understanding it!
And, great video as always! Keep them up!
There's three things in war: Training, Training & Training.
I thought it was money, money and yet more money :P
Even a trained veteran army is useless once it got encircled
I am offensive and i find this german.
tricky
Listen to your generals.
& carry some warm cloths.
*U'LL WIN!!!!*
Hi, Offensive. I'm dad.
Yes offended people tend to be easily German when it comes to the 3rd reich!
You would think that after having lost a world war despite being tactically and operationally superior that the previous focus would have been discredited and the economic aspects like the blockade that played such a huge role in undermining morale and the war effort would have become almost an obsession instead of STILL neglected.
It was sertenly not neglectet.To the contrary, this time it was delegatet to a genius. - Responsible for this was A.H.
@@TheTergeols Although he was more aware of the economic aspects of war than many of his generals, this "genius" didn't anticipate that the UK would follow through on its war threat over Poland and did little or nothing to prepare for a war with Britain including preventing blockade. He allowed his navy to make wasteful white elephants like large battleships instead of focusing intently on submarines and fast light cruisers with anti air capability (like the USS Atlanta) that would have been ideal commerce raiders.
Here's the thing,strategically germany was already in a bad position,economically shes tied up to europe their main trade partners in general,and is almost landlocked,and any war with any of them means that it will damage the economy,so they need to win fast or otherwise it would be a didaster for the economy,what they also would need is diplomacy,someone like bismarck would be extremely useful. In needed the germans didn't needed good strategy what they needed was good diplomacy something that was lacking since Bismarck.
Really good. Thanks
Excellent video, as usual, but I was a little surprised to find Martin van Creveld's excellent "Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945" missing in action from your references. He makes two important observations: German officers and NCOs were specifically selected based on their character for leadership, and soldiers (both recruits and replacements) were generally assigned to units based on the region (Wehrkreis) where they lived. Both policies led to effective combat leadership, tight unit integrity, and high levels of morale which persisted even to the end of the war.
I bought this book because my Dad - who fought as PFC in the 63rd ID in WWII - had such a horrible combat experience - basically due to poor NCO leadership, the U.S. policy of assigning low-IQ (my dad only graduated 8th grade) men to combat units, and the U.S. replacement policy which threw soldiers with relatively low levels of training into unfamiliar units.
The book also shed light on the WWII experiences of my uncle Geörg. He was initially trained in the Reichsarbeitsdienst and went on to volunteer for a paratroop unit (thus avoiding being "recruited" into the SS) and fought against U.S. troops landing on D-Day. Only after being completely surrounded and running out of food and ammunition did the unit surrender, and he spent the rest of the war in a Texas POW camp.
Here's a link to the book: www.amazon.com/Fighting-Power-Performance-1939-1945-Contributions/dp/0313091579
Trisha that was a really good book. Another one is “A Genius for War” by Trevor N Dupuy which is an excellent treatment of the subject.
In Britain, units made from locals were called "Pals Battalions" and they were scrapped after WW1. The reason they were scrapped was because in battles like The Somme and Ypes, the British lost 10s of thousands in a day and it left entire villages and towns without men. Imagine an entire town without men and heartbroken women and children? Tragic.
Martin van Creveld concentrated on the early performance of the US Army to the exclusion of its later battles. I find him to be a charlatan.
@@anthonyrhodes8042 Everything Martin van Creveld said about US Army performance was true in 1944 and 1945, when my Dad served in the 63rd ID, and fought in the Battle of the Bulge and The Battle of Heilbronn. And not just his opinion, years ago I interviewed other guys from the 63rd ID who had similar stories as my Dad about hastily trained officers and NCOs. In June 1944, My uncle Geörg. also had low opinions about the U.S. Army troops he faced.
@@TheSonicfrog So it didn't vary from division to division? I'm so shocked🙄 But seriously, read "The G.I. Offensive in Europe" by Peter Mansoor.
Just discovered your channel sir and congratulations along with gratitude. Dave . England.
Bernhard, your videos are great!
please do go into detail on the different planning and operational levels.
You mean the Wehrmacht was not effective because of superior German technology, drugs and fanaticism like everyone else says!?
^ Sarcastic by the way. Most informative as always. A 15 minute video of the highest quality is always better than 45 minutes of hyperbole and tripe.
These other stuff is also important, but without proper use (tactics and strategy), these things do not have such great benefits.
Plus we've now seen the long term effects of these drugs. You can only do military grade meth so many times before you permanently damage your heart. It would be like a car that can use nitro only about 6-12 times depending on the make and model. in the human sense depending on biology and the person's attitude. Some people can do meth/heroin/cocaine a few times and never do it again. (not that heroin is anywhere close to as damaging as the other two, but is WAY more addictive! but yeah; Plenty of people do heroin everyday for decades and go to work. NO ONE does meth or cocaine (daily) for that long without having a heart attack/ brain aneurysm/ or just strokes out. Btw *I'm not promoting daily heroin use*
Their technology played its part! But also their fit soldiers and skilled commanders and always fresh equipment
@@forgefathereli8354 > NO ONE does meth or cocaine (daily)
Except for people drinking the original original recipe of Coca-cola, which had small amounts of cocaine in it. And that is the real secret. Take any of those drugs in small enough quantities, and you get the good effects, until you habituate to them, so that you need more to get the same effect. That is what causes the problems, the doses needed after habituation, and their effects.
@johnmann "there was no pervitin in the wehrmacht, in fact it doesn't even exist to begin with! Nobody in Germany ever took anything other than food and drink, and then only water! Its all a conspiracy, waaaaaaah mommy! 😩"
Probably because of their stylish Hugo Boss uniforms.
Thanks !
A clear and detailed answer to the question in the video caption.
I noticed TH-cam Recommending me more old Videos recently. And right now my suggestions bar is full of old MHV and MHNV Videos. There must be some reworking of the Algorythm going on.
Gut :)
TH-cam is also rather buggy at the moment, I got MHV videos suggested while I was logged into MHV... which haven't happened in the previous 7 years.
I'd recommend that you add the location/place/person names as txt on the video when they come up. Accent makes certain Generals sound like cartoon characters. Wilhelm Wiley and the Autobahnrunners. ^^
But seriously it would be a nice addition :)
Yours to be elevated
-T
(bad hearing, bad english, bad Finnish accent but accidental chance of joke)
What seems to be missed is the pre-military training every boy and lad got prior to entering the Wehrmacht. They were basically in para- military training from age 12-18 through the Hitler Youth and German Labour Service. The young learned discipline, drill, toughness, comradeship, leadership and esprit-de-corps during these years. Allied forces had to teach all that in a matter of weeks. Young Luftwaffe hopefuls started learning to fly in gliders in their teens before ever getting in a powered aircraft.
that was heavily outweighed by Germany not having conscription since 1935, additionally, the nazis were not in charge since 1933. I might be mistaken, but I doubt that the Hitler youth was a crucial factor in the early victories at all, because this was mostly the crop of the Reichswehr leading and training.
I read somewhere the statement of an american of the occupying force who investigated the hitler youth, he came to the conclusion that the allied boy scouts where more militaristic, as they had a similiar kind of training in manhood and in the field and had regularly kinds of war games. The hitler youth was an instrument of indoctrination and all of that, but also to give the boys a good time, have adventures away from the authority from their parents, chosing their own leaders, some remember it in this regard even as democratic, because they chose their own leaders from their ranks based on their individual traits. So the allies had a militaristic training for their youths the entire time, not like the germans who had it only for a comparatively short period of time.
I've heard that the wehrmacht issued extra rations of sauerkraut to the troops. To this day, the outside world has yet to determine if this was intended to be a proverbial carrot or stick.
Seven Proxies lol maybe to prevent scurvy lmao
It was actually meant to be used as a weapon. It is biological warfare.
Sauerkraut is awesome with sausage and bread dude :o
To a real German, Sauerkraut is like candy :D
Good introduction into the 'mentality' or 'culture' of the 'Prussians' - as the German armed forces were still called in the more 'westernized' southern states of Germany (Baden, Wuerttemberg and the Rhine Province).
The failure of neglecting grand strategy and strategic thinking was revealed in WW I and WW II when Germany lacked the allies necessary to bring the British Empire and their informal allies, the United States, to the negotiating table - which is, according to Clausewitz, the whole point of warfare, the 'contest of will' in the realm of *politics* (vs an unsustainable 'total war' as an end in itself).
That no amount of investment in 'substitution technologies' (like BUNA, *synthetic* *rubber* or LEUNA, *petrol* *refined* *from* *coal* , later run in Auschwitz by lethal forced labour in order to reach the elusive economic *'autarchy'* when pre-war stockpiling would have been cheaper) would have have been sufficient to compete in a war of *attrition* (the favoured mode of operation of the Allies) is a valid point - but doesn't take into account that *diplomacy* is a *crucial* element of warfare. This is proven by the success of the Anglo-American 'special relationship' (practically an informal re-union) that enabled Great Britain to engage in 'world politics' (global - or as it was called in the 1930s, 'planetary' - affairs) despite a beginning decolonisation of it's empire in Asia, while the nationstate of Germany was still intellectually stuck in the concept of the *'pentarchy'* , a balance between the 'great powers' of the Napoleonic Wars, a view on the world which was outdated since the *Crimean* *War* when the Republic of France and 'parliamentarian' Britain suddenly allied against the Russian Tsar, protecting the declining Ottoman Empire.
When Prussia presented the leading protestant principality within the Holy Roman Empire in the 18th century, admired by the French for lending it's 'enlightened' military service against catholic Hapsburg - on the international stage it became a target in an ideological struggle between 'Westernization' and Tradition. Since the unification of Germany, Prussia was increasingly demonized in the West simply as the 'huns'. After the Treaty of Versailles (Germany was denied a general staff as an institution of strategic planning) there was only one realistic way out of this international isolation: an alliance with the Soviet Union - which had the natural ressources needed to fight a prolongued conflict and which could end the unsolvable problem of fighting on two fronts at the same time.
The necessity of this strategic trajectory was noticed by several people at different times: before the unification of Germany diplomatic servant *Constantin* *Frantz* advocated strongly for a federal constitution that could reconstruct a transnational Central European entity akin the Holy Roman Empire, ruled by international law - after WW I Chief of the Reichswehr *Hans* *von* *Seeckt* wrote a booklet with a similar perspective, arguing for German neutrality, this time including Russia as a pragmatic partner ('Deutschland zwischen West und Ost'. 1933.) - finally *Karl* *Haushofer* concluded from his studies in political geography that an *Eurasian* *Axis* from Berlin, through Moscow to Tokyo could resist an Anglo-American *'stranglehold'* ('Weltpolitik von heute'. 1934.) - Britain and the US as maritime powers controlled all *sealanes* *as* the *main* *line* *of* *communication* *for* the global *trade* of industrialized nations. An advocat of a peace with Russia, *Fritz* *Todt* , died in a plane crash in 1942 (party veteran Rudolf Hess was captured in Britain while naively probing the Allies for negotiations in 1941).
archive.org/details/Haushofer-Karl-Weltpolitik-von-heute
The fact that not these farsighted concepts were the guiding principles of German military organization, but *voluntaristic* traits like 'bluntness' and nostalgic legends, like how 'providence saved Prussia during the Seven Years War' explains why a 'combat effective Wehrmacht' , trained, experienced and resourceful on the tactical and operational level, is simply not enough to secure sovereignty in an age of 'world powers'. 'Gott mit uns' sounds pathetic if one doesn't bother to assure it's outcome by all means necessary.
th-cam.com/video/uomJPhX5qkY/w-d-xo.html
After WW II the European Union, and the more informal Trilateral Commission, came into effect incrementally (Russia was formally integrated within the Security Council of the newly founded United Nations) - all framed along the principles of the Atlantic Charta and under the watchful eyes of it's guarantee powers and their unshaken belief that only the Western way of life should lead into modernity ('modernization theory' - suffering a substantial setback only in Korea and Vietnam)...
Another negative aspect of a sole focus on military training, would be the failure to switch the consumer industry into a full war economy to the extent of 1944 (with no territory left to manouver the material for battle), when it's output peaked (though debatable in reference to 'ressort propaganda', the factors were: *rationalization* , *standardization* of *mass* *production* and *co-ordination* of management innovation). Again, this aspect depends ultimately on secure access to Russian oil and many metals (or even a potential productivity three times higher than that of Germany!) since these could not be extracted from occupied territories, but it is striking how Britain and it's Commonwealth nations shifted to a war economy with women employed in arms factories and other male dominated professions when families in Berlin were reaping stiffling economic contributions from occupied territories to make NS-Germany believe it is still relatively at peace (in the background haunted by the sailor mutinies of 1918). While France, Belgium and the Netherlands could stomach the rationing, many Greeks starved to death - no surprise that recruitment of foreigners into SS-volunteer legions for an anti-communist crusade was underwhelming (less than a million men).
www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-history-of-the-second-world-war/economics-of-the-war-with-nazi-germany/E2F3FE2B9549A00F2E992673C5C8B28D/core-reader
On a last note: if one reads through documents of the Prussian general staff (Helmut von Moltke the younger) before WW I and the German Imperial Naval Office then one can find remarks on *economic* *primacy* all over - whether it is the securing of financial credit for the campaign against Austria in 1866 via Bismarck's private financier Gerson Bleichröder (by unconstitutional liquidation of private railroad assets) and lobbying against Austrian credit worthiness at the Rothschilds (according to Fritz Stern) - or the far reaching considerations how the socio-economic shift from an 'agriculture state' towards an 'industry state' will influence lobbying in the 'Reichstag' for naval funding (see *Tirpitz* and his subordinate *Capelle* ) - the view of the feudal, militant, barbarian Prussian is rather a carricature, although with a grain of truth.
books.google.de/books?id=hY-qNpTEvQwC&pg=PA370&lpg=PA370&dq=moltke+on+economy&source=bl&ots=Ngt-tuMgoM&sig=AV2KYpHDTMXgFkqQ8yBSewIPpGA&hl=de&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiq77Ck2aDdAhUIW5AKHdkEAzkQ6AEwEHoECFoQAQ#v=onepage&q=moltke%20on%20economy&f=false
www.deutsche-biographie.de/gnd116447265.html#ndbcontent
Christoph Mahler: Jeez, that's quite a bit of research. I've always just settled for a overview that both Germany and Japan were somehow limited to total victory in a short war. But of course real, and even long historical, considerations produce such an outlook.
Thanks for the detail.
I'm looking for an explanation of why we still live in a world of empires and nation states committed to exploiting the neighbors, with the US setting the standards of military intimidation. It all seems so dated and barbaric.
Thank you for taking the time to write this comment, it was quite informative!
@@jeffmoore9487
Thanks for Your reply, Jeff.
TH-cam doesn't always correctly notify about comments.
Details, details, details, interpreted in their inter-relation - or otherwise the construction of another 'myth'!
"I'm looking for an explanation of why we still live in a world of empires and nation states committed to exploiting the neighbors, with the US setting the standards (...). It all seems so dated and barbaric."
I do sniff _socialism_ that argues just like liberal imperialists along Western *'modernization theory'* , here - and _integrating animalistic and pre-rational_ aspects into a *view of man* will counter that - while liberalism and socialism opposed centuries of feudal order by rationalistic claims of man, being a 'blank canvas' for 'enlightened ideas' to be stamped upon - only to form exclusive oligarchies by themselves when referring to the _interest of barons_ against kings in Magna Carta and the English Revolutions... (fascist sociologist Robert Michels formulated his _'iron law of oligarchy'_ - but the 'cycle of constitutions' that is reflected in Spengler's pessimistic writing is an antique concept of 'anacyclosis')
(Introduction to sociology)
th-cam.com/video/ICppFQ6Tabw/w-d-xo.html
(On oligarchy)
th-cam.com/video/xYFc8yG_4CM/w-d-xo.html
A contemporary concept to the current Western efforts in *liberal hegemony* can be found e.g. in John Mearsheimer's *'structural realism'* .
The analytical advantage of 'realism' in international affairs, in my view, is that it doesn't bother with _ideology_ and _political systems_ that are propagated 24/7 in liberal mainstream media ("Putin! Trump! We hate You" ...).
(Mearsheimer and the recently passed Stephen Frand Cohen on 'Russia-gate')
th-cam.com/video/SJBQikfYyKs/w-d-xo.html
(Mearsheimer's concept of *liberal hegemony* )
th-cam.com/video/ESwIVY2oimI/w-d-xo.html
I don't regard Marxist theory as anything more, but _ideology_ - in contrast to actual social science - but I understand the rejection of liberal claims and the quest for less conflict driven models of society:
(e.g. British 'anthroposophist' Terry Boardman on BREXIT and alternatives to hegemony via *'social threefolding'* of societies)
th-cam.com/video/hyMgwnT3I5w/w-d-xo.html
@@RegularOlSammy
"Thank you for taking the time to write this comment (...)"
Thanks for reading through it and considering it's reasoning - despite it's 'shotgun' approach to the 'veneer' of conventional post-War historiography.
The fighting divisions of the German army were selected from areas with individuals from the same geographical area.It as been a well known aspect of warfare that soldiers with a common language dialect,interelated families,and similar customs fight much better than soldiers from widely separate national areas.
4:00 So like those maneuvers Ike ran down south?
Agree with your points on Versailles and allowing the German military to cut down to the best of the best. Would only add that troops were not only trained for their own rank but that of their superior. Under combat conditions troops from this stage were incredibly well trained and did not suffer disorganization that officer loses cause other forces.
Your point on getting rid of old equipment is 200% correct. The German army was the most technically advanced and most modern of any in the world at that time. Old equipment and the WWI mindset to go with it gave other forces a huge disadvantage.
Great point on the military focus on the military. The separation of the military from politics / economy is something in today's world is hard to fathom and is a point I don't hear often enough about the German military of WWII.
Having some of the best military commanders of the time is the only thing I would add. Great vid. Thank you for the post.
> The German army was the most technically advanced and most modern of any in the world at that time.
Still, they used WWI rifles for infantry when Soviets were equipped with more than million of SVT's in 1941.
B- True enough. But overall, or in total areas added up as you suggest, I would still say the most advanced.
Alex - Can't argue with that. You could add radar to your example or powered turrets for tanks also. But taken as a whole I would still say the most advanced.
10:18 "heiß umfehdet - wild umstritten, liegst dem Erdteil - du inmitten" ;-)
Hi Sir, Hope You Are Doing Well, I just want to ask, how do post my questions to you so that you can answer
Question: Wouldn´t Hauptmann Öbvious be more like it?
Strange how the British took awhile to implement combined arms warfare during the second world war, when they where the first ones to implement in ww1
Field Marshal Michael Carver makes the same point in his book “Tobruk”.
The Germans had a knack for combined arms warfare that their opponents were slow to catch up on.
Most of the british and french leadership at the time were slower to catch up in comparison to their german and soviet counterparts regarding combined arms warfare. The soviets with their deep operations doctrine and the germans with their schwerpunkt
Good video. But you did'nt mention "Auftragstaktik". I thought that was one of the corner stones of Wehrmachts combat effectivness, on both tactical and operational level.
I am waiting on THE book on Auftragstaktik, since I am assuming that there is a lot of bullshit out there that might be wrong.
On the contrary USSR focused on long war and permanent mobilisation. Troops were not so highly qualified, but they had a numerical advantage. In July of 1941 german generals were very surprised meeting many new formed soviet armies in front of them. Then again after heavy losses soviets mobilise, equip and armed so many new divisions. 800 in total.
Thats why they had huge casualties in every battle! They realy should train their soldiers better
@@paraskaikessa597 it depends on operation. Ratio of soviet and German losses improved each year for Russians. And sad but true, russian officers were less qualified than their German counterparts. Both Russian and German infantry soldiers were exceptionaly good in moral and stamina aspects.
Can you do a video in German sometime like Joerg Sprave does?
The chronology -of me watching your very good videos is a bi..Č. So I hope it's not too late to suggest an improvement: please correct the pronunciation of emphasis and accuracy. It makes me rewind some parts of your videos 4-5 times before i get it. Unless of course that was the goal and part of the image. Which is fine, the rest is perfect, and where it isn't you hint at the complexity of the matter, leave space to read between the lines (the length of your videos is fantastic, very good measure) and you attract very interesting people here!
Interesting analysis. I think these points can be similarly applied to other small and highly militarized nations/societies such as Sparta and Israel, with a focus on quickly achieving a decisive victory with highly trained troops and aggressive offensive tactics. It works until it doesn’t, such as for Sparta when they became archaic and inflexible and were defeated by Thebes and for Israel when they got bogged down in Lebanon.
This is absolutely fascinating ! And it explains so well why the wehrmacht was initially so successful and why it was eventually so poor towards the end of the war... Ww2 came down to economics and Germany was losing that front by 1942
As an Israeli, I cannot avoid seeing the similarities to our military doctarine, especially in 49-67.
1) in the prioritation of "crushing powet" over "staying power", and the chase for a shorter war
2) in the focus on offensiveness, manuevers, and trickery
3) in the focus on human quality
4) the focus on combined arms
It might be interesting to have a video on the similarities, and what the IDF probably learn from them.
Israel is basically second prussia in middle east
Good vid. It also favoured the Wehrmacht early on that their opponents weren't prepared for a total war. The French were in material terms, kind of /partially but the overall mentality in France was defensive and not proactive on the operational or strategic level. The Islanders only BEGAN mobilizing in 1937 although they had a very effective air-defence system organized. The Nazi's were preparing the Germans for war for many years, most of the 1930's in fact whereas the Islanders and their snail-eating friends were putting lots of effort into AVOIDING war. With the Great War still in living memory, France and Britain weren't eager to plunge into the mud and blood of northern Europe again whereas the Nazi's were preparing to at least subdue or defeat France and then turn to the east, which was by most accounts their plan all along.
Strange that the Nazi's had little information as to the actual level of Russian in depth strength? The German Armies were completely unprepared for bad weather in Russia , even though there was plenty ofdocumented Nepolianic & WW1 experiences at hand.
The Russians definetly knew how to deal with winter. They hung on, sacrificing millions of men; but once old man Winter set in, the Germans were doomed. The appearance of the heavily armed & winter equipped Siberian Russsian Armies seemed a surprise to the Germans. The Russians had kept these forces on the Chinese border, to counter the Japanese Forces, but eventually negotiated a Military stalemate deal with the Japanese; which allowed the Russians to relocate their Siberian Forces to the European Front.
Remember, the undefeated enemy will learn from you.
You might think that the changing quality of the enemies might have something to do with it.
Exactly. The Allies gained experience in the African Deserts. After that, they were much more effective.
Wehrmacht op pls nerf
Germany started WW2 as the 2nd most powerful nation in Europe and by the end they were the 5th most powerful nation in Berlin.
Well that esclated quickly.
It was nerfed during the winter update
@@MAAAAAAAAAA123 France was more powerful than Germany in 1939 and 1940.
We just give the sowjets much more tickets
Nice videos man...I was expecting younger face
It still amazes me that Germany didnt go into a war manufacturing production mode at the outset of the war. For instance, it wasnt until later on that they ramped up production of planes to its highest level. They didnt seem to throw their full industrial might into the war until it was too late.
BD: They were producing at 'the highest level" at the beginning. It was a matter of HOW things were done that made the difference. The changes were those of prioritization, standardization (reduction of models) and allowing manufacturers the flexibility to improve and react without being overly supervised.
"Let the horses do the thinking. They have bigger heads".
To answer your question: As the invasion of the USSR showed historically, German commanders neglecting the economic aspects of war had disastrous consequences. I'm not entirely sure, but I believe it was Halder who altered plans to retain troops for capturing Moscow despite orders otherwise. I have read he was fixated on the strategic short term victory to the point of jeopardizing the long term economic aims of capturing the vital oil. That would be one place where a general with a better understanding of war economy would have done a better job, realising raw materials to continue a war are far more vital than a short term land gain. This is only one example where greater emphasis on logistics in training, could have been very beneficial to fighting a war, when combined with the other aspects of German staff training.
As a counter argument, Halder may well have realised that Germany's plan A was that after 2 months the Soviet army and political structure was supposed to collapse. Then easy to take the oil fields at their leisure. The USSR lacked roads and the only half decent ones went to Moscow and Leningrad. Trying to focus on the south would have been logistically impossible simply due to the lack of roads, trucks and rubber. Take a look at a map and see how far the oil fields were. Hence Halder may have just done what he could do. Of course if Plan A failed there was no plan B... just fight to the death.
It probably helped that in Poland because of France and Britain Poland was not fully mobilized and they had Soviet support. The Wehrmacht were able to figure out what worked and didn't for a year before they invaded France.
Der neuartige Einsatz der Panzerwaffe war meines Erachtens ebenfalls ausschlaggebend für die großen Anfangserfolge. In nahezu allen ausländischen Militärs herrschte die Meinung, dass Panzer keine eigenständige Waffe sind bzw sein können und dementsprechend also nur in Kombination mit Infanterie zum Einsatz kommen können und sich dieser unterzuordnen haben. Auch in der Wehrmacht wurde diese Ansich anfangs vertreten, auf Drängen einiger Generäle und nach einigen erfolgreichen Übungen konnte sich der Panzer allerdings als eigenständige Waffe in sogenannten Panzerdivisionen durchsetzen. Diese Panzerdivisionen bestanden nicht ausschließlich aus Panzertruppen, diese stellten nur etwa 1/3 davon dar. Der Rest waren motorisierte Infanterie und Panzergrenadiere, zusätzlich Artillerie und andere Unterstützungstruppen. Grundlegend ist aber, dass die Panzer die Geschwindigkeit vorgaben und alle anderen sich unterordnen mussten, nicht umgekehrt. Im Buch "Guderian - Erinnerungen eines Soldaten" wird genau dieser gedankliche und in der Folge auch taktische Umbruch beschrieben, zudem wird ausführlich erläutert, wie sich diese neue Waffengattung auf den Schlachtfeldern geschlagen und bewährt hat.
Guderian hat zum Großteil Sachen behauptet die so nicht statt gefunden haben, siehe mein Video zu Guderian oder besser noch Pöhlmann: Mechanisierung des Krieges
Enjoyed this video. Big picture wise, the Modern German state has always been able to muster, arm, and deploy large numbers of soldiers. Their early victories are often just a matter of numerical superiority. Certainly better training and doctrine helped. They had also created the world's first truly motorized divisions with proper understanding of how to use them. They used these Divisions too wonderful effect in 1940 against France.
From what I've read, the German army had a very clear doctrine about counter attacking and attack that served them very well.
The puzzling thing about Imperial Japan during the war is that they failed to do things -- like build more tankers and destroyers -- that would be necessary to exploit their larger resource area. Just as the German army seemed to not understand the importance of getting an oil supply quickly, the Japanese navy seemed to ignore the details of exploiting the oil supply they had taken.
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Reminds me of how time after time the Confederate army defeated larger and better equipped Union forces in the US Civil War. Quality over quantity. Grant's primary "genius" was operating in line with Napoleon's phrase "Quantity has a quality all it's own."
I thought that's Stalins phrase
Did he answer the question in the title?
Most armies do this though - the Russian Army for example after the 2008 Georgia War was extremely critical of its own performance, as covered in Dale Herspring's 2013 article 'Anatoly Serdyukov and the Russian Military''
MHnVisualized - You miss the basic point of your video. My dad fought out in the Western Desert from its earliest beginnings right up until just after El Alamain. When fighting the Africa Korps in most cases they were fighting an enemy that had better tactics, far better equipment, co-ordinated aircraft back up and much fitter and better trained troops.
Our officers particularly in the Tank Corps fell time and time again for the same tactics and then the preplanned supposed withdrawal of their tanks to behind prepared defences of mines which when coupled with the awesome 88's accuracy, and the ability to lay down massive and accurate firepower won time and time again. In short dad said they could hit us long before we could hit them. It was not until just before El Alamain that for the first time with the new equipment delivered that we became more on an even keel with them helped by better trained troops, tactics, Enigma and the Desert Air Force no end.
> You miss the basic point of your video.
maybe, but I don't see how and your comment is beyond my understanding.
Also unemployment during the 1920's. A safe job with reliable pay at a time of mass unemployment
Why did the Wehrmacht have so much trouble taking Tobruk from the British early in the war? It seems there was a flaw in battle doctrine. After all, Tobruk was a small garrison that used simple tactics to hold off a much larger force.
In 1918, the German offensives in the West were extremely successful on the operational and tactical levels, but did not have a clearly defined strategic goal (except: beat the enemy). When the time came to make a strategic decision, nothing happened.
How was the german economy and cultural life was like during the war?
15 minutes video, uploaded 2 minutes ago, has 77 likes. Well yeah, it's not like it'll be bad.
It's like playing Civilization (up to 5 anyway.) Put all your gold into science and combine it with military knowledge for a guaranteed conquest victory.
There's another guy on TH-cam -- I think that his name is Bernhard -- who claims that the Wehrmacht wasn't as good as people think. You should debate him sometime.
If its not as good as everyone thinks thrn how did it conquer Europe and USSR!
@@paraskaikessa597 -- Bernard contends that Germany's victims didn't prepare for war of blitzkrieg, whereas Germany (obviously) did prepare.
@@kevinbyrne4538 Yeah! And this suprise AND their strenght allowed them to conquer Europe!
@@kevinbyrne4538 it is bullshit. France already building the maginot line before the war. And the soviet union built up the largest army at that time. They were prepared
@@venator5 -- Then you and the host of this TH-cam channel have a disagreement.
I think some of you have forgotten that Stalin
Preceding Barbarosa had executed up to 70%
Of his officers, some reports claim!
That, and of course they
Were horribly unprepared to to put up
any kind of real defense.
I really enjoy WW2 history, and you have
Done a great job with all of your vidoes! As well as
The great comments and debates!
Great Job!
But they still had Zhukov! The Manstein of USSR
Why is the Prussian/German attitude of being a "power in the middle" funny to you as an Austrian? I didn't quite catch what you meant there.
well, for Prussia I get it, but as far as I know it was also the case for unified Germany. Considering that Austria is located in Central Europe and Germany is at least limited by the Baltic sea, I would say Austria is a bit more surrounded.
Well now it is yea, but at the time, Austria had the alps to the west the Adriatic to the south the, and the Carpathians to the east. Austria may have looked surrounded on a map but they definitely had only a few real boarders with other countries.
Perhaps it's also due to the political situation of neighbouring countries. For most of Austria history Germany (HRE), Italy and the Balkans were politically divided and so provided a kind of buffer zone around Austria.
To add to that, we Czechs were also historically in the middle of enemies: Germany in the west, Russia in the east, Habsburg superiors in the south.
Also, Österreich means you're not in the middle, but in the east. :D Or was it a name given by the Germans?
this is good but rather basic. what if you bring some fresh facts from german war archives? or show this in comparrison with other armies?
Auftragstaktik! Their military doctrinal culture of allowing individuals to decide how best to complete a mission, not the higher authority. It goes way back with zee Germans.
Radios! Guderian was a signals guy, he outfitted their tanks with two-way radios (European Allies had none or one-way). Hugely effective.
FULLY motorized Panzer divisions! If it did not roll, clank, or fly it was not in the initial thrust. Their tanks sucked until 1942, the key was SPEED SPEED SPEED and the fully motorized divisions freed them from walking speed while the enemy distributed their tanks in a supporting roll among the turtle-slow infantry.
Watch the video GERMAN ARMY MECHANIZATION - DR. LOUIS A. DIMARCO
All the Grand Strategy in the world would not have helped them once America acquired the A-bomb and the B-29 (a project even more expensive than the Manhattan Project). America was turning their cities and Japanese ones to ash even before that though (German women had a saying in 1945: “Better to have a Russian on top of you than an American over your head.”). The night bombing raid of Tokyo on 9-10 March 1945 is still the single most destructive bombing raid in human history.
Was it really anex of Czechoslovakia? Slovakia was an "independent" state in that time. So anex of Czechia?
Lol I had that part in and cut it, because it is complicated.
It is very hard to listen to you and at the same time read additional text...
The text is not for reading, but for reference.
Trouble is, they WERE beaten on the battlefield in 1918. The early 1918 attacks (which wehrboos think were so successful) were stopped, and defeated, by the same force that cut them open later that year. The ANZACs. Who taught them combined arms warfare? Monash. They learned it at the hands of the men who thrashed them soundly with it in 1918.
They generals knew, if they would calculate, they couldn't start the war.
There was never an "annexation of Czechoslovakia." Only the Sudetenland was annexed. Slovakia became an independent state and the Czech region (Bohemia and Moravia) became a German protectorate.
The axis had two of the most powerful navies, one of the most powerful army, and all 3 had a great air force... But none of them had a good economy. And I say that was their downfall.
and thank god for it
Lol a powerful army and navy are no good if they're owned by different countries that don't work together. The Axis is kind of a dumb term as it makes people think they worked together with common goals which wasn't really the case. That was their downfall. Perhaps had Japan attacked Russia in support of Germany instead of America they could have secured some badly needed oil.
I am confused by your use of terms. Wehrmacht is Heer + Luftwaffe + Kriegsmarine. Similarly the Reichswehr is Reichsheer +Reichsmarine. You talk about combined arms tactics and it is impossible for me to understand what are you saying. Combined arms means navy +army before Luftwaffe? Or combined arms as in army + airforce? But this was a late development. Combined arms as in different branches of the army? That is hardly unique to Germans.
Your last proposal is right I think. Combined arms is a term for warfare with different branches/combat arms (infantry, artillery, tanks).
combined arms for different branches for the army and according to my source the Kriegsakademie in the 1930ies was the only one that did it from the get to.
@@BaronUltimo If so my question is : Did the Germans uses their experience in The Soviet Union to write the material for that 3 years course on "tactics"?
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized Thank you for your reply. I know that there were other nations that had proponents of combined arms forces (Estienne is one example) but maybe this was not taught in schools.
I can't remember the exact text passage, but it sounded along the lines for Germans combined arms warfare was the default mode, whereas for others it was advanced or some special stuff.
You're ignoring the elephant in the living room. A lot of the shortcomings you cite as far as the Germans not paying sufficient attention to logistics and economics but instead focusing only on "military" matters can be traced directly to ... Carl Von Clausewitz in his book "On War".
LOL it is actually quite known in German military historian circles that the Prussians/Germans for the most part ignored Clausewitz unless it suited them, this is REALLY obvious, because he is all about Grand Strategy, which was clearly lacking on the German side. He was for the "Primat der Politik" (Primacy of politics).
@@MilitaryHistoryNotVisualized
Tbf Bismarck understood it very well.
Twentieth Century Germans not so much.
Yes sure, but the Soviets also gained experience in Spain and of course in Poland, when they marched in and occupied half the country following the German assault.
The German approach isn't wrong per se. I mean they managed to defeat Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1940 despite their GDP and military was twice as strong.
Because they were the best army in history. Imagine fighting with one hand tied behind your back, lack of oil, constant bombing against your production, a two front war, and still inflicting
2:1 casualty ratios.
Little known fact, the Soviet manpower reserves were severely depleted by the end of WW2, there's a real chance that without the opening on the western front, that the Wehrmacht depletes Soviet manpower reserves before they themselves run out. Even with less tanks, less planes, almost no fuel, the Wehrmacht was still pound for pound better than any Allied military. It's just hard to fight at your peak effectiveness when you have minimal air cover and oil. When they had both, they dominated every opponent.
Yes but the German armed forces were ultimately defeated by a stronger coalition. Casualties do not matter when you lose the war, any army can kill soldiers but not every army can win a war. I find it hard to call them the best army in history when they could not win their most important war. Ultimately every German soldier was defeated by the Allies. Allies who won by their own strengths not by their enemies weaknesses. If the Wehrmacht was the greatest fighting force in history, they likely would not have been crushed so decisively. They won many battles, yes, they defeated many opponents but militaries win wars and that they could not do even when their survival depended on it. The Wehrmacht was excellent fighting force but a deeply flawed one and one defeated so decisively. The Allies were genius's for mass production, determined in their cause, and highly adaptable. By the end of the war, the Allies had changed, improved, and adapted into something the Wehrmacht could not have hoped to challenge. The countries the Wehrmacht conquered returned. The Reich did not. Let us not forget that the Allies themselves fought on more fronts than the Wehrmacht. Also the Heer is the army, the Wehrmacht is the military.
@@MH-tr4kn winning a 3 front war when you don’t have naval or air superiority, your entire manufacturing base is under 24/7 bonbons raids, and constant fuel and other supply shortages, just isn’t realistic for any army. When the Wehrmacht fought on a level playing field with any of their opponents they crushed them.
They should focus on economics at least in the regards to the Soviet Union. Germany had a much bigger GDP, and their industrial output in iron, coal, and aluminum was several times larger than the Soviet ones. This should have translated into more weaponry in the field at the start of the war, not in 1943/44.
Germany underestimated the Soviets like crazy.
They don't have the US to supply them with practically everything and with the British navy blockading them from getting needed materials from friendly countries like Argentina.
I would question whether the Wehrmacht was really as good as often claimed. From what I can tell as an amateur, they only really did well when facing ill-trained and equipped opponents. Once said opponents started becoming better equipped/trained/experienced, the odds evened out much more and the Germans began losing. God help them had they invaded a Russia in which Stalin had not decimated the officer corps, and even with that they still ran into trouble.
well, the Wehrmacht (Army, Air Force & Navy) was at its peak in Summer 1941, by Summer 1942 by the Germans own assessment the Army extremely decimated - as outlined in this video which compares the combat effectiveness of divisions in Summer 1941 vs. 1942: th-cam.com/video/caoxNSNcQZs/w-d-xo.html
Still, even by Summer 1944 the Wehrmacht which was now a former shadow of itself give quite a beating:
th-cam.com/video/9sbwU-KMH2k/w-d-xo.html
And that after being pounded for several years by the 3 strongest powers back then: British Empire (not just UK), Soviet Union and of course USA.
The Germans were superb, when facing less capable opposition armies; however once the Russians & Western Allies got experience, the Germans were done for. The Allies continually upgraded their Air forces & Armies; whereas the Germans pretty well maintained older versions of aircraft. The Germans never had a successful long range heavy bomber.
Strangely, the Allies had crappy tanks throughout WW2. I can never figure out why the US couldn't come up with something like a decent Panzer or T34? The Brits used the .303 Enfield Rifle into the 1960's. Even the US Army upgraded from the 30-06 Springfield to the M1 Garand (not the greatest gun in the world).
The Germans had Automatic Riifles at the end of WW1.
The US had the best tank for ww2 in the Sherman. Watch the Chieftain's vids on that.
Your thesis is not supported by hard facts, try to understand what Martin v. Creveld is discussing in Fighting Power.
It's not that they were so good, as their enemies were so bad.
The scary thing is that the Germans army in ww2 could had defeated any army in the world even the us head to head one on one scenario , even though they had smaller number soldiers 😳.
Yea well their eyes were bigger than their stomachs, and they chose to start wars with nations that would offer maximum resistance possible before they could gather the correct resources to do so. They could have walked into the Middle East and took all that oil and the Suez Canal with minimal resistance. Inviting the USA to the party was the worst idea possible, WHY, the Americans did not want to be invited to the Party, but the Japanese and the German's with their unmitigated hubris did not plan at all to expand without considering that they took the maximum risk possible.
So it was learning from mistakes on steroids
We Americans can sympathize for German citizen of WWII.
Pervotin (spelling)? Meth. Meth. Meth. People are usually pretty good at killing and mayhem when they are out of their minds crazy and don't sleep.
The Wehrmacht was always more experienced. Most people do not understand the important of it
Such a German thing to say if the tanks break down get more Maintenance folks, instead of making tanks more reliable coming out of the factory.
The germans only lost because they used the wehrmacht at a way where it was not maked for and that was waging a long war with huge distances while it was supposed to fight short wars on limited distances and even when the wehrmacht was used the wrong way they almost defeated the red army they came very close the sovjets were at some point very close to being defeated.