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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 27 ส.ค. 2024
- The US Navy abandoned the Marines on Guadalcanal - A WWII Myths show
With Dave Holland
Part of our WWII Myths series of short shows
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Did the US Navy abandon the Marines on Guadalcanal?
With special guest Dave R. Holland who is originally from the US but now resides in Australia. Dave is a former US Marine Infantry (8 years) and Battlefield Guide in Guadalcanal.
He runs the Facebook and TH-cam channels - Guadalcanal - Walking a Battlefield.
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Dave Holland knows his stuff, I love watching his work. Well done.
Outstanding job in bringing Dave Holland aboard! He is not brief, but neither is he boring. He covered it as briefly as he could while ensuring proper context. GREAT JOB!!!!
Thank you for a great show.
Another very informative presentation.
Dave Holland is the authority on Guadalcanal and the Battle for the Solomon islands. I do hope he will return as a guest in the future.
He'll be back yes
Dave always delivers an outstanding presentation, and this one is no different. I am so glad that he addressed this myth and gave credit to the brave US Navy crews that fought and died to help protect the Marines on Guadalcanal.
200 of the naval casualties were Australians on the Australian cruzer Canberra .Not just US Navy.
@@paulobrien9248 Thank you for reminding me about the brave crew of the HMAS Canberra. I apologize for not including them in my statement. It was an oversight and by no means meant as a slight to those brave men.
@@paulobrien9248 We Americans known this and recognize the sacrifices the men and women of your great nation gave in defeating the Imperial Japanese Empire in the 20th century. Many of us also know how General Douglas MacArthur never acknowledged the Australian forces the true credit they deserved during the time he was in charge of theater operations in the Southwest Pacific.
Excellent discussion and presentation. Thanks Dave and Paul.
I truly appreciate all the WWII Myths shows. One of the things that we (specifically speaking as Americans) tend to forget is how hard and how steep the learning curve was for US war planners and executors. Our equipment stunk. Our tactics were frankly mediocre. We had a number of leaders who just weren't up to the game. We had to learn how to fight, how to plan, how to execute the truly amazing logistical war that WWII became. That is one of the unrealized benefits of our rough introduction to war with the Japanese. Really nice job. Thank especially to Dave, the casualty figures alone are an incredible eye opener. We forget, the vicious naval struggles that were executed in support of the Marines 1st Division. Thanks again!
As an American, Guadalcanal is a word which resonates so deeply in my heart.
I can certainly understand why the average Marine, with no knowledge of the bigger picture, may have felt abandoned by the navy the day after Savo Island. They did have to eat small meals and Japanese rations for several weeks. I'm sure that feeling was real and given their isolated situation during their first time in combat, that is a feeling every Marine who experienced it would have remembered as long as they lived. However, I hope those same men later came to realize, rationally, that the USN didn't actually abandon them at any point. The Navy came back to Guadalcanal again and again. Both things can be true, the emotional memory, and the rational fact.
Christ, the way Dave described the thousand USN sailors killed during Savo Island still at their posts to this day, hit me just right and put the dust in my eyes. Rest easy sailors, the enemy still hasn't taken the beachhead you were defending that night.
The year of 1942, when every American action in the Pacific theatre was done on a shoestring, truly represents our finest hour. Also, thanks to the British and Australians forces and the coast watchers who also fought the Japanese that fateful year.
Great job by Dave Holland.
Yeah brother I’m Australian and a lot of our grandfathers experienced some wide range of moments together throughout the whole pacific campaign I lived across the road from another vet that was in Bougainville if I’m not mistaken he showed me a photo of him back then in his uniform and I couldn’t believe it hey he was 16 or 17 I think he said and he looked like a literal 13 year old kid in such unimaginable brutality it was hard to wrap my head around seeing a small boy in what is known as such a gruesome moment in history. I was super young and the only story I really remember him telling off the top of my head was about how they were on a patrol boat or something of the sorts with a vickers gun and found some Japanese by the water taking a dump and in his words “ asses where flying around all over the place” he was a very nice man he held clear resentment towards the Japanese though as I’m sure alot of vets did having friends and whatnot killed after surrendering
@therealuncleowen great post, my sentiments also.
My father served on a destroyer during the entire Guadalcanal/Solomons Campaign. He considered the early USN commanders fools and incompetents. Savo Island was totally preventable had the American leaders not consistently underestimated the Japanese and prepared their personnel for night warfare. The Japanese were experts at that.
Dave nailed it. Hard. Perception vs reality, and of course, the 4-1 ratio of USN vs Marine losses. We WERE trying to get a "win" for morale back home, and of course, we'd never done such an op before. WW2 was a learn-as-you-go experience, warts included, to be blunt. Banger of a show once more!
Fantastic summary from Dave. Just superb!
Thank you kindly!
Woody/Dave. Brilliant presentation on a subject in know little about. Perception is important to those concerned but this myth explained and busted by Dave. Thanks. Bob
Dave Holland great stuff. Nuance. Been said before on ww2tv but nuance.
Fletcher got a raw deal.
Absolutely
By Morrison, certainly.
Good show to remind us what heavy fighting took place around the island. Grüße
No doubt
Dave Holland is a Rock Star! Even though the episode took almost 40 minutes, this is one of the most concise explanations about the controversy over the Navy's role in Operation Shoestring. I don't think this is a myth because you have two competing points of view a.k.a. Turner and Vandegrift versus Fletcher because Ghormley was completely derelict as an Area Commander. Ghormley using an American football term punted the decision to his subordinates which is completely inexcusable. From the USMC's point of view the Navy told them to go to the lower Solomons and successfully oust the Japanese from there without giving the Marines the most basic necessity: adequate supplies and support. From the USN's point of view they had to deal with the IJN's response, which was completely devastating, not only the battle of Savo Island but also including the next 6 months which saw the US carrier fleet whittled down to one damaged ship the USS Enterprise and the gutting of the fleet's heavy cruiser force.
@ morganhale3434 I was going to write a long comment on this and then I read yours. You were on point and concise. I might have been able to do as well but after your comment I check to the power.
Thank you , that was very gracious.@@73Trident
The Navy left. Over the Campaign thru Feb 1943 5,000+ sailors died. 1,200 Marines died. The Navy repaid their debt in Blood. Semper fi.
And the Bloody Marines should have got off their arses and helped
Where were the Sgts and Sgt Majors they were slack as well
Over in New Guinea the blokes on the Small Ships would have said get off your arses, if you want to eat unload the bloody stores
Sorry I missed this live. Dave is a treat, walking encyclopedia. Thank you.
great show! This is one i have definitely heard of before. Dave did a fabulous job!!!
personal note: my mom in the late 1950's was a nurse and had a co-worker who's husband had served on the USS San Francisco (the flagship of Admiral Callaghan, one of the two admirals who got killed in the battle that Dave mentioned...at one point it was about 2000 yards (point blank range in naval gunnery) from the Japanese battleship Hiei, the flagship of the Japanese force, and shot it out with it. Some how the San Francisco survived, even landing a shell hit that helped the sinking of the Japanese battleship the next day. San Francisco suffred over 100 killed out of 800 crew, had 20+ fires at one time and hit over 40 times.) My mom told me her co-worker said her husband was still having nightmares from that fight (PTSD?) still 15 years after the fight :(
Great show. I like the narrow focus on a specific controversy. I really appreciate Dave Holland's eagerness to honor the sacrifice of the sailors while acknowledging the legitimacy of the feelings held by the Marines on the island.
That was it exactly, a balanced history lesson
@@WW2TV I also love Dave's deep South accent. The first time I heard him speak, I had a hard time understanding, but having watched many videos on his channel, I'm no longer confused, and instead I hear deep roots in a particular place, and it's reassuringly real. Maybe Mississippi, Alabama or Arkansas?
He's from Alabama, but there's also the Australian twang given he has lived there so long
@@WW2TV yes, that really confused me the first time!
The Marines have every right to be very proud of their performance on Guadalcanal. The USN does as well. My late father, after 27 years in the US Army, would have observed wryly that the Marines have a better PR department. (In fairness, they have to publicize their successes because there is always the niggling fear they will be folded into the Army).
It always strikes me, the difference between land combat and naval combat. Land combat can be days spent in contact with the enemy with relatively few casualties each day (obviously some days are much worse than others). Naval combat is almost always short periods in contact with the enemy, sometimes punctuated with huge losses, such as 1,000 dead in 30 minutes at Savo Island.
Every Marine who was on Guadalcanal the night the Japanese BBs shelled the airfield remembers the terror of it, the way the ground shook and seemingly everything above ground was destroyed. But most Marines were able to take cover in bunkers and foxholes and if memory serves, less than ten Marines died in that bombardment. Their deaths are still tragic, but the scale of destruction between land and naval combat on Guadalcanal is stark. Being able to take cover in the ground makes a huge difference.
The Americans in WW2 waged a war of plenty, seeming to always have more of everything than the enemy and other allies, here at Guadalcanal they had to fight on a shoestring and proved they could.
Nice to see Dave on so many channels.
Ironbottom Sound did not get that name for no reason.
A brilliant show by Dave, always a pleasure to listen to his comprehensive knowledge on the Pacific Theatre, thank you Dave and Paul
For every Marine lost on Guadalcanal, four (4) U.S. Navy sailors were lost in naval battles defending the beachhead and the air strip on the island.
Yes, that's what Dave said
Yep. The Navy paid the blood price for Guadalcanal.
The Marines and Army paid the price in suffering and misery.
OK. But sailors had beds showers a change of clothes and decent meals .
All allied servicemen, ozzies are greatfull for their commitment to freedom and won't be forgotten.
@@geoffwaterman6560 Blood price is far higher than the misery and suffering price...
@@RodneyGraves I've been in the army but have never had to endure the survival conditions that our courageous generation of fathers endured thankfully. I respect your opinion but I believe that if you sampled both those conditions you would see my point. Battle and dieing is but a tiny period in military life. They will all be remembered.
Never heard of this before, so that made for an enlightening show. Thanks Dave & Woody.
This is the longest talk on it. But Unauthorized History of The Pacific has talked of it with Dave also, as part of their larger videos of Guadalcanal. And Drachinifel's videos on the battles in Ironbottom Sound elucidetes how bloody it was. That place did not get it's name for nothing.
@@PalleRasmussen I am subscribed to both of those channels and they are magnificent presentations if one wants the deep dive into the subject.
My favorite moment of this presentation is when Dave mentions the sailors still at their posts on the bottom of Iron Bottom Sound. That and the disparity in casualties between the US Navy and Marine Corps during the overall campaign. The ratio of KIA to WIA for the Navy is sobering to say the least: over 5000 KIA to 700 WIA. That and the fact that the Navy was only not present for 4 days says it all for me. Brilliant exposition, perfectly executed as a parade ground maneuver, as one expects from a former Marine. Semper Fidelis Dave!
A lot of men died do to poor Naval leadership.
@@johnbox271 There was certainly some incompetence, much of it born of underestimating what the Japanese could do. It was a steep learning curve that cost many ships and lives for sure.
@@davidlavigne207 The Battle of Savo Island 1,077 killed, 4 heavy cruisers sunk,
1 heavy cruiser damaged and 2 destroyers damaged was a clear indicator of leadership failure. Lack of proper training both pre-war and afterwards. Ineffective command structure, bizarre command decisions.
Extra reconnaissance requested missions over The Slot but the missions were never ordered leaving the Navy believing it was being conducted.
Radar that was never serious tested for effectiveness in this location, yet relied on for early warning. "Chicago's Captain Bode ordered his ship's radar to be used only intermittently out of concern that it would reveal his position. He allowed a single sweep every half hour with the fire control radar..."
"At 20:55, Crutchley left the southern group in Australia to attend the conference, leaving Bode in charge of the southern group. Crutchley did not inform the commanders of the other cruiser groups of his absence, contributing further to the dissolution of command arrangements."
"Crutchley elected not to return with Australia to the southern force but instead stationed his ship just outside the Guadalcanal transport anchorage, without informing the other Allied ship commanders of his intentions or location."
"...Japanese reconnaissance seaplanes dispensed flares to illuminate the scene but was never reported..."
"...Bode did not send a message to the Northern Force about his group’s disastrous encounter with the enemy..."
"...the inquiry centered on two cruiser captains, Frederick Riefkold of Vincennes, and Howard Bode of Chicago. As the Savo report acknowledged, neither had any additional command staff for their sudden assignment, nor any instructions on how to carry out this sudden change in responsibility. Crutchley steamed away, leaving Riefkold with responsibility for the three heavy cruisers of the Northern Patrol Force and Bode for the two remaining heavy cruisers of the Southern Patrol Force.
No change of command was noted in the contemporaneous log of any ship in Crutchley’s force; Vice Admiral Crutchley (who was British, in command of an Australian squadron) signaled the handover by blinker, which conveniently left no record. Neither cruiser captain attempted to fight their squadron during the battle, instead concentrating on their own ship."
I will stop there, but it is clear that training and command was the cause of the disaster at Savo Island.
Just to note as part of this tragedy...
' On his return to Panama, Bode wrote a series of three lengthy letters to Hepburn, further explaining his actions off Savo. In the last one, written on 18 April 1943, he wrote, “I have now carefully considered what my course of action should now be. I have decided that the only honorable course is to atone for my errors of judgment in the only way I can.
“I am writing a letter to be delivered to my wife, which I hope you will forward as soon as practical. Although she is a very courageous and competent person she should have knowledge of the why and wherefore, or a reason for this totally unexpected tragedy descending upon her. . . . I am sure that you will be able to understand the reaction caused by a sudden reversal of the path of life and hope and achievement I had been following.”
The next morning, he accepted his morning coffee and newspaper from his steward and returned to his room. Wearing a navy-blue bathrobe, he stepped into his bathroom, pressed his .38 caliber revolver to his temple and pulled the trigger.
His Navy personnel file concludes with the note, “Not a war casualty.”
@@johnbox271aside from Savo Island where was there poor Naval leadership?
love listening to Dave Holland talking about Guadal Canal. Watching the Pacific TV Series, they show landing craft with ramps, I assume this was wrong and unloading supplies meant a lot of lifting of crates over bows of small boats.
The pacific aggravated me in the aspect of, from I could see, ignoring for the most part any in depth recognition of the numerous large naval battles just off the shore. I always figured this was beause of the money it would take to recreate the naval battles. But whatever the reason it hepled to fuel this myth.
Wow - I learned so much from this episode - and it was on a topic I thought I already knew a lot about! Dave Holland is a complete GEM of a resource!
This is such an enjoyable and informative series Woody, the guests selected are outstanding.
Another excellent show. Dave always delivers. Loving the myth busters series Woody. Keep up the good work.
watching the video now. My first question is how in the name of all things holy did you keep Dave to 40 minutes..JK love ww2 tv and dave is probably my favorite guest (I like all the guests) thanks paul and dave.
Ah, but it was supposed to be shorter lol
@@WW2TV We thank you for your indulgence!
Let him run!
Great presentation Dave, from a fellow Dave. Love the Aussie/American accent combo as well!
Thank you kindly!
Howdy there folks. Dave Holland kiboshes the Marines abandoned myth and has the skin on the wall as proof. Dave did a great job outlining the complexity of command in the Solomons in 40 minutes. Impressive all around.
First myth of today, last one for me. Another great one. This was a good myth day show!
Woody keeps going over the top. I wish he'd slowed down so I could watch all these videos.😊😊😊❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤❤😊😊😊
Sorry Not Sorry
Paul and Dave great account of the operation. Thank you both.
For those unfamiliar with the situation off Guadalcanal, I recommend Drachinifel's Guadalcanal naval campaign playlist as a good primer.
link
th-cam.com/video/jET2M8yP4Jo/w-d-xo.html
Saw all of Drachs shows on Guadalcanal. Excellent to watch.
Really good analysis of a complicated topic
It sounds like the USN suffered from the same perception issue among the USMC that the RAF had over Dunkirk - you can’t see them so you assume they aren’t there but they’re actually keeping the enemy from even getting sight of you…
I also suspect that this was a strong reason why doctrine was reinforced for other operations but sadly you often learn what you can get away with only by pushing that limit
It's like the dunkerque myith about the royal navy and airforce not being there for the army. Yet the facts show a different
Turner spent years slandering Fletcher, misstating the latter's D+2 withdrawal warning. Lundstrom goes into detail on this.
Good to see Dave Holland here. Seen him elsewhere, he's always a goddamned knowledgeable guest and hope to see him here more.
Never have been a fan of Turner. I have been a fan of Adm Fletcher. He never got the recognition he deserved for his service. His biggest slanderer was Samuel Elliot Morrison whom I have no respect for at all.
Agreed. A deeper reading of Fletcher's decisions show them to be largely sound. Fletcher. like any commander, was flawed, but Turner, and as you rightly point out Morison, are (no pun intended) Terribly unfair. King too, for that matter, regarding FJF.
Fletcher's record speaks for itself: lost two big flattops under his command, while units under his command sank three biggies and two lights. Won one major victory and one major rebuff of a Japanese offensive. Turned back the first big Japanese convoy to the Solomons. This at a time when the US had to fight its way to flattop parity. @@73Trident
Excellent
Really excellent work. TY. This is a hard myth to challenge, because to a large extent one’s view depends on how one defines “abandoned.”
The marine’s perception of being abandoned reminds me of the British Army’s complaints about the RAF at Dunkirk. For the average soldier in a foxhole, what both the USNavy and the RAF were doing was over the horizon and invisible to them.
Great guest, I look forward to a 2 hour delve into all the rabbit holes.
My Grandfather an Airplane Mechanic for the Navy said they were abandoned on accident. He was one of the abandoned and He was Navy.
According to my dad, a 1st Marines pfc, he ate captured rice twice a day with fish heads for the first 10 days on the Canal.
Respect to your dad. Do you know what specific unit he was with? If not I can assist you with that. That’s one of the things I do. The eating variety really depended on what unit you were either. Yes captured rice was a staple. Some ate only captured oatmeal, US pancakes, US Spam and captured tinned soy beef. The first big resupply occurred on 18 Sept when the 7th Marines landed.
Great presentation. I would like to hear a detailed discussion about how or why the U.S. Navy was caught so badly off guard with the battle of Savo Island.
Long lance torpedoes.
Poor tactics and lack of training.
Navy got lucky at Savo that IJN didnt press attack and destroy rest of the force including transports.
Excellent program. I have read a lot about this battle (land and sea) - yet I learned even more in this presentation. Thank you.📸
Dave Holland 👍
The navy lost 28 ships and 4,000 sailors and the losses on land were 1,000 so how could anyone claim the Marines were left alone.
Damn, I missed the stream, but I just want to say Navy-Marines relationship is one of the unique relationships between branches in US. In my opinion both of them are a team in Guadalcanal, trying to defeat Japan in Air, ground and sea (the Americal Division was there too btw). Marine general Vandegrift adamant in holding Guadalcanal at all costs and Halseys aggresiveness combined the effort in defeating IJN and IJA in the campaign.
The loss of sailors and ships in the campaign should put paid the story of abandonment.
In college I had a professor who was a Marine on USS Wasp. Aide to the captain. His opinion on hearing conversations between Gormley left a low opinion of the Admiral
A very honest assessment of a controversial topic that still raises passions amongst those who were not there.
take care
rwmccoy
Another excellent and informative presentation.
As a Marine Corps Vietnam vet I appreciate the deep dive about Guadalcanal.
You wre welcome
A good book about this subject is:
"Challenge for the Pacific" Guadalcanal: The Turning Point of the War, by Robert Leckie. A veteran of the Campaign.
Published by Bantam Books.
One of the luckiest or perhaps smartest things the Marines while getting ready to disembark to Guadalcanal was they stripped their trucks that were being left behind of M2 .50 HMG and the ammo supplies and kept those to the actual companies and transported as integral company gear. So not in the huge supplies or division gear. Without the .50's on the beach and helping to defend the perimeter, Guadalcanal would have been lost. The Marines actually issued a manual training order for the use of the M2 .50 as part of company level defense and stated the company commander when setting up defense would first site the M2's, then the LMG's, then the BAR then the riflemen. Also the use of the 37mm AT gun with cannister/shotgun rounds was pivotal at places like Bloody Ridge, etc.
On a sad note, I lost two uncles on Guadalcanal. Both wounded, both recovered, then both back into combat where they were KIA'd. One of my uncle's has a building named after him at Camp Pendleton.
While the Navy did abandon the beachhead and did so before unloading everything the Marines needed. The Marines were never really abandoned as you have noted. But, its a good way to wind up a squid forever, tho. :)
Chris
60 days worth of food Bloody hell I think the Marines expected too much I think the Australians on Kokoda would have loved to have 60 days of food.
The reason that they call it “Iron Bottom Sound” is because of all of the ships sunk in it. Look at the 5 Sullivan brothers that went down with 682 shipmates in the USS Juneau as an example of the losses experienced by the US Navy.
Guadalcanal was also deadly to the Japanese soldiers. Their nickname for it was “Starvation Island”. Contrary to a false belief, Japanese soldiers weren’t good jungle fighters, losses in New Guinea agree with it. They probably lost more soldiers to the island than to the fighting.
In Malaysia there was excellent preparation where jungle trails were mapped out that helped significantly to out flanked the British who had limited or no information on those trails.
Interesting presentations
If the Navy hadn't regrouped after the disaster at Savo, then the Marines would have been defeated.
It would be really cool to see a video on what percentage of the pre war american fleet was lost in the pacific from the beginning of the war up to the end of this campaign.
People forget that this the first American amphibious landing in the war, period
There were mistakes made and the need to keep the carriers as safe as possible made things difficult
But limited training and resources due to it being so early in the American part of WW2 made this a painful “learning experience” for leadership
I have fought this battle myself many times over the years. Just had a debate on- line with someone over the Pacific episode 1.
The people who generally are the worst will be my fellow Marines or people who had relatives in the Marines especially WWII vets.
For those that are wondering Fletcher had a number of good reasons for his decision to pull the carriers back.
1. Destroyer fuel state. Pre war estimates of fuel burn especially for destroyers had been shown to be massively optimistic especially if you needed to operate at high speed.
2. Fighter losses. There was a strong feeling at this point that the Zero was greatly superior to the Wildcat and Fletcher had already suffered a level of losses that was concerning
3. Air and Submarine threat. At this point in the war carrier forces were raiding forces. They were not like the big blue fleet of 1944 that had the power to stand off the most powerful Japanese base and destroy it.
4. But finally and most importantly Fletcher well understood that control of the seas would be the determining factor in who won. He knew there would be a carrier battle and if he lost we would lose Guadalcanal. It was going to be quite some time before the Essex class started showing up and he understood that his Carriers were at that moment irreplaceable national assets that had to be preserved. To lose one sinking a Japanese task force was one thing. To lose one to a submarine or land based air strike without any offsetting gain wasn’t acceptable. Not to mention that his orders from Nimitz continued to embody the famous principle of calculated risk.
It’s all too often forgotten that Frank Jack Fletcher despite being a career surface officer took command of US carrier forces at a time when the carrier as a weapon was still a very immature platform with an immature doctrinal playbook and then proceeded to go 3-0 against the finest carrier force in the world at the top of its game including the seminal Battle of Midway where he was in overall command. In those battles he sank 2 light carriers and 4 fleet carriers for the loss of 2 fleet carriers. One of which (USS Lexington) had suffered only minor damage and was doomed by a combination of bad luck and poor damage control and the other (Yorktown) which never would have been attacked at all had Pete Mitscher not disobeyed orders and sent Hornet’s squadrons off in the wrong direction.
@jetdriver great post. Sounds as if you are a fan of Adm Fletcher also. He did not lose a battle. And Mitscher I don't want to rant for an hour. So I'll just stop there.😀
@@73Tridentyou are not alone about Mitscher my friend. But castigating a dead guy 80 years later seems unproductive.
@@73Trident I am a fan of Fletcher. Consider what he was dealing with. He wasn’t an aviator and he gets placed in command of this very new weapon system that has never been in combat before and for which the doctrinal playbook is still almost non existent. The early aviators are skilled but they aren’t at the level of their Japanese counterparts. Who happen not only to be the best in the world at what they do but are also operating their ships in multi carrier groups that can launch a multi carrier fully coordinated strike in minutes. The IJN carrier force in 1942 is quite simply the best in the world period.
Despite all these handicaps (and more as well that vary from battle to battle) he goes 3-0. I’m sure I’m repeating a lot of what I’ve already said but it’s just a shame that King didn’t like him and Morrison further trashed his reputation. He deserved much much better.
@@scottl9660 I think given that much of the historical record has solely focused on Mitcher’s accomplishments in command of the Fast Carrier Task Forces it’s fair to point out his failures and seek a more balanced understanding of his record.
I knew veterans that were there. In the 1970s and 80s. YES the Navy did leave the battle area. With a plan to return. So they did not bug out and leave the Marines there forever. The one Marine I knew that was there. They had supplies for some things. Some like food rations were pretty scarce. All the Navy veterans I knew were on Supply ships.
The Story is true..... But it is incomplete because they had to protect the supply ships. Fletcher did the right thing.
The carriers left taking air cover with them. The surface screen stayed (forever in some cases.) The USN still had to learn how to combat load the cargo ships so that material would be unloaded in a way that was meaningful for food and ammo. Little planning had been given to how to get or leave aircraft on the airfield if it was ready for use. The light carrier ferrying some aircraft out from Pearl Harbor wasn't expected until mid August. The rest of the land based fighters were too far from Guadalcanal to fly in with out belly tanks that weren't available in sufficient numbers. Who knows if avgas and bombs would have been unloaded to supply fighters if they had been left behind. Ghormley did a poor job of making sure the oil tankers were routed properly to make sure they were rendezvousing properly with the fleets to make sure they were getting the fuel needed. Destroyers at the time burned a lot of fuel when at high speed operations and had small fuel tanks.
@@user-gl5dq2dg1j Both the Navy men I knew were on Cargo ships. They left the area. The late Don Miller watched the battle of Savo Island from his gun post and thought Our ships were shooting at each other. He ran the Landing craft to the Beaches after their return. He said the Marines were hungry and very pissed off.
Another good informative guest. The lack of facilities for unloading transports quickly was a problem. Also we were in a two ocean war with long range Uboats having their way with oil tankers just trying to get out of the Gulf. We were literally using yachts for submarine spotting which seems to me a suicide mission if any were spotted that way. Guadalcanal was the result of US Naval Chief Earnest King's directive to go on the offense immediately following the fortunes at Midway which had come unexpected to King who had been placing his confidence in the Washington DC team of Cryptologists..Army Chief of Staff George Marshal didn't like the Guadalcanal idea at least not at this early stage. He didn't think we had the Pacific resources to replace transports with yet should we have lost them in numbers. His eventual support was tentative at best.
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So it was a damned good thing that Admiral Mikawa didn't know the whereabouts of Fletcher's Carrier fleet the night his force of Cruisers snuck between our radar pickets into Guadalcanal Sound and sank four Allied Cruisers. Fletcher had decided to pull his Carriers out of the range of air raids from Rabaul, disastrous as their losses to AA were. Midway's sudden change of fortunes was no doubt on his mind and I don't think I'd be the one to second guess his focus on protecting the valuable national assets under his charge.
.Japan's surface fleet's practice was in night action which served them well once they lost the Air power in the Kido Butai. Daytime would see his task force back in Rabaul. But Fletcher's carriers were also out of range of Mikawa's Task force and had he known that and had he known more than IJN High Command knew about our intention to hold Guadalcanal he would've certainly gone after the transports and that would've been disastrous for our first offensive of the Pacific War. We'd have been fortunate to be able to evacuate our Marines from there at that time. It would've changed our timetable and very possibly for the harder fight than it already was. Our morale at home had reportedly been hurting some up until Midway.
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I wouldn't be second guessing Mikawa either for the same reason's as with Fletcher. Up until then we had been engaged in hit-n-run attacks on the perimeter of Japan's defensive ring of islands and they also didn't think we were logistically ready to occupy Guadalcanal's air base for our own just yet. ..King never seemed to forgive Fletcher for what he probably thought of as endangering his risky gamble at an early offensive. He knew how lucky we were.
King eventually wound up with plenty of reasons to get Fletcher out of the picture. Frank Jack was less than enthusiastic over the entire Watchtower operation and said so to Vandegrift and Kelly Turner, who had planned it and had been sent there by King to run the amphibious part of the operation.
@@dukeford Well a Japanese Admiral voiced similar misgivings about the Midway invasion plans as the Kido Butai got underway for the mission. He proposed at that late date a return to the goal of severing our sea lane to Australia and when they turned that idea down he pestered them with other ideas to improve or delay the mission because of half hazard planning . . . all of which sounded wise from my cheap seat, hindsight being 20-20. No doubt it drove Yamamoto 's blood pressure up. I'd not be surprised to have heard about the man's reassignment to some remote insignificant corner of their holdings . . . perhaps one of our bypassed islands.
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I'm just glad my vantage point is free from the weight of decision making of that magnitude. I would not envy Fletcher or King. I think it safest to say that I wouldn't second guess either one of them, lol.
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I'd like to hope I I had the good sense to fit drop tanks on P47s as soon as they showed up in the 8th AAF and from the vantage of Hap Arnold and Ira Eaker in '43. I'd have no problem deciding the end of their tenure as well if I were benevolent dictator. Otherwise I'd be delegating the decision making to more qualified people than I.
By the way, the note taker for Ghormley at thr Saratoga conference was Dan Callahan, that would be the admiral in charge of turning back that Nov 13th battleship force by the IJN.
He takes a lot of criticism for his planning of that battle but he also died leading it alongside those sailors.
Yep, we talked about Callahan and showed his photo in the video
Those US Navy transports and cargo ships that left after the invasion came back to Guadalcanal time and time again. The waters around Guadalcanal are littered with the remains of transports and cargo ships, most of them are Japanese.
Very cool
It’s fortunate for the Allies that the Japanese did so poorly in Guadalcanal. There was a huge learning curve for the US armed forces in the Pacific.
At the same time as the Guadalcanal campaign was on there was a parallel campaign against a greater Japanese force with in worse conditions with fewer rescores in the same area .
A few hundred miles to the east in New Guinea.
The Japanese treated both as part of one campaign.
There was no Naval support at all for the troops, US & Australian Army in New Guinea.
There were 350,000 Japanese troops in the New Guinea over 4 years of the campaign.
The marines had tanks heavy machine guns & artillery.
These were virtually unknown in New Guinea in the initial months of the fighting.
In the Kokoda campaign the Australians had no heavy machine guns, no artillery, no mortars .
The wounded had to crawl or be carried for up to a week to get to a hospital!
We tend to only hear about Guadalcanal.
I constantly stress the duality of the Papuan- New Guinea Guadalcanal Campaign. Both of those ended around the same time (Jan and Feb 43). They were the one two punch defeats to the Japanese that finally shifted the strategic initiative in the Pacific. Many of your data points cover the entire New Guinea Campaign up to 45. Dr Peter Williams actually did a myth show a few weeks back here about the Australians being outnumber on the Kokoda which turns out to be a myth. My wife’s grandfather was in the 2/33 Bn 7th Div there. On Guadalcanal the forces were generally even matched until the last month or so. Where does the death rate of 1 in 32 on Guadalcanal come from? This channel has several shows on the Australian and US Army’s fight in New Guinea.
I have checked out the episode on the Kokoda fight and when new information comes along if it stands up tp scrutiny ( as this does) i have changed my view on the size of the forces involved . Never too late to learn . However on the other subject on the relative chances of being KIA in New Guinea compared to Guadalcanal still feel some vindication Guadalcanal Compared To New Guinea
Comparing chances of Death in the Battle of Guadalcanal to those at the Battles of Buna & Gone. Fight. These were occurring at roughly the same time period & were seen as 2 parts of the same action.
This does not include the Milne Bay fighting.
On Guadalcanal: there were 60000 US troops (see below) . KIA among land combatants = 1,768 out of 60,000.
Buna Gona:20,000 US and Australian troops. KIA = 1,991
1. Frank, pp. 57, 619-621; Rottman, p. 64. Approximately 20,000 U.S. Marines and 40,000 U.S. Army troops were deployed on Guadalcanal at different times during the campaign. Figures for other the Allies are not included.
2. Tucker 2014, p. 213
3. The USMC History Division states that the US ground forces (Army and Marine Corps) suffered 4,709 total wounded. Marine air units add another 127 to this figure. Frank notes that the Bureau of Personnel, World War II Casualty List, Books 2 and 3, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. lists US Navy wounded over the course of the campaign as 2,953, (Frank, p. 644) but this number appears to be an understatement.
4.
1. The USMC History Division states that the US ground forces (Army and Marine Corps) suffered 4,709 total wounded. Marine air units add another 127 to this figure. Frank notes that the Bureau of Personnel, World War II Casualty List, Books 2 and 3, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. lists US Navy wounded over the course of the campaign as 2,953, (Frank, p. 644) but this number appears to be an understatement.
2. Frank, pp. 598-618; and Lundstrom, p. 456. 85 Australians were killed in the Battle of Savo Island. Total Solomon Islander deaths are unknown. Most of the rest, if not all, of those killed were American. Numbers include personnel killed by all causes including combat, disease, and accidents. Losses include 1,768 dead (ground), 4,911 dead (naval), and 420 dead (aircrew). Four U.S. aircrew were captured by the Japanese during the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands and survived their captivity.
Buna Gona
1. Australian War Memorial (AWM) collection reference number.
2. See Order of battle for details.
3. Deaths include 1,204 Australian and 671 US killed in action or died of wounds. Illness from contracting tropical diseases exceeded 50 percent of the Allied troops. This figure includes nearly 8,000 Americans evacuated sick but does not include Australian troops evacuated sick (see section - 'Aftermath').
4.
Units involved
See Battle of Buna-Gona: Allied forces and order of battle
Strength
20,000+ (total) [Note 2]
)
Casualties and losses
1,991 killed,
12,300+ injured or sick[Note 4]
14,291 Casualties out of a force von 20,000 !
Cheers Paul
@@paulobrien3241 thanks. Did you include the sick rates at Guadalcanal? I know the 1st MarDiv alone had over 8,000 cas from sickness.
Well we were discussing the stats for KIA as a percentage of troops involver . I think we can agree both places were pretty shitty .That being said 8000 as a percentage of 60,000 is still fewer than 12000+ out of 20,000. My point was that through that time in the war the troops in New Guinea had no naval support at all . Just one destroyer to shell the Japanese at Buna or Gona would have been a game changer. All MacArthur had was the small boats unit . Mostly civilian craft who volunteered to run supplies and men around the New Guinea coast. I actually have met several men from Newcastle who were in the small boats flotilla. They did not receive any official recognition . They were not US or Australian navy. They were civilian volunteers .paid by their civilian employers . Yet they were required to go into a war zone .If killed their families received nothing from the respective navies because they were never officially a part to either service.. Perhaps this is a good subject for a future WW2TV show @@guadalcanal-walkingabattle5349
The more you know about Guadalcanal the more complicated it gets.
48 hours after the landing, the Japanese navy showed up and creamed the USN. 5 cruisers and 2 destroyers lost. The transports had no choice but to run away. But they did not stay gone. This is where we got introduced to the long lance Japanese torpedo.
I would not say they abandoned the Marines, but perhaps the plan was more "half-baked". Which, considering the status of the U.S. navy and marines at that point in the war, they did really, really well. The whole mess could have been a catastrophic defeat at multiple points over those months.
Even if Fletcher was fully aware what was going on at Savo Island he couldn't do anything about it. It was a night action and night carrier flight ops didn't exist in the USN. Even if Fletcher launched a strike package they could have easily hit their own ships.
Within the week after Halsey became area commander, the Japanese made a serious attempt to drive US forces from Henderson and Guadalcanal, by land, sea, and air. A week after taking command Halsey's naval forces fought the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, in which US carriers were outnumbered 4 flight decks to 2, and nearly 3:2 in aircraft. US forces paid heavily for this, but Halsey basically put his carriers on the line to preserve the Guadalcanal campaign. Then about 3 weeks after he did the same with his surface forces, risking their destruction for the sake of the campaign. Ghormley had been cautious, and possibly thought his campaign would be defeated; Halsey acted boldly, paid heavily, but after the mid November battles, the IJN and IJA started to realize they were facing defeat. Halsey's actions at sea were in parallel with the difficult land fighting of the Marines (and Army?).
Halsey followed in Nimitz's footsteps and actually visited Guadalcanal. He asked Vandergrift what he needed to win the campaign and then did his best to deliver. Ghormley never left Nomeau.
Halsey was great early in the war, not so much later. Ghormley was never good at all.
@@73Trident Agreed. Once '44 rolled around, the fleet was to large for Halsey's chaotic leadership style. Halsey was perhaps just a bit too aggressive and had an all or nothing attitude. Spruance was perhaps the best fleet admiral the USN has in the war.
@@73Trident Ghormley was out of his element as the area commander, but later did decent work for Nimitz as commander of the 14th Naval District in Pearl and at the end of the war under Betty Stark in Europe.
As a retired US Marine I'd say no.
The US Navy had good reason to get the transports and cargo ships out of the area at the time.
BUT they could have just moved to another area and come back a day or two later.
Marines were "abandoned" and suffered greatly due to four Navy failures. 1) The southern naval force was struck first, ships retreated without informing the fleet of the action, which allowed the northern naval force to be surprised. Thousands of sailors died due to naval command and control incompetence. 2) Fletcher gave priority to his carriers over the landing force during a period of time the landing force should have had priority at the risk of the carriers. 3) The Navy planned inadequate logistical support. 4) Abject failure of unity of command by Gormley. As a result, to this day Marines attempt to operate without reliance upon any other service --an impossibility which will lead to a disaster.
All l know is my uncle Mark was at Gudicanal , the family always told a story that Uncle Mark once slugged a navy boy in his whites , broke his nose , the cops asked why ... he replied " Principal".
No just the Philippines and Bataan!
The myth is that the Naval Leadership was competent.
Harsh
Untrue
The continued existence of the Enterprise was the one thing standing between the Marines and a Japanese prison camp--at best.
Navy abandon ..... No. Fletcher abandoned with his forced 3 day only plan Even though everyone else was telling him 4 to 5 days minimum. Dave states that a marginal but adequate amount of ammunition got off loaded But doesn't state primarily only small arms ammo. He doesn't mention that only the light artillery got off, And without their prime movers. He doesn't mention that heavy artillery never Got off for the initial landings. He doesn't even touch upon water (Marines that landed only had one canteen each), or engineer equipment to complete the runways which was the primary reason for the landing. He states that marine infantry men refused to Help with the off loading when it's a well-known fact that many of them did. Plus Either doesn't know or just fails to mention that It was requested from the navy to provide off loading assistance on the shore but they refused. It's a well-known and well documented fact that the Marines initially subsisted on captured Japanese rations, and that the engineers only managed to complete the runways to receive planes by using left behind Japanese equipment.
Was logistics and planning inadequate .... Absolutely it was. But that does not justify being miserly and over protective of those assets you do have. Casualties and losses are a part of warfare. But the mission always comes first, No matter what the risk. Is no matter the cost, the basics to complete the mission had to get off loaded and weren't.
So to say that the navy abandoned the Marines is unfair and untrue. But to say that Fletcher ordered it is fact. So it's safe to say that if not for the resourcefulness of the Marines who did land and The materials left behind by the Japanese, The airfield would never have been compleaded and the island would probably have been recaptured by the Japanese.
Hi. The heavy 155mm battalion was left in NZ due to weight. All the rest of the arty including the 105mm Bn offloaded. Plenty of arty ammo. The priority of offloading were ammo, water, food and medical supplies. I only had a short time to discuss the subject and could deep dive into specifics. I know all about the transport loading and unloading issues. Plenty of blame to go around on all sides.
well considering that japanese absolutely pummling the us navy and allied fleets at the Battle of Savo Island they had little choice really.
One fact that needs to be brought to like about 'Watchtower' is that it had to happen before the airfield that became Henderson Field became operational. By Japanese standards it almost was operational. Had the airfield been operational 'Watchtower' would not have been possible in 1942. It was a now or never thing with whatever is availible, in other words it was get ashore and we'll figure out the rest later. Enjoyed the presentation, but this is vital to understanding why the JCS put the Marines in such a sorry situation. I think Dave would agree, what do you think?
I expect Dave will see this and reply
Dave here. I totally agree and that’s why the JCS and especially Admiral King were willing to take such a big risk. One of the controversies with Fletcher is his priority on the carriers over the operation even though the JCS seemed willing to take that risk. Nimitz ‘calculated risk’ doctrine I think played a part in Fletchers thinking. Ghormley even thought his main priority was keeping that supply line open from the US to Australia not Watchtower.
@@guadalcanal-walkingabattle5349 Fletcher had to operate within Nimitz battle doctrine of 'calculated risk' which certainly precluded losing carriers if at all possible. He had to do what he did to stay within doctrine. I've been through the Gray Book and Morison's history. Some folk's haven't. Those folks may not understand the basic rules of engagement imposed on Fletcher. Timing and doctrine are the overlooked or maybe ignored keys in this whole operation. Thank you.
Thanks Dave
No myth,take the word of the Marines who were there.
Did you even watch the show?
😊😊😊😊😊👍👍👍👍👍
if true that the marines refused to help unloading material on the beach, because they where marines and wouldnt help. I cant help but think of what happened later as karma...
Partially true. I mention this in the episode. Vandergrift only had 5 infantry battalions on Guadalcanal on 7 Aug. Their intelligence suggested that a large Japanese infantry regiment was on the island which had not been encountered yet (later to be false info). They were required to man an initial beachhead perimeter. Their commanders refused any Marines to be pulled away to unload. The 1st Pioneer Bn had been earmarked to be the shore party but were low in numbers. After this the Marine landing shore units were established. They are still in existence and wear red tabs on their uniforms as a means of ID for off loading on the beach. We use to call them red tabs and told others that meant they had a disease 😀. I was a young infantry Marine so we had to have fun somehow.
And the Infantry refusing to unload the stores .Hell try that that in the Australian Army and it would have been "Get off your arses if you want to eat, unload, if not we take it back. No mucking about with the Aust Engineers that operated the Small Ships
They were expecting a major counterattack by a regiment of Japanese infantry that intell had placed on the island. The commanders were reluctant to give them to US Navy beach master at the time.
@@guadalcanal-walkingabattle5349 Crap our infantry helped unload the ships at Tobruk
@@jacktattisby the end of the Guadalcanal campaign entire infantry battalions were rotated back to act as stevedores. After Guadalcanal the USMC established complete landing shore units specifically designed for that work. An interesting point the USMC in 42 had the most effective amphibious doctrine of any nation. The other Allies, including the Australians, used the basis of the doctrine in their later amphibious assaults. This 1934 doctrine was arguably the greatest thing the USMC did for the overall war effort. I’m very familiar with the Australian efforts in Europe and throughout the Pacific. My wife’s grandfathers were both Australian vets there. I’ve served personally both in overseas operations with USMC forces and in Australian forces. Both are great and comparing the two then as now is like apples and oranges.
@@guadalcanal-walkingabattle5349 By the end was a bit bloody late.
@@guadalcanal-walkingabattle5349 Mate the Guadalcanal campaign went for six months and it was a shambles Of course they got their act together at the end of it
That doctrine was not used in the west and they did all right. D/Day ?The Brits and Canucks were six miles off the beach by the end of the day and there were 75000 of them.
We never had our Army in Europe in WW2 We came back to fight the Japs after El Alamein The Kiwis went through Italy with the Brits.
Fletcher absolutely abandoned them and the rest of the fleet.
Or did he do exactly what he told them he would do?
@@WW2TV Pre-invasion he said nothing about abandoning the surface fleet. He got cold feet and asked Vice Admiral Robert Lee Ghormley if he could flee, to which he agreed. Both would be replace before then end of the year.
"That bastard left us bare-assed at Guadalcanal!" - Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner
You didn't actually watch the video did you?
@@WW2TV I did. Mikawa was heavy criticized for not making the transport/supply ships the priority, as he had lost focus of the priority. Fletcher failed in the same way, the landing and the protection of the logistic was the priority.
Did Fletcher contact his superiors and tell them he was refusing to protect the shipping in and around Guadalcanal? No, and when Admiral King found out he was livid.
What Fletcher did was tell subordinates that he was going to bug out before the operation was anywhere near completed regardless of the results to the operation.
"Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto signaled a congratulatory note to Mikawa on his victory, stating, "Appreciate the courageous and hard fighting of every man of your organization. I expect you to expand your exploits and you will make every effort to support the land forces of the Imperial army which are now engaged in a desperate struggle." Later on, though, when it became apparent that Mikawa had missed an opportunity to destroy the Allied transports, he was intensely criticised by his comrades."
Do you think Vice Admiral Mikawa Gunichi would get a pass on his action because he told a subordinate ahead of time?
The Japanese had some advantages at the beginning of Ww2 that were not clearly understood for quite a while.
The advantages applicable to the disparate performance of the USN and the IJN were .....1. The
Japanese were considerably better at night ope r ations 2. The so called Long Lance torp e do which fu n ctioned quite well and ha d a range that was not well understood ny the allies.
The ABDAcruiser division suffered from a split commsnd and were not well ca oordinated.
The Japanese executed a picture perfect attack. Their torpedo launch and gunnery were perfect..
The picket ship for the ABDA cruser divi d ion did not pick up on the arrival of the Japanese task force. Surprise was complete.
The result was the ABDA cruisers were sunk . The NAVY took a real bearing.
The NZ longshoremen were a fairly disgraceful bunch by most accounts. The Marines had to unload their bulk packed cargo ships and repack them "invasion offload" style mostly on their own. Think of how stuff arrives in bulk truckloads at a Costco distribution center and then how it has to be rearranged and reshipped to reach their "wholesale" outlets for efficient daily distribution to customers.
These cargo ships were extremely scarce and valuable fast vessels.
Please keep that in mind as the story unfolds.
Some perspective here. There were a small number of strikers! Under the war emergency powers. They were arrested sent to trial and imprisoned! But this had nothing to do with the order of loading these ships. That was under the US military Authorities. And it was of course, a number of weeks before the invasion of Guadalcanal. Anyway, both the US and NZ military jumped in to finish loading the ships. Actually, if possible, the military preferred to load their ships. Or at least have them loaded under their close supervision. All the Allies including the US Aust etc, had strikes and disrupters to deal with during the war. Not just NZ. Think about it. Like Aust NZ had been at war since Sept 1939!! And had most of its fighting men overseas. Given this reality! Do you think the public had any great sympathy for these trouble makers!!?
@@davidtaylor351thanks for this reply and information. This in itself could be a blown out myth (Ive just excepted) as it’s always written the NZ dock workers all refused to unload those ships. What you say makes perfect sense and now I will do some research myself on this.
Dave Holland gave an outstanding presenting an issue that for so many decades has been misunderstood by so many; The U.S. Navy’s “abandonment” of the USMC invasion force on Guadalcanal in 1942.
Also, I normally have praise for WW2TV for there detailed and probing format, but I think Mr. Holland was given kinda given the “bum’s rush” at the conclusion of his fine presentation. Only one follow up question and virtually no further discussion regarding something that was, and still is, of great historical importance to Americans.
As of 2024 this historical misunderstanding is still a small but persistent wedge between the relations of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps personnel. The lack of follow up conversation is was uncharacteristic of this channel. Very, very disappointing.
Dave here. Thanks for the nice comments and glad you enjoyed it. In defense of Woody and the channel these myth themed shows are designed to go under 30 minutes. As there was no other guest following me I thank Woody for allowing the extra time he did.
Harsh comments, we're specifically trying to keep these shows to a shorter length to bring in new viewers
@@WW2TV I apologize if I came across as harsh, I was just disappointed, that’s all. I so look forward to your responses to your guest’s presentations and the subsequent feedback from your inquiries that it was so surprising when you just ended the show.
Essentially I am moving forward trying to play the TH-cam game. I've spent 3 years doing only long format shows, and although views have been steadily rising, the calibre of guests deserves more views. Since starting the 20-30 minute myth busting shows, views have tripled, so clearly it works. You know and I know Dave can talk for hours on this, but I need to think about sustaining the channel long term@@parrot849
@@WW2TV Completely understood. No matter how deeply you or anyone would desire to dive into any single subject, you, as a channel owner needs to do what is necessary to survive and grow the channel. 100% behind whatever your decisions take you. You are one of the few pure educators of World War Two history currently available online and whatever you need to do to sustain and grow your wonderful program go for it….
These seems an awful lot like: Everyone onboard USS Thresher was killed immediately when contact with the sub was lost.
*Fast Forward 60 years*
"Most of the entire crew was alive, to the point that they engaged the main sonar battery and sent out regular pings until the battery ran dry. Essentially screaming for help until they couldn't."
What I'm saying is: The United States Navy, lies out of convenience. Along with the Government it serves.
So if you are taking "The Navy's" word as gospel, I figure you must function at below average intelligence.
I don't disagree with your points, but I would draw the line at your last comment about anyone believing what the Navy says being of below-average intelligence
"HF radio propagation is a science" - HA! HA! HA! HA!
It is a dark art with wishful thinking thrown in.
Yes it’s a frustrating dark art at times 😊
excuses are like a holes every one has one. no revision is going to save the navys reputation. they lit out scared. the navy could have left the transports for sacrifice to get unloaded. we had plenty
That's really harsh and not at all true, did you even watch the video?
I appreciate your considered response and input. Unfortunately we did not have plenty of transports. The logistical situation in 1942 regarding those were dire. As I pointed out in the episode the transports were not carrying the heavy loads but the cargo ships were.
@@WW2TV Thank you for responding to just another a++++ with an opinion. I watched every min. the navy could have left the transports behind. we had plenty. it would have bolstered the marines. Did i miss the part where you mention the tokyo express sailing up the slot shelling the marines. i think that also leads to the poor reputaion of the navy. i understand it was a whole campaign. and on a shoestring. and it cost plenty. the navy could have taken its time like an english officer not crouching could have acted as if it was in control. not acting scared to save a few expendable transports
I try and reply to most comments when I can
@@andrewfischer8564 they were protecting the 3 out of the only 4 carriers they had left in the Pacific. Fletcher had placed the importance of the safety of the carriers over the amphibious assault for a number of reasons.
Lots of information but…he’s extremely hard to listen to, disjointed at times, moving back and forth in time and occasionally diffficult to understand partiallly due to the use of acronyms and I think partially due to what I think is his acccent. I would really like to read him as it would be easier for me.
Interesting, maybe I'm used to Dave's accent but I think it was a measured and solid presentation. Dave has not written on the subject yey, but he has plenty of content on his channel th-cam.com/channels/SPWS6QYjnWy6_8-m7NvE-Q.html
Thanks for the response and the link. I think if he had more time and been able to slow down I would have been more comfortable. I was already aware of much of the info he presented and that helped. Using terms such as units of fire didn’t help. I’m sure they’re common terms in the military and he did explain what it meant later in the discussion. He just needs to remember he’s not really talking to you, he’s talking to an audience. I look forward to more of your content and Dave’s as well especially if he decides to publish.
@@WW2TV
Thanks
People used to be surprised I didn’t have an accent, go figure. Having met Dave, he told me he has, what you’d call a hybrid accent. Glad he put this myth to bed.