These videos have allowed me to fully and finally grasp what happened at these locations that hours of reading couldn't do for me. You have been extremely patient in answering several very critical and rude commenters on here. Like you said- it's impossible to get every exact detail perfectly correct on these map/videos. I'm ordering your book and appreciate the time/dedication you put into this. Thank you.
Heys, JackMany thanks for this one! Your talking me through this animated map helps to clarify a great deal. My great great grand dad was there in the Vermont 13th.
Hi Jack. I really enjoy these companion pieces to your book but I think there's a slip-up in this one you might want to correct. At 1:57 you say " . . . the assumed bull's-eye of the Federal attack . . ." where I'm sure you meant to say "Confederate attack". Regardless, well done. Cheers!
Again very good. What software did you use for those maps? Wilcox and Lang charged into the reserve artillery line of McGilvery, a daunting task. This was the support that if properly timed, would have prevented the VT regiments from enfilading the CSA flanks. It is the support that Lee referred to when he said the attack would have been successfull, "If properly supported.....", which it was not
Just a note to share. The "Copse of Trees" was not the objective. The military objective--the reason for both of Longstreet's assaults on July 2nd and 3rd was always Cemetery Hill. In fact, you can find this in General R.E. Lee's Post combat reports. When Lee arrived at Gettysburg; around 4:30pm or sometime thereafter; he saw what every general officer saw on that field. Cemetery Hill was the most strategic and prominent terrain around. Lee wrote in his reports that his objective was,..... ".....to make Cemetery Hill untenable...." Zeigler's Grove was the objective on July 3rd. It sits just southwest of Cemetery Hill. The "copse of trees" was the physical landmark used by Pickett to coordinate his division and ensure that all 3 brigades under Pickett's command aligned properly by the "left oblique". If you'd like to know more, simply reply and I'll answer any other questions you may have about what REALLY happened at Gettysburg.
Gregory: This the first I've heard oanyone suggesting that Zeigler's Grove, let alone Cemetery Hill, was the bull's eye of the final attack on July 3rd! If it was, the Confederates definitely missed!
@@jackkunkel yeah they missed!! The tremendous volume of fire directed at them caused most confederate units to "flinch". Thus driving more easterly to get into closer contact with Hancock's Corps. Pickett's division was to slam into the union lines further north of the copse of trees. With Pettigrew and Trimble taking the more direct approach to the base of Zeigler's Grove. Lee's plan was always to "...make Cemetery Hill untenable." I've always been curious as to what Lee and Longstreet discussed under that tree on the night-morning of July 1-2. No one will ever know because no one recorded their conversation. We only know of the meeting through a confederate surgeon's reports about the incident. .
@@jackkunkel truth is difficult to find amidst all the stories. Begin your investigation by reviewing Robert E. Lee's post Gettysburg campaign reports. They're archived in Richmond, VA.
Can I use this maps for educational purposes? I'm a German civil war buff and I want my people to know about Gettysburg. There is very little information avaible in german language and I am willing to change that. Deo vindice, Curd Schumacher. P.s My 3 times grand uncle J.S.Ray fought in one of the N.C Regiments.
Sure you can use the maps for education purposes! That's what they're there for. As discussed in through out the book, German immigrants played a big part in the Gettysburg battle - both as civilians and as soldiers - and in fact they were probably in all the Civil War battles. Mostly they were on the Union side, but an unknown number also fought for the South.
J.E.B. Stuart with his 6,000 rough neck soldiers were to just blast their way though only 2,500 soldiers that protected the East back flank. There was one problem and nobody talks about it. George Armstrong Custer and 2,500 soldiers twice charged out to met Stuart’s 6,000 soldiers and drove them back to where they were 1st positioned not once but twice, saving the Union army from a rear attack from Stuart’s forces. My ? Why is this never told when the Gettysburg’s war is told, they might say Stuart was turned back but not a word of Custer who was out front of his men. And you never hear how many soldiers were involved 6,000 Confederate soldiers vs 2,499 Union soldiers with 1- Custer.
The battle of East Cavalry Field (Custer, Stuart, etc) is fully discussed in the book in Chapt 25. And there's an animation to go with it, as there are with most of the book chapters. There are 24 animations here on TH-cam. You will find all of them at th-cam.com/users/feedmy_videos
Most of Pettigrew's men never reached the stone wall- they retreated in fear back into Seminary Woods. Gen Trimble tells us they never got closer than 200 yards. Pickett's men tell us Pettigrew's men fled back into the woods not getting closer than 500 yards. Take your pick- most of Pettigrew's division never made it to the Union lines at the stone wall in any great numbers leaving Pickett's men to do the heavy fighting and dying that day:(
@Ken: The 72PA didn’t break and run. They refused to advance when ordered, but they stood their ground and kept firing, only advancing once it was clear the Confederates were falling back. Regarding Pettigrew’s (formerly Heth’s) division, which had been heavily shot up in the 1st day’s fighting, his far-left brigade - Brockenbrough’s VA brigade - did break and run. However, the bulk of his other brigades made it to the fence on Emmitsburg Rd, though only a small (and unknown) percentage continued charging across the road and up the hill to the wall. All of this is discussed at some length in the book.
@@jackkunkel Eyewitness accounts from the 69th Irish Brigade who were immediately to the left of the 71st PA regiment said they fled to the rear in cowardly panic- eyewitness words not mine:)
@@jackkunkel The overall Conf commanding officer- Gen Trimble- in an eyewitness account- said Pettigrew's men never got closer than 200 yards of the stone wall- sorry, those darn eyewitness accounts again.
@@kenbash2951 (a) Trimble was not the overall commander. He was merely commander of the division that followed Pettigrew's. (b) And he stated that all he could see of Pettigrew's brigade ahead of him was a cloud of smoke in front of him at Emmitsburg Rd, which is (c) exactly 200 yards to the wall. at the Outer Angle. I know that because I've measured it.
@@kenbash2951The 71PA wasn't involved in this issue. Look at a map. It was the 72PA we're talking about. My understanding, also from eye witnesses - the 72PA's brigade commander- was that the 72PA refused to charge but didn't run. Believe what you want, but it'd be helpful if you read a book or two on the subject.
The 71st Pennsylvania Regiment of the Union army fled the stone wall completely and ran to the rear in fear leaving the 69th PA regiment alone at the key attack point at the copse of tress. They didn't split up- they ran to the rear in panic and fear as they saw the Pickett's man approaching- there fixed it:)
There are many variables at play in Longstreets Assault (aka Picketts Charge). Firstly... the artillery barge that preceded the assault was relatively ineffective at achieving its tactical goal. Overshooting its target, a fact the Confederate command did not know. Second, the Union Army was able to mass its entire force on the field quicker than Lee believed they could, largely as a result of Stuarts absence not providing him with good intel. By the time of Longstreets assault on the 3rd day the entire 6th Corp (the largest Corp in the Union Army, 1/5th of the Union Infantry, and last in line of march) had reached the field and fully reinforced the Union position... Lee's objective at Gettysburg was to launch large scale attacks before the Union Army was fully concentrated... he believed the 6th Corp was not yet fully up, when in fact they were already deployed... again a lack of intel. Thirdly... the arrival of the Artillery reserve and redistribution of artillery allowed Meade to place fresh guns on Cemetery Ridge and then ordered them to remain silent until an infantry attack... the Confederate High Command had no idea the Union Artillery was massed on Cemetery Ridge in the numbers they were. Forth... Meade had tremendously accurate intel on the Confederate order of battle. He knew on the night of the 2nd Day that the entire Confederate Army had engaged at Gettysburg accept Picketts Division. He wisely judged that the 3rd day would see an assault by Picketts Division on his center... and he spent the night of the 2nd and morning of the 3rd reinforcing his lines. Late on the night of 2nd the Union High Command convened a meeting and decided the best course of action was to adjust their lines to maximize their positions advantage. The Union army spend a solid 6-8 hours reinforcing and adjusting their position for renewed Confederate attacks on the 3rd day... they were ready, to say the least.... this at time when Lee's knowledge of the Union Army was inaccurate and he still believed the Army was not fully on the field. Fifth.... Lee had destroyed 4 Union Corps in 2 days of fighting... he had no reason to believe his men could not destroy one more. Sixth... Pickett fell apart. In an assault that reached its objective of breaking the Union line, once the assault began to falter Pickett utter fell apart. The final push of the division and retreat of his men were done without Pickett effecting any control of himself or his command. In the hands on a solid command leader the Division could have had at a minimum and orderly retreat and possibly a firmer control of the break. Unfortunately Pickett was not that kind of General. He completely and utter fell to pieces and totally lost Lee's confidence for not lookin after his division. Late in the War Lee placed Pickett under arrest for yet another complete collapse of his command ability... and in seeing Pickett later in marching along in retreat with his collapsed command said to an aid "is that man still with this Army?" ... Pickett proved at Gettysburg ineffectual leadership and by the end of the war had earned a place on the Confederate shit-list... only after the war, as the Lost Cause Myth lifted up confederate generals did we begin to see Pickett in a positive light. Picketts career as of commander has little to see in a positive light. Lastly... Lee underestimated Meade. Lee assumed Meade would be cautious and careful in his new command and be slow to react. Lee felt strong fast assaults would overwhelm Meade as it did his predecessors. However, Meade was a confident and quick tempered Commander that was solid in battle and firm in resolve. He moved fast and made good tactical decisions on the fly. He conferred with his Corp commanders and utilized the talents of his better officers in the fight... especially Hancock. Lee misjudged Meade. All of these factors and more caused Lees failure, most of which Lee simply did not know. The confederates fought as good as could be expected and better... they just reached a bit too far given their intelligence disadvantages at Gettysburg.
Dynamic Prepper , that’s an outstanding and highly accurate accounting of what went wrong. I love Lee as a commander but I’d fault him for two more things. First , he proceeded to prepare for a battle even while knowing he was blind and lacking intel and against Longstreets cautions , and two, invading the north in general. . Even though Antietam was no real strategic victory for the north , it was essentially a very costly battle for Lee with no gain, and Lee was lucky to retreat back out of there - ditto for GB. Twice Lee entered the north , and twice suffered what proved to be insurmountable losses. If they fought south and strictly defended their land , they may have outlasted Lincoln’s stomach for the prolonged war
I don’t see how it ever could have succeeded being that Meade had so much support located behind Cemetery Ridge to fill in any openings that might occur in the union line . Supposedly I have read that he had 10,000 men in reserve here .
get your history correct or dont put out videos. Davis' Brigade was past the fence they went to the Bryan/ Brian Barn they went the farthest. You have too many inaccuracies to even be considered serious.
Jeff: Keep in mind that these videos are a supplement to the book, not vice versa, and there's only so much detail that can be squeezed into a short video involving so many regiments. The book mentions that SOME of Davis' brigade crossed the fences and charged the barn. "A few dozen " according to one Federal gunner.
These videos have allowed me to fully and finally grasp what happened at these locations that hours of reading couldn't do for me. You have been extremely patient in answering several very critical and rude commenters on here. Like you said- it's impossible to get every exact detail perfectly correct on these map/videos. I'm ordering your book and appreciate the time/dedication you put into this. Thank you.
Excellent and clear presentation. Thank you.
Excellent presentation. Very clear graphic- and verbal description! Well done, sir.
Heys, JackMany thanks for this one! Your talking me through this animated map helps to clarify a great deal. My great great grand dad was there in the Vermont 13th.
What a ridiculous way to assault a position. “Hey guys, the idea is for us to keep dying until the other guys run out of bullets.”
Very nicely done
Very good.
Hi Jack. I really enjoy these companion pieces to your book but I think there's a slip-up in this one you might want to correct. At 1:57 you say " . . . the assumed bull's-eye of the Federal attack . . ." where I'm sure you meant to say "Confederate attack". Regardless, well done. Cheers!
I like to read your book.👍
Gonna have to read the book now :)
Again very good. What software did you use for those maps?
Wilcox and Lang charged into the reserve artillery line of McGilvery, a daunting task. This was the support that if properly timed, would have prevented the VT regiments from enfilading the CSA flanks.
It is the support that Lee referred to when he said the attack would have been successfull, "If properly supported.....", which it was not
What if.....
Just a note to share. The "Copse of Trees" was not the objective. The military objective--the reason for both of Longstreet's assaults on July 2nd and 3rd was always Cemetery Hill.
In fact, you can find this in General R.E. Lee's
Post combat reports.
When Lee arrived at Gettysburg; around 4:30pm or sometime thereafter; he saw what every general officer saw on that field.
Cemetery Hill was the most strategic and prominent terrain around. Lee wrote in his reports that his objective was,.....
".....to make Cemetery Hill untenable...."
Zeigler's Grove was the objective on July 3rd.
It sits just southwest of Cemetery Hill.
The "copse of trees" was the physical landmark used by Pickett to coordinate his division and ensure that all 3 brigades under Pickett's command aligned properly by the "left oblique".
If you'd like to know more, simply reply and I'll answer any other questions you may have about what REALLY happened at Gettysburg.
Gregory: This the first I've heard oanyone suggesting that Zeigler's Grove, let alone Cemetery Hill, was the bull's eye of the final attack on July 3rd! If it was, the Confederates definitely missed!
@@jackkunkel yeah they missed!!
The tremendous volume of fire directed at them caused most confederate units to "flinch".
Thus driving more easterly to get into closer contact with Hancock's Corps.
Pickett's division was to slam into the union lines further north of the copse of trees.
With Pettigrew and Trimble taking the more direct approach to the base of Zeigler's Grove.
Lee's plan was always to "...make Cemetery Hill untenable."
I've always been curious as to what Lee and Longstreet discussed under that tree on the night-morning of July 1-2.
No one will ever know because no one recorded their conversation.
We only know of the meeting through a confederate surgeon's reports about the incident.
.
@@gregorydonatelli3429 I think you've been smoking something! You might want to read a book on the subject, or just look at a map. But whatever!
@@jackkunkel truth is difficult to find amidst all the stories.
Begin your investigation by reviewing Robert E. Lee's post Gettysburg campaign reports.
They're archived in Richmond, VA.
Can I use this maps for educational purposes?
I'm a German civil war buff and I want my people to know about Gettysburg.
There is very little information avaible in german language and I am willing to change that.
Deo vindice, Curd Schumacher.
P.s My 3 times grand uncle J.S.Ray fought in one of the N.C Regiments.
Sure you can use the maps for education purposes! That's what they're there for. As discussed in through out the book, German immigrants played a big part in the Gettysburg battle - both as civilians and as soldiers - and in fact they were probably in all the Civil War battles. Mostly they were on the Union side, but an unknown number also fought for the South.
@@jackkunkel thank you so much, foremost in the name of those brave men of both sides, who fought, suffered and died.
They shall never be forgotten!
@@jackkunkel thank you so much, foremost in the name of those brave men of both sides, who fought, suffered and died.
They shall never be forgotten!
J.E.B. Stuart with his 6,000 rough neck soldiers were to just blast their way though only 2,500 soldiers that protected the East back flank. There was one problem and nobody talks about it. George Armstrong Custer and 2,500 soldiers twice charged out to met Stuart’s 6,000 soldiers and drove them back to where they were 1st positioned not once but twice, saving the Union army from a rear attack from Stuart’s forces. My ? Why is this never told when the Gettysburg’s war is told, they might say Stuart was turned back but not a word of Custer who was out front of his men. And you never hear how many soldiers were involved 6,000 Confederate soldiers vs 2,499 Union soldiers with 1- Custer.
The battle of East Cavalry Field (Custer, Stuart, etc) is fully discussed in the book in Chapt 25. And there's an animation to go with it, as there are with most of the book chapters. There are 24 animations here on TH-cam. You will find all of them at th-cam.com/users/feedmy_videos
Most of Pettigrew's men never reached the stone wall- they retreated in fear back into Seminary Woods. Gen Trimble tells us they never got closer than 200 yards. Pickett's men tell us Pettigrew's men fled back into the woods not getting closer than 500 yards. Take your pick- most of Pettigrew's division never made it to the Union lines at the stone wall in any great numbers leaving Pickett's men to do the heavy fighting and dying that day:(
@Ken: The 72PA didn’t break and run. They refused to advance when ordered, but they stood their ground and kept firing, only advancing once it was clear the Confederates were falling back.
Regarding Pettigrew’s (formerly Heth’s) division, which had been heavily shot up in the 1st day’s fighting, his far-left brigade - Brockenbrough’s VA brigade - did break and run. However, the bulk of his other brigades made it to the fence on Emmitsburg Rd, though only a small (and unknown) percentage continued charging across the road and up the hill to the wall.
All of this is discussed at some length in the book.
@@jackkunkel Eyewitness accounts from the 69th Irish Brigade who were immediately to the left of the 71st PA regiment said they fled to the rear in cowardly panic- eyewitness words not mine:)
@@jackkunkel The overall Conf commanding officer- Gen Trimble- in an eyewitness account- said Pettigrew's men never got closer than 200 yards of the stone wall- sorry, those darn eyewitness accounts again.
@@kenbash2951 (a) Trimble was not the overall commander. He was merely commander of the division that followed Pettigrew's. (b) And he stated that all he could see of Pettigrew's brigade ahead of him was a cloud of smoke in front of him at Emmitsburg Rd, which is (c) exactly 200 yards to the wall. at the Outer Angle.
I know that because I've measured it.
@@kenbash2951The 71PA wasn't involved in this issue. Look at a map. It was the 72PA we're talking about. My understanding, also from eye witnesses - the 72PA's brigade commander- was that the 72PA refused to charge but didn't run. Believe what you want, but it'd be helpful if you read a book or two on the subject.
The 71st Pennsylvania Regiment of the Union army fled the stone wall completely and ran to the rear in fear leaving the 69th PA regiment alone at the key attack point at the copse of tress. They didn't split up- they ran to the rear in panic and fear as they saw the Pickett's man approaching- there fixed it:)
Grade A Copium boys, Pickett’s charge was decisively crushed and was a costly mistake (although in full context Lee’s actions do have merit)
Those Green Mountain Boys!! 16th & 13th Vermont!!
What could I possibly add? I'm struck dumb. Vermont … my God! … Vermont!
Is there any evidence that Pickett's charge might have succeeded instead of being the one-sided slaughter that it was ?
There are many variables at play in Longstreets Assault (aka Picketts Charge). Firstly... the artillery barge that preceded the assault was relatively ineffective at achieving its tactical goal. Overshooting its target, a fact the Confederate command did not know. Second, the Union Army was able to mass its entire force on the field quicker than Lee believed they could, largely as a result of Stuarts absence not providing him with good intel. By the time of Longstreets assault on the 3rd day the entire 6th Corp (the largest Corp in the Union Army, 1/5th of the Union Infantry, and last in line of march) had reached the field and fully reinforced the Union position... Lee's objective at Gettysburg was to launch large scale attacks before the Union Army was fully concentrated... he believed the 6th Corp was not yet fully up, when in fact they were already deployed... again a lack of intel. Thirdly... the arrival of the Artillery reserve and redistribution of artillery allowed Meade to place fresh guns on Cemetery Ridge and then ordered them to remain silent until an infantry attack... the Confederate High Command had no idea the Union Artillery was massed on Cemetery Ridge in the numbers they were. Forth... Meade had tremendously accurate intel on the Confederate order of battle. He knew on the night of the 2nd Day that the entire Confederate Army had engaged at Gettysburg accept Picketts Division. He wisely judged that the 3rd day would see an assault by Picketts Division on his center... and he spent the night of the 2nd and morning of the 3rd reinforcing his lines. Late on the night of 2nd the Union High Command convened a meeting and decided the best course of action was to adjust their lines to maximize their positions advantage. The Union army spend a solid 6-8 hours reinforcing and adjusting their position for renewed Confederate attacks on the 3rd day... they were ready, to say the least.... this at time when Lee's knowledge of the Union Army was inaccurate and he still believed the Army was not fully on the field. Fifth.... Lee had destroyed 4 Union Corps in 2 days of fighting... he had no reason to believe his men could not destroy one more. Sixth... Pickett fell apart. In an assault that reached its objective of breaking the Union line, once the assault began to falter Pickett utter fell apart. The final push of the division and retreat of his men were done without Pickett effecting any control of himself or his command. In the hands on a solid command leader the Division could have had at a minimum and orderly retreat and possibly a firmer control of the break. Unfortunately Pickett was not that kind of General. He completely and utter fell to pieces and totally lost Lee's confidence for not lookin after his division. Late in the War Lee placed Pickett under arrest for yet another complete collapse of his command ability... and in seeing Pickett later in marching along in retreat with his collapsed command said to an aid "is that man still with this Army?" ... Pickett proved at Gettysburg ineffectual leadership and by the end of the war had earned a place on the Confederate shit-list... only after the war, as the Lost Cause Myth lifted up confederate generals did we begin to see Pickett in a positive light. Picketts career as of commander has little to see in a positive light. Lastly... Lee underestimated Meade. Lee assumed Meade would be cautious and careful in his new command and be slow to react. Lee felt strong fast assaults would overwhelm Meade as it did his predecessors. However, Meade was a confident and quick tempered Commander that was solid in battle and firm in resolve. He moved fast and made good tactical decisions on the fly. He conferred with his Corp commanders and utilized the talents of his better officers in the fight... especially Hancock. Lee misjudged Meade.
All of these factors and more caused Lees failure, most of which Lee simply did not know. The confederates fought as good as could be expected and better... they just reached a bit too far given their intelligence disadvantages at Gettysburg.
Dynamic Prepper , that’s an outstanding and highly accurate accounting of what went wrong. I love Lee as a commander but I’d fault him for two more things.
First , he proceeded to prepare for a battle even while knowing he was blind and lacking intel and against Longstreets cautions , and two, invading the north in general. .
Even though Antietam was no real strategic victory for the north , it was essentially a very costly battle for Lee with no gain, and Lee was lucky to retreat back out of there - ditto for GB.
Twice Lee entered the north , and twice suffered what proved to be insurmountable losses.
If they fought south and strictly defended their land , they may have outlasted Lincoln’s stomach for the prolonged war
I don’t see how it ever could have succeeded being that Meade had so much support located behind Cemetery Ridge to fill in any openings that might occur in the union line . Supposedly I have read that he had 10,000 men in reserve here .
Yes it's called the delusional Lost Cause
You are wrong Pickett was in charge of all div in the charge to make charge more organized
So Bernie Sanders can fight after all. That little Vermont regiment was all over the place
get your history correct or dont put out videos. Davis' Brigade was past the fence they went to the Bryan/ Brian Barn they went the farthest. You have too many inaccuracies to even be considered serious.
Jeff: Keep in mind that these videos are a supplement to the book, not vice versa, and there's only so much detail that can be squeezed into a short video involving so many regiments. The book mentions that SOME of Davis' brigade crossed the fences and charged the barn. "A few dozen " according to one Federal gunner.