There is nothing quite like primary source material in gaining a better understanding of history. Thank you for your research. It is always enlightening.
@louislemire6691 It's just a general principle of historical research: the more contemporary to events an eye-witness account is, the more accurate it's likely to be. But there are exceptions, of course, as with any generality . . .
@@QED_ - Why, after 20 years, would it "weaken its utility?" Possibly, if only one primary source is researched, but if many primary sources, such as personal letters and diaries are researched, a pattern does surface. This would be valuable to understand the end result. If one is writing on the evolution of the Union cavalry in the East...the many letters written by Union troopers, especially during the winter months between 1862-63...reveal the development and evolution of a very professional Union cavalry as they initially were focused on small unit tactics....As the winter months passed, those "small unit tactics" evolved into platoon and company growth....and the culmination came in the Spring of 1863 at Brandy Station... then culminating at The Battle at Hanover, PA on June 30th, then General Buford on Day 1 (Gettysburg)....then General Custer on Day 3 (Gettysburg). I no longer do any serious research in History. But for decades, I became sold on primary sources as a source....regardless if it was the French and Indian Wars, the Civil War....through the Spanish-American War to World War 2. Any well written History book has to rely on primary sources or it loses its worth.
@@WilliamStahl-qp4vm 20 years after the fact. That alone weakens the narrative. Most people can’t remember events word for word 5 years ago let alone events 20 years ago. Thing the with the civil war is we have a ton of primary sources but for the south outside or personal journals and whatnot they all wrote books after they lost and needed to change the narrative.
Great piece of history. Thanks Ron. It's nice to see your channel growing steadily. Your short stories based on Civil War history are always very informative and interesting.
Law's opinion of attacking frontally was totally correct and borne out by events. Lee should NOT have attempted such a bold move. It was far too costly and even Lee admitted on the day of the battle that is was "all his fault". All great military men make mistakes. This was Lee's mistake. They should have listened to Law. The outcome might have been very different.
Sometimes just like now leadership should listen to their field noncom and officer's. Cause they are in the field while leader is in the toc drinking tea
But remember this was only part of the attack. Jeb Stuart wins and you have cavalry in the rear. Ewell is to attack and take Culps Hill. The frontal attack supported by cannon on the flanks and the stone wall is taken and held. Grant didn't learn as he continued frontal attack at Cold Harbor, Crater,Spotslvania.
I remember Sun Tzu saying something like "don't fight an enemy for too long or he will eventually learn how to defeat you." Gettysburg seems to have been an example of that. Early on the Confederate generals understood that technology had shifted the advantage to the defender, so strategically they would move offensively towards the enemy, but at the tactical level they would look around for a hill or other good defensive terrain and the occupy it in such a way that the Union force would have to attack them. The Army of the Potomac had seen so much of this that at Gettysburg, the lower level commanders all knew they had to get to the nearest high ground first and set up there.
Absolutely... precisely! Especially in the person of General Dan Sickles! He had been ORDERED to RETREAT from the high ground at Chancellorsville just 6 weeks earlier... then he and his men had to endure hours of shelling from Confederate guns placed exactly on that high ground. Sickles refused to be a victim a 2nd time around; so he moved his III corps men AND ARTILLERY to "The Wheatfield" - where they exacted a terrible toll on Longstreet's attacking divisions on the afternoon of the 2nd. NO ONE WOULD EVER HAVE HEARD OF "the Peach Orchard," the Wheatfield, Devil's Den or THE SLAUGHTER PEN if Dan Sickles hadn't ADVANCED his men to those tactically strategic grounds and MADE the Rebs PAY to take them. So people CRITICIZE Sickles "HE GOT HIS CORPS ALL SHOT UP!" Well.... General REYNOLDS got I Corps SHOT UP the previous morning... and he is an acknowledged hero! YOU PUT ANY Union corps in front of a fresh Confederate corps on the attack at this point of the war, you are going to take heavy losses. REMEMBERING THE LESSON of Chancellorsville, NON- West Point, NON-professional soldier DAN SICKLES _personally_ led his men to ADVANTAGEOUS GROUND, and MADE THE REBS PAY to take it - the Union army at its finest
@@hawaiianonymous3917 From the Gettysburg movie: "... When our people get here Lee will have the high ground and there will be the Devil to pay! The high ground!"
"don't fight an enemy for too long or he will eventually learn how to defeat you." excellent quote - Putin should have read Sun Tzu before he started the dust up in Ukraine.
I took my family to Gettysburg after reading Shiarra’s book on the battle of Gettysburg. We hired a historical guide with the request that we march, as Lee’s army did, across the open fields and have them narrate the encounter. When we arrived at the Armistead monument where the Union line had been briefly broken, we cried.
What an excellent idea! But you must be wonderful walkers because just the defensive line of the Union (the fishhook) is six miles long! I too I have visited Gettysburg but did so by car…. I am rather lazy. But this is definitely the way to introduce your children to history. Might I also suggest Shilo in the Western theatre. On a misty early foggy morning it is almost as if the ghosts of the past walk with you. Good tripping.
There were apparently several generals in Lee's Army that didn't like the way things were being run, Mclaws and D. H. Hill among them. They ended up in the West.
Longstreet took two divisions to help Bragg in Tennessee. It was a disaster, because old Pete was pretty hopeless when not under Lee's command. McLaws was unfairly scapegoated and court-martialed as a result, but it didn't stick. Longstreet was an egotist who happened to work well with Lee. Each of them were out of their depth.
General Law was right, Lee totally dropped the ball at Gettysburg, didn't listen to Longstreet there either. Lee's last frontal charge was so badly thought out as to wonder if he knew what he was doing at all, Fredericksburg was a prime example of what a frontal assault would do to an enemy, strangely a battle which Lee had won.
In my view, Lee, in ordering the charge on July 3rd, was merely doing what he had successfully done before. On June 27th, 1862, his army had attacked the Federals directly on a two mile front at Gaine’s Mill and driven the Union Army from its position; also, only two months before Gettysburg, on May 3rd, 1863, Lee and Stuart (commanding Jackson’s Corps) had frontally assaulted superior Union forces behind breastworks at Chancellorsville and successfully broke the Union line. He and his army had done it before. Lee must be judged, to some degree, with this in mind. Longstreet’s advice to move around the right was not based in reality. To move an army that size, with casualties to care for and thousands of prisoners to tend to from the previous days fighting, with miles and miles of supply wagons, and with minimal knowledge of Federal forces positions south and southeast of town, it would have been reckless to order such a move. And, needless to say, the Federals had lookout positions and, observing such a movement, would have assaulted Lee’s army at its most vulnerable.
Very insightful commentary on a micro-facet of Gettysburg I had not heard before. I subscribed to your channel and will watch your other interesting videos on Gettysburg this morning. Lee fought the fluid ad-hoc battle of Gettysburg rigidly. I have heard he was in poor health, perhaps having suffered a heart attack and/or heat exhaustion and being in a mental fog. The "sureness of touch" that the most successful generals maintain in their armies by allowing subordinates to exercise initiative in bending tactical orders to fit circumstances they perceive on the ground was lost. If Stonewall Jackson had been there, it would have been a different battle, but alas, he wasn't.
Late on July 1, Lee considered moving Ewell’s Corps to form as his right flank, but Ewell and Early objected. Had Stuart been present to observe the Union 0:27 positions and report his findings, Lee would be better informed as to what options he had. The Union Sixth Corps had arrived and 2 infantry brigades plus artillery held a strong position to repulse an attack around the Round Tops. Meade provided a strong defense here, easy to reinforce from the nearby artillery park and other available brigades, if needed.
@@aaronfleming9426 Everyone assumes Lee had no intel, but that is not true. He had a decent idea of the Union situation on July 2 and his planned assaults might have won the day but for the complete disruption of the field by Sickle's move forward. We fail to understand that the move badly disrupted Lee's plan and Longstreet could not concentrate his attack as a result. The other unexpected twist was the successful defeat of Stuart to the east that prevented an assault on the Union rear.
@@jamesb4789 On the contrary, on every count. Lee had no idea that the Union line extended as far south as it did. If the attack had proceeded as originally conceived, Sickles would have been able to enfilade Longstreet's right as he moved up the Emmitsburg Road; that would have been just as disruptive, and a lot safer for Sickles. We understand that Sickles' move was unexpected, but we also understand that Sickles' move was idiotic: it stretched his line to 3x the length it could effectively cover, which got his corps ripped to shreds; furthermore, it put him a half mile in front of the rest of the line, which meant that reinforcements had to be rushed piecemeal into the fighting, leading to those formations being mauled as well. Meade certainly was not impressed by Sickles' move, and neither was Grant, who made sure Sickles never held a battlefield command again. We shouldn't be impressed by it either. The "unexpected" twist in the cavalry wasn't unexpected either. Meade had skillfully protected his flanks and rear with cavalry to prevent exactly that sort of maneuver, and those cavalry intercepted Stuart precisely as alert professional cavalry should. Stuart's exhausted troopers were predictably turned back by fresh troops, some of whom were armed with repeating Spencer rifles. Even if Stuart had managed to force back the Union cavalry, surprise had been lost and his troopers and horses would have been all the more exhausted and unable to make a strategically decisive attack on the Union rear.
Law is someone who has always fascinated me- from Gaines Mill to Gettysburg and beyond. He saw some serious combat… like Hill, he rubbed Longstreet the wrong way, but had the kind of courage Hood embodied, and seemed to have had the same tactical alternatives as Hood wanted for July 2- and even Longstreet , despite Lee’s orders for that day based upon misunderstood Union positioning which Hood and Law knew better by the time the forward orders went into motion. It is strange how little is written about him or known about him. I am one who sides with the view that Hood and Law (and even Longstreet) might have had a better result on the 2nd if left to their own discretion. But orders are orders… As for blaming Stuart… there is legitimate grounds for it, but no one can debate the martial spirit of all involved, including Lee. Wonder what Law thought of the direct assault on the 3rd…? Lee was a legend, but Gettysburg on the 3rd, rather than the 2nd is where the greatest gambles, and greatest faults lie with him. Easy of course for me to say from a couch in France rather than a rifle in PA… Anyway, love what you are doing Ron. Keep em coming!!!
Agreed about how little has been written about him. Law dwells in the shadows of Hood and Longstreet. I'm working on a profile of him for the next issue of the magazine.
I am of that school that believes that Lee was in ill health by the time of this campaign. By the very appearance of the man, he had suffered considerably since 1861, And it seems that earlier in the year he has suffered a heart attack. Living in the field was hard for any man his age. Grant thought he was too old. Certainly he did not have the physical resilience of Grant who was walking wounded when he showed up in Chattanooga. but immediately restored the confidence of the army by his swift actions.
Maybe, had Longstreet not dragged his feet until late afternoon on the 2nd, Lee's battle plan would've been proven a winner. Remember, the Federal troops only occupied Little Round Top at the last minute. Had the attack commenced on schedule, it would have still been bare and wholly vulnerable, as would the entire Union flank.
@@Former11BRAVO Bad history. Longstreet did not delay. And the difficulty of getting all troops into position such that the attack commenced at 4 pm had zero impact on the outcome. Jackson's long flanking maneuvers at Chancellorsville delayed the attack until 5 pm. Gettysburg Day 2 was a similar plan, but it failed because of more difficult terrain, and the Union Army fought better.
Not being a Civil War buff but very interested in US history in general and the War, I've all ways thought, from what I've read, that Lee ordered Pickett's Charge because he felt trapped and didn't know what else to do: an act of desperation. I have always thought it a possibility to consider.
A couple of points *Law's brigade had marched around 20 miles THAT DAY before the assault on LRT. Imagine the fatigue of his troops. *Lee's plan on July 2nd was to attack in echelon up the Emmitsburg Rd, rolling up the Union line South to North. The taking of LRT at the direction of Warren altered the entire affair, forcing CSA forces to address those heights and depart from the echelon movement. *To suggest a further departure from Lee's plan , a circuitous assault on LRT was even further at odds with any coordination as planned by Lee. Lee's planned collapsed with the Union taking LRT, for it forced a departure from unit coordination in the attack.
Laws conclusion that only a general assault had a chance of success, but that that success would have left the army much weakened. Certainly the Union Army’s very skillful defense that day suggests he is probably right. Only Union mistakes could have given them victory and their generals did not make enough of them.
The echelon was carried out by Wilcox and Wright's brigades. They captured batteries but couldn't carry them off for lack of support. Contrary to what the NPS plaque states, Wright's brigade made it to the crest of Cemetery Ridge but lack of support forced them to retreat back down to the woods from where they started.
I understood that Sickles redeployment messed up Lee's plan, as it was based on Union troop disposition in the morning as surveyed by Lee's aide Johnson. I also understood that Hood, who favored a wider sweep on the right, then diverted into Devils Den and toward LRT based on the alteration of the plan caused by Sickles forward deployment. His attack was hampered by this more difficult terrain.
In Army of NVA before Gettysburg there was rivalry between 1st Corp of Gen Longstreet and 2nd Corp of Gen Jackson I would call it friendly and when you read and research it from Seven Days until Chancellorsville it seem fine ( Longstreet wasn't at Chancellorsville he and Hood's ,Pickett's and Ransom's was sent to southeast Va ,But Anderson's and McLaw's stayed with Lee)Now at Gettysburg and afterwards there now 3 Corp in ANV , But there alot things said from members of 1st Corp and 2nd Corp and down right personal . This claim about Moving around the right at Round Tops is crazy ! Even if Stuart was there scouting the right ( and Lee did have 4 Cavalry Brigades with him -Stuart had 3) Moving around right at time of the attack would been met by Union 6th Corp coming up South to North from Taneytown road ! Hood's division would been wipeout ! Longstreet was reduced from 5 div before Gettysburg down to 3 and on 2nd day he didnt have Pickett's division ( which at Gettysburg was missing Corse and Jenkin's Brigades station near Richmond) ! The mistake made was 1st Lee should kept ANV at 2 Corp not 3 ! 2nd Corse and Jenkin's should not been detached , Richmond had 2 full Divisions station there ! Please don't forget south was very close to winning at Gettysburg but as Gen Gordon and Pickett said Union troops fought well that day and more so there were on there soil !
Thank-you. I wondered about a Corp in reserve behind LRT, or at least one arriving late to the battle. What are your feelings concerning Pickett if he had been available on the second day to re-enforce Hood’s people in a sweeping movement to the right? If that 6th Corp were spread out along the road, and if Hood and Pickett were able to unite in attack? One can but wonder.
Lee had to have a victory. Both for Political and Military reasons. I believe very strongly that is why he attacked. It worked in the Seven Days battles. It did not at Gettysburg.
Lee's performance at Gettysburg was very poor and easy to criticize. At this stage of the Civil War, most generals understood the level of casualties that a frontal assault would entail, a level of casualties that the South could not sustain.
Stonewall Jackson wasn’t at Gettysburg with his unbelievable flanking maneuvers to save Robert E. Lee. Jackson’s soldiers were often called the “foot cavalry” because they marched so quickly that they often surprised Union forces by outflanking them as if they were riding horses.
@@picklerix6162 Stonewall Jackson was much more impressive in his Shenandoah campaign where he wore out a Union army by defending and retreating, taking light casualties while inflicting heavy casualties.
@@picklerix6162General Jackson wasn't at Gettysburg because he was shot by his own troops. It's said that when God decided that Jackson had to go.😊 I think if you wage war for the express purpose of perpetuating human bondage, it is unlikely that God will smile upon your effort.
Lee lost at Gettysburg I believe for two reasons. First, The Confederates had trouble moving through the town. Also, General Buford knew the ground was excellent for a battle and the Union was able to hold that ground. Second, Lee was trying to destroy The Union Army to win the war. It was very difficult to totally destroy a Civil War era Army. Grant was the only one to do it and he had to capture the three Confederate Army's to destroy them. Lee's frontal assaults were almost certain to fail.
Of course Lee didn’t want to lose the battle but why did he make the decisions that he did. In battle the defense has all the advantages except one, the initiative. Lee could have made the North follow him and Lee could have chosen the battlefield. He didn’t, and the question is why not. My personal theory is that Lee was heartbroken at the loss of his right hand, Gen Jackson. I believe that this loss was something that was a bigger factor on the battle of Gettysburg than may be realized. Lee was not himself at Gettysburg. Just my opinions.
Jackson's death played no role in the conduct of the actual campaign. Lee was much more confident in Longstreet's ability (and I'm no idol of Longstreet). Jackson completely failed Lee during the Seven Days' Battles (primarily because of his religious zealotry), he once said that he never ate pepper with his food because it made his left leg weak, and he suggested a pre- dawn assault in the early morning after the final Union repulse at Fredericksburg. To differentiate between Union and Confederate, he recommended that their troops strip naked- in the dead of winter. Jackson was a talented but erratic corps commander whose relations with his own subordinates were unusually poor. Lee saw to it that when Longstreet and Jackson were elevated to corps command, Longstreet had one days' seniority. The defensive as the stronger form of war was still new in 1863 even though rifling the conoidal bullet had been around many decades, and the vast majority of Civil War generals were tyros in their profession. Few graduates of West Point had ever commanded anything larger than a regiment. Lee was all but out of time by 1 July. He was late getting into Pennsylvania, his army hadn't foraged since his concentration order of 29 June (he couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days), and the clock was ticking at Vicksburg (placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began).
@@manilajohn0182 We cannot know what didn’t happen, but Jackson might have have been more aggressive on the first day and denied the Federals the high ground. However, Meade already had a place to fall back upon if Lee had driven his forces back. So probably the fight should simply taken place further south. And our guesses about that one would be the purest of speculations. All I will say that I think Meade would have handled things pretty well. Always have thought he has never received the credit owing him. He was like Nimitz after he took over at Pearl Harbor, although he lacked Nimitz’s personal touch.
@@johnschuh8616 I said that Jackson played no role in the conduct of the actual campaign. What he might have done if he had been there is an open question, but it's 50/50 either way at best.
Robert E. Lee had been suffering with Chronic Dysentery for a month, or more. Along with Heart infractions and Lee going from Maryland into Pennsylvania suffered a heart attack. And Lee was missing the loss of Thomas Jackson, who had passed away 6 weeks before, after Chancelirsville. Whom, Lee considered to be his Right Arm. And Lee was also worried about JEB Stuart, had not reported in from reconisance. Who had been held up in fighting skirmishes, North of Gettysburg, fighting with Custer. But along with Jeb Stuart, on the reconisance was two of Lees' sons. Being that they all were cousins.
Great video! It has always seemed that from the moment on July 1 when Longstreet told Lee they should quickly swing around the Union army and get between them and Washington, everyone but Lee knew that that was the was they should proceed, but also that following the orders as given would lead to disaster. If Sickles had not been an idiot, it would have been even more apparent on July 2 how futile it was going to be.
The problem with Longstreet's idea is that there wasn't really any way to "quickly swing around the Union army". Meade covered all the interior lines of communication...I can't see on a map how Lee would have done that, unless Meade and his cavalry were just sitting around doing nothing, which obviously wasn't the case in this campaign.
Amazing reportage. I’ve been to Gettysburg and taken the tours and observed the battlefield setup on that day. Even an untrained sailor such as I commented to the tour guide that a frontal attack was pure suicide and Lee was highly negligent in his tactics. He should have listened to Longstreet, and now it appears Gen. Law. I think we must conclude that the hand of Devine Providence was guiding toward the most desirable outcome on that day.
I find fault in considering something written twenty years after the fact as a primary source. I think at that point you're in the memory stage. I'm not an historian and didn't stay at a Holiday Inn last night, but I'm sceptical of this being a primary source, with history and memory being two separate things. Keep up the good work Ron, I enjoy every show
I tend to agree, but we're missing context in this case. Jubal Early spent years after the war defaming General Longstreet. Longstreet was forced to publicly himself. This account was given in support of Longstreet to counter Jubal Early's lies and ignorance. Also, it's considered a primary source because the writer is giving a firsthand account. 🤠✌️
The Sons and Daughters of the Confederacy made it their mission to ensure that history books were written to provide a favorable view of the South. This is a documented fact. They did this decades after the war. Southerners have been educated to believe their cause was honorable and that Lee was practically a god. If any source should be believed, it's a man who was there rather than a group with an agenda. It's not surprising that his report is missing since it was critical of Lee. It seems to be consistent with the strategy of Southerners who wanted to paint the Confederacy in a positive light. A recent article published about an Alabama unit that fought for the Union revealed that a well known Southern historian had hidden information about it.
It's still a primary source, although the context matters. Primary sources can be crap, and need to be assessed, but it is still statements by a witness.
@@dmbeaster I was questioning the number of years... Can you record what you did twenty years ago with any accuracy? He is remembering what he did and more than likely only the better parts of that. Memory is not history. Yes I know all primary sources are to be taken with a grain of salt.
Just saw your channel for the first time and subscribed. Do you have anything about confederate general Sterling Price? My mom talked him up pretty good but I'm finding some cracks in the dam.
Laws certainly hits one of the nails on the head. However, did he strike the hammer after the war in order to make himself look good? That is certainly worth a deeper dive. The fact of the matter is the South suffered from an absence of leadership from Jeff Davis on down. It was a sickness that spread to both theaters and doomed a nation (not that I am complaining since my ancestors were both Union officers). Southern strategy seemed to be attack frontally after Stonewall was killed. Even when Stonewall was alive there was a certain mantra about the attack. Lee was a great commander but also a flawed one. After Stonewall died he didn't trust his subordinates and his chosen replacements of Stonewall all were lacking for various reasons. Ewell might have been suffering from PTSD after his wounds and therefore hesitant to attack in his first real taste of command. Hill and Longstreet didn't get along well and that was evident in the failed orders of July 3rd. I could go on. There is so much wrong with the leadership of the Confederacy that has been glossed over by the Lost Cause myth as to excuse real issues. I subbed to your channel. Excellent stuff. Keep up the great work!
Lee let frustration of tthe stalemate get to him in a way great commanders just can't do. He ordered the suicidal tactic of Pickett's charge out of pure frustration.
Law was a brigadier general and would almost certainly have had no idea that Lee's plan of campaign had been ruined by the victory of 1 July- and that he had no alternative but to either attack or abandon the campaign in total failure. (EDIT) Stuart's absence was Lee's fault, and not Stuart's.
Lee hoped that the cannonade before Picket’s change would do far more damage than it did. But like the bombardment of Iwo Jima, it came too late to avoid mass casualties. From Japanese sources, we now know that if the fleet had arrives a few days early, then they would have been much less prepared. Timing is everything.
…”had no alternative but to either attack or abandon the campaign in total failure.” Why would he have to abandon the field in failure? Lee repeatedly, and successfully, moved around enemy positions.
@@Sodbusterrod I don't understand the assertion that Lee couldn't move away after the first day of fighting, but don't agree with the idea that Lee could have moved around the Union left at Gettysburg. The question is, "How? By what road? And what makes us think the Union wouldn't have been alert to the movement - which would have taken hours - and wouldn't have adjusted to the movement?" The Army of the Potomac had almost always fought very well on the defensive. It was especially sharp at Gettysburg. I just don't see any way that Lee get's around the left...strategic withdrawal was his only way to salvage the operation: Claim victory for the first day's battle, be grateful for the opportunity to gather abundant supplies in Pennsylvania, and savor the brief respite from defending Virginia. Would have saved Lee almost 20,000 casualties.
@@Sodbusterrod Reagan's memoirs show clearly enough that the strategic objective of the campaign (decided between Lee and the Confederate political leadership at Richmond in mid- May) was to gain enough of a success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg (when Vicksburg was placed under siege, this became achieving enough of a success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg). Ideas to assist Vicksburg originally involved transferring formations from the AoNV to assist. Lee argued against this, telling Seddon in early April that the surest way to assist Johnston (C- in- C of the Western Department) was for the AoNV to advance into Maryland. The operational objective of the campaign was to take the war away from Virginia and forage off of Union territory to restock the AoNVs supply train because the AoNV was starving in its position along the Rappahannock. Lee's plan of campaign was to entice the AotP to attack the AoNV and defeat that attack (from Lee's after- action report and Longstreet's memoirs). To accomplish this, Lee needed information on the strength and location of the AotP. Lee assigned this task to Stuart. By the time that Lee began moving north, Vicksburg had already been placed under siege so time was critical. Lee was late getting into Pennsylvania because he erred in giving his infantry formations (known for their tendency to straggle) two objectives for one force- namely, to forage and get northward in good time. He wrote Davis during the move north that the necessity to forage was retarding his movement. He erred again when he likewise gave Stuart two objectives for one force by instructing him to gather both information and provisions. These two objectives were both contradictory and coincided in time. Gathering information required mobility which gathering provisions would only impede (which is what happened). Moreover, Stuart lacked the available force to accomplish both simultaneously or the time to accomplish first one and then the other. He attempted to accomplish both and predictably failed. Lack of information on the strength and location of the AotP led directly to the unexpected meeting engagement of 1 July. This engagement ruined Lee's plan of campaign because although he had originally intended to maneuver the AotP into attacking him, he assumed the tactical offensive himself to gain a minor victory. Having been repulsed at Fredericksburg and stunned at Chancellorsville- and with a new commanding general at the helm- there was no realistic chance that the AotP would go over to the offensive. This left Lee stuck. The clock was ticking at Vicksburg (under siege for approximately six weeks), he had so far done nothing to assist them, he couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days because he was foraging (he hadn't foraged since his concentration order of 29 June), he couldn't forage in the immediate presence of the AotP, and the tactical initiative which he had not wanted was his. He had to either attack or abandon the campaign. His tactics during the battle were a variant of the Napoleonic strategic battle- strike both flanks so as to draw local reserves from the center, and then attack the center. Meade recognized this, telling Gibbon on the evening of 2 July that if Lee attacked on the 3rd, it would be on Gibbon's front. Pickett's attack on 3 July failed for a number of reasons- not the least of which was that Meade saw the attack coming and had approximately 20,000 reinforcements move toward the Union center to defeat it.
Evander Law's scenario has been war gamed by experts. The result? Still a Confederate defeat. After July 1st there was no realistic option for a Confederate victory, either tactical or strategic. The Union position was too strong, their men too resolute, they had overpowering artillery, and a massive numerical superiority. In addition I would argue, more competent leadership in depth compared to the post Jackson Confederate army of Northern Virginia.
It's fascinating to me that Meade held a council of war, in which he included John Gibbon, who (iirc) was in temporary command of a corps. I'd love to study this more, but my hypothesis is that Lee's command style - very small staff, few corps commanders, and few councils of war - ultimately stunted the development of up-and-coming generals. Do you have any thoughts on that matter?
My feeling is that the relative success of the confederates on 1st July obliged Lee to press on during the next two days in circumstances that make it hard to see how he could have won.
@@redemptivepete I think you've got a valid point there. I think he still deserves censure for the abysmal intelligence gathering, but with the information he did have, the attacks of the second day make more sense.
Remember a few years back an old man telling me how his daddy and grandfather were not happy with Gen Lee for sending a lot of boys to there death on that frontal assault in which close family members were lost at Gettysburg, he told the story like it just happen it was very personal to him and his family.
Communications on the battlefield at this time were extremely difficult, they were completely dependent on runners and riders. This led to Generals being very reluctant to change plans once battle had commenced. A great video that even a Brit can find interesting.
@@jamesb4789This is exactly what would have happened. Union forces were SOUTH of Gettysburg on July 1. Had Lee tried to break off and head for Washington, he would have blundered directly into the Army of the Potomac. As the PBS documentary "The Civil War" says about the run-up to Gettysburg, "If Meade didn't know where Lee was heading, Lee didn't know where Meade even WAS."
Lifelong CW buff, since my grandfather took me to Gettysburg at age 7, as the Centennial events were starting in 1961. I've been a student of the war ever since, so more than 60 years. No matter how many books I read, or how many battlefields I trek over, I know there is always more to learn, and other perspectives and views to consider. The fascination with this conflict never lessens. So thank you, Ron, for improving on my knowledge of Gen. Law's role at Gettysburg, at least as he described it. This is the first of what I understand to be a number of such short stories that I need to find!
It's hard to figure except that Lee may have been severely compromised by heart trouble. He did everything wrong during the Gettysburg campaign. He even marched his troops north away from Gettysburg, splitting his army. You don't beat your enemy by surrendering vital road junctions to him. He didn't even bother to recon with the cavalry he did have. Sure, he wanted to scoop up as much food as he could, but he seemed to forget that the Union Army could march, too. Then he attacked with only half his army on the field, tired from marching. Longstreet did the best he could on Day two, but, cannons needed water. So did men and horses. That Longstreet was able to launch an assault on Day 2 is actually a very impressive piece of work.
I appreciate your contribution. But consider this. Gettysburg was not Lee’s chosen place of battle. Harrisburg was his focus and a full Corp was already well on its way there before things got sidetracked by overly ambitious troops. Those Harrisburg bound troops had to be recalled when the battle was already engaged. That corps was spread out over twenty miles of very hilly roads and the temperatures were mid-ninety (95). By the time the whole Corp retraced their routes and got back to where the battle was and got reformed, the day was long spent. The Union was entrenched by evening of that first day. Such are the fates that battles fall prey to.
@@fredhall5038 Yup, a very bad plan poorly executed. The further Lee got from Virginia, he got weaker. Nobody really knows what he was thinking. It was unlikely that the Union Army would do nothing as he marched into Pennsylvania. Even after Lee botched everything, he still could have slipped south from Gettysburg, threaten DC and forced a battle of maneuver, evening the odds. When he opted to continue a static fight, he really had no chance.
Gettysburg was different in many ways. Lee was used to having his Army concentrated for each battle. At Antietam and Gettysburg, he was strung out and vulnerable. I think he also realized after Day two at Gettysburg the Union was bringing in large reserves that he could not match and he would be very vulnerable if he pulled back. I have often wondered if Picket's Charge was an attempt to win the field and give him time to retreat. The Day two assaults on the flanks were near things. The attack on the Union right tied down reserves and would have let Longstreet punch through but of Sickle's unexpected move forward with delayed and broke up the Longstreet attack. If you walk the battlefield, you will notice that Cemetery Ridge is barely a bump when you get to the Round Tops and the line would have been broken. Sickle's move to the higher ground forward of he Ridge gave his men a better chance. And it broke up the concentrated punch Longstreet was supposed to deliver. Little Roundtop gets the attention, but it was the bloody fighting in the Wheat Field and Peach Orchard that won the day and bought the time for two Union Corps to move in and join the battle.
Apparently the confederate artillery was shooting high over the lines of the massing union army. It made a mess of the supply carriages etc of the union, but left the infantry relatively clear. The trails of the canon were digging into the soft ground as they recoiled.
Lee was ill at Gettysburg which I feel affected his judgment. After the beating the Union troops had taken he felt they would run at the first serious charge. I think because it was Northern soil those Yanks weren't gonna move for nobody. To lose Vicksburg the same week- disastrous.
Curiously, Lee eschewed a right flanking option as advised by Longstreet, and we had the sad madness of Pickett’s Charge against the Union centre on July 3rd. The presenter makes this conclusion.
RON IS SUCH A FINE, ARTICULATE COMMENTATOR OF THE CIVIL WAR. THIS IS THE THIRD EPISODE THAT I HAVE VIEWED & ENJOYED VERY MUCH. PUT ME IN MIND OF SHELBY FOOTE'S DEEP IMMERSION IN THAT SAD PERIOD IN OUR COUNTRY'S HISTORY.
Coulda,woulda,shoulda,Law had commanded the assault the previous day on Little Round Top, Made famous most recently in the movie Gettysburg .His brigade had suffered heavy losses and the right flank of the Union was reinforced . In Shakespeare the famous" once more into breach my dear friends " sums up the attitude of many just a little more effort must be made so our sacrifices won't be in vain.
It is difficult for me to get a complete picture of this battle, but I have to wonder about a few decisions such as attacking the stone wall head on and losing all of those men for nothing.
I listened closely and heard you say that Laws wanted to put artillery on Big Round top but you neglected to point out that it was Laws brigade that failed to turn the flank of Chamberlain at Little Round top. That's a fairly important point to leave out in consideration of Laws criticism. He felt that if he'd been allowed to flank the Union left from Big Round top, it might have caused Meade to draw his left back towards Cemetery Ridge. I don't know but these are points you failed to mention that color Laws criticism of Lee and excuse his own failure.
The ghost of Chancellorsville haunted Lee's army at Gettysburg. Jackson got astonishingly luck at Chancellorsville, but generals like Longstreet, Hood, and Law seem to have taken away the lesson that it's as easy as pie to just schlep your corps around the Union left and the Union will just sit there doing nothing. Lee seems to have taken away the lesson that his men were invincible. They all found out otherwise.
If you've ever been to Gettysburg and seen the site of Pickett's charge, it's amazing they even attempted it. Perhaps if they had just turned the men loose to sprint across that field willy nilly toward the union position to do what they could(I know, that's not how they rolled...) it might have had some chance of success but to march across that expanse in straight lines etc into the maw of union cannon and rifle fire, inconscionable .
My son and I just came from the area of Pickett’s charge and I was dumbfounded that General Lee even considered it. He had his men charge across a 1,000 yards in open fields and then about 300 yards from the Little Round Top, the Rebels had to climb over strong pasture fences that set them up to be slaughtered. Some soldiers were funneling to downed gates, which provided an excellent cannon target. So sad though it was an unjust war.
In blaming Lee for the second day attacks by Longstreet what is being overlooked is that Longstreet had the discretion of doing exactly what Hood and Law suggested but for some reason he (Longstreet) refused. Lee always gave his generals leeway in adapting his orders to what they encountered when face to face with the enemy. If anyone is to blame, it is Longstreet.
The ANV was operating in enemy territory at Gettysburg. General Lee was desperate to get that knock out blow as quickly as possible. Logistics was the key. The ANV had limited time to deliver the Coup de Grace to the Union Army. When the ANV was fighting battles in Virginia, logistics was much easier.
He wasn’t the only General at Gettysburg that could see the recklessness of Lee’s orders- “Pickett's after-battle report was reportedly extremely bitter, and General Lee forced Pickett to destroy it. Cavalry Captain John Singleton Mosby explained that after the war, Pickett still blamed Lee for the devastating losses and held bitter resentment for the old general.” Nat’l Battlefield Trust
Remember this 1,000 yard march was across high prairie grass in the sweltering July heat. By the tine any of the few soldiers left had to be exhausted.
Law was the last surviving Confederate Major General. He spent his later years in Florida. Law is buried in Bartow, FL in central Florida, in an nice, older cemetery. My husband has been to his gravesite. Cheers.
He felt the plan to take little round top wasn't bad but that the commanders on the ground did a poor job of implementing his plan. He felt had they done a better job coordinating the attack the plan would have worked. The assault of little round to itself was more piecemeal. Never enough to ovewhelm the defenders and overcome their advantage of the high ground. The stiff resistence of the north at Devil's Den had taken a big toll.
Lee did not give Stuart CLEAR orders, but gave hime the option to do what he did. Lee often deferred to subordinates in a way that Stonewall did not. Also Longstreet should have felt confident enough to order a “flanking” attack at Little / Big Round-top. Lee was brilliant in defence, but not so much in attack, unless he was with Stonewall. (In my humble opinion) Lee was at fault in his orders to Stuart, who needed clear orders, which he would then obey. Lee should also have allowed Longstreet more latitude, he had the ability and experience to make his own judgements. In contrast the Union officers made many crucial decisions without consulting Mead.
I was just listening to Hood's account of this incident on another TH-cam channel. I've always wondered if Longstreeet was 'working to rule' because Lee had turned down his suggestion that the whole army move round the Union left. It is normal for commanders to change the plan of a superior if the situation requires it so Longstreet would not have needed to contact Lee for approval which would have taken some time. i'm from the UK but have been interested in the ACW since I was at school in the 1950s and have visited many of the major batttlefield including Gettysburg. I'm doing a talk about the battle next year so would be very interested in any comments or points anyonw cares to make on this subject. Also, I've never considered Longstreet's idea of moving round the flank to be a feasible operation of war. The armies were in contact so it would have been difficult to break contact and make the movement especially as they would have been moving into enemy territory without cavalry to recconnoitre and sceen the move. Again thoughts observations etc on this view woule be most welcome. Thanks for a very interesting videol
Also, consider Pickett’s charge, a frontal assault ordered by General Lee on the third day at Gettysburg which was a complete disaster. Lee blamed himself and rightfully so.
Brigadier General Evander Law is of course correct. HOWEVER. The Army commander knew that another tactical victory would not suffice. Only a strategic victory forcing Lincoln to stop the war would do. Lee likely believed that he had, logistically, only this one shot at a strategic victory. He could not manoeuvre his army in proximity to the entire army of the Potomac. As Shelby Foote had it, 'the stars in their courses'. From July 3rd 1863 to April 9th 1865 the stars did not deviate from their appointed courses.
I thing people are forgetting about the arrival of Sykes' and Sedgwick's corps arrival on July 2nd. Had the Confederates followed Law's advice to attack from the South, the arrival of Sykes' and Sedgwick would've been on their right flank. Sedgwick's Corp was the largest in the Army of the Potomac with 16,000 men. They arrived via the Baltimore Pike. Longstreet shouldn't have drug his feet, and his attitude was infectious.
General Lee didn't have Stonewall and it is the latter's willingness to make long audacious movements that gave General Lee's plans their favorable results. General Lee and General Jackson were a perfect pair. The fortitude of General Jackson's men under his leadership was just amazing.
.I appreciate the work you are doing on this channel and on this topic. I taught Civil War Advance Placement too for 20 years. I hope my donation to you helps your work. J. Hugh Craft 1 April 2024
Lee had a gift for inspiring soldiers, other than that he was very good at getting into the head of his opponents. I have never found him a particularly genius commander. He had solid subordinates, especially in 1862 before the death of Jackson, when he had Jackson and Longstreet as his only Corps commanders. Add in JEB Stuart and you have three very capable commanders under him. His tactics and strategies got less and less bold as the war went on in part due to the loss of many of these commanders. He simply no longer had the talent in his officers corps to pull off massive and successful operations like 2nd Bull's Run and Chancellorsville. He was a solid general with incredibly gifted subordinates and a unified command structute that the North lacked. The rest is mythology.
My! This is the first time I've heard described the "aroun' t'the rahhht' strategy at Gettysburg described as "easy". I've always heard the move described as circumventing BOTH Round Tops and trying to start an assault from BEHIND Little Round Top, along the axis north along Taneytown Road!!! As it was, the Rebs used the northern slopes of Big Round Top to gain a better position from which to assault Little Round Top ... but we all know how THAT turned out!
I believe it is called "BATTLE FEVER". A commander comes to a point where so much energy has been spent that desperation comes into play where cost what it may "THERE MUST COME AN ENDS TO IT!" as Gen. Lee said to Gen Longstreet in the movie Gettysburg..."WE ARE ADRIFT IN A SEA OF BLOOD AND I WANT IT TO END!" instead of Longstreets advice to move pass Mead, get between him and Washington and find some good ground to fight upon.
I recently read a biography about Stonewall Jackson. I came away with a deep appreciation for the tactical and strategic brilliance of Stonewall Jackson. He always attacked the Union’s weak points. (Thank God his pre-Gettysburg recommendations of attacking north to Philly and beyond were not followed or the South may have triumphed.) Conversely this book made me realize that Lee was deeply flawed as a tactician, as he always sought costly frontal attacks against the Union’s strongest points.
I’d rate Lee’s performance at Gettysburg a little above Burnside’s performance at Fredericksburg, but making most of the same mistakes. It demonstrates how difficult it is to be the Aggressor in War. I personally don’t think Lee was very good at it. Much better in Defense Mode.
People can say Lee came in blind but a great commander would have instantly saw culps hill and did whatever it took to control it say what you want but the truth is the truth
Can we speculate that Longstreet saw the disaster of the Devil's Den/Little Round Top attack then foresaw the fate of Pickett's Charge? Lee saw the disaster of Pickett's charge then said-"Johnson may yet succeed." He was then informed that Johnson had been thrown back
Thanks for the video. It is my understanding that Longstreet, Hood, and Law all advised against the direct frontal assault. They all advised that attacking from the side and rear would be more effective and more likely to succeed. If this is true (IF) why would Lee disregard his generals advice? And. Does anyone have the unbiased truth.
I have to agree with Evander Law's post war assessment of why Lee was defeated at Gettysburg - because he attempted the direct approach tactical offense against a well massed opponent harnessing strong defensive terrain with some confident Union leaders prepared to receive such an attack - that is why per the tactical realm. The overall reason Lee was defeated - was fighting this battle in the first place, but the details of the 2nd day, in front of Law, for example, show fully why fighting here at all was folly. The Federals had all the advantages, and the Confederates had none.
Great series. I am reading up on the Revolutionary war 1776. The pointlessness of Britain's attempt to retain control of the 13 States can best be understood by 1861, only a generation later, and the massive bloodletting that ensued in addition to the genocide of the indigenous population. A nation built, developed, and sustained by constant war - internal and external.
The North American continent had seen many brutal wars among Native Americans long before Europeans arrived. The European nations were also battling for control over this land that was rich in resources and potential. The warfare between settlers and indigenous tribes was brutal when it happened, but it wasn't always a state of war and there was not complete genocide happening in this era. The British were not pointless in their attempt to keep the colonies. The colonists did not universally want separation. Far from it.
@@film50565 Thank you. On reflection England attempted it's own anti monarchy revolution in the 1640's with Cromwell winning the Civil War albeit temporarily. Much Cromwellian sentiment was evident in the early English colonies and I believe that this prospered with 5,000 miles of separation from the Old Country.
In several books I've read about Gettysburg, the idea that Lee was "off his game" or "not at his best" has been raised more than once. In one account of the meeting that led to Pickett's Charge, one of the participants said that Lee seemed "not all there" and "distracted". The reasons why this was so, if indeed it was, aren't made clear. Robert E. Lee, when confronted with his ultimate challenge and his ultimate opportunity, did not meet the moment, whatever the reason. A part of me cannot help but think, What if Jackson had not fallen at Chancellorsville? His presence at Gettysburg might- might- have altered history. I think Lee trusted Jackson more than any of his other subordinate commanders. Often, Lee merely told Jackson what to do and left it to Jackson to figure out how best to do it. Beginning even late on Day One, I think you could have counted on Jackson to be planning some sort of flanking movement, a tactic which had served him so well so often. I can't help but think that Jackson's presence would have meant no need for Pickett's Charge- almost certainly the single most futile actions of the Civil War.
I have trouble believing many that try to make themselves look like they knew the correct way to fight a battle. I have been guilty myself in my career of being a Monday Morning Quarterback. The one I do believe tho is Longstreet on his opposition of the 3rd day charge across an open field. I believe that Lee at that time had a sense that God was leading him, but may have just been an inflated ego.
I've heard from more than one quarter that Lee may have suffered a heart attack or stroke on the first day of the battle, which clouded his judgement over the next couple of days.
I do not believe Lee had an inflated ego, most likely he had an over confidence in the ability of his army and his commanders with good reason being mostly successful but Gettysburg just did not turnout good for the south it was close but not a win and Meade was unwilling to make alot of mistakes that Lee could take advantage of. I do believe with Jackson this would be a different battle , where was A.P hill and Ewell was just off to the sidelines Lee's only dependable corp commander was Longstreet his old war horse.
Most notably it was General Longstreet that questioned Lee’s decision to send Pickett’s Division against the massed Union Army on Cemetery Ridge on day 3 of the battle - Many southerners chose to villainize Longstreet rather than acknowledge as Lee did himself the awful mistake he had made to continue the battle instead of withdrawing his intact army south - * “AI” we are doomed - autocorrect continues to dumb down the English language - e.g., it flags “Villainize” as a non-existent word - - How about Artificial Stupidity -
What is often missed in how Lee 's army viewed Grant is the bigger picture. The Anaconda plan first put forth and implemented is mostly remembered for the blockade, but the second phase was the pincer drive to control the Mississippi Valley splitting the Confederacy. Sherman's march through Georgia was also a phase. Grant flourished in the West, with smaller armies, because the distances worked against the Rebels, but also because the politicians only watched Lee. Lee's Army had disdain for the western campaign as well. Yet Longstreet and others were nervous because the Vicksburg campaign was a siege, but also a brilliant campaign of maneuver by Grant and Sherman. One of the crucial lessons Grant learned at both Shiloh and Vicksburg was the South had limited resources and needed time to replenish after battles. The pattern of several months respite was clear by1864. By that time the North had information that showed Lee had virtually destroyed his Army in 1862 Seven Days battle and in the end it was McClellan's loss of nerve and retreat that gave the victory to Lee. They also knew by 1864, that the South was shuffling units between the West and Virginia. From a regional strategic view, the Overland Campaign was a brutal blunt assault, but in terms of grand strategy, Grant was forcing the South to commit their reserves to Virginia and opening the door for Sherman's drive to the sea which in the end was fatal to the South. It was Grant's version of Patton's "Grab him by the nose and kick him in the a$$. As bad as the losses were for the Army of the Potomac, they could be replaced. Lee's Army though was steadily ground into the dust. Civil Wars are different and almost always require breaking resistance at afar higher cost than normal wars. Grant understood it. It should also be noted that Lee's Army suffered a far higher percentage of KIA and seriously wounded than the Armies under Grant or McClellan. At West Point, Lee is considered the bloodier of the two.
@@nicksam2 I find a lot of things to misrepresented about various generals. I grew up a few miles from Gettysburg and my Grandfather was an official Pennsylvania Civil War historian. He told me Meade was a purely political general who never did anything to prove he was an effective commander, but he played the political game at the highest level. Lincoln appointed Meade because of the political pressure. Others like Reynolds did not want the job for that reason. It was Reynolds and his second and successor Doubleday who picked the union position and with Hancock set up the line. Meade arrived later when the real decisions were set. Meade held a council of war and wanted to retreat, but the other commanders refused. The reality is Meade was not in charge at Gettysburg. On second day, Sickles moving his corps forward is perhaps the most pivotal moment of the battle. The south end of Cemetery Ridge is actually in a valley and undefendable. So Sickle moved forward to ground that had a much better chance of being held. His movement totally threw off Lee's echelon attack plan which probably would have won the day. Instead, Lee's army had to force Sickle's men back but in the process were exhausted to the point that only a couple of brigades could launch the echelon attack in the afternoon and they failed to break the line. Sickles move also bought 10 valuable hours for most of the rest of the Army of the Potomac to arrive. Pickett's charge was in truth the attack Lee wanted to mount the second day but Sickle blocked. And Sickle ignored Meade's orders. After the battle Meade failed to pursue Lee which the other commanders wanted to do and instead made sure the Press knew he beat Lee. Meade did not order a pursuit until Lincoln asked why they were not moving. Grant effectively took over field command because Meade was incompetent but after Gettysburg could not be removed. The last major decision by Meade was the Battle of the Crater. A division of Black troops trained for weeks to launch the assault and were prepared. The night before the attack, Meade overrode Burnsides and ordered white units to do the assault whose commanders knew nothing of the plan to lead the attack. Why? Because he did not want black men to get the credit. There are letters he wrote stating that. The attack was a disaster. Burnsides resigned when Grant refused to remove Meade. Politics. Meade and his staff thereafter were effectively regulated to logistics and Meade was effectively a token figure.
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There is nothing quite like primary source material in gaining a better understanding of history. Thank you for your research. It is always enlightening.
. . . although 20 years after the fact, weakens its utility.
@louislemire6691 It's just a general principle of historical research: the more contemporary to events an eye-witness account is, the more accurate it's likely to be. But there are exceptions, of course, as with any generality . . .
Hope people learn from this because how on earth can people still support traitor trump. MAGA = CSA 2.0.
@@QED_ - Why, after 20 years, would it "weaken its utility?" Possibly, if only one primary source is researched, but if many primary sources, such as personal letters and diaries are researched, a pattern does surface. This would be valuable to understand the end result. If one is writing on the evolution of the Union cavalry in the East...the many letters written by Union troopers, especially during the winter months between 1862-63...reveal the development and evolution of a very professional Union cavalry as they initially were focused on small unit tactics....As the winter months passed, those "small unit tactics" evolved into platoon and company growth....and the culmination came in the Spring of 1863 at Brandy Station... then culminating at The Battle at Hanover, PA on June 30th, then General Buford on Day 1 (Gettysburg)....then General Custer on Day 3 (Gettysburg). I no longer do any serious research in History. But for decades, I became sold on primary sources as a source....regardless if it was the French and Indian Wars, the Civil War....through the Spanish-American War to World War 2. Any well written History book has to rely on primary sources or it loses its worth.
@@WilliamStahl-qp4vm 20 years after the fact. That alone weakens the narrative. Most people can’t remember events word for word 5 years ago let alone events 20 years ago. Thing the with the civil war is we have a ton of primary sources but for the south outside or personal journals and whatnot they all wrote books after they lost and needed to change the narrative.
Old timey Civil War Buff here. I really enjoy these. You have a balanced approach to this very complicated subject. Thanks.
Great piece of history. Thanks Ron. It's nice to see your channel growing steadily. Your short stories based on Civil War history are always very informative and interesting.
Law's opinion of attacking frontally was totally correct and borne out by events. Lee should NOT have attempted such a bold move. It was far too costly and even Lee admitted on the day of the battle that is was "all his fault". All great military men make mistakes. This was Lee's mistake. They should have listened to Law. The outcome might have been very different.
Sometimes just like now leadership should listen to their field noncom and officer's. Cause they are in the field while leader is in the toc drinking tea
Plus Longstreet
It was a HUGE mistake, the Confederate high tide
But remember this was only part of the attack. Jeb Stuart wins and you have cavalry in the rear. Ewell is to attack and take Culps Hill. The frontal attack supported by cannon on the flanks and the stone wall is taken and held. Grant didn't learn as he continued frontal attack at Cold Harbor, Crater,Spotslvania.
I remember Sun Tzu saying something like "don't fight an enemy for too long or he will eventually learn how to defeat you." Gettysburg seems to have been an example of that. Early on the Confederate generals understood that technology had shifted the advantage to the defender, so strategically they would move offensively towards the enemy, but at the tactical level they would look around for a hill or other good defensive terrain and the occupy it in such a way that the Union force would have to attack them. The Army of the Potomac had seen so much of this that at Gettysburg, the lower level commanders all knew they had to get to the nearest high ground first and set up there.
It’s over Anakin, I have the high ground :)
Absolutely... precisely! Especially in the person of General Dan Sickles! He had been ORDERED to RETREAT from the high ground at Chancellorsville just 6 weeks earlier... then he and his men had to endure hours of shelling from Confederate guns placed exactly on that high ground. Sickles refused to be a victim a 2nd time around; so he moved his III corps men AND ARTILLERY to "The Wheatfield" - where they exacted a terrible toll on Longstreet's attacking divisions on the afternoon of the 2nd.
NO ONE WOULD EVER HAVE HEARD OF "the Peach Orchard," the Wheatfield, Devil's Den or THE SLAUGHTER PEN if Dan Sickles hadn't ADVANCED his men to those tactically strategic grounds and MADE the Rebs PAY to take them.
So people CRITICIZE Sickles "HE GOT HIS CORPS ALL SHOT UP!" Well.... General REYNOLDS got I Corps SHOT UP the previous morning... and he is an acknowledged hero!
YOU PUT ANY Union corps in front of a fresh Confederate corps on the attack at this point of the war, you are going to take heavy losses.
REMEMBERING THE LESSON of Chancellorsville, NON- West Point, NON-professional soldier DAN SICKLES _personally_ led his men to ADVANTAGEOUS GROUND, and MADE THE REBS PAY to take it - the Union army at its finest
The north suffered early on with incompetent generals. Had McClellan actually USED the forces he was given, the war likely would've been shorter.
@@hawaiianonymous3917 From the Gettysburg movie: "... When our people get here Lee will have the high ground and there will be the Devil to pay! The high ground!"
"don't fight an enemy for too long or he will eventually learn how to defeat you." excellent quote - Putin should have read Sun Tzu before he started the dust up in Ukraine.
These frequent videos from Ron are a great contribution to history.
Ron, love the information that you put out! Love your show! And, look fwd. to every episode!
I enjoy these very much. I am a proud graduate of Strong Vincent High School in Erie, Pennsylvania
Excellent presentation. I enjoyed it very much.
another great story Ron, thank you.
I took my family to Gettysburg after reading Shiarra’s book on the battle of Gettysburg. We hired a historical guide with the request that we march, as Lee’s army did, across the open fields and have them narrate the encounter. When we arrived at the Armistead monument where the Union line had been briefly broken, we cried.
Sounds like a "fun" tour
What an excellent idea! But you must be wonderful walkers because just the defensive line of the Union (the fishhook) is six miles long! I too I have visited Gettysburg but did so by car…. I am rather lazy. But this is definitely the way to introduce your children to history. Might I also suggest Shilo in the Western theatre. On a misty early foggy morning it is almost as if the ghosts of the past walk with you. Good tripping.
I have done the same.
There were apparently several generals in Lee's Army that didn't like the way things were being run, Mclaws and D. H. Hill among them. They ended up in the West.
Longstreet took two divisions to help Bragg in Tennessee. It was a disaster, because old Pete was pretty hopeless when not under Lee's command. McLaws was unfairly scapegoated and court-martialed as a result, but it didn't stick. Longstreet was an egotist who happened to work well with Lee. Each of them were out of their depth.
Longstreet di pretty well at Chickamauga under Bragg, who was definately up to Lee's caliber.@@neilpemberton5523
@@neilpemberton5523You're blaming Longstreet for Bragg's decisions?
@roberthicks4923 No. I mean, when Bragg gave Longstreet assignments, he was hopeless at carrying them out.
@@neilpemberton5523 Agree -- Longstreet's Knoxville Campaign was a disaster.
General Law was right, Lee totally dropped the ball at Gettysburg, didn't listen to Longstreet there either. Lee's last frontal charge was so badly thought out as to wonder if he knew what he was doing at all, Fredericksburg was a prime example of what a frontal assault would do to an enemy, strangely a battle which Lee had won.
The Union soldiers weren't shouting " Fredricksburg " for nothing.
Did Robert E Lee have a heart attack after the battle of Fredericksburg ? Was he having heart problems during the Gettysburg campaign ?
In my view, Lee, in ordering the charge on July 3rd, was merely doing what he had successfully done before. On June 27th, 1862, his army had attacked the Federals directly on a two mile front at Gaine’s Mill and driven the Union Army from its position; also, only two months before Gettysburg, on May 3rd, 1863, Lee and Stuart (commanding Jackson’s Corps) had frontally assaulted superior Union forces behind breastworks at Chancellorsville and successfully broke the Union line. He and his army had done it before. Lee must be judged, to some degree, with this in mind. Longstreet’s advice to move around the right was not based in reality. To move an army that size, with casualties to care for and thousands of prisoners to tend to from the previous days fighting, with miles and miles of supply wagons, and with minimal knowledge of Federal forces positions south and southeast of town, it would have been reckless to order such a move. And, needless to say, the Federals had lookout positions and, observing such a movement, would have assaulted Lee’s army at its most vulnerable.
@@frankofva8803You make a good point here, however Lee himself would later say that the mistake was his.
@@BSU55 His health was flagging, but I never heard of a heart attack.
'86 Citadel grad here. Spent 4 years in Law Barracks. Brig. Gen. Evander M. Law was never talked about in my presence...
The Citadel... a once great school turned into a woke experiment.
Very insightful commentary on a micro-facet of Gettysburg I had not heard before. I subscribed to your channel and will watch your other interesting videos on Gettysburg this morning. Lee fought the fluid ad-hoc battle of Gettysburg rigidly. I have heard he was in poor health, perhaps having suffered a heart attack and/or heat exhaustion and being in a mental fog. The "sureness of touch" that the most successful generals maintain in their armies by allowing subordinates to exercise initiative in bending tactical orders to fit circumstances they perceive on the ground was lost. If Stonewall Jackson had been there, it would have been a different battle, but alas, he wasn't.
When I was at The Citadel ‘82-‘86 my barracks, a.k.a. 3rd Battalion, was named Law Barracks after Gen. Law
And Jenkins Hall
Late on July 1, Lee considered moving Ewell’s Corps to form as his right flank, but Ewell and Early objected. Had Stuart been present to observe the Union 0:27 positions and report his findings, Lee would be better informed as to what options he had.
The Union Sixth Corps had arrived and 2 infantry brigades plus artillery held a strong position to repulse an attack around the Round Tops. Meade provided a strong defense here, easy to reinforce from the nearby artillery park and other available brigades, if needed.
Honest question here...even with better intelligence, what might Lee have done differently on the second day?
@@aaronfleming9426 Everyone assumes Lee had no intel, but that is not true. He had a decent idea of the Union situation on July 2 and his planned assaults might have won the day but for the complete disruption of the field by Sickle's move forward. We fail to understand that the move badly disrupted Lee's plan and Longstreet could not concentrate his attack as a result. The other unexpected twist was the successful defeat of Stuart to the east that prevented an assault on the Union rear.
@@jamesb4789 On the contrary, on every count. Lee had no idea that the Union line extended as far south as it did. If the attack had proceeded as originally conceived, Sickles would have been able to enfilade Longstreet's right as he moved up the Emmitsburg Road; that would have been just as disruptive, and a lot safer for Sickles.
We understand that Sickles' move was unexpected, but we also understand that Sickles' move was idiotic: it stretched his line to 3x the length it could effectively cover, which got his corps ripped to shreds; furthermore, it put him a half mile in front of the rest of the line, which meant that reinforcements had to be rushed piecemeal into the fighting, leading to those formations being mauled as well.
Meade certainly was not impressed by Sickles' move, and neither was Grant, who made sure Sickles never held a battlefield command again. We shouldn't be impressed by it either.
The "unexpected" twist in the cavalry wasn't unexpected either. Meade had skillfully protected his flanks and rear with cavalry to prevent exactly that sort of maneuver, and those cavalry intercepted Stuart precisely as alert professional cavalry should. Stuart's exhausted troopers were predictably turned back by fresh troops, some of whom were armed with repeating Spencer rifles. Even if Stuart had managed to force back the Union cavalry, surprise had been lost and his troopers and horses would have been all the more exhausted and unable to make a strategically decisive attack on the Union rear.
The missing element, Stuart, is key.
Law is someone who has always fascinated me- from Gaines Mill to Gettysburg and beyond. He saw some serious combat… like Hill, he rubbed Longstreet the wrong way, but had the kind of courage Hood embodied, and seemed to have had the same tactical alternatives as Hood wanted for July 2- and even Longstreet , despite Lee’s orders for that day based upon misunderstood Union positioning which Hood and Law knew better by the time the forward orders went into motion.
It is strange how little is written about him or known about him. I am one who sides with the view that Hood and Law (and even Longstreet) might have had a better result on the 2nd if left to their own discretion.
But orders are orders…
As for blaming Stuart… there is legitimate grounds for it, but no one can debate the martial spirit of all involved, including Lee.
Wonder what Law thought of the direct assault on the 3rd…?
Lee was a legend, but Gettysburg on the 3rd, rather than the 2nd is where the greatest gambles, and greatest faults lie with him. Easy of course for me to say from a couch in France rather than a rifle in PA…
Anyway, love what you are doing Ron. Keep em coming!!!
Agreed about how little has been written about him. Law dwells in the shadows of Hood and Longstreet. I'm working on a profile of him for the next issue of the magazine.
I am of that school that believes that Lee was in ill health by the time of this campaign. By the very appearance of the man, he had suffered considerably since 1861, And it seems that earlier in the year he has suffered a heart attack. Living in the field was hard for any man his age. Grant thought he was too old. Certainly he did not have the physical resilience of Grant who was walking wounded when he showed up in Chattanooga. but immediately restored the confidence of the army by his swift actions.
@@lifeonthecivilwarresearchtrail Had a relation in the 4th Alabama. My favorite regiment. THANK YOU for giving Law a day in the sun.
Maybe, had Longstreet not dragged his feet until late afternoon on the 2nd, Lee's battle plan would've been proven a winner. Remember, the Federal troops only occupied Little Round Top at the last minute. Had the attack commenced on schedule, it would have still been bare and wholly vulnerable, as would the entire Union flank.
@@Former11BRAVO Bad history. Longstreet did not delay. And the difficulty of getting all troops into position such that the attack commenced at 4 pm had zero impact on the outcome. Jackson's long flanking maneuvers at Chancellorsville delayed the attack until 5 pm. Gettysburg Day 2 was a similar plan, but it failed because of more difficult terrain, and the Union Army fought better.
wonderful presentation and informative vid!! Thank you!!
Not being a Civil War buff but very interested in US history in general and the War, I've all ways thought, from what I've read, that Lee ordered Pickett's Charge because he felt trapped and didn't know what else to do: an act of desperation. I have always thought it a possibility to consider.
There is no U.S. history if not the civil war
A couple of points
*Law's brigade had marched around 20 miles THAT DAY before the assault on LRT. Imagine the fatigue of his troops.
*Lee's plan on July 2nd was to attack in echelon up the Emmitsburg Rd, rolling up the Union line South to North. The taking of LRT at the direction of Warren altered the entire affair, forcing CSA forces to address those heights and depart from the echelon movement.
*To suggest a further departure from Lee's plan , a circuitous assault on LRT was even further at odds with any coordination as planned by Lee.
Lee's planned collapsed with the Union taking LRT, for it forced a departure from unit coordination in the attack.
Laws conclusion that only a general assault had a chance of success, but that that success would have left the army much weakened. Certainly the Union Army’s very skillful defense that day suggests he is probably right. Only Union mistakes could have given them victory and their generals did not make enough of them.
@@johnschuh8616 Typical of the war...
even if the CSA won the field, little was gained, and the chance they could hold the gain was low.
The echelon was carried out by Wilcox and Wright's brigades. They captured batteries but couldn't carry them off for lack of support.
Contrary to what the NPS plaque states, Wright's brigade made it to the crest of Cemetery Ridge but lack of support forced them to retreat back down to the woods from where they started.
In addition, I believe that day it was a humid, 90 fing degrees
I understood that Sickles redeployment messed up Lee's plan, as it was based on Union troop disposition in the morning as surveyed by Lee's aide Johnson. I also understood that Hood, who favored a wider sweep on the right, then diverted into Devils Den and toward LRT based on the alteration of the plan caused by Sickles forward deployment. His attack was hampered by this more difficult terrain.
In Army of NVA before Gettysburg there was rivalry between 1st Corp of Gen Longstreet and 2nd Corp of Gen Jackson I would call it friendly and when you read and research it from Seven Days until Chancellorsville it seem fine ( Longstreet wasn't at Chancellorsville he and Hood's ,Pickett's and Ransom's was sent to southeast Va ,But Anderson's and McLaw's stayed with Lee)Now at Gettysburg and afterwards there now 3 Corp in ANV , But there alot things said from members of 1st Corp and 2nd Corp and down right personal . This claim about Moving around the right at Round Tops is crazy ! Even if Stuart was there scouting the right ( and Lee did have 4 Cavalry Brigades with him -Stuart had 3) Moving around right at time of the attack would been met by Union 6th Corp coming up South to North from Taneytown road ! Hood's division would been wipeout ! Longstreet was reduced from 5 div before Gettysburg down to 3 and on 2nd day he didnt have Pickett's division ( which at Gettysburg was missing Corse and Jenkin's Brigades station near Richmond) ! The mistake made was 1st Lee should kept ANV at 2 Corp not 3 ! 2nd Corse and Jenkin's should not been detached , Richmond had 2 full Divisions station there ! Please don't forget south was very close to winning at Gettysburg but as Gen Gordon and Pickett said Union troops fought well that day and more so there were on there soil !
Thank-you. I wondered about a Corp in reserve behind LRT, or at least one arriving late to the battle. What are your feelings concerning Pickett if he had been available on the second day to re-enforce Hood’s people in a sweeping movement to the right? If that 6th Corp were spread out along the road, and if Hood and Pickett were able to unite in attack? One can but wonder.
Lee had to have a victory. Both for Political and Military reasons. I believe very strongly that is why he attacked. It worked in the Seven Days battles. It did not at Gettysburg.
Evander Laws looked just like KEVIN BACON!
Egads! You're right! I wouldn't have noticed that if you hadn't mentioned it.
6 degrees of Kevin Bacon is a thing!!!
I was going to say he looks a lot like Ethan Hawke, who also kind of looks like Kevin Bacon.
He even MORE looks like Steve Gaines (guitarist) who died in the 1977 Lynyrd Skynyrd plane crash
Thank you sir, may I have another.
Lee's performance at Gettysburg was very poor and easy to criticize. At this stage of the Civil War, most generals understood the level of casualties that a frontal assault would entail, a level of casualties that the South could not sustain.
Stonewall Jackson wasn’t at Gettysburg with his unbelievable flanking maneuvers to save Robert E. Lee. Jackson’s soldiers were often called the “foot cavalry” because they marched so quickly that they often surprised Union forces by outflanking them as if they were riding horses.
@@picklerix6162 Stonewall Jackson was much more impressive in his Shenandoah campaign where he wore out a Union army by defending and retreating, taking light casualties while inflicting heavy casualties.
General Lee is possibly the most overrated Commander ever.
@@picklerix6162General Jackson wasn't at Gettysburg because he was shot by his own troops.
It's said that when God decided that Jackson had to go.😊
I think if you wage war for the express purpose of perpetuating human bondage, it is unlikely that God will smile upon your effort.
In a few words - Lee was desperate.
Lee lost at Gettysburg I believe for two reasons. First, The Confederates had trouble moving through the town. Also, General Buford knew the ground was excellent for a battle and the Union was able to hold that ground. Second, Lee was trying to destroy The Union Army to win the war. It was very difficult to totally destroy a Civil War era Army. Grant was the only one to do it and he had to capture the three Confederate Army's to destroy them. Lee's frontal assaults were almost certain to fail.
Of course Lee didn’t want to lose the battle but why did he make the decisions that he did.
In battle the defense has all the advantages except one, the initiative. Lee could have made the North follow him and Lee could have chosen the battlefield. He didn’t, and the question is why not.
My personal theory is that Lee was heartbroken at the loss of his right hand, Gen Jackson. I believe that this loss was something that was a bigger factor on the battle of Gettysburg than may be realized. Lee was not himself at Gettysburg. Just my opinions.
He certainly was not in good health.
Jackson's death played no role in the conduct of the actual campaign. Lee was much more confident in Longstreet's ability (and I'm no idol of Longstreet). Jackson completely failed Lee during the Seven Days' Battles (primarily because of his religious zealotry), he once said that he never ate pepper with his food because it made his left leg weak, and he suggested a pre- dawn assault in the early morning after the final Union repulse at Fredericksburg. To differentiate between Union and Confederate, he recommended that their troops strip naked- in the dead of winter. Jackson was a talented but erratic corps commander whose relations with his own subordinates were unusually poor. Lee saw to it that when Longstreet and Jackson were elevated to corps command, Longstreet had one days' seniority.
The defensive as the stronger form of war was still new in 1863 even though rifling the conoidal bullet had been around many decades, and the vast majority of Civil War generals were tyros in their profession. Few graduates of West Point had ever commanded anything larger than a regiment. Lee was all but out of time by 1 July. He was late getting into Pennsylvania, his army hadn't foraged since his concentration order of 29 June (he couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days), and the clock was ticking at Vicksburg (placed under siege before Lee's campaign even began).
@@manilajohn0182 We cannot know what didn’t happen, but Jackson might have have been more aggressive on the first day and denied the Federals the high ground. However, Meade already had a place to fall back upon if Lee had driven his forces back. So probably the fight should simply taken place further south. And our guesses about that one would be the purest of speculations. All I will say that I think Meade would have handled things pretty well. Always have thought he has never received the credit owing him. He was like Nimitz after he took over at Pearl Harbor, although he lacked Nimitz’s personal touch.
@@johnschuh8616 I said that Jackson played no role in the conduct of the actual campaign. What he might have done if he had been there is an open question, but it's 50/50 either way at best.
@@johnschuh8616 And I agree- Meade did extremely well all things considered.
Robert E. Lee had been suffering with Chronic Dysentery for a month, or more. Along with Heart infractions and Lee going from Maryland into Pennsylvania suffered a heart attack. And Lee was missing the loss of Thomas Jackson, who had passed away 6 weeks before, after Chancelirsville. Whom, Lee considered to be his Right Arm. And Lee was also worried about
JEB Stuart, had not reported in from reconisance. Who had been held up in fighting skirmishes, North of Gettysburg, fighting with Custer. But along with Jeb Stuart, on the reconisance was two of Lees' sons. Being that they all were cousins.
Great video! It has always seemed that from the moment on July 1 when Longstreet told Lee they should quickly swing around the Union army and get between them and Washington, everyone but Lee knew that that was the was they should proceed, but also that following the orders as given would lead to disaster. If Sickles had not been an idiot, it would have been even more apparent on July 2 how futile it was going to be.
The problem with Longstreet's idea is that there wasn't really any way to "quickly swing around the Union army". Meade covered all the interior lines of communication...I can't see on a map how Lee would have done that, unless Meade and his cavalry were just sitting around doing nothing, which obviously wasn't the case in this campaign.
Interesting piece of history. Something that is not widely taught. Keep up the good work.
Lee was ill during this battle
Why not? Lee himself criticized his own leadership and resigned. his resignation was refused.
Bet Law doesn't have many memorials named for him.
Did Lee want to lose the battle?
He does have a “Law” degree though
Amazing reportage. I’ve been to Gettysburg and taken the tours and observed the battlefield setup on that day. Even an untrained sailor such as I commented to the tour guide that a frontal attack was pure suicide and Lee was highly negligent in his tactics. He should have listened to Longstreet, and now it appears Gen. Law. I think we must conclude that the hand of Devine Providence was guiding toward the most desirable outcome on that day.
I find fault in considering something written twenty years after the fact as a primary source.
I think at that point you're in the memory stage. I'm not an historian and didn't stay at a Holiday Inn last night, but I'm sceptical of this being a primary source, with history and memory being two separate things.
Keep up the good work Ron, I enjoy every show
I tend to agree, but we're missing context in this case. Jubal Early spent years after the war defaming General Longstreet. Longstreet was forced to publicly himself. This account was given in support of Longstreet to counter Jubal Early's lies and ignorance.
Also, it's considered a primary source because the writer is giving a firsthand account. 🤠✌️
The Sons and Daughters of the Confederacy made it their mission to ensure that history books were written to provide a favorable view of the South. This is a documented fact. They did this decades after the war. Southerners have been educated to believe their cause was honorable and that Lee was practically a god. If any source should be believed, it's a man who was there rather than a group with an agenda. It's not surprising that his report is missing since it was critical of Lee. It seems to be consistent with the strategy of Southerners who wanted to paint the Confederacy in a positive light. A recent article published about an Alabama unit that fought for the Union revealed that a well known Southern historian had hidden information about it.
It's still a primary source, although the context matters. Primary sources can be crap, and need to be assessed, but it is still statements by a witness.
@@dmbeaster I was questioning the number of years... Can you record what you did twenty years ago with any accuracy? He is remembering what he did and more than likely only the better parts of that. Memory is not history. Yes I know all primary sources are to be taken with a grain of salt.
@@HenryHahnsRifle I agree with you
Just saw your channel for the first time and subscribed. Do you have anything about confederate general Sterling Price? My mom talked him up pretty good but I'm finding some cracks in the dam.
Laws certainly hits one of the nails on the head. However, did he strike the hammer after the war in order to make himself look good? That is certainly worth a deeper dive. The fact of the matter is the South suffered from an absence of leadership from Jeff Davis on down. It was a sickness that spread to both theaters and doomed a nation (not that I am complaining since my ancestors were both Union officers). Southern strategy seemed to be attack frontally after Stonewall was killed. Even when Stonewall was alive there was a certain mantra about the attack. Lee was a great commander but also a flawed one. After Stonewall died he didn't trust his subordinates and his chosen replacements of Stonewall all were lacking for various reasons. Ewell might have been suffering from PTSD after his wounds and therefore hesitant to attack in his first real taste of command. Hill and Longstreet didn't get along well and that was evident in the failed orders of July 3rd. I could go on. There is so much wrong with the leadership of the Confederacy that has been glossed over by the Lost Cause myth as to excuse real issues. I subbed to your channel. Excellent stuff. Keep up the great work!
I enjoy your videos. I like the videos that tell the stories of individual sometimes little known Civil War persons
Lee let frustration of tthe stalemate get to him in a way great commanders just can't do. He ordered the suicidal tactic of Pickett's charge out of pure frustration.
Communication was their biggest problem . It still is today .
Law was a brigadier general and would almost certainly have had no idea that Lee's plan of campaign had been ruined by the victory of 1 July- and that he had no alternative but to either attack or abandon the campaign in total failure. (EDIT) Stuart's absence was Lee's fault, and not Stuart's.
Lee hoped that the cannonade before Picket’s change would do far more damage than it did. But like the bombardment of Iwo Jima, it came too late to avoid mass casualties. From Japanese sources, we now know that if the fleet had arrives a few days early, then they would have been much less prepared. Timing is everything.
Lee’s campaign plan was defiantly not ruined after July 1.
…”had no alternative but to either attack or abandon the campaign in total failure.” Why would he have to abandon the field in failure? Lee repeatedly, and successfully, moved around enemy positions.
@@Sodbusterrod I don't understand the assertion that Lee couldn't move away after the first day of fighting, but don't agree with the idea that Lee could have moved around the Union left at Gettysburg. The question is, "How? By what road? And what makes us think the Union wouldn't have been alert to the movement - which would have taken hours - and wouldn't have adjusted to the movement?"
The Army of the Potomac had almost always fought very well on the defensive. It was especially sharp at Gettysburg. I just don't see any way that Lee get's around the left...strategic withdrawal was his only way to salvage the operation: Claim victory for the first day's battle, be grateful for the opportunity to gather abundant supplies in Pennsylvania, and savor the brief respite from defending Virginia. Would have saved Lee almost 20,000 casualties.
@@Sodbusterrod Reagan's memoirs show clearly enough that the strategic objective of the campaign (decided between Lee and the Confederate political leadership at Richmond in mid- May) was to gain enough of a success to remove pressure from the Confederate defenders at Vicksburg (when Vicksburg was placed under siege, this became achieving enough of a success to force the Union to lift the siege of Vicksburg). Ideas to assist Vicksburg originally involved transferring formations from the AoNV to assist. Lee argued against this, telling Seddon in early April that the surest way to assist Johnston (C- in- C of the Western Department) was for the AoNV to advance into Maryland. The operational objective of the campaign was to take the war away from Virginia and forage off of Union territory to restock the AoNVs supply train because the AoNV was starving in its position along the Rappahannock. Lee's plan of campaign was to entice the AotP to attack the AoNV and defeat that attack (from Lee's after- action report and Longstreet's memoirs). To accomplish this, Lee needed information on the strength and location of the AotP. Lee assigned this task to Stuart. By the time that Lee began moving north, Vicksburg had already been placed under siege so time was critical.
Lee was late getting into Pennsylvania because he erred in giving his infantry formations (known for their tendency to straggle) two objectives for one force- namely, to forage and get northward in good time. He wrote Davis during the move north that the necessity to forage was retarding his movement. He erred again when he likewise gave Stuart two objectives for one force by instructing him to gather both information and provisions. These two objectives were both contradictory and coincided in time. Gathering information required mobility which gathering provisions would only impede (which is what happened). Moreover, Stuart lacked the available force to accomplish both simultaneously or the time to accomplish first one and then the other. He attempted to accomplish both and predictably failed.
Lack of information on the strength and location of the AotP led directly to the unexpected meeting engagement of 1 July. This engagement ruined Lee's plan of campaign because although he had originally intended to maneuver the AotP into attacking him, he assumed the tactical offensive himself to gain a minor victory. Having been repulsed at Fredericksburg and stunned at Chancellorsville- and with a new commanding general at the helm- there was no realistic chance that the AotP would go over to the offensive. This left Lee stuck. The clock was ticking at Vicksburg (under siege for approximately six weeks), he had so far done nothing to assist them, he couldn't remain in any one area for more than 3- 5 days because he was foraging (he hadn't foraged since his concentration order of 29 June), he couldn't forage in the immediate presence of the AotP, and the tactical initiative which he had not wanted was his. He had to either attack or abandon the campaign.
His tactics during the battle were a variant of the Napoleonic strategic battle- strike both flanks so as to draw local reserves from the center, and then attack the center. Meade recognized this, telling Gibbon on the evening of 2 July that if Lee attacked on the 3rd, it would be on Gibbon's front. Pickett's attack on 3 July failed for a number of reasons- not the least of which was that Meade saw the attack coming and had approximately 20,000 reinforcements move toward the Union center to defeat it.
Evander Law's scenario has been war gamed by experts. The result? Still a Confederate defeat. After July 1st there was no realistic option for a Confederate victory, either tactical or strategic. The Union position was too strong, their men too resolute, they had overpowering artillery, and a massive numerical superiority. In addition I would argue, more competent leadership in depth compared to the post Jackson Confederate army of Northern Virginia.
It's fascinating to me that Meade held a council of war, in which he included John Gibbon, who (iirc) was in temporary command of a corps. I'd love to study this more, but my hypothesis is that Lee's command style - very small staff, few corps commanders, and few councils of war - ultimately stunted the development of up-and-coming generals. Do you have any thoughts on that matter?
My feeling is that the relative success of the confederates on 1st July obliged Lee to press on during the next two days in circumstances that make it hard to see how he could have won.
@@redemptivepete I think you've got a valid point there. I think he still deserves censure for the abysmal intelligence gathering, but with the information he did have, the attacks of the second day make more sense.
Remember a few years back an old man telling me how his daddy and grandfather were not happy with Gen Lee for sending a lot of boys to there death on that frontal assault in which close family members were lost at Gettysburg, he told the story like it just happen it was very personal to him and his family.
Communications on the battlefield at this time were extremely difficult, they were completely dependent on runners and riders. This led to Generals being very reluctant to change plans once battle had commenced. A great video that even a Brit can find interesting.
Any idiot would have seen that Lee should have marched toward Washington after the first day of battle
Lee should have called in air support.
You mean right into the Army of the Potomac???
@@jamesb4789This is exactly what would have happened. Union forces were SOUTH of Gettysburg on July 1. Had Lee tried to break off and head for Washington, he would have blundered directly into the Army of the Potomac. As the PBS documentary "The Civil War" says about the run-up to Gettysburg, "If Meade didn't know where Lee was heading, Lee didn't know where Meade even WAS."
Lifelong CW buff, since my grandfather took me to Gettysburg at age 7, as the Centennial events were starting in 1961. I've been a student of the war ever since, so more than 60 years. No matter how many books I read, or how many battlefields I trek over, I know there is always more to learn, and other perspectives and views to consider. The fascination with this conflict never lessens. So thank you, Ron, for improving on my knowledge of Gen. Law's role at Gettysburg, at least as he described it. This is the first of what I understand to be a number of such short stories that I need to find!
It's hard to figure except that Lee may have been severely compromised by heart trouble. He did everything wrong during the Gettysburg campaign. He even marched his troops north away from Gettysburg, splitting his army. You don't beat your enemy by surrendering vital road junctions to him. He didn't even bother to recon with the cavalry he did have. Sure, he wanted to scoop up as much food as he could, but he seemed to forget that the Union Army could march, too. Then he attacked with only half his army on the field, tired from marching. Longstreet did the best he could on Day two, but, cannons needed water. So did men and horses. That Longstreet was able to launch an assault on Day 2 is actually a very impressive piece of work.
I appreciate your contribution. But consider this. Gettysburg was not Lee’s chosen place of battle. Harrisburg was his focus and a full Corp was already well on its way there before things got sidetracked by overly ambitious troops. Those Harrisburg bound troops had to be recalled when the battle was already engaged. That corps was spread out over twenty miles of very hilly roads and the temperatures were mid-ninety (95). By the time the whole Corp retraced their routes and got back to where the battle was and got reformed, the day was long spent. The Union was entrenched by evening of that first day. Such are the fates that battles fall prey to.
@@fredhall5038 Yup, a very bad plan poorly executed. The further Lee got from Virginia, he got weaker. Nobody really knows what he was thinking. It was unlikely that the Union Army would do nothing as he marched into Pennsylvania. Even after Lee botched everything, he still could have slipped south from Gettysburg, threaten DC and forced a battle of maneuver, evening the odds. When he opted to continue a static fight, he really had no chance.
Gettysburg was different in many ways. Lee was used to having his Army concentrated for each battle. At Antietam and Gettysburg, he was strung out and vulnerable. I think he also realized after Day two at Gettysburg the Union was bringing in large reserves that he could not match and he would be very vulnerable if he pulled back. I have often wondered if Picket's Charge was an attempt to win the field and give him time to retreat.
The Day two assaults on the flanks were near things. The attack on the Union right tied down reserves and would have let Longstreet punch through but of Sickle's unexpected move forward with delayed and broke up the Longstreet attack. If you walk the battlefield, you will notice that Cemetery Ridge is barely a bump when you get to the Round Tops and the line would have been broken. Sickle's move to the higher ground forward of he Ridge gave his men a better chance. And it broke up the concentrated punch Longstreet was supposed to deliver. Little Roundtop gets the attention, but it was the bloody fighting in the Wheat Field and Peach Orchard that won the day and bought the time for two Union Corps to move in and join the battle.
Apparently the confederate artillery was shooting high over the lines of the massing union army. It made a mess of the supply carriages etc of the union, but left the infantry relatively clear. The trails of the canon were digging into the soft ground as they recoiled.
Lee was ill at Gettysburg which I feel affected his judgment. After the beating the Union troops had taken he felt they would run at the first serious charge. I think because it was Northern soil those Yanks weren't gonna move for nobody. To lose Vicksburg the same week- disastrous.
Curiously, Lee eschewed a right flanking option as advised by Longstreet, and we had the sad madness of Pickett’s Charge against the Union centre on July 3rd. The presenter makes this conclusion.
RON IS SUCH A FINE, ARTICULATE COMMENTATOR OF THE CIVIL WAR. THIS IS THE THIRD EPISODE THAT I HAVE VIEWED & ENJOYED VERY MUCH. PUT ME IN MIND OF SHELBY FOOTE'S DEEP IMMERSION IN THAT SAD PERIOD IN OUR COUNTRY'S HISTORY.
Coulda,woulda,shoulda,Law had commanded the assault the previous day on Little Round Top, Made famous most recently in the movie Gettysburg .His brigade had suffered heavy losses and the right flank of the Union was reinforced . In Shakespeare the famous" once more into breach my dear friends " sums up the attitude of many just a little more effort must be made so our sacrifices won't be in vain.
It is difficult for me to get a complete picture of this battle, but I have to wonder about a few decisions such as attacking the stone wall head on and losing all of those men for nothing.
I listened closely and heard you say that Laws wanted to put artillery on Big Round top but you neglected to point out that it was Laws brigade that failed to turn the flank of Chamberlain at Little Round top. That's a fairly important point to leave out in consideration of Laws criticism. He felt that if he'd been allowed to flank the Union left from Big Round top, it might have caused Meade to draw his left back towards Cemetery Ridge. I don't know but these are points you failed to mention that color Laws criticism of Lee and excuse his own failure.
General Law is buried in Bartow, Florida. I have visited his grave several times.
I never heard this. Great job.
The ghost of Chancellorsville haunted Lee's army at Gettysburg. Jackson got astonishingly luck at Chancellorsville, but generals like Longstreet, Hood, and Law seem to have taken away the lesson that it's as easy as pie to just schlep your corps around the Union left and the Union will just sit there doing nothing. Lee seems to have taken away the lesson that his men were invincible. They all found out otherwise.
But Longstreet did it first at second Manassas .
@@lorrainedixon4440 Not really. That's a pretty different tactical situation. It was brilliant, to be sure - Lee's best battle, in my opinion.
If you've ever been to Gettysburg and seen the site of Pickett's charge, it's amazing they even attempted it. Perhaps if they had just turned the men loose to sprint across that field willy nilly toward the union position to do what they could(I know, that's not how they rolled...) it might have had some chance of success but to march across that expanse in straight lines etc into the maw of union cannon and rifle fire, inconscionable .
My son and I just came from the area of Pickett’s charge and I was dumbfounded that General Lee even considered it. He had his men charge across a 1,000 yards in open fields and then about 300 yards from the Little Round Top, the Rebels had to climb over strong pasture fences that set them up to be slaughtered. Some soldiers were funneling to downed gates, which provided an excellent cannon target. So sad though it was an unjust war.
In blaming Lee for the second day attacks by Longstreet what is being overlooked is that Longstreet had the discretion of doing exactly what Hood and Law suggested but for some reason he (Longstreet) refused. Lee always gave his generals leeway in adapting his orders to what they encountered when face to face with the enemy. If anyone is to blame, it is Longstreet.
Agreed 👍
The ANV was operating in enemy territory at Gettysburg. General Lee was desperate to get that knock out blow as quickly as possible. Logistics was the key. The ANV had limited time to deliver the Coup de Grace to the Union Army.
When the ANV was fighting battles in Virginia, logistics was much easier.
He wasn’t the only General at Gettysburg that could see the recklessness of Lee’s orders- “Pickett's after-battle report was reportedly extremely bitter, and General Lee forced Pickett to destroy it. Cavalry Captain John Singleton Mosby explained that after the war, Pickett still blamed Lee for the devastating losses and held bitter resentment for the old general.”
Nat’l Battlefield Trust
Remember this 1,000 yard march was across high prairie grass in the sweltering July heat. By the tine any of the few soldiers left had to be exhausted.
Law was the last surviving Confederate Major General. He spent his later years in Florida. Law is buried in Bartow, FL in central Florida, in an nice, older cemetery. My husband has been to his gravesite. Cheers.
After failing to capture Little Round Top Lee needed to rethink his strategy. He did not and got spanked for it.
He felt the plan to take little round top wasn't bad but that the commanders on the ground did a poor job of implementing his plan. He felt had they done a better job coordinating the attack the plan would have worked.
The assault of little round to itself was more piecemeal. Never enough to ovewhelm the defenders and overcome their advantage of the high ground. The stiff resistence of the north at Devil's Den had taken a big toll.
Lee initially took responsibility for the defeat at Gettysburg. Later Lee blamed his subordinates.
@@robertfreitag7328 Who, Longstreet?
@@JamesWatheist I think Rockhound is the person you want to question. It was not my comment. But I think Rockhound was referring to Lee!
Lee did not give Stuart CLEAR orders, but gave hime the option to do what he did. Lee often deferred to subordinates in a way that Stonewall did not. Also Longstreet should have felt confident enough to order a “flanking” attack at Little / Big Round-top. Lee was brilliant in defence, but not so much in attack, unless he was with Stonewall. (In my humble opinion) Lee was at fault in his orders to Stuart, who needed clear orders, which he would then obey. Lee should also have allowed Longstreet more latitude, he had the ability and experience to make his own judgements. In contrast the Union officers made many crucial decisions without consulting Mead.
I was just listening to Hood's account of this incident on another TH-cam channel. I've always wondered if Longstreeet was 'working to rule' because Lee had turned down his suggestion that the whole army move round the Union left. It is normal for commanders to change the plan of a superior if the situation requires it so Longstreet would not have needed to contact Lee for approval which would have taken some time. i'm from the UK but have been interested in the ACW since I was at school in the 1950s and have visited many of the major batttlefield including Gettysburg. I'm doing a talk about the battle next year so would be very interested in any comments or points anyonw cares to make on this subject. Also, I've never considered Longstreet's idea of moving round the flank to be a feasible operation of war. The armies were in contact so it would have been difficult to break contact and make the movement especially as they would have been moving into enemy territory without cavalry to recconnoitre and sceen the move. Again thoughts observations etc on this view woule be most welcome. Thanks for a very interesting videol
Also, consider Pickett’s charge, a frontal assault ordered by General Lee on the third day at Gettysburg which was a complete disaster. Lee blamed himself and rightfully so.
Brigadier General Evander Law is of course correct. HOWEVER. The Army commander knew that another tactical victory would not suffice. Only a strategic victory forcing Lincoln to stop the war would do. Lee likely believed that he had, logistically, only this one shot at a strategic victory. He could not manoeuvre his army in proximity to the entire army of the Potomac. As Shelby Foote had it, 'the stars in their courses'. From July 3rd 1863 to April 9th 1865 the stars did not deviate from their appointed courses.
I thing people are forgetting about the arrival of Sykes' and Sedgwick's corps arrival on July 2nd. Had the Confederates followed Law's advice to attack from the South, the arrival of Sykes' and Sedgwick would've been on their right flank. Sedgwick's Corp was the largest in the Army of the Potomac with 16,000 men. They arrived via the Baltimore Pike.
Longstreet shouldn't have drug his feet, and his attitude was infectious.
General Lee didn't have Stonewall and it is the latter's willingness to make long audacious movements that gave General Lee's plans their favorable results. General Lee and General Jackson were a perfect pair. The fortitude of General Jackson's men under his leadership was just amazing.
Thanks!
.I appreciate the work you are doing on this channel and on this topic. I taught Civil War Advance Placement too for 20 years. I hope my donation to you helps your work. J. Hugh Craft 1 April 2024
JUDGEMENTS ARE ALWAYS EASIEST WHEN RESPONSIBILITY IS EXTRANEOUS!!!!!!!!!!!
Lee had a gift for inspiring soldiers, other than that he was very good at getting into the head of his opponents. I have never found him a particularly genius commander. He had solid subordinates, especially in 1862 before the death of Jackson, when he had Jackson and Longstreet as his only Corps commanders. Add in JEB Stuart and you have three very capable commanders under him. His tactics and strategies got less and less bold as the war went on in part due to the loss of many of these commanders. He simply no longer had the talent in his officers corps to pull off massive and successful operations like 2nd Bull's Run and Chancellorsville. He was a solid general with incredibly gifted subordinates and a unified command structute that the North lacked. The rest is mythology.
My! This is the first time I've heard described the "aroun' t'the rahhht' strategy at Gettysburg described as "easy". I've always heard the move described as circumventing BOTH Round Tops and trying to start an assault from BEHIND Little Round Top, along the axis north along Taneytown Road!!!
As it was, the Rebs used the northern slopes of Big Round Top to gain a better position from which to assault Little Round Top ... but we all know how THAT turned out!
Hindsight is always seeing 20/20 but Law was probably correct about moving to the right.
Never fight uphill me boys, and always remember your lucky charms.
I believe it is called "BATTLE FEVER".
A commander comes to a point where so much energy has been spent that desperation comes into play where cost what it may "THERE MUST COME AN ENDS TO IT!" as Gen. Lee said to Gen Longstreet in the movie Gettysburg..."WE ARE ADRIFT IN A SEA OF BLOOD AND I WANT IT TO END!" instead of Longstreets advice to move pass Mead, get between him and Washington and find some good ground to fight upon.
I recently read a biography about Stonewall Jackson. I came away with a deep appreciation for the tactical and strategic brilliance of Stonewall Jackson. He always attacked the Union’s weak points. (Thank God his pre-Gettysburg recommendations of attacking north to Philly and beyond were not followed or the South may have triumphed.) Conversely this book made me realize that Lee was deeply flawed as a tactician, as he always sought costly frontal attacks against the Union’s strongest points.
Jackson had the fortune of attacking weak commanders and green troops.
Very good video. The fog of war is real. ❤
I’d rate Lee’s performance at Gettysburg a little above Burnside’s performance at Fredericksburg, but making most of the same mistakes. It demonstrates how difficult it is to be the Aggressor in War. I personally don’t think Lee was very good at it. Much better in Defense Mode.
Excellent video. Dixie General Store Heflin Alabama
Pickett's charge was a foolhardy idea at best. The artillery barrage before the order did little to affect the bluecoats.
People can say Lee came in blind but a great commander would have instantly saw culps hill and did whatever it took to control it say what you want but the truth is the truth
Can we speculate that Longstreet saw the disaster of the Devil's Den/Little Round Top attack then foresaw the fate of Pickett's Charge? Lee saw the disaster of Pickett's charge then said-"Johnson may yet succeed." He was then informed that Johnson had been thrown back
Thanks for the video. It is my understanding that Longstreet, Hood, and Law all advised against the direct frontal assault. They all advised that attacking from the side and rear would be more effective and more likely to succeed. If this is true (IF) why would Lee disregard his generals advice? And. Does anyone have the unbiased truth.
I have to agree with Evander Law's post war assessment of why Lee was defeated at Gettysburg - because he attempted the direct approach tactical offense against a well massed opponent harnessing strong defensive terrain with some confident Union leaders prepared to receive such an attack - that is why per the tactical realm. The overall reason Lee was defeated - was fighting this battle in the first place, but the details of the 2nd day, in front of Law, for example, show fully why fighting here at all was folly. The Federals had all the advantages, and the Confederates had none.
Gettysburg was lost at Chancellorsville.
Has Law been proven right?
Great series. I am reading up on the Revolutionary war 1776. The pointlessness of Britain's attempt to retain control of the 13 States can best be understood by 1861, only a generation later, and the massive bloodletting that ensued in addition to the genocide of the indigenous population. A nation built, developed, and sustained by constant war - internal and external.
The North American continent had seen many brutal wars among Native Americans long before Europeans arrived. The European nations were also battling for control over this land that was rich in resources and potential. The warfare between settlers and indigenous tribes was brutal when it happened, but it wasn't always a state of war and there was not complete genocide happening in this era. The British were not pointless in their attempt to keep the colonies. The colonists did not universally want separation. Far from it.
@@film50565 Thank you. On reflection England attempted it's own anti monarchy revolution in the 1640's with Cromwell winning the Civil War albeit temporarily. Much Cromwellian sentiment was evident in the early English colonies and I believe that this prospered with 5,000 miles of separation from the Old Country.
In several books I've read about Gettysburg, the idea that Lee was "off his game" or "not at his best" has been raised more than once. In one account of the meeting that led to Pickett's Charge, one of the participants said that Lee seemed "not all there" and "distracted". The reasons why this was so, if indeed it was, aren't made clear. Robert E. Lee, when confronted with his ultimate challenge and his ultimate opportunity, did not meet the moment, whatever the reason.
A part of me cannot help but think, What if Jackson had not fallen at Chancellorsville? His presence at Gettysburg might- might- have altered history. I think Lee trusted Jackson more than any of his other subordinate commanders. Often, Lee merely told Jackson what to do and left it to Jackson to figure out how best to do it. Beginning even late on Day One, I think you could have counted on Jackson to be planning some sort of flanking movement, a tactic which had served him so well so often. I can't help but think that Jackson's presence would have meant no need for Pickett's Charge- almost certainly the single most futile actions of the Civil War.
I have trouble believing many that try to make themselves look like they knew the correct way to fight a battle. I have been guilty myself in my career of being a Monday Morning Quarterback. The one I do believe tho is Longstreet on his opposition of the 3rd day charge across an open field. I believe that Lee at that time had a sense that God was leading him, but may have just been an inflated ego.
I've heard from more than one quarter that Lee may have suffered a heart attack or stroke on the first day of the battle, which clouded his judgement over the next couple of days.
@@Gwaithmir I have read he was in poor heath earlier in the Spring. but he felt that the invasion was essential and that he had to lead it.
I do not believe Lee had an inflated ego, most likely he had an over confidence in the ability of his army and his commanders with good reason being mostly successful but Gettysburg just did not turnout good for the south it was close but not a win and Meade was unwilling to make alot of mistakes that Lee could take advantage of.
I do believe with Jackson this would be a different battle , where was A.P hill and Ewell was just off to the sidelines Lee's only dependable corp commander was Longstreet his old war horse.
This gentleman reminds me in look and accent of Richard Dolan the ufologist.. I thought for a second he was now talking about the ACW!
Monday morning everyone is a coach...try it when the game is on.
I would love to see these civil war historians do videos about what it was like to be a slave. Tell us about the whipping post and cat o nine.
Exactly describe the actual horrors and evilness of slavery instead of glorifying slaveholders ❤
They did in a movie called "Roots".
Great insight.
Most notably it was General Longstreet that questioned Lee’s decision to send Pickett’s Division against the massed Union Army on Cemetery Ridge on day 3 of the battle - Many southerners chose to villainize Longstreet rather than acknowledge as Lee did himself the awful mistake he had made to continue the battle instead of withdrawing his intact army south -
* “AI” we are doomed - autocorrect continues to dumb down the English language - e.g., it flags “Villainize” as a non-existent word - - How about Artificial Stupidity -
What is often missed in how Lee 's army viewed Grant is the bigger picture. The Anaconda plan first put forth and implemented is mostly remembered for the blockade, but the second phase was the pincer drive to control the Mississippi Valley splitting the Confederacy. Sherman's march through Georgia was also a phase. Grant flourished in the West, with smaller armies, because the distances worked against the Rebels, but also because the politicians only watched Lee. Lee's Army had disdain for the western campaign as well. Yet Longstreet and others were nervous because the Vicksburg campaign was a siege, but also a brilliant campaign of maneuver by Grant and Sherman.
One of the crucial lessons Grant learned at both Shiloh and Vicksburg was the South had limited resources and needed time to replenish after battles. The pattern of several months respite was clear by1864. By that time the North had information that showed Lee had virtually destroyed his Army in 1862 Seven Days battle and in the end it was McClellan's loss of nerve and retreat that gave the victory to Lee. They also knew by 1864, that the South was shuffling units between the West and Virginia. From a regional strategic view, the Overland Campaign was a brutal blunt assault, but in terms of grand strategy, Grant was forcing the South to commit their reserves to Virginia and opening the door for Sherman's drive to the sea which in the end was fatal to the South. It was Grant's version of Patton's "Grab him by the nose and kick him in the a$$. As bad as the losses were for the Army of the Potomac, they could be replaced. Lee's Army though was steadily ground into the dust. Civil Wars are different and almost always require breaking resistance at afar higher cost than normal wars. Grant understood it.
It should also be noted that Lee's Army suffered a far higher percentage of KIA and seriously wounded than the Armies under Grant or McClellan. At West Point, Lee is considered the bloodier of the two.
Well said, and convincing at least to me.
@@nicksam2 I find a lot of things to misrepresented about various generals. I grew up a few miles from Gettysburg and my Grandfather was an official Pennsylvania Civil War historian. He told me Meade was a purely political general who never did anything to prove he was an effective commander, but he played the political game at the highest level. Lincoln appointed Meade because of the political pressure. Others like Reynolds did not want the job for that reason. It was Reynolds and his second and successor Doubleday who picked the union position and with Hancock set up the line. Meade arrived later when the real decisions were set. Meade held a council of war and wanted to retreat, but the other commanders refused. The reality is Meade was not in charge at Gettysburg. On second day, Sickles moving his corps forward is perhaps the most pivotal moment of the battle. The south end of Cemetery Ridge is actually in a valley and undefendable. So Sickle moved forward to ground that had a much better chance of being held. His movement totally threw off Lee's echelon attack plan which probably would have won the day. Instead, Lee's army had to force Sickle's men back but in the process were exhausted to the point that only a couple of brigades could launch the echelon attack in the afternoon and they failed to break the line. Sickles move also bought 10 valuable hours for most of the rest of the Army of the Potomac to arrive. Pickett's charge was in truth the attack Lee wanted to mount the second day but Sickle blocked. And Sickle ignored Meade's orders. After the battle Meade failed to pursue Lee which the other commanders wanted to do and instead made sure the Press knew he beat Lee. Meade did not order a pursuit until Lincoln asked why they were not moving.
Grant effectively took over field command because Meade was incompetent but after Gettysburg could not be removed. The last major decision by Meade was the Battle of the Crater. A division of Black troops trained for weeks to launch the assault and were prepared. The night before the attack, Meade overrode Burnsides and ordered white units to do the assault whose commanders knew nothing of the plan to lead the attack. Why? Because he did not want black men to get the credit. There are letters he wrote stating that. The attack was a disaster. Burnsides resigned when Grant refused to remove Meade. Politics. Meade and his staff thereafter were effectively regulated to logistics and Meade was effectively a token figure.
Lee's strategy at Gettysburg was horrible, he should be assigned major blame for the loss...
Lee admitted after Pickett's charge he said it was all his fault
thank you 🙏🏼
General Pickett said, “What? You want me to do what?”
Lee failed.