CRUSADE IN EUROPE DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1948 Page 336 _‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to_ *_defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches_* _in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces.'_
Operation Market Garden was probably one of the best resistance put up by the Germans in WW2 when they came f2f with the Allies. It surprised the Allies! Most of the German artillery, SS and MBTs were hiding behind bushes and trees, camouflaged, waiting for the columns to cross their path.
Market Garden was a success: ♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and German forces. Antwerp was the only port taken intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge attack right through US lines. ♦ It created a staging point to move into Germany at Nijmegen, which happened. ♦ It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed at London. ♦ It isolate the German 15th army in Holland. ♦ They reached the Rhine. ♦ The salient was fleshed out. ♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken. All this while Patton was stalled at Metz moving 10 miles in three months against a 2nd rate German army. And US forces were stopped before Aachen and eventually defeated at Hurtgen Forest - you know that engagement the US historians and History channels ignore.
v2 rockets were a joke and the allies created a salient to basiclly no where and it took 4 months for the allies to do anything...the15th army pulled out and was never surrounded...not to mention the treatment of the poles after market garden...it was a huge fail;ure...not to mention 1st para was annialated
*The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies *From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303* Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" *From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." *From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14* Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
*The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies *From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303* Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" *From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." *From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14* Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
@@bigwoody4704 Ho Rambo, more confusion from you as usual. Eisenhower stopped the clearing of the Scheldt. Now you know. How is the social isolation going?
Burns you resemble a one legged man in an ass kicking contest.Ring the nurses station - maybe they'll sing London Bridge for you - you can substitute the words "John Burns"
"Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives: to get Allied troops across the *Rhine* and to capture the *Ruhr.* Three major advantages were expected to accrue: ( I) *cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland;* (2) *outflanking the West Wall,* and (3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent *drive into* *Germany along the North German Plain."* - US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (Page 120). "Eisenhower approved the operation with certain conditions. Market Garden would commence on 17 September. Securing the approaches to the port at Antwerp would be delayed until Montgomery seized bridgeheads over the Rhine. His priority after seizing the bridgeheads would be gaining the much needed deep water port. He would not continue the attack to Berlin as he had proposed." - A FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISKS BY JAMES V. SCHULTZ A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES FOR THE COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA J UNE 1996 (Page 50). "later, on I5 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he *named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal"* - US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN (Page 210). One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the the pincer on the Ruhr, Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.
Brian Urquhart is wrong. He seems bitter because of being dropped from the operation. After the breakout in Normandy there were few German troops in France. The US went to near the German border very fast as did the British right into Belgium. Patton had a whole poor German army in front of him in Lorraine. Patton moved only 10 miles in 3 months at Metz such was the German resistance. The fuel situation was rectified quite quickly. The US army was beaten in Hurtgen Forest just over the German border. *To suggest that giving Patton all the supplies he needed would have made a bigger impact in defeating the Germans is pure naivety.* Patton went on a chase into nowhere - again. _General Eisenhower had agreed at the conference with his commanders in Brussels on I 0 September to defer the Antwerp operation while awaiting the outcome of Operation MARKET-GARDEN. "The attractive possibility of quickly turning the German north flank led me to approve the temporary delay in freeing the vital port of Antwerp . . .," the Supreme Commander wrote later._ - US Official History, BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE (Page 209). The First Allied Airborne Army was a joint British, American and Polish army of paratroopers to be used in operations to assist any western allied ground army when needed. It was an army in its own right with all troops wearing the 1st Airborne Army insignia.
*The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies *From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303* Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part" *From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude." *From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14* Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
He’s my great great uncle🙂
That is interesting. Any relation to the famous Scot diplomat David Urquhart (1805 - 1877), who introduced the Turkish Bath to the UK ?
An extraordinary, most noble & moral fellow is Brian Urquhart
Herman47
A pity he had a chip on his shoulder after being fired from Market Garden.
A search on: _RAF Reconnaissance Arnhem_ gets it. The document that discredits Urquhart.
CRUSADE IN EUROPE
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 1948
Page 336
_‘At the September 10 conference in Brussels Field-Marshall Montgomery was therefore authorised to_ *_defer the clearing out of the Antwerp approaches_* _in an effort to seize the Bridgehead I wanted. To assist Montgomery I allocated to him the 1st Allied Airborne Army, which had been recently formed under Lieutenant-General Lewis H. Brereton of the United States Air Forces.'_
Operation Market Garden was probably one of the best resistance put up by the Germans in WW2 when they came f2f with the Allies.
It surprised the Allies!
Most of the German artillery, SS and MBTs were hiding behind bushes and trees, camouflaged, waiting for the columns to cross their path.
Most German tanks were not hiding at all. Few were in the Arnhem area. Most came in from Germany in the days following the drop.
Market Garden was a success:
♦ It created a 60 mile buffer between Antwerp and
German forces. Antwerp was the only port taken
intact. This buffer proved itself in the German Bulge
attack right through US lines.
♦ It created a staging point to move
into Germany at Nijmegen, which happened.
♦ It eliminated V rocket launching sites aimed
at London.
♦ It isolate the German 15th army in Holland.
♦ They reached the Rhine.
♦ The salient was fleshed out.
♦ The Germans never retook one mm of ground taken.
All this while Patton was stalled at Metz moving 10 miles in three months against a 2nd rate German army. And US forces were stopped before Aachen and eventually defeated at Hurtgen Forest - you know that engagement the US historians and History channels ignore.
v2 rockets were a joke and the allies created a salient to basiclly no where and it took 4 months for the allies to do anything...the15th army pulled out and was never surrounded...not to mention the treatment of the poles after market garden...it was a huge fail;ure...not to mention 1st para was annialated
will B
The Market Garden salient, a buffer for Antwerp, worked when the Germans pounded through US lines at the Bulge. You are wrong on all points.
lol ok man...the point was to get across the rhine...we didnt but somehow it was a success ok
will B
Market Garden had many points to it. I assume you never read my 1st post.
*The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
*From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303* Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
*From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
*From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14*
Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
A Bridge Not So Far? Was that the sequel?
Montgomery never failed to capture Antwerp (well the approaches), as he never even tried to capture the approaches.
*The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
*From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303* Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
*From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
*From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14*
Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
@@bigwoody4704
Ho Rambo, more confusion from you as usual. Eisenhower stopped the clearing of the Scheldt. Now you know. How is the social isolation going?
Burns you resemble a one legged man in an ass kicking contest.Ring the nurses station - maybe they'll sing London Bridge for you - you can substitute the words "John Burns"
Johnny - it's FRIDAY - get all gussied up in your who farted T-Shirt and head out
@@bigwoody4704
Wow Rambo! Do you wear those T-shirts with the 82nd badges on them?
R. I. P 101 is a good age
I somehow missed his passing. Amazing he lived so long. I wish his warnings had been heeded in September of 1944.
no generation ever does we repeat our failures because we are led by greed
"Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives:
to get Allied troops across the *Rhine*
and to capture the *Ruhr.*
Three major advantages were expected to accrue:
( I) *cutting the land exit of those Germans remaining in western Holland;*
(2) *outflanking the West Wall,* and
(3) positioning British ground forces for a subsequent *drive into*
*Germany along the North German Plain."*
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
(Page 120).
"Eisenhower approved the operation with certain conditions. Market Garden would commence on 17 September. Securing the approaches to the port at Antwerp would be delayed until Montgomery seized bridgeheads over the Rhine. His priority after seizing the bridgeheads would be gaining the much needed deep water port. He would not continue the attack to Berlin as he had proposed."
- A FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY DECISION MAKING UNDER RISKS
BY JAMES V. SCHULTZ
A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES FOR THE COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
AIR UNIVERSITY MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE,
ALABAMA J
UNE 1996
(Page 50).
"later, on I5 September, General Eisenhower himself reopened the wound, perhaps with a view to healing it once and for all through a process of bloodletting. Looking beyond both Arnhem and Antwerp, he *named Berlin as the ultimate Allied goal"*
- US Official History, THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN
(Page 210).
One of the prime aims of Market Garden was to be the northern grip of the the pincer on the Ruhr, Eisenhower changed yet again his strategy from the Ruhr to Berlin two days before Market Garden.
A bridge not so far??
Brian Urquhart is wrong. He seems bitter because of being dropped from the operation. After the breakout in Normandy there were few German troops in France. The US went to near the German border very fast as did the British right into Belgium.
Patton had a whole poor German army in front of him in Lorraine. Patton moved only 10 miles in 3 months at Metz such was the German resistance. The fuel situation was rectified quite quickly. The US army was beaten in Hurtgen Forest just over the German border.
*To suggest that giving Patton all the supplies he needed would have made a bigger impact in defeating the Germans is pure naivety.* Patton went on a chase into nowhere - again.
_General Eisenhower had agreed at the conference with his commanders in Brussels on I 0 September to defer the Antwerp operation while awaiting the outcome of Operation MARKET-GARDEN. "The attractive possibility of quickly turning the German north flank led me to approve the temporary delay in freeing the vital port of Antwerp . . .," the Supreme Commander wrote later._
- US Official History, BREACHING THE SIEGFRIED LINE
(Page 209).
The First Allied Airborne Army was a joint British, American and Polish army of paratroopers to be used in operations to assist any western allied ground army when needed. It was an army in its own right with all troops wearing the 1st Airborne Army insignia.
@Daniel McGREW
'How long it took Montgomery to capture Caen: Two months'.
How did that effect the outcome of the campaign?
*The Eisenhower Papers,volume IV,by Edward Chandler* By early September Montgomery and other Allied leaders thought the Wehrmacht was finished .It was this understanding that led Monty to insist on the Market-Garden Operation over the more mundane task of opening the port of Antwerp. He ignored Eisenhower's letter of Sept 4 assigning Antwerp as the primary mission for the Northern Group of Armies
*From The Guns at Last Light,by Rick Atkinson,page 303* Even Field Marsahall Brooke had doubts about Montgomery's priorities "Antwerp must be captured with the Least possible delay" he wrote in his diary Admiral Ramsey wrote and warned that clearing the Scheldt of mines would take weeks,even after the German defenders were flicked away from the banks of the waterway"Monty made the startling announcement that he would take the Ruhr with out Antwerp this afforded me the cue I needed to lambaste him.......I let fly with all my guns at the faulty strategy we had allowed. Montgomery would acknowledge as much after the war,conceding "a bad mistake on my part"
*From With Prejudice, Air Marshall Tedder,p.586* Eisenhower's firm commitment to the Anglo-American Alliance dominated his thinking. He handled Allied disagreements in Normandy, at the Falaise Gap and for Market-Garden the same way. Eisenhower was determined to protect the facade of Allied unity at the highest levels of the Allied command in spite of Montgomery's insubordination which was motivated by both personal and political objectives. Eisenhower's efforts to cover up Montgomery's lies in Normandy drew praise from his British second in command, Lord Tedder: "One of the most disturbing features of the campaign ... had been the uninhibited boosting at home (England) of the British Army at the expense of the Americans. I ... fear that this process was sowing the seeds of a grave split between the Allies. For the moment, the Americans were being extremely reticent and generous, largely on account of Eisenhower's fine attitude."
*From Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14*
Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease.The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later. From page 19 ,Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp
@@bigwoody4704
Hi Rambo, I love your disjointed ramblings. Is this some sort of puzzle?