In this video, I examine eliminative materialism (eliminativism), the view that mental states simply don't exist. In particular, I focus on the version of eliminativism defended by Paul Churchland.
All of these Philosophy of Mind videos have been great and have really helped me. Your explanations are super clear and I'm really grateful that you took the time to make and upload them. Thank you thank you thank you
Great video! I feel like saying "mental states don't exist" is misleading, when something like "the perceived distinction between mental and physical states is illusory" might be more accurate. So pain still exists and is real, but merely as a physical state in the brain. What isn't real, according to eliminitavism, is the notion that our inner experience is somehow categorically different from a physical state. If I understood it correctly, I have to say I find it quite convincing. Although it clearly doesn't disprove folk theory, for the reasons you gave, the burden of proof should in my opinion lie with those who claim that nonphysical things can exist.
I'm afraid that you misunderstood main eliminativism claim. Not every physicalist have to be eliminativist, as the latter assert that FP concepts are inconsistent concepts and don't signify anything real. So claim is not that FP concepts are reducible to physical states: they can't be reduced, only eliminated in favour of more coherent theoretical framework.
@@exalted_kitharode Hmm, but according to the video Churchland's argument was that FP is superficial, not that it's disconnected from reality. Believing the FP has to be eliminated from the current model to form a coherent physicalist theory doesn't require believing that FP is not indicative of the underlying reality in some ways, does it? Sort of like recognizing that Newtonian physics is incompatible with relativity, but that the theory is still derived from real phenomena and useful in some ways. I could be misunderstanding your argument, I haven't read about this subject for quite a while. Sorry if that's the case.
@@nollhypotes do Ptolemaic model of solar system refer to anything in the world? What's the difference between its relation to reality and, for instance, Galilean model's relation to reality? What do we even mean when we talk about such relation? It all is not clear to me. Although It seems uncontroversial to claim that some theoretical postulates from geocentric model can't be reduced to conceptions in heliocentric model. Epicycles and deferents symply have no place in it. I think that's the correct example of concept elimination. As theories are Incommensurable, terms from one can't reduced to terms from another, only thrown away.
Thank you so much for making this video. The arguments and replies you organised and talked through are really easy to understand and clear. Got my first exam in 9 days, wish me luck.
Hi Kane, thank you for all your work! I wanted to ask is there any decent research that you know that look upon some possible implications for personal identity if we take eliminative materialism as a premise?
Interesting video. Intependently from the question if materalism holds I find it interesting, which of our mental phenomena actually need to be explained at all.
Kane B what's you preferred philosophy of mind and your personal opinion of EM? As I agree with you and according to the philosophy survey of 2020 95% of philosophers don't like the theory.
my opinion on illusionism is that the "me", the emotions, our feelings are maps which are also physiological and which, like a road map, help us to find our way in life. but the map has no reality. we take the map for reality but it is only an interface to help the organism that produced it to live. a dream that serves as an intermediary between the body and the world.
Folk psychology might be false, but I dont see how this denies the existence of subjective experience(i.e whatever it is mental phenomena are part of this world) and as long as subjective experience exists the mind is beyond physicalism or at the very least mental states exist. Could you help me out here if I am getting something wrong.
@Oners82 I think a formulation of what he meant would go something like: 1. Subjective experiences are by definition separate from physical things. 2. Subjective experiences exist. 3. Given 1 and 2, nonphysical things exists. So 3 does actually follow from the premises, but the premises are indeed begging the question.
To answer your question, the problem is that you define subjective experience as nonphysical, when the only evidence you have for that is a feeling that it is. But that feeling may just be what a mind does when it produces physical brain states.
It seems that if a theory t is not intrinsic to individual i's thinking then individual i can change his thinking (how i thinks about things). It seems that we can bracket our theories. And also when we see paul churchland,do we think that he's a utility maximiser? We can see him as a non-utility maximiser.
Sorry to be so dense about this but how does Eliminative Materialism relate to itself i.e. to the mental state that mental states do not exist? Seems to be self refuting unless I'm missing something. Help!
Instead of "mental states don't exist", it's more like "the perceived distinction between mental and physical states is illusory". So pain (as an example) still exists and is real, but merely as a physical state in the brain. An eliminitavist would relate to themselves as someone with a brain state containing the above belief.
Ok, with some afterthought I can see where I'm not getting this right - the question should be - if eliminative materialsim says there are no mental states, what name does it ascribe to what are generally know as mental states?
+Adam Kosterski I'm not sure I understand your question. Eliminativists use the same name as everybody else - they call them "mental states". Then they deny that mental states exist. (If I deny that witches exist, I don't need to propose a new name for witches.) . If you mean, "what do they propose is going on in our heads instead of mental states?" - well, that's difficult to answer for two reasons. First, different eliminativists have different views. Second, pretty much all eliminativists admit that we don't yet have a viable replacement for folk psychology. They expect that a replacement will emerge, but the cognitive sciences just aren't that far along yet. However, there are a few sketches of what the replacement might look like, and I discuss Churchland's suggestion briefly in this video from about 34:40. . I don't think eliminativism is self refuting. Obviously, if we believe in mental states, then we'll say that being an eliminativist involves having a mental state to the effect that mental states don't exist (it involves believing that there are no beliefs). But since eliminativists don't accept that mental states exist, they wouldn't characterize themselves this way. How would they characterize themselves? Well, as noted above, we run into the problem that the replacement for folk psychology hasn't been worked out yet. So certainly, eliminativists often struggle to express themselves coherently. Since folk psychology is the only framework we have at the moment, we can only express ourselves through folk psychology, so of course it will seem self-refuting to then deny central parts of folk psychology. It wouldn't necessarily be self-refuting to express eliminativism with a new framework, though. I discuss the self-refutation objection in the next video, at about 5:30: th-cam.com/video/zlcgGDklUjg/w-d-xo.html
Kane B According to elminativists, conceptions are the product of folk psychology and dont really exist. Truth IS a conception, therefore according to this nonsense view, truth does not exist, therefore if eliminativism is a true, it is not true. Lol. This laughably violates the law of non-contradiction. Educate yourself, it might help you through your nonsense. Mental states’ existence are the only thing in the universe that cannot be doubted.
So you think you can actually think you love someone and be mistaken about it that makes absolutely no sense I don't understand why this should be any different from the case of one thinks he has pain but he is mistaken about it, no you can't be mistaken about your mental States
I think you could have presented a more charitable reading of Churchland. Its more interesting to engage with an argument you've built up through a charitable reading rather than debating a straw man.
Great explanation of an incredibly unconvincing argument. At every step I'm screaming "no, that's not the same because..."; "no, first our brains develop..."; "no, if that were the case then...". It's just a terrible argument to a conclusion which is obviously nonsense. I know philosophers like to make arguments for things which are "unintuitive", i.e. which seem like bollocks, but playing word games to deny your own reality instead of facing up to the fact that we can't explain consciousness with physics is a real piss take.
All of these Philosophy of Mind videos have been great and have really helped me. Your explanations are super clear and I'm really grateful that you took the time to make and upload them. Thank you thank you thank you
I'm with the Churchlands on this.
Great video! I feel like saying "mental states don't exist" is misleading, when something like "the perceived distinction between mental and physical states is illusory" might be more accurate. So pain still exists and is real, but merely as a physical state in the brain. What isn't real, according to eliminitavism, is the notion that our inner experience is somehow categorically different from a physical state. If I understood it correctly, I have to say I find it quite convincing. Although it clearly doesn't disprove folk theory, for the reasons you gave, the burden of proof should in my opinion lie with those who claim that nonphysical things can exist.
I'm afraid that you misunderstood main eliminativism claim. Not every physicalist have to be eliminativist, as the latter assert that FP concepts are inconsistent concepts and don't signify anything real. So claim is not that FP concepts are reducible to physical states: they can't be reduced, only eliminated in favour of more coherent theoretical framework.
@@exalted_kitharode Hmm, but according to the video Churchland's argument was that FP is superficial, not that it's disconnected from reality. Believing the FP has to be eliminated from the current model to form a coherent physicalist theory doesn't require believing that FP is not indicative of the underlying reality in some ways, does it? Sort of like recognizing that Newtonian physics is incompatible with relativity, but that the theory is still derived from real phenomena and useful in some ways. I could be misunderstanding your argument, I haven't read about this subject for quite a while. Sorry if that's the case.
@@nollhypotes do Ptolemaic model of solar system refer to anything in the world? What's the difference between its relation to reality and, for instance, Galilean model's relation to reality? What do we even mean when we talk about such relation? It all is not clear to me. Although It seems uncontroversial to claim that some theoretical postulates from geocentric model can't be reduced to conceptions in heliocentric model. Epicycles and deferents symply have no place in it. I think that's the correct example of concept elimination. As theories are Incommensurable, terms from one can't reduced to terms from another, only thrown away.
But then identity-theory would count as eliminitivism.
Thank you so much for making this video. The arguments and replies you organised and talked through are really easy to understand and clear. Got my first exam in 9 days, wish me luck.
Eliminative materialism denies facts in order to promote itself as the only logical explanation. This in itself disqualifies it.
Hi Kane, thank you for all your work!
I wanted to ask is there any decent research that you know that look upon some possible implications for personal identity if we take eliminative materialism as a premise?
God bless you. I watched Patricia churchlands video and I found myself more confused lmao.
Very high quality content , this is essentially gold for those who want to understand this subjects but might find the papers on them too convoluted .
Interesting video. Intependently from the question if materalism holds I find it interesting, which of our mental phenomena actually need to be explained at all.
Kane B what's you preferred philosophy of mind and your personal opinion of EM? As I agree with you and according to the philosophy survey of 2020 95% of philosophers don't like the theory.
my opinion on illusionism is that the "me", the emotions, our feelings are maps which are also physiological and which, like a road map, help us to find our way in life. but the map has no reality. we take the map for reality but it is only an interface to help the organism that produced it to live. a dream that serves as an intermediary between the body and the world.
kane b you legend
Folk psychology might be false, but I dont see how this denies the existence of subjective experience(i.e whatever it is mental phenomena are part of this world) and as long as subjective experience exists the mind is beyond physicalism or at the very least mental states exist. Could you help me out here if I am getting something wrong.
'Subjective experience' would be another folk concept.
@Oners82 I think a formulation of what he meant would go something like:
1. Subjective experiences are by definition separate from physical things.
2. Subjective experiences exist.
3. Given 1 and 2, nonphysical things exists.
So 3 does actually follow from the premises, but the premises are indeed begging the question.
To answer your question, the problem is that you define subjective experience as nonphysical, when the only evidence you have for that is a feeling that it is. But that feeling may just be what a mind does when it produces physical brain states.
7:33 "Bear that in mind"
...Ha!
It seems that if a theory t is not intrinsic to individual i's thinking then individual i can change his thinking (how i thinks about things).
It seems that we can bracket our theories.
And also when we see paul churchland,do we think that he's a utility maximiser? We can see him as a non-utility maximiser.
Thankyouuuuuu you saved my day and my assignment
what would be a slogan for this if you were to come up with one
Sorry to be so dense about this but how does Eliminative Materialism relate to itself i.e. to the mental state that mental states do not exist? Seems to be self refuting unless I'm missing something. Help!
Instead of "mental states don't exist", it's more like "the perceived distinction between mental and physical states is illusory". So pain (as an example) still exists and is real, but merely as a physical state in the brain. An eliminitavist would relate to themselves as someone with a brain state containing the above belief.
Many thanks for the reply. Your explanation makes it much easier to grasp the overall concept.
Ok, with some afterthought I can see where I'm not getting this right - the question should be - if eliminative materialsim says there are no mental states, what name does it ascribe to what are generally know as mental states?
+Adam Kosterski I'm not sure I understand your question. Eliminativists use the same name as everybody else - they call them "mental states". Then they deny that mental states exist. (If I deny that witches exist, I don't need to propose a new name for witches.)
.
If you mean, "what do they propose is going on in our heads instead of mental states?" - well, that's difficult to answer for two reasons. First, different eliminativists have different views. Second, pretty much all eliminativists admit that we don't yet have a viable replacement for folk psychology. They expect that a replacement will emerge, but the cognitive sciences just aren't that far along yet. However, there are a few sketches of what the replacement might look like, and I discuss Churchland's suggestion briefly in this video from about 34:40.
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I don't think eliminativism is self refuting. Obviously, if we believe in mental states, then we'll say that being an eliminativist involves having a mental state to the effect that mental states don't exist (it involves believing that there are no beliefs). But since eliminativists don't accept that mental states exist, they wouldn't characterize themselves this way. How would they characterize themselves? Well, as noted above, we run into the problem that the replacement for folk psychology hasn't been worked out yet. So certainly, eliminativists often struggle to express themselves coherently. Since folk psychology is the only framework we have at the moment, we can only express ourselves through folk psychology, so of course it will seem self-refuting to then deny central parts of folk psychology. It wouldn't necessarily be self-refuting to express eliminativism with a new framework, though. I discuss the self-refutation objection in the next video, at about 5:30: th-cam.com/video/zlcgGDklUjg/w-d-xo.html
Lol. Eliminativism IS self-refuting. DEAL WITH IT.
Kane B According to elminativists, conceptions are the product of folk psychology and dont really exist. Truth IS a conception, therefore according to this nonsense view, truth does not exist, therefore if eliminativism is a true, it is not true. Lol. This laughably violates the law of non-contradiction. Educate yourself, it might help you through your nonsense. Mental states’ existence are the only thing in the universe that cannot be doubted.
Kane B My belated thanks for your response - much appreciated.
interesting position
I'm seeking a reference (academic) for the argument laid out at 37:41. Mind sharing where I might find one?
Probs too late but Dan Dennett uses the software analogy a lot in arguing for his brand of eliminativism
So you think you can actually think you love someone and be mistaken about it that makes absolutely no sense I don't understand why this should be any different from the case of one thinks he has pain but he is mistaken about it, no you can't be mistaken about your mental States
Kane B Just curious, are you an eliminativist?
I think you could have presented a more charitable reading of Churchland. Its more interesting to engage with an argument you've built up through a charitable reading rather than debating a straw man.
In what respect do you think my presentation of Churchland's argument is a straw man?
I agree. Hard to see it as straw-man.
Great explanation of an incredibly unconvincing argument. At every step I'm screaming "no, that's not the same because..."; "no, first our brains develop..."; "no, if that were the case then...".
It's just a terrible argument to a conclusion which is obviously nonsense. I know philosophers like to make arguments for things which are "unintuitive", i.e. which seem like bollocks, but playing word games to deny your own reality instead of facing up to the fact that we can't explain consciousness with physics is a real piss take.
23:00
@23:00 folk (common sense] psy. - falsified
1 for attitude pls
1:17
😂Based
let emilio see the vid
full communism or bust!