I just applied that military doctrine to a warno game. works very well especially when you have a player acting as a commander who uses artillery, heavy anti-aircraft missiles and air force well enough to suppress enemy fire (especially air force with carpet bombers). In A 5 vs 5 match, 1 person's mission is to act as scout and vanguard, 2 to act as the main force, 1 to act as a reserve, and 1 to act as commander and support. When our unit was able to push the main force to the rear of the enemy and round to their flanks, they completely lost control and only reacted to our movements.
You always find another step up to forward your content. First a cinematic storytelling of your pvp matches, then your historical walk through games, and now a podcast with a visual aid. Absolutely amazing lesson on soviet doctrine
This is a great video that turns some of the less digestible field and tactical manuals into an excellent visual aid while still being entertaining. Great job Whiskey, really punching above your weight with this video!
What a well visualized video! I do have some thoughts though. Mainly, the discussion of Soviet principles is a little narrow and the discussion of echelonment falls into very common western misconceptions. The way Soviet quantitative approaches are described in this video is so far removed it's not even wrong, and there's some big issues with how artillery is described. The combat action in this video is better described as an attack in a single echelon, not in three. Let's dive into echelonment first. I'm mainly going to discuss the use of echelonment in the attack, but keep in mind it was also used in the defense as well. I hope this isn't too scatterbrained, btw, I had to re-write it because youtube ate my comment. In this video the Combat Recon Patrol, Forward Security Element and Advance Guard are described as separate echelons. In fact they, along with the other various detachments, groups and parties (including the main body in one or more echelons), form the elements of the (combat, march or pre-battle) formation [poryadok] of a Soviet unit [chast'] (subunit [podrazdeleniye], formation [soedinenye], higher formation [ob'edinenye]). I know having transliterated Russian in brackets is really clunky, but it's (IMO) necessary to keeping the terminology coherent, given things like translating poryadok and soedinenye both as formation when one means "arrangement of troops and forces" and one means "military command of ~independent brigade/division/corps scale". These elements, and the way they are arranged to fight, screen, reconnoiter, and move about the battlefield, are indeed designed to expose the minimum amount of RED to enemy fire while ratcheting up pressure on BLUE. But, importantly, these are not echelons. In the Soviet definition (using Sovietskaya Voennaya Entsyklopediya. See Vol. 2. p. 421; Vol. 6 p. 392, Vol. 8 p. 617-619) an echelon is an element of the formation [poryadok] of a military unit (etc) with a specific mission assigned before its commitment. We can shed more light on this by looking at the definitions of the first and second echelons. The first echelon is always formed, always task organized, always combined arms, and *as a rule* existed to fulfill the initial mission of a unit (etc), and may achieve the subsequent mission depending on battlefield circumstances. In the 1970s and 1980s the 1st Echelon might consist of 1/2 to 2/3 of the combat power of a unit (etc). If an enemy defense was incoherent, weak, or unprepared the Soviets would use a single echelon. The second echelon is often formed, and exists to further the success of the unit (etc) in combat. It remains uncommitted at the start of combat like a reserve, but it receives a specific mission, alongside an intended axis of advance as well as details of the intended time/manner/place of its commitment. This is not locked in stone, the mission, commitment, objectives etc are all subject to changing battlefield circumstances. The second echelon is formed generally (in the attack) when the enemy's defense is reasonably coherent/dug in and allows the commander to flexibly develop the combat action by rapid commitment of significant combat power. In the 1970s and 1980s a second echelon generally had 1/3 to 1/2 of the combat power of a unit (etc). A third echelon was very rarely formed, generally only if the Soviets were fighting in restricted terrain like mountain valleys or something. Typical missions for a second echelon might include further developing the attack, achieving the subsequent objective of a Soviet unit (etc), conducting the pursuit, liquidating bypassed enemy groupings, defeating a counterattack, or replacing in part or whole first echelon forces rendered combat ineffective before or during their commitment (e.g. replacing losses to interdiction). It is REALLY important to note that as a rule further echelons were used to reinforce the success of the first, NOT to redeem failure. The Soviets held that the best assistance to a unit (etc) struggling in combat was the headlong success of their neighbor. If the first echelon was having trouble the second would not charge in to reinforce them, but be committed on a different axis to envelop, pin, turn a flank, or even perhaps become the main axis of emphasis. As in all things with the Soviet military bold and sensible audacity should guide superior and subordinate. Creative and flexible adaptation to changing battlefield circumstances are necessary for success on a changing battlefield. To recapitulate sizes: 1st echelon = 1/2 - 2/3 of a unit's combat power. 2nd Echelon = 1/3 - 1/2 of a units combat power. Combined Arms Reserve = ~1/9th of a units combat power. What we can see from all of the above is that the video Now, regarding Soviet principles, while mass and tempo are both emphasized they are among a broader swath of like seven or eight principles of varying importance. Note that they are flexible and change based on the nature, form and type of combat being discussed, as well as the material-technical conditions. Reznichenko's 1987 edition of Taktika gives (in no particular order): ---High Combat Readiness; ---High activity [aktivnost'], determination [reshitel'nost'], and continuity of combat; ---Coordinated and Joint use of combat arms and special troops (Spetsalnikh voisk) in combat and the maintenance of continuous interaction between them; ---The decisive concentration of the main efforts of troops in the main direction and at the right time; ---Maneuver by forces and fires; ---Comprehensive exploitation and use of morale, moral, political and psychological factors to further tasks; ---Comprehensive combat support; ---Maintenance and timely restoration of combat capability of troops; ---Firm and uninterrupted command and control of troops, unwavering commitment to achieving the intended goals, fulfilling decisions made and completing tasks assigned. Now, Tempo and Mass are on this list, in the second and fourth ones listed, but they're not alone! And these break down further, you wind up with a list of like 20 principles which I don't want to bog down here. Read Chapter 1 of Taktika '87 (Fundamentals of Combined Arms Combat). When it comes to understanding the Soviet mathematical / quantitative approach to war, I would really suggest the monograph "Calculating Combat Outcomes" by the Soviet Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst. The way it's described in this video is so far off base I don't even know where to start. Also, the scientific approach to the study of war isn't /just/ about quantitative methods, it's to do with creating a system of knowledge for understanding and analyzing war and armed conflict based on observations, experiments, data and analysis. When it comes to the implementation of Soviet artillery in this video (and I suspect in CMCW in general) it's just wrong. Soviet artillery was (for one) directed quite differently, running on a supply-push rather than demand-pull model where the artillery commander would generally be in 'collar grabbing' distance of the commander they were attached to and be maneuvering their fires directly, rather than putting calls for fire through an FDC. There's also recon-fires-complexes, where C2, observation and fires assets would be lashed together in a specific cell to hunt down high priority targets with very short see-shoot loops. In general, fires would be phased but with flexibility. The phases were generally, Fire Support for Movement Forward | Fire Preparation | Fire Support in the Attack | Fire Accompaniment. The average time to shift between targets for soviet artillery in the 1970s and 1980s was ~2 minutes. I don't know what it is in CMCW, but a quick google showed that it's like... 8 minutes in CMBS? That's absolutely whack. Chapters 7 and 8 of FM 100-2-1 (1990) and Red God of War are helpful on this. I will say, this video did a solid job showing off a Soviet combined arms attack, it just described them wrong. And that's not y'all's fault, most of the sources available are wrong and agree with each other. This is a pretty solid example of a soviet avangard attacking in one echelon. Also, just some nitpicking, the US until 1975, UK until 1963, the West Germans, French, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, etc all had conscription. They were all just as much mass-mobilized conscript armies as the Soviets were. Shit, so were the Israelis. The idea that there was somehow some kind of innate difference between a West German conscript and a Soviet conscript is absolutely bizzare to me. Sources: Soviet Military Encyclopedia Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary FM 100-2-1 (1990) Reznichenko's Taktika (1987) SSRC Calculating Combat Outcomes Chris Bellamy's Red God of War
That was an excellent read. Quite a few things here I didn't know, so thank you for that. The point of the video is ofcourse to give the viewer tools to use what's given to them in CM in a way that resembles doctrine from the era. For this, we had to cut quite a few of the principles out as they don't apply to CM (high combat readiness, high maintenance, etc) or are not as important, we felt. The bit about the terminology I didn't know and I would have used that info if I had known. But at least the info is now here in the comments, so thanks for that!
Excellent explanation of the soviet military! If you don't mind me asking, why did the modern Russian army operate in a very disappointing manner in Chechnya and Ukraine? Is it because of corruption and the expectation that a war with NATO was unlikely? Was it because the Russians wanted a force that was more focused on shock-and-awe style operations like in Georgia and in Crimea? Or did they drop the doctrine altogether after the Soviet Union broke apart?
@@andrewuy1294 it's a complex issue that I would say still can't be fully answered. There's many factors at play leading up to their failure in Ukraine, some of them peculiar to this conflict, some of them systemic. It's also a changing target - the Russians are learning and changing as they go (as are the Ukrainians). The Russian threat after the war won't be the same as it was before the war, and not just because they will have to rebuild it. They're changing and learning.
Reminds me of discussing Doctrinal Templates for Soviet forces in my MDMP classes as a LT in the late 90s at Ft Sill. As a non-intelligence branch LT, you get the distilled version. Our S-2s were highly versed in the doctrine and employment of the "Krasnovian Guards MRR" or whatever they called 11th ACR OPFOR back then.
So if I'm understanding this correctly, these three parts shown in the video are actually used in a realistic manner, but are actually groups within a single echelon, while an actual second echelon would be as a rule uncommitted but with explicit (though flexible) orders upon its committal.
Brilliant as ever. One of the best bits of CM is when you are able to get your opponent's perspective on what they did, where, when and why. This Video does that brilliantly. Thanks!
When I was in the military, something I heard often was that in the West we fire to maneuver, in Russia they maneuver to fire. A gross oversimplification, but it describes it well. Soviet recon elements would keep maneuvering till they found the path of least resistance, then their command would throw everything that direction. Western recon elements would find where the enemy isn't, and exploit that.
Strictly the "shift axis to follow the path of least resistance" is an operational level thing, where the doctrine is significantly more flexible and fluid. That's what the Regimental, Divisional and Army recce units will be enabling. On the CM level, that work should have been done, so you're already encountering the weak part of a line, with sufficient force to destroy it (at least in theory). That means that the formation reconnaissance is instead tasked with finding an enemy that you already know is there somewhere - typically I abstract that "you know the enemy is somewhere on the map". So the tactical reconnaissance is forging ahead, a Command Push along the expected or ideal line of advance, where timing is of the utmost importance. The NATO equivalent of that is a more tentative Recon Pull - the main force is held in reserve, and the plan is derived from what the reconnaissance can find. This is significantly less risky for all concerned, but costs time, which means there's more chance for the opponent to do something about it.
Soviet doctrine, nothing a wing of tactical nuclear armed F-111's couldn't handle or so we hoped at the time. I was stationed at RAF Upper Heyford during the early 80's as a crew chief on the F-111E. Almost all of our exercises started non-nuclear but ended with a mass launch of simulated nuclear armed jets. As part of the exercise, we always got gassed (good old MOPP 4) and or nuked. We had 9 jets on Victor Alert ready to go 24/7. Good times.
Combat Mission doesn't show it, but I believe the Soviet doctrine is centered around the assumption that WW3 would be fought in an apocalyptic wasteland - hence the mechanized focus and general lack of dismounting. Also, I've flown in DCS squadron with a cold war era veteran pilot. Wonderful stories he could tell about that time also...
@@FreeWhisky At least they were prepared to fight in the wasteland, but for what purpose? With millions of deaths and destroyed cities/countries what did you win? The question answers itself hence they never attacked. Taking nuke's out of the picture it would have made great reading 50 years after the war, much like WWII.
I don't really play Combat Mission but I hope you do a video in style on the western forces as well (US and French forces especially) because it's actually very interesting.
You know Whiskey it's funny that I was JUST thinking about making this exact video! Appreciate the efforts of yourself and Dom to make this happen so I don't have to! 🤣
Great explanation of Russian Operational art and its prescriptive approach to war. I recently had to learn how to write a Soviet/Russian Op Order for a Btl Recon unit. These orders can be in depth and contain plans B/C already in them for exactly the reason you stated. There is so much myth based on propaganda , historical biases, and myth about Russian Deep Battle Operations and the way Russian Military Operates. We are seeing the results today, and I will leave it at that. Thanks for for showing people some reality as to why.
I really liked your video and I am wondering are you planning on doing something similar for the US forces? The soviet army is usually the main point of interest when it comes to this period but I always wondered what was the US doctrine and tactics at the time to stop the red tide.
Looking forward for the next video. :) Domfluff insight on the soviet doctrine is quite interesting. The combinaison of the theory and practice goes very well together.
@@FreeWhiskyif there is a reason this doesn't have 288,000 views it's because it takes a tough dedication to historical realism to play the 1979-1983 NATO v WP WWIII scenario. Everyone wants overpowered American weapons king of the battlefield M1 M2 M3 Apache MRLS combination. Nope it's m48s and m60s starships and unprotected M113 gunners fighting numerous and better Soviet tanks and BMPs
Super cool video, thank you to both of you for taking the time to bring this to us! It's funny to see the doctrine of turning combat into a science litterally played on a computer that does just that, turning everything into numbers and dice rolls 😂 Edit: does Dumfluff have a TH-cam channel?
This was a very informative demonstration of Soviet Doctrine. Well explained and illustrated; imminently digestible compared to reading tactical and field manuals. Fascinating to see what they came up with to maximize the strengths of a mass mobilized firepower centered conscript army. Theory and Practice come together in something that looks beautifully simple if it works well.
This is a brilliant piece of work. I have seem media on Soviet Doctrine that is more precise and media that is more concise. But this is the best video I have seen, so far, where so much is explained in so little. It's highly detailed but maintains a good pace, while being engaging and making a remarkable use of the media available (a game you just discovered to me). Genuinely impressed by this video. It's extraordinary.
So nice to hear you enjoyed it! There are free demo's of this game at the Battlefront.com website since you just discovered the game, just not of this particular title sadly. Or just enjoy my content about it; I do that for other games, all good 😊
The problem with that is that Soviet defensive doctrine was not as well developed - the intention would have been to be on the attack as much as possible. The broad concept though, was defence in depth (so mutually supporting islands, built around a mix of AT assets - recoilless rifles and ATGMs in pairs to compensate for each other's weaknesses, and dug-in infantry and vehicles), supported by wire and mines. Then, as much as possible of the force was kept in reserve for a counter-attack, since that's the best way to maximise your mass and keep the enemy on the back foot. The issue with a lot of that is that it's a lot harder to visualise in a CM battle, especially in this kind of abstract Quick Battle "typical combat mission" scenario.
I should probably add that 00000spoon00000 is our good friend Domfluff in disguise😉. We do talk about it for a bit in my next video, but what Domfluff wrote here is pretty much the gist of it.
@@FreeWhisky ok and thank you for the video I am currently reading weapons and tactics of the soviet army by David C Isby, I having a hard time imaging what soviet offensive would look like (rush to b meme)but your video help with that
Think you could do some videos on other nation’s doctrine? Not many people in TH-cam go in depth into war doctrine and this is one of the best that I’ve seen.
Domfluff has once again bribed his way onto another channel to espouse the glories of tactical socialism while fighting monkey model M60s and troops demoralized after Vietnam. He can't keep getting away with this. Otherwise, an excellent video that goes into some nice intro-level concepts and dispelling of some common myths in a relatively short, accessible, and entertaining time frame, as always. I'm really excited for a more in-depth look as teased at the end of the video as well. There is so much more complexity to soviet doctrine than a lot of people believe, even at the tactical level. And cold war has been the best tool ever made to actually practice or even display that in a way that allows the results to be easily shared and taught to a general audience. I cannot wait for the greater deep dive, and of course where ever else this channel goes in the future.
Great video! The only addition I would suggest is that Soivet's doctrine was heavy on strategic goals instead of tactical ones. If one division can break through the frontline, the enemy either has to retreat or risk being encircled. If the enemy is retreating they giving up their favourable positions and/or not have enough time to create a strong point of resistance. (A doctrine conclusion from the 2nd world war)
I'm so glad to see this video. I've been describing these kinds of tactics to people for years now and people just don't seem to get it, thinking that the entire Soviet way of war relies on Western doctrine. Non-stop I argue with people who are firmly convinced that the Soviets were undertrained morons whose equipment is faulty and flawed beyond belief, the T-72 with its autoloader and "poorly trained crews" being a stand out example. Nobody seems to understand why the Soviets fought the way they did or why their equipment was designed the way it was, and it is purely because they are taking Western doctrine and applying it to an army that had to learn to fight and win from 1939 onwards without advantages such as a highly-trained, university-educated officer corps, state-of-the-art technology and even radio.
thats on them tho. But regardless, in real life we are seeing that the fact they are at least two generations behind the West in military tech, and the tech they do have has been piecemealed and sold on the black market for vodka drinking allowance, in a real conventional war between soviet and western doctrine and military itself, the soviets would have gotten absolutely crushed.. the only thing saving them now, is their nukes that may or may not work
@@raidermaxx2324 This is the kind of argument I have had many times before: the mistake you are making is that you believe that the Soviet Union is exactly the same as modern-day Russia, which is like comparing the entire United States in the sixties to California today. Russia is a failed state that is still trying to recover from its economic collapse and now has to adapt to the combat conditions of the 21st century. Designs such as the Armata and Kurganets reflect Western thinking and actually surpass Western counterparts when it comes to crew protection, active protection and modularity. But if you can't produce them in quantity, nor possess the trained and educated personnel to utilise them, then they may as well not exist at all. In terms of the manpower it commanded, the money it could put into its military, and the ideological driving behind its policy, the Soviet Union was a completely different beast, and its military reflected as such. In a conventional war against the kind of military the Soviet Union had at its disposal during the Cold War, the West would only have been able to slow the Soviet advance, not stop it completely - I can argue the point if you like, as others have reached the same conclusion.
@@Firespectrum122 How so? How would the West only be able to "slow them down" when its clear that they could not conquer Costa Rica at this point, and Costa Rica dont even have an army?? Its fallacious of you to say that the Soviet Union is "sooo much different from present day Russia" when its the exact system of corruption, and mafia run governing which leads to the weakness and incompetence of their army. In fact the only difference between the Soviet union and Russia today, is its more authoritarian because at least there was a Politburo that had a say in calling the shots back then, unlike now when its just one man.
@@raidermaxx2324 "How so? How would the West only be able to "slow them down" when its clear that they could not conquer Costa Rica at this point" The general argument is too in depth to go into on TH-cam, but can be summarised as follows: The U.S.S.R, in the years following WWII, had 30% larger territories and with it, 75% more manpower than it had in WWII, along with the increased industrial capacity. Furthermore, its victory following the "great patriotic war" meant the country was more ideological devoted than it had been in even the Stalin years, which was by no means small. Lastly, the Soviet doctrine, with its accompanying conscript army (of which this video only covers a small amount) emerged during WWII specifically to deal with a more technologically advanced opponent and was perfected during the latter stages of the conflict and was developed further during the Cold War. In summary, the Soviet Union that we would have fought in the Cold War gone hot scenario would have had more manpower, been more ideologically driven, had more industrial capacity and a perfected doctrine that had been used in the past to almost single-handedly defeat Nazi Germany, a military that specifically utilised the same style of western training and technology and was roundly defeated. Furthermore, Western combat power was largely reliant on the United States, with the rest of the component nations of NATO being largely aids rather than major players. After WWII, the United States was unwilling to be the participant in any major war, which was why every conflict following, from Korea to Afghanistan, was a defeat for them; they won the battles, and admirably, but were hampered by a civilian population that did not want to be a part of any major conflict and vocally protested against it, particularly when casualties started rolling in. So to summarise, a Soviet Union almost twice as powerful as it was during its peak in WWII would use its sheer mass against the weakest points in Western lines (a part not covered by the video) and done this simultaneously with massive assaults and encirclements, and it would have been able to do so for a prolonged amount of time. The casualties for both sides would be enormous, but the Soviet Union would be ready and willing to replace these losses while the West would and could not. The more the conflict drags on, the less the U.S. is willing to participate due to the aforementioned civilian protests, and eventually has to either carry the slog on while accepting the casualties, or give in and sue for peace, either leaving Europe to fight the Soviets by themselves (they couldn't) or accepting Soviet terms. "Its fallacious of you to say that the Soviet Union is "sooo much different from present day Russia" How so? The Soviet Union had much larger territories, far more GDP and much more investment in its ideology. Now it has none of this. If the United States balkanised, had its GDP reduced to a quarter of what it has now, got rid of the constitution and disbanded half of its army, we wouldn't call it the same country. Why should we compare present day Russia to the Soviet Union?
I remember arguing about this some tens of years ago in a youtube comment section lol The Russian tanks use auto-loaders because it limits the size of their tank and crew most importantly. meaning that with a 1000 people Russian can dish out 333 tanks, while the US will have to put up 250.
That was a great insight, thank you so much! Really looking forward to your next video about this topic. Quite intrested in potential counter moves to such an attack.
Thanks! Interesting question; I'd suspect that it would require a whole video about the NATO/US defensive doctrine though 😉. Hm maybe a few pointers can be wiggled into the next vid somehow... Let's see!
Yeah, one of the really fascinating things about CMCW should be that it can potentially demonstrate the differences in NATO doctrine. Classically the US, BAOR and Bundeswehr approaches were all solving the same problem, but attacking it from different angles - where the BAOR preferred a fairly static, defence-in-depth and counter-attack approach that relied on Chieftain as the core enabler, the US preferred an up-front, elastic defence (in Active Defence, at least), creating depth through manoeuvre and leaning heavily on TOW. The West Germans prioritised counter-attack and manoeuvre first, and looked to create depth in the enemy position, the mobile combination of Marder and Leopard 1. All "defence in depth", technically, but going at it quite differently.
17:21 mechanized infantry tactics assumes that you just put the infantry to be quickly dismounted from the carriers take up a position, and then pop off your dragons and law. Rockets and destroy the enemy tanks. I think only the British understood that infantry will survive on the defense when protected with trenches and overhead cover as i've seen their training videos. American training videos from the 1980s don't seem to factor in how destructive artillery would be to troops only finding cover after getting out of the carrier. Cuz in the war games they played back at the training ranges, it's hard to simulate artillery suppression
Fascinating analysis. Very well done. The Soviets never had the opportunity to apply their tactics in a real conventional war. Ironically, the Ukrainians would be the ones to use them in the Kharkiv-Kupiansk offensive in 2022.
@@FreeWhisky Aye its a really engaging video and superbly put together - having both sides of the hill explain how they are seeing things and the underpinning doctrine explanations from Dom really brought this to life.
Sooo nice Video! Please do the same with the NATO-Force-Doctrine in Cold War-Times. And after this a second podcast wich tells something about the worldwide mílitary situation today.
Ah, I'm sort of thinking about expanding my horizon... if even for just one video... Keep a look out for hints about this in my next video - which will be more of a podcast 😁
13:08 What are the modifications of the M60 and T64? An early T-64 with a gun from the T-62 and a stereoscopic sight, maybe. But it is unlikely that any version of the M60 will reach the level of the T-64B or T-72A. From where in general 65%. Even if we compare the M60A1 without a Laser rangefinder, it is definitely not better than the early T-64. Advantages of the early T-64 compared to the M60A1. Size, mobility, gun stabilizer, armor, 115 mm gun from the T-62, it's not a modern 125 mm gun, but APFSDS was on it from the very beginning. I can't say in what year APFSDS for M68 appeared. What does the M60A1 have? I can admit that the USSR was inferior to NATO in aviation and nuclear weapons, but definitely not in tanks. I think 65% is a lie and an attempt to justify the lack of development of armored vehicles in NATO (before the appearance of Leopard 2, M1 Abrams, Challenger). The M60A2 starship concept failed, the MBT-70 and XM-803 were too expensive. How to eliminate the backlog, just don't admit it.
As mentioned in the video, that percentage was an arbitrary value, meant to quickly illustrate a concept, without spending half an hour teaching people how to read nomograms. One can argue the various advantages of hardware forever (and the optics of any version of an M60 are superior, even though the earlier versions have a worse fire control system), but that's fundamentally not the point, and getting lost in the small scale details of singular aspects of equipment is an enormous trap, because it's mostly irrelevant.
As Domfluff said; its an arbitrary value to illustrate how one can go about war as a science. So you're right that it's not necessarily true, but I wouldn't call it a lie, just a fictional example to explain a concept.
Thanks! I love it when people who don't play CM enjoy the content non the less, as I like to think of CM videos as a way to tell a good story rather than a report of a game I played 😊. Welcome aboard!
@@FreeWhisky OK Thank You, I've studied Soviet doctrine a bit myself and I think the discussions and demonstrations you two are doing is amazing. I was going to ask if he had an email or something to send a few questions on related topics.
So glad to have found your channel. Very fascinating. Ps, which game is it and where can I get it so I can practice different doctrines myself? Liked, shared, subscribed and commented!
Wow, to come in and subscribe without even knowing the game is quite something 😁. It's Combat Mission: Cold War. You can find it on Steam, or otherwise at battlefront.com.
Thats was a very fun watch, thank you both for the effort Just a small note, doesnt it look like the soviet side was much stronger than the Nato forces from the get go?
Well you're not wrong 😁. We talked about what the force compositions should look like, and didn't 100% pay attention to points. In hind sight I could have brought more and the outcome would have been the same, if just a bit closer. What you didn't see in that video was that I brought a couple of the more expensive cobra's as Domfluff thought it'd be a good idea to make a point about AA, but that didn't make it into the video. So those are point you don't see represented on the map.
This excellently illustrates the point of why the Russian army has suffered so many casualties in the early weeks of the war in Ukraine : if things go according to plan, they work flawlessly, but if the advancing army encounters a dug in and prepared opponent, once set in motion pre-scheduled waves of attack will keep throwing themselves into a the teeth of the defenders, even if it may not make sense. Perun has made an excellent lecture on this, and this video shows what it looks like in practice, if things go as they are meant to.
Yeah I agree. The explanation and descriptions of their doctrine was great, but it worked perfectly, like the OpFor aren't even trying to react or for some reason cannot/is not, that is perfect case scenario, something which seldom happens on an actual battlefield. Given how Soviet equipment wasn't quite as well maintained as people like to think, conscript armies do not work as well as professional armies & while not as corrupt todays Russia the Soviet army would have definitely been effected. So already things were not perfect case scenario, then one has to take into consideration how much they depended on the few career soldiers and officers and how losses of NCO's and officers would have severely crippled their "tempo". There are so many soft factors which would have crippled Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces. Equipment and numbers (mass) wise the doctrine would/does work well but it needs a perfect environment to do so, if an enemy knows how they're going to fight the tempo/initiative is difficult to keep & maintain.
There's a large volume produced - Grau and Bartles 2017 Russian Way of War isn't really good because it's post-soviet. I'd very much suggest the 1990 revision of FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics. The 1984 edition is mediocre but the 1990 edition is excellent
@@FreeWhisky I might have actually mixed up your video and you mentioned the document in another one. Thank you for the tip though. Ive only read the Russian way of war which is quite different.
14:49 is M60 tank. It's blown up and it's soon followed by the nightmare of all NATO ground commanders, a swarm of speedy T72 tanks with their long guns. Driving at top speed, whose numbers have not been cut down to manageable levels, and they are passing to the left and right of you and going 10 m every 2 seconds. And you have the horrible realization that you and your entire force are flanked and in the next few minutes you will be all killed. Because it's easy for an infantry man to surrender because you can see his actions, but it's hard for a tanker to surrender cuz a tank can't exactly put up its hands.
It's in the first sentence but you're not the first to ask so I should have been more clear. I'll update the description. The title is Combat Mission: Cold War.
Comparing the US to the Soviets in Cold War - the US doctrine of Active Defence was (unsurprisingly) defensive, whilst the Soviet main thrust was offensive. Active Defence has been criticised as "A Good Way to Lose a Battle Slowly". The primary thrust of that was an elastic defence, creating depth by setting up successive killzones. This is tremendously complex to achieve, and the army of the 1970s this was designed for arguably couldn't manage it. So the US approach surrendered the initiative, emphasised fire over manoeuvre and relied on predictable courses of action. Arguably there also just wasn't enough time and space available to make it work. This was replaced by Airland battle. This sought to create depth in the enemy's position, by striking deep with aircraft and other assets to extend the battlefield. It's still fundamentally a defence in depth, because it's still trying to solve the problem of the overwhelming mass of the Soviet army, but the technological advantage and training were now there to actually make this work. CMCW does a good job of representing this transition point, since it runs 1979-1982. Fundamentally, all NATO powers were planning on some kind of "defence in depth", although they went about it in different ways.
@@domfluff This is fantastic and I deeply appreciate you not only taking the time to post this, but to study this, as Soviet Deep Battle is something that fascinates me. I have wondered for quite some time how it would truly face up in a fight, though I think we all know deep down that was never a real possibility with the sheer extent of nuclear warfare that would've occurred and America's willingness to completely glass the continent if it came down to it.
Another quick question if I may, do you or DumFluff have any recommendations of videos or presentations about cold war USSR or US tactical doctrine in general? I've been looking around for more videos or presentations like this but I've really not found much, and the little I've found hasn't been reliable. Thanks!
So I thought that @Domfluff would perhaps answer your question as I don't know of any, but all we can think of is old 1980's training movies by NATO countries. th-cam.com/video/jcYTM_PJ4rY/w-d-xo.html
End result was a Total Victory, but the casualties were pretty heavy. Attack qbs weight the objectives higher than casualties (650vp vs 350vp in total), so you have to focus more on the terrain than the losses. As a conceptual idea, there's really two ways to answer that. One I did in the video, where I mentioned that the "the extent to which you're not a (tactical) genius is the number of casualties you'll take". The second is that this in the operational context would be the lead battalion of the regiment, which would be the lead regiment of the division - the battalion is an asset to be spent, and achieving a victory here means that the follow-on forces will exploit - essentially the losses don't matter. This is also where the comparisons in other comments to the army of the Russian Federation really fall down. The doctrinal fundamentals are indeed very similar, but they just don't have the mass of manpower to do this kind of thing. In CM terms specifically - this is a demonstration of the principles of how to play the Soviets in CMCW, but this isn't how you should play Russia in CMBS. A well designed scenario or campaign would reward you for this in Cold War, but punish you for this in Black Sea.
I do have a question in regards to the war as a science bit. Number crunching is all well and good, but I can’t help but feel like you guys missed something. What happens when you add Kurt Angle to the mix?
One of the fascinating things about the Cold War is that all of the NATO powers agreed on the same basic solution - defence in depth, to slow and attrit the Soviets over time - but they went about it in vastly different ways. In the US context of the 1970s this was active defence, an elastic defence that begins all up-front, but then rotates elements back to successive killzones. The issues with this is that you need the space to do it, which isn't always available in real life or CM, and it's a complex series of manoeuvres that demand a level of training and discipline that the post-Vietnam US army simply didn't have (yet). Further, it was entirely reactive, so surrendered the initiative - "A good way to lose a battle slowly" is a period quote about this.
I think the heavy EW and lack of morale in conscripted armies would lead to loss of tempo for Soviet Forces.(History shows that low training without command leads to major mistakes) Games need to model EW better imo.
The main flaw here is that the Soviets had terrible reconnaissance. and allied forces had excellent recon, so the Soviet idea of launching such a surprise multi-layer attack is a bad one because it would be scouted quickly, and even if it worked once, it would lead to countermeasures probably using artillery that would do to the Soviets what we've seen in the video done to the Americans.
You didn't take into consideration that nearly 60% will be broken in the first 10km, another 15% will not have ammo or fuel and the rest will only survive at best for 2 days
I just applied that military doctrine to a warno game. works very well especially when you have a player acting as a commander who uses artillery, heavy anti-aircraft missiles and air force well enough to suppress enemy fire (especially air force with carpet bombers). In A 5 vs 5 match, 1 person's mission is to act as scout and vanguard, 2 to act as the main force, 1 to act as a reserve, and 1 to act as commander and support. When our unit was able to push the main force to the rear of the enemy and round to their flanks, they completely lost control and only reacted to our movements.
That's like the Wargame series right. Very well done if you can get any kind of actual coördination going between team mates 😁
You always find another step up to forward your content. First a cinematic storytelling of your pvp matches, then your historical walk through games, and now a podcast with a visual aid. Absolutely amazing lesson on soviet doctrine
Thanks, glad you're enjoying my wanderings through the world of Combat Mission 😊
This is a great video that turns some of the less digestible field and tactical manuals into an excellent visual aid while still being entertaining. Great job Whiskey, really punching above your weight with this video!
Thanks! Punching above my own weight, yes, but that's why I brought my friend along this time 😉.
What a well visualized video! I do have some thoughts though. Mainly, the discussion of Soviet principles is a little narrow and the discussion of echelonment falls into very common western misconceptions. The way Soviet quantitative approaches are described in this video is so far removed it's not even wrong, and there's some big issues with how artillery is described.
The combat action in this video is better described as an attack in a single echelon, not in three. Let's dive into echelonment first. I'm mainly going to discuss the use of echelonment in the attack, but keep in mind it was also used in the defense as well.
I hope this isn't too scatterbrained, btw, I had to re-write it because youtube ate my comment.
In this video the Combat Recon Patrol, Forward Security Element and Advance Guard are described as separate echelons. In fact they, along with the other various detachments, groups and parties (including the main body in one or more echelons), form the elements of the (combat, march or pre-battle) formation [poryadok] of a Soviet unit [chast'] (subunit [podrazdeleniye], formation [soedinenye], higher formation [ob'edinenye]). I know having transliterated Russian in brackets is really clunky, but it's (IMO) necessary to keeping the terminology coherent, given things like translating poryadok and soedinenye both as formation when one means "arrangement of troops and forces" and one means "military command of ~independent brigade/division/corps scale".
These elements, and the way they are arranged to fight, screen, reconnoiter, and move about the battlefield, are indeed designed to expose the minimum amount of RED to enemy fire while ratcheting up pressure on BLUE. But, importantly, these are not echelons.
In the Soviet definition (using Sovietskaya Voennaya Entsyklopediya. See Vol. 2. p. 421; Vol. 6 p. 392, Vol. 8 p. 617-619) an echelon is an element of the formation [poryadok] of a military unit (etc) with a specific mission assigned before its commitment. We can shed more light on this by looking at the definitions of the first and second echelons.
The first echelon is always formed, always task organized, always combined arms, and *as a rule* existed to fulfill the initial mission of a unit (etc), and may achieve the subsequent mission depending on battlefield circumstances. In the 1970s and 1980s the 1st Echelon might consist of 1/2 to 2/3 of the combat power of a unit (etc). If an enemy defense was incoherent, weak, or unprepared the Soviets would use a single echelon.
The second echelon is often formed, and exists to further the success of the unit (etc) in combat. It remains uncommitted at the start of combat like a reserve, but it receives a specific mission, alongside an intended axis of advance as well as details of the intended time/manner/place of its commitment. This is not locked in stone, the mission, commitment, objectives etc are all subject to changing battlefield circumstances. The second echelon is formed generally (in the attack) when the enemy's defense is reasonably coherent/dug in and allows the commander to flexibly develop the combat action by rapid commitment of significant combat power. In the 1970s and 1980s a second echelon generally had 1/3 to 1/2 of the combat power of a unit (etc). A third echelon was very rarely formed, generally only if the Soviets were fighting in restricted terrain like mountain valleys or something. Typical missions for a second echelon might include further developing the attack, achieving the subsequent objective of a Soviet unit (etc), conducting the pursuit, liquidating bypassed enemy groupings, defeating a counterattack, or replacing in part or whole first echelon forces rendered combat ineffective before or during their commitment (e.g. replacing losses to interdiction).
It is REALLY important to note that as a rule further echelons were used to reinforce the success of the first, NOT to redeem failure. The Soviets held that the best assistance to a unit (etc) struggling in combat was the headlong success of their neighbor. If the first echelon was having trouble the second would not charge in to reinforce them, but be committed on a different axis to envelop, pin, turn a flank, or even perhaps become the main axis of emphasis. As in all things with the Soviet military bold and sensible audacity should guide superior and subordinate. Creative and flexible adaptation to changing battlefield circumstances are necessary for success on a changing battlefield.
To recapitulate sizes: 1st echelon = 1/2 - 2/3 of a unit's combat power. 2nd Echelon = 1/3 - 1/2 of a units combat power. Combined Arms Reserve = ~1/9th of a units combat power.
What we can see from all of the above is that the video
Now, regarding Soviet principles, while mass and tempo are both emphasized they are among a broader swath of like seven or eight principles of varying importance. Note that they are flexible and change based on the nature, form and type of combat being discussed, as well as the material-technical conditions. Reznichenko's 1987 edition of Taktika gives (in no particular order):
---High Combat Readiness;
---High activity [aktivnost'], determination [reshitel'nost'], and continuity of combat;
---Coordinated and Joint use of combat arms and special troops (Spetsalnikh voisk) in combat and the maintenance of continuous interaction between them;
---The decisive concentration of the main efforts of troops in the main direction and at the right time;
---Maneuver by forces and fires;
---Comprehensive exploitation and use of morale, moral, political and psychological factors to further tasks;
---Comprehensive combat support;
---Maintenance and timely restoration of combat capability of troops;
---Firm and uninterrupted command and control of troops, unwavering commitment to achieving the intended goals, fulfilling decisions made and completing tasks assigned.
Now, Tempo and Mass are on this list, in the second and fourth ones listed, but they're not alone! And these break down further, you wind up with a list of like 20 principles which I don't want to bog down here. Read Chapter 1 of Taktika '87 (Fundamentals of Combined Arms Combat).
When it comes to understanding the Soviet mathematical / quantitative approach to war, I would really suggest the monograph "Calculating Combat Outcomes" by the Soviet Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst. The way it's described in this video is so far off base I don't even know where to start. Also, the scientific approach to the study of war isn't /just/ about quantitative methods, it's to do with creating a system of knowledge for understanding and analyzing war and armed conflict based on observations, experiments, data and analysis.
When it comes to the implementation of Soviet artillery in this video (and I suspect in CMCW in general) it's just wrong. Soviet artillery was (for one) directed quite differently, running on a supply-push rather than demand-pull model where the artillery commander would generally be in 'collar grabbing' distance of the commander they were attached to and be maneuvering their fires directly, rather than putting calls for fire through an FDC. There's also recon-fires-complexes, where C2, observation and fires assets would be lashed together in a specific cell to hunt down high priority targets with very short see-shoot loops. In general, fires would be phased but with flexibility. The phases were generally, Fire Support for Movement Forward | Fire Preparation | Fire Support in the Attack | Fire Accompaniment. The average time to shift between targets for soviet artillery in the 1970s and 1980s was ~2 minutes. I don't know what it is in CMCW, but a quick google showed that it's like... 8 minutes in CMBS? That's absolutely whack. Chapters 7 and 8 of FM 100-2-1 (1990) and Red God of War are helpful on this.
I will say, this video did a solid job showing off a Soviet combined arms attack, it just described them wrong. And that's not y'all's fault, most of the sources available are wrong and agree with each other. This is a pretty solid example of a soviet avangard attacking in one echelon.
Also, just some nitpicking, the US until 1975, UK until 1963, the West Germans, French, Danes, Dutch, Belgians, etc all had conscription. They were all just as much mass-mobilized conscript armies as the Soviets were. Shit, so were the Israelis. The idea that there was somehow some kind of innate difference between a West German conscript and a Soviet conscript is absolutely bizzare to me.
Sources:
Soviet Military Encyclopedia
Soviet Military Encyclopedic Dictionary
FM 100-2-1 (1990)
Reznichenko's Taktika (1987)
SSRC Calculating Combat Outcomes
Chris Bellamy's Red God of War
That was an excellent read. Quite a few things here I didn't know, so thank you for that. The point of the video is ofcourse to give the viewer tools to use what's given to them in CM in a way that resembles doctrine from the era. For this, we had to cut quite a few of the principles out as they don't apply to CM (high combat readiness, high maintenance, etc) or are not as important, we felt. The bit about the terminology I didn't know and I would have used that info if I had known. But at least the info is now here in the comments, so thanks for that!
Excellent explanation of the soviet military! If you don't mind me asking, why did the modern Russian army operate in a very disappointing manner in Chechnya and Ukraine?
Is it because of corruption and the expectation that a war with NATO was unlikely? Was it because the Russians wanted a force that was more focused on shock-and-awe style operations like in Georgia and in Crimea? Or did they drop the doctrine altogether after the Soviet Union broke apart?
@@andrewuy1294 it's a complex issue that I would say still can't be fully answered. There's many factors at play leading up to their failure in Ukraine, some of them peculiar to this conflict, some of them systemic. It's also a changing target - the Russians are learning and changing as they go (as are the Ukrainians). The Russian threat after the war won't be the same as it was before the war, and not just because they will have to rebuild it. They're changing and learning.
Reminds me of discussing Doctrinal Templates for Soviet forces in my MDMP classes as a LT in the late 90s at Ft Sill. As a non-intelligence branch LT, you get the distilled version. Our S-2s were highly versed in the doctrine and employment of the "Krasnovian Guards MRR" or whatever they called 11th ACR OPFOR back then.
So if I'm understanding this correctly, these three parts shown in the video are actually used in a realistic manner, but are actually groups within a single echelon, while an actual second echelon would be as a rule uncommitted but with explicit (though flexible) orders upon its committal.
Brilliant as ever. One of the best bits of CM is when you are able to get your opponent's perspective on what they did, where, when and why. This Video does that brilliantly. Thanks!
I agree, I think I ought to have more of that in my videos... Thanks for the cudos!
When I was in the military, something I heard often was that in the West we fire to maneuver, in Russia they maneuver to fire. A gross oversimplification, but it describes it well.
Soviet recon elements would keep maneuvering till they found the path of least resistance, then their command would throw everything that direction.
Western recon elements would find where the enemy isn't, and exploit that.
Strictly the "shift axis to follow the path of least resistance" is an operational level thing, where the doctrine is significantly more flexible and fluid. That's what the Regimental, Divisional and Army recce units will be enabling.
On the CM level, that work should have been done, so you're already encountering the weak part of a line, with sufficient force to destroy it (at least in theory). That means that the formation reconnaissance is instead tasked with finding an enemy that you already know is there somewhere - typically I abstract that "you know the enemy is somewhere on the map".
So the tactical reconnaissance is forging ahead, a Command Push along the expected or ideal line of advance, where timing is of the utmost importance. The NATO equivalent of that is a more tentative Recon Pull - the main force is held in reserve, and the plan is derived from what the reconnaissance can find. This is significantly less risky for all concerned, but costs time, which means there's more chance for the opponent to do something about it.
Glad Domfluff is here to pick up my slack.... And he said it better than I ever could 😉. Nice to see you back on another video!
@@domfluff Right, as I said, a gross oversimplification
Soviet doctrine, nothing a wing of tactical nuclear armed F-111's couldn't handle or so we hoped at the time. I was stationed at RAF Upper Heyford during the early 80's as a crew chief on the F-111E. Almost all of our exercises started non-nuclear but ended with a mass launch of simulated nuclear armed jets. As part of the exercise, we always got gassed (good old MOPP 4) and or nuked. We had 9 jets on Victor Alert ready to go 24/7. Good times.
Combat Mission doesn't show it, but I believe the Soviet doctrine is centered around the assumption that WW3 would be fought in an apocalyptic wasteland - hence the mechanized focus and general lack of dismounting. Also, I've flown in DCS squadron with a cold war era veteran pilot. Wonderful stories he could tell about that time also...
@@FreeWhisky At least they were prepared to fight in the wasteland, but for what purpose? With millions of deaths and destroyed cities/countries what did you win? The question answers itself hence they never attacked. Taking nuke's out of the picture it would have made great reading 50 years after the war, much like WWII.
its truly a miracle that the world survived those times, and makes these times even scarier
Everyone knew there wouldn't be an invasion, not with the many nukes there were..
I don't really play Combat Mission but I hope you do a video in style on the western forces as well (US and French forces especially) because it's actually very interesting.
It would be, and we'll come to talk about why a video like that would be difficult, in my next video/podcast.
This channel is truly a golden nugget. So glad I stumbled upon it!
Almost a year ago - glad you're still enjoying it!
You know Whiskey it's funny that I was JUST thinking about making this exact video! Appreciate the efforts of yourself and Dom to make this happen so I don't have to! 🤣
I'm not planning a video about US Army doctrine, but I'd love to see one... Just saying 😉
@@FreeWhisky *gigga-thonk intensifies* 🤔
Brazy, appreciate all your work on these CM videos
Thank you so much! It's great to see that this little project is appreciated, and all the more with your kind gesture!
Great explanation of Russian Operational art and its prescriptive approach to war. I recently had to learn how to write a Soviet/Russian Op Order for a Btl Recon unit. These orders can be in depth and contain plans B/C already in them for exactly the reason you stated. There is so much myth based on propaganda , historical biases, and myth about Russian Deep Battle Operations and the way Russian Military Operates.
We are seeing the results today, and I will leave it at that.
Thanks for for showing people some reality as to why.
I really liked your video and I am wondering are you planning on doing something similar for the US forces? The soviet army is usually the main point of interest when it comes to this period but I always wondered what was the US doctrine and tactics at the time to stop the red tide.
When will the legend return? 🫡
Thank you comrade, many BRDM-2s will die in recon but I will find targets for my artillery
Life is precious, rounds are cheap, always shoot twice, eh 😉
Looking forward for the next video. :)
Domfluff insight on the soviet doctrine is quite interesting. The combinaison of the theory and practice goes very well together.
He's a walking encyclopedia, isn't he. Very glad that he was on board with this idea.
I cant understand why u dont have more subs, this is a masterpiece! Loved every minute of this video!
Glad you enjoyed it!
@@FreeWhiskyif there is a reason this doesn't have 288,000 views it's because it takes a tough dedication to historical realism to play the 1979-1983 NATO v WP WWIII scenario. Everyone wants overpowered American weapons king of the battlefield M1 M2 M3 Apache MRLS combination. Nope it's m48s and m60s starships and unprotected M113 gunners fighting numerous and better Soviet tanks and BMPs
Super cool video, thank you to both of you for taking the time to bring this to us! It's funny to see the doctrine of turning combat into a science litterally played on a computer that does just that, turning everything into numbers and dice rolls 😂
Edit: does Dumfluff have a TH-cam channel?
Our pleasure! Unfortunately, he doesn't. He has a habit of showing up in other people's youtube vids, though 😉
You can find him on the CM discord
This was a very informative demonstration of Soviet Doctrine. Well explained and illustrated; imminently digestible compared to reading tactical and field manuals.
Fascinating to see what they came up with to maximize the strengths of a mass mobilized firepower centered conscript army. Theory and Practice come together in something that looks beautifully simple if it works well.
Ah, if it works well. My first hand experience tells me that that's the tricky part - but I'll nail it eventually 😉
This is a brilliant piece of work.
I have seem media on Soviet Doctrine that is more precise and media that is more concise.
But this is the best video I have seen, so far, where so much is explained in so little. It's highly detailed but maintains a good pace, while being engaging and making a remarkable use of the media available (a game you just discovered to me).
Genuinely impressed by this video. It's extraordinary.
So nice to hear you enjoyed it! There are free demo's of this game at the Battlefront.com website since you just discovered the game, just not of this particular title sadly. Or just enjoy my content about it; I do that for other games, all good 😊
@@FreeWhisky I'll check it out
Thanks!
Any day Free Whisky uploads is a good day.
Cheers, I appreciate that!
Thank you for the video, can u do a soviet defense video please?
The problem with that is that Soviet defensive doctrine was not as well developed - the intention would have been to be on the attack as much as possible.
The broad concept though, was defence in depth (so mutually supporting islands, built around a mix of AT assets - recoilless rifles and ATGMs in pairs to compensate for each other's weaknesses, and dug-in infantry and vehicles), supported by wire and mines.
Then, as much as possible of the force was kept in reserve for a counter-attack, since that's the best way to maximise your mass and keep the enemy on the back foot.
The issue with a lot of that is that it's a lot harder to visualise in a CM battle, especially in this kind of abstract Quick Battle "typical combat mission" scenario.
I should probably add that 00000spoon00000 is our good friend Domfluff in disguise😉. We do talk about it for a bit in my next video, but what Domfluff wrote here is pretty much the gist of it.
@@FreeWhisky ok and thank you for the video I am currently reading weapons and tactics of the soviet army by David C Isby, I having a hard time imaging what soviet offensive would look like (rush to b meme)but your video help with that
This is going to be very useful to remember the next time I have a tabletop game too
Huh, hadn't thought of that. I suppose it could be.
Great video, love your editing and style. Thanks to both you and Domfluff for creating and sharing this type of videos.
Our pleasure!
Think you could do some videos on other nation’s doctrine? Not many people in TH-cam go in depth into war doctrine and this is one of the best that I’ve seen.
I'm sure I'll get back to it sooner or later!
Another excellent video
Thanks!
All I can imagine during this discussion is the hordes decending from the eastern stepps supported by mounted archers and artillery
They, too, appreciated mass and tempo!
Domfluff has once again bribed his way onto another channel to espouse the glories of tactical socialism while fighting monkey model M60s and troops demoralized after Vietnam. He can't keep getting away with this.
Otherwise, an excellent video that goes into some nice intro-level concepts and dispelling of some common myths in a relatively short, accessible, and entertaining time frame, as always. I'm really excited for a more in-depth look as teased at the end of the video as well. There is so much more complexity to soviet doctrine than a lot of people believe, even at the tactical level. And cold war has been the best tool ever made to actually practice or even display that in a way that allows the results to be easily shared and taught to a general audience. I cannot wait for the greater deep dive, and of course where ever else this channel goes in the future.
I mean, yes.
The best analysis of this video by far!! 😂
Haha I love the analysis also 😉. Thanks for the kind words!
Great video! The only addition I would suggest is that Soivet's doctrine was heavy on strategic goals instead of tactical ones. If one division can break through the frontline, the enemy either has to retreat or risk being encircled. If the enemy is retreating they giving up their favourable positions and/or not have enough time to create a strong point of resistance. (A doctrine conclusion from the 2nd world war)
What a joy this video was
Thanks!
brilliant work gentlemen, thank you
Amazing video! Loved to watch both sides and the different doctrines of each one. Great strategic value too
Absolutely excellent video. Please keep making CM content, this is by far the best I've seen!
I'm so glad to see this video. I've been describing these kinds of tactics to people for years now and people just don't seem to get it, thinking that the entire Soviet way of war relies on Western doctrine. Non-stop I argue with people who are firmly convinced that the Soviets were undertrained morons whose equipment is faulty and flawed beyond belief, the T-72 with its autoloader and "poorly trained crews" being a stand out example.
Nobody seems to understand why the Soviets fought the way they did or why their equipment was designed the way it was, and it is purely because they are taking Western doctrine and applying it to an army that had to learn to fight and win from 1939 onwards without advantages such as a highly-trained, university-educated officer corps, state-of-the-art technology and even radio.
thats on them tho. But regardless, in real life we are seeing that the fact they are at least two generations behind the West in military tech, and the tech they do have has been piecemealed and sold on the black market for vodka drinking allowance, in a real conventional war between soviet and western doctrine and military itself, the soviets would have gotten absolutely crushed.. the only thing saving them now, is their nukes that may or may not work
@@raidermaxx2324 This is the kind of argument I have had many times before: the mistake you are making is that you believe that the Soviet Union is exactly the same as modern-day Russia, which is like comparing the entire United States in the sixties to California today. Russia is a failed state that is still trying to recover from its economic collapse and now has to adapt to the combat conditions of the 21st century. Designs such as the Armata and Kurganets reflect Western thinking and actually surpass Western counterparts when it comes to crew protection, active protection and modularity. But if you can't produce them in quantity, nor possess the trained and educated personnel to utilise them, then they may as well not exist at all.
In terms of the manpower it commanded, the money it could put into its military, and the ideological driving behind its policy, the Soviet Union was a completely different beast, and its military reflected as such.
In a conventional war against the kind of military the Soviet Union had at its disposal during the Cold War, the West would only have been able to slow the Soviet advance, not stop it completely - I can argue the point if you like, as others have reached the same conclusion.
@@Firespectrum122 How so? How would the West only be able to "slow them down" when its clear that they could not conquer Costa Rica at this point, and Costa Rica dont even have an army?? Its fallacious of you to say that the Soviet Union is "sooo much different from present day Russia" when its the exact system of corruption, and mafia run governing which leads to the weakness and incompetence of their army. In fact the only difference between the Soviet union and Russia today, is its more authoritarian because at least there was a Politburo that had a say in calling the shots back then, unlike now when its just one man.
@@raidermaxx2324
"How so? How would the West only be able to "slow them down" when its clear that they could not conquer Costa Rica at this point"
The general argument is too in depth to go into on TH-cam, but can be summarised as follows:
The U.S.S.R, in the years following WWII, had 30% larger territories and with it, 75% more manpower than it had in WWII, along with the increased industrial capacity. Furthermore, its victory following the "great patriotic war" meant the country was more ideological devoted than it had been in even the Stalin years, which was by no means small.
Lastly, the Soviet doctrine, with its accompanying conscript army (of which this video only covers a small amount) emerged during WWII specifically to deal with a more technologically advanced opponent and was perfected during the latter stages of the conflict and was developed further during the Cold War.
In summary, the Soviet Union that we would have fought in the Cold War gone hot scenario would have had more manpower, been more ideologically driven, had more industrial capacity and a perfected doctrine that had been used in the past to almost single-handedly defeat Nazi Germany, a military that specifically utilised the same style of western training and technology and was roundly defeated.
Furthermore, Western combat power was largely reliant on the United States, with the rest of the component nations of NATO being largely aids rather than major players.
After WWII, the United States was unwilling to be the participant in any major war, which was why every conflict following, from Korea to Afghanistan, was a defeat for them; they won the battles, and admirably, but were hampered by a civilian population that did not want to be a part of any major conflict and vocally protested against it, particularly when casualties started rolling in.
So to summarise, a Soviet Union almost twice as powerful as it was during its peak in WWII would use its sheer mass against the weakest points in Western lines (a part not covered by the video) and done this simultaneously with massive assaults and encirclements, and it would have been able to do so for a prolonged amount of time. The casualties for both sides would be enormous, but the Soviet Union would be ready and willing to replace these losses while the West would and could not.
The more the conflict drags on, the less the U.S. is willing to participate due to the aforementioned civilian protests, and eventually has to either carry the slog on while accepting the casualties, or give in and sue for peace, either leaving Europe to fight the Soviets by themselves (they couldn't) or accepting Soviet terms.
"Its fallacious of you to say that the Soviet Union is "sooo much different from present day Russia"
How so? The Soviet Union had much larger territories, far more GDP and much more investment in its ideology. Now it has none of this. If the United States balkanised, had its GDP reduced to a quarter of what it has now, got rid of the constitution and disbanded half of its army, we wouldn't call it the same country. Why should we compare present day Russia to the Soviet Union?
I love a good discussion and you make some very interresting points. Thank you for that!
I remember arguing about this some tens of years ago in a youtube comment section lol
The Russian tanks use auto-loaders because it limits the size of their tank and crew most importantly. meaning that with a 1000 people Russian can dish out 333 tanks, while the US will have to put up 250.
Ah, as a way to save on manpower... that makes sense also, if you're looking to an as many tanks as possible.
Your content is absolutely top shelf. Hope you find the time and/or motivation to make some more in the future.
Thanks
Excellent outline of the Soviet doctrine. Look forward to the next installment!
Many thanks!
Really great video, great direction and cinematography.
I love seeing doctrine applied in CM its so cool
That was a great insight, thank you so much! Really looking forward to your next video about this topic. Quite intrested in potential counter moves to such an attack.
Thanks! Interesting question; I'd suspect that it would require a whole video about the NATO/US defensive doctrine though 😉. Hm maybe a few pointers can be wiggled into the next vid somehow... Let's see!
Yeah, one of the really fascinating things about CMCW should be that it can potentially demonstrate the differences in NATO doctrine. Classically the US, BAOR and Bundeswehr approaches were all solving the same problem, but attacking it from different angles - where the BAOR preferred a fairly static, defence-in-depth and counter-attack approach that relied on Chieftain as the core enabler, the US preferred an up-front, elastic defence (in Active Defence, at least), creating depth through manoeuvre and leaning heavily on TOW. The West Germans prioritised counter-attack and manoeuvre first, and looked to create depth in the enemy position, the mobile combination of Marder and Leopard 1. All "defence in depth", technically, but going at it quite differently.
Incredible. The effort put into your videos is amazing.
Glad you like them!
Dude! This is so insanely amazing. Thank you!
Glad you liked it!
Excellent pieces of information, and excellent editing! Thank you so much for the time and energy you put into it. Cheers
This is fantastic. Thank you!
Thanks!
17:21 mechanized infantry tactics assumes that you just put the infantry to be quickly dismounted from the carriers take up a position, and then pop off your dragons and law. Rockets and destroy the enemy tanks. I think only the British understood that infantry will survive on the defense when protected with trenches and overhead cover as i've seen their training videos. American training videos from the 1980s don't seem to factor in how destructive artillery would be to troops only finding cover after getting out of the carrier. Cuz in the war games they played back at the training ranges, it's hard to simulate artillery suppression
Love your videos, really cool style, quite unique.
I appreciate that!
What works best for me is to set up L in defensive position then push it up in the right order all at the same time
Just stumbled upon your videos, these are really something else! please keep it up, its awesome stuff!
Glad you like them!
Great content brother, got my sub.
Much appreciated!
It is the best Combat Missions video i've ever seen. Thx.
Cheers!
Fascinating analysis. Very well done.
The Soviets never had the opportunity to apply their tactics in a real conventional war.
Ironically, the Ukrainians would be the ones to use them in the Kharkiv-Kupiansk offensive in 2022.
EXCELLENT!!
THANKS! 😁
@@FreeWhisky Aye its a really engaging video and superbly put together - having both sides of the hill explain how they are seeing things and the underpinning doctrine explanations from Dom really brought this to life.
Sooo nice Video!
Please do the same with the NATO-Force-Doctrine in Cold War-Times. And after this a second podcast wich tells something about the worldwide mílitary situation today.
You never miss! Maybe some Steel Beasts or Graviteam in the future?
Ah, I'm sort of thinking about expanding my horizon... if even for just one video... Keep a look out for hints about this in my next video - which will be more of a podcast 😁
Another excellent video. Your work is really appreciated and I'm looking forward to the next video. Thanks.
Thank you very much!
13:08 What are the modifications of the M60 and T64? An early T-64 with a gun from the T-62 and a stereoscopic sight, maybe. But it is unlikely that any version of the M60 will reach the level of the T-64B or T-72A.
From where in general 65%. Even if we compare the M60A1 without a Laser rangefinder, it is definitely not better than the early T-64.
Advantages of the early T-64 compared to the M60A1. Size, mobility, gun stabilizer, armor, 115 mm gun from the T-62, it's not a modern 125 mm gun, but APFSDS was on it from the very beginning. I can't say in what year APFSDS for M68 appeared. What does the M60A1 have?
I can admit that the USSR was inferior to NATO in aviation and nuclear weapons, but definitely not in tanks. I think 65% is a lie and an attempt to justify the lack of development of armored vehicles in NATO (before the appearance of Leopard 2, M1 Abrams, Challenger). The M60A2 starship concept failed, the MBT-70 and XM-803 were too expensive. How to eliminate the backlog, just don't admit it.
As mentioned in the video, that percentage was an arbitrary value, meant to quickly illustrate a concept, without spending half an hour teaching people how to read nomograms. One can argue the various advantages of hardware forever (and the optics of any version of an M60 are superior, even though the earlier versions have a worse fire control system), but that's fundamentally not the point, and getting lost in the small scale details of singular aspects of equipment is an enormous trap, because it's mostly irrelevant.
As Domfluff said; its an arbitrary value to illustrate how one can go about war as a science. So you're right that it's not necessarily true, but I wouldn't call it a lie, just a fictional example to explain a concept.
I apologize for my violent reaction. It seemed to me that the figure of 65% was taken from any official sources. Your opinion is your opinion.
This was very educational. You deserve more subs!
Thanks! And I'm not compaining 😊.
Great editing as usual. Keep em coming mate.
Thanks, will do!
A wonderful video as always, I appreciate the deep dive!
Thanks! The fun for me is that I learn new things about these topics along with all of you 😊.
Very interesting. Love to see researched real life tactics in CM! Thx a lot :)
Glad you enjoyed it!
Don’t play combat missions but this video earned you a sub :)
Looking forward to the podcast length upload
Thanks! I love it when people who don't play CM enjoy the content non the less, as I like to think of CM videos as a way to tell a good story rather than a report of a game I played 😊. Welcome aboard!
Wow, this is an awesome video. Just found your channel and looking forward to seeing more.
Awesome, thank you!
Subscribed. Top quality content.
Fantastic Content. Excited to see more.
Much appreciated!
this was done so well really informative . Keep it up bro
Appreciate it!
That was an incredibly informing and fun to watch video. Glad I stumbled upon it, definitely gonna sub!
Awesome, thank you!
You've won yourself another subscriber.
Awesome 😁
That was fantastic, perhaps the best practical description I've seen of this interesting subject.
Glad it was helpful!
@@FreeWhisky does Domfluff have a channel of his own on youtube? I couldn't find one.
@@mjkypta No, he doesn't. You can find him on the unofficial CM discord though.
@@FreeWhisky OK Thank You, I've studied Soviet doctrine a bit myself and I think the discussions and demonstrations you two are doing is amazing. I was going to ask if he had an email or something to send a few questions on related topics.
ooo just found this channel 👀 time to binge the vids
Hope you enjoyed them 😊
more on other doctrines please! 😊
Noted 😉
So glad to have found your channel. Very fascinating.
Ps, which game is it and where can I get it so I can practice different doctrines myself?
Liked, shared, subscribed and commented!
Wow, to come in and subscribe without even knowing the game is quite something 😁. It's Combat Mission: Cold War. You can find it on Steam, or otherwise at battlefront.com.
Excellent vid. Played that game on CW as Soviets so v interested in your take on it.
I hope you did as well as Domfluff 😉
Thats was a very fun watch, thank you both for the effort
Just a small note, doesnt it look like the soviet side was much stronger than the Nato forces from the get go?
Well you're not wrong 😁. We talked about what the force compositions should look like, and didn't 100% pay attention to points. In hind sight I could have brought more and the outcome would have been the same, if just a bit closer. What you didn't see in that video was that I brought a couple of the more expensive cobra's as Domfluff thought it'd be a good idea to make a point about AA, but that didn't make it into the video. So those are point you don't see represented on the map.
Great video as always dude
Appreciate it!
Fascinating information and Russian tactics. Love it!
Glad to hear it!
Super interesting. Subscribed!
Awesome, thank you!
Just really amazing!
Good to hear!
I wish I could like this twice!
Thanks! Glad you liked it!
This excellently illustrates the point of why the Russian army has suffered so many casualties in the early weeks of the war in Ukraine : if things go according to plan, they work flawlessly, but if the advancing army encounters a dug in and prepared opponent, once set in motion pre-scheduled waves of attack will keep throwing themselves into a the teeth of the defenders, even if it may not make sense.
Perun has made an excellent lecture on this, and this video shows what it looks like in practice, if things go as they are meant to.
Thanks! Yes, Perun's take on that was very good, learned a lot from it.
Yeah I agree. The explanation and descriptions of their doctrine was great, but it worked perfectly, like the OpFor aren't even trying to react or for some reason cannot/is not, that is perfect case scenario, something which seldom happens on an actual battlefield. Given how Soviet equipment wasn't quite as well maintained as people like to think, conscript armies do not work as well as professional armies & while not as corrupt todays Russia the Soviet army would have definitely been effected. So already things were not perfect case scenario, then one has to take into consideration how much they depended on the few career soldiers and officers and how losses of NCO's and officers would have severely crippled their "tempo".
There are so many soft factors which would have crippled Warsaw Pact and Soviet forces. Equipment and numbers (mass) wise the doctrine would/does work well but it needs a perfect environment to do so, if an enemy knows how they're going to fight the tempo/initiative is difficult to keep & maintain.
You mentioned a document on soviet doctrine. Can you be more which one you mean? It's not "the Russian way of war" by Lester Grau is it?
There's a large volume produced - Grau and Bartles 2017 Russian Way of War isn't really good because it's post-soviet. I'd very much suggest the 1990 revision of FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics. The 1984 edition is mediocre but the 1990 edition is excellent
Did I? I'm not sure I did? But I mainly use the FM 100-2-1 as referenced by Whatismoo.
@@FreeWhisky I might have actually mixed up your video and you mentioned the document in another one. Thank you for the tip though. Ive only read the Russian way of war which is quite different.
@@MrPeercraft understandably, given it's talking about the Russians c.2017 vs the Soviets in the 1980s
This was great!
Thanks!
Great video 👍
Cheers!
14:49 is M60 tank. It's blown up and it's soon followed by the nightmare of all NATO ground commanders, a swarm of speedy T72 tanks with their long guns. Driving at top speed, whose numbers have not been cut down to manageable levels, and they are passing to the left and right of you and going 10 m every 2 seconds. And you have the horrible realization that you and your entire force are flanked and in the next few minutes you will be all killed. Because it's easy for an infantry man to surrender because you can see his actions, but it's hard for a tanker to surrender cuz a tank can't exactly put up its hands.
A little Correction fir your typo: you type "p72" instead of "T-72"
@@cousinpizza6958 corrected thanks. Speech to text haha
@@cousinpizza6958actually I blame that typo on Soviet electronic jamming
@@decimated550 I see
@@decimated550 you are welcome brother 😁👍❤️
Am I the only one with no clue what name of this game is? Ive checked the title and description
It's in the first sentence but you're not the first to ask so I should have been more clear. I'll update the description. The title is Combat Mission: Cold War.
In your experience, what's the pros and cons of the doctrine versus the other?
Comparing the US to the Soviets in Cold War - the US doctrine of Active Defence was (unsurprisingly) defensive, whilst the Soviet main thrust was offensive.
Active Defence has been criticised as "A Good Way to Lose a Battle Slowly". The primary thrust of that was an elastic defence, creating depth by setting up successive killzones. This is tremendously complex to achieve, and the army of the 1970s this was designed for arguably couldn't manage it.
So the US approach surrendered the initiative, emphasised fire over manoeuvre and relied on predictable courses of action. Arguably there also just wasn't enough time and space available to make it work.
This was replaced by Airland battle. This sought to create depth in the enemy's position, by striking deep with aircraft and other assets to extend the battlefield. It's still fundamentally a defence in depth, because it's still trying to solve the problem of the overwhelming mass of the Soviet army, but the technological advantage and training were now there to actually make this work. CMCW does a good job of representing this transition point, since it runs 1979-1982.
Fundamentally, all NATO powers were planning on some kind of "defence in depth", although they went about it in different ways.
@@domfluff This is fantastic and I deeply appreciate you not only taking the time to post this, but to study this, as Soviet Deep Battle is something that fascinates me.
I have wondered for quite some time how it would truly face up in a fight, though I think we all know deep down that was never a real possibility with the sheer extent of nuclear warfare that would've occurred and America's willingness to completely glass the continent if it came down to it.
I can't add anything to what Domfluff has said, but thanks for watching 😁
Read Red Army by Ralph Peters if you haven’t already, one of the best depictions of a European Cold War conflict
Thanks!
Amazing
Thanks!
Another quick question if I may, do you or DumFluff have any recommendations of videos or presentations about cold war USSR or US tactical doctrine in general? I've been looking around for more videos or presentations like this but I've really not found much, and the little I've found hasn't been reliable. Thanks!
So I thought that @Domfluff would perhaps answer your question as I don't know of any, but all we can think of is old 1980's training movies by NATO countries. th-cam.com/video/jcYTM_PJ4rY/w-d-xo.html
@@FreeWhisky thanks for the effort!
Your awesome
No YOU're awesome 😉
just one question though. what seems to be the problem for combat mission dev team to move on from those dx9-ish graphics to a newer one
Niche game, perhaps? I don't know really.
Interesting to see casualties from both sides in numbers after the demonstration
How many Ivans was lost compared to Joes
End result was a Total Victory, but the casualties were pretty heavy.
Attack qbs weight the objectives higher than casualties (650vp vs 350vp in total), so you have to focus more on the terrain than the losses.
As a conceptual idea, there's really two ways to answer that. One I did in the video, where I mentioned that the "the extent to which you're not a (tactical) genius is the number of casualties you'll take". The second is that this in the operational context would be the lead battalion of the regiment, which would be the lead regiment of the division - the battalion is an asset to be spent, and achieving a victory here means that the follow-on forces will exploit - essentially the losses don't matter.
This is also where the comparisons in other comments to the army of the Russian Federation really fall down. The doctrinal fundamentals are indeed very similar, but they just don't have the mass of manpower to do this kind of thing.
In CM terms specifically - this is a demonstration of the principles of how to play the Soviets in CMCW, but this isn't how you should play Russia in CMBS. A well designed scenario or campaign would reward you for this in Cold War, but punish you for this in Black Sea.
All I remember for sure is that I only lost 5 tanks.... all five 😉.
I do have a question in regards to the war as a science bit. Number crunching is all well and good, but I can’t help but feel like you guys missed something.
What happens when you add Kurt Angle to the mix?
Someone's chances of winning drastic go down, but we'll need Professor Steiner to explain it to us.
Now I have to google Kurt Angle... Glad Domfluff answered this one for you 😁
Kurt Angle? i'd be more scared of Kurt Russell if i was the commies
What would be the "antidote" to the Soviet doctrine? Have more mass than what the Soviet commander thinks you have? React assymentrical?
One of the fascinating things about the Cold War is that all of the NATO powers agreed on the same basic solution - defence in depth, to slow and attrit the Soviets over time - but they went about it in vastly different ways.
In the US context of the 1970s this was active defence, an elastic defence that begins all up-front, but then rotates elements back to successive killzones. The issues with this is that you need the space to do it, which isn't always available in real life or CM, and it's a complex series of manoeuvres that demand a level of training and discipline that the post-Vietnam US army simply didn't have (yet). Further, it was entirely reactive, so surrendered the initiative - "A good way to lose a battle slowly" is a period quote about this.
We go into this in my next upload; a podcast where we discuss this topic among others!
I think the heavy EW and lack of morale in conscripted armies would lead to loss of tempo for Soviet Forces.(History shows that low training without command leads to major mistakes) Games need to model EW better imo.
CM has EW, yet with you being an omnipotent commander it's probably not as problematic as in real life...
Game?
The main flaw here is that the Soviets had terrible reconnaissance. and allied forces had excellent recon, so the Soviet idea of launching such a surprise multi-layer attack is a bad one because it would be scouted quickly, and even if it worked once, it would lead to countermeasures probably using artillery that would do to the Soviets what we've seen in the video done to the Americans.
As I understand it, it depends on the timeframe. Mid seventies, no. Mid eighties, yes, probably.
extremely well made video, but i wonder what would nato do to counter these ? air support for sure but what else
We talk about that for a bit in the podcast I released after this video. It's time stamped so you can just jump to that bit.
Everyone is saying it but yeah great video
Appreciate it non the less, thanks 😉
Hell ya!
Da, tovarishch! 😉
You didn't take into consideration that nearly 60% will be broken in the first 10km, another 15% will not have ammo or fuel and the rest will only survive at best for 2 days