3. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium, Strict Dominance, and Efficiency (Game Theory Playlist 4)

In this episode we first argue that a strictly dominated strategy can never be a part of Nash equilibrium. We then provide another example (Battle of the Sexes Game), find Nash equilibria of this game in pure and mixed strategies, and argue that the mixed Nash equilibrium is inefficient.
It's crucial to watch lecture videos in the proper order to ensure effective learning. This is because the concepts in each video build upon those introduced in previous videos. To help you with this, I recommend visiting my website, www.selcukozyurt.com, for a recommended course outline.

[@gamzebahaar]

Pek çok videonuzu izledim adınızı görene kadar yabancı bir profesör sanmıştım. Çok açıklayıcı bir şekilde anlatıyorsunuz. Sayenizde game theory dersini sevdim.

[@economicdevelopment5972]

Great presentation!

[@RaviParmar-n7q]

at 13.30, you said RPS and matching pennies have only 1 pure nash equlibrium each, but shouldn't it be they only have one mixed nash equilibrium?

[@xorwt]

Eyw hocam