Very good explanation. First time some one could explaine de re de dicto so that I could understand it. I am very much look forward to the next video in this series.
10:18 I think you might have mistakenly swapped around the _“de dicto”_ and _“de re”_ labels in this example? By the way, thank you for your wonderful definition: “When we speak _de dicto,_ we are concerned with the description, ... and this description does not necessarily attach to anybody in particular... But when we speak _de re,_ we are looking through the description, to the actual object that bears it; we see through the description to the object itself.”
Could 8 also be a case of difference in scope (of the existential quantifier)? 8a) Ralph believes there is someone who is a spy. 8b) There is someone such that Ralph believes they're a spy.
I haven't seen it mentioned in any of your videos but isn't there another major fundamental problem with modal logic: how to distinguish between the possible and the impossible? why is it necessary that 8 is greater than 5, but (as you suggest) possible that there are less than 5 planets? If I was mathematically challenged both these things might seem equally implausible. So surely the distinction between possible and impossible depends on the information available to the person reading the statement.
I think you can paraphrase 'Frank believes that Bob Dylan was a musician' as 'Frank believes that the person named by the name 'Bob Dylan' is a musician.' Similarly for 'Frank believes that Robert Zimmerman is a musician.' The rewording in both cases makes clear that Frank's belief is about an objective person, regardless of how that person is named and regardless of what Frank thinks about the naming. On this account one might be able to argue for the preservation of truth value upon substitution, because the truth value depends only on the person about whom Frank believes that that person is a musician. Since both names 'Bob Dylan' and 'Robert Zimmerman', when used refer to the same person (regardless of what Frank thinks), and since Frank's belief can be construed as having the person as its object, the case can be made that the truth value is preserved upon substitution.
The issue here is that “the person named by the name ‘Bob Dylan’” doesn’t pick out anything uniquely. You would need to reformulate this as an (extensional) definite description. And it would be by no means clear that the definite description and the idea of ‘Bob Dylan’ in franks mind are interchangeable.
At 6:48 3) & 4) could be read differently. You might be using the names 'Bob Dylan' and 'Frank Zimmerman' from the point of view of the writer of the statement rather than Franks point of view.
Very good explanation. First time some one could explaine de re de dicto so that I could understand it. I am very much look forward to the next video in this series.
we are waiting for the next video :D it's two years and the new video is not ready yet :D
8 years now
9 years now
10:18 I think you might have mistakenly swapped around the _“de dicto”_ and _“de re”_ labels in this example?
By the way, thank you for your wonderful definition:
“When we speak _de dicto,_ we are concerned with the description, ... and this description does not necessarily attach to anybody in particular... But when we speak _de re,_ we are looking through the description, to the actual object that bears it; we see through the description to the object itself.”
Thank you for a clear and concise explanation of what referential opacity is :). I wish you all the best on your current project!
No next video? :(
Could 8 also be a case of difference in scope (of the existential quantifier)?
8a) Ralph believes there is someone who is a spy.
8b) There is someone such that Ralph believes they're a spy.
I haven't seen it mentioned in any of your videos but isn't there another major fundamental problem with modal logic: how to distinguish between the possible and the impossible? why is it necessary that 8 is greater than 5, but (as you suggest) possible that there are less than 5 planets? If I was mathematically challenged both these things might seem equally implausible. So surely the distinction between possible and impossible depends on the information available to the person reading the statement.
Was this series ever continued?
best ever!
where can i find the next vedio haha
I think you can paraphrase 'Frank believes that Bob Dylan was a musician' as 'Frank believes that the person named by the name 'Bob Dylan' is a musician.' Similarly for 'Frank believes that Robert Zimmerman is a musician.' The rewording in both cases makes clear that Frank's belief is about an objective person, regardless of how that person is named and regardless of what Frank thinks about the naming. On this account one might be able to argue for the preservation of truth value upon substitution, because the truth value depends only on the person about whom Frank believes that that person is a musician. Since both names 'Bob Dylan' and 'Robert Zimmerman', when used refer to the same person (regardless of what Frank thinks), and since Frank's belief can be construed as having the person as its object, the case can be made that the truth value is preserved upon substitution.
The issue here is that “the person named by the name ‘Bob Dylan’” doesn’t pick out anything uniquely. You would need to reformulate this as an (extensional) definite description. And it would be by no means clear that the definite description and the idea of ‘Bob Dylan’ in franks mind are interchangeable.
At 6:48 3) & 4) could be read differently. You might be using the names 'Bob Dylan' and 'Frank Zimmerman' from the point of view of the writer of the statement rather than Franks point of view.
Therefore Quine was necessarily correct in all possible worlds.