ฝัง
- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 24 ก.ค. 2024
- It's not worth considering dialetheism unless we can point to a few things that might be considered true contradictions. The most obvious candidates are the paradoxes. In this video, I examine the most famous and most tenacious of the paradoxes, the Liar paradox. I explore different kinds of Liar, and outline the responses given by Kripke, Tarski, and Prior.
Further reading on the Liar:
Haack's "Philosophy of Logic", chapter 8
Kirkham's "Theories of Truth", chapter 9
Read's "Thinking About Logic", chapter 6
Sainsbury's "Paradoxes", chapter 6 (this book provides, as the title suggests, a good and accessible introduction to a whole bunch of paradoxes)
Priest's work can be found in chapter 1 of "In Contradiction" and part 3 of "Beyond the Limits of Thought".
The point of this video is just to demonstrate how obstinate the Liar is: there's unlikely to be a solution that will preserve all our intuitions.
I always say "that's false!!" when someone asks if I could pass the salt
35:24 I don't see the liar paradox in there? If 2 and 3 are true, 2 of the 3 (I.E. the majority of what Jones says) is true. So, 1 is false and 4 is false and there is no paradox. Right?
you're right. it's not there. if either 2 or 3 was false, it would be though. i think that's the way it's supposed to be
sorry, that would just make 1 and 4 True.
why can't all the complication be stripped away it just be like this [to get the Liar's Paradox]:
Smith says: "Everything Jones says is false"
Jones says: "Everything Smith says is true"
It’s a mild relief to see I’m not the only one who noticed that.
Even supposing Tarski's heirarchy is stable, that the levels don't and can't mix, they are still susceptible to an infinite paradox, where the levels would never cross but the truth value could never be determined. And isn't such a framework the entire point of the structure of type theory, which was proven to have dialethical metalinguistic statements?
1- description of reality (what exists or how things are ) only if groundedness.
2- if 1,then propositions describe reality only if propositions are grounded.
3- the proposition p ( this sentence is false or valueless).
4- p is not grounded.
5- falsity and truth only if description of reality.
6- falsity is failure of accurate description of reality,and truth is achevement of accurate description of reality, and accurate just means presentation of things as they are.
C) therefore falsity and truth can not be applied to p.
If we want them (truth and falsity) to be applied to p,then we should say (this sentence is either valueful or valueless).
And easily seen that there's no paradox,because we applied things to what they should be and can be applied to.
At 6:23, I would say that the meaning we assign to interrogative sentences can also be expressed with certain declarative sentences and thus have truth values.
The meaning we would assign to a question like “Could you pass the salt?” could also be expressed with the declarative sentence “I would like you to pass the salt”.
Now, generally, the meaning we would assign to a question would be true, but it can sometimes be false.
For example, if you come out as an atheist to your very religious parents, it’s possible that they will begin asking you questions they don’t actually want to hear the answers to because they are experiencing cognitive dissonance. Essentially, they are lying.
I'm trying to use Dialetheism to gain a better understanding of a certain type of criminal
I do wonder about Tarski's solution. What if the statement in the object language is something like the following:
"This statement's metalanguage is false"
Doesn't it just reappear in that form?
This metalinguistic statement is false. Senseless! The truth-value should be stated at the meta-metalinguistic language.
you can only refer to levels below, so 'this statement's metalanguage.." has no meaning
Interesting to watch all these supposed experts go all around the houses to try to resolve paradoxes like the Liar paradox as per Quine. Kripke’s ideas on groundedness are sensible but only as a qualifier of the proper resolution which no one seems to recognize. Consider…………the very famous W. V. Quine created three categories of paradoxes (not necessary to go into here, but for the third, antimony), an example of the third of which he claimed to present a “crisis of thought”, he apparently believing it to be unresolvable. He could not have been more wrong and transparently so. His representative example of the problem was the statement, ”this statement (or sentence) is false”. If you consider that if it is true, it is false for it claims to be so…then how could it be true that it is false?…thus the paradox. However, it is in fact not a paradox at all and certainly no crisis of anything. The deceptive self-referencing statement is the only means by which to facilitate such a paradoxical function, making it on that basis alone, in this case, invalid. In order for it to be paradoxical, the subject noun “statement” (which is also a set definition but devoid of members) must be devoid of content or meaning. By this only can the term statement be free of any connection to a reference object which would then be that to which it referred and that by which it might be judged true or false. For clarity, consider the modification, “this statement that the sky is green, is false”. Here no paradox arises because “that the sky is green” is the reference object (of the content) of the term “statement”, a possible member of the set of which it (statement) is the definition. There is information which can be judged as to whether it is true or false. Absent such a construction, there is nothing to judge. Additionally, the paradox violates the law of non-contradiction, that it cannot be true and false at the same time and that the object of the statement, “this statement is false”, or false (or the adjective linked to the subject noun, statement), be at once the cause and effect of the paradoxical function. (I will address infinite regress and the like in the section on language below)
Consider, for the paradox to be stated at all and that its paradoxical function might be conveyed and understood for consideration, deference to the (formal) logic of the structure of language must be made and maintained. Logically then, we are obliged to assume that the statement, “this statement is false”, is true or what is the point of the exercise?
This “paradox” is an assault on logic and the language itself, including that by which the paradox was defined in the first place and cannot truly be considered legitimate by anyone, the sophistry applied by the “experts” to facilitate the escape from such a conclusion, notwithstanding. I believe Wittgenstein, Frege and Russell would have agreed, a notion easily understood in their works on language and meaning.
The liar paradox is sophomoric and that it is claimed to have challenged many philosophers for hundreds of years is hardly high praise. Sad formulations such as dialethism as a means of validation of this kind of sophistry only make my point when examined. There are no paradoxes in the material or abstract realm. None. There are no conceptual contradictions which material reality permits. That a rock cannot be both here and there at once is self-evident. That one cannot appeal to truths to formulate a position which denies the existence of truth is equally so. It is all piffle.
I am actually very confused by the contingent paradox one... if 2 and 3 are true, then 1 must be false because 2/3 of the things Smith says are definitely not false, and if 1 is false, then 4 must also be false.
Was 2 supposed to be true and 3 false or vice versa? Because I see the paradox then (because then the majority seems to depend on the truth value of 4)
Mayby french is your first second language. "Weiss" is pronounced like "wise" with a "v"... sort of "vise".... or "vice"
The Lair Paradox shows the deep limitations of 'classical' logic. It is a reason to examine non-classical logics, to be sure.
paradoxes are smoke and mirrors.
It makes no sense to me to suggest that contradictions exist. And i'll explain why. Namely I believe a concept or word representing that concept means several things. If I state or believe that there exists a chair, this is the same as saying/believing that there is no absence of a chair. These mean the same thing. Similarly a statement that there is no chair, means the same thing as there is no presence of a chair. If I state that there is and is not a chair, what am I saying? I'm not really saying anything. Its not something I can imagine, conceive, talk about and it is most certainly not a possible configuration in a nature. Either there is a chair or there is not. Because the definition of chair necessitates that there are no absences of chairs.
Substitute chair for anyother concept and you'd see how it is absurd to suggest there are contradictions in nature.
well actually it is a configuration found in nature. a quantum superposition has precisely these characteristics [that a particle is 'there' AND not 'there' simultaneously]
@@thorcook If it's 'there' then by your own admission it can't be not 'there'. That's stupid. The particle can be spread out, so it can be 'there' and 'here'. The particle can also change location with time, so it can be 'there' and then the next moment not 'there'. The suggestion it can be what it is but not be what it is at the same time is insanity that is supported by no evidence, experiment or common sense. Even if a scientist says, this it doesn't matter, that scientist is an idiot. If you suggest that contradictions exist in nature then you deny any argument based on logic. I can claim you don't exist or that i'm president of the united states or literally any bat shit thing I can think of and you have no right to dispute me with logic because you destroy its very foundation, which is the law of non-contradiction. All logic flows from this.
@@MrWaterlionmonkey well, you don't have to abandon logic altogether to construct a system of logic that entails the possibility of 'contradiction'. but we should clarify the meaning of 'contradiction', because in my view, there are 2 types of contradictions; the first is described in the law of non-contradiction which states 'that contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time'. the other type of contradiction is more of an 'apparent contradiction' IMO, but whatever you label it, it is the one that appears in dialetheism, and it's the type that allows for something to be true and false at the same time [under certain circumstances]. it should be noted that this second type is NOT the same as the first and it can coexist logically with the first, meaning it can hold without breaking the law of non-contradiction. Anyways, I would agree with you that the law of non-contradiction probably cannot be broken, but this doesn't mean that there cannot be instances where things are true and false at the same time, and 'there' and 'not there' at the same time. The quantum superposition is an example of this 'apparent contradiction' and does not violate the law of non-contradiction. People often incorrectly assume that if you introduce the possibility of [apparent] 'contradiction' that you must allow it absolutely everywhere but this is not the case. there are strict parameters around where it can and cannot occur and therefore a valid and self-consistent order of logic can be built that includes it, and it need not crumble the foundation of logic itself.
@@thorcook how do you accertain what parameters these are?
This is quite good but I wish you would stop moving the cursor and its yellow circle all the time!
It's like asking me what my twin brother is called. I don't have a twin brother. That's not a paradox. It's a gibberish question. Like asking me when I stoped beating my wife. I've never been married.
So imagine I've never spoken. Verbally in writing etc. Then my fist statement is...... "My previous statement is false". What previous statement??!! There is no previous statement. That sentence is gibberish.
So when they are like this statement is false it's not linguistically correct. It's only correct if there is a statement it's referring to. In this case there isn't. Do it's nonsense.