Battalion Commanders in World War 1
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 29 มิ.ย. 2024
- This presentation, Dr Peter Hodgkinson looks at battalion commanders in the British Army in WW1. Were they 'donkeys' or skilled and motivated officers? Who were these men? What were their backgrounds?
This is one of two lectures given at the WFA's AGM and Conference 2014
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Enjoyed this presentation, lots of stats and background regarding officer qualifications. Many battalion commanders were killed or wounded. Lest we forget.
My Grandfather fought in the Boar War and he was later in the BEF in France....he kept his head down !
Almost impossible to break the 'lions led by donkeys' myth... People want to believe it. It's a simple explanation, helps them make sense of the massive losses and gives them someone to blame. Much easier than dealing with complicated reality.
Wow I am really curious about your comment.. Would you like to explain it to me a little bit more?
@@ofcr3237 Sure... What I meant is that British casualties (no higher than other belligerents btw) were due to a multitude of factors that cannot simply be explained by poor military leadership. Primary reason was that the BEF was in no condition to fight a continental war vs Germany in 1914. Far too small, poorly equipped, inexperienced, yet thrown into battle against the most powerful army in the world. Outcomes of political decisions for which military somehow gets blamed. Consider the colossal task of building / training / equipping an industrial age army in the midst of war while under constant political pressure to support the French. Casualties were always going to be high. British war industry also to blame for insufficient / poor quality arms.
By calling 'lions led by donkeys' a myth I don't mean to exonerate generals from costly blunders, just that they’ve been made scapegoats for political and societal failings. All in all I think British commanders did about as well as could reasonably be expected under the circumstances.
Stuart, I wholeheartedly agree with you. Sure some officers were incompetent and some made some terrible blunders, but war fighting in the early part of the 20th Century shouldn't be judged by the standards of today. There is a thirst for apportioning blame; not unlike with the current COVID pandemic.
@@StuartTheunissen : Very astute & pertinent historical insights expressed here! These were all the delayed unfortunate consequences & undesirable side-effects of Victorian Britain 🇬🇧 & its Empire, wallowing aimlessly for far too long in an effortless & stultified protraction & the resulting torpor of its prevailing “Splendid Isolation Foreign Policy!”
As a consequence of & in the wake of the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War from 1871 onwards, when effectively British Foreign Policy’s main objectives had all been broken down by Bismarck’s Prussian Army’s triumph over France (Thus effectively upsetting Britain’s age-old Continental Balance of Power concept & policy), ever larger sums of money & substantial resources should then have been incrementally made available to the Army & its auxiliary services, in view of fighting an eventual continental war against the then new Prussian-led German Empire!
The soldiers including the senior officers were just as always products of their existing society & the systems they obviously spawn!! The responsible, incompetent, lackadaisical Late-Victorian politicians in Britain, post 1870 were actually the real “Donkeys” here & the contemporary British 🇬🇧 Army in 1914-18, as an overall organization, as well as its Officers, NCOs & Men, who were all then in the main, the real “Lions in this situation!!”
In a historical context, it all somehow keeps on reminding me of the shades, words & echoes of Kipling’s famous Poem & Barrack Room Ballad, “Tommy” here!!
@@theoraclerules5056 Thank you! Said it better than I did. Britain's politicians (pre 1914 & wartime) have very skilfully passed the buck on to the military... And the public eagerly bought it because they were also at fault since a more responsible pre-war policy toward Germany would have involved greater expenditure on the army and a degree of conscription... Something no one was willing to countenance at the time.
Gordon Corrigan’s book, Mud, Blood and Poppycock puts to rest many of the old stories. The most dangerous rank to hold in percentage terms was Brigadier. In overall percentage terms more officers died than private soldiers. Gordon Corrigan was one of my lecturers at Sandhurst. His access to the records is probably second to none. Although I’m an ex army officer and knew my great grandfather who fought on the first day of the Somme in 1916 I had no idea why the Somme battle was fought, or where the original orders came from until reading the book. Senior British officers have taken the blame for a politically ordered battle for over 100 years.
Well said. British commanders were reluctant to commit to the Somme offensive, warned it was too early...
@@StuartTheunissen John Hill, the alliance-based reasons for the Somme are covered in EVERY serious book on the subject... and a preference to attack in Belgium excuses the poor execution? The French did far, far better on Day One and subsequently. They'd been studying tactics, BEF GHQ was politicing to get the top jobs, worrying about 'cowardly' New Army soldiers, and obsessing over the big cavalry breakthrough. Corrigan erects straw men and knocks them down. He ignores serious historians' critiques, which is why he's obsesed with Blackadder and Alan Clark. This channel has many really excellent historians but GC is just a former officer who doesn't like British Army officers being criticised.
WFA,
Thanks for this interesting and well-researched talk by Dr. Hodkinson. In it he shows that with a few exceptions TF Battalion Commanders were well-trained militarily and had quite good backgrounds in exam qualifications, previous military service and organisation.
Great presentation and great song.
Having commanded a Bn its really beyond my imagination how the British army command structure survived, let alone figured out how to defeat the enemy. We know a great deal more about stress today but the unrelenting pressure of command is only to be understood if you’ve experienced it. It can never be set aside, its always with you. Of course the needs were very great and developing a field grade officer takes years. Not all were successful but the willowing process created those who had the leadership skills to succeed
Wasn't it tactics planned by Australian Generals that finally broke the stalemate?
Then there's the standard lobotomising that happens to all officer cadets at Sandhurst! NCO's have always, and always will be the backbone of the armed forces.
@@pablo19136 No. Monash et al were applying tactics developed by the BEF over the months (and indeed years) prior to 1918.
And I'm Australian.
Great talk! One thing to add regarding the Territorial Force (TF) COs: it should be remembered that they were for 'home defence' and not for fighting a 'war' as such. Therefore, it would be wrong to suggest that they were 'not fit' in regards to command; because they never had a chance to command in the role they were trained for. I feel it's comparing 'apples with oranges' in regards to the COs of TF battalions in 1914. However, after 1914, there may be a justified argument about competence.
Interesting presentation.
Excellent!
General Joseph Hooker of the Union Army in the American Civil War noted at his Congressional hearings after Chancellorsville that 'one never knew who well an officer might perform his duties until that officer was required to perform his duties during actual fighting."|
Thank you, Doctor.
I agree Stuart, I think that people watch Blackadder goes forth and base their assumptions on that.
my greatgrandad was a private in the welch fusillars in the boar war from 1900 trained shipped out 1901 he lied about his age he was 14 years old ,stayed in the army till 1906 rejined in late 1914 as a res and trained soldiers as a sgt he then went to france in 1915 ,he told me of no gas masks had to piss on rags to cover his nose and mouth he was a sgt all through the ww1 wounded sent back wounded sent back till his last big wounds in 1918 out of his group of over a 1000 men less than 200 went through the war from 1915 tilll the end he as at the somme 2 times and high woods and other places ,he died at the age of 102
A super lecture. No one knew what was going to happen on all sides. Great military history.
show your friends and family this series!!
The British army was really only reorganised in 1909, lessons from the boer war,led to increased practice rounds and self reliance, was part of this. The 1914 BEF lacked Heavy indirect artillery and insufficient machine guns. In the 100 years since the Nepoleonic War British artillery was used as direct fire and designed for maneuvering with support. The cavalry was where many of the best officers were sort, their role very much neutralized by the static front for 3 years . 1917 and 1918 Cavalry were used to exploit and help contain the Lundendorf offensive,part of the strength in depth. Haig will always be thought of as the Butcher,because of the Somme. This may be unfair as 1916 Verdun offensive was making pressure for the newly arrived Kitcheners Army to be put into action and relieve attention from that. Also the Heavy guns and ammunition was unable to cut the wire nor beach the german barracks areas. The efficifness of the mines laid is also questionable replacing one obstacle with another? At battalion level officer did very much lead from the front , read about one Col. using his hunting horn to help ralley his troops and try press the attack. So loafers is a slur, that maybe the cavalry officrs may be tarred with,yet not one that stand upto the sacrifice made infact the casualties among junior officers was among the worse on the western front,while British causalties on the whole ,apart from the Somme,were less. What is quite Damning is the time it took to learn how to advance under barrage. That at the Battle of Arras they still were experimenting , makes people like myself,not steeped in knowledge wonder .
You can only the wars that are on offer. Nothing could have prepared them for what WWI offered.
Nice. More please.
Many years ago i met a bloke, ex Royal Engineer, that spent his summers clearing up unexploded ordnance in France. He reckoned that over 30% pf the shells fired in the areas he cleared either didnt go off or fell short.
My mother worked in munitions during WW2. (My dad was serving on the Royal Artillery at the time). She reckoned that early in the war, people that she worked with, both managers and workers, had little concern pver the quality of their production, numbers of shells sent put the door counting for more than the quality. Eventually a policy of putting women whose husbands were serving in crotical areas of production. The stress of working with ammunition that was so unreliable must jave been significant!
That opening song makes me want to go over the top, I'd rather risk german machine guns.
Great info but bullet points to denote time lines doesn’t really work
Errrrrr....the fact that some were promoted is hardly proof that they were competent.
But so many were passed-over to allow the talent to rise!
Well done. My mothers dad served in canadian corps. At Vimy. There is no room for incomopetence in the field.
He said. They had a way of dispebsi g field discipline. A tdrrible ecperience he never recovered from. Gas. PTSD.
I'm reminded of the tale of two Brigade Commanders in the Canadian Corps during the Second Battle of Ypres at St.Julien during the first poison gas attacks.The first was Richard Ernest William Turner VC, the Boer War experienced VC war hero in command of the 3rd Brigade CEF.
Turner froze in battle, became problematic when made a sudden and unilateral decision to withdraw his brigade back to the General Headquarters (GHQ) line, several miles to the rear leaving the 2nd Brigade on Turner's right completely unprotected.
Brigadier General Arthur Currie, commanding the 2nd Brigade, a peacetime militia officer and ultimately unsuccessful real estate agent.was left to pick up the pieces. He actually left his post in the middle of the battle to fill in the command gap left by his immobilized professional soldier colleague, something for which he was not sacked (fortunately for the Imperial Army).
As Napoleon Bonaparte said In Cannons All men are equal! K
Casualty rates among British frontline officers speak for themselves, I think the majority of cock ups tend to stem from decisions made at a Staff level, as well as the harsh reality of conditions that Allied troops had to face.
Military planners failed in their duty to understand the adoption of heavy artillery and mass machine gun positions before the Great War. In 1914 the British army was still using the same tactics as they had 20 years before. War colleges should have been re-educating its offices corps. Many of their line officers were shocked and taken by surprise the advances the Germans had made in military tactics. Learning the ropes during a battle is a terrible way to win a war.
The Germans weren't much better , don't believe the hype.
Nice treatment little covered elsewhere. Nice too to be an officer and sent home when poorly not tied to a gun carriage or worse like the PBIs.
Cheaper to watch this than read his book on Kindle, 76 quid no less, who sets these prices?
The Keizer?
It's unfortunately typical for academically orientated books. The prices are, by and large set by the publishers, small estimated market, low print runs leading to high unit costs.
The Travers quote IN NO WAY asserts that 3/4 of battalion commanders in the BEF were incompetent: he says a brigade with 3 duds out of 4 was "probably not unique". He does NOT say: "this was universal". Now, let's hear about Haking, Gough, Pulteney and Butler. . . the men picked out for accellerated promotion in 1915.
Add General Launcelot Kiggell to that lot
They were led soundly on ground, however It was the old guard staff with no "Modern Battlefield" experience, and that false level of security of "Gentlemanly warfare" of sitting back and taking it, then doling it out.
The Machinegun, The Tank, Gas, technical evolutions of strategic artillery... evolving tactics and equipment... How do you counter something like that when your years of command and warfare were single shot to short range firepower and drill and ceremony under parade guard conditions?
That would be like walking into hell with a gasoline suit. Just think of that environment as a learning curve?
The modern contemporary battlefield nearly broke modern day officers in their first year of combat- and they knew what was waiting for them... Someone who's experience was from the 18-early 1900's style of warfare? My guess is that they had to either sink or swim pretty fast in terms of taking command- at any level.
As Alexander the Great has said Men I will not demand on you things which I myself won’t do! Leadership by example! As the commander of the Paratroopers has said the Officers is the first one to jump in the Plane where the bullets meets the meat! K
Different war mate!!
Why is there no war no. Are we all cowards?
Why is it that I can’t stop noticing him smacking his lips at the end of every sentence
Gah I can't stop noticing it now!!!
Once you've noticed it, it gets under your skin and now it's all you can notice!!
You Ricardo!! Now I can't help notice it either!!
Most of what I hear in this presentation is repetition of input measures, e.g. training, or citation of British army promotion / recognition etc. None of this is directly relevant to the point he is trying to prove, i.e. that they were militarily effective rather than incompetent (which is not what I am suggesting).
I'd hardly call the 1914 BEF the best equiped british army to ever go forth to war, they didnt even have proper hand grenades.
but nobody had hand grenades in 1914?
My grandmother hand 2 hand grenades, (mills bombs) as ornaments in the fire place which were black leaded every week.
The British army didn’t ‘beat the German army in 1918’ they played a significant role, but ultimately it was the combined might of the French, Americans, British and Italians, as well as the ghost of the Russian empire which had tied down and drained a lot of German manpower with fighting ongoing until late March 1918. A starving army and populace couldn’t stand up to the logistical might of the allies by this time.
Because of the British class system officers in the British army came from a totally different background from the ordinary Tommy, they had nothing in common. British society were and is still conditioned into thinking that the people with posh voices are natural leaders and knew what they we're/are doing. In fact it was the NCOs that ran the show in the end because of the officer class incompetence and contempt they showed to the men they were supposed to be leading. Another point which is interesting was that many British soldiers ate better on the western front than they did at home. That says a lot , what we're they fighting for? King and Country? What a load of bollocks.
Might I respectfully suggest that you read 'Mud, Blood and Poppycock' by Gordon Corrigan.
My Grandad joined as a private soldier in an infantry regiment, he was repeatedly offered to be sent back to the UK to be trained as an officer. He refused each time as the proportional death rate was higher for officers than private soldiers. He served as a runner so worked closely with the lieutenant. Grandad survived the war and searched many years for the grave of the man he considered his officer, eventually he saw this officers name on a memorial for those who had no known grave.... he cried. He believed all his life he did the right thing fighting for his country. I asked him if he could go back would he do the same ..he said he would. You cannot judge by today standards the decisions of those from over 100 years ago, it is totally out of context in experience and conditions. So surely to say what a load of bollocks is disrespectful to them considering how many of them joined the forces or home guard or ARP In the 2nd.
You're telling us that you think maintaining a class distinction was more important than winning a war? You'd have to come up with some serious proof to substantiate that argument.
@@ktgiffin8147 I don't think so. Preservation of the empire was a major part of the war and thus the preservation of the class system also. To my mind it was infact a "dick measuring contest", a battle of egos amongst cousins to whom the lives of the enlisted and conscripted were no more important than that of a dog.
"Britishness" ultimately led to a series of mutinies in the Royal Canadian Navy in the immediate post WWII period. The traditional British class system had been imposed on men from a different culture that did not share that background. The Mainguy Report ended the "Britishness" in the RCN and a Canadian command structure that reflects Canadian culture ended all that disagreeable stuff forever. It would have been an issue on the Western Front, as well.
I think a note of caution is required here. Certainly, there's a deal of truth in the notion that, collectively at least, the higher British command in 1914-18 has been done a disservice of sorts by the "donkeys" narrative. Clearly, Alan Clark was no historian. Both "The Donkeys" and "Barbarossa" are, to differing degrees, flawed pieces of work, with only "The Fall of Crete" showing a genuine mastery of its subject. That said, the revisionist school championed by (and to an extent initiated by) the likes of Terraine, is equally flawed. It remains the case that no number of historians looking to make a reputation for themselves by defending the indefensible will be heard above the roar of the hundreds of thousands who lost their lives because of a lack of imagination on the part of men who learned their trade in Victoria's Little Wars and then found themselves thrust into an industrialised & mechanised nightmare which was beyond their capability to properly understand, still less direct.
Really cant handle this guys smacking, god it is annoying
Bb
Trying to make sense of WAR. WHY? DON'T do WAR doesn't that make sense??
It may have escaped your notice...but, it happened!
In regard to 'Lions and Donkeys' this amateur historian completely misses the point.
“Amateur”? He has a Ph.D. in this subject. Disagree with one or more of his points if you wish, but kindly explain why and propose and defend a better alternative.
Your sample size for your conclusions and deductions are comically few. Your bias has driven everything in this presentation.
You make no allowance for inter divisional rivalries in your conclusions. Frankly, you are biased.
There wasn't that many divisions in the bef. Only by the time of conscription was there infact a field size army requiring the need for a field marshal!!
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