@@MikeTMike My banner literally states I'm a theist. So does the intro of every video I post. So does my info page. I'm sorry that you are illiterate. Also, theism is the *belief* that at least one deity exists. It is *_NOT_* the claim. I'm sorry that I refuse to recognize your insistence on conflating the two, or you don't understand that it's possible to think something is true without knowing or asserting it.
@@JustifiedNonetheless If you're a theist, you believe god/gods exist, by definition. Define the god you believe in, then demonstrate it exists. The onus is on you. I don't even have to do anything. And asking you a question, using better English than yours means I'm illiterate? You love making ridiculous claims, don't you?
@MikeTMike "...then, demonstrate it exists." I'm a theist. That means I tentatively assent to the proposition that at least one deity exists. I'm *also* agnostic. That means I concede that I may be mistaken and therefore *_DON'T MAKE THAT ASSERTION._* I'm sorry that you are either too ignorant or dishonest to recognize the distinction.
My response is similarly going to use the courtroom analogy. A prosecutor makes a claim: "the defendant committed murder. My evidence for this claim is that we have videotape of him leaving the apartment complex front door 2 hours after the murder occurred, according to forensic evidence. I rest my case." Obviously, that is extremely poor evidence so the defense attorney stands and says "The prosecutor hasn't met their burden of proof. I rest my case." The jury takes 5 minutes to return a "not guilty" verdict. I as a juror do not know if the defendant is guilty or not, he was never proven innocent. But I do know that the evidence provided is not enough to sway me from the standard of "considered innocent until proven guilty." Obviously, they are not actually innocent until proven guilty, but we consider them so before taking their freedom. Do you accept that a juror can legitimately not know if the defendant is guilty or not in such a situation?
@@JustifiedNonetheless I was hoping not to get into insults after a good faith attempt, but OK. You make a lot of good points in that linked video, but you are not accounting for a situation where the evidence shown is so scant that someone can legitimately not know something. If a total stranger walks up to me and says "My wife walked our dog this morning at 8AM" I have not even made an unconscious decision to believe the claim or not. For you to claim otherwise is you claiming you know the internal state of my mind. I get that belief is not a decision, it's forced upon us by the evidence, and can be unconscious, but I disagree that every single claim creates an instant unconscious belief, which it seems like you're claiming. Do you have some empirical evidence for that claim?
@@jsmall10671 I have 1 question: does anyone anywhere ever believe anything that is unjustified? As long as the answer to that question is affirmative, even though we can agree that someone _shouldn't_ believe that there is an even or odd number of gumballs, or that the suspect is guilty or innocent, we still cannot validly conclude that they don't anyway. That's the problem: you can't validly derive the "is" of an absence of belief from the "ought." I don't assert to know your thoughts, and I don't have to. *You* have to demonstrate the the absence of belief, and that you somehow know it.
@@jsmall10671 _Anyone_ who asserts _anything l_ incurs a burden of proof for the content of that assertion. It is for that reason that I am irreligious and agnostic as it pertains to the (non)existence of a deity. By the same token, and for the same reason, _atheists_ who assert that their "lack" of belief in deities is different from disbelief incur a burden of proof for _that_ claim. For the same reason that atheists reject the analogies, arguments, and personal anecdotes submitted by religious people in lieu of empirical evidence for the existence of deities, _I_ reject the analogies, arguments, and personal anecdotes submitted by atheists in lieu of empirical evidence for their *neurological* claim.
@@JustifiedNonetheless Sure, there are some people with unjustified beliefs. Why should that mean that every claim of "lack of belief" is therefore fake? I can't demonstrate my own mental state, that's impossible. I can only raise a hypothetical (or real) situation to see if you also have non-belief. Are you honestly saying, about yourself, that every single claim ever made to you, you have a belief as to its veracity? There's not one where you are legitimately on the fence? What about my last hypothetical, which way would you lean if asked? A total stranger walks up and says his wife walked the dog this morning starting at 8AM. You have 3 seconds to decide whether you 1) believe him or 2) believe he's lying or 3) have a lack of belief based on too little information. You claim you would never ever in your entire life choose option 3 for any such claim?
Premise #2 is a crock of balooney, If I do not believe the defendant is guilty, does that mean I necessarily believe they are innocent? No. If I don't believe I have sufficient evidence is accept the number of gumballs in the jar are odd-numbered, does that mean I believe they are even-numbered? No. If I don't believe it will rain today, does that mean I believe it will not rain today? No. If I don't believe you have 20 bucks in coins in your pocket, does that mean I believe you don't have 20 dollars in coins in your pocket? I mean this isn't hard to grasp. You seem intelligent enough to grasp it. Are you being dishonest, or do you really have such a hard time understanding that lacking a belief in X is not the same thing as believing X is false?
@GWFHegel-ms7gz Prove it. Also, the Gumball analogy is shit. I have a Playlist dismantling it. I _understand_ it just fine. It simply doesn't do what you think it does. It can tell you that you _shouldn't_ believe that there is an even or odd number. It doesn't tell us a thing about whether or not you _do._ Lol
@@JustifiedNonetheless "prove it." Prove what? The claim about non-belief? I did. I used about 5 arguments from analogy. "Also, the Gumball analogy is shit. I have a Playlist dismantling it." That isn't an argument, but an assertion. Let me know when you got something. "It simply doesn't do what you think it does." Another assertion, "It can tell you that you shouldn't believe that there is an even or odd number." Right....which means there is a third position other than affirming and denying the number is odd. Duh. Kinda like there is a third position between accepting the claim that God exists, and accepting its negation. Duh. "It doesn't tell us a thing about whether or not you do." No one claimed it does, my slow-on-the-uptake pal. It demonstrates that you can hold a third position (agnosticism) and it indicates that would be the rational position in the absence of sufficient evidence.
@GWFHegel-ms7gz These are sources that demonstrate that a genuine difference in the brain activity of atheists and religious people has already been substantiated (by fMRI, for example). Therefore, to demand for the asserted distinction in brain activity between self-identifying atheists who express belief in the nonexistence of any deity and self-identifying atheists who express a mere "lack" of belief in deities cannot be considered unreasonable. However, no such reliably distinguishable difference has been substantiated; and this remains the point of contention. References: Belanger, E. (2014). Is an atheist’s brain the same as a believer’s? New research says religious and nonreligious minds work differently. Advance Local Farias, M. (2021). ANALYSIS | Are the brains of atheists different to those of religious people? The Conversation Gervais, W., van Elk, M., Xygalatas, D., McKay, R., Aveyard, M., Buchtel, E., Dar-Nimrod, I., Kundtová Klocová, E., , Ramsay, J., Riekki, T., Svedholm-Häkkinen, A. & Bulbulia, J. (2023, January 1). Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon? Judgment and Decision Making. Vol. 13 Issue 3. Cambridge University Press Hagan, E. (2022, May 11). Believers and non-believers work differently. Psychology Today Harris, S., Kaplan, J., Curiel, A., Bookheimer, S. Y., Iacoboni, M. & Cohen, M. S., (2009). The neural correlates of religious and nonreligious belief. PLoS One Kapogiannis, D., Deshpande, G., Krueger, F., Thornburg, M.P., & Grafman, J.H. (2014). Brain networks shaping religious belief. Brain Connectivity McGregor, I. & Nash, K. (2009, March 5). Brain differences found between believers in God and non-believers. Science Daily Nash, K., Kleinert, T., Leota, J., Scott, A. & Schimel, J., (2022, March). Resting-state networks of believers and non-believers: An EEG microstate study. Biological Psychology. Vol. 169 Newberg, A. (2012, January 1). Ask the brains. Scientific American. Ranjha, A. (2022, May 30). The brains of of believers and nonbelievers differ. Psychology Roots These sources indicate that while, uncertainty does activate specific areas of the brain, because belief is simply finding proposition more likely to be true than untrue, uncertainty does not imply an absence of belief, as this is a distinct threshold from that of certainty. References: Bzdok, D., Groß, D., Eickhoff, S.B. (2015). The Neurobiology of Moral Cognition: Relation to Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Mind-Wandering. In: Clausen, J., Levy, N. (eds) Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer, Dordrecht. doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_161. Retrieved from link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_161 Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1977). Knowing with certainty: The appropriateness of extreme confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 3(4), 552-564. doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.3.4.552 Giacomo Novembre, Luca F. Ticini, Simone Schütz-Bosbach, Peter E. Keller, Motor simulation and the coordination of self and other in real-time joint action, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, Volume 9, Issue 8, August 2014, Pages 1062-1068. Retrieved from doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst086 Huber, F. (2007). The Logic of Uncertainty and Decision. In Philosophy of Probability. Retrieved from philpapers.org/rec/HUBTLO Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. Retrieved from gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705 Jeffrey, R. (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press. Kvanvig, J. L. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press. Locke, J. (1689). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Retrieved from earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book4.pdf Moore, G. E. (1959). Certainty. In Philosophical Papers (pp. 227-229). Allen & Unwin. Pitt Philsci Archive. (n.d.). Conceptualizing and Measuring Belief, Certainty, and Probabilistic Judgments. Retrieved from philsci-archive.pitt.edu Sosa, E. (2009). Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. Oxford University Press. Smith, E. E., et al. (2013). The relationship between confidence and accuracy in perceptual decision-making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(4), 1043-1056. doi.org/10.1037/a0032471 Vieira, J. B., Almeida, P. R., Ferreira-Santos, F., Barbosa, F., Marques-Teixeira, J., & Marsh, A. A. (2013). Distinct neural activation patterns underlie economic decisions in high and low psychopathy scorers. Retrieved from link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_161 Windschitl, P. D., et al. (2015). The effect of confidence on the relationship between subjective probability and choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(2), 147-158. doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1833 These sources discuss the wide array of factors beyond evidence and reason involved in belief formation which include, but are not limited to, aliefs, biases, other cognitive functions, cultural influences, emotions, intuition, personal experiences, pre-existing beliefs, social pressures, and upbringing. References: Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (Eds.). (2007). Encyclopedia of social psychology. Sage Publications. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press. Jones, A. B. (2019, April). The role of media in shaping public beliefs. In B. R. Johnson (Chair), Media influence on public opinion. Symposium conducted at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. (1991). The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology. In J. B. Murray (Ed.), Social psychology. (pp. 45-67). McGraw-Hill. Smith, J. (2020, October 10). The impact of cultural influences on belief systems. Psychology Today. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185 (4157), 1124-1131. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press.
@GWFHegel-ms7gz These are sources that indicate that beliefs is not an act of will. References: Alston, W. P. (1989). Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Cornell University Press. Bennett, J. (1990). Why is belief involuntary? Semantic Scholar. Curley, E.M. (1975). Descartes, Spinoza, and the Ethics of Belief. In Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, ed. Maurice Mandelbaum and Eugene Freeman, 159-89. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing. Scott-Kakures, D. (2000). Motivated Believing: Wishful and Unwelcome. Nous 34. 348-75. West, M. (2014). Doxastic Involuntarism, Attentional Voluntarism, and Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, Vol. 3, No. 5, 37-51. Williams, B. (1970). Deciding to Believe. In Language, Belief, and Metaphysics, ed. Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz, 95-111. Albany: SUNY Press These are sources that indicate that beliefs can be held subconsciously, without the subject's awareness. References: Bargh J. A. & Morsella, E. (2008, January). The Unconscious Mind. Perspectives on Psychological Sciences. Vol. 3. Issue 1. pp. 73-9. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00064.x. PMID: 18584056; PMCID: PMC2440575. Bloom, Paul (2011). How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like. W. W. Norton & Co. Burkeman, O., (2010). This column will change your life: From alief to belief. The Guardian. Crane, T., (2013). Unconscious belief and conscious thought. Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oup Usa. pp. 156 dos Reis, J. (2020, February 26). How To Change Your Core Beliefs In The Subconscious Mind. Medium Hodge, K. M. (2011). "On Imagining the Afterlife". Journal of Cognition and Culture. 11 (3-4): 367-389. McKay, R. & Dennett, D. (2009). "The Evolution of Misbelief" (PDF). Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 32 (6): 493-510. Morgan, K. (2019). The psychology of belief. Forge Parvez, H. (2023). Belief systems as subconscious programs. Psych Mechanics Rich, J. (2011). The power of your unconscious beliefs. HuffPost. Szabó Gendler, T. (2008, October). Alief and belief.The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 105, No. 10, Epistemic Norms. Part Two pp. 634-663 Subbotsky, E. (2011). The Ghost in the Machine: Why and how the belief in magic survives in the rational mind. Human Development. 54, No. 3, Explanatory Co-Existence, pp. 126-143 Ward, K. (2020, October 29). Out-Smart Self-Sabotage: 5 Steps To Change Subconscious Beliefs. Mind Body Green These are sources on action theory (that suggests an "absence" of belief holds no explanatory power for willful action, making the presence of a subconscious belief an inference to the best possible explanation). References: Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. Coleman, P. (2011). Belief and ageing. University of Southampton. Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 60(23), 685-700. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Davis, L. H. (1979). Theory of Action, Prentice-Hall, (Foundations of Philosophy Series), Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Funke, J. (2017). How Much Knowledge Is Necessary for Action?. In Meusburger, P.; Werlen, B.; Suarsana, L. (eds.). Knowledge and Action. Knowledge and Space. Vol. 9. Springer International Publishing. pp. 99-111. Heydari Fard, S. (2018). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the desire-luck problem. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics. Jackson, F. (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics 101 (3): 461-82. Kroeker, E. (n.d.). Thomas Reid: theory of action. Internet Encyclopedia of PhilosophyHodge, Mi. (2011). "On Imagining the Afterlife". Journal of Cognition and Culture. 11 (3-4): 367-389. Locke, D. (Jul 1982). Beliefs, desires and reasons for action. American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 241-249 Mele, A. R. (ed.) (1997). The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Paul, S. (2020). The Philosophy of Action: A Contemporary Introduction, London, Routledge. Sandis, C. (ed.) (2009). New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. Sandis, C. (ed.) (2019). Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe, London, Routledge. These are sources that describe beliefs as private mental events, which means they are not empirically observable, testable, verifiable, falsifiable, or knowable. Baum, W. M. (2011, Fall). Behaviorism, private events, and the molar view of behavior. Behavioral Analysis. Vol. 34. No. 2. pp. 185-200. Connors, M. H., & Halligan, P. W. (2015). A cognitive account of belief: A tentative road map. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1588. doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588 Dougher, M. J. (2013, Fall). Behaviorisms and private events. Behavioral Analysis. Vol. 36. No. 2. pp. 223-227. Gilbert, D. T., Fiske, S. T., & Lindzey, G. (1998). The handbook of social psychology (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill. Jacobs, A. & Sachs, L. B. (Ed.).(2013, November 14). The psychology of private events. Perspectives on covert response systems. Academic Press Landesman, C. (1964, March). Mental events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. 24. No. 3. pp. 307-317. Leigland, S. (2014). Contingency horizon: On private events and the analysis of behavior. Perspectives on Behavior Science, 37, 13-24. doi.org/10.1007/s40614-014-0002-5 Rosenberg, A. (2004). Philosophy of science: A contemporary introduction. Routledge. Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. Vintage. Tourinho, E. Z. (2010). On the distinction between private events and the physiology of the organism. Journal of Behavior Analysis and Therapy, 41(2), 272-273. doi.org/10.1037/h0094052 Based on this data, I contend that the insights that should be gathered here should be that: 1) The perceived distinction between the dissent to a proposition and the assent to its negation may be nothing more than an illusory subjective experience akin to Free Will 2) Due to the complexity of belief and the wide variety of factors beyond evidence and reason involved in belief formation, justification is not required for the presence of belief. 3) Doxastic involuntarism is true, rendering the absence of belief an "ought," but not necessarily an "is." 4) While a genuine distinction in the brain activity between atheists and religious people has already been substantiated (by fMRI, for example) in multiple clinical trials, the asserted distinction between the brain activity of self-identifying atheists who express belief in the nonexistence of any deity and self-identifying atheists who express a mere "lack" of belief in any deity has not. 5) Because a genuine distinction in the brain activity between atheists and religious people has already been substantiated (by fMRI, for example) in multiple clinical trials, the demand that the asserted distinction between the brain activity of self-identifying atheists who express belief in the nonexistence of any deity and self-identifying atheists who express a mere "lack" of belief in any deity be substantiated in similar fashion cannot be validly deemed "unreasonable." 6) While it has been demonstrated that uncertainty activates different parts of the brain, this uncertainty does not imply an absence of belief. 7) Belief in the nonexistence of a deity may be held subconsciously without the subject's awarenes; 8) Because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation, the asserted "absence" of any given belief is untestable, unverifiable, unfalsifiable, unknowable (even to the subject to whom it pertains due to the potential presence of a subconscious belief), and unscientific; therefore, the default dismissal of such claims is justified--if not obligatory. 9) Because it explains the actions of those who express a "lack" of belief whereas an "absence" of belief does not, the presence of belief serves as an inference to the best explanation. 10) Finally, I contend that I've gone far and above what can reasonably be expected of an interlocutor; and I am not even asserting that it is objectively true that "nonbelief" is the same thing as disbelief (expressed differently). Yet, those who are making the assertion that there is a difference don't put _any_ effort into supporting _their own_ claim. Their refusal to present evidence to support their claim; their consistent reliance excuses, fallacies, and false accusations; their refusal to engage with the actual point of contention and arguments; and their their blatant disregard for contradictory evidence only bolsters my tentative credence that "nonbelief" is a sophistric framework erected to maintain the facade of justification without doing any work to genuinely be justified. So, what's it gonna be now? Excuses, fallacies, accusations?
@MikeTMike Agreed. Anyone who asserts anything incurs a burden of proof for the content of that assertion. It is for that reason that I am irreligious and agnostic as it pertains to the (non)existence of a deity. By the same token, and for the same reason, atheists who assert that their "lack" of belief in deities is different from disbelief incur a burden of proof for _that_ claim. For the same reason that atheists reject the analogies, arguments, and personal anecdotes submitted by religious people in lieu of empirical evidence for the existence of deities, *I* reject the analogies, arguments, and personal anecdotes as submitted by _atheists_ in lieu of empirical evidence for their *neurological* claim--and for the exact same reason.
@@MikeTMike Theism ≠ gnosticism ≠ religion There is theism without religion. There are atheistic religions. Of course, that's just a red herring because it has fuck all to do with the neurological claim that I am disputing. Would you like to return to the topic?
@@JustifiedNonetheless That's not how it works. If you're not a theist, you're an atheist. Irreligious is not a thing. And your claim is ridiculous. Are you a neurologist?
"Irreligious is not a thing." Tell me you don't know what the hell you're talking about without telling me you don't know what the hell you're talking about. "And your claim is ridiculous." *_WHAT_* claim? th-cam.com/users/shortsd80KUABK3rc?si=gvIr6Ixr9ip9PCKp
@sp1ke0kill3r Wrong. "Just because I don't believe there _is_ a god, doesn't mean I believe there is *no* god" is a claim, too. It's an independent neurological claim that requires support in its own right and pretending that it isn't or doesn't only exposes you as a dishonest interlocutor.
@@JustifiedNonetheless I gather you believe in god. Can you prove that you actually believe in this claim and are not mistaken somehow? Your positive claim that you believe in god requires evidence. You do not believe in god unless you can prove to me that you do, and since there is no way for you to prove it right now I will just assert that you don't. There is no such thing as a theist, I know this because no one has proved to me that their brain states match that of a consciousness that is convinced of a god claim.
"Can you prove..." I don't make any such assertion. However, as belief informs action and an absence of belief provides no impetus _for_ action, any action taken (including willful abstention) is evidence of the *presence* of belief. Therefore, pursuant to the principle of inference to the best explanation, I am justified in my tentative conclusion that *I* believe that a deity of some sort exists somewhere, and that intellectually dishonest interlocutors who express "nonbelief," *do* believe that *no* deity exists. Since, again, I'm not making an assertion, I have no burden of proof, much less can I "shift" it. Since _atheists_ assert that there is a genuine distinction between the dissent to a proposition and the assent to its negation, they, _as the claimaints,_ already have the burden of proof _for _*_their own_*_ assertion._ See how easy that is?
@bwLindahl Here is a simple thought problem that illustrates the challenge of the asserted distinction between ¬Bp (nonbelief) and B¬p (disbelief). "There is a baseball inside the box" is a claim. This _ontological_ assertion can be tested and thereby (dis)confirmed by looking inside the box and either finding or not finding a baseball inside. If, however, the claim is, "I _believe_ there is (not) a baseball inside the box," how can this _neurological_ assertion be falsified? Is that even possible? Consider a scenario in which one subject holds the doxastic disposition of ¬Bp, and a second subject holds the doxastic disposition of B¬p. • Neither asserts or holds ¬p as an _epistemic_ disposition. • Either subject can _express_ either position, whether it is true or not. So, by what independently verifiable means can we conclusively determine who holds which position? A distinction that does not manifest in reality is indistinguishable from a distinction that does not exist, and the null hypothesis is to proceed as though there is no distinction unless there is sufficient evidence to substantiate its asserted existence.
@@JustifiedNonetheless you want me to prove the distinction between me disbelieving the claim and believing the contrary. This is entirely up to my brain states, so it is ridiculous to ask it of me. It is equally ridiculous for me to ask you to prove your own brain states, which is why I did. Your entire series is a genuine waste of time.
Clifford's principle is silly and unnecessary, for how are we to determine if any given "evidence" is "insufficient" for believing any given conclusion? That is clearly a subjective distinction and your mistake is in pretending that is a problem. Its not. Because different people can believe different things for different reasons without insisting either one of them is "wrong," although any given example may make it difficult for those people to work together. See pragmatism for a notion of "truth" that isn't metaphysical question begging.
@@JustifiedNonetheless which also isn't a problem. There is just no sense in which we have to insist that any given people must agree on what is "correct," including you and I right now. Hence the irony. People either agree, or they don't and for the purposes of epistemology, we can speak wholly in these terms while ignoring what you call "truth."
@ericb9804 There's also Sagan's standard, Hume's maxim, and Ockham's razor... You know what? Screw it. Let's throw them all out, and no one needs evidence for anything...including the existence of a deity. So, since you don't need evidence, you believe, right?
@@JustifiedNonetheless you're getting closer...the point is why should it matter to you what I believe unless we share some specific goal where the achievement of which requires our agreement? Everyone believes as they do BECAUSE they think themselves justified by way of their experience. And yet, if someone else disagrees with them, its unclear why that matters in the absence of some goal. In philosophical terms, the point is that you are choosing a vocabulary within which to express your epistemology and pretending that other vocabularies are impossible. But they are not. We are wholly capable of expressing epistemology without bothering to impose such silly "maxims" and "razors" on other people. All of our problems are either practical, or they are meaningless.
"I have this great argument, but don't ask me if I'm a theist, or it breaks"
-Kevin Berger
@@MikeTMike
My banner literally states I'm a theist. So does the intro of every video I post. So does my info page. I'm sorry that you are illiterate.
Also, theism is the *belief* that at least one deity exists. It is *_NOT_* the claim. I'm sorry that I refuse to recognize your insistence on conflating the two, or you don't understand that it's possible to think something is true without knowing or asserting it.
@@JustifiedNonetheless
If you're a theist, you believe god/gods exist, by definition.
Define the god you believe in, then demonstrate it exists. The onus is on you.
I don't even have to do anything.
And asking you a question, using better English than yours means I'm illiterate?
You love making ridiculous claims, don't you?
@MikeTMike
"...then, demonstrate it exists."
I'm a theist. That means I tentatively assent to the proposition that at least one deity exists.
I'm *also* agnostic. That means I concede that I may be mistaken and therefore *_DON'T MAKE THAT ASSERTION._*
I'm sorry that you are either too ignorant or dishonest to recognize the distinction.
@JustifiedNonetheless
So defensive. Keep up those ad hominems. They show everything we need to know about you.😉
@@MikeTMike
Are you going to acknowledge the difference between belief and knowledge? Between a statement of belief and a knowledge claim?
My response is similarly going to use the courtroom analogy.
A prosecutor makes a claim: "the defendant committed murder. My evidence for this claim is that we have videotape of him leaving the apartment complex front door 2 hours after the murder occurred, according to forensic evidence. I rest my case."
Obviously, that is extremely poor evidence so the defense attorney stands and says "The prosecutor hasn't met their burden of proof. I rest my case."
The jury takes 5 minutes to return a "not guilty" verdict.
I as a juror do not know if the defendant is guilty or not, he was never proven innocent. But I do know that the evidence provided is not enough to sway me from the standard of "considered innocent until proven guilty." Obviously, they are not actually innocent until proven guilty, but we consider them so before taking their freedom.
Do you accept that a juror can legitimately not know if the defendant is guilty or not in such a situation?
@@jsmall10671
Nope. Already squashed that bullshit.
th-cam.com/video/Agci73QA258/w-d-xo.htmlsi=qNZz5r-YuhCUe-XN
@@JustifiedNonetheless I was hoping not to get into insults after a good faith attempt, but OK.
You make a lot of good points in that linked video, but you are not accounting for a situation where the evidence shown is so scant that someone can legitimately not know something.
If a total stranger walks up to me and says "My wife walked our dog this morning at 8AM" I have not even made an unconscious decision to believe the claim or not. For you to claim otherwise is you claiming you know the internal state of my mind. I get that belief is not a decision, it's forced upon us by the evidence, and can be unconscious, but I disagree that every single claim creates an instant unconscious belief, which it seems like you're claiming.
Do you have some empirical evidence for that claim?
@@jsmall10671
I have 1 question: does anyone anywhere ever believe anything that is unjustified?
As long as the answer to that question is affirmative, even though we can agree that someone _shouldn't_ believe that there is an even or odd number of gumballs, or that the suspect is guilty or innocent, we still cannot validly conclude that they don't anyway. That's the problem: you can't validly derive the "is" of an absence of belief from the "ought."
I don't assert to know your thoughts, and I don't have to. *You* have to demonstrate the the absence of belief, and that you somehow know it.
@@jsmall10671
_Anyone_ who asserts _anything l_ incurs a burden of proof for the content of that assertion. It is for that reason that I am irreligious and agnostic as it pertains to the (non)existence of a deity.
By the same token, and for the same reason, _atheists_ who assert that their "lack" of belief in deities is different from disbelief incur a burden of proof for _that_ claim.
For the same reason that atheists reject the analogies, arguments, and personal anecdotes submitted by religious people in lieu of empirical evidence for the existence of deities, _I_ reject the analogies, arguments, and personal anecdotes submitted by atheists in lieu of empirical evidence for their *neurological* claim.
@@JustifiedNonetheless Sure, there are some people with unjustified beliefs. Why should that mean that every claim of "lack of belief" is therefore fake?
I can't demonstrate my own mental state, that's impossible. I can only raise a hypothetical (or real) situation to see if you also have non-belief.
Are you honestly saying, about yourself, that every single claim ever made to you, you have a belief as to its veracity? There's not one where you are legitimately on the fence?
What about my last hypothetical, which way would you lean if asked?
A total stranger walks up and says his wife walked the dog this morning starting at 8AM. You have 3 seconds to decide whether you 1) believe him or 2) believe he's lying or 3) have a lack of belief based on too little information. You claim you would never ever in your entire life choose option 3 for any such claim?
Premise #2 is a crock of balooney,
If I do not believe the defendant is guilty, does that mean I necessarily believe they are innocent? No.
If I don't believe I have sufficient evidence is accept the number of gumballs in the jar are odd-numbered, does that mean I believe they are even-numbered? No.
If I don't believe it will rain today, does that mean I believe it will not rain today? No.
If I don't believe you have 20 bucks in coins in your pocket, does that mean I believe you don't have 20 dollars in coins in your pocket?
I mean this isn't hard to grasp. You seem intelligent enough to grasp it. Are you being dishonest, or do you really have such a hard time understanding that lacking a belief in X is not the same thing as believing X is false?
@GWFHegel-ms7gz
Prove it.
Also, the Gumball analogy is shit. I have a Playlist dismantling it. I _understand_ it just fine. It simply doesn't do what you think it does. It can tell you that you _shouldn't_ believe that there is an even or odd number. It doesn't tell us a thing about whether or not you _do._
Lol
@@JustifiedNonetheless
"prove it."
Prove what? The claim about non-belief? I did. I used about 5 arguments from analogy.
"Also, the Gumball analogy is shit. I have a Playlist dismantling it."
That isn't an argument, but an assertion. Let me know when you got something.
"It simply doesn't do what you think it does."
Another assertion,
"It can tell you that you shouldn't believe that there is an even or odd number."
Right....which means there is a third position other than affirming and denying the number is odd. Duh. Kinda like there is a third position between accepting the claim that God exists, and accepting its negation. Duh.
"It doesn't tell us a thing about whether or not you do."
No one claimed it does, my slow-on-the-uptake pal. It demonstrates that you can hold a third position (agnosticism) and it indicates that would be the rational position in the absence of sufficient evidence.
@GWFHegel-ms7gz
These are sources that demonstrate that a genuine difference in the brain activity of atheists and religious people has already been substantiated (by fMRI, for example). Therefore, to demand for the asserted distinction in brain activity between self-identifying atheists who express belief in the nonexistence of any deity and self-identifying atheists who express a mere "lack" of belief in deities cannot be considered unreasonable. However, no such reliably distinguishable difference has been substantiated; and this remains the point of contention.
References:
Belanger, E. (2014). Is an atheist’s brain the same as a believer’s? New research says religious and nonreligious minds work differently. Advance Local
Farias, M. (2021). ANALYSIS | Are the brains of atheists different to those of religious people? The Conversation
Gervais, W., van Elk, M., Xygalatas, D., McKay, R., Aveyard, M., Buchtel, E., Dar-Nimrod, I., Kundtová Klocová, E., , Ramsay, J., Riekki, T., Svedholm-Häkkinen, A. & Bulbulia, J. (2023, January 1). Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon? Judgment and Decision Making. Vol. 13 Issue 3. Cambridge University Press
Hagan, E. (2022, May 11). Believers and non-believers work differently. Psychology Today
Harris, S., Kaplan, J., Curiel, A., Bookheimer, S. Y., Iacoboni, M. & Cohen, M. S., (2009). The neural correlates of religious and nonreligious belief. PLoS One
Kapogiannis, D., Deshpande, G., Krueger, F., Thornburg, M.P., & Grafman, J.H. (2014). Brain networks shaping religious belief. Brain Connectivity
McGregor, I. & Nash, K. (2009, March 5). Brain differences found between believers in God and non-believers. Science Daily
Nash, K., Kleinert, T., Leota, J., Scott, A. & Schimel, J., (2022, March). Resting-state networks of believers and non-believers: An EEG microstate study. Biological Psychology. Vol. 169
Newberg, A. (2012, January 1). Ask the brains. Scientific American.
Ranjha, A. (2022, May 30). The brains of of believers and nonbelievers differ. Psychology Roots
These sources indicate that while, uncertainty does activate specific areas of the brain, because belief is simply finding proposition more likely to be true than untrue, uncertainty does not imply an absence of belief, as this is a distinct threshold from that of certainty.
References:
Bzdok, D., Groß, D., Eickhoff, S.B. (2015). The Neurobiology of Moral Cognition: Relation to Theory of Mind, Empathy, and Mind-Wandering. In: Clausen, J., Levy, N. (eds) Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer, Dordrecht. doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_161. Retrieved from link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_161
Fischhoff, B., Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1977). Knowing with certainty: The appropriateness of extreme confidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 3(4), 552-564. doi.org/10.1037/0096-1523.3.4.552
Giacomo Novembre, Luca F. Ticini, Simone Schütz-Bosbach, Peter E. Keller, Motor simulation and the coordination of self and other in real-time joint action, Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, Volume 9, Issue 8, August 2014, Pages 1062-1068. Retrieved from doi.org/10.1093/scan/nst086
Huber, F. (2007). The Logic of Uncertainty and Decision. In Philosophy of Probability. Retrieved from philpapers.org/rec/HUBTLO
Hume, D. (1739). A Treatise of Human Nature. Retrieved from gutenberg.org/ebooks/4705
Jeffrey, R. (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press.
Kvanvig, J. L. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
Locke, J. (1689). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Retrieved from earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1690book4.pdf
Moore, G. E. (1959). Certainty. In Philosophical Papers (pp. 227-229). Allen & Unwin.
Pitt Philsci Archive. (n.d.). Conceptualizing and Measuring Belief, Certainty, and Probabilistic Judgments. Retrieved from philsci-archive.pitt.edu
Sosa, E. (2009). Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume II. Oxford University Press.
Smith, E. E., et al. (2013). The relationship between confidence and accuracy in perceptual decision-making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(4), 1043-1056. doi.org/10.1037/a0032471
Vieira, J. B., Almeida, P. R., Ferreira-Santos, F., Barbosa, F., Marques-Teixeira, J., & Marsh, A. A. (2013). Distinct neural activation patterns underlie economic decisions in high and low psychopathy scorers. Retrieved from link.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_161
Windschitl, P. D., et al. (2015). The effect of confidence on the relationship between subjective probability and choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28(2), 147-158. doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1833
These sources discuss the wide array of factors beyond evidence and reason involved in belief formation which include, but are not limited to, aliefs, biases, other cognitive functions, cultural influences, emotions, intuition, personal experiences, pre-existing beliefs, social pressures, and upbringing.
References:
Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (Eds.). (2007). Encyclopedia of social psychology. Sage Publications.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford University Press.
Jones, A. B. (2019, April). The role of media in shaping public beliefs. In B. R. Johnson (Chair), Media influence on public opinion. Symposium conducted at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC.
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. (1991). The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology. In J. B. Murray (Ed.), Social psychology. (pp. 45-67). McGraw-Hill.
Smith, J. (2020, October 10). The impact of cultural influences on belief systems. Psychology Today.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185 (4157), 1124-1131.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Cambridge University Press.
@GWFHegel-ms7gz
These are sources that indicate that beliefs is not an act of will.
References:
Alston, W. P. (1989). Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Cornell University Press.
Bennett, J. (1990). Why is belief involuntary? Semantic Scholar.
Curley, E.M. (1975). Descartes, Spinoza, and the Ethics of Belief. In Spinoza: Essays in Interpretation, ed. Maurice Mandelbaum and Eugene Freeman, 159-89. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing.
Scott-Kakures, D. (2000). Motivated Believing: Wishful and Unwelcome. Nous 34. 348-75.
West, M. (2014). Doxastic Involuntarism, Attentional Voluntarism, and Social Epistemology. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, Vol. 3, No. 5, 37-51.
Williams, B. (1970). Deciding to Believe. In Language, Belief, and Metaphysics, ed. Howard E. Kiefer and Milton K. Munitz, 95-111. Albany: SUNY Press
These are sources that indicate that beliefs can be held subconsciously, without the subject's awareness.
References:
Bargh J. A. & Morsella, E. (2008, January). The Unconscious Mind. Perspectives on Psychological Sciences. Vol. 3. Issue 1. pp. 73-9. doi: 10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00064.x. PMID: 18584056; PMCID: PMC2440575.
Bloom, Paul (2011). How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like. W. W. Norton & Co.
Burkeman, O., (2010). This column will change your life: From alief to belief. The Guardian.
Crane, T., (2013). Unconscious belief and conscious thought. Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oup Usa. pp. 156
dos Reis, J. (2020, February 26). How To Change Your Core Beliefs In The Subconscious Mind. Medium
Hodge, K. M. (2011). "On Imagining the Afterlife". Journal of Cognition and Culture. 11 (3-4): 367-389.
McKay, R. & Dennett, D. (2009). "The Evolution of Misbelief" (PDF). Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 32 (6): 493-510.
Morgan, K. (2019). The psychology of belief. Forge
Parvez, H. (2023). Belief systems as subconscious programs. Psych Mechanics
Rich, J. (2011). The power of your unconscious beliefs. HuffPost.
Szabó Gendler, T. (2008, October). Alief and belief.The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 105, No. 10, Epistemic Norms. Part Two pp. 634-663
Subbotsky, E. (2011). The Ghost in the Machine: Why and how the belief in magic survives in the rational mind. Human Development. 54, No. 3, Explanatory Co-Existence, pp. 126-143
Ward, K. (2020, October 29). Out-Smart Self-Sabotage: 5 Steps To Change Subconscious Beliefs. Mind Body Green
These are sources on action theory (that suggests an "absence" of belief holds no explanatory power for willful action, making the presence of a subconscious belief an inference to the best possible explanation).
References:
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Coleman, P. (2011). Belief and ageing. University of Southampton.
Davidson, D. (1963). Actions, reasons, and causes. The Journal of Philosophy, 60(23), 685-700.
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Davis, L. H. (1979). Theory of Action, Prentice-Hall, (Foundations of Philosophy Series), Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
Funke, J. (2017). How Much Knowledge Is Necessary for Action?. In Meusburger, P.; Werlen, B.; Suarsana, L. (eds.). Knowledge and Action. Knowledge and Space. Vol. 9. Springer International Publishing. pp. 99-111.
Heydari Fard, S. (2018). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the desire-luck problem. Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics.
Jackson, F. (1991). Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection. Ethics 101 (3): 461-82.
Kroeker, E. (n.d.). Thomas Reid: theory of action. Internet Encyclopedia of PhilosophyHodge, Mi. (2011). "On Imagining the Afterlife". Journal of Cognition and Culture. 11 (3-4): 367-389.
Locke, D. (Jul 1982). Beliefs, desires and reasons for action. American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 241-249
Mele, A. R. (ed.) (1997). The Philosophy of Action, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Paul, S. (2020). The Philosophy of Action: A Contemporary Introduction, London, Routledge.
Sandis, C. (ed.) (2009). New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Sandis, C. (ed.) (2019). Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe, London, Routledge.
These are sources that describe beliefs as private mental events, which means they are not empirically observable, testable, verifiable, falsifiable, or knowable.
Baum, W. M. (2011, Fall). Behaviorism, private events, and the molar view of behavior. Behavioral Analysis. Vol. 34. No. 2. pp. 185-200.
Connors, M. H., & Halligan, P. W. (2015). A cognitive account of belief: A tentative road map. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 1588. doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01588
Dougher, M. J. (2013, Fall). Behaviorisms and private events. Behavioral Analysis. Vol. 36. No. 2. pp. 223-227.
Gilbert, D. T., Fiske, S. T., & Lindzey, G. (1998). The handbook of social psychology (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill.
Jacobs, A. & Sachs, L. B. (Ed.).(2013, November 14). The psychology of private events. Perspectives on covert response systems. Academic Press
Landesman, C. (1964, March). Mental events. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. 24. No. 3. pp. 307-317.
Leigland, S. (2014). Contingency horizon: On private events and the analysis of behavior. Perspectives on Behavior Science, 37, 13-24. doi.org/10.1007/s40614-014-0002-5
Rosenberg, A. (2004). Philosophy of science: A contemporary introduction. Routledge.
Skinner, B. F. (1974). About behaviorism. Vintage.
Tourinho, E. Z. (2010). On the distinction between private events and the physiology of the organism. Journal of Behavior Analysis and Therapy, 41(2), 272-273. doi.org/10.1037/h0094052
Based on this data, I contend that the insights that should be gathered here should be that:
1) The perceived distinction between the dissent to a proposition and the assent to its negation may be nothing more than an illusory subjective experience akin to Free Will
2) Due to the complexity of belief and the wide variety of factors beyond evidence and reason involved in belief formation, justification is not required for the presence of belief.
3) Doxastic involuntarism is true, rendering the absence of belief an "ought," but not necessarily an "is."
4) While a genuine distinction in the brain activity between atheists and religious people has already been substantiated (by fMRI, for example) in multiple clinical trials, the asserted distinction between the brain activity of self-identifying atheists who express belief in the nonexistence of any deity and self-identifying atheists who express a mere "lack" of belief in any deity has not.
5) Because a genuine distinction in the brain activity between atheists and religious people has already been substantiated (by fMRI, for example) in multiple clinical trials, the demand that the asserted distinction between the brain activity of self-identifying atheists who express belief in the nonexistence of any deity and self-identifying atheists who express a mere "lack" of belief in any deity be substantiated in similar fashion cannot be validly deemed "unreasonable."
6) While it has been demonstrated that uncertainty activates different parts of the brain, this uncertainty does not imply an absence of belief.
7) Belief in the nonexistence of a deity may be held subconsciously without the subject's awarenes;
8) Because beliefs are private mental events not subject to direct empirical observation, the asserted "absence" of any given belief is untestable, unverifiable, unfalsifiable, unknowable (even to the subject to whom it pertains due to the potential presence of a subconscious belief), and unscientific; therefore, the default dismissal of such claims is justified--if not obligatory.
9) Because it explains the actions of those who express a "lack" of belief whereas an "absence" of belief does not, the presence of belief serves as an inference to the best explanation.
10) Finally, I contend that I've gone far and above what can reasonably be expected of an interlocutor; and I am not even asserting that it is objectively true that "nonbelief" is the same thing as disbelief (expressed differently). Yet, those who are making the assertion that there is a difference don't put _any_ effort into supporting _their own_ claim. Their refusal to present evidence to support their claim; their consistent reliance excuses, fallacies, and false accusations; their refusal to engage with the actual point of contention and arguments; and their their blatant disregard for contradictory evidence only bolsters my tentative credence that "nonbelief" is a sophistric framework erected to maintain the facade of justification without doing any work to genuinely be justified.
So, what's it gonna be now? Excuses, fallacies, accusations?
@@Professor_Pink
Oh, and agnosticism doesn't preclude belief, dipshit.
That means christians have the obligation to demonstrate all the gods they don't believe in don't exist.
@MikeTMike
Agreed. Anyone who asserts anything incurs a burden of proof for the content of that assertion. It is for that reason that I am irreligious and agnostic as it pertains to the (non)existence of a deity.
By the same token, and for the same reason, atheists who assert that their "lack" of belief in deities is different from disbelief incur a burden of proof for _that_ claim.
For the same reason that atheists reject the analogies, arguments, and personal anecdotes submitted by religious people in lieu of empirical evidence for the existence of deities, *I* reject the analogies, arguments, and personal anecdotes as submitted by _atheists_ in lieu of empirical evidence for their *neurological* claim--and for the exact same reason.
@JustifiedNonetheless
Irreligious? You're either a theist or an atheist. Which is it?
@@MikeTMike
Theism ≠ gnosticism ≠ religion
There is theism without religion. There are atheistic religions. Of course, that's just a red herring because it has fuck all to do with the neurological claim that I am disputing. Would you like to return to the topic?
@@JustifiedNonetheless
That's not how it works.
If you're not a theist, you're an atheist.
Irreligious is not a thing.
And your claim is ridiculous. Are you a neurologist?
"Irreligious is not a thing."
Tell me you don't know what the hell you're talking about without telling me you don't know what the hell you're talking about.
"And your claim is ridiculous."
*_WHAT_* claim?
th-cam.com/users/shortsd80KUABK3rc?si=gvIr6Ixr9ip9PCKp
Unfortunately Kev the claim in question is whether God exists.
@sp1ke0kill3r
Wrong.
"Just because I don't believe there _is_ a god, doesn't mean I believe there is *no* god" is a claim, too. It's an independent neurological claim that requires support in its own right and pretending that it isn't or doesn't only exposes you as a dishonest interlocutor.
@@JustifiedNonetheless I gather you believe in god. Can you prove that you actually believe in this claim and are not mistaken somehow? Your positive claim that you believe in god requires evidence. You do not believe in god unless you can prove to me that you do, and since there is no way for you to prove it right now I will just assert that you don't. There is no such thing as a theist, I know this because no one has proved to me that their brain states match that of a consciousness that is convinced of a god claim.
"Can you prove..."
I don't make any such assertion. However, as belief informs action and an absence of belief provides no impetus _for_ action, any action taken (including willful abstention) is evidence of the *presence* of belief. Therefore, pursuant to the principle of inference to the best explanation, I am justified in my tentative conclusion that *I* believe that a deity of some sort exists somewhere, and that intellectually dishonest interlocutors who express "nonbelief," *do* believe that *no* deity exists. Since, again, I'm not making an assertion, I have no burden of proof, much less can I "shift" it. Since _atheists_ assert that there is a genuine distinction between the dissent to a proposition and the assent to its negation, they, _as the claimaints,_ already have the burden of proof _for _*_their own_*_ assertion._
See how easy that is?
@bwLindahl
Here is a simple thought problem that illustrates the challenge of the asserted distinction between ¬Bp (nonbelief) and B¬p (disbelief).
"There is a baseball inside the box" is a claim. This _ontological_ assertion can be tested and thereby (dis)confirmed by looking inside the box and either finding or not finding a baseball inside. If, however, the claim is, "I _believe_ there is (not) a baseball inside the box," how can this _neurological_ assertion be falsified? Is that even possible? Consider a scenario in which one subject holds the doxastic disposition of ¬Bp, and a second subject holds the doxastic disposition of B¬p.
• Neither asserts or holds ¬p as an _epistemic_ disposition.
• Either subject can _express_ either position, whether it is true or not.
So, by what independently verifiable means can we conclusively determine who holds which position? A distinction that does not manifest in reality is indistinguishable from a distinction that does not exist, and the null hypothesis is to proceed as though there is no distinction unless there is sufficient evidence to substantiate its asserted existence.
@@JustifiedNonetheless you want me to prove the distinction between me disbelieving the claim and believing the contrary. This is entirely up to my brain states, so it is ridiculous to ask it of me. It is equally ridiculous for me to ask you to prove your own brain states, which is why I did. Your entire series is a genuine waste of time.
Clifford's principle is silly and unnecessary, for how are we to determine if any given "evidence" is "insufficient" for believing any given conclusion? That is clearly a subjective distinction and your mistake is in pretending that is a problem. Its not. Because different people can believe different things for different reasons without insisting either one of them is "wrong," although any given example may make it difficult for those people to work together. See pragmatism for a notion of "truth" that isn't metaphysical question begging.
@@ericb9804
Still got Hitchens' razor.
@@JustifiedNonetheless which also isn't a problem. There is just no sense in which we have to insist that any given people must agree on what is "correct," including you and I right now. Hence the irony. People either agree, or they don't and for the purposes of epistemology, we can speak wholly in these terms while ignoring what you call "truth."
@ericb9804
There's also Sagan's standard, Hume's maxim, and Ockham's razor...
You know what? Screw it. Let's throw them all out, and no one needs evidence for anything...including the existence of a deity. So, since you don't need evidence, you believe, right?
@@JustifiedNonetheless you're getting closer...the point is why should it matter to you what I believe unless we share some specific goal where the achievement of which requires our agreement? Everyone believes as they do BECAUSE they think themselves justified by way of their experience. And yet, if someone else disagrees with them, its unclear why that matters in the absence of some goal.
In philosophical terms, the point is that you are choosing a vocabulary within which to express your epistemology and pretending that other vocabularies are impossible. But they are not. We are wholly capable of expressing epistemology without bothering to impose such silly "maxims" and "razors" on other people. All of our problems are either practical, or they are meaningless.
@@ericb9804
I care about reality and what is true. Don't you?