Can we, please, STOP with the Gumball Analogy?
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 29 ธ.ค. 2024
- In this video, I show once and for all why the Gumball Analogy doesn't prove what its proponents think it proves.
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The content used in this video is intended for educational and informational purposes only and is protected by the Fair Use guidelines of Section 107 of the Copyright Act. All rights to the images, music, clips, and other materials used belong to their respective owners. I do not claim ownership over any third-party content used and have made every reasonable effort to credit copyright owners as appropriate.
References:
Background Music
Tonehinge. (2021). Above the sun. [song].
why would they stop using a good analogy?
@meowsteradmiral5140
It's a shit analogy, as I explain. Of course, you'd know that, if you had bothered to actually watch the video before commenting on it.
@@830toAwesome
Bullshit. Bye.
@@JustifiedNonetheless Great answer, you dull potato.
@@830toAwesome
Feel free to provide ev • i • dence of the claimed distinction between the phenomena of dissent to a proposition and the assent to its negation. 🥔
The analogy actually fails for a different reason. "The number of gumballs is even" is a well-defined, falsifiable hypothesis, whereas the God narrative is not a hypothesis at all. It's unfalsifiable, it contains meaningless concepts like an entity "existing" and "performing acts" "outside of spacetime", and on top of it all, barely any two theists even agree on the details.
Your burden is to first demonstrate that it is possible to define and distinguish the brain states associated with what is termed "belief". Until such is defined and demonstrated, we rightfully rely on testimony of the individual who claims to know his or her own conscious mind. Your leap of faith is the claim that there is such a thing as a brain state that can indicate an individual's belief more accurately than their personal testimony. Prove it.
@protonman8947
"...we rightfully rely on testimony of the individual who claims to know his or her own conscious mind."
No. We don't.
I often hear the objection that we cannot prove that we (don't) believe what we claim to (not) believe; therefore, we should just accept what each other expresses.
It seems to me that this notion is problematic. Firstly, the mere expression of one's doxastic disposition is nothing more than an argument by assertion.
Secondly, if Hitchens' razor that what can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence, Hume's maxim that a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence, and Clifford's principle that it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient are not taken to be axiomatic, then we will be obliged to believe or reject every claim without regard to the evidence, or to apply different standards of evidence to different claims, thus resulting in the commission of special pleading fallacies. After all, if we allow for the argument here that is essentially, "it's too hard to provide evidence for my claim," we set a problematic precedent that could be used to justify similar claims in other contexts, including arguments for the existence of a deity.
Thirdly, the fact that the veracity of a proposition cannot be demonstrated due to the difficulty (or, indeed, the impossibility) of gathering and presenting evidence is not a fault in the epistemology, but in the claim. If one cannot demonstrate _how_ one knows a claim is true, then it cannot be demonstrated _that_ the claim is true, either; and one is merely arguing by assertion, which leads back the initial problem. In addition, because beliefs can be held subconsciously and the subconscious is inaccessible to the conscious mind, by definition, the assertion that one "knows" that a belief is "absent" amounts to a psychologist's fallacy, if not an omniscience fallacy.
One of the fundamental flaws with the notion of apisticism is that it presumes the absence of subconscious belief that was involuntarily formed by any a plethora of factors, and such a presumption is unjustified. The fact that one can believe the proposition that one is apistic _at all_ without justification serves as evidence that one can hold a belief toward *any* proposition without justification--including the (non)existence of a deity. Arguing that one "knows" that one's doxastic disposition is that of of apisticism presumes the existence of apisticism, which is the point of contention, rendering this an example of circular reasoning.
Fourthly, if one wishes to deviate from empiricism and evidentialism, opting to instead justify apisticism through some _other_ epistemology, then one is obliged to apply that alternative epistemology for all other propositions in equal measure--including theism--to avoid the commission of another special pleading.
However, there is a fifth problem that is arguably the most critical that arises due to beliefs being private mental events. Pain is _also_ a private mental event. Yet, doctor's *don't* just take their patients' statements about their pain at face value when prescribing medication, particularly when it comes to narcotics. They consider _behavior,_ as this can serve as evidence.
It just so happens that the behavior of those who express "absence of belief" tends to correspond to the _presence_ belief in either a proposition or its negation; and as such an "absence" of belief holds no explanatory power for action, the _presence_ of belief one way or the other is a *better* hypothesis despite its vehement denial. Thus, there are three compelling reasons why "nonbelief"-claims *shouldn't* be accepted at face-value: a claim invokes a burden of proof, period; the difficulty involved doesn't magically absolve one of the burden of proof; and contradictory evidence in the form of action gives sufficient cause to be skeptical. With that in mind, while it would be premature and ill-advised to declare that those expressing "absence of belief" definitely are wrong or deceptive, one is justified in taking those claims with a pillar of salt; and ultimately, as the claimants, the burden of proof lies with those expressing their alleged "absence of belief" to provide empirical evidence of the phenomenological distinction between this and belief to the contary.
@protonman8947
Also, a genuine difference in brain states between belief and DISbelief _has_ been substantiated. What _hasn't_ been demonstrated is the asserted distinction between "NONbelief" and disbelief. Of course, your asinine arguments raises the obvious problem: if you cannot demonstrate *how* you know that they aren't the same thing, then you cannot show *that* you know it, either...and you're just arguing by assertion.
"Prove it," indeed.
"While scans showed the amount of brain activity does not vary between religious and non-religions subjects, _they detected notable differences in the way those brain regions communicate._
In their findings, the researchers said subjects who perceive a supernatural agent at work in their daily lives _tend to use brain pathways associated with the regulation of fear when asked to contemplate their religious beliefs._
And subjects with religious beliefs based on doctrine, such as knowledge of religious scripture, _tend to use pathways associated with language when they contemplate religion._
However, _non-religious subjects tend to use pathways associated with visual imagery_ when they contemplate religion, according to the study" [emphasis added] (Belanger, 2014).
"We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure signal changes in the brains of thirty subjects-fifteen committed Christians and fifteen nonbelievers-as they evaluated the truth and falsity of religious and nonreligious propositions. For both groups, and in both categories of stimuli, belief (judgments of “true” vs judgments of “false”) was associated with greater signal in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area important for self-representation, emotional associations, reward, and goal-driven behavior. This region showed greater signal whether subjects believed statements about God, the Virgin Birth, etc. or statements about ordinary facts. _A comparison of both stimulus categories suggests that religious thinking is more associated with brain regions that govern emotion, self-representation, and cognitive conflict, while thinking about ordinary facts is more reliant upon memory retrieval networks,_ [emphasis added] (Harris, Kaplan, Curiel, Bookheimer, Iacoboni, & Cohen, 2009).
"Interestingly, all subjects shared the R-sided IFG to dmPFC pathway, _but religious subjects also possessed a similar L-sided network, therefore, providing bilateral IFG input to this self-referential area..._
"Moreover, in _non-religious subjects,_ a pathway from R ITG to R IFG positively covaried with +D1. White matter connections between these regions have been strengthened in recent phylogenesis, presumably, in association with the evolution of language (to the L) and other symbolic representation systems (to the R). Preferential recruitment of this pathway by _non-religious_ subjects suggests that processing of symbolic representations may have driven their understanding of SAs' intent. By contrast, with higher +D1 (and +D3), _religious subjects_ recruited a pathway that assesses plausibility and resolves conceptual ambiguities: this pathway originates at R frontopolar PFC (BA 10) and terminates at Broca's area, a key area for action understanding and verbal representation of intended behaviors" (Kapogiannis, Deshpande, Krueger, Thornburg, & Grafman, 2014).
I have several more sources that I can cite of clinical studies that have been conducted that demonstrate a *neurological* distinction between the brain states of atheists and religious people.
"You brought up a philosophical question."
It's *_NOT_* a philosophical question. It's a *_NEUROLOGICAL_* questions, as evidenced by all of the sources below.
Don't like the sample size in the study I quoted? Here's another one of 3,461 subjects from 14 different cultures. "Figure 1 displays the posterior distributions for unstandardized betas, which represent the predicted change observed in individual belief in God as performance on the CRT increases by each additional correct answer...Most of the posterior densities’ masses are quite close to zero, suggesting that any relationships between CRT performance and religious disbelief within countries were modest, in even the few cases where they were reliably evident...However, our model estimates a .92 posterior probability of an inverse relationship between slopes and intercepts indicating that the analytic atheism relationship was apparently strongest in sites more reliably religious...
But...here's the crux of the matter: it's still *_YOUR_* burden of proof that there's a genuine distinction between "nonbelief" and disbelief because that your *_YOUR_* assertion. Belief doesn't equate to knowledge, and a belief statement doesn't equate to a claim of knowledge. I readily concede that I may be mistaken. I'm simply stating what zi _believe_ to be true. I _believe_ that "nonbelief" is incoherent. You *_ASSERT_* knowledge that "nonbelief" is real and that its different from disbelief. I'm still waiting for empirical evidence of this, or some independently verifiable means by which "nonbelief" might be distinguished from disbelief.
"Your burden is to first demonstrate that it is possible to define and distinguish the brain states associated with that is termed "belief."
*Burden met. Your turn.*
References:
Belanger, E. (2014). Is an atheist’s brain the same as a believer’s? New research says religious and nonreligious minds work differently. Advance Local
Farias, M. (2021). ANALYSIS | Are the brains of atheists different to those of religious people? The Conversation
Gervais, W., van Elk, M., Xygalatas, D., McKay, R., Aveyard, M., Buchtel, E., Dar-Nimrod, I., Kundtová Klocová, E., Ramsay, J., Riekki, T., Svedholm-Häkkinen, A. & Bulbulia, J. (2023, January 1). Analytic atheism: A cross-culturally weak and fickle phenomenon? Judgment and Decision Making. Vol. 13 Issue 3. Cambridge University Press
Hagan, E. (2022, May 11). Believers and non-believers work differently. Psychology Today
Harris, S., Kaplan, J., Curiel, A., Bookheimer, S. Y., Iacoboni, M. & Cohen, M. S., (2009). The neural correlates of religious and nonreligious belief. PLoS One
Kapogiannis, D., Deshpande, G., Krueger, F., Thornburg, M.P., & Grafman, J.H. (2014). Brain networks shaping religious belief. Brain Connectivity
McGregor, I. & Nash, K. (2009, March 5). Brain differences found between believers in God and non-believers. Science Daily
Nash, K., Kleinert, T., Leota, J., Scott, A. & Schimel, J., (2022, March). Resting-state networks of believers and non-believers: An EEG microstate study. Biological Psychology. Vol. 169
Newberg, A. (2012, January 1). Ask the brains. Scientific American.
Ranjha, A. (2022, May 30). The brains of of believers and nonbelievers differ. Psychology Roots
This isn't word salad, Gish Gallop, talking points, or copy pasta. It's not burden shifting. You made a claim. I think it's bullshit. I ask for evidence. That's how the burden of proof works.
@@protonman8947
Now, go ahead and make some other bs excuse. Or commit some fallacy. Or falsely accuse me of word salad, copy pasta, Gish Gallop, or talking points.
Anything BUT provide empirical evidence to support your own damned assertion.
@@BennyAscent
I called it. Bye.
@@JustifiedNonetheless You brought up "word salad" in defense of an accusation unmade. Strange. But back to the point. I did not make a claim. I noted that we rely on personal testimony, absent anything better. Do you have anything better? You do not have access to evidence that is even close to distinguishing between the cognitive states at issue. PET and EEG studies are descriptive and of very low resolution, and the results of these are no more than correlative of any number of differences in the personality and emotional disposition of believers vs non-believers, and do not address cognition. These are very blunt tools. You are not a neuroscientist, and are unqualified to do more than provide a list of studies with remotely relevant titles. You are a hobbyist, who thinks he has hit upon some revelation. Aside from testimony, we can say at best that a person's actions are indicative of their belief: They believe the pond is frozen over and we observe that they walk upon it. We have no access to, or understanding of the neural states that would warrant the descriptors "belief", "non-belief", or "disbelief" and it is a leap of faith to assume that there are such neural states that can be used as evidence. Why should I assume that you "believe" your own arguments to be valid and sound? I rely on the assumption that you are honest, and I note your actions - ie, that you repeatedly offer these same arguments. Yes Virginia, in philosophy and science, arguments still rely on base assumptions. Some are metaphysical, and some are practical. In so far as a person can comprehend the notion of non-belief, and the notion of disbelief, it is not a stretch to assume they can recognize the difference in their own thoughts. Take a two year old that has never heard of Jehovah. Is their cognitive relation to Jehovah one of non-belief or disbelief? Absent any knowledge of the concept, how can it be other than simple non-belief? It is a valid concept. Once they have heard about Christian theology, they might morph into disbelief - as they should :-)
Logic at best is a hypothesis claim that needs to be tested
@lilmsgs
I'm still waiting for someone to actually test distinction between the dissent to a proposition and the assent to its negation instead of just asserting it. I've seen a mountain of logical fallacies, failed analogies, and excuses...but no substance.
@@JustifiedNonetheless
To address that, need to examine the concepts of dissent, assent, and negation.
Dissenting to a proposition P and assenting to its negation not-P are not equivalent:
Psychological Differences:
Dissent and assent involve different psychological states and attitudes:
Dissent is an active rejection or disagreement with P. It implies considering P and then deciding against it.
Assent to not-P is an affirmative acceptance of the negation. It focuses on accepting an alternative proposition rather than rejecting the original.
This psychological difference could potentially be tested through careful questioning or analysis of a subject's thought process.
Logical Relationship:
While dissent to P and assent to not-P are logically related, they are not necessarily identical:
Dissent to P does not always entail a full commitment to not-P. One could dissent to P while remaining uncertain about not-P.
Assent to not-P is a stronger position that implies both dissent to P and acceptance of its negation.
Degrees of Certainty:
The strength of dissent or assent can vary:
One might weakly dissent to P without strongly believing not-P.
Assent to not-P typically implies a higher degree of certainty.
Potential Testing Approaches:
To empirically test the distinction, researchers could:
Use carefully designed surveys or interviews to probe subjects' thought processes when presented with propositions and their negations.
Analyze linguistic patterns in how people express dissent vs. assent to negations in natural language.
Employ cognitive neuroscience techniques to examine brain activity patterns associated with dissent and assent.
Conduct behavioral experiments measuring reaction times or decision-making processes for dissent vs. assent tasks.
Explore philosophical thought experiments that highlight edge cases where dissent and assent to negation might diverge.
Challenges in Testing:
There are some inherent challenges in empirically testing this distinction:
The subtle nature of the difference makes it difficult to design unambiguous experiments.
Individual variations in how people conceptualize and express dissent/assent could confound results.
The act of testing itself might influence subjects' thought processes about the distinction.
There are theoretical grounds for distinguishing between dissent to P and assent to not-P, empirically testing this distinction presents significant challenges.
I'm sorry. Did you present ev • i • dence somewhere that I missed?
Here's the issue. A genuine distinction between the brain activity of atheists and religious people _has already been_ substantiated in multiple clinical trials using fMRI (as a for instance). Do you know what _hasn't_ been substantiated? A difference in the brain activity between self-identifying atheists who express disbelief in deities and the brain activity of self-identifying atheists who express a "lack" of belief in deities. A distinction that does not manifest in reality is indistinguishable from a distinction that does not exist, and the null hypothesis is to proceed as though there is no distinction unless there is sufficient evidence to substantiate its existence.
If you cannot demonstrate _how_ you know there is a distinction, then you cannot show _that_ you know it, either, and you're just arguing by assertion.
As it stands, I have 100+ reasons to tentatively conclude that the perceived "lack" of belief is nothing more than an illusory, subjective experience akin to Free Will. Maybe I am mistaken. Those who claim to know that I am are always free to simply present some empirical evidence to support their claim.
@@JustifiedNonetheless
What is your source for clinical trials using fmri showing distinction between the brain activity of atheists and religious people?
@@JustifiedNonetheless
No where did I claim to be presenting evidence.
The issue is that, in our day and age, people don’t really care about truth; they’re ultimately after emotional satisfaction. I’ve tried to convince dozens of people that "objectively bad" media doesn’t exist - which, by all means, should be a straightforward and easy discussion - always turns into a wall-talking fest. If sophistry makes someone feel good or reaffirms a worldview that brings them comfort, they will believe it, no matter what.
@GrugTalks
I mean, I think "objectively bad" media may exist, but haven't put a lot of thought into it. The problem is that people don't vet the information that they are given. I am convinced that people don't _want_ to know some truths and _prefer_ to just accept whatever crap they are spoon-fed because, if they do their own research--if they find out for themselves, that comes with responsibility; and people *don't want to be accountable for anything.* It's easier to sit back and blame someone else, saying, "well, so-and-so told me such-and-such."
@@JustifiedNonetheless Media can't be objectively bad because objective badness is paradoxical. For something to be "bad," it must necessarily be determined as such, and that determination results from interpretation. "Good" and "bad" are judgments made that correspond to our values. Objectivity must be free of interpretation to be objective.
The belief in objective media is propagated through ego. No artist wants to admit that their 500k-word novel they spent seven years writing isn't inherently better than a child's picture book, and media consumers like to think their tastes are supported by some elite knowledge that the unwashed masses are too intellectually below to comprehend - when in reality, they're just being egotistical about ultimately arbitrary preferences.
Anyways, you're absolutely right. Intellectual laziness is a serious problem in our day and age and I think the general hyper-polarization of society is partially to blame. People have become trained to be ideologically inclined to certain positions, combined with vanguardism we're essentially reducing all discussion into a paint-by-the-numbers thought process of "They said it so it must be true"
Thanks Kevin