tl;dl: 1) The finite is something limited. 2) The determinate finite is restriction (something within its limit) and the ought (something beyond its limit) 3) If restriction is absolute, it is self-related, i.e. restricted restriction. 4) What restricts is the same as what is restricted, but this is the ought which is something beyond its limit. 5) The ought, in negating the limit which would restrict it, is itself restricted in not being the limit which is other to it. 6) Therefore, what is restricted ought to be restricted, and what ought to be necessarily is restricted, i.e. what is is what ought to be. There, Hume is refuted.
The finite passing itself is in a way making it infinite. The finite is promised nothing, and to end in nothing, but noting is also its birthplace, where the finite being is deternined in order to escape the nothing. The fact that a plant or something else beautiful dies, but then we see it in something else proves this. Things are not beautiful, but only a representatives of beauty, which is something absolute and infinite, thus, the finite wears the visage of the infinite
So I watched the vid and then went and read the article and things started falling in place, interesting stuff mate . So you def convinced me that Hegel is onto something, however only if you define the ought as something's unrealized potentials (correct me if I'm wrong). Something's unrealized potentials will be immanent within it, insofar as its constraint is itself constrained by the unrealized potentials. And so you have a constrained constraint and you can't distinguish in principle between an inner and outer constraint, as long as the constraint is finite, I.e not infinite, in the way a rock is vis a vis sentience e.g. Therefore, what is, is what ought to be, and what ought to be is what is, simply because you can't distinguish them in principle, and which is which, is a matter of perspective, like form and foreground in an Escher painting. This is a water down way of saying restriction passes or self sublates into its other which is the aught or in my language the unrealized possibilities of a thing. Here of course , the unrealized potential doesn't just refer to anything my imagination can fancy, but rather the potentials of a thing according to its nature or in other words its restriction, I.e that which defines it. I know the concept of essence doesn't appear yet in the SOL, but one might say the potentialities of something according to its essence. If I got this right, then the only issue I have with this when it comes the issue of morality as Hume was concerned with, is that this doesn't mean the "ought" in the moral mundane sense, but includes all potentialties including the moral, immoral and morally neutral. Towards the end of your article, you appear to be concluding that what ought to be will come about eventually, not sure how this was derived, can you elaborate? Is this related to the best of all possible worlds concept of Leibniz? Thought provoking stuff!
The ought is far simpler than potentials, and it can also be actual. The restriction is its own nature, e.g. with the rock and sentience, what restricts the rock is the rock's own actual being itself. Hegel notes that we are inconsistent with whether we think the restriction is the real being, or the ought, yet we treat both as non-beings anyway. It is indeed a matter of perspective, but there really are two perspectives at once. You can see both as restriction and ought depending on your focus. How a restriction passes over into its ought and vice versa is not just in potentials, but in actuality. Hegel gives the example of a seed which as seed is already on its path to growth in being itself, and gives the example of hunger (restriction) and eating (ought). To hunger is to already be in the moment of realizing eating even if only partially. The restriction restricts itself by backgrounding itself in its own foregrounding from the very beginning of instantiating its nature. You're right that this ought concerns the amoral domain. The moral ought is more specific, but it will also express this abstract form of ought, i.e. it will give objective normative demand and consequence for action via the nature of the end sought (there are valid and invalid ends) on consequence of real damage to the moral subject and patient. There is a trivial sense that what ought to be always already is, and that is that the very nature of things already dictates whether a nature will or will not be realized, whether it ought to or ought not be. A bad genetic seed by its own nature already sets that it ought not germinate. A good genetic tropical seed in a desert is determined by its own nature to not germinate since its conditions are not present, so it ought not. The non-trivial sense relies on the Absolute/God drawing the world towards the evolution of freedom, where the process cannot fail to produce God's own awareness and fully realized being in the Natural world. This is, of course, a tall order to prove even in a monograph, let alone a short essay section. No, I wasn't thinking of Leibniz. For Hegel, there are no possible worlds. There is only *the* actual world. It happens to be that the actual world is actually and absolutely good as a realization of freedom. Those who claim to "imagine" a better world don't understand that they in fact don't imagine a better world, but a tiny fragment abstraction that does not take into account the freedom of all beings.
@@AntonioWolfphilosophyCheers for the answer! If I recall correctly, this is somewhat a throwback to Aristotle's thinking where he more or less identifies the good with what harmonizes with human nature. However in the example of bad seeds and good seeds applied to humanity, where does that leave agency and "free will" in the sense of ability to choose other from what was chosen? Perhaps it's different when considering humanity at large over long epochs, nonetheless individually how does that bode for this sense of "freedom" ? lol you may have just solved the problem of evil in just one paragraph. To clarify though, do you mean that the world is absolutely good, insofar as it is a necessary component of God's free self actualization/self-creation ? And so envisioning a better world even within realistic constraints is only possible and meaningful because of the freedom to do so in the first place? Or in other words, it is only because of the freedom inherent in humanity, the world ...etc that things can go wrong, which allows for the possibility or a la Hegel the *actuality* of the good? I think there's 2 senses of good here, the meta sense of self determination and the sense of "what fits human nature" which obviously includes an element of self determination although constrained to some extent by our human limitations? Am I way off? Thanks for the stimulating discussion!
So I was wondering when it comes to the ought and is. Could this imply that different beings have different potential? to use the example of the seeds, not all seeds become trees and of those that do some grow to be big and strong and stand thousands of years while others grow small and others grow and then are torn down by a strong wind and decompose within a few years of rising from the ground.
Not quite. The potential belongs to the nature of the thing, in this case a seed. Some seeds have better genetics, but in general they're all equally good. This individual restrictions and oughts, however, can differ. Given the seed and this or that restriction, they may realize this potential or not. If the seed is restricted by lack of water, its ought will remain unrealized. If it has water, it overcomes its restriction of being a seed, and grows into the tree it ought to be. But if it suffers strong winds, well that is a restriction on it which, if it is felled, will keep it from what it ought to be. It's not the potential that is necessarily different, but the restricting conditions.
@@AntonioWolfphilosophy Would this mean that while the material conditions might restrict the realization while the potential still exists and would (in different material conditions be realized)? And thus would it be the case that a being conscious of their material conditions might be capable of changing their material conditions in order to achieve their ought potential (or the ought potential of others). If I'm using the term Material Conditions incorrectly I apologize (My English isn't always great at explaining things).
@@edspace. To the first question: yes. To the second question: yes. A conscious, and especially thinking being, has the highest capacity for realizing their potential since they can try to correct their circumstantial conditions.
@@AntonioWolfphilosophy Interesting, obviously moral philosophers differ in opinion on this question, but would it be fair to say that in Hegel's view, the thinking being is morally obliged to make changes to achieve their ought?
The simple is the most difficult, not the most easy. It is difficult because simplicity allows only itself as a tool, and therefore it allows no tools at all. Hegelian concepts are to construct other things, not constructed by other things. This is why the self-referential nature is inescapable.
@@AntonioWolfphilosophy doesn't "Hegelian tools are to build other things, not built by other things" go against the basic premise that Dialectics is the state of nature and we're not making things dialectical but we are just trying to discover the world that is dialectical?
tl;dl:
1) The finite is something limited.
2) The determinate finite is restriction (something within its limit) and the ought (something beyond its limit)
3) If restriction is absolute, it is self-related, i.e. restricted restriction.
4) What restricts is the same as what is restricted, but this is the ought which is something beyond its limit.
5) The ought, in negating the limit which would restrict it, is itself restricted in not being the limit which is other to it.
6) Therefore, what is restricted ought to be restricted, and what ought to be necessarily is restricted, i.e. what is is what ought to be.
There, Hume is refuted.
I'll need to watch this a few more times to understand the ought and the is concept so I can impress my seven year old.
this one i love in particular ... you're an artist
The finite passing itself is in a way making it infinite. The finite is promised nothing, and to end in nothing, but noting is also its birthplace, where the finite being is deternined in order to escape the nothing. The fact that a plant or something else beautiful dies, but then we see it in something else proves this. Things are not beautiful, but only a representatives of beauty, which is something absolute and infinite, thus, the finite wears the visage of the infinite
Good explanation.
So I watched the vid and then went and read the article and things started falling in place, interesting stuff
mate . So you def convinced me that Hegel is onto something, however only if you define the ought as something's unrealized potentials (correct me if I'm wrong). Something's unrealized potentials will be immanent within it, insofar as its constraint is itself constrained by the unrealized potentials. And so you have a constrained constraint and you can't distinguish in principle between an inner and outer constraint, as long as the constraint is finite, I.e not infinite, in the way a rock is vis a vis sentience e.g. Therefore, what is, is what ought to be, and what ought to be is what is, simply because you can't distinguish them in principle, and which is which, is a matter of perspective, like form and foreground in an Escher painting. This is a water down way of saying restriction passes or self sublates into its other which is the aught or in my language the unrealized possibilities of a thing. Here of course , the unrealized potential doesn't just refer to anything my imagination can fancy, but rather the potentials of a thing according to its nature or in other words its restriction, I.e that which defines it. I know the concept of essence doesn't appear yet in the SOL, but one might say the potentialities of something according to its essence.
If I got this right, then the only issue I have with this when it comes the issue of morality as Hume was concerned with, is that this doesn't mean the "ought" in the moral mundane sense, but includes all potentialties including the moral, immoral and morally neutral.
Towards the end of your article, you appear to be concluding that what ought to be will come about eventually, not sure how this was derived, can you elaborate? Is this related to the best of all possible worlds concept of Leibniz?
Thought provoking stuff!
The ought is far simpler than potentials, and it can also be actual. The restriction is its own nature, e.g. with the rock and sentience, what restricts the rock is the rock's own actual being itself. Hegel notes that we are inconsistent with whether we think the restriction is the real being, or the ought, yet we treat both as non-beings anyway. It is indeed a matter of perspective, but there really are two perspectives at once. You can see both as restriction and ought depending on your focus. How a restriction passes over into its ought and vice versa is not just in potentials, but in actuality. Hegel gives the example of a seed which as seed is already on its path to growth in being itself, and gives the example of hunger (restriction) and eating (ought). To hunger is to already be in the moment of realizing eating even if only partially. The restriction restricts itself by backgrounding itself in its own foregrounding from the very beginning of instantiating its nature.
You're right that this ought concerns the amoral domain. The moral ought is more specific, but it will also express this abstract form of ought, i.e. it will give objective normative demand and consequence for action via the nature of the end sought (there are valid and invalid ends) on consequence of real damage to the moral subject and patient.
There is a trivial sense that what ought to be always already is, and that is that the very nature of things already dictates whether a nature will or will not be realized, whether it ought to or ought not be. A bad genetic seed by its own nature already sets that it ought not germinate. A good genetic tropical seed in a desert is determined by its own nature to not germinate since its conditions are not present, so it ought not. The non-trivial sense relies on the Absolute/God drawing the world towards the evolution of freedom, where the process cannot fail to produce God's own awareness and fully realized being in the Natural world. This is, of course, a tall order to prove even in a monograph, let alone a short essay section.
No, I wasn't thinking of Leibniz. For Hegel, there are no possible worlds. There is only *the* actual world. It happens to be that the actual world is actually and absolutely good as a realization of freedom. Those who claim to "imagine" a better world don't understand that they in fact don't imagine a better world, but a tiny fragment abstraction that does not take into account the freedom of all beings.
@@AntonioWolfphilosophyCheers for the answer! If I recall correctly, this is somewhat a throwback to Aristotle's thinking where he more or less identifies the good with what harmonizes with human nature. However in the example of bad seeds and good seeds applied to humanity, where does that leave agency and "free will" in the sense of ability to choose other from what was chosen? Perhaps it's different when considering humanity at large over long epochs, nonetheless individually how does that bode for this sense of "freedom" ?
lol you may have just solved the problem of evil in just one paragraph. To clarify though, do you mean that the world is absolutely good, insofar as it is a necessary component of God's free self actualization/self-creation ? And so envisioning a better world even within realistic constraints is only possible and meaningful because of the freedom to do so in the first place? Or in other words, it is only because of the freedom inherent in humanity, the world ...etc that things can go wrong, which allows for the possibility or a la Hegel the *actuality* of the good?
I think there's 2 senses of good here, the meta sense of self determination and the sense of "what fits human nature" which obviously includes an element of self determination although constrained to some extent by our human limitations? Am I way off?
Thanks for the stimulating discussion!
So I was wondering when it comes to the ought and is.
Could this imply that different beings have different potential? to use the example of the seeds, not all seeds become trees and of those that do some grow to be big and strong and stand thousands of years while others grow small and others grow and then are torn down by a strong wind and decompose within a few years of rising from the ground.
Not quite. The potential belongs to the nature of the thing, in this case a seed. Some seeds have better genetics, but in general they're all equally good. This individual restrictions and oughts, however, can differ. Given the seed and this or that restriction, they may realize this potential or not. If the seed is restricted by lack of water, its ought will remain unrealized. If it has water, it overcomes its restriction of being a seed, and grows into the tree it ought to be. But if it suffers strong winds, well that is a restriction on it which, if it is felled, will keep it from what it ought to be. It's not the potential that is necessarily different, but the restricting conditions.
@@AntonioWolfphilosophy Would this mean that while the material conditions might restrict the realization while the potential still exists and would (in different material conditions be realized)?
And thus would it be the case that a being conscious of their material conditions might be capable of changing their material conditions in order to achieve their ought potential (or the ought potential of others).
If I'm using the term Material Conditions incorrectly I apologize (My English isn't always great at explaining things).
@@edspace. To the first question: yes.
To the second question: yes. A conscious, and especially thinking being, has the highest capacity for realizing their potential since they can try to correct their circumstantial conditions.
@@AntonioWolfphilosophy Interesting, obviously moral philosophers differ in opinion on this question, but would it be fair to say that in Hegel's view, the thinking being is morally obliged to make changes to achieve their ought?
Ok
There must be a simpler way of explaining the concept of finite in Hegel.
The simple is the most difficult, not the most easy. It is difficult because simplicity allows only itself as a tool, and therefore it allows no tools at all. Hegelian concepts are to construct other things, not constructed by other things. This is why the self-referential nature is inescapable.
@@AntonioWolfphilosophy doesn't "Hegelian tools are to build other things, not built by other things" go against the basic premise that Dialectics is the state of nature and we're not making things dialectical but we are just trying to discover the world that is dialectical?