UPDATE AS OF 19:11 ON 22/10/2024 - The RAIB has released a statement, which provides further details about the incident. This is what it says: "At around 19:26 on the evening of 21 October 2024, the 18:31 Transport for Wales passenger service from Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth collided with another train on Network Rail’s Cambrian line, approximately 800 metres west of the passing loop located at Talerddig, Powys. Initial evidence suggests that collision occurred at a speed of approximately 24 km/h (15 mph). The second train involved was the 19:09 Machynlleth to Shrewsbury passenger service, also operated by Transport for Wales. One passenger tragically died and four other people were seriously injured. Eleven more people sustained injuries which required hospital treatment. RAIB was notified of the accident at 19:45 on the night of the accident and immediately dispatched a team of inspectors to examine the site and collect evidence. Additional RAIB staff and specialist equipment have arrived at the site of the accident throughout today and we continue to work in conjunction with the British Transport Police, the Office of Rail and Road and the railway companies involved to secure the necessary evidence to support our independent safety investigation. This will include examining the condition of the train and downloading its ‘black box’ data recorder, inspecting the track, analysing data from railway signalling and radio systems, and interviewing witnesses. The railway approaching Talerddig from each direction consists of a single track. To allow trains to pass each other a track loop is provided. These loops have points at each end and allow trains to enter a short length of track which lies alongside the single line. RAIB’s initial inspection of the track on approach to the point of collision found evidence that wheel/rail adhesion was relatively low, suggesting that the train may have entered into wheel slide when braking. This will be an area of ongoing investigation. Our investigation is in its very early stages and an additional update will be available in the coming days once RAIB has gathered and analysed further evidence."
the passing loop is at the summit of Talerddig bank and the train that may have entered into wheel slide would have very quickly been onto a 1in 52 down gradient after leaving the passing loop
A train travelling at 15 mph with several hundreds of tons pushing would probably be greater damage than say a car crashing at 70mph! It’s a basic law of physics! A ship thousands of tons moving at 5mph hits a pier for instance there is a huge amount of damage to the ship and the pier or any other heavy object! I have forgotten the mathematics behind it but the results would be thousands of ft/pounds or kilograms/metre! Thousands of Joules in metric terms! Fraser🛠
It was reported early on that the person that died had suffered a heart attack and I have been told today (by TFW staff) that the driver gave CPR to him until the emergency services arrived to take over - but that has been ignored by all the sensational reporting in the media.
Beyond the call of duty ?, BUT NOT beyond the call of HUMANITY. I Hope and Trust the Driver IS commended for this action. He will feel an even greater sadness that He didn't succeed.
Such sad news, thoughts are with all those involved and affected by this tragic incident. Thank you Green Signals for not doing the normal media thing, and for waiting for reports and proper information. 👍
Thank you Stef and Nigel, for this update. Naturally thoughts must go to all those involved in this incident, especially the family and friends of the sadly now deceased male passenger
Excellent observation. We hear far too many interviews which are painful to listen to on account of umming and arrhing and people speaking over each other.
My go to channel for accurate reporting on railway matters...forget the tabloid press who tend to sensationalise and speculate. This is journalism at it's best👍
Thank you nigel and steph for this update. Mainstream media not helping the situation here neither and some of these bloggers and youtubers . Ive had to bite my tongue a couple of times today and what ive read and heard. No doubt this incident youll be bringing up in a future episode
Just what i needed. A concise summary without the usual wild (and often inaccurate) speculation that most other sources tend to report. Its also nice to know hats likely to happen next.
I hadn't even heard of this until your video popped up. Thanks for just setting out the facts as you know them, plus the update below. Very sad indeed, for the dead and injured ...
Great calm and accurate analysis. Interested why reports that the driver saw the crash about to happen, knew he was powerless to prevent it, so left the cab to warn the passengers in the train. Also read he administered CPR to the man who sadly passed away.
Worked in the industry for 50 years, you will be shocked at what rail head contamination can do . Look up one incident in Scotland, it slid for many miles.
Was that the one at Broughty Ferry?, (involving train reporting number 1B47) that slid past the protecting signal & went over the CCTV level crossing with the barriers in the raised position?
As beens they was speculating about thw Gareth Dennis situation, and even after Gareth came out and told the truth, green signals never apologised foe speculating
Very clear, concise, and unambiguous reporting, dealing with the facts and not the speculation. Well done both! Great balanced and impartial journalism!
I was very concerned to hear about this incident, especially as a passenger had died. Desperately looking around for facts, I hadn't initially thought to visit you guys, but now I am so glad I belatedly noticed your report. Concise and professional, I expected no less. Well done.
Gosh - this is very sobering news. A 1,000 yard overshoot seems quite incredible, especially with all the built-in safety systems and relatively low line speed there. Truly a tragedy. Let's hope the causes are found quickly, and remedies can also be applied in short order. Sensitively reported - thank you.
The westbound train had just come down Talerddig Bank which is quite steep, and would have been braking as it approached the passing loop. If there had been some form of partial brake failure or skid it wouldn't take him long to cover 1000 yards. No doubt all will be revealed in due course.
I drive 165's which are broadly comparable in weight and wheel loadings to 158's. I had a similar incident (thankfully with no collision) about 10 years ago at this time of year and the same time of day. I slid for 1243 yards in emergency brake from 54 MPH to stopped on a 1/150 falling gradient. The track had not been treated and my unit had no sand in the sand boxes. My sympathies for all involved.
@@davem3894I’m a driver too. I’ve also had a low adhesion slide. Of course when this happens we have to apply the emergency brake, but with a heavy heart as it assures that you’re going for a long slide. It’s better to apply and release the brake, particularly if you have no sand but we have to do what is mandated.
@@David-cm4ok Hi, yes I was addressing the comment about 1,000 yards being an unbelievable slide without going into jargon or procedural intricacies. I did all the things we are supposed to do and for non drivers reading this we have no in cab sand level indicator. So I had no idea that I was out of sand until it affected my braking by which time it's too late. I was actually commended for my actions which it was judged helped to avoid a collision.
Thank you both for a factual resumé of the circumstances, professional as always. My thoughts are with all who are involved, and sincere condolences to the family and friends of the gentleman who sadly passed away.
A very professional report. My condolences to the family of the deceased passenger and a speedy recovery to the injured. Well done to the train crew for managing the scene until the impressive arrival of the emergency services.
Nigel, the Cambrian is European Train control System (ETCS) Not ATP. Class 158 brake system has a known fault. An all wheels sliding will lead the brake system and sanding to be fooled into believing the train is stood still and therefore not allow the ABS or sanding equipment to release some brake pressure or to apply sand. I know this from my days working on leaf fall forecasting and poor railhead driver training. I must add this not speculation but fact! From a retired Driver, Driver Manager and operations specialist.
The problem arises from the type of 3 step brake fitted to 158s and other disc brake units fitted with the same system. They tried to address the problem in two ways. 1 was by fitting scrubbing blocks to the first and last bogie but only on the 3 car units. 2. The other was by retro fitting automatic sanding equipment but to the second inboard axle set. So, has the system takes its input from the wheel sets, the thinking was that the sand would disrupt the wheel rotation feed and trigger sand application. But as seen at Slough, Salisbury tunnel, Copley hill junction and others and now Tallerddig. Once all wheels stop rotating, the sand application doesn't take place. One proposed solution put forward by me was to give the driver a sand application button. But, that was not liked by Network Rail engineers would seemed protective of possible damage to point work caused by sand application, and mindful of Farnborough loss, of track circuit detection. I was the driver manager who introduced leaf fall forecasting to the industry. Also, the proposer of the use of ASD. Despite its problems.
Well done to all for putting together an informative and objective set of information. Once the dust has settled it might be worth considering the roles of all the parties involved: Police, RAIB, ORR, NR, TFW etc and then perhaps considering whether having ORR, RAIB and RSSB as separate entities is the optimum structure for the railways.
@@GreenSignals Stef, you didn’t do badly as there are a few testing places to pronounce in the area. Easy for a Welsh person like me to comment. You both handled matters sensitively so well done.
Sad day . Thoughts with the family of deceased and all those affected . Thanks for laying out the facts which are actually quite difficult to come by in the mainstream media
Well done on a report that puts the mainstream media to shame because you understand the core issues and can explain them with impeccable lucidity. I'm constantly amazed at the inability of mainstream media to grasp basics of the kind that you lay out so clearly; and as for the quality of comments by the public on this and related matters in the MSM . . . . . So many people seem to think that running a railway is like driving a car or bus. . . . . Thank you! Subscribed!! 🙂
Heart of wales line been shut today because of railhead conditions. One unit took over an hour to get from llandovery to Cynhordy which should have taken less than 10
For the record- The Salisbury Rail Crash occurred on 31 October 2021. Two trains, travelling on converging lines, collided at Salisbury Tunnel Junction, approximately one mile (1.5 kilometres) northeast of Salisbury station.
A cracking video, it is so refreshing to hear facts facts and only facts following tragedies big or small. Sadly people who know little or nothing at all about collisions on the tracks or roads etc often spread rumours which then become fact in the minds of the wider public.
Thank you for the excellent report. If there's a suggestion that it might be to do with loss of adhesion in connection with leaf fall, I hope that it might make them do something once and for all about letting trees grow right up to the formation so close that they're whacking the train.
It’s about time the lineside was managed as a railway and not as a nature reserve. I have little doubt that this incident will turn out to be a runaway on wet leaves.
There isn't a great deal that can be done about trees beyond the railway boundary. As I understand it Network Rail only seeks to request the landowner to remove trees if there's a risk of them falling on the line.
@@jeremybarker7577 That's right, but they can cut what is on NR along with overhanging vegetation. Cursory inspection of the stretch of Cambrian near me suggests that there is a lot that could go that's on NR land alone. Comparison with photos from thirty years ago demonstrates that maintenance essentially stopped and was only done on a reactionary basis rather than proactively. Witness the farcical way they've dealt with invasive buddleia on platform 3 at Shrewsbury station. It started to prise masonry out several years ago. The response is to screw some mesh around it. This beggars belief. Given how they are supposedly obsessed with H&S, no price is too high to stop a brick landing on somebody's head, the mesh won't work.
ERTMS comprises of the European Train Control System (ETCS), which is fitted on the Cambrian line and ATP (Automatic Train Protection) functionality is embedded within it. Hope that helps to clarify.
No speculation, just the facts. If only mainstream media could apply the same principles. Maybe it’s a blessing they’ve not given it much coverage. Raises some questions about ECTS and as an employee of SNCF I’ll be interested to hear the conclusions of the RAIB. Look forward to seeing your follow up on this story. And of course condolences to the family of the gentleman who died.
It goes without saying, it’s sad and unfortunate news, but clear, informative, and sensible coverage (bravo Steph with the Welsh names too by the way).
Condolences to the family of the gentleman who died. According to a statement by BTP his death was not as a result of the collision so what a separate issue unrelated to the collision. Brilliant no nonsense reporting Nigel and Steph.
Just been reading Rolt's account of the Abermule head-on crash 1921 on the Cambrian. Even with Tyer's Block in operation things went wrong because people so trusted the system they did not examine which tablet was the correct one. Only the injured fireman at the crash site found the tablet of the loco that had been incorrectly sent forward and discovered that it was the wrong one. His train, the express, was carrying the correct one - the only one permitting his train to be on that section of line.
Once report out and you cover it in some more detail - would be good to include detail of the RSSB dual rate sander trial / programme. Has been a number of years since the trial concluded (2021) - are dual rate sanding systems now a compulsory part of the specification for new vehicle tenders ?
Thanks for the comment. ERTMS comprises of the European Train Control System (ETCS), which is fitted on the Cambrian line and ATP (Automatic Train Protection) functionality is embedded within it. Hope that helps to clarify.
Thank you for the update of information so far. Until the initial report is published by the RAIB before we all speculate on probabilities of cause. A tragic incident and the prime focus is with those of the Injured and the family of the poor soul who has died. A very dark day on our network 😢
I look forward to the accident report and the RAIB digests, for a low speed collision the amount of damage to the one cab must be a cause for concern as the cab on the drivers side was almost against the bulkhead judging by the TV pictures. Fortunately the driver managed to get clear in time.
Both trains acting under caution due to railhead conditions previously reported.the train due to stop in the loop slid for the largest distance and unable to brake any more than emergency
It’s a single track route with passing places, on this bit of track the passing place is at the top of a steep climb, it’s always stops to let the train coming up the hill pass, apparently the track was running reduced speed to to earlier drivers going through reporting it was very slippy. I’d guess he stopped in the passing place and gravity took over.
@@Thecrazyvaclav I appreciate that but it was a long way past the passing loop. It is still sad that this happened. How this can happen needs a thorough investigation and changes made to make sure it cannot happen again.
@@Thecrazyvaclav that's the idea of the sanders to prevent sliding. If that is what happened then the whole use of that section needs to be reviewed. The investigation needs an answer quickly. I have no opinion on what went wrong. 800m is a very very long slide.
that is absolute rubbish because there is no way in this world that either of the trains involved were traveling anything like that speed. it was a low speed impact
@@Mach_One_Photos For that the RIAB will have to confirm, as is the overrun distance consistent with a 15mph speed before brake application even given railhead conditions - which also causes concern on railhead treatment, manangement and procedures.
@@RWL2012 I'm not sure what channel I heard it on, but if you look at the driving cab if it wasn't the driver who died where was he and who was the person who died our local news still hasn't reported who it was who died,,
@@RWL2012 mate just looked up Google it says the person who died was a chap Tudor Evans just shows even news channels get it wrong he was a passenger not the driver,
Somehow I doubt this was a failure of the signalling. More likely to have similar cause to the salisbury incident exacerbated by recent stormy weather. As I understand the 158 units have a limited future on these services with new rolling stock on order so hopefully this is something that has been taken into account in the design process and there will be little chance of a repeat.
network rail and tfw cancelled the heart of wales line today aswel due to low addision reported ive been on rail replacement over it. there only sending the sandite train up from swansea to Llandeilo and not further up to treat the lines
As an ex 158/159 driver I used to get hokd of them very early in leaf fall. Cut my my speed by a ⅓rd at a double yellow coming down to ⅔rds at the single & dropping. I had a 158 one day though where the automatic sanders were not topped up and it didn't want to stop. It was taken out of service at the next station by SWT Control.
A few things puzzle me. Firstly if a short light train cant stop in a passing loop due to leaves then the line might have to be considered unsafe in any but perfect dry conditions and as it stands be unfit for purpose. Secondly if the train did not stop in the loop would the points on exit have been set for the oncoming train and would that not have caused a derailment? Thirdly the accident happened in the evening. Did any other trains use the passing loop earlier in the day and if so were any problems reported?
Another incident apparently induced by low adhesion almost 3 years after that at Fisherton Tunnel, Salisbury. Will the Class 158/Class 159 design be a factor in examination - IIRC these vehicles feature a proportional braking system dependent on passenger load?
Does anyone know what the protocol and procedure for entering and stopping in the Talerddig passing loop would be? Presumably the times are pretty tightly managed nowadays (it used to be minutes of waiting before the ATP). Is it just case of the the first train to reach the loop going into the loop or is it an active system to ensure speed of approach of each train is managed? In this case the stopping train was the westbound train. I would have expected the points to then change so that the main track was open for the eastbound train to pass on the main track. How then did the westbound train leave the passing loop and get onto the main track? Is there some protocol for keeping the passing loop points open until the stopping train is definitely halted on the passing loop?
First say I like to express my condolences to the families of the victim who lost his life and everyone who was injured. Secondly, I hope they can get to the bottom of this as quickly as possible so those who like to jump into conclusions can be silenced quickly once and for all.!
Why does it appear that the exit of the passing loop was not protected by trap points? Even if a train can’t be driven onto the single line without authority under ERTMS it could still occur in the event of a brake or other mechanical failure.
Completely agree Richard! Unfortunately we weren't able to do much editing on the video as Richard is away, so we were doing the best we could manage in terms of editing the video in his absence!
Surely if one train was waiting in a loop, expecting another train, one would know whether the train had gone past as one would see the other train passing on the other track. If it hasn't gone past then one should surely wait and not proceed out of the loop.
@@highpath4776 Read the RAIB statement quoted above. It happened 800 metres (just under half a mile) west of the Talerddig loop which means the eastbound train wasn't even close to it when the collision occurred. The westbound train overran for a reason which is yet to be determined.
@@cd66061 The RAIB statement refers to low adhesion on approach to the point of collision. You can find the location on Google Maps. It's where a bend on the A470 is right next to the line. Plenty of trees and lineside vegetation in that area. The statement says nothing about adhesion at the Talerddig loop half a mile away. There is a thread discussing this incident on RailUK forums in which the operational arrangements at the loop are explained on page 4.
if one train westbound had entered the loop already ,how on earth would the eastbound train crash head on into the westbound train if it had travelled 1000 yards(over half mile past the loop) ,that would be impossible surely (as there are trackpoints on the loop also there should be catchpoints to derail trains to prevent any overshoots or train rentering without authorisation ) and main track that would have prevented the westbound from reentering the main track .until eastbound train had passed and cleared the section . obvious here westbound was wheels were slipping and sliding along even with brake applied followed by emergency braking set by driver who left his control desk to warn passengers of imminent danger .due to wooded are with trees etc ,leaves on line does play mostly in this sad accident ,but lack of catchpoints if there were not any should be considered ,as it could have been much worse .well done to all emergency services involved for swift response .luckily these accidents are very few .and railways are much safer .I was a railwayman myself years ago and have been involved in incidents myself .
@@vincitveritas3872 no, they would have to be points that protect the running line ,hence the catch points that should be installed on all loop lines like this or on lines when leaving train depot,s etc.
The usual arrangement at passing loops is spring loaded points which are "run through" as trains leave the loop. There is usually no trap point protection provided, but there is a "points set" light to notify the oncoming driver the points are correctly set at the entry to the loop.
@@InverhavonRailways They were sprung points when Radio signalling was used but now ERTMS system .They are motorised point machines now www.ertms.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/15.-ERTMS-in-the-UK_Thales.pdf
@@InverhavonRailways Two signaller positions were implemented in Machynlleth to control the total route. This route is supported by the deployment of a new GSM-R system, axle counters, new motorised point machines and balises along the track and a single Radio Block Centre (RBC) installed at the control centre in Machynlleth
Please correct the summary...it says "evening of October 22nd" not "morning" - Otherwise thank you reminding us all what reporting and journalism should look and sound like.
Main thoughts with the relatives of the deceased who will need accurate answers as to what led up to this accident. Lets all hope that human error did not form any part of this accident, although if it did criminal proceedings due to loss of life will follow. Because of the issues I have placed in the above sentence, is it not a wiser course not to list all the respective likely causes or speculating upon which is the likely cause of this accident. Experts who know what to look for, are already on the ground and will make public their results as soon as legally and practically possible. If a life has been lost this is better than on line speculation, however knowledgeable the individuals doing so are.
A "raised eyebrow " at the mention of 1000yds. Hmm. Very sad that a fatality occured, initially I thought it was one of the Drivers. Pleased you appended the RIAB initial report. By God, They Don't hang about "Do IT NOW" in microcosm - and for bloody good reason. With Utmost Respect to the Deceased and His Family, and staff involved. This will be a troubling time for them all.
How many investigations teams are going? Anything more than one is unacceptable. The only team who should be allowed are the Rail Accident Investigation Branch. Everyone else’s duty must be to acquire data for the RAIB and keep their noses out.
In essence that's what the operating protocols for RAIB and other services say except in some rare situations. The one piece of advice anyone involved in a train accident needs to know is they should only give a statement to a RAIB person.
UPDATE AS OF 19:11 ON 22/10/2024 - The RAIB has released a statement, which provides further details about the incident. This is what it says: "At around 19:26 on the evening of 21 October 2024, the 18:31 Transport for Wales passenger service from Shrewsbury to Aberystwyth collided with another train on Network Rail’s Cambrian line, approximately 800 metres west of the passing loop located at Talerddig, Powys. Initial evidence suggests that collision occurred at a speed of approximately 24 km/h (15 mph). The second train involved was the 19:09 Machynlleth to Shrewsbury passenger service, also operated by Transport for Wales.
One passenger tragically died and four other people were seriously injured. Eleven more people sustained injuries which required hospital treatment.
RAIB was notified of the accident at 19:45 on the night of the accident and immediately dispatched a team of inspectors to examine the site and collect evidence.
Additional RAIB staff and specialist equipment have arrived at the site of the accident throughout today and we continue to work in conjunction with the British Transport Police, the Office of Rail and Road and the railway companies involved to secure the necessary evidence to support our independent safety investigation. This will include examining the condition of the train and downloading its ‘black box’ data recorder, inspecting the track, analysing data from railway signalling and radio systems, and interviewing witnesses.
The railway approaching Talerddig from each direction consists of a single track. To allow trains to pass each other a track loop is provided. These loops have points at each end and allow trains to enter a short length of track which lies alongside the single line.
RAIB’s initial inspection of the track on approach to the point of collision found evidence that wheel/rail adhesion was relatively low, suggesting that the train may have entered into wheel slide when braking. This will be an area of ongoing investigation.
Our investigation is in its very early stages and an additional update will be available in the coming days once RAIB has gathered and analysed further evidence."
the passing loop is at the summit of Talerddig bank and the train that may have entered into wheel slide would have very quickly been onto a 1in 52 down gradient after leaving the passing loop
@@Mach_One_PhotosI just can't see how a 15mph accident can cause a death
@@garethjones8047 reports are saying the death was not a result of injures sustained during impact
@garethjones8047 The death was due to a heart attack likely due to shock.
A train travelling at 15 mph with several hundreds of tons pushing would probably be greater damage than say a car crashing at 70mph! It’s a basic law of physics! A ship thousands of tons moving at 5mph hits a pier for instance there is a huge amount of damage to the ship and the pier or any other heavy object! I have forgotten the mathematics behind it but the results would be thousands of ft/pounds or kilograms/metre! Thousands of Joules in metric terms! Fraser🛠
Clear concise reporting, without any speculation, thanks guys, very well done and, very well handled. This is what journalism should be.
You would expect nothing less from Nigel Harris
Absolutely. If only the main news outlets were willing to learn from the Green Signals team.
It was reported early on that the person that died had suffered a heart attack and I have been told today (by TFW staff) that the driver gave CPR to him until the emergency services arrived to take over - but that has been ignored by all the sensational reporting in the media.
Beyond the call of duty ?, BUT NOT beyond the call of HUMANITY. I Hope and Trust the Driver IS commended for this action. He will feel an even greater sadness that He didn't succeed.
Thanks for that. I noticed that most BTL comments in MSM outlets were basically people getting a good hate on against train drivers.
Thanks, I was wondering how someone died in a 15mph crash.
Thanks for the prompt, concise update. Journalism at its best. My heart goes out to the relatives of the deceased.
Thank you. Couldn't agree more - our hearts go out to them too.
This is vital. News reporting from those who know what they’re talking about - thanks.
Very kind, thank you.
Such sad news, thoughts are with all those involved and affected by this tragic incident.
Thank you Green Signals for not doing the normal media thing, and for waiting for reports and proper information. 👍
My condolences for the man who lost his life. Well done Stef Nigel and green signals for this update. Nothing sadder than hearing about a train crash.
Thank you Stef and Nigel, for this update. Naturally thoughts must go to all those involved in this incident, especially the family and friends of the sadly now deceased male passenger
Thanks Roddy.
Im mighty impressed with the delivery by Steph. Not a single "um" or " arh"......
Excellent observation. We hear far too many interviews which are painful to listen to on account of umming and arrhing and people speaking over each other.
Very kind of you to say so, thank you.
A timely reporting of the known facts. I look forward to the HMRI interim report. Thanks for the update.
Thanks Mervyn, glad you found it useful.
Excellent reporting with exceptional professionalism in difficult circumstances. Huge respect Nigel and Stef.
That's very kind of you to say, thank you Kate.
My go to channel for accurate reporting on railway matters...forget the tabloid press who tend to sensationalise and speculate. This is journalism at it's best👍
That’s kind Geoff, thanks
Thank you nigel and steph for this update. Mainstream media not helping the situation here neither and some of these bloggers and youtubers . Ive had to bite my tongue a couple of times today and what ive read and heard.
No doubt this incident youll be bringing up in a future episode
Just what i needed. A concise summary without the usual wild (and often inaccurate) speculation that most other sources tend to report. Its also nice to know hats likely to happen next.
Thanks Stephen. Exactly what we were hoping to achieve.
I hadn't even heard of this until your video popped up. Thanks for just setting out the facts as you know them, plus the update below. Very sad indeed, for the dead and injured ...
Excellent fact based non-sensationalist reporting. A credit to you and the channel
Thanks Steve, that means a lot.
Great calm and accurate analysis. Interested why reports that the driver saw the crash about to happen, knew he was powerless to prevent it, so left the cab to warn the passengers in the train. Also read he administered CPR to the man who sadly passed away.
Thank you, facts given and no sensationalist mainstream media reporting. Well done.
Thanks very much.
Worked in the industry for 50 years, you will be shocked at what rail head contamination can do . Look up one incident in Scotland, it slid for many miles.
Was that the one at Broughty Ferry?, (involving train reporting number 1B47) that slid past the protecting signal & went over the CCTV level crossing with the barriers in the raised position?
Sensible reporting of the known facts. I expected nothing less from the professionals at Green Signals. Well done.
Thanks Mark, that’s very kind of you to say.
As beens they was speculating about thw Gareth Dennis situation, and even after Gareth came out and told the truth, green signals never apologised foe speculating
I'm a railfan from the States and I send condolences to all involved...
Very clear, concise, and unambiguous reporting, dealing with the facts and not the speculation. Well done both! Great balanced and impartial journalism!
Thanks Richard, that really kind of you to say.
I was very concerned to hear about this incident, especially as a passenger had died. Desperately looking around for facts, I hadn't initially thought to visit you guys, but now I am so glad I belatedly noticed your report. Concise and professional, I expected no less. Well done.
Thanks very much. Glad we were able to help.
I appreciate the timely and well informed update Nigel and Stef.. Whatever the cause, it's sad a life was lost. Cheers, Rob
Thanks Rob. As you say, incredibly sad.
Thanks both. My thoughts go out to the family of the person who died. And to all those who were involved.
Absolutely, our thoughts are with them too.
Thanks both for a very level headed report
Just what we expect from GreenSignals.
My thoughts to all those involved.
Thanks very much. It's kind of you to say so. And as you say, our thoughts go out to all those affected.
Gosh - this is very sobering news.
A 1,000 yard overshoot seems quite incredible, especially with all the built-in safety systems and relatively low line speed there.
Truly a tragedy.
Let's hope the causes are found quickly, and remedies can also be applied in short order.
Sensitively reported - thank you.
The westbound train had just come down Talerddig Bank which is quite steep, and would have been braking as it approached the passing loop. If there had been some form of partial brake failure or skid it wouldn't take him long to cover 1000 yards. No doubt all will be revealed in due course.
Why no catch points for the loop, tom derail an over running train?
I drive 165's which are broadly comparable in weight and wheel loadings to 158's. I had a similar incident (thankfully with no collision) about 10 years ago at this time of year and the same time of day. I slid for 1243 yards in emergency brake from 54 MPH to stopped on a 1/150 falling gradient. The track had not been treated and my unit had no sand in the sand boxes. My sympathies for all involved.
@@davem3894I’m a driver too. I’ve also had a low adhesion slide. Of course when this happens we have to apply the emergency brake, but with a heavy heart as it assures that you’re going for a long slide. It’s better to apply and release the brake, particularly if you have no sand but we have to do what is mandated.
@@David-cm4ok Hi, yes I was addressing the comment about 1,000 yards being an unbelievable slide without going into jargon or procedural intricacies. I did all the things we are supposed to do and for non drivers reading this we have no in cab sand level indicator. So I had no idea that I was out of sand until it affected my braking by which time it's too late. I was actually commended for my actions which it was judged helped to avoid a collision.
I am devastated on what has happened in Wales. Really devastated to hear this. 😢
Thank you both for a factual resumé of the circumstances, professional as always. My thoughts are with all who are involved, and sincere condolences to the family and friends of the gentleman who sadly passed away.
Thanks Brian. Completely agree - our thoughts are with all those involved too.
A very professional report. My condolences to the family of the deceased passenger and a speedy recovery to the injured. Well done to the train crew for managing the scene until the impressive arrival of the emergency services.
Nigel, the Cambrian is European Train control System (ETCS) Not ATP.
Class 158 brake system has a known fault. An all wheels sliding will lead the brake system and sanding to be fooled into believing the train is stood still and therefore not allow the ABS or sanding equipment to release some brake pressure or to apply sand. I know this from my days working on leaf fall forecasting and poor railhead driver training.
I must add this not speculation but fact! From a retired Driver, Driver Manager and operations specialist.
...which has embedded automatic train protection functionality......!
V. interesting re the fault. Daft question Chris, but if it were known about, should it not have been addressed?
The problem arises from the type of 3 step brake fitted to 158s and other disc brake units fitted with the same system. They tried to address the problem in two ways.
1 was by fitting scrubbing blocks to the first and last bogie but only on the 3 car units.
2. The other was by retro fitting automatic sanding equipment but to the second inboard axle set. So, has the system takes its input from the wheel sets, the thinking was that the sand would disrupt the wheel rotation feed and trigger sand application.
But as seen at Slough, Salisbury tunnel, Copley hill junction and others and now Tallerddig. Once all wheels stop rotating, the sand application doesn't take place.
One proposed solution put forward by me was to give the driver a sand application button. But, that was not liked by Network Rail engineers would seemed protective of possible damage to point work caused by sand application, and mindful of Farnborough loss, of track circuit detection.
I was the driver manager who introduced leaf fall forecasting to the industry. Also, the proposer of the use of ASD. Despite its problems.
Well done to all for putting together an informative and objective set of information. Once the dust has settled it might be worth considering the roles of all the parties involved: Police, RAIB, ORR, NR, TFW etc and then perhaps considering whether having ORR, RAIB and RSSB as separate entities is the optimum structure for the railways.
A timely reporting of the known facts. Thank You
Verygood reporting guys well done
Thanks Richard.
EAST of Machynlleth has been closed between there and Shrewsbury, not WEST as Stef stated but she did a fair job on the Welsh pronunciation!
Thanks Simon, and apologies for that! Glad I got the Welsh pronunciation right though - I was worrying about that. Stef
@@GreenSignals Stef, you didn’t do badly as there are a few testing places to pronounce in the area. Easy for a Welsh person like me to comment. You both handled matters sensitively so well done.
Welll reported with just the facts no speculation thank you Green signals team
Thanks Paul.
Well reported. Also, well done to Real Time Trains which respectfully state that the trains were cancelled "because of leaves on the line".
Some saying 158824 was brought to a stop by the ETCS system when it detected that 158841 hadnt stopped in the loop due to wheelslip
Sad day . Thoughts with the family of deceased and all those affected . Thanks for laying out the facts which are actually quite difficult to come by in the mainstream media
Well done on a report that puts the mainstream media to shame because you understand the core issues and can explain them with impeccable lucidity.
I'm constantly amazed at the inability of mainstream media to grasp basics of the kind that you lay out so clearly; and as for the quality of comments by the public on this and related matters in the MSM . . . . . So many people seem to think that running a railway is like driving a car or bus. . . . . Thank you!
Subscribed!! 🙂
Thanks very much Martin, we're really pleased you found it useful. And thanks for Subscribing!
Thanks. Very apt and precise reporting. Facts must come before speculation.
Thanks. And agreed.
Heart of wales line been shut today because of railhead conditions. One unit took over an hour to get from llandovery to Cynhordy which should have taken less than 10
The drivers cab was basically the crumple zone. Jarring images. Hope they are okay.
For the record- The Salisbury Rail Crash occurred on 31 October 2021. Two trains, travelling on converging lines, collided at Salisbury Tunnel Junction, approximately one mile (1.5 kilometres) northeast of Salisbury station.
Thank you for the update. A very concise report.
Thanks Nigel, glad you found it useful.
A cracking video, it is so refreshing to hear facts facts and only facts following tragedies big or small. Sadly people who know little or nothing at all about collisions on the tracks or roads etc often spread rumours which then become fact in the minds of the wider public.
Thank you for the excellent report. If there's a suggestion that it might be to do with loss of adhesion in connection with leaf fall, I hope that it might make them do something once and for all about letting trees grow right up to the formation so close that they're whacking the train.
It’s about time the lineside was managed as a railway and not as a nature reserve. I have little doubt that this incident will turn out to be a runaway on wet leaves.
There isn't a great deal that can be done about trees beyond the railway boundary. As I understand it Network Rail only seeks to request the landowner to remove trees if there's a risk of them falling on the line.
@@jeremybarker7577 That's right, but they can cut what is on NR along with overhanging vegetation. Cursory inspection of the stretch of Cambrian near me suggests that there is a lot that could go that's on NR land alone. Comparison with photos from thirty years ago demonstrates that maintenance essentially stopped and was only done on a reactionary basis rather than proactively. Witness the farcical way they've dealt with invasive buddleia on platform 3 at Shrewsbury station. It started to prise masonry out several years ago. The response is to screw some mesh around it. This beggars belief. Given how they are supposedly obsessed with H&S, no price is too high to stop a brick landing on somebody's head, the mesh won't work.
Is the Cambrian line ETRMS rather than ATP?
@@richardwilcock2942 yes
@@richardwilcock2942 ERTMS
ERTMS comprises of the European Train Control System (ETCS), which is fitted on the Cambrian line and ATP (Automatic Train Protection) functionality is embedded within it. Hope that helps to clarify.
Nicely done you chaps. Like many with knowledge of the railway I've had a few ideas in my head but I've kept my mouth shut.
No speculation, just the facts. If only mainstream media could apply the same principles. Maybe it’s a blessing they’ve not given it much coverage. Raises some questions about ECTS and as an employee of SNCF I’ll be interested to hear the conclusions of the RAIB. Look forward to seeing your follow up on this story. And of course condolences to the family of the gentleman who died.
It goes without saying, it’s sad and unfortunate news, but clear, informative, and sensible coverage (bravo Steph with the Welsh names too by the way).
Thank you for saying so and I'm glad I didn't do a bad job on the Welsh names. Stef
Condolences to the family of the gentleman who died.
According to a statement by BTP his death was not as a result of the collision so what a separate issue unrelated to the collision.
Brilliant no nonsense reporting Nigel and Steph.
Good no b/s reporting ,well done on this one G/S
Thanks very much.
Just been reading Rolt's account of the Abermule head-on crash 1921 on the Cambrian. Even with Tyer's Block in operation things went wrong because people so trusted the system they did not examine which tablet was the correct one. Only the injured fireman at the crash site found the tablet of the loco that had been incorrectly sent forward and discovered that it was the wrong one. His train, the express, was carrying the correct one - the only one permitting his train to be on that section of line.
Once report out and you cover it in some more detail - would be good to include detail of the RSSB dual rate sander trial / programme. Has been a number of years since the trial concluded (2021) - are dual rate sanding systems now a compulsory part of the specification for new vehicle tenders ?
How are the two front line crews? Not a mention of them any where...
Another sad day when some one loses there life on railway.
The signalling on The Cambrian is ERTMS/ETCS not ATP which was the System on the GWR between Paddington and Reading.
Thanks for the comment. ERTMS comprises of the European Train Control System (ETCS), which is fitted on the Cambrian line and ATP (Automatic Train Protection) functionality is embedded within it. Hope that helps to clarify.
@@GreenSignals indeed, but you solely called it atp in the video. I maybe a little pedantic here but it is Literally ERTMS.
You're right, we did say that. Apologies for any confusion caused. Hopefully we've clarified it now.
Makes a change to have some accurate reporting from people who clearly know what they’re talking about. Well done.
Thank you for the update of information so far. Until the initial report is published by the RAIB before we all speculate on probabilities of cause. A tragic incident and the prime focus is with those of the Injured and the family of the poor soul who has died.
A very dark day on our network 😢
The 158s are the same as those involved in the Salisbury Tunnel crash a few years ago.
Same time of year and similar time of day as well.
Can you define a low speed impact?
Remember Purley train crash also read an original report oat Purley Oaks whilst I was there.
Purley train crash was caused by something different, although not always fully reported.
I look forward to the accident report and the RAIB digests, for a low speed collision the amount of damage to the one cab must be a cause for concern as the cab on the drivers side was almost against the bulkhead judging by the TV pictures. Fortunately the driver managed to get clear in time.
Agree Simon, the RAIB reports will be very important.
Both trains acting under caution due to railhead conditions previously reported.the train due to stop in the loop slid for the largest distance and unable to brake any more than emergency
I find it very sad that 2 trains can still be on the same piece if track travelling in oposite directions.
It’s a single track route with passing places, on this bit of track the passing place is at the top of a steep climb, it’s always stops to let the train coming up the hill pass, apparently the track was running reduced speed to to earlier drivers going through reporting it was very slippy.
I’d guess he stopped in the passing place and gravity took over.
@@Thecrazyvaclav I appreciate that but it was a long way past the passing loop. It is still sad that this happened. How this can happen needs a thorough investigation and changes made to make sure it cannot happen again.
@@TheSleepychicken like I said, maybe he stopped and gravity took over
@@Thecrazyvaclav that's the idea of the sanders to prevent sliding. If that is what happened then the whole use of that section needs to be reviewed.
The investigation needs an answer quickly.
I have no opinion on what went wrong. 800m is a very very long slide.
@@TheSleepychicken RAIB the investigation board have said this morning 5/11 the sanders weren’t working
Thanks for a "speculation free" report on the saddening event.
Reports of this incident reminded me of the Salisbury Tunnel Junction one of 31/10/2022.
Does "Low speed collision" have a standard definition? E.g. less than 15mph?
According to a passenger on the train interviewed by the BBC his train was "going 40, 50, maybe 60 miles per hour to nothing in the blink of an eye"
that is absolute rubbish because there is no way in this world that either of the trains involved were traveling anything like that speed. it was a low speed impact
@@Mach_One_Photos Yes I agree. Only the BBC could find someone with such a vivid imagination.
@@BibTheBoulderTheOriginalOne Does any one believe anything the bbc reports these days
@@Mach_One_Photos For that the RIAB will have to confirm, as is the overrun distance consistent with a 15mph speed before brake application even given railhead conditions - which also causes concern on railhead treatment, manangement and procedures.
Don't believe anything on the bbc.
Hopefully the 2 drivers will be able to give a matching account of what happened soon and put an end to any speculation
These days it's more likely data from the OTDR and the ETCS system will provide the information required.
I use to catch the daily service from Aberystwth to Shrewsbury return many years ago...Wow
This was on my line, only 29 miles away from me. So sad that one passenger died :(
Unfortunately it was the driver who died I can't imagine how his family feel getting the news, god bless him and all those involved such a tragedy,
@@joginns778 where did you hear that? and which driver? I'm pretty sure it was a passenger that died.
@@RWL2012 I'm not sure what channel I heard it on, but if you look at the driving cab if it wasn't the driver who died where was he and who was the person who died our local news still hasn't reported who it was who died,,
@@RWL2012 mate just looked up Google it says the person who died was a chap Tudor Evans just shows even news channels get it wrong he was a passenger not the driver,
Well done folks, very rewarding having a cool appraisal! Did there not used to be catch points once preventing unauthorised entry from 'sidings'?
Somehow I doubt this was a failure of the signalling. More likely to have similar cause to the salisbury incident exacerbated by recent stormy weather. As I understand the 158 units have a limited future on these services with new rolling stock on order so hopefully this is something that has been taken into account in the design process and there will be little chance of a repeat.
How will the replacement stock be any better? Not enough adhesive weight
@@physiocrat7143 indeed will this fundamental flaw finally be recognised by RAIB and acted on by DfT?
@@highpath4776
You can be sure that the new stock will be more uncomfortable than the 158 units, but why do they need to be replaced by worse?
network rail and tfw cancelled the heart of wales line today aswel due to low addision reported ive been on rail replacement over it. there only sending the sandite train up from swansea to Llandeilo and not further up to treat the lines
As an ex 158/159 driver I used to get hokd of them very early in leaf fall. Cut my my speed by a ⅓rd at a double yellow coming down to ⅔rds at the single & dropping. I had a 158 one day though where the automatic sanders were not topped up and it didn't want to stop. It was taken out of service at the next station by SWT Control.
A few things puzzle me. Firstly if a short light train cant stop in a passing loop due to leaves then the line might have to be considered unsafe in any but perfect dry conditions and as it stands be unfit for purpose. Secondly if the train did not stop in the loop would the points on exit have been set for the oncoming train and would that not have caused a derailment? Thirdly the accident happened in the evening. Did any other trains use the passing loop earlier in the day and if so were any problems reported?
Another incident apparently induced by low adhesion almost 3 years after that at Fisherton Tunnel, Salisbury. Will the Class 158/Class 159 design be a factor in examination - IIRC these vehicles feature a proportional braking system dependent on passenger load?
All modern passenger cars have a load weighed braking system so that brake rate for a particular demand is independent of vehicle loading.
Does anyone know what the protocol and procedure for entering and stopping in the Talerddig passing loop would be? Presumably the times are pretty tightly managed nowadays (it used to be minutes of waiting before the ATP). Is it just case of the the first train to reach the loop going into the loop or is it an active system to ensure speed of approach of each train is managed? In this case the stopping train was the westbound train. I would have expected the points to then change so that the main track was open for the eastbound train to pass on the main track. How then did the westbound train leave the passing loop and get onto the main track? Is there some protocol for keeping the passing loop points open until the stopping train is definitely halted on the passing loop?
Where are the two trains scheduled to pass each other?
This is after the pwllhelli train couples up at machynlength
may have been a low speed impact, its flattened one of the 158 cabs
First say I like to express my condolences to the families of the victim who lost his life and everyone who was injured. Secondly, I hope they can get to the bottom of this as quickly as possible so those who like to jump into conclusions can be silenced quickly once and for all.!
"we'll try and LAYOUT the facts".... I see what you did there.
Why does it appear that the exit of the passing loop was not protected by trap points? Even if a train can’t be driven onto the single line without authority under ERTMS it could still occur in the event of a brake or other mechanical failure.
My thoughts as well. Trap points are the first line of defence in a situation like this.
money
A map would have been useful.
Completely agree Richard! Unfortunately we weren't able to do much editing on the video as Richard is away, so we were doing the best we could manage in terms of editing the video in his absence!
Here, right beside the A470 - maps.app.goo.gl/CzYbBpPudYqHtCUY8
Sad times to have such an accident.
Yet again, another news headline not covered
Thank you, all to often MSM report as if they are entitled to information that probably doesn’t exist. Not everyone realises how complex a railway is.
Phonetic descriptions please.
Surely if one train was waiting in a loop, expecting another train, one would know whether the train had gone past as one would see the other train passing on the other track. If it hasn't gone past then one should surely wait and not proceed out of the loop.
I assume one train was entering the loop, and the other entered it but failed to stop in it
@@highpath4776 Read the RAIB statement quoted above. It happened 800 metres (just under half a mile) west of the Talerddig loop which means the eastbound train wasn't even close to it when the collision occurred. The westbound train overran for a reason which is yet to be determined.
@@maunsell24so presumably the train sliding, slid through the loop section completely before the points were even thrown??
@@cd66061 The RAIB statement refers to low adhesion on approach to the point of collision. You can find the location on Google Maps. It's where a bend on the A470 is right next to the line. Plenty of trees and lineside vegetation in that area. The statement says nothing about adhesion at the Talerddig loop half a mile away. There is a thread discussing this incident on RailUK forums in which the operational arrangements at the loop are explained on page 4.
if one train westbound had entered the loop already ,how on earth would the eastbound train crash head on into the westbound train if it had travelled 1000 yards(over half mile past the loop) ,that would be impossible surely (as there are trackpoints on the loop also there should be catchpoints to derail trains to prevent any overshoots or train rentering without authorisation ) and main track that would have prevented the westbound from reentering the main track .until eastbound train had passed and cleared the section . obvious here westbound was wheels were slipping and sliding along even with brake applied followed by emergency braking set by driver who left his control desk to warn passengers of imminent danger .due to wooded are with trees etc ,leaves on line does play mostly in this sad accident ,but lack of catchpoints if there were not any should be considered ,as it could have been much worse .well done to all emergency services involved for swift response .luckily these accidents are very few .and railways are much safer .I was a railwayman myself years ago and have been involved in incidents myself .
I think that was a little slip just like saying the line west of Machynlleth was closed when it was the line to the east.
@@jeremybarker7577 what are you on about ,?main track was open both directions
Are the loop points 'spring points' like on some lines in Scotland?
@@vincitveritas3872 no, they would have to be points that protect the running line ,hence the catch points that should be installed on all loop lines like this or on lines when leaving train depot,s etc.
Why no catch points on the loop to stop a train over running the loop?
The usual arrangement at passing loops is spring loaded points which are "run through" as trains leave the loop. There is usually no trap point protection provided, but there is a "points set" light to notify the oncoming driver the points are correctly set at the entry to the loop.
@@InverhavonRailwaysyes thought it was spring points.
@@InverhavonRailways They were sprung points when Radio signalling was used but now ERTMS system .They are motorised point machines now www.ertms.net/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/15.-ERTMS-in-the-UK_Thales.pdf
@@InverhavonRailways Not with ERTMS
@@InverhavonRailways Two signaller positions were implemented in Machynlleth to control the total
route. This route is supported by the deployment of a new GSM-R system, axle
counters, new motorised point machines and balises along the track and a
single Radio Block Centre (RBC) installed at the control centre in Machynlleth
Please correct the summary...it says "evening of October 22nd" not "morning" - Otherwise thank you reminding us all what reporting and journalism should look and sound like.
Thanks very much for the spot! Fixed.
Main thoughts with the relatives of the deceased who will need accurate answers as to what led up to this accident.
Lets all hope that human error did not form any part of this accident, although if it did criminal proceedings due to loss of life will follow. Because of the issues I have placed in the above sentence, is it not a wiser course not to list all the respective likely causes or speculating upon which is the likely cause of this accident.
Experts who know what to look for, are already on the ground and will make public their results as soon as legally and practically possible. If a life has been lost this is better than on line speculation, however knowledgeable the individuals doing so are.
A "raised eyebrow " at the mention of 1000yds. Hmm. Very sad that a fatality occured, initially I thought it was one of the Drivers. Pleased you appended the RIAB initial report. By God, They Don't hang about "Do IT NOW" in microcosm - and for bloody good reason. With Utmost Respect to the Deceased and His Family, and staff involved. This will be a troubling time for them all.
Must been scary because I feel the train when the train connects another carriage but crashing into eachother SHIT. I KNOW THEM
How many investigations teams are going? Anything more than one is unacceptable. The only team who should be allowed are the Rail Accident Investigation Branch. Everyone else’s duty must be to acquire data for the RAIB and keep their noses out.
In essence that's what the operating protocols for RAIB and other services say except in some rare situations.
The one piece of advice anyone involved in a train accident needs to know is they should only give a statement to a RAIB person.
Man.
1000 yards = over 3/4 mile 😢
No! There's 1760 of them in a mile. Over 1/2 a mile but less than 3/4.
@@boldford Yes, you're right. But it was still a long way to go without stopping.