*NOTES, LINKS and SOURCES* I’ll be discussing the “tank heavy” problem that the British suffer from during my upcoming Operation Crusader video. But in a nutshell, Major General Percy Hobart thought that tanks could win battles on their own. This meant that when he created 7th Armoured Division, he didn’t really think much about the infantry or artillery aspects. He advised Auchinleck, Norrie, and Cunningham for Crusader, which is why they split their tanks from their infantry into two separate corps. In the end, it was the infantry corps (13th) that won the day. The 1st UK Armoured Division did have an extra brigade (4th Armoured) prior to 2007, but this was dropped. Even so, the ratio of tanks to infantry remains the same. There are variances, but in general - Binary divisions have two regiments; Triangular divisions have three regiments; Square divisions have four regiments; And Pentomic divisions have five battlegroups (going off the US version, since they’re the only ones to make this type of division ever as far as I’m aware). Not all German divisions in 1941-42 went from 9 to 6 battalions, so the numbers shown in the video are rough estimates. That said, we know that the Germans replaced their losses, and we know that they increased the number of their divisions. And what we find is that the number of men on the Axis-Soviet Front actually grown in the summer periods of 1941-1943. It is only post Kursk that the Germans have manpower issues and difficulties filling their ranks. Prior to Kursk, they did have shortages (what army doesn’t), but these were usually in the Winter months. The reduction in the size of German divisions in the period 1941-1943 therefore cannot be explained by manpower shortages as usually stated. I highly recommend the book “Enduring the Whirlwind” by Liedtke (listed below) for a decent discussion on German unit manpower and tank strengths, as well as replacements, in the period 1941-1943. It’s essential reading for anyone interested in the Axis-Soviet Front. Not a lot has been written on this topic, and most of what has been written doesn’t specifically state why the triangular division concept was the dominating one at the time. House’s book does talk about it, but I’d like a second opinion. I suspect it’s not really an interesting subject for non-military personnel, but it is a topic I’m now interested in. If you have any recommendations for books on the topic of division composition and the transition to a more combined-arms organization, please let me know. And as you can see from the source list below, I’m needing a lot of books (let alone other equipment) to make these videos. Please consider supporting me on Patreon and make these videos as good as they can be. I’m highly reliant on your support www.patreon.com/TIKhistory And a big thank you goes to my current Patreons for your ongoing support, for which I am super-grateful. As always, you guys are awesome! *VIDEO LINKS* You may be interested in the following videos after watching this one - How BIG were Soviet Armies and Divisions in 1942? And what impact did this have? th-cam.com/video/wDslsMgnphI/w-d-xo.html Why No German Reinforcements at Stalingrad? th-cam.com/video/VQ3-TqeZqeA/w-d-xo.html Operation Compass 1940-41 (where 20k British troops under O’Connor beat 150k Italians under Marshal Graziani in North Africa, prompting Rommel to be sent to Libya) th-cam.com/video/b71kdhj27rk/w-d-xo.html FALL BLAU 1942 - Examining the Disaster th-cam.com/video/hzr6dD8fvVY/w-d-xo.html The MAIN Reason Why Germany Lost WW2 - OIL th-cam.com/video/kVo5I0xNRhg/w-d-xo.html Your Perception of the WW2 Eastern Front is Wrong th-cam.com/video/B-ZHH770WLs/w-d-xo.html The Numbers Say it All | The Myth of German Superiority on the WW2 Eastern Front th-cam.com/video/_7BE8CsM9ds/w-d-xo.html Stalin’s Purge of the Red Army and Its Effects on the WW2 Eastern Front th-cam.com/video/JnWNnI6YlQQ/w-d-xo.html Kampfgruppen in WW2 th-cam.com/video/zKWczZkQ130/w-d-xo.html And various Order of battle videos - Paulus's 6th Army ORDER OF BATTLE - Before Stalingrad th-cam.com/video/DCDjAqTUCmw/w-d-xo.html The Axis Order of Battle for Operation Crusader 1941-42 WW2 th-cam.com/video/LwPJWb2BUj4/w-d-xo.html The British Order of Battle for Operation Crusader 1941-42 WW2 th-cam.com/video/QCNDEoRDp6I/w-d-xo.html *SOURCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY -* Books: Anderson, T. “The History of the Panzerwaffe. Volume 2: 1942-45.” Osprey Publishing, 2017. Barnett, C. “The Desert Generals.” Kindle, 2nd Edition. Becket, I. “Rommel: A Reappraisal.” Pen & Sword Ltd, Kindle, 2013. Butler, D. “Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel.” Casemate Publishers, 2015. Ford, K. “Operation Crusader 1941: Rommel in Retreat.” Osprey Publishing, 2010. Christie, H. “Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army in the Opening Campaign in the Western Desert, June 1940.” Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014. Glantz, D. “When Titan’s Clashed.” University Press of Kansas, 2015. Glantz, D. House, J. “The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1. To the Gates of Stalingrad. Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942.” University Press of Kansas, 2009. Guderian, H. “Panzer Leader.” Penguin Books, 2000. Heyman, C. “The Armed Forces of the United Kingdom 2006-2007.” R & F Defence Publications, 2006. Hill, A. “The Red Army and the Second World War. (Armies of the Second World War.” Cambridge University Press, 2017. House, J. “Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization.” University Press of the Pacific, 2002. Isaev, A. “Dubno 1941: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War.” Helion & Company, 2017. Liedtke, G. “Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943.” Helion & Company LTD, 2016. Mark, J. “Death of the Leaping Horsemen: The 24th Panzer Division in Stalingrad 12th August - 20th November 1942.” Stackpole Books, Kindle 2003. Mitcham, S. “Hitler’s Legions: German Army Order of Battle World War II.” Redwood Burn Limited, 1985. Mitcham, S. “German Order of Battle: Volume One: 1st-290th Infantry Divisions in WWII.” Stackpole Books, 2007. Mitcham, S. “German Order of Battle: Volume Two: 291st-999th Infantry Divisions, Named Infantry Divisions, and Special Divisions in WWII.” Stackpole Books, 2007. Mitcham, S. “German Order of Battle: Volume Three: Panzer, Panzer Grenadier, and Waffen SS Divisions in WWII.” Stackpole Books, 2007. Nafziger, G. The Afrika Korps: An Organizational History 1941-1943. 1997. Pitt, B. “The Crucible of War: Auchinleck’s Command.” The Definitive History of the Desert War. Cassell & Co, 2001. Playfair, I. The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume III, British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb [September 1941 to September 1942]. The Naval & Military Press LTD 1960. Ed. 2004. Internet Sources: Moore, G. “Operation Crusader” (Order of Battle) gregpanzerblitz.com/Crusader.htm German Army Official Website www.deutschesheer.de/ Thanks for watching, bye for now!
If you want a good over view of the German ww2 Infantry Division look at “The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945” by Alex Buchner. It into detail on the organization of the early war division and the later war changes the moved to 6 Battalions. Even mentioning that they disbanded the reconnaissance battalion, converting 1 battalion in every regiment into a fusilier battalion that had a company equipped with bicycles.
The British didn't too well in the early part of North Africa not because of their composition of armor divisions; moreover, it was because the British AT guns and tanks were under gunned with little more than 6 lbs guns at best.
George, that's not the only reason. The 2-pouder AT guns were capable of tackling the German tanks within 500m (which was roughly the range the Panzer III's also needed to be to engage the British). The main issue was that the Germans used their infantry and anti-tank guns with their tanks, whereas the British didn't. This meant that the Germans had more guns to bear on the British tanks. British artillery (with their good 25-pounders) was also kept out of the loop when they were needed most. Yes, the 88's outranged the British tanks, but even when the 88s weren't around, British tanks went in alone and got chewed up. At least, this is what happened up to and including Crusader, if not afterwards. In the few instances where the British did use their AT-guns with the tanks, the results were better for the British.
Pardinas82 he is a little too much of a contrarian imo. Its always nice to hear different view points, but in some ways he goes a little far. Id also like some myth busting on the french, polish,british and american side. Its mostly german, russian, italian myth busting. I also think hes going to far with his criticism of guderian, manstein, rommel and the rest of the germans. It may balance the views of the „wehraboos“ but in my opinion these were all excellent generals/field marshalls. Manstein with the sichelstreich for example, to replace the schlieffenplan. Guderian with his efforts to establish the modern german tank warfare. Rommels success in france and africa. I think that the germans had by far the best the best officers in europe and maybe also the best trained and prepared soldiers, atleast at the beginning. The british had a lot of trouble with their officers. We dont have to talk about the french... or italians i think?! And the russians arent on par either. Id rate the americans 2nd overall. Obviously these ppl are still human. Macarthur, nimitz, patton, monty too.
Uncle Joe Stalin i never said that he doesnt. He knows more than i do. Im just listening and learning and criticizing what i think is a little over the top crackdown on wehraboo heros.
When I was a tanker in the Marines, we were taught over and over that without infantry support, tanks are absolutely dead in an urban fight. We need grunts clearing houses, identifying and marking out enemy strongpoints, and keeping the RPGs off our asses. Tankers give a lot of shit to infantry, but we need those guys and there's nothing like a tank putting rounds into enemy positions to motivate the infantry. We are entirely combined and work together.
Thank you for that explanation. I was an SSG in the Military History Division of the Army Reserves. I was never in battle. I've heard many lectures but your explanation has been the most clear.
There isn't a finer and more deadly fighting force that is constantly deployed and ready for action in the history of warfare then the USMC. It's a joke to hear all this euro-centric therories of warfare. I can't really find anything in the annuals of history where these europeans have ever fought to our level. We can be out numbered, far away from home and we just kill these clowns.
This is why the WW2 Churchill tanks was so liked by its crews and the infantry. It was slow but could climb hills that defeat other tanks and proved the duality of infantry supporting tanks and vice-versa.
One should suppose that TIK has made it much more difficult to loose arguments now that your own knowledge is supplemented and fortified with logic and such deep looks inside the numbers. It can be hard to find a room that can keep up with me in war context he just made it more difficult.
A lot of people are so TACTICAL in their thoughts of war. They conclude that the Germans had good tanks so thats why they took so much land. The Germans took a lot of land uncontested at first. People now of days think that you can fight wars with drones or by smart bombs alone. If the enemy is dug in, good luck with that. The Generals must use STRATEGY to win wars, and that always means boots on the ground.
Definitely. People who study war know this, and realize the importance of certain boring or seemingly "old" "outdated" things like logistics and deploying troops to the ground. In fact it's sometimes baffling how inept leaders can be. I read a great book about the invasion of Iraq, apparently Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neocon leadership had come up with their own theories for how to win a modern war and they learned absolutely NOTHING from Vietnam or Korea specifically how massive bombing campaigns alone do very little, and in fact often have a paradoxical effect by driving inhabitants to join the opposition (russia did learn that lesson from us and in their invasion of Afghanistan had a fairly large ground deployment, but had their own problems, which we then learned from them but still forgot the earlier lessons lol). During the Invasion of Iraq the neocon leadership truly believed we could win a war in Iraq with nothing but precision bombing (opposed to the earlier carpet bombing [ironically still drives local population against us as seen from precision drone attacks which are shockingly indiscriminate]) and marines/special forces. The joint chiefs were extremely upset by rumsfeld's plan and the planning teams were trying to urge him to follow the logistics protocol which was designed specifically for an overseas invasion but he wanted to do the war on the cheap while still accomplishing our lofty goals. The result was during the initial deployment and invasion, the limited troop formations we deployed ran out of fuel and the US army ground to a stalemate in a day with hardly any combat! The marines were also given some absurd orders to do the war by themselves with little to no support despite it not being what they were designed to do and actually protested the orders! Some people inside were really mad they would refuse to carry out orders but they knew they had a good point. And the first actual helicopter deployment also ended in near catastrophe when the choppers took heavy fire and some very green soldiers were downed and accidentally brought more units into harm attempting to rescue them, they were very nearly encircled and destroyed but a nearby SAS team working behind enemy lines happened to be near enough to hear what was happening and showed up. They were able to flank the Iraqis forcing them to withdraw and the downed soldiers were extracted. you'll never hear about any of this because it was quite embarrassing and there was a psychological operation (or perception management) going on, so this stuff was unknown at the time to keep spirits/morale high in the army and us/ally population to maintain support by making it seem like an easy fight, if people knew what was really happening perception would have been different. In the end really war comes down to making the least amount of mistakes and so many things can happen, even to the marines who we just hear about being supersoldiers
Infantry in Africa had to be motorized to be of any use, foot troops in the desert tend to be static forces and easily outflanked. So fuel was not the problem.
You can't motorize the infantry without fuel, and there was barely enough of that for the motorized elements that were there already. So fuel was the problem.
Not only this. Africa also means covering really large distances - for this, you also better have fuel and vehicles to move your troops around. Next, at the time there were some roads around, but not much railways, meaning you had to carry supply over large distances using mostly trucks. Again, fuel. And more fuel. Then, you want to actually have some air cover and reconnaissance - fuel, here we come. How do the supplies and troops reach Africa? By convoys, that also use some fuel. And we`re not yet at the tanks, even ;)
More fire power means more shooting - leading to more supply trucks - leading to longer pauses for reloading... 5 minutes shooting by a minigun may send 15000 bullits downrange but the reload time? And breakdown times of those weapon systems? It's the need for more eyes to spot the enemy, that will give those weapon systems something to do... All armies need scouts, snipers and infantry to mob up the enemy area, and those grunts should be able to call in any other weapon systems within range to punch large holes in the enemy as needed...
13:51 **Shows War Thunder picture** - "...World of Tanks 2..." 😂😂😂 I love these little jokes he fits in all his videos, those details make it all so much better!
I’m outraged, I tells ya! How dare you yada yada... this is the internet after all, there needs to be at least one person salty about throwing shade on their (and my) favourite game! But seriously, I love the little throwaway jokes. The delivery is so deadpan and serious I almost (almost) miss them sometimes.
What pisses me off immensely is that I just KNOW there is some absolute gold collecting dust in Italian archives that historians just overlook, just neglect when it could shed so much light on so many topics. I'm especially keen to understand just what the fuck happened during Operation: Agreement. Perhaps the most devastating raid you never hear talked about - the Dieppe of the North Africa.
I want to cry. I've just finished my "paper" for my high school finals about the evolution of armoured warfare between WW1 and WW2 and you just dropped this massive video with a wall of text of sources and additional informations. I'm presenting it on the third of July, but how am I supposed to talk without checking all the informations you gave me? It's becoming a drug. The more I know, the more I understand I don't know anything.
Myth-buster number 1045: Zaitsev didn't fight a famous German sniper from an elite sniper school. It was just some random German sniper. (Now the question is, why did I deliberately use the number 1045?)
When I was younger, I first thought that motor/mech divisions became less tank-heavy, not only because of the learning curve of the combined-arms, but also because of logistics and training. How to obtain more mechanic-hours? Spare parts? Supply dumps? Unghhhhhhhh .......... (more worries) Excellent video! I liked its well-organized and concise format.
Thank you! Glad you liked the video. And yes, it's something that's intrigued me for a while. Now I've looked into a few different campaigns, I can see there is a correlation. It might be both the combined arms and logistics elements
Got to love the different usage of the terms Regiment, Battalion and Brigade in WW2. German armoured battalion is the equivalent to a British armoured regiment. German regiment is the equivalent to a British brigade (armoured and infantry). Meanwhile, a regiment in the British infantry is an administrative organisation.
@@TheImperatorKnight Oh thankyou for saying that. I was beginning to feel very stupid. lol Is there a chart somewheres that lays all this out at a glance?
I've been in the US army for a decade and I still cant keep up. Also, a degraded unit (late campaign) may have battalion colors present but are barely comp enough by sized.
This is one of your best perhaps the best short answer to the long problem of assumption, perception and permanent fog of war. I have walls full of books authored by those who were there and none of them ever saw the macro scaled as you have. A bit older than you so those things have lingered and festered with me so it is very good indeed that another generation is learning and that brilliant historians and analysts like you carry on. This study you did should be your ticket to a lifetime of lectures and recognized for being seminal. Wondering if you will ever assemble your work as a larger teaching tool as required learning. Please dont stop my brain is hungry forever.
Let's hope his transmission system doesn't fail, and he spends more time trying to get powerpoint to work then on youtube. Don't want to be too much of a tiger :x
I am kind of surprised that there is no comment about US Armored Division in WW2. Americans did the same thing by reforming their Armored Divisions from 1940 T/O&E, to 1942 T/O&E, then to 1943 T/O&E to finally reach the perfect tank/infantry/artillery 1:1:1 ratio. They also mobilized numbers of separate tank battalions to be attached to Infantry Divisions and abandoned the specialized, heavily tank concentrated Armored Corps idea.
You're right, I could have mentioned them. I just don't have too much information on US armoured units since my focus has been Market Garden, North African Campaign, and Eastern Front.
Because it is almost impossible to explain when you add the attached anti-tank battalions to the picture, especially considering the bizarre C3 implications (what exactly does 'attached' mean from a command perspective, plus tanks had infantry radios, anti-tanks did not until 1944-95). This would require its own video - probably multiple videos. The US TOE was either intended or made to be more flexible than other armies and does not reflect the significant differences in the way forces were deployed and used among theaters.
Michael. No. Tank destroyer battalions, towed or self-propelled, are just anti-tank battalions. Their major difference from those similar units in other countries is tank destroyer battalions were in the non-divisional battalion-group system other than being an organized unit in divisions. The non-divisional battalion-group system is one of the keys, I believe, to understand US Army in WW2. The German equivalent to tank destroyer battalions was just panzerjager abteilung. Other things, like the radios you mentioned, are trivial.
Michael A Mayo: tank destroyers battalions concept was created to counter the supposed tank penetration that the US feared from the Germans in the invasion of France onwards. The TD battalions were supposed to be used on its own to rush into the penetration sector (hence the emphasis on speed and light armor) to counter the enemy tank column from the flanks, preferably from a hull down, ambush position (hence the focus on open top vehicles and improved visibility. They envisioned that the forward defending infantry divisions will almost invariably overrun, but where they are overrun tells Corp and Army commanders the location of the tank column and the TD battalion is supposed to seal off that breach. In practice, first, nobody want to relegate the poor infantry to the fate of being overrun by tanks without effective anti-tank forces, thus Corps and Army commanders started to attach these battalions semi-permanently to the Infantry Divisions. These additions are ad hoc, however, the commanders realised that units attached together for a long time fight better so despite the ad hoc nature, they were rarely re-assigned. Second, and more importantly, the US Army was attacking instead of defending. In the attack, Corp and Army commanders were not about to let TD battalions just sit around doing nothing so they were pushed into offensive roles, sometimes used as tanks, but other times as indirect fire support platforms or assault guns. The downside is when the Germans do attack and achieve a tank column penetration (for eg: Battle of the Bulge), Armies and Corps suddenly found themselves without the mobile reaction force the TD battalions supposed to be. Still, despite the ad hoc nature, the attached TD battalions performed very well. They achieved better Kill-Loss ratios than tanks; remember: despite having lighter armour without a roof. The primary reason being since they were lightly armoured units attached to large infantry formations, they worked together with infantry in a better combined arms team than the tanks in Armoured Divisions, which sometimes charged recklessly into the enemy.
Xuan: The majority of what you said is right, and I want to add something: Tank destroyers were just anti-tank guns, they did not need to be vehicles. Although the majority types of the (self propelled) tank destroyers that successfully introduced into service were tank-like vehicles, most of them are not tank-like. They could be just an anti-tank gun mounted on a 3/4 ton truck (37mm Gun Motor Carriage M6). Also, a lot (half in 1943) of tank destroyer battalions were using 3 inch Gun M5 towed by M3 half-tracks. The towed units were in the original concept and tested successfully in Louisiana Maneuvers and Carolina Maneuvers. There were no self-propelled tank destroyers in the original concept introduced by General Headquarters and it was the latter formed Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center in favor of the self-propelled vehicles. The attachment to Infantry Division was not ad hoc, it was written in the doctrine (FM 18-5, 1943). Tank destroyer units were fully defensive and were not used as tanks in their secondary roles. They stayed in "overwatch" positions and support the attack as field artillery, although one of their secondary roles was considered as "assault gun". During Battle of the Bulge, it was not just "lack of mobile reaction forces". Instead, it was "lack of forces" including infantry (three divisions vs two panzer armee). The "combined arms team with tank destroyers and infantry" was never better than Armored Divisions because 1: the actual "combined arms team" was a combination of Infantry Division with attached units including one separate tank battalion, one or two tank destroyer battalion, one AAA/AW battalion, one chemical mortar battalion and several other supporting units like an extra combat engineering battalion and six quartermaster truck companies (for full motorization) instead of "tank destroyers and infantry"; 2: its role was different from that of Armored Division which also received a tank destroyer battalion (sp) attachment, thus there is no "better or worse" at all.
From what I’ve found, commanders believe that their own branch of arms is superior to others. Rommel was an infantry commander, so of course he would believe that more infantry would be needed to create a better force. Guderian was a cavalryman, so in turn he would believe more tanks were the answer to creating a better fighting force. It’s been that way since the dawn of warfare. Napoleon believed very strongly in artillery, Custer in cavalry, Westmoreland in infantry (surprise surprise those were their branches of the army).
From the Translation of taped conversation with General Hermann Balck. : "Q: Did you have a chance to try out large divisions along-side small ones to see what their relative effectiveness was? A:[...] Actually, Guderian was a strong advocate of the big division, surprisingly enough. He liked divisions like the Gross Deutschland Division, which I commanded for a while. That division was so big and fat that you could split it in two, and you would have two divisions, each of which would be fat enough by itself. Now a man like Guderian could lead such a large division. But the average division commander from across the street has to be able to command the organization - - that's the real problem. Then clearly the small divisions were superior in maneuverability and speed." PS I replaced a very long yes with [... ].
And also about German and Italian Generals. Italian Generals had a better strategic vision than German Generals and their Greece debacle was as much of their own making as it was due to Mussolini's impulsive orders, which wrecked two campaigns at once. The same Generals had shown sufficient organisational capabilities in organising the Invasion of Ethiopia despite the huge logistical difficulties. But Mussolini's Grand Gestures also tied down significant budgetary, raw material, and bureaucratic time in operations instead of reforming the Italian Armed Forces. The results are well known. But a lot of Italian 'incompetence' is due to the Germans maligning them rather their objective performance or the objective circumstances under which they operated.
I agree that the Germans are responsible for the poor reputation the Italians have in WW2. I don't think they were as bad as often stated. But sadly, I can't read Italian sources and not much has been translated into English. So our (English speaking) perspective of the Italian contribution to the war is largely from the German and British accounts, both of which did not view the Italians in a good light for various reasons.
I think our point of view is skewed because of Operation Compass that smashed Italian forces in Cyrenaica. Apart from that operation (which included a lot of luck) Royal Italian Army was a capable force with a lot of good commanders and soldiers. Their equipment wasn't on the same level as German or British one, especially their tanks, but even in Operation Compass we have a lot of documented fights when for example Italian artillery fought bravely to the last man in Bardia against Australian 6th Division. It takes a lot of courage to stand to fight when you know that enemy is better equiped & prepared to war. That's why I respect Italian soldiers a lot.
Italians had sound reasoning on a lot of levels, like shown in this video about the M38 Carcano infantry rifle th-cam.com/video/V-lJZPF_fJQ/w-d-xo.html TIK is extremely good at showing how war historiography is skewed "a posteriori". i also believe that military history is skewed because you can't have brilliance from the past overshadow present-day apporaches that are flawed or even inferior.
I think 'skewed' is the right word to describe the common perception of the Italians. There has been little study of the Italian army in English...I guess it's just not as 'sexy' as the idea of free wheeling German armoured columns (ironically anchored by Italian infantry). The problem is compounded by dubious Allied sources - some Australian histories for instance are notoriously one eyed. After trumpeting their early successes they seem unable to admit to set backs against the Italians thereafter.....some even go as far as explaining defeats by replacing Italian troops with German ones :D
Well done TIK! Well thought out and explained. Interesting that Guderian made a number of mis-interpretations, (thinking about his opposition to the manufacture of assault guns). Thanks for this analysis! By comparison, Rommel was no fool, though he made his own mistakes, but learned from them, and tried not to repeat them.
It seems to me that Guderian obsessed over having large, concentrated tank forces to enable them to theoretically function at the operational level, at the expense of their usefulness tactically. I think he was somewhat paranoid about a repeat of a great war situation in which the tanks were bogged down by being utterly tied to the infantry. I can understand where guderian was coming from theoretically, but he (along with everyone else of course) lacked the field experience to recognize where his operational theory didn't make sound tactical sense.
Well, he's not wrong in the sense that you want to disperse your tank strength too much. But by the same token, the lesson learnt from the early battles was that you don't want tank-heavy units. Nobody was saying a panzer division shouldn't have battalions of tanks in them. The question was, how many was the right balance?
That seems common with all the tank enthusiasts (or should I say... radicals) Go to speak with Hobart and we would make Guderian look timid by comparison.
I would speculate inflating number in smaller divisions, as opposed to maintaining larger divisions, might be connected with cronyism within ranks of German army officers, as larger number of divisions means more possible appointments for ambitious officers.
Could be both. War tends to expose competent officers by their conduct in action, and once you know there are many officers deserving the promotions, more then actual openings for promotion, there might be tendency to create openings for them more for internal political reasons then for actual operational necessity. Of course I don't know any of that for a fact, or have any documented evidence of it, but from personal knowledge of how such large organisations work I think it might be ad least contributing factor.
I believe Otto Skorzeny was a fine example of a rather imaginative - though not particularly skilled - officer who made himself politically by 'being there' when Mussolini was 'liberated' at Gran Sasso and also being responsible for the kidnapping of Hungary's Admiral Horthy's son in Op. Panzerfaust. Skorzeny earned his rank to this one act which so impressed Hitler even though it was a Luftwaffe officer who actually organised and commanded the operation to take Mussolini. [It's likely Mussolini would have survived WW2 had Fallschirmjager/Skorzeny not taken him to Hitler and put him in charge of the Salo Republic in Northern Italy] Skorzeny was responsible for Operation Greif [I could be wrong about the name as Op. Grief could have been the Airborne Op. to disrupt Allied lines of comms and supply with Fallshirmjager] during the Battle of the Bulge. Op. Greif was used by Hitler to get German soldiers wearing US GI uniforms over their Army uniforms as a 'ruse of war' to send false orders, change road signs , etc but ultimately to take the bridges over the Meuse.
Funny thing about operation grief. The German troops were provided with counterfeit US military I.D.s sadly for these Germans, though the I.D. were a meticulously exact counterfeits of the US Military I.D. the German in charge of producing them corrected a spelling error found on the US I.D. this correction rendered the I.D. not only useless in it's intended purpose but served as a Red flag exposing all German soldiers carrying one as enemy. (According to Paul Fussell, an uncorrected typographical error on American identity cards could serve as a tell: the top of a genuine card read "NOT A PASS. FOR INDENTIFICATION PURPOSES ONLY." Someone preparing the disguises of the commandos could not resist correcting the spelling on their false cards to read "IDENTIFICATION."[12])
TIK - I like the improvements you are implementing - only the bright yellow background is a bit 'too much' for me - watching a bright screen in the dark... :o)
The intensity of the fighting revealed that divisional commanders were being overwhelmed. Six fighting battalions was about all that they could effectively run. All of the armies ran into this. Shock formations were the exception to this rule. Additionally, creating new divisions was THE perfect way to promote revealed talent. This did wonders for institutional morale.
13:42 - Another reason to superficially imagine that tanks are the main element of modern armies, is that tanks were invented to overcome trench warfare, which is such a major inflection point in history, it's easy for me to see why people would think of the innovation (tanks) as dominating military doctrine in a wider array of situations ever since.
Guderian always says: "If we had done it my way we would have won!". Yet, he never takes into account neither the fuel situation nor the fact that the enemy would have reacted or adapted to his proposed tactics. Also, one thing these post-war memoirs rarely mention is the fact the Hitler is NEVER alone defending a point of view.
Fantastic vid. Truly enlightening basic understanding of the meat and potatoes of fundamentals. Never knew these items. Love all your stuff anyway. I think you are getting better and better. Alwsys worth my time to view.
I remember Victor Suvorov mentioning oversized pre-war soviet tank corpses that had a hard time even peacefuly redeploying due to traffic jams and supply problems. So it's not just about combined arms, but something far less romantic but just as important: logistics. :)
Another potential reason to the shift towards smaller formations might also be in the size of the eastern front. Divisions were often tasked with covering dozens of miles of territory and having more command centers along this front may have eased the burden of communication between divisional elements. Also more smaller divisions would grant greater operational flexabilty. Less trains to move divisions along the front and less stain on logistical formations that have to organise distribution to the division far away from supply depos and rail heads.
It's shocking that how combining units can be natural for a current strategy game player as war3 or Sc2, but not for an old general graduated from high ranking military school .... Great video btw, really nice job by demystifying lot of legends
Great Video TIK! Might the triangular division be more suited for the Western trenches of the Great War? Often the third division was a reserve division. You have a narrow front, so you can't put everyone at the front at the same time. Flexibility is less needed because it is harder to outflank in the narrow battle front. Each time a regiment withdrew it needed to be replaced quickly, to avoid the enemy from exploiting a gap in the lines. Thus having a lot of reserves at the ready was key. Where there any differences between the eastern fronts and the western fronts during the First World War, organizationally speaking? The Eastern front was wider and more mobile, and because of this saw less extensive trenching.
The Square division had all sorts of specialist units integral to the division. Which was found to be inefficient. The Triangular division dispensed with the specialist units and they would be attached from Corps Army as needed.
I really like this because, up until a year ago, I believed the change in the panzer division organization following the polish campaign was because the early PzDiv was too tank heavy. Then I started seeing a lot of military historians on TH-cam talking about how this was Hitler's idea to expand the number of PzDiv prior to Barbarossa. Thanks for letting me know that I wasn't just high and that the reason for the reorg was actually to improve the PzDiv command structure and fighting ability.
It is true that the combined experience of simply retaking lost territory from the Versailles treaty as well as Anschluss and the annexation of Czechoslovakia not to mention the Spanish civil war gave the Germans the edge in experience, learning, evolving and refining the various challenges and issues that presented from these events. I read somewhere that while driving into Austria with a tank column along a narrow road, the lead tank broke down and lead to complete chaos. This seemingly innocuous event lead the Germans to rethink simply driving tank after tank along narrow roads, including mixing up maintenance, repair as well as spacing etc. During one early battle of France, the Germans learnt again that simply sending groups of unprotected tanks against an enemy position would lead to heavy losses, So all the military adventures they engaged in from re-taking the Ruhr to France gave Germany the edge in refining combined arms warfare including the right balance of different types of units grouped together. However, this still flies in the face of the overwhelming, over-arching facts that WWII was essentially a battle of production, numbers and access to all essential types of resources. I think to compare the dilution of the panzer divisions before Barbarossa with the North African theatre is perhaps a composition/division fallacy meaning what's true in one place in not necessarily true in another. I do tend to believe Hitler's insistence in increasing armour production (which was partially ignored) with heavier guns, over the argument that Hitler ordered a partial demobilisation after the defeat of the allies in the Western campaign, though the over-confidence and hubris in some sectors German general staff, of the Waffennamt and other sections of industry, may have been responsible for this costly oversight. So we now conclude that the removal of a panzer regiment to create a new panzer division was a good idea? I'm still not convinced of Hitler's reasons for this given his reported delight in seeing paper divisions on situation maps, the debacle of the Luftwaffe 'field divisions', and so on. Of course no one single decision or area of decisions can be attributed to the catastrophic defeat of the Wehrmacht, but I do believe one of the greatest blunders which both hitler and his Generals are responsible for was not adjusting operationally after the defeat at Moscow. I happen to believe both Manstein and Von Mellenthin that a stalemate could have been achieved on the Eastern Front up until late '43.
Fascinating original analysis again. Well done! One thing comes to mind when comparing armoured divisions from WW2 to modern ones. Modern western armies are likely over geared to perform in an insurgency war. It might be better to compare armoured divisions from the cold war era when opponents were structuring their militaries along conventional lines.
Could it be that Guderian was actually thinking about tank availability and wanted more tanks to actually have the functioning tanks he needed to attack and defend against a relentlessly attacking enemy who was causing continuing attrition of his forces? Maybe Guderian saw on-the-ground that the lessons of Poland and France did not exactly transfer to the Russian front. You have mentioned in another video the problems of logistics and parts supply. I guess and add to that the problem of availability of trained and experienced personnel necessary to repair complex machinery - something that seems to be given short shrift in analysis of warring forces. Stahel in "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East" has combat readiness charts that are interesting to me as they show what would no doubt have been a concerning lack of combat-ready equipment in the Panzer divisions. Perhaps that would explain Guderian's comment. Love your videos. Great stuff.
Everyone who wants to learn about your topics learns about it here. I really loved your Battle of Arnhem video. How about making a lighter version of your topics that are easier accessibel for the less concentrated? Have it illustrated with movie scenes (if legally possible) and get a different audience drawn to your already excellent videos. For instance: “Why does a tank batallion need infantry support?” Great channel TIK!
Very informative information this guy is great at explaining what happened . Never read this stuff before but what I have read before was wrong ,great stuff
I love your binary division argument. It totally agrees with the US adoption of two combat commands (A and B) for each division where the divisional commander can set up two "combat commands" which can be more flexible than the original structure of two armored and one armored infantry regiments (i.e. a triangular division). Great work!!
Excellent video. Personal guess, about the misconception (for example, why blaming "less tanks in tank divisions", or "smaller divisions"): Germans did a good job at some point (say 1940 when fighting against France) and won with larger divisions (or heavier tank divisions); they did not went that well and finally lost after invading Soviet Union while they changed to use smaller divisions (or tank divisions with less tanks). It's quite natural to get this misconception (or misleading/plausible idea) that smaller units (tank divisions with less tanks) are in general weaker and responsible for the failure. Good job TIK, at debunking these statements. Hope you can keep doing this and give us a more objective and more comprehensive view of WW2.
Infantry divisions were primarily defensive; the panzers conquered and the infantry occupied and held. During the mid war period the Germans became more focussed on defence and increased the allocation of automatic weapons to their infantry. This allows them to reduce the strength of infantry units without reducing their defensive firepower on the front line and increase your artillery ratio; infantry can delay an attack, but it is artillery that breaks it. These smaller divisions could hold the same front line as the older larger divisions; so more divisions could be rotated out of the line for refurbishment/deeper defence/ retraining.
Very interesting analysis and study of army military structure. As a veteran of the US Army, never questioned the organization of the units but of course accepted them the way they were. This video gives an insight into how military planners focus on the problems of deploying their forces and making them more maneuverable.
You make excellent use of the work of David Glantz (also in your “4 Statements” video which quotes COL House as well). Hopefully this will encourage viewers to examine his deep body of work in this area. If you haven't read them already, you'll also find that the “August Storm” volumes of Glantz are absolutely priceless. Anyone looking to purchase used copies of his “August Storm” volumes on the Soviet invasion of Manchuria should be aware, however, that there are two different sets available that have very similar names. They’ll want to make sure that they are getting the 2003 volumes, “Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm" and “Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm" from Frank Cass Publishers. The earlier and less comprehensive 1883 volumes -- which are nevertheless rock-solid works --- are titled “August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria” (Leavenworth Papers No. 7) and “August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945” (Leavenworth Papers No. 8). By the time that Glantz produced the 2003 set he’d been able to benefit greatly from the upsurge in archival material that became available after the breakup of the Soviet Union. And it was a good thing that he took advantage of this while he could because the “openness” started to close off almost as quickly as it had begun and now comes in the form of periodic, official spurts instead of through independent research of primary source materials. Nevertheless, the result is that his knowledge, which broadened exponentially between the 1983 and 2003 sets, is still expanding and this has prompted Glantz to modify his opinion in some areas. For example, while he formerly expressed that the Soviets might have been able to conduct a successful operation in Northern Hokkaido, he has since come to the conclusion that “any military operations against Hokkaido were infeasible, even if Stalin had decided to challenge Truman -- which he didn’t.” (D. M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay, p258) Giangreco notes that: “When producing the 2003 book he had less information available to him and knowledge of the Japanese situation was largely limited to how it was characterized in the Russian after-action reports. The piecemealing out of documents from the former Soviet Union has been an ongoing frustration for Glantz. He notes that the material available to researchers is still limited and that this is unlikely to change significantly any time soon. Said Glantz: ‘The mail’s still out. There’s one more -- maybe three, four, five more -- rounds [of document releases to come] before we’re through’.” (Giangreco, Hell to Pay, p509) See Glantz and Giangreco (and Richard B. Frank) on stage together here, www.c-span.org/video/?327355-5/strategies-invasion-defense-japan, discussing US, Soviet and Japanese operational plans for combat on Hokkaido, and Giangreco here, th-cam.com/video/_4uDfg38gykh/w-d-xo.htmlttps://th-cam.com/video/_4uDfg38gyk/w-d-xo.html, dealing principally with the interdependence of European and Pacific theater operations and US support for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.
The triangular division (or any triangular unit) typically fought "two up, one back", with two regiments in the line and one in reserve. That's great if you can afford to have 33% of your manpower out of contact with the enemy. The German Army quickly decided it was a luxury they could not afford. It's important to note their 6-battalion divisions always had a 7th reserve battalion, designated "Fusilier" or "Schnell" with some mobile assets (often just bicycles) to take the place of the former reserve regiment. On a technical note, I rather like the less-busy backgrounds in most of this video.
Maybe the triangular division was more suited for the Western trenches of the great war? You have a narrow front, so you can't put everyone at the front at the same time. Each time a regiment withdrew it needed to be replaced quickly, to avoid the enemy from exploiting a gap in the lines.
The Great War is not my forté, but I know that for most of the war the British had square divisions, with four infantry brigades. So those were usually "three up, one back". When the Americans came in they also had square divisions; US divisions were massive, with about 22,000 men each. My understanding is that during the course of the war the various Armies evolved to the triangular organization due to the shortages of manpower, and this carried on into the '20s and '30s.
@@SeraphimARcanus In theory and in practice, yes. But I was sometimes used as a reserve due to having somewhat better mobility (and perhaps troop quality)
This was my thinking also, a binary division forces more troops up front. If you give any commander 3 units, he will want to hold 1 in reserve. If commanders on every level do this, then you have 1 regiment + 2 battalions + 2 companies + ... over 50% in reserve or in-depth positions. So in theory you can cover as much front with a binary division as a triangular division.
I served in the US 1st Infantry Division from 2001 - 2006 - At that time it was 3 brigades, each had 2 mech infantry battalions, 1 armor battalion, 1 engineer 1 field arty, a forward support battalion a a brigade recon troop and a HHC Brigade that had all the S shops. When we deployed to Iraq, the Brigade commander carved off 1 tank company and added a tank platoon to each infantry battalion, 1 tank platoon to the engineers, 1 tank platoon to the field arty, who also lost 1 company to each of the same.1 infantry mech infantry battalion similarly had a company of bradleys carved off and sent by platoons to each battalion. Then we were supplemented with 2 light infantry national guard battalions. This created 5-800 man battalion task forces. Combined arms as you mention in living color. I was in the Brigade recon troop which acted as the brigade reserve.
I’d argue that the convergence of memory and self-interest makes for lots of errors. Add-in the ‘repeated tale’ experiment. Information gets transformed as it is repeated.
Remember being in BATUS in the 90s doing battle group exercises. The battle groups were either tank heavy (2 tank squadrons to 1 infantry company) or infantry heavy (2 infantry companies to 1 tank squadron) the infantry heavy ones were always more effective, hence the reason about a third of the new challenger 2s were put in storage.
What is really interesting is that within the States prior to its involvement in World War II, there was a massive war game. This stretched across a good portion of the country and accommodated hundreds of thousands of men, including George S. Patton (who was nicknamed "The Green Hornet" because of his ridiculous uniform during the operation). What was realized during these exercises was that combined-arms formations, not purely tank or infantry formations, were the best use of resources upon the battlefield and gave a greater chance of victory.
Hi TiK, I am coming from MHV channel and I got this info from one of his videos: From Deutsce Reich & und der 2. Weltkrieg, Band 6 (p. 778-779, 785-787) it was calcilated by the organization department of General Staff of the Army that in June 1942 the army was lacking 740 000 men. They didn't really manage to fill the manpower needs of the army to the extent that was required by the General Staff.
Thanks! However, the point to note is that they assigned enough replacements to replace combat losses, so why were they still down? I actually discussed this in the video yesterday.
In the wargaming world, Dunnigan wrote about this extensively in the 70s. He noted that the standard 1939 German infantry division decreased in headcount by about 25%, relative to the 1944 organization. Yet there was no decrease in overall firepower. I have read other writers (Seaton, Cooper) who noted that the motorized division switched to binary structure in 40-41, and attributed it to a need to have divisions sized to allow the divisional leadership more easy handling. I have also read other accounts of British officers needing more onfantry for combined arms operations under Montgomery in France. The view was that the Italian campaign was tying up too many infantry divisions, and there weren't enough to pair with armored formations in France.
Great video, I especially learned from the stuff about the Italians. one thought though about the quote from Guderian's memoirs: as you present it in this video, it could be interpreted to mean that Guderian was not necesarily opposed to the thought of the binary panzer division, but more like he wanted a greater effort put into creating even more armoured formations. as I haven't read the memoirs, I don't know if there is other statements in it one way or another.
You may be right with your speculation on Guderian, but then I would argue that this shows his ignorance about the overall German oil-crisis which dictated that it wasn't possible to build more tanks or mobile divisions. th-cam.com/video/kVo5I0xNRhg/w-d-xo.html (link to "Why Germany Lost - OIL" video, in case you haven't seen it)
Fair point, but that wouldn't be a surprise to me if he was somewhat ignorant of that problem. (and yes I have watched that video, I think I'm pretty much up to date with everything you've put up, except the gaming videos :) )
Haha I don't blame you for not getting through the 800+ gaming videos! I'm planning on doing the odd gaming video now and then, but the focus will be the history from now on.
One thing I'd be interested to hear you address: Why did Italians fight so poorly? DID they fight so poorly? Were Italians bad soldiers or was a lot of it things out of their control? Did Italians not have their heart in the fight? etc.
One concern for when you referenced the Soviet Mechanized Corps. It seems a bit of a weak comparison to put a Soviet Mechanized Corps against a panzer division. Both formations were infantry heavy, but a better consideration would be (I would think) the Soviet Tank Corps, which was similar to a Soviet Mechanized Corps. However, instead of 3 motorized infantry brigades and 1 tank brigade, a Soviet Mechanized Corps had 1 motorized infantry brigade and 3 tank brigades. The Soviet tank corps continued throughout the war and even replaced the Soviet tank divisions (although it seems the "division" formation was making a comeback in the final year or so) and fulfilled the same role for the Red Army as an armored division from any other nation's army. One thing that keeps leaving me confused with this video is that the Germans pretty much always operated with a triangular division template, with a large exception of the light divisions in Africa. I've never heard about motorized infantry divisions losing their 3rd regiment. All I can think is that they were added back in later. Even your template for a 1945 panzer division features 3 regiments (1 panzer, 2 panzergrenadier regiments). While the regiments were smaller (generally 2 battalions vs 3) and the brigade echelon of the panzer divisions were removed, reducing the overall size of the divisions. On the Italian Army, you seemed to completely ignore that that every Italian Infantry division, on paper anyway, was supposed to include a legion of blackshirts. A legion was supposed to be the equivalent of a regiment, but only consists of 2 battalions. As of 1940, particularly after Operation Compass, the Regio Esercito decided against reforming CCNN (blackshirt) divisions and instead opt to assign blackshirt battalions to existing infantry divisions. While the blackshirt battalions were not always included, that leaves the Italian "binary" division with a total of 8 battalions, not 6. Hoping to get some feedback on this. Cheers!
When you said about Hitler messing up the Panzer divisions in 41 I knew you were going to quote Good Ole Heinz and his book, I read it too so I knew where you were going.
I've been reading about WW2 for over 50yrs (yes I'm an old fart). And I've taken so much misinformation over so much time as gospel because most authors supported these myths which were perceived as accurate history. Thank you Tic for challenging my whole perceived paradigm mindset of WW2 created by 1000's of academic authorities on this subject.🤔👍
Another thing I frequently see being ignored in relation to the amount of tanks per division is the logistical burden, the tanks per division being lower allowed for the logistical and maintenance burden to be more spread out allowing for supply lines to be less stressed on specific locations. This also influenced the switch the Soviets had towards the (late war) mechanized corps which from what I've read were generally speaking the better performing mobile formations in the later war for the soviets. If you notice the amount of logistics and maintenance units in a panzer division doesnt change when going from 2 regiments to 1 regiment meaning that initially those units would have been supporting twice the tanks which would obviously have led to a general shorter independent operating range for the division and this has generally speaking been the same for allot of other nations in that the decrease in regiments didn't mean a decrease in support assets.
I want to thank TIK for his beautiful, SIMPLE English. I have a very weak level of English (the level of the old USSR school, ahah), but to my surprise, I can read and understand subtitles - there are few complex rare words and used simple words that I know. The pronunciation is also very clear! I don't usually understand english colloquial speaking. I think he do this specifically for the convenience of people with poor English. So - Thanks!!
I had a poll up on a video ages ago asking which battle I should cover next. Crete was one of the options. As was the Battle of the Bulge. But for some reason, everyone voted for Stalingrad. So, going with the majority like a good democratic vote should, I'm now neck-deep in the most ambitious project I've ever attempted, or ever will attempt. So yes, I will cover them, but only after Stalingrad.
instead of "only"Crete, go for a general overview of all the para/glider attacks in WW2 and why some worked, some didnt and , lesson learned, why MODERN parachute regiments DO NOT and WILL NOT ever do (large scale ww2 style) parachute attacks anymore...
Guderian is talking about more tanks being needed not more tanks per division. Rommel landed with 1 light division (5th light) which later was converted to a panzer division (15th). After a few months he received his 1st panzer division (21st)
about the composition of german army divisions today and them being similarly infantry heavy like later Wehrmacht divisions, you have to take into account: 1) divisions today are not considered the main operational unit performing combined arms operations, but the brigade is. 2) them being infantry-heavy results from having been shaped by almost three decades of peacekeeping and such, where tank formations were of less use and difficult to deploy, as well as tank units getting dissolved due to higher costs. 3) remaining units, both divisions and brigades might not necessarily fight with this structure in wartime, but act as retention basin for the remaining batallions during peacetime, after most other divisions and brigades were dissolved. 4) the structure of german mechanized brigades during most of the cold war period, when the army was tailored to fight a large-scale conventional conflict in Europe similar to WWII, the number of Panzergrenadier and armor brigades was about equal, they were triangular, armor brigades had two tank batallions and one PzGren batallion, Panzergrenadier brigades had it reversed - thus you have either 2:1 or 1:2 ratio for tanks to infantry, but not generally more infantry units.
Really interesting topic. And your conclusion at the end is very true-- not much actual evidence of TOE's and the evolution of division structures for all nations from pre-war onward. Perhaps there's a natural limit to what a "Commander" can manage effectively at this scale?
I think there is, and I think the limit is quite small. This is probably why the Soviets had trouble in the mid-war period, since their army commanders were controlling way too many units (as I've suggested in the Soviet Army Size 1942 video). And I suspect the reason there's not much discussion on TOE's or divisional structural evolution is because it's a relevant and very important topic that the militaries around the world don't want to discuss in the open.
TIK. Thanks. Nice analysis. I wish I saw this video sooner. From all my reading over the years and your logical and supported explanation, I think you are correct. But I confess the argument would be better if I knew where all these officers and NCOS ( less so) were comming from. ( You mention a pool of Officers.) Training schools ? OR each division has extra Officers? IT looks like one of the benefits of the new structure is an increase in the ratio of the officers and NCOS to EM per over all command. The manpower stayed the same but the command Staff and some NCOS had to be increased. This tells me there are more leaders. The new leaders are in a new organization so they are not in each others way. Leadership casualties would have a larger pool of experienced men to draw -up to replace lost leaders. So I see that as a plus too. Some Officers could be Mustangs ( EM promoted to Officer) But still I would think most Officers would come from Training schools. SO... Did Germany Train Officers in a larger number , or maybe more effectively ? And perhaps NCOS too.?
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*NOTES, LINKS and SOURCES*
I’ll be discussing the “tank heavy” problem that the British suffer from during my upcoming Operation Crusader video. But in a nutshell, Major General Percy Hobart thought that tanks could win battles on their own. This meant that when he created 7th Armoured Division, he didn’t really think much about the infantry or artillery aspects. He advised Auchinleck, Norrie, and Cunningham for Crusader, which is why they split their tanks from their infantry into two separate corps. In the end, it was the infantry corps (13th) that won the day.
The 1st UK Armoured Division did have an extra brigade (4th Armoured) prior to 2007, but this was dropped. Even so, the ratio of tanks to infantry remains the same.
There are variances, but in general - Binary divisions have two regiments; Triangular divisions have three regiments; Square divisions have four regiments; And Pentomic divisions have five battlegroups (going off the US version, since they’re the only ones to make this type of division ever as far as I’m aware).
Not all German divisions in 1941-42 went from 9 to 6 battalions, so the numbers shown in the video are rough estimates. That said, we know that the Germans replaced their losses, and we know that they increased the number of their divisions. And what we find is that the number of men on the Axis-Soviet Front actually grown in the summer periods of 1941-1943. It is only post Kursk that the Germans have manpower issues and difficulties filling their ranks. Prior to Kursk, they did have shortages (what army doesn’t), but these were usually in the Winter months. The reduction in the size of German divisions in the period 1941-1943 therefore cannot be explained by manpower shortages as usually stated.
I highly recommend the book “Enduring the Whirlwind” by Liedtke (listed below) for a decent discussion on German unit manpower and tank strengths, as well as replacements, in the period 1941-1943. It’s essential reading for anyone interested in the Axis-Soviet Front.
Not a lot has been written on this topic, and most of what has been written doesn’t specifically state why the triangular division concept was the dominating one at the time. House’s book does talk about it, but I’d like a second opinion. I suspect it’s not really an interesting subject for non-military personnel, but it is a topic I’m now interested in. If you have any recommendations for books on the topic of division composition and the transition to a more combined-arms organization, please let me know.
And as you can see from the source list below, I’m needing a lot of books (let alone other equipment) to make these videos. Please consider supporting me on Patreon and make these videos as good as they can be. I’m highly reliant on your support www.patreon.com/TIKhistory
And a big thank you goes to my current Patreons for your ongoing support, for which I am super-grateful. As always, you guys are awesome!
*VIDEO LINKS*
You may be interested in the following videos after watching this one -
How BIG were Soviet Armies and Divisions in 1942? And what impact did this have? th-cam.com/video/wDslsMgnphI/w-d-xo.html
Why No German Reinforcements at Stalingrad? th-cam.com/video/VQ3-TqeZqeA/w-d-xo.html
Operation Compass 1940-41 (where 20k British troops under O’Connor beat 150k Italians under Marshal Graziani in North Africa, prompting Rommel to be sent to Libya) th-cam.com/video/b71kdhj27rk/w-d-xo.html
FALL BLAU 1942 - Examining the Disaster th-cam.com/video/hzr6dD8fvVY/w-d-xo.html
The MAIN Reason Why Germany Lost WW2 - OIL th-cam.com/video/kVo5I0xNRhg/w-d-xo.html
Your Perception of the WW2 Eastern Front is Wrong th-cam.com/video/B-ZHH770WLs/w-d-xo.html
The Numbers Say it All | The Myth of German Superiority on the WW2 Eastern Front th-cam.com/video/_7BE8CsM9ds/w-d-xo.html
Stalin’s Purge of the Red Army and Its Effects on the WW2 Eastern Front th-cam.com/video/JnWNnI6YlQQ/w-d-xo.html
Kampfgruppen in WW2 th-cam.com/video/zKWczZkQ130/w-d-xo.html
And various Order of battle videos -
Paulus's 6th Army ORDER OF BATTLE - Before Stalingrad th-cam.com/video/DCDjAqTUCmw/w-d-xo.html
The Axis Order of Battle for Operation Crusader 1941-42 WW2 th-cam.com/video/LwPJWb2BUj4/w-d-xo.html
The British Order of Battle for Operation Crusader 1941-42 WW2 th-cam.com/video/QCNDEoRDp6I/w-d-xo.html
*SOURCES/BIBLIOGRAPHY -*
Books:
Anderson, T. “The History of the Panzerwaffe. Volume 2: 1942-45.” Osprey Publishing, 2017.
Barnett, C. “The Desert Generals.” Kindle, 2nd Edition.
Becket, I. “Rommel: A Reappraisal.” Pen & Sword Ltd, Kindle, 2013.
Butler, D. “Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel.” Casemate Publishers, 2015.
Ford, K. “Operation Crusader 1941: Rommel in Retreat.” Osprey Publishing, 2010.
Christie, H. “Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army in the Opening Campaign in the Western Desert, June 1940.” Pickle Partners Publishing, 2014.
Glantz, D. “When Titan’s Clashed.” University Press of Kansas, 2015.
Glantz, D. House, J. “The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1. To the Gates of Stalingrad. Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942.” University Press of Kansas, 2009.
Guderian, H. “Panzer Leader.” Penguin Books, 2000.
Heyman, C. “The Armed Forces of the United Kingdom 2006-2007.” R & F Defence Publications, 2006.
Hill, A. “The Red Army and the Second World War. (Armies of the Second World War.” Cambridge University Press, 2017.
House, J. “Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th-Century Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization.” University Press of the Pacific, 2002.
Isaev, A. “Dubno 1941: The Greatest Tank Battle of the Second World War.” Helion & Company, 2017.
Liedtke, G. “Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943.” Helion & Company LTD, 2016.
Mark, J. “Death of the Leaping Horsemen: The 24th Panzer Division in Stalingrad 12th August - 20th November 1942.” Stackpole Books, Kindle 2003.
Mitcham, S. “Hitler’s Legions: German Army Order of Battle World War II.” Redwood Burn Limited, 1985.
Mitcham, S. “German Order of Battle: Volume One: 1st-290th Infantry Divisions in WWII.” Stackpole Books, 2007.
Mitcham, S. “German Order of Battle: Volume Two: 291st-999th Infantry Divisions, Named Infantry Divisions, and Special Divisions in WWII.” Stackpole Books, 2007.
Mitcham, S. “German Order of Battle: Volume Three: Panzer, Panzer Grenadier, and Waffen SS Divisions in WWII.” Stackpole Books, 2007.
Nafziger, G. The Afrika Korps: An Organizational History 1941-1943. 1997.
Pitt, B. “The Crucible of War: Auchinleck’s Command.” The Definitive History of the Desert War. Cassell & Co, 2001.
Playfair, I. The Mediterranean and Middle East, Volume III, British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb [September 1941 to September 1942]. The Naval & Military Press LTD 1960. Ed. 2004.
Internet Sources:
Moore, G. “Operation Crusader” (Order of Battle) gregpanzerblitz.com/Crusader.htm
German Army Official Website www.deutschesheer.de/
Thanks for watching, bye for now!
Thanks! Glad you liked it!
If you want a good over view of the German ww2 Infantry Division look at “The German Infantry Handbook 1939-1945” by Alex Buchner. It into detail on the organization of the early war division and the later war changes the moved to 6 Battalions. Even mentioning that they disbanded the reconnaissance battalion, converting 1 battalion in every regiment into a fusilier battalion that had a company equipped with bicycles.
The British didn't too well in the early part of North Africa not because of their composition of armor divisions; moreover, it was because the British AT guns and tanks were under gunned with little more than 6 lbs guns at best.
Thanks Paul, I've added that book to a shopping list and will pick it up!
George, that's not the only reason. The 2-pouder AT guns were capable of tackling the German tanks within 500m (which was roughly the range the Panzer III's also needed to be to engage the British). The main issue was that the Germans used their infantry and anti-tank guns with their tanks, whereas the British didn't. This meant that the Germans had more guns to bear on the British tanks. British artillery (with their good 25-pounders) was also kept out of the loop when they were needed most. Yes, the 88's outranged the British tanks, but even when the 88s weren't around, British tanks went in alone and got chewed up. At least, this is what happened up to and including Crusader, if not afterwards. In the few instances where the British did use their AT-guns with the tanks, the results were better for the British.
You should create a series called "But is this really the case?" Its becoming a staple of the channel. xD
That's a very good idea! Thank you!
indeed try it!!!
Pardinas82 he is a little too much of a contrarian imo.
Its always nice to hear different view points, but in some ways he goes a little far.
Id also like some myth busting on the french, polish,british and american side.
Its mostly german, russian, italian myth busting.
I also think hes going to far with his criticism of guderian, manstein, rommel and the rest of the germans.
It may balance the views of the „wehraboos“ but in my opinion these were all excellent generals/field marshalls.
Manstein with the sichelstreich for example, to replace the schlieffenplan.
Guderian with his efforts to establish the modern german tank warfare.
Rommels success in france and africa.
I think that the germans had by far the best the best officers in europe and maybe also the best trained and prepared soldiers, atleast at the beginning.
The british had a lot of trouble with their officers.
We dont have to talk about the french... or italians i think?!
And the russians arent on par either.
Id rate the americans 2nd overall.
Obviously these ppl are still human.
Macarthur, nimitz, patton, monty too.
@@TheImperatorKnight You're an imbecile who doesn't know wtf you are even talking about. Don't bother.
Uncle Joe Stalin i never said that he doesnt.
He knows more than i do.
Im just listening and learning and criticizing what i think is a little over the top crackdown on wehraboo heros.
When I was a tanker in the Marines, we were taught over and over that without infantry support, tanks are absolutely dead in an urban fight. We need grunts clearing houses, identifying and marking out enemy strongpoints, and keeping the RPGs off our asses. Tankers give a lot of shit to infantry, but we need those guys and there's nothing like a tank putting rounds into enemy positions to motivate the infantry. We are entirely combined and work together.
Thank you for that explanation. I was an SSG in the Military History Division of the Army Reserves. I was never in battle. I've heard many lectures but your explanation has been the most clear.
There isn't a finer and more deadly fighting force that is constantly deployed and ready for action in the history of warfare then the USMC.
It's a joke to hear all this euro-centric therories of warfare. I can't really find anything in the annuals of history where these europeans have ever fought to our level. We can be out numbered, far away from home and we just kill these clowns.
I would agree with anything an infantryman will say. You're the bomb!
This is why the WW2 Churchill tanks was so liked by its crews and the infantry. It was slow but could climb hills that defeat other tanks and proved the duality of infantry supporting tanks and vice-versa.
@@dhardy6654 once again the American education system fails an American citizen. Lol
"There's more balance in the Force" great Jedi Master TIK, 25th June 2018
Meesa Jedi? Yousa should follow me now, okeeday?
Oh God, WHY. I read that perfectly in Jar Jar. 10/10 would cringe again.
Best Jar Jar reenactment of all time. XD
Oh god
One should suppose that TIK has made it much more difficult to loose arguments now that your own knowledge is supplemented and fortified with logic and such deep looks inside the numbers. It can be hard to find a room that can keep up with me in war context he just made it more difficult.
A lot of people are so TACTICAL in their thoughts of war. They conclude that the Germans had good tanks so thats why they took so much land. The Germans took a lot of land uncontested at first. People now of days think that you can fight wars with drones or by smart bombs alone. If the enemy is dug in, good luck with that. The Generals must use STRATEGY to win wars, and that always means boots on the ground.
Yes, absolutely
Except for you, you are the exceptional thinker here?
None Ya
Thank you, buddy. Couldn't have said it better myself.
Definitely. People who study war know this, and realize the importance of certain boring or seemingly "old" "outdated" things like logistics and deploying troops to the ground. In fact it's sometimes baffling how inept leaders can be. I read a great book about the invasion of Iraq, apparently Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld and the neocon leadership had come up with their own theories for how to win a modern war and they learned absolutely NOTHING from Vietnam or Korea specifically how massive bombing campaigns alone do very little, and in fact often have a paradoxical effect by driving inhabitants to join the opposition (russia did learn that lesson from us and in their invasion of Afghanistan had a fairly large ground deployment, but had their own problems, which we then learned from them but still forgot the earlier lessons lol). During the Invasion of Iraq the neocon leadership truly believed we could win a war in Iraq with nothing but precision bombing (opposed to the earlier carpet bombing [ironically still drives local population against us as seen from precision drone attacks which are shockingly indiscriminate]) and marines/special forces. The joint chiefs were extremely upset by rumsfeld's plan and the planning teams were trying to urge him to follow the logistics protocol which was designed specifically for an overseas invasion but he wanted to do the war on the cheap while still accomplishing our lofty goals. The result was during the initial deployment and invasion, the limited troop formations we deployed ran out of fuel and the US army ground to a stalemate in a day with hardly any combat! The marines were also given some absurd orders to do the war by themselves with little to no support despite it not being what they were designed to do and actually protested the orders! Some people inside were really mad they would refuse to carry out orders but they knew they had a good point. And the first actual helicopter deployment also ended in near catastrophe when the choppers took heavy fire and some very green soldiers were downed and accidentally brought more units into harm attempting to rescue them, they were very nearly encircled and destroyed but a nearby SAS team working behind enemy lines happened to be near enough to hear what was happening and showed up. They were able to flank the Iraqis forcing them to withdraw and the downed soldiers were extracted. you'll never hear about any of this because it was quite embarrassing and there was a psychological operation (or perception management) going on, so this stuff was unknown at the time to keep spirits/morale high in the army and us/ally population to maintain support by making it seem like an easy fight, if people knew what was really happening perception would have been different. In the end really war comes down to making the least amount of mistakes and so many things can happen, even to the marines who we just hear about being supersoldiers
None Ya that's a fact. I think i am going to read the art of war soon and then see what strategies are still being used i am very interested in that.
Maybe Rommel didn't ask for more tanks simply because he didn't have the logistics and fuel to use more
Maybe. But logistics and fuel is also a factor on the Eastern Front too.
Infantry in Africa had to be motorized to be of any use, foot troops in the desert tend to be static forces and easily outflanked. So fuel was not the problem.
WHY didnt he ask for donkeys, horses ...AND CAMELS ?
You can't motorize the infantry without fuel, and there was barely enough of that for the motorized elements that were there already. So fuel was the problem.
Not only this.
Africa also means covering really large distances - for this, you also better have fuel and vehicles to move your troops around.
Next, at the time there were some roads around, but not much railways, meaning you had to carry supply over large distances using mostly trucks. Again, fuel. And more fuel.
Then, you want to actually have some air cover and reconnaissance - fuel, here we come.
How do the supplies and troops reach Africa? By convoys, that also use some fuel.
And we`re not yet at the tanks, even ;)
Great stuff. The term we used in the Army was “force multiplier” when reducing manpower but increasing the firepower in weapon systems
Yes, that's it! Force-multiplier! I couldn't think of the term :) also "economy of force" is another one I remembered today.
More fire power means more shooting - leading to more supply trucks - leading to longer pauses for reloading...
5 minutes shooting by a minigun may send 15000 bullits downrange but the reload time?
And breakdown times of those weapon systems?
It's the need for more eyes to spot the enemy, that will give those weapon systems something to do...
All armies need scouts, snipers and infantry to mob up the enemy area, and those grunts should be
able to call in any other weapon systems within range to punch large holes in the enemy as needed...
13:51
**Shows War Thunder picture**
- "...World of Tanks 2..."
😂😂😂
I love these little jokes he fits in all his videos, those details make it all so much better!
Haha good to hear a few people got that one ;)
I’m outraged, I tells ya! How dare you yada yada... this is the internet after all, there needs to be at least one person salty about throwing shade on their (and my) favourite game! But seriously, I love the little throwaway jokes. The delivery is so deadpan and serious I almost (almost) miss them sometimes.
Still, war thunder is better
What pisses me off immensely is that I just KNOW there is some absolute gold collecting dust in Italian archives that historians just overlook, just neglect when it could shed so much light on so many topics. I'm especially keen to understand just what the fuck happened during Operation: Agreement. Perhaps the most devastating raid you never hear talked about - the Dieppe of the North Africa.
I want to cry. I've just finished my "paper" for my high school finals about the evolution of armoured warfare between WW1 and WW2 and you just dropped this massive video with a wall of text of sources and additional informations.
I'm presenting it on the third of July, but how am I supposed to talk without checking all the informations you gave me? It's becoming a drug. The more I know, the more I understand I don't know anything.
I know it's a curse, whenever I want to make a rebuttal to some TH-cam reply, I end up watching an hour long Tik video just for one stupid reply
TIK!!! BEST WORLD WAR 2 CHANNEL ON TH-cam!!! I ALWAYS LEARN SOMETHING!!! AWESOME STUFF!
Well, I'm glad you're enjoying this :D
When are you going to write a book.
Busting the myths of WW2
Myth-buster number 1045: Zaitsev didn't fight a famous German sniper from an elite sniper school. It was just some random German sniper.
(Now the question is, why did I deliberately use the number 1045?)
TIK day 1045 of WW2 was the start of El Alamein......new video 😋
Was it? If it was, that actually wasn't the reason :D
TIK good guess though
Would you like an answer? Or should we let someone else guess first?
When I was younger, I first thought that motor/mech divisions became less tank-heavy, not only because of the learning curve of the combined-arms, but also because of logistics and training. How to obtain more mechanic-hours? Spare parts? Supply dumps? Unghhhhhhhh .......... (more worries)
Excellent video! I liked its well-organized and concise format.
Thank you! Glad you liked the video. And yes, it's something that's intrigued me for a while. Now I've looked into a few different campaigns, I can see there is a correlation. It might be both the combined arms and logistics elements
Got to love the different usage of the terms Regiment, Battalion and Brigade in WW2. German armoured battalion is the equivalent to a British armoured regiment. German regiment is the equivalent to a British brigade (armoured and infantry). Meanwhile, a regiment in the British infantry is an administrative organisation.
Yes! Even I get lost at times!
thank you helped with my confusion regarding this DK
@@TheImperatorKnight Oh thankyou for saying that. I was beginning to feel very stupid. lol
Is there a chart somewheres that lays all this out at a glance?
I've been in the US army for a decade and I still cant keep up. Also, a degraded unit (late campaign) may have battalion colors present but are barely comp enough by sized.
Someone should make a cheat sheet for it
This is one of your best perhaps the best short answer to the long problem of assumption, perception and permanent fog of war. I have walls full of books authored by those who were there and none of them ever saw the macro scaled as you have. A bit older than you so those things have lingered and festered with me so it is very good indeed that another generation is learning and that brilliant historians and analysts like you carry on. This study you did should be your ticket to a lifetime of lectures and recognized for being seminal. Wondering if you will ever assemble your work as a larger teaching tool as required learning. Please dont stop my brain is hungry forever.
You are finally using powerpoint! It's like seeing a panzer III transform into a tiger. :D
Haha, I'm not actually. I've just started doing some more advanced animations in Premiere Pro. But glad you noticed ;)
I guess we'll have to engage in a cold war now. PP16 ftw.
Let's hope his transmission system doesn't fail, and he spends more time trying to get powerpoint to work then on youtube.
Don't want to be too much of a tiger :x
to be fair to TIK he has a good format which reliably pumps out content. Editing on powerpoint is a bitch.
I like the Panzer III :c
It's ridiculous how much I've learned from your channel. Thanks for your hard work put into making these videos.
I am kind of surprised that there is no comment about US Armored Division in WW2. Americans did the same thing by reforming their Armored Divisions from 1940 T/O&E, to 1942 T/O&E, then to 1943 T/O&E to finally reach the perfect tank/infantry/artillery 1:1:1 ratio. They also mobilized numbers of separate tank battalions to be attached to Infantry Divisions and abandoned the specialized, heavily tank concentrated Armored Corps idea.
You're right, I could have mentioned them. I just don't have too much information on US armoured units since my focus has been Market Garden, North African Campaign, and Eastern Front.
Because it is almost impossible to explain when you add the attached anti-tank battalions to the picture, especially considering the bizarre C3 implications (what exactly does 'attached' mean from a command perspective, plus tanks had infantry radios, anti-tanks did not until 1944-95). This would require its own video - probably multiple videos.
The US TOE was either intended or made to be more flexible than other armies and does not reflect the significant differences in the way forces were deployed and used among theaters.
Michael. No. Tank destroyer battalions, towed or self-propelled, are just anti-tank battalions. Their major difference from those similar units in other countries is tank destroyer battalions were in the non-divisional battalion-group system other than being an organized unit in divisions. The non-divisional battalion-group system is one of the keys, I believe, to understand US Army in WW2. The German equivalent to tank destroyer battalions was just panzerjager abteilung. Other things, like the radios you mentioned, are trivial.
Michael A Mayo: tank destroyers battalions concept was created to counter the supposed tank penetration that the US feared from the Germans in the invasion of France onwards. The TD battalions were supposed to be used on its own to rush into the penetration sector (hence the emphasis on speed and light armor) to counter the enemy tank column from the flanks, preferably from a hull down, ambush position (hence the focus on open top vehicles and improved visibility. They envisioned that the forward defending infantry divisions will almost invariably overrun, but where they are overrun tells Corp and Army commanders the location of the tank column and the TD battalion is supposed to seal off that breach.
In practice, first, nobody want to relegate the poor infantry to the fate of being overrun by tanks without effective anti-tank forces, thus Corps and Army commanders started to attach these battalions semi-permanently to the Infantry Divisions. These additions are ad hoc, however, the commanders realised that units attached together for a long time fight better so despite the ad hoc nature, they were rarely re-assigned. Second, and more importantly, the US Army was attacking instead of defending. In the attack, Corp and Army commanders were not about to let TD battalions just sit around doing nothing so they were pushed into offensive roles, sometimes used as tanks, but other times as indirect fire support platforms or assault guns.
The downside is when the Germans do attack and achieve a tank column penetration (for eg: Battle of the Bulge), Armies and Corps suddenly found themselves without the mobile reaction force the TD battalions supposed to be.
Still, despite the ad hoc nature, the attached TD battalions performed very well. They achieved better Kill-Loss ratios than tanks; remember: despite having lighter armour without a roof. The primary reason being since they were lightly armoured units attached to large infantry formations, they worked together with infantry in a better combined arms team than the tanks in Armoured Divisions, which sometimes charged recklessly into the enemy.
Xuan: The majority of what you said is right, and I want to add something:
Tank destroyers were just anti-tank guns, they did not need to be vehicles. Although the majority types of the (self propelled) tank destroyers that successfully introduced into service were tank-like vehicles, most of them are not tank-like. They could be just an anti-tank gun mounted on a 3/4 ton truck (37mm Gun Motor Carriage M6). Also, a lot (half in 1943) of tank destroyer battalions were using 3 inch Gun M5 towed by M3 half-tracks. The towed units were in the original concept and tested successfully in Louisiana Maneuvers and Carolina Maneuvers. There were no self-propelled tank destroyers in the original concept introduced by General Headquarters and it was the latter formed Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center in favor of the self-propelled vehicles.
The attachment to Infantry Division was not ad hoc, it was written in the doctrine (FM 18-5, 1943). Tank destroyer units were fully defensive and were not used as tanks in their secondary roles. They stayed in "overwatch" positions and support the attack as field artillery, although one of their secondary roles was considered as "assault gun".
During Battle of the Bulge, it was not just "lack of mobile reaction forces". Instead, it was "lack of forces" including infantry (three divisions vs two panzer armee).
The "combined arms team with tank destroyers and infantry" was never better than Armored Divisions because 1: the actual "combined arms team" was a combination of Infantry Division with attached units including one separate tank battalion, one or two tank destroyer battalion, one AAA/AW battalion, one chemical mortar battalion and several other supporting units like an extra combat engineering battalion and six quartermaster truck companies (for full motorization) instead of "tank destroyers and infantry"; 2: its role was different from that of Armored Division which also received a tank destroyer battalion (sp) attachment, thus there is no "better or worse" at all.
Tanks for the video!
It was my pleasure, no need to tank me!
So you're telling me the efficiency/power of 10 width spam is historically accurate?
no the fact that hoi got division/brigade and regiment strenght wrong. Historically accurate would be like 20-30 widths with 50/50 split.
Except outside mods with really high frontage relative to industry/manpower (like equestria at war) 40 width is meta.
@@janehrahan5116 Or in Asia and Africa. That's always hell, no matter how big or small your divisions are. Even with logistics support.
And for the original comment: How the hell is 10 width spam "efficient" or 'powerful' in any way?
From what I’ve found, commanders believe that their own branch of arms is superior to others.
Rommel was an infantry commander, so of course he would believe that more infantry would be needed to create a better force.
Guderian was a cavalryman, so in turn he would believe more tanks were the answer to creating a better fighting force.
It’s been that way since the dawn of warfare.
Napoleon believed very strongly in artillery, Custer in cavalry, Westmoreland in infantry (surprise surprise those were their branches of the army).
Fantastic video. No one really does in-depth discussions of formations and stuff like you do.
From the Translation of taped conversation with General Hermann Balck. :
"Q: Did you have a chance to try out large divisions along-side small ones to see what their relative effectiveness was?
A:[...] Actually, Guderian was a strong advocate of the big division, surprisingly enough. He liked divisions like the Gross Deutschland Division, which I commanded for a while. That division was so big and fat that you could split it in two, and you would have two divisions, each of which would be fat enough by itself.
Now a man like Guderian could lead such a large division. But the average division commander from across the street has to be able to command the organization - - that's the real problem. Then clearly the small divisions were superior in maneuverability and speed."
PS I replaced a very long yes with [... ].
>Calling War Thunder "World of Tanks 2"
Loading the gold. Shots fired.
no, loading the gold is WoT.
Plus, War Thunder is kind of World of Tanks 2, in that it is more recent, and better.
Loading the stalinium*
And also about German and Italian Generals. Italian Generals had a better strategic vision than German Generals and their Greece debacle was as much of their own making as it was due to Mussolini's impulsive orders, which wrecked two campaigns at once. The same Generals had shown sufficient organisational capabilities in organising the Invasion of Ethiopia despite the huge logistical difficulties. But Mussolini's Grand Gestures also tied down significant budgetary, raw material, and bureaucratic time in operations instead of reforming the Italian Armed Forces. The results are well known. But a lot of Italian 'incompetence' is due to the Germans maligning them rather their objective performance or the objective circumstances under which they operated.
I agree that the Germans are responsible for the poor reputation the Italians have in WW2. I don't think they were as bad as often stated. But sadly, I can't read Italian sources and not much has been translated into English. So our (English speaking) perspective of the Italian contribution to the war is largely from the German and British accounts, both of which did not view the Italians in a good light for various reasons.
I think our point of view is skewed because of Operation Compass that smashed Italian forces in Cyrenaica. Apart from that operation (which included a lot of luck) Royal Italian Army was a capable force with a lot of good commanders and soldiers. Their equipment wasn't on the same level as German or British one, especially their tanks, but even in Operation Compass we have a lot of documented fights when for example Italian artillery fought bravely to the last man in Bardia against Australian 6th Division. It takes a lot of courage to stand to fight when you know that enemy is better equiped & prepared to war. That's why I respect Italian soldiers a lot.
Posinec Do not forget the final stage of the Second Battle of El Alamein when Rommel sacrificed the Italians in order to escape with AK.
Italians had sound reasoning on a lot of levels, like shown in this video about the M38 Carcano infantry rifle th-cam.com/video/V-lJZPF_fJQ/w-d-xo.html
TIK is extremely good at showing how war historiography is skewed "a posteriori". i also believe that military history is skewed because you can't have brilliance from the past overshadow present-day apporaches that are flawed or even inferior.
I think 'skewed' is the right word to describe the common perception of the Italians. There has been little study of the Italian army in English...I guess it's just not as 'sexy' as the idea of free wheeling German armoured columns (ironically anchored by Italian infantry). The problem is compounded by dubious Allied sources - some Australian histories for instance are notoriously one eyed. After trumpeting their early successes they seem unable to admit to set backs against the Italians thereafter.....some even go as far as explaining defeats by replacing Italian troops with German ones :D
Well explained, with diagrams, maps etc.
Thank you! I'm glad you liked the style. Trying to make the videos better :)
Well done TIK! Well thought out and explained. Interesting that Guderian made a number of mis-interpretations, (thinking about his opposition to the manufacture of assault guns). Thanks for this analysis! By comparison, Rommel was no fool, though he made his own mistakes, but learned from them, and tried not to repeat them.
Wonderful insights again. You are a true historian!
You're too kind!
Excelent Video, one ofthe best. Congratulations!!! It is not by chance that you are reaching 40.000 subscribers . Great Goal!!!
It seems to me that Guderian obsessed over having large, concentrated tank forces to enable them to theoretically function at the operational level, at the expense of their usefulness tactically. I think he was somewhat paranoid about a repeat of a great war situation in which the tanks were bogged down by being utterly tied to the infantry.
I can understand where guderian was coming from theoretically, but he (along with everyone else of course) lacked the field experience to recognize where his operational theory didn't make sound tactical sense.
Well, he's not wrong in the sense that you want to disperse your tank strength too much. But by the same token, the lesson learnt from the early battles was that you don't want tank-heavy units. Nobody was saying a panzer division shouldn't have battalions of tanks in them. The question was, how many was the right balance?
That seems common with all the tank enthusiasts (or should I say... radicals) Go to speak with Hobart and we would make Guderian look timid by comparison.
The biggest problem with the blitzkrieg was that tanks would simply outrun the infantry during encirclements
I would speculate inflating number in smaller divisions, as opposed to maintaining larger divisions, might be connected with cronyism within ranks of German army officers, as larger number of divisions means more possible appointments for ambitious officers.
That could be true. But then, was it more a factor of cronyism, or a lot of good officers you could exploit by putting them into smaller divisions?
Could be both. War tends to expose competent officers by their conduct in action, and once you know there are many officers deserving the promotions, more then actual openings for promotion, there might be tendency to create openings for them more for internal political reasons then for actual operational necessity.
Of course I don't know any of that for a fact, or have any documented evidence of it, but from personal knowledge of how such large organisations work I think it might be ad least contributing factor.
I believe Otto Skorzeny was a fine example of a rather imaginative - though not particularly skilled - officer who made himself politically by 'being there' when Mussolini was 'liberated' at Gran Sasso and also being responsible for the kidnapping of Hungary's Admiral Horthy's son in Op. Panzerfaust. Skorzeny earned his rank to this one act which so impressed Hitler even though it was a Luftwaffe officer who actually organised and commanded the operation to take Mussolini. [It's likely Mussolini would have survived WW2 had Fallschirmjager/Skorzeny not taken him to Hitler and put him in charge of the Salo Republic in Northern Italy]
Skorzeny was responsible for Operation Greif [I could be wrong about the name as Op. Grief could have been the Airborne Op. to disrupt Allied lines of comms and supply with Fallshirmjager] during the Battle of the Bulge. Op. Greif was used by Hitler to get German soldiers wearing US GI uniforms over their Army uniforms as a 'ruse of war' to send false orders, change road signs , etc but ultimately to take the bridges over the Meuse.
Funny thing about operation grief. The German troops were provided with counterfeit US military I.D.s sadly for these Germans, though the I.D. were a meticulously exact counterfeits of the US Military I.D. the German in charge of producing them corrected a spelling error found on the US I.D. this correction rendered the I.D. not only useless in it's intended purpose but served as a Red flag exposing all German soldiers carrying one as enemy. (According to Paul Fussell, an uncorrected typographical error on American identity cards could serve as a tell: the top of a genuine card read "NOT A PASS. FOR INDENTIFICATION PURPOSES ONLY." Someone preparing the disguises of the commandos could not resist correcting the spelling on their false cards to read "IDENTIFICATION."[12])
Ive rediscovered ww2 recently and i FIND THIS CHANNEL EXCELLENT
TIK - I like the improvements you are implementing - only the bright yellow background is a bit 'too much' for me - watching a bright screen in the dark... :o)
Thanks for the feedback! I'll bear that in mind next time and darken the yellow somewhat :)
The intensity of the fighting revealed that divisional commanders were being overwhelmed. Six fighting battalions was about all that they could effectively run.
All of the armies ran into this. Shock formations were the exception to this rule.
Additionally, creating new divisions was THE perfect way to promote revealed talent. This did wonders for institutional morale.
Destroyed war thunders career in 10 seconds
13:42 - Another reason to superficially imagine that tanks are the main element of modern armies, is that tanks were invented to overcome trench warfare, which is such a major inflection point in history, it's easy for me to see why people would think of the innovation (tanks) as dominating military doctrine in a wider array of situations ever since.
Guderian always says: "If we had done it my way we would have won!". Yet, he never takes into account neither the fuel situation nor the fact that the enemy would have reacted or adapted to his proposed tactics.
Also, one thing these post-war memoirs rarely mention is the fact the Hitler is NEVER alone defending a point of view.
Fantastic vid. Truly enlightening basic understanding of the meat and potatoes of fundamentals. Never knew these items. Love all your stuff anyway. I think you are getting better and better. Alwsys worth my time to view.
I love this channel because your one of the only historians who doesn’t blame Hitler for everything.
I remember Victor Suvorov mentioning oversized pre-war soviet tank corpses that had a hard time even peacefuly redeploying due to traffic jams and supply problems. So it's not just about combined arms, but something far less romantic but just as important: logistics. :)
Another potential reason to the shift towards smaller formations might also be in the size of the eastern front. Divisions were often tasked with covering dozens of miles of territory and having more command centers along this front may have eased the burden of communication between divisional elements. Also more smaller divisions would grant greater operational flexabilty. Less trains to move divisions along the front and less stain on logistical formations that have to organise distribution to the division far away from supply depos and rail heads.
I feel like I'm back at the Royal Military College. Good stuff!
It's shocking that how combining units can be natural for a current strategy game player as war3 or Sc2, but not for an old general graduated from high ranking military school .... Great video btw, really nice job by demystifying lot of legends
Great Video TIK!
Might the triangular division be more suited for the Western trenches of the Great War? Often the third division was a reserve division. You have a narrow front, so you can't put everyone at the front at the same time. Flexibility is less needed because it is harder to outflank in the narrow battle front. Each time a regiment withdrew it needed to be replaced quickly, to avoid the enemy from exploiting a gap in the lines. Thus having a lot of reserves at the ready was key.
Where there any differences between the eastern fronts and the western fronts during the First World War, organizationally speaking? The Eastern front was wider and more mobile, and because of this saw less extensive trenching.
I'm not qualified enough on WW1 to answer this question. But I've hearted it in hopes that someone else reading it is qualified.
The Square division had all sorts of specialist units integral to the division. Which was found to be inefficient. The Triangular division dispensed with the specialist units and they would be attached from Corps Army as needed.
I really like this because, up until a year ago, I believed the change in the panzer division organization following the polish campaign was because the early PzDiv was too tank heavy. Then I started seeing a lot of military historians on TH-cam talking about how this was Hitler's idea to expand the number of PzDiv prior to Barbarossa. Thanks for letting me know that I wasn't just high and that the reason for the reorg was actually to improve the PzDiv command structure and fighting ability.
Very good demonstration as usual . Thanks for your work.
The Spanish Blue division was top shelf ! Ya ought to do an episode about
It is true that the combined experience of simply retaking lost territory from the Versailles treaty as well as Anschluss and the annexation of Czechoslovakia not to mention the Spanish civil war gave the Germans the edge in experience, learning, evolving and refining the various challenges and issues that presented from these events.
I read somewhere that while driving into Austria with a tank column along a narrow road, the lead tank broke down and lead to complete chaos.
This seemingly innocuous event lead the Germans to rethink simply driving tank after tank along narrow roads, including mixing up maintenance, repair as well as spacing etc.
During one early battle of France, the Germans learnt again that simply sending groups of unprotected tanks against an enemy position would lead to heavy losses, So all the military adventures they engaged in from re-taking the Ruhr to France gave Germany the edge in refining combined arms warfare including the right balance of different types of units grouped together.
However, this still flies in the face of the overwhelming, over-arching facts that WWII was essentially a battle of production, numbers and access to all essential types of resources.
I think to compare the dilution of the panzer divisions before Barbarossa with the North African theatre is perhaps a composition/division fallacy meaning what's true in one place in not necessarily true in another.
I do tend to believe Hitler's insistence in increasing armour production (which was partially ignored) with heavier guns, over the argument that Hitler ordered a partial demobilisation after the defeat of the allies in the Western campaign, though the over-confidence and hubris in some sectors German general staff, of the Waffennamt and other sections of industry, may have been responsible for this costly oversight.
So we now conclude that the removal of a panzer regiment to create a new panzer division was a good idea? I'm still not convinced of Hitler's reasons for this given his reported delight in seeing paper divisions on situation maps, the debacle of the Luftwaffe 'field divisions', and so on.
Of course no one single decision or area of decisions can be attributed to the catastrophic defeat of the Wehrmacht, but I do believe one of the greatest blunders which both hitler and his Generals are responsible for was not adjusting operationally after the defeat at Moscow.
I happen to believe both Manstein and Von Mellenthin that a stalemate could have been achieved on the Eastern Front up until late '43.
Fascinating original analysis again. Well done! One thing comes to mind when comparing armoured divisions from WW2 to modern ones. Modern western armies are likely over geared to perform in an insurgency war. It might be better to compare armoured divisions from the cold war era when opponents were structuring their militaries along conventional lines.
Seriously you should start uploading some courses.
Your analysis and explanation deserves more. Far, far much more.
I love how accurately this is modelled in HOI4
And older HOI3.
Are we counting regiments a lines? then yeah it is, with 2 line divisions fitting.
I just do cav division and invade everyone on 1936.
Could it be that Guderian was actually thinking about tank availability and wanted more tanks to actually have the functioning tanks he needed to attack and defend against a relentlessly attacking enemy who was causing continuing attrition of his forces? Maybe Guderian saw on-the-ground that the lessons of Poland and France did not exactly transfer to the Russian front. You have mentioned in another video the problems of logistics and parts supply. I guess and add to that the problem of availability of trained and experienced personnel necessary to repair complex machinery - something that seems to be given short shrift in analysis of warring forces. Stahel in "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East" has combat readiness charts that are interesting to me as they show what would no doubt have been a concerning lack of combat-ready equipment in the Panzer divisions. Perhaps that would explain Guderian's comment. Love your videos. Great stuff.
I admit I chuckled when you called War Thunder "World of Tanks 2"
Everyone who wants to learn about your topics learns about it here. I really loved your Battle of Arnhem video. How about making a lighter version of your topics that are easier accessibel for the less concentrated? Have it illustrated with movie scenes (if legally possible) and get a different audience drawn to your already excellent videos. For instance: “Why does a tank batallion need infantry support?” Great channel TIK!
Very informative information this guy is great at explaining what happened . Never read this stuff before but what I have read before was wrong ,great stuff
I love your binary division argument. It totally agrees with the US adoption of two combat commands (A and B) for each division where the divisional commander can set up two "combat commands" which can be more flexible than the original structure of two armored and one armored infantry regiments (i.e. a triangular division).
Great work!!
Excellent video.
Personal guess, about the misconception (for example, why blaming "less tanks in tank divisions", or "smaller divisions"): Germans did a good job at some point (say 1940 when fighting against France) and won with larger divisions (or heavier tank divisions); they did not went that well and finally lost after invading Soviet Union while they changed to use smaller divisions (or tank divisions with less tanks). It's quite natural to get this misconception (or misleading/plausible idea) that smaller units (tank divisions with less tanks) are in general weaker and responsible for the failure.
Good job TIK, at debunking these statements. Hope you can keep doing this and give us a more objective and more comprehensive view of WW2.
11:40 WRONG
The modern day division template includes ARMORED support units (and infantry), EXCLUSIVELY.
Infantry divisions were primarily defensive; the panzers conquered and the infantry occupied and held. During the mid war period the Germans became more focussed on defence and increased the allocation of automatic weapons to their infantry.
This allows them to reduce the strength of infantry units without reducing their defensive firepower on the front line and increase your artillery ratio; infantry can delay an attack, but it is artillery that breaks it.
These smaller divisions could hold the same front line as the older larger divisions; so more divisions could be rotated out of the line for refurbishment/deeper defence/ retraining.
Very interesting analysis and study of army military structure. As a veteran of the US Army, never questioned the organization of the units but of course accepted them the way they were. This video gives an insight into how military planners focus on the problems of deploying their forces and making them more maneuverable.
You make excellent use of the work of David Glantz (also in your “4 Statements” video which quotes COL House as well). Hopefully this will encourage viewers to examine his deep body of work in this area. If you haven't read them already, you'll also find that the “August Storm” volumes of Glantz are absolutely priceless.
Anyone looking to purchase used copies of his “August Storm” volumes on the Soviet invasion of Manchuria should be aware, however, that there are two different sets available that have very similar names. They’ll want to make sure that they are getting the 2003 volumes, “Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm" and “Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: August Storm" from Frank Cass Publishers. The earlier and less comprehensive 1883 volumes -- which are nevertheless rock-solid works --- are titled “August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria” (Leavenworth Papers No. 7) and “August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945” (Leavenworth Papers No. 8). By the time that Glantz produced the 2003 set he’d been able to benefit greatly from the upsurge in archival material that became available after the breakup of the Soviet Union. And it was a good thing that he took advantage of this while he could because the “openness” started to close off almost as quickly as it had begun and now comes in the form of periodic, official spurts instead of through independent research of primary source materials. Nevertheless, the result is that his knowledge, which broadened exponentially between the 1983 and 2003 sets, is still expanding and this has prompted Glantz to modify his opinion in some areas. For example, while he formerly expressed that the Soviets might have been able to conduct a successful operation in Northern Hokkaido, he has since come to the conclusion that “any military operations against Hokkaido were infeasible, even if Stalin had decided to challenge Truman -- which he didn’t.” (D. M. Giangreco, Hell to Pay, p258) Giangreco notes that: “When producing the 2003 book he had less information available to him and knowledge of the Japanese situation was largely limited to how it was characterized in the Russian after-action reports. The piecemealing out of documents from the former Soviet Union has been an ongoing frustration for Glantz. He notes that the material available to researchers is still limited and that this is unlikely to change significantly any time soon. Said Glantz: ‘The mail’s still out. There’s one more -- maybe three, four, five more -- rounds [of document releases to come] before we’re through’.” (Giangreco, Hell to Pay, p509)
See Glantz and Giangreco (and Richard B. Frank) on stage together here, www.c-span.org/video/?327355-5/strategies-invasion-defense-japan, discussing US, Soviet and Japanese operational plans for combat on Hokkaido, and Giangreco here, th-cam.com/video/_4uDfg38gykh/w-d-xo.htmlttps://th-cam.com/video/_4uDfg38gyk/w-d-xo.html, dealing principally with the interdependence of European and Pacific theater operations and US support for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria.
As usual, excellent analysis, TIK
The triangular division (or any triangular unit) typically fought "two up, one back", with two regiments in the line and one in reserve. That's great if you can afford to have 33% of your manpower out of contact with the enemy. The German Army quickly decided it was a luxury they could not afford. It's important to note their 6-battalion divisions always had a 7th reserve battalion, designated "Fusilier" or "Schnell" with some mobile assets (often just bicycles) to take the place of the former reserve regiment.
On a technical note, I rather like the less-busy backgrounds in most of this video.
Maybe the triangular division was more suited for the Western trenches of the great war? You have a narrow front, so you can't put everyone at the front at the same time. Each time a regiment withdrew it needed to be replaced quickly, to avoid the enemy from exploiting a gap in the lines.
The Great War is not my forté, but I know that for most of the war the British had square divisions, with four infantry brigades. So those were usually "three up, one back". When the Americans came in they also had square divisions; US divisions were massive, with about 22,000 men each. My understanding is that during the course of the war the various Armies evolved to the triangular organization due to the shortages of manpower, and this carried on into the '20s and '30s.
The fusilier battalion is supposed to be a reconnaissance unit.
@@SeraphimARcanus In theory and in practice, yes. But I was sometimes used as a reserve due to having somewhat better mobility (and perhaps troop quality)
This was my thinking also, a binary division forces more troops up front. If you give any commander 3 units, he will want to hold 1 in reserve. If commanders on every level do this, then you have 1 regiment + 2 battalions + 2 companies + ... over 50% in reserve or in-depth positions. So in theory you can cover as much front with a binary division as a triangular division.
I served in the US 1st Infantry Division from 2001 - 2006 - At that time it was 3 brigades, each had 2 mech infantry battalions, 1 armor battalion, 1 engineer 1 field arty, a forward support battalion a a brigade recon troop and a HHC Brigade that had all the S shops. When we deployed to Iraq, the Brigade commander carved off 1 tank company and added a tank platoon to each infantry battalion, 1 tank platoon to the engineers, 1 tank platoon to the field arty, who also lost 1 company to each of the same.1 infantry mech infantry battalion similarly had a company of bradleys carved off and sent by platoons to each battalion. Then we were supplemented with 2 light infantry national guard battalions. This created 5-800 man battalion task forces. Combined arms as you mention in living color. I was in the Brigade recon troop which acted as the brigade reserve.
An episode of the "Oslo Report" and the "Tripartite Pact" would be nice.
This channel completely changed my opinion about Hitler!
Fantastic as always, liking the new lighting set up!
I’d argue that the convergence of memory and self-interest makes for lots of errors. Add-in the ‘repeated tale’ experiment. Information gets transformed as it is repeated.
Remember being in BATUS in the 90s doing battle group exercises. The battle groups were either tank heavy (2 tank squadrons to 1 infantry company) or infantry heavy (2 infantry companies to 1 tank squadron) the infantry heavy ones were always more effective, hence the reason about a third of the new challenger 2s were put in storage.
What is really interesting is that within the States prior to its involvement in World War II, there was a massive war game. This stretched across a good portion of the country and accommodated hundreds of thousands of men, including George S. Patton (who was nicknamed "The Green Hornet" because of his ridiculous uniform during the operation). What was realized during these exercises was that combined-arms formations, not purely tank or infantry formations, were the best use of resources upon the battlefield and gave a greater chance of victory.
It would be great if you did the siege of Leningrad
Dude, you are really good at what you do.
Wow thanks, I'm glad you think so. I'm certainly trying my best :)
Guderian is telling you to stick to tanks
I love how you called War Thunder "World of Tanks 2". 🤣😅😳😬😎👌
Hi TiK,
I am coming from MHV channel and I got this info from one of his videos:
From Deutsce Reich & und der 2. Weltkrieg, Band 6 (p. 778-779, 785-787) it was calcilated by the organization department of General Staff of the Army that in June 1942 the army was lacking 740 000 men. They didn't really manage to fill the manpower needs of the army to the extent that was required by the General Staff.
Thanks! However, the point to note is that they assigned enough replacements to replace combat losses, so why were they still down? I actually discussed this in the video yesterday.
I wish you make a video on Little Big Horn battle :)
In the wargaming world, Dunnigan wrote about this extensively in the 70s. He noted that the standard 1939 German infantry division decreased in headcount by about 25%, relative to the 1944 organization. Yet there was no decrease in overall firepower.
I have read other writers (Seaton, Cooper) who noted that the motorized division switched to binary structure in 40-41, and attributed it to a need to have divisions sized to allow the divisional leadership more easy handling.
I have also read other accounts of British officers needing more onfantry for combined arms operations under Montgomery in France. The view was that the Italian campaign was tying up too many infantry divisions, and there weren't enough to pair with armored formations in France.
Great video, I especially learned from the stuff about the Italians.
one thought though about the quote from Guderian's memoirs: as you present it in this video, it could be interpreted to mean that Guderian was not necesarily opposed to the thought of the binary panzer division, but more like he wanted a greater effort put into creating even more armoured formations.
as I haven't read the memoirs, I don't know if there is other statements in it one way or another.
You may be right with your speculation on Guderian, but then I would argue that this shows his ignorance about the overall German oil-crisis which dictated that it wasn't possible to build more tanks or mobile divisions. th-cam.com/video/kVo5I0xNRhg/w-d-xo.html (link to "Why Germany Lost - OIL" video, in case you haven't seen it)
Fair point, but that wouldn't be a surprise to me if he was somewhat ignorant of that problem. (and yes I have watched that video, I think I'm pretty much up to date with everything you've put up, except the gaming videos :) )
Haha I don't blame you for not getting through the 800+ gaming videos! I'm planning on doing the odd gaming video now and then, but the focus will be the history from now on.
One thing I'd be interested to hear you address: Why did Italians fight so poorly? DID they fight so poorly? Were Italians bad soldiers or was a lot of it things out of their control? Did Italians not have their heart in the fight? etc.
One concern for when you referenced the Soviet Mechanized Corps. It seems a bit of a weak comparison to put a Soviet Mechanized Corps against a panzer division. Both formations were infantry heavy, but a better consideration would be (I would think) the Soviet Tank Corps, which was similar to a Soviet Mechanized Corps. However, instead of 3 motorized infantry brigades and 1 tank brigade, a Soviet Mechanized Corps had 1 motorized infantry brigade and 3 tank brigades. The Soviet tank corps continued throughout the war and even replaced the Soviet tank divisions (although it seems the "division" formation was making a comeback in the final year or so) and fulfilled the same role for the Red Army as an armored division from any other nation's army.
One thing that keeps leaving me confused with this video is that the Germans pretty much always operated with a triangular division template, with a large exception of the light divisions in Africa. I've never heard about motorized infantry divisions losing their 3rd regiment. All I can think is that they were added back in later. Even your template for a 1945 panzer division features 3 regiments (1 panzer, 2 panzergrenadier regiments). While the regiments were smaller (generally 2 battalions vs 3) and the brigade echelon of the panzer divisions were removed, reducing the overall size of the divisions.
On the Italian Army, you seemed to completely ignore that that every Italian Infantry division, on paper anyway, was supposed to include a legion of blackshirts. A legion was supposed to be the equivalent of a regiment, but only consists of 2 battalions. As of 1940, particularly after Operation Compass, the Regio Esercito decided against reforming CCNN (blackshirt) divisions and instead opt to assign blackshirt battalions to existing infantry divisions. While the blackshirt battalions were not always included, that leaves the Italian "binary" division with a total of 8 battalions, not 6.
Hoping to get some feedback on this. Cheers!
Great episode! Would you consider making one on the greco Italian war?
I laughed out loud when you said "World of tanks, World of tanks 2, Tanks for supporting me on patreon" 😁
When you said about Hitler messing up the Panzer divisions in 41 I knew you were going to quote Good Ole Heinz and his book, I read it too so I knew where you were going.
poor Guderian is always picked on by everybody :) ... great video as always
Good old Heinz 'Punchbag' Guderian :)
TIK not funny😡
😂😂😂
I can’t defend or explain my statements
I've been reading about WW2 for over 50yrs (yes I'm an old fart). And I've taken so much misinformation over so much time as gospel because most authors supported these myths which were perceived as accurate history. Thank you Tic for challenging my whole perceived paradigm mindset of WW2 created by 1000's of academic authorities on this subject.🤔👍
Another thing I frequently see being ignored in relation to the amount of tanks per division is the logistical burden, the tanks per division being lower allowed for the logistical and maintenance burden to be more spread out allowing for supply lines to be less stressed on specific locations. This also influenced the switch the Soviets had towards the (late war) mechanized corps which from what I've read were generally speaking the better performing mobile formations in the later war for the soviets. If you notice the amount of logistics and maintenance units in a panzer division doesnt change when going from 2 regiments to 1 regiment meaning that initially those units would have been supporting twice the tanks which would obviously have led to a general shorter independent operating range for the division and this has generally speaking been the same for allot of other nations in that the decrease in regiments didn't mean a decrease in support assets.
>warthunder picture
>world of tanks 2
TRIGGEREDDDD
I want to thank TIK for his beautiful, SIMPLE English.
I have a very weak level of English (the level of the old USSR school, ahah), but to my surprise, I can read and understand subtitles - there are few complex rare words and used simple words that I know. The pronunciation is also very clear! I don't usually understand english colloquial speaking.
I think he do this specifically for the convenience of people with poor English.
So - Thanks!!
TIK will you cover the Italian attack on Greece and why it failed?
Or the fall of Crete ?
I had a poll up on a video ages ago asking which battle I should cover next. Crete was one of the options. As was the Battle of the Bulge. But for some reason, everyone voted for Stalingrad. So, going with the majority like a good democratic vote should, I'm now neck-deep in the most ambitious project I've ever attempted, or ever will attempt.
So yes, I will cover them, but only after Stalingrad.
TIK you forget TIK, this is a dictatorship, and you ARE the democracy
Great channel ! Keep it up
You are correct Jamie! Thanks for pointing that out. Now, off to the Gulag with you.
instead of "only"Crete, go for a general overview of all the para/glider attacks in WW2 and why some worked, some didnt and , lesson learned, why MODERN parachute regiments DO NOT and WILL NOT ever do (large scale ww2 style) parachute attacks anymore...
I thought Germany's new panzer divisions in 1941still had 3 regiments- 1 tank and 2 infantry regiments?
Guderian is talking about more tanks being needed not more tanks per division. Rommel landed with 1 light division (5th light) which later was converted to a panzer division (15th). After a few months he received his 1st panzer division (21st)
about the composition of german army divisions today and them being similarly infantry heavy like later Wehrmacht divisions, you have to take into account: 1) divisions today are not considered the main operational unit performing combined arms operations, but the brigade is. 2) them being infantry-heavy results from having been shaped by almost three decades of peacekeeping and such, where tank formations were of less use and difficult to deploy, as well as tank units getting dissolved due to higher costs. 3) remaining units, both divisions and brigades might not necessarily fight with this structure in wartime, but act as retention basin for the remaining batallions during peacetime, after most other divisions and brigades were dissolved. 4) the structure of german mechanized brigades during most of the cold war period, when the army was tailored to fight a large-scale conventional conflict in Europe similar to WWII, the number of Panzergrenadier and armor brigades was about equal, they were triangular, armor brigades had two tank batallions and one PzGren batallion, Panzergrenadier brigades had it reversed - thus you have either 2:1 or 1:2 ratio for tanks to infantry, but not generally more infantry units.
Great vid and there's some fab photos in your presentation.Would love to know if there's an online source for them but it's probably a trade secret...
I think they were all taken from Google images, with the exception of the green-background maps
Ah cool - thanks for the response TIK!
You're welcome! I just use Google and avoid ones with watermarks (which I'm personally against when it comes to historical photos)
Really interesting topic. And your conclusion at the end is very true-- not much actual evidence of TOE's and the evolution of division structures for all nations from pre-war onward.
Perhaps there's a natural limit to what a "Commander" can manage effectively at this scale?
I think there is, and I think the limit is quite small. This is probably why the Soviets had trouble in the mid-war period, since their army commanders were controlling way too many units (as I've suggested in the Soviet Army Size 1942 video). And I suspect the reason there's not much discussion on TOE's or divisional structural evolution is because it's a relevant and very important topic that the militaries around the world don't want to discuss in the open.
Every time I watch your videos I feel a urge to play HOI4.
Excellent video, as always
Good analysis.
Thank you!
TIK. Thanks. Nice analysis. I wish I saw this video sooner. From all my reading over the years and your logical and supported explanation, I think you are correct. But I confess the argument would be better if I knew where all these officers and NCOS ( less so) were comming from. ( You mention a pool of Officers.) Training schools ? OR each division has extra Officers? IT looks like one of the benefits of the new structure is an increase in the ratio of the officers and NCOS to EM per over all command. The manpower stayed the same but the command Staff and some NCOS had to be increased. This tells me there are more leaders. The new leaders are in a new organization so they are not in each others way. Leadership casualties would have a larger pool of experienced men to draw -up to replace lost leaders. So I see that as a plus too. Some Officers could be Mustangs ( EM promoted to Officer) But still I would think most Officers would come from Training schools. SO... Did Germany Train Officers in a larger number , or maybe more effectively ? And perhaps NCOS too.?
World of tank 2? XD that cracked me up! Cheers!
I recall reading that in making more Panzer Division's they lacked the necessary transport thus making them less mobile/slower