Why No German Reinforcements at Stalingrad?
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- เผยแพร่เมื่อ 1 ต.ค. 2024
- Sixth Army was starved of reinforcements at Stalingrad, but it wasn't because the Germans had run out of manpower. No, they had the replacements - they just didn't send them to 6th Army! But why is this the case? Let's explore this.
Check out the pinned comment below for more information, notes, links, and sources.
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*Extra Notes, Links and Sources*
Despite the evidence given in the video, I have no doubt that some of you will still argue that the Germans couldn’t, or indeed, didn’t replace their losses suffered in 1941 by the summer of 1942. Some will probably complain that Germany was (by as early as 1942) at the bottom of the manpower barrel. But this was simply not the case. The following quote from Liedtke explains that Germany actually squandered her available manpower -
“Regardless of the heavy losses sustained over the previous year, the Wehrmacht as a whole had witnessed a net increase of about 1.1 million personnel by 1 July 1942. However, despite the urgency of defeating the Soviet Union as quickly as possible, which should have resulted in a ruthless prioritization towards meeting the needs of the Army, large consignments of personnel were still allocated to the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine.” - Enduring the Whirlwind, Page 209
This, and the evidence presented in the video, points us firmly in the direction of mismanagement and poor staff-work. Germany had the manpower, but didn’t use it correctly.
Also to note, the Germans created an additional 22 divisions in 1942. This was at a time when their other divisions weren’t at full strength. This fact is often used as a point against the explain why they didn’t have enough manpower. In reality, with an almost 3,000 kilometer front, which was about to expand to 4,100 kilometers, Germany needed both to reinforce her existing divisions, and create more divisions. So to say that they were wrong to create 22 new divisions is the wrong conclusion to come too, especially when you consider some of these divisions were made from elements of other veteran divisions.
Either way, why is Army Group Centre being prioritised in terms of reinforcements over Army Groups A and B? This does not make any sense, regardless whether you agree or disagree with the manpower situation. I’d love to hear your thoughts so let me know.
If you would like book recommendations for further reading, the two books I suggest you pick up are Citino’s “Death of the Wehrmacht” and Liedtke’s “Enduring the Whirlwind” - both of which cover the Operation Blau period quite well.
*Links*
Citino’s lecture on the “Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns in 1942.” th-cam.com/video/UNDhswF1GKk/w-d-xo.html
My “Your Perception of the WW2 Eastern Front is Wrong” video th-cam.com/video/B-ZHH770WLs/w-d-xo.html
My “The Numbers Say it All | The Myth of German Superiority on the WW2 Eastern Front” video th-cam.com/video/_7BE8CsM9ds/w-d-xo.html
Another thank you goes out to my Patreons. If you would like to support me in creating these videos, please take a look at my Patreon page www.patreon.com/TIKhistory
*Selected Sources/Bibliography*
Citino, R. “Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942.” University of Kansas, 2007.
Glantz, D. House, J. “The Stalingrad Trilogy, Volume 1. To the Gates of Stalingrad. Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942.” University Press of Kansas, 2009.
Glantz, D. “When Titan’s Clashed.” University Press of Kansas, 2015.
Hayward, J. “Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East 1942-1943.” University Press of Kansas, 1998.
Liedtke, G. “Enduring the Whirlwind: The German Army and the Russo-German War 1941-1943.” Helion & Company LTD, 2016.
“Germany and the Second World War: Volume VI/II, The Global War.” Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Research Institute for Military History) Potsdam, Germany. Oxford University Press, 2015.
Thanks for watching, and thanks for commenting!
At Stalingrad I think it boils down to the average Russian being tougher than the average German.
tstocker, you're really looking to start an argument aren't you :D
I dont disagree but the Kriegs marine was not beaten at this point, the uboats were still efective. The luftwaffe needed Personal too, despite being in the defense in europe but extensive use to support troops in africa and so on. The thing that comes to my mind is Germany should have taken the flaks from the homefront and supplied them to their allies at the flanks of stalingrad.
TIK Another great video!
But I do have one criticism (nothing to do with the content, just presentation): maybe not put your face in the thumbnail of every video. I hate when people do that; comes across as clickbait (the annoying kind).
Other than that:
Keep up the good work!
is there a point to be made that german replacements where less trained/experienced than the soldiers they replaced? (especially volksturm units)
I studied history and ww2 for 23 years. I have never heard someone talking about that. GREAT WORk
Check out Liedtke's Enduring the Whirlwind book. I think you may enjoy it 😊
I have wondered this, especially lately upon seeing a map with where the divisions were and where the lines were. It screams "encirclement coming, reinforce flanks now or GTFO!"
The logistics of distance & winter are pointers l think-why they should have had more re-enforcement. I like what General Yang said in book The Art of War: not to attack cities as they rapidly drain resources & men. Appears true.
Who was studying from for 2 decades? There has been dozens or more of books written on these battles, and this one is unique?
WW2 is like most things, a complete fake....
..one man can not start a war nor can he rebuild the economy, it was the Crypto Master..the very same Master that is dicking our foreheads today!
Hitler(Germany) = Big-boys "kidnapping of a nation", trying to eliminate the Bolshevik revolution (great threat to capital and to the old Monarchs of Europe). In essence...it was just another false-flag-whore, money piling blood sacrifice to the pagan Gods...Paganismuss never ended
Hitler was a first-class junky, consuming in all....70+ substances. Entire Nazi Germany was on methamphetamines.
Hitler was bagging Poland only for the Danzig corridor (years). In theory, a Bloody road/train corridor would save the war in the west :P
Most of Wehrmacht truck engines ware courtesy of Hanry Ford, the little .... kept a picture of Hitler in his office.
Zyclon-B was a gift from the Rockefeller.
Luftwaffe would be grounded from day 1 if the Yanks would not provide some additive for the fuel.
Tirpitz, enigma, Treaty of Versailles, Pearl Harbor, war-trials....all insider jokes
Nazi eugenics program is an American "copy-paste".
General Paton hated Jews, guess what was the souvenir he took back to the states...a copy of the "Nurenberg Laws". I wonder whos the proud owner of Goering`s blue Mercedes, etc?
Crypto Master was predicting the Holocaust...the starvation and extermination of" 6 million Jews" at least 35 years prior happening.
After the war, most of the SS were smuggled out of Europe by the Vatican.
Goering`s, Hitler`s and Himmler's right hands were all American spies...drugging and controlling them! Himmler`s personal shaman turned Himmler into a complete puppet, he even bought 60K jew from him as payment for his treatment.
In the winter of 41 Wehrmacht sent one-third of the Russian front back to German factories, i guess it makes sense to burn millions-of-souls in such a hurry then?
As seen in the above videos, the entire war was a colossal joke....German supply couldn't provide any serious offensive...doomed from the start, a complete madness
....sick Frankist idea of having fun! Implementation of "4-BAAL" declaration, IS-RA-EL....the purification through transgression?
Would add some links but the Crypto-master is deleting them
..someone is still on the crusade?? From the ancient, medieval, the Napoleonic, WW`s and the Iraqi wars!!!
von Manstein said; "amateurs are praised by tactics and strategy in war, real experts always care about logistics"
Real experts don't lose wars twice!
@@blueshirtman8875 HAhahaha! Yeeessss! That's the truth, the bitter truth!
@@blueshirtman8875 Real experts don't start them in a first place...
@@florianfloditt2881 Please be kind enough to explaiain that comment? Thanks in advance.
@@blueshirtman8875 a smart man solves problems, a genius prevent them becoming a problem.
The whole operation was doomed to fail in a first place. The Germans knew from the beginning that their logistics couldn't cover a front line that far and that they didn't have enough resources without the Ukraine. But they couldn't get the Ukraine without beating Russia first. Getting the oil in a war was just not possible. Therefore no way to win. It was a gamble and the Germans bet that the Russian would have failed before the winter. That didn't happen and all operations from that point were Pyrrhus-battles to maintain the nazi-partie at power as long as possible.
Manstein must have been aware of it, as he was in the inner circle of high command.
The generals tried to create the myth of a clean Wehrmacht and sell their Pyrrhus-victories as the result of their genius mind. But that was just marketing...
Just a shame that they sacrificed so many life's for a lost cause and their "glory"
You've hit on a point that according to Kenneth Macksey in his book “Why the Germans Lose at War", has plagued the Prussian Army from the beginning: poor emphasis on logistics. Macksey argues that the Prussian idea is a short war concentrating on movement and that long logistical trains were never emphasized. This failing then was transmitted to the Wehrmacht through the predominance of Potsdam Prussian trained officers. Remember, Hitler complained that his generals did not understand the "economic aspects of war"; it seems he was right.
I've not read that book, but it does sound as though Robert Citino is taking up where Machsey left off. Have you read Citino? I generally agree that Hitler wasn't wrong about his generals not understanding the strategic and economic aspects of the war. They were trained to view it as an operational and tactical art, not a grand strategic campaign, which Hitler certainly viewed it as, and which lead him into conflict with his generals (most notably Halder, which shaped his post-war leanings, and thus our understanding of the war).
Yes, it seems Halder has had an enormous influence on the perception of Hitler, and perhaps Hitler was not the inept fool he has been made out to be.
"Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics" - Gen. Robert H. Barrow
"Questions of supply can exert on the form and direction of operations, as well as the choice of a theatre of war and the line of communication.” - Clausewitz
After watching his videos i think Maybe Stalin making sure that his generals fear him is not such a bad thing after all
It seems as if Prussian doctrine is the land variant of Alfred T. Mahan's Fleet doctrine. Winning a decisive battle vs. fighting a longer campaign.
TIK Imagine you are a Commander of any unit at this time. You have your task and you need everything you can get to have better chances and you would try to do so for your troops - for good reasons. With that number of divisions and frontlines, Berlin has requests for resupply from Northern Africa up to Norway, from the coastline to England to the endless frontlines in the east. As this commander, you have experienced how thousands of your men have been killed in battle, you want to prevent more deaths in your ranks and you know every other General tries this for his own troops. What happens now is a distortion of reality. the Generals begin to overate their difficulties (not even on purpose). In that situation, it depends on who is more CONVINCING to Hitler. In one of your episodes, you described Paulus as a General who is not the man who stands up and argues, well...there it is. It was difficult for the HQ to determine the grand picture with all real needs and Center Group has outlined their situation more convincing than army goup south.
You make a very good point. Same applies with vehicle losses. Graebner at Arnhem took the wheels off his half-tracks so he could claim they weren't fit for transport elsewhere. This is the only reason he had any trucks at all on day one of Market Garden (being the only unit in 9th SS Panzer Division that had armoured fighting vehicles). It's not hard to imagine this was going on all over the place.
Of course huge role in who gets what was played be personal contacts, old favours was called, old school budies were helping each other, personal relations ships and old anymosities played also as well . . .
Berlin: Paulus! Great job! Really driving those Reds at Stalinigrad. So do you need anything?
Paulus: Thank you, yes...We...
Berlin: Fine, fine...Listen I've got that pain in the ass Halder on the other line so ...
Paulus: Yes, but re enforcements are...
Berlin: Right, good of you to offer. I'll ask him what he needs. **CLICK**
I was thinking the same thing. I’m just getting into this subject, but my first thoughts were politics, the reports, and the reporting schedule.
It almost looks like the staff were making sufficient progress into September. Then something happened during September, they wrote up their report, and requested reinforcements going into October.
I wouldn’t personally ask for more staff if I was confident in our progress, while other teams were struggling. Most don’t want to be the squeaky wheel, so I’d like to see a timeline of September and get an idea for what changed for whoever was in charge.
I’d also like to see that compared to whoever was in charge on the Soviet side in September in Stalingrad - See if they were more confrontational in getting reinforcements when they needed them.
@Fabio Erklärt, There is no such thing as a "good excuse." So difficult as it were, they were expected to know how to conduct war. Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz would have spanked these administrators good and hard for poor planning and poor execution. Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz would never have allowed this kind of catastrophe.
"the reasons the Germans lose the battle of Stalingrad is because of poor staff work, the German general staff are the ones to blame for this disaster" I love these type of videos you put out TIK
Halder, the same man who wasn't able or willing to supply Rommel in North Africa wasn't willing or able to supply Paulus in Stalingrad. We might see a trend here...
Yes, exactly. Although some of what he says about Rommel might be true.
We need to understand how the command structure worked,OKH was the Army's general staff,ie Russian front,OKW was the staff for the armed forces. Rommel was technical reported to the OKW,not the OKH just another layer of BS for Rommel to contend with why it was set-up that way is has more to do with Hitler and the way he kept any military institution from becoming too powerful.
Phil Hsueh yes they had broken Enigma but in late 42 early 43 italian tankers were getting Thur just to the wrong ports, ports they no longer held.Point was Rommel essentially had to go it alone when he went to Hitler,no OKH to have his back,at times the OKH could address some issues in house unless they we're counter maned ,The debalce in N Africa became knowing asTunnis grad in OKH, could read von Luck he had some interesting things to say about it. It's an ok read,just a little bit sugar coated.von Luck served in Russia went to Africa then France ended up s POW in Russia,but it's somewhat self servicing.
That might be something to looking to the German Army lost between 400;000 to 600;000 front line troops from 42 10 and 43 5. These we're some of the best they had.
Lets see if I can see a trend here...Who approved halder command of the 6th. Certainly was not me. Judging by
by outcome, it was a fine decision.
Halder despised Rommel and Halder always thought that Africa was truly a sideshow. He hated wasting the resources. Oh, and yea, some of what Halder said about Rommel was clearly true.
Mannstein's 11th Army had been scheduled to accompany Paulus' 6th Army in the Stalingrad Attack. However, Soviet Aircraft from Crimea were bombing the Oil Supplies in Romania. Hitler gave the capture of Crimea a top priority. The 11th Army quickly took Crimea except for Sevastopol. Mannstein's 11th Army began its siege towards end of October, and expected to take the City by Christmas 1941, which would have left plenty of time to join the attack on Stalingrad. However, Sevastopol held out for 280 days up into July 1942. It was desperate fighting accompanied by the War cry "Sevastopol Never Surrender". It did not surrender but ran out of defenders with the loss of 250,000 casualties. Even with no ammunition the soldiers linked arms and charged the German Forces. The 11th Army suffered significant casualties to take Sevastopol, and was unable to accompany the 6th Army at Stalingrad -- possibly changing the course of the War. Sevastopol is one of only 4 cities distinguished as a Hero City of the Soviet Union. The 11th Army was rested with Army Group Central.
D Nickaroo actually the 11th army was sent to army group north to try to capture Leningrad but the Soviets struck first and the army became embroiled in defensive fighting it was split among the 16th and 18th armies
the 11th army was sent to Crimea first. it was not sent to the north. Mannstein was, not the entire army. most of the 11th army was lost in crimea
TheLastOne the 11th army was sent northwards after the capture of Sevastopol because Hitler changed his mind and wanted to capture Leningrad
TheLastOne the 11th army's losses in the battle of Sevastopol was 27412 dead,wounded and missing out of a force of around 200000 men.the army was not destroyed,its success at Sevastopol convinced Hitler to try to capture Leningrad and part of it was sent along with von manstein was sent to army group north,the rest was split between army group centre and army group south
well that's according to the western sources. if you check the Russian/Soviet sources that's way different number from both sides.
27k is to little for such a battle. in fact he lost most of his army.
when Hitler send his comgratulations on capture of Sevastopol, Mannstein said: "one more such a victory and my fuhrer will have no soldiers left".
The Stalingrad video spree is still alive and well I see? Nice! Was a good video, keep ehm coming TIK.
Yes! It won't be Stalingrad every week, but it's all about working towards that bigger goal of the Battlestorm Stalingrad documentary. These little videos are helping me do the research and form the opinions and test the waters for the eventual culmination of all ideas and concepts into that big video.
Sir, thank you for your videos. Having been in the U.S. Army for over 23 years (and still working with them after a total of 32 years), I can share some light on this subject. There is one central character I can identify that would place the success or failure directly to his decisions regarding the entire scenario.. Chief of Staff of the German Army High Command Franz Halder. His original goal was to attack Moscow and capture the capitol to win the war. The fact that Hitler dismisses him and orders the attack to go south instead, sets in motion the next phases... 1) While Hitler is ordering attacks and movements to the South, Halder still controls the reinforcements, and the SUPPLIES to the AIRLIFT that would be crucial to the success of Stalingrad, and thus the entire Caucas campaign for the oil. 2) Halder is directly undermining Hitler's efforts to show the attack in the South was a bad idea, and that he has the resources already in place in Army Central to take Moscow, and will use this to force Hitler to obligate the next focus on Halder's objective. 3) The removal of combat forces from Army Group South, after their initial push to be deployed there, is showing his contempt for the overall plan of Hitler, and further supporting my assumption. 4). He woefully under staffs the replacements to the operational units, to force them into a defensive-only posture, and will not supply the units with the means to obtain the objective. 5) Halder's shortcoming is that he underestimates Paulus and the units under his command to push forward and attack at all costs. By the time Halder realizes he is grinding his flank to become non-combat effective, he is risking Army Group Central's ability to protect itself, so he reluctantly supports the South, but too late.
Thank you, very interesting read. He was so petty that he would throw a major wrench in the works. Maybe hitler should've purged instead
Very interesting theory.!
When I watched this with an Anthropological lens, I was hypothesizing that someone must have been purposely undermining the operation for some reason. I am currently reading german soldier diaries and other primary source data to learn the soldier mindset. From these alone, there were MANY reasons Hitler could have had people working againist him. Especially after throwing a wrench in the push for Moscow. And I came upon this! The 8th book, I'm near the end of Moscow Tram Stop, Assistenzarzt Haape.
Halder is the Hotzendorf of his time.
Only if Hotzendorf then went on to have a major influence in all post-war histories of the war, because unfortunately Halder definitely did and we're paying the price for it now.
This is clearly off-topic but, man, you deserve a Nobel prize. I wish we had a beer or two some day and discuss history. This is what the Internet in its finest is supposed to be: an endless continuity of eye opening ideas challenging everything you know and forcing you to re-evaluate. I'll be watching your content until I die ;-)
well said
Nobel prize? No disrespect to this author person who does some very detailed work + bar graphs, but please, a nobel prize for a detailed research paper?
obama got a nobel peace prize for simply existing
Capt, can you be a little more specific with your reply? You do get bonus points for making up a new word that the world will little note or remember.
--
There are dozens of videos out here on this subject... How hard can it be NOW, after the numerous numbers of others have written on this for decades, to put this event together. The biggest deal NOW is to come up with a new angle on these events. We even have videos to come with the writings and ideas.
Put, I guess that put(s) him ahead of you?
After watching this video I can only think: WTF Halder, WTF...
Personally I don't even buy the argument that logistics was the main problem to get reinforcements to the Don bend and Stalingrad just beyond. TIK I don't know if you are familiar with how the Germans reinforced there divisions in the field, but I will explain regardless because of my argument.
Basically every German infantry division was raised from a number of regiments which originated from a certain part of Germany. Germany was divided into a number of military districts called Wehrkreis. These conscripted, trained and raised regiments which in turn where formed into divisions within the Wehrkreis. This meant that divisions originated from a certain part of Germany with its own local customs, dialect etc. When mobilised and deployed these divisions still had there ties to there Wehrkreis. This is where there corresponding Erzatsheer units, the replacement army where located for the units in the field. One such tie where reinforcements. These where trained and marched in battalion size to a division and distributed there over the units. This ensured that the division remained homogenic in terms of manpower. It also was meant to encourage the acceptance of replacements into the ranks. They came from the same region, they might know each other from back home, same customs etc. Forging the brotherhood right from the start so that veterans would also look out over them to keep them alive and make them wise to the do's and don't of combat. It was a very good system in that regard.
Therefore in the German system a replacement is not a statistic to be send somewhere at random. No, they are recruited and deployed to divisions tied to the same Wehrkreis. That makes the process of replacement not very flexible. That of course works both ways. Now TIK, you demonstrated that the Germans where reinforcing all over the line. That makes sense with this system. It however does not explain why 6. Armee was starved of reinforcements. I don’t know to which Wehrkreis the divisions in Stalingrad where tied, but I can hardly imagine that there respective Wehrkreis ran out of reinforcements and all others didn’t. To me it seems that the troops in Stalingrad basically got denied reinforcements because some other divisions belonging tot he same Wehrkreis, but in a whole different army of even army group got priority for some bizar reason. It would make sense if the units in Stalingrad belonged tot the same Wehrkreis as the units fighting the battles of Rzhev, but that sounds rather unlikely seeing as there where seventeen German Wehrkreis.
So I am back tot the original point, WTF Halder, WTF…
This is just a massive strategic blunder. If you attack with one army group, make sure they get reinforcements because they will lose the most men. Sure, the Rzhev sector needed reinforcements because of constant Soviet attack, and so did Leningrad, but the south needed it more.
This also puts into perspective why the Germans attacked Stalingrad, and why they stalled. I think I have some reason to doubt that Paulus would have attacked if he knew he would not be reinforced any time soon. The city was destroyed and well within artillery range so why bother if you can't make up losses? Sure, taking the city shortens the lines and covers the flank, but the prime objective of the entire army group was flank security and blocking the Volga, not taking the city. That objective could be done without taking the city. Denying any traffic on the river for a prolonged period would virtually cripple the Soviets. This because they would lose access to 90% of there fuel production, regardless of German success in the Caucasus. That fact alone should have been worth sending tens of thousands of replacements of just keeping some divisions in the area as a reserve and deploying them, rotating a few battered divisions out when necessary. Holding positions along the Volga would have killed off virtually the entire Soviet tank and air force, as well as cripple there economy. I would trade the Rzhev sailiant for it and order a withdraw, no questions about it.
Yes hindsight, I know. Still, the OHK must have known about Soviet fuel production and there shipping via the Volga.
Good point about the Wehrkreis system. Thanks for commenting :)
No problem, glad I can help out a bit with a small part of the puzzle. Got my own degree in military history and what you are doing is seriously good and refreshing. Maybe a bit hurtful for the inner "German army fanboy" inside me which got me into history in the first place, but I can't change that. I already accepted that the Panther tank was kinda bad, so I think I will also survive this. :P
Now it would be interesting if you could trace the divisions in Stalingrad to there respective Wehrkreis and figure out if there is a connection with Rzhev or another major but largely forgotten battle in 1942. I however have no idea where to start that search. I know that the Germans numbered some divisions along with first infantry regiment, and the first few regiments corresponded with the Wehrkreis, but that is about it. So for example the German 1. Infanterie-Division was from East Prussia because Wehrkreis I. That only gets you so far. Pretty sure the German army had more than seventeen divisions and a few motorised and Panzer divisions which generally didn't have a specific Wehrkreis where they originated from.
DaniëlWW2
Thank you for your information about the Wehkreis system. I have a question about it: do you know if that system was also used to the Waffen SS? I suspect not because there were lots of foreigners and foreign born Germans but I could be wrong. I'm asking this because if the Waffen SS wasn't subjected to this system their replacement pool would be much more flexible and hence used, at least at a divisional level, to replace or help army divisions in need of reinforcements.
In that light sending two elite SS division from Army Group B sounds even more weird.
I agree, especially about the Rhezev whithdrawal, wich came directly after and as a result of Stalingrad kinda. Rhezev forces should have withdrawn in the beginning of the campaign, firstly to distract troops near moscow, later to reinforce stalingrad. It is easier to defend a place after you have withdrawn a bit from it.
ALSO about logistics, the Germans should had scavenged other groups transport trucks to increase supply output.
Don't forget the German's faced an assault at Velikie Luki which required reinforcements. And how much manpower was wasted towards reinforcing a hopeless situation in North Africa after Operation Torch?
Halder is surreptitiously loading Army Group Center to take Moscow. This was Halder's obsession.
The more I get to know about Halder, the more I'm convinced he is the main one to blame for German defeat on the Eastern Front.
In a way, having more panzer forces and troop reserve for sure helped Army group center to resist Mars operation.
Put the reinforcement in the South, and AGC would maybe have been the one being surrounded instead of 6th Army.
But you're point is quite spot on. If the South offensive was so important, the Rijev saillant should have been evacuated to shorten lines and make more troups available for AG B.
Very true ! He constantly harassed Hitler about Moskow ! Hitler was against the Moskow stuff. But Hadler had many supports among the generals ( Von Bock, Von Leeb Von Rundstedt) the OKH was a mess but certainly because it is impossible to determine a decisive military Gola in Russia.
Well Army Group Center was facing Operation Mars from the Soviets and even with the large reinforcements, barely held. So had the largest reinforcements gone to Stalingrad, AGC may well have collapsed, which would have collapsed the whole front.
@@WheelsRCool Yeah this should be def be mentioned. Its now a question of should army group center have held the Rzhev salient or abandoned it like they did the following year to shorten their line and free up troops. Its hard to imagine anyone capable of enacting this actually favoring it in early summer 1942 with the successes of the 2nd battle of kharkiv and the pocket/salient clearing in Rzhev. They would have really had to think outside the box, foresee future problems, question the importance of Moscow, admit that the superior german troops weren't perfect and could lose, and give land back to the soviets. I"m assuming Hitler would reject anything involving giving back the precious lebensraum.
Great video. I think the reason Army Group Center was receiving the reinforcements was because at this time the Germans also wanted to keep the Rhev salient because it was only about 200 miles away from Moscow. It was a valuable strategic location to maintain but ended never being fully exploited. The Soviets were constantly launching large scale attacks at this sector. The German 9th Army at Rhev was holding the Soviets off but was taking heavy losses.
Well, German losses were heavy across the entire front, and Stalingrad was the farthest away from the German logistical center. Plus, I don't think they expected the Soviet Far East forces to redeployed all the way to Stalingrad, and for all these mechanized forces to materialize and launch a fresh counteroffensive in the winter
Gotta be some truth here since the RUS troops did appear from the east(?) and surround an entire famed(?) invading army by surprise?
If they didn't expect that, it doesn't speak very well of their mid to long term planning capacity...
@@TheBayzent, Indeed, the Germans had seemingly poor intelligence gathering on the Soviet Union interior and far east. It seems they did not detect the coming hoards of commie/socialists. The commie/socialists seem to better comprehend the Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz lessons on war.
@@WJack97224 Seemingly is not half of it german intelligence missed entire army groups. And going off the numbers counter intelligent proved it would seem that the Red Army should have been destroyed multiply time now. Plus the Uk was Feed intelligence to the soviets about the german movement whenever they could.
@@kraigisboss, Root cause or symptoms? The Nazis and Japanese War Lords failed because they were infected with Satan's evil. And then they failed to heed the warnings of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. The demographics, logistics, geography and insecure communications doomed to failure the warmongers; they never had a chance.
I guess all of those comments about the German General Staff being second to none during World War II was in fact an overstatement.
Absolutely. This coming Monday's video will help address this, at least partly.
250txc it was the case to the last day they fought to the death idiot Bolshevik. Bolsheviks will be hunted so worry about yourself and we’re here to stay.
No! That's one of the truest things you'll ever read. Even the allies admitted they were constantly out-generaled (One British General said "Every army, including ours had very good generals. But the German army had TEN TIMES as many very good generals.") You have to blame Hitler for the eventual defeat of Germany - for the causes I would say try out the works of James Dunnigan who explains every factor.
Just a little!
No......it was true......but it was also true that infiltration of OKW by the soviets was on the highest level
I never got into Stalingrad too much.. so this series is very interesting!
Keep up the good work =)
Glad to hear, and don't worry, I will :) It's a great battle to study for several reasons, not least because there's so much going on, and it's linked in with the whole summer offensive in 1942, plus the overall strategic situation. It's also one of the (if not the biggest) turning points of the war.
TIK yes, been studying WW2 for years and always thought that its obsolete to fight Red Army in a snow without proper winter clothing.. :D
Edit: sickening replacement rates...
Jim lastname yeah.. :/
@@TheImperatorKnight Replacements for Army group B, did they include also Hungarian units, or you meant only on German ones ?
It’s pretty obvious the Germans did not increase replacement to 6th Army because they could not supply them adequately., unless you have evidence Halder was undermining Fall Blau in order to support an attack elsewhere(Moscow?). I was hoping you would touch on this more. Its one thing to have soldiers, its another to supply them a thousand miles away.
Casualties are a mix of wounded and dead. Most are wounded. Then you can subdivide wounded into permanent losses (e’g. Lost a leg) versus Return To Duty after treatment.
Very good video TIK, in my opinion from research over the last year i read heavily into why Army Group Centre got the replacements and even veteran divisions in late 1942. The russian Stavka was conducting a stragetic offensive in late July (First Rzhev-Sychevka Offensive and later Operation Mars in November-December) and lasted all the way into September. This was waged against Models 9th Army, 2nd Panzer Army, 3rd Panzer Army which was fighting a heavy fighting over the Rzhev-Viazma sailent which was bleeding german forces in the reigon. Replacements here were quite plentyful here but germans commited over 25 divisions half of Army group centre in dealing with this penertration on the front near Sychevka particularly with counterattacks by Panzer divisions. Ill agree Halder had a strong idea and even hitler to this degree on holding the ground near moscow for "future operations". Hitler even said "Someone," he stated, "must collapse. It will not be us!" about the situation for Von Kluge's Army Group Centre who he himself was loyal to Hitler.
Leading the russians Western Front Zhukov and Kallilin Front was Konev, as know the russians were not imaganitive with the attacks but artillery and consistent attacks weared the germans down over time even though fresh reinforcements were replacing losses this is why it quickly became the Rhzev Slaughterhouse however partisan, airborne and cavalry deep pentration operations put the german forces under pressure since the start of the year and the germans had only just dealt with this threat (Operations Seydlitz, Hannover 1 and Hannover 2).
Thanks Peter, great explanation. I'll be looking into Rzhev soon :)
To add to Peter's suggestion above, an additional factor may be that Army Group Center had started that 1942 campaigning season at a significantly lower "baseline" of strength than formations in the South. I'm pretty sure the relevant volume in the semi-official "Germany and the Second World War" describes how only the units of Army Group South were able to be brought up to something approaching full strength before the start of operations, while those at Center could remain at levels as low as 50%. Thus, those very heavy offensives Peter mentions above were inflicting losses on units that were already severely weakened, so that, conceivably, it required an above-normal level of replacements and reinforcements to keep them fighting. Put another way, that disproportion of reinforcements you show being sent to Center in July-October may in part have been simply the delayed price to pay for the disproportion of reinforcements sent to South in March-June.
Fantastic episode.
Wow, I have been reading about WW2 most of my life, and I have heard none of this. This represents a data-driven view of history that we have not really seen before. Great job!
I was going to post the exact same things - that Army Group Centre was under heavy attack, and that it had barely survived the Winter Offensive - but I was beaten to the punch. But the overall weakness of AG Centre, coupled with the Ryzev fighting, points to a true point of contention between Halder & Hitler regarding the defensibility of the Ryzev salient in the first place. Halder was arguing all summer that Ryzev needed to be evacuated so that troops could be freed up for AGs A & B, and perhaps he used the distrubution of the replacements as a ploy to make his point. “See, I don’t have troops to send to the south b/c I have to send them all to Ryzev!” Hitler could have suspected that Halder was exaggerating, but couldn’t prove it, so left Halder’s replacement distribution in place along with the command to hold the line. And AG B were the the victims of the high-level power play.
The Russian summer attack at Rzhev Viazma (the meat grinder ) according to Georgy Zhukov had exactly this purpose not to let Germans send enough reinforcements to Stalingrad Very good point from your part
Here's the quote from the semi-official German history I was thinking regarding Army Group Center units starting the 1942 the campaigning season at a significantly lower strength level than those of South:
"By 1 May the Army General Staff expected the army in the east to be short of no fewer than 625,000 men, most of these vacancies being in the fighting forces. For the infantry divisions of Army Groups North and Centre--as Halder demonstrated to Hitler in April--this meant a shortfall of no fewer than, respectively 4,800 and 6,900 men per division. Only in the more highly favoured infantry divisions of Army Group South was it hope to limit vacancies initially to 2,400 per unit and then eliminate them entirely by the opening of the operation. Even so, Halder, in full agreement with the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, estimated the diminution of infantry combat efficiency, to the scale of losses by the end of April, at 60 per cent of initial strength for Army Group South and at no less than 65 percent for the other two army group. (...) If, in these circumstances, the Organization Department nevertheless considered possible 'a full personnel replenishment of Army Group South, staggered in time in accordance with operational intentions', then this could only be at the price of shortened training periods and a temporary further rise in personnel shortfalls in the sectors of Army Groups North and Center." (Germany and the Second World War. Volume VI: The Global War", p 864, but see also diagram of losses and replacements per Army Group on pp.865-67).
This is to fully excuse Hader or anything, but I think it might make it less incomprehensible that such a Center was receiving such large numbers of replacements even as Army Groups A and B were pushing ever deeper into the Caucasus and towards the Volga. The units at Center was at lower starting level of strength, and (as several other commenters have noted) suffered heavy losses throughout the year from the various Rzhev offensives. (The continued grotesque underestimation of Soviet reserves by German intelligence might conceivably have played a part here as well: since arguably the advances by South and the scale of losses suffered by Center suggested that such Russian reserves as remained were in the central area, justifying prioritizing reinforcements to the latter until it was, as it turned out, too late.)
ok as some1 who has kina stumbled into TIK over the last week or so, generally iv got good feelings about these videos i like that you dont try and appeal to the lowest intellectual denominator and you have faith that your viewers can manage an attention span slightly longer than a gerbil (long in-depth videos exploring multiple different viewpoints and interpretations, without the tedious moral lording over that some see as the victors almost mandatory prerogative, many thumbs up).
HOWEVER when your using graphs, stats, and other material that has ovs been researched (not just direct quotes), an on-screen reference, or caption reference or reference in the description section below would be great. Im not saying that you made them up or anything nefarious of that nature but references are reassuring to a cynical viewer and would certainly make me feel better. even if ppl dont actually check them their good to have.
keep up the good work (y)
Good point, I'll try include that from now on. In this video I used "Enduring the Whirlwind" by Liedtke for the stats. Now the official German history does also provide stats that are similar for this period. But they are different in a few ways. So Liedtke could actually be wrong. However, as I said to another commenter, the stats provided in the official German history for the same period appeared to be flawed, and looked as though they overstated losses (which then doesn't fit with other stats I have from many other books). So to me, Liedtke's stats appear to be more reliable, but I could be wrong. Either way, the only issue with the stats is the loss numbers, not the replacement numbers, which still favour Army Group Centre.
Also, thanks for the constructive criticism :)
As my grandfather arrived at the borders of Stalingrad only 3 men of his company were still alive (from 140 men). He had shown me very clear how hard and taff the fight was at the approche of the 6. Armee in Summer.
Nico Schmidt i hope your grandpa made it out ok he was a true hero and deserves the highest in praise
@@stevensedillo6996 really?
and what business had your grandpa in the USSR anyway ? Why would he fight for?
@@theopot5798 Because it was clear that USA and Britain were about to gang up on Germany again so they needed more resources to fight them.
@@AK-hi7mg I am Turkish and I love Germany. We were allies in WWI. Why the fuck would you think a Turk would hate the Germans? He's probably some butthurt pole.
i just found your channel and as a fellow history enthusiast i have to say your channel is amazing! keep up the awesome work youre doing!
I'm late to the party, but the Rzhev was the main factor attracting most of the replacements in the Army group Center.
yes, the summer Rzhev battles, where the Soviets launched massive attacks against AGC and frequently achieved penetrations that had to be counterattacked and sealed off are the clear answer why German reinforcements were prioritized to Army Group Center. These battles were prioritized by Zhukov, and the germans knew that if they were expelled from the salient, all hope of ever taking Moscow would be lost. So the germans had to pour in reinforcements; eventually this escalation became known as the "meatgrinder". Meanwhile, it was felt that 6 Army had things in hand, despite it's losses. Only one or two people hit on this, while so many comments here are utterly clueless. And to refute TIk's point, the fact that forces had to be stripped from A and B and sent to Center in order to reinforce them against the furious soviet attacks PROVES that the germans did not have the manpower to carry out all of it's objectives on offense while still maintaining an adequate defense outside of Moscow.
When you had the feeling you had to support one channel and you see it exceeds your expectations and you feel happy for a well reserved success!
Thanks for the support, it really is making the difference :)
Interesting theory.
Don't ask me where to get the data, but one "proof" of the theory would be a study of the routes and equipment used to supply B and the 6th Army, and the carrying capacity of that system and vehicles. These facts are crucial to your analysis.
Your spot on that's crucial to the finding why
This is an excellent presentation - I learnt quite a bit about reinforcement and loss numbers from watching.
Good to hear! :)
Definitely one of the more exceptional and insightful Tik videos, which are great and backed already.
The management and then even blame going on against the southern group are stunning.
Even America who had to cross an ocean replaced casualties better
The infamous"repple depples" ,? Where individuals were broken up and sent to unit's that didn't know anything about them? It's known how bad the Americans replaced there troops ,
First of all, thank you very much for this explanation. The german army simply at that time of the war ran out of fuel. They went there by horses and on foot like in the first world war. Russia was just too big for them. Please continue with your detailed numbers and statistics. These facts count the most. I used to live and work in the UK a few times and 30 years ago I have been basically allover UK for travelling. I really appretiate your videos. Greetings from Lüneburg in Lower Saxony
Of course the Axis favoured the reinforcement of Army Group Centre - it was resisting the main axis of the Red Army's attack - the 3 battles of Rzhev. Glantz refers to these as Zhukov's greatest blunders. Massed Red forces smashing repeatedly against AGC - with a goal of no less than the destruction of AGC - the better to finish the war in 1942. In your analysis you never tell us where the main focus of Soviet effort was. What was reinforced on the axis side is given to us in isolation. You're missing half the equation - the Red strategic schwerpunkt at AGC.
If you reinforce Army Group B you risk the destruction of AGC. Zhukov was inept in 1942 - no maskirovka just blasting away with green troops. The Germans saw it all coming and, of course, reinforced.
As you say 90% of Stalingrad was conquered by late October. Chuikov was largely finished. The Germans thought that that theatre was safe. Why did they get it wrong? Partly because Vatutin was an excellent commander who was adept at maskirovka at a time when the overrated Zhukov was still learning (expensively) on the job.
Bottom line - if you are short of manpower - which Germany always was - you have to put your men where you think the threat is. They knew Zhukov's threat to AGC. Operation Uranus came as a surprise because of the excellent work of Vatutin.
I like your work my scouse friend - but the Germans acted as logically as they could given the situation as they saw it.
Thanks and another aspect of the conflict cometh forth! Hope to follow up on this angle. Sort of also plays into AH telling paulus to stay and die and you are helping the fatherland to win.
Many knew before this failed attempt in Stalingrad was finished, a mad-man was at the helm. Too bad that big table saved his butt in that attempt on him that was soon to follow.
Interesting but the group casualties tell the real story. Your theory ignores where the losses were occurring. More likely the misapplication of resources was due to traitors in the Wehrmacht, such as Halder, who immediately becomes best buddies with the enemy after the war. Halder then ably assists in covering up Wehrmacht treachery that lead to Germany's failing to secure enough oil to establish a European peace.
@@GCNavigator lol, what sort of Naci fetishism is this?
And.. They failed. They got outplayed.
This just continues to prove that the Germans absolutely sucked at the operational and strategic levels. They were great tacticians but the Soviets were vastly superior at strategy although they sucked at tactics. I also did an interview with a university professor that pretty much confirms what we are both trying to convey to the wider public. Obviously he may have his biases since he is half Eastern Europe, but alas TIK, we are getting there.
that is a brilliant analogy.
^ that is a terribly atrocious and inaccurate statement. They won at Kursk precisely because of their elastic defense strategy coupled with the redeployment of an entire reserve front behind. Can you prove anything you say? Do you even know the distinction between the operational theater and tactics? German general staff even initiated operation barbarossa knowing that they couldn't supply their lines. Only guys complaining were logicians.
"They won at Kursk precisely because of their elastic defense strategy coupled with the redeployment of an entire reserve front behind"...
But how much did the Russians know, because of the British? At that time the British code-breakers pretty much read every dispatch the German army was sending... It stands to reason that they gave a lot of that information to the Russians.
It would be wrong to take anything away from the blood the Russians spilled... But likewise it would be unjust to claim that the Germans "absolutely sucked at the operational and strategic levels".
It isn't an unjust claim. Look at how maskirovka worked.
'"This just continues to prove that the Germans absolutely sucked at the operational and strategic levels. They were great tacticians but the Soviets were vastly superior at strategy " yep we saw that "brilliant Soviet strategic leadership" in 1941 and 1942, minus Stalingrad...they lost so much men and equipment that any other smaller european army would literally stop existing in such circumstances...yet Stalin barely blinked and meatgrinded his way to Berlin...hardly impressive...The Soviets could afford to loose army after army and battle after battle, the Germans couldnt afford any mistakes...thats it. The size was first and foremost reason the USSR was victorious, everything else is vastly less important.'
Losing men in battles is in the tactical sphere, but the Soviets were superb in front wise troop placement which is why they were able to manage 10:1 ratio battles whilst only having 1.5:1 ratios in frontline strength. You seem to not know the difference.
The Luftwaffe pounded Stalingrad incessantly leaving behind ironically wrecks in the city that became ideal defensive and ambush structures that tied down German forces in attrition battles. This wear them down and afforded the Soviet side the time and space to build up their forces for counter attacks on an already weakened German forces.
Wasn't that because they wanted to make sure the city would be ruined if they couldn't take it?
I was wondering what would that chart look like for 1941? Given the battle of Moscow in the winter of 1941, then continuous Soviet counter-offensives + Rhzev early in 1942, it was Army Group Centre, I presume, that took most of the casualties. Perhaps the German staff was still in the momentum of recuperating the losses to Army Group Centre when July started?
yes and no. you see ... Col. Adam (was responsible for Reinforcements as the 1C-Officer of the 6.Army) constantly begs for men and officers and went to Berlin 2 times and to Winnytza 3 or 4 times to put pressure on his superiors. with little to no result. and he also is constantly complaining how little food and ammunition supply the 6. Army got.
Paulus decided to even leave the majority of horses behind on the Don-River because there was not enough food the feed all the horses (A TERRIBLE DECISION ! because these horses could helped a lot in the encirclement to keep the men alive )
a second thing is: the reinforcements are not nearly as good as the men lost. most of them are poorly trained, a lot with no fighting experience. and most important : the huge lack of good sergeants and lower rank officers. if you loose those highly skilled men of the inter-war-period you cannot simply replace them by promoting soldiers.
Love your videos man I got bummed out when I watched all of them and realized there's no more!
Yeah, most of my videos are gameplay videos, which don't appeal to everyone. But there's going to be new videos every Monday :)
I respect your choice of putting gameplay videos since it seems like this is how you started the channel. May I suggest that you put them all in a different channel? There are so many of them and we have to sort thru them to find non/gameplay videos. I am pretty sure that you will augment views on past videos this way. Cheers from Canada buddy and keep up the awesome work!
Did fighting around Rzhev is a factor? it happen before and end after stalingrad
I'm more than certain it was, but as you can see, the reinforcements going to Army Group Centre was a lot more than was actually needed to replace the losses.
Good question, good question! And yep, TIK, someone in charge appears to have a plan that might not have come to the light of day just yet.
There was a video out here, now deleted, that reflected on how badly the RUS fought the invaders as they approached the city limits, contrary to stalin being remembered as 'great military' leader. It was revealed he usually said the same as the invaders leader saying things like: no retreat, fight every man to his death for every foot of ground. Less than maybe the best ideas?
This fits into the beginning of your video that stated that the worst fighting was before actually entering the city.
Why the big build up in the center of the country? Looks like moscow silly rabbit!
Maybe they expected the campaign in the south to be over in a couple of months and were already gearing up for an offensive in the central sector?
The Soviet counterattack was simply inevitable.
But more panzers if you’ve got fuel and lubricants.
Great info, but you drive me right out my skull with your repeating the same things over and over and over and over again. Yes, we got it after 8 minutes - reinforcements to Army Group B were far lower than losses. Yet still at 18-20 minutes you're reviewing the fact that reinforcements were far lower than losses. I literally fell asleep at about the 14 minute mark - which happens to me frequently about the middle of a lot of your analysis type videos. You've said what needs to be said. You've made your point. You've shown the evidence. Once you've done that, move on and give us the conclusions - or in this case at least lay out the questions that need to be answered but will probably never be answered. But again - your info is great and the issues you bring up are great!!!
By the way, I have to agree with others - why go into the city at all? Urban combat is a horror. And as you say, Army Group B was protecting the flank of Army Group A. Protect the flanks. Don't start a massive battle for a the city - there was nothing the Germans needed in the city and holding it didn't particularly do anything to help protect the flank of Army Group A. Plus, as you and others have pointed out, taking a Panzer army from Army Group A to reinforce Army Group B weakened the thrust for the oilfields, which is what the whole campaign was about.
Was going to leave a comment but you did all job, thanks
About city: they had to take Stalingrad because it was foothold for Red Army, they did supply via Volga fleet. And tank factory was working despite any circumstances
Just extraordinary. You shine a light on this conflict like no other. The deficit in supply to this primary objective would beggar belief were the argument not backed up so convincingly. I find myself almost gasping in astonishment. A period i thought i knew well and was so well documented there's nothing more to say until, that is, you enter the debate. Its striking that you can effect an almost visceral response to a well worn subject with such insights. I wont say new insight for the facts are there all along. You bring them to the fore, making history anew. A commentator below jokingly suggested making you professor of history in his fictional dictatorship. I would humbly suggest this to be a real career option for you at any progressive university. My heart felt thanks to you, sir.
Thank you for your great comment. Very encouraging :) I'm getting my ideas from the books and sources, although I am also forming my own conclusions. Assuming you want to know more, I'd recommend the books "Enduring the Whirlwind" by Liedtke and "Death of the Wehrmacht" by Citino. Also anything by David Glantz. Can't go wrong with Glantz!
Thanks i'll make a note of those authors. Like a lot of people i've got a pile of reading to do. Recently got through a huge volume on ancient Egypt, but i'll put your suggestions on my to read list. Thanks again.
I want to second this. TIK is amazing; his explanations are truly incisive. I too have read over this area - several books on Stalingrad alone along with many on WWII European theater. I know the history pretty well for a non-specialist; and I must say that TIK does an amazing job digging up the important data and coming at arguments from the point of view of neglected perspectives. It looks to me more and more like the war was lost before June 22, 1941 due to complete lack of proper planning, logistics, supply, weather forecasting, and intel - they didn't even know about the T-34! You can fault Eisenhower all you want but he understood the importance of logistical supply of large armies in the field. Case Blue reveals the Germans still didn't get it after Typhoon fails for lack of winter clothing! Keep it up TIK - you do a great job!
TIK Yeah, Robert Citino's books are really good.
+OraPro Nobis - I think you are going a bit far with your conclusions. Germans were masters of maneuver, which is primarily a logistical exercise. You need planing and brilliant execution for such a thing to succeed.
How about simply underestimating the resilience of Soviet resistance? You don't need much to make this kind of mistake, and it also explains Halder's and Manstein's frustration with never ending Soviet hordes.
In this view, Germans more or less correctly estimate their logistical needs and shortcomings, and also correctly predict the outcomes of initial battles. They just incorrectly expect Soviets to crumble.
I like this view better, because it does not require for Halder or Manstein to be idiots. Which is a hard sell to me, I'll admit that freely.
:coughHalder:... lol xD
Adolescent behavior? We did that in middle school, 30 yrs ago? Rebumkins did that in a state of the union address about 7 yrs ago. This one was hard to swallow.
TIK, pick your game up... Great numbers and work on your VID here but your audience, I'd guess, is not high school students?
"slightly" lower than high school
Ok, these observations are brilliant, thank you so much for breaking the numbers down. I've been reading about Stalingrad and Operation Blau for forty years, and have not seen the simple, by Army Group #'s, replacement breakdown like this before. But maybe I can offer an explanation.
I don't think Halder alone can be scapegoatted here. I think I read,- memory hazy- that the German General Staff was very much of against pursuing Operation Blau, even when it was being considered by Army Group South as a single entity (wrong strategic axis entirely). Furthermore, as the plan evolved and split Army Group South into two, these two subsequent entities were ill-advised formations doing ill-advised work (from the point of view of the German General Staff) at the end of an extremely long supply line, different gage tracks, no petrol, and armored formations already out of gas, BEFORE the replacement issue you described so well comes up. As you pointed out, it took Paulus 2 weeks to be reinforced with the petrol he needed to keep moving. SO simple conclusion, they could get guns and butter, or bodies, but not both. And they were not well prioritized because:
Again- problem was that the strategic axis makes no sense even to a layman, forget a schooled staff officer- (Glantz does break this down somewhat in some diagrams, but does not address this issue specifically). The push SHOULD have been at Moscow, and not on the Southern Flank, extending AND SPLITTING the flank into areas of poor supply, infrastructure and reinforcement capacity. I believe Hitler made a political decision to push for Operation Blau, but this was about resource management (oil) and insisted on an operational/strategic focus that no one thought advisable- and I think his hand in turnj was forced by some fuel agreement renegotiations with the Romanians (from whom he's getting most of his oil at this point).
In other words, if you look not at German replacement rates, but German oil production and anticipated needs for this period, you'll understand why he wants to push at the oil fields. This is not post 1944 crazy Hitler, but the guy with the Big Picture still in mind.....But the German General Staff was absolutely not in agreement, and obviously they knew they could scarcely supply what was there to begin with. They weren't stupid, nor that slow to react if you really think about it.
In any large scale organization, reported losses from one quarter are then adjusted on the next. Many current corporations are too large and too many layers exist to react DAILY to what is going on. No army is that nimble. No one has that picture accurately, until the month is over and the tallies are added up. You cannot remake military replacement policy change in a month. So I think the Wehrmacht reacted as quickly, indeed quite quickly for an organization that would make Walmart look small, in a quarter, to the losses they projected inaccurately for. It was too little too late, but I don't think it was but two things: Institutional paralysis, and an overall reluctance strategically to buy into a 'plan' that was no 'plan' at all, but a reaction to a political (and strategic supply) need. Because as you point out, the replacement policy was inexplicably AWAY from the tip of the spear.
Lastly, and I think this might be also a point to consider-the Germans did the unthinkable in Russia, and they managed the early part of the war with, what by middle 1942, might be considered 3 reasonably experienced Army Group staffs.
Where did the 4th materialize from, or were AG A and B essentially skeleton halves of what was once AG South's command and staff structure? Either way, you would have had half the experience, doing twice the labor, on a front not well supplied to begin with, for a seriously compromised strategic direction, split in two, requiring accurate replacements and supplies would have been impossible. Rememer each AG might have somewhere between 200 and 500000 men, could have been considered the equivalent of most small countries entire armed forces, to be run on the move, in combat, thousands of miles from home. I doubt these were efficient formations, by German standards (meaning quite efficient compared to the rest of us).
Great comment! And I agree. Have you read any sources that specifically said the German General Staff didn't want to go south? I'd like to read them so I can give specific examples (other than Halder)
I’ll look for citations, pretty sure I can find at least one mention if not many. As I said though, Glantz partitions the strategic ‘axes’ through which invasion made the most sense. Blau made no sense: it’s goals weren’t clear and dividing forces is a military no-no. I’m on the road so anecdotal is all I can offer but I’ll buzz you back timely. But if Blau was craziness, then Stalingrad was folly on top of folly, because as it turns out, AG A literally made it to Asia, where Stalingrad was a meat grinder of absolutely no strategic importance, save name. You pointed out how much of AG A and B’s losses were even in August, crazy out of whack. Only thing I can think of is a certain dictator’s obsession with the other. AG B was supposed to be defensive. What the Hell? And the Germans took no other city similarly in WW2, they’d encircle with Pz Armee. I think you’re seeing High Command deal with an unexpected and unprojected loss total because of Stalingrad and then scramble to fix. 2-3 months is still pretty impressive given what all was going on, the magnitude of Barbarossa, and the sheer size of the Wehrmacht (and Red Army).
@@tampabaycanuck64 Cutting off the Soviet Oil supplies is not folly.
The Soviets had put most of their reinforcements on the Moscow direction, attacking Moscow again isn’t going to provide much benefit.
It took him 10 minutes to say the main point, the OKW supplied the the wrong army groups
The German army was very good about keeping a reserve force no matter how desperate the situation. This they had learned from their WW1 experience and it probably prolonged the war by months. Stalingrad happened mostly because the Germans were literally at the end of the line, running short of everything except enemies and having to ship almost everything including even rebuilt tanks all the way from Germany. The further the Germans got the harder it got to supply them, logistics is obviously what destroyed the German army, that and the fuel situation, which starting in 1944 was desperate. Hitler had been told all this in 1941 but gambled on the "Short war" even thinking it would be wrapped up before winter 1941 (and idiot Keitel buying this crap too so didn't order winter clothing for the Heer...Only the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine ignored him and ordered winter gear for their troops anyway, but this didn't help the poor soldaten one bit while they froze!). Hitler and the OKW were completely wrong, of course, and even though everybody including der fuehrer, realized or had been told, German industry was well organized in breadth (they had plenty of types of everything) but never in DEPTH (and never enough of anything)! Once that became clear Hitler seized on the mad ideas of a "political solution" (Ardennes offensive was all about trying to drive a wedge between the British and Americans somehow, ignoring all facts) plus the
"secret weapons" (meaning the ME262, sturmgewehr, and V1 and V2 missiles) that were only ready much too late to have any effect on the battlefield at all.
Am glad that its not 1942 and you Sir are not working for the German general staff. Really enjoyed it.
I am not so sure Halder is to blame. Here's my take:
1-In the original plan Army Group B is just guarding the flank
2-The battles of Rzhev take place until early october (Army Group Center)
3-Model's 9th army is involved in the heavy fighting in Rzhev and he is a notorious unit grabber and hoarder who can get Hitler to give him what he wants
4-The bulk of the red army is still in front of Moscow
5-In Hitler's eyes, Stalingrad becomes important only once he realizes that the TRUE objective of the campaign, the Baku oils fields, are definitively out of reach
For french historian Jean Lopez, Stalingrad's importance grows with every german defeat: the Caucasus, El-Alamein, Operation Torch ... Until the capture of the city becomes the only possible good news he can give to the german people.
Late to the party but I'm liking this explanation
Will, you lost me on item #3
@@anthonyivanaglugubjr.2645 there was an attempt to break through to them after the encirclement by guderian's panzers but it ultimately came up short of opening a gap to retreat through. If this is what you are asking, yes they did try to help them. Not all that hard but that's all they could spare in the area.
Of course attrition hurt Germany far far more than the USSR. Not just because of vast quantitative difference overall but quality. USSR had a handful of good units. For Germany, most of them could be considered good units.
@willou 86
I am with you in your 5 points!! but not with the Jean Lopez's interpretation.
Stalingrad was a huge success of the Soviets because they saw an opportunity and had known how to achieved it.
For #2 given, then Germany should have vacated the caucuses to throw those former caucus units in to the Stalingrad effort.
I already comnented on this video that the preferred attacking strength of 3.00:1.00 in ground forces was not even remotely close to being accomplished let alone even a break even ratio.
Germany needed to learn that "quantity is a quality of its own"-Josef Stalin.
There generally are not enough firepower-multipliers during the the WWII era weapons to compensate for a significantly deficient attacking ground force.
TIK looks like someone who drinks nothing but beer.
Hmmm...Germany fought in North Africa as well ? Had troops in France (Dieppe), Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe. And STRECHED LINES OF COURSE. A logistical nightmare. And they were agressors on foreign land. Who will fought thousands of miles from home with enthusiasm ? Nobody, that's who. Greetings from Croatia man !
This is a good video and an interesting anecdote, but the blame is still totally Hitler's, with a nice assist from Goering.
1. Hitler should have never launched Operation Barbarossa. Every mishap after its failure in 1941 is just a cascade of gambles gone bad.
2. Ordering Paulus into Stalingrad a. dramatically increased attrition, b. pinned down half his forces, and c. invites the encirclement that eventually occurred,
3. Hitler underestimated Soviet strength (acttually from 1941 through 1945 when he insanely called for the imaginary "Army Wenck" to rescue him from Zhukov's attack on Berlin),
4. Stalingrad's surrender was forced by the inability to resupply it. As you know, Goering promised aerial replenishment at levels he could never come close to fulfilling.
Finally, if the battle hinged on the diversion of troops to Group Center, why didn't they see a string of victories in the following months? Include Kursk / Citadel in your answer.
One more excelent video !!!!. TIK your are lighting, with hard data, proper analysis and conclutions about Stalingrad`s shadows. Congratulations !!!
Wow! - this is borderline ground breaking. I had no idea - talk about destroying the myth of German staff officer excellence.First Manstein and now the actual main planning body (Halder looks more muppet like after each video). Obviously so much more information has come to light since the end of the iron curtain, everything I read 20+ years ago is out of date. Those Wehrmacht officers got away with making it up to cover their reputations for so long...........
Sounds like you'll enjoy next week's video too :)
After these videos I'm starting to see the memories of Manstein, Halder (and others) as more fit to chronicle what was going on during the Cold War and at the respectable society of West Germany that about was going on during WW2.
In that sense their excellent sources for the 50's and early 60's
That's an interesting perspective. Especially considering Manstein was asked to advise on the founding of the Bundeswehr in the 50's.
Where were all the lower level officers who would have had inside information as to what was going on but without an agenda of protecting their reputation? Was it too politically toxic to even suggest that too much blame for the loss was being placed on Hitler?
Would one have been considered a "Hitler defender" to push back on that narrative? Would be interesting to know if there was even a single voice back in the first 10-15 years after the war that was calling BS. There certainly had to be some people at the time that had enough first hand knowledge to point fingers at someone other than the usual suspects. Of course, it would have taken quite a bit of courage for someone to offer a counter-narrative, but In later years where the price to pay would not be so hefty, you would think someone would come forward.
The numbers are helpful in pointing out how the decisions that were made worked against the war effort but all they really can do is suggest at various theories as to what processes produced these decisions. Maybe there were German officers in a position to know that did speak up but I have not heard any of these people cited in support of any of the theories that contradict the standard explanation for German losses.
As to the junior officers who knew what was going on - based on TIK's vid the other week - I would imagine most of them were dead.
TIK Can you do a video on the German invasion of France whenever you get the time? I don't hear much about it
Bottom line on this saga? The French walked out of Paris so the city would not be destroyed. One of the invaders generals did not follow AH orders and DID NOT burn Paris. Toss in Dunkirk as to the last stand on the French homeland. Another blunder here by the invaders!
The thing is... maybe Germans were understrength around Stalingrad, but this is not, where Soviets broke the front, furthermore: Paulus could hold out until they literally starved to death.
It was the Romanian, Italian and Hungarian armies that were overrun.
The real question: why were they neglected so severely? And it wasn't about tanks and fuel which was obviously quite scarce or motorized units...
They lacked any adequate anti-armor and winter equipment. It was static infantry waiting for tanks freezing to death.
I liked the historical side of this, but the speculation is ridiculous as always. Could the Germans have changed tactics and done better? Of course. But in saying that such action would have won them the battle is ignoring the Soviet's change in plans that would have inevitably occurred as a result. That's something most alt-history speculation suffers from: you forget that the other side will adapt to whatever new change you introduce. Stalin and his generals wouldn't have been like "oh well, the Germans reinforced and have more men in the city, I'm just going to do absolutely nothing about it". The only way the Germans win the battle is in a world where they do everything perfectly, and the Soviet's just refuse to do anything to adapt, and ignore all sense of logistics and anything to do with fighting a damn war. In other words, no. Just no. It didn't, wouldn't have, nor ever will have happened. Get over it.
this is fascinating analysis.
If you're looking for opinions, I would question whether Halder redirected reinforcements in spite of the logistical limits, or because of it. It may have been logistically impossible to direct the supply and reinforcement necessary for A and B to achieve their objectives???
Vern Etzel Nope! For supplies maybe but not for reinforcements.
So you can reinforce without supply? Motorized units specifically?
I'm not saying it's a fact, I'm just interested in the possible limitation imposed by the rail system etc beyond Rostov
Vern Etzel 56000 men in 4 and 1/2 months is about 400 per day. Let's assume they were sending 200 tonnes of supplies daily to the sixth Army and we get 2 men for each tonne. That is not impossible.
My opinion is that Halder thought that the southern push will flounder and he will then can make the war winning strike against Moscow. Maybe with more researchers studying this anomaly we can have a more definitive answer.
Again, what about the logistical infrastructure for that region? Weekly train loads (you should probably work in weeks, not days) require a rail head with sufficient motor transport (or horse wagons) to deliver supplies to each Army.
Difficult to do with units fighting in the Caucuses. It's my understanding that the actual rail lines were few. Air interdiction might have been an issue as well.
Bottom line, and this my speculation: The entirely of AG South, broken into A and B, couldn't be sufficiently resupplied, so divisions were transferred away.
If this is wrong, then it was simply Halder's decision to not give priority to a major, critical offensive-- but I'm thinking TIK here is on the case, and we'll know more conclusively by the time his epic project is uploaded.
@TIK One very important thing I don't think that very much military history really brings out is that large numbers of soldiers are not 'teeth arms' (ie, infantry, armour, artillery and engineers). Infantry tend to take 70% plus, of losses and most of the rest are armour, engineers and artillery. A lot of soldiers involved in supply, admin etc, while doing vital jobs, normally take very few losses. It is really worthwhile, when you can, to look at actual combat losses by arm and especially infantry, that ALWAYS do most of the dying.
I agree, but sadly I don't have the statistics/sources to do this for the whole of Blau :(
Thats true 99 but during total war, that can and will change. Pencil-pushers, as well as adsorbents and old men, will be taking bullets before it is over.
Love your videos and appreciate your hard work
Thank you Mason, it's really good to hear :)
Grandson of killers and invaders can not understand why Nazi failed. Nazi replenished theirs Center Army because of Mars operation near Rzhev town. It would be better to show bloodthirsty actions on the Eastern front dude
This particular video isn't about Nazi atrocities and can't possibly mention everything, but I do have several videos on the atrocities (see links below). That said, I don't appreciate being called "grandson of killers and invaders" considering I'm not a Socialist (National or Marxist) and don't support said ideologies. You're assuming/accusing me of being something I'm not with zero evidence or explanation, which is not appreciated.
Baltic civilians th-cam.com/video/PWY3ByskitQ/w-d-xo.html
Stalingrad civilians th-cam.com/video/e5FhRDRAZPw/w-d-xo.html
Leningrad civilians th-cam.com/video/nnyJ-qlzZGk/w-d-xo.html
@@TheImperatorKnight please, don't feed the trolls.
This does not include the fact that the Germans had lost more than a million men by the time they got to the Don River. Also, the entire Sixth Army was literally starved of food, ammunition and fuel not to mention winter clothing. By the time the Russians completed the encirclement most of the German army could be considered fought out. They talked about a breakout but the condition of the troops and the few working tanks and trucks with fuel made that impossible.The Luftwaffe's effort to supply the army by air was a dismal, costly failure.
Halder replaced at the end of September and that explains the increase of reinforcements during October and November..I think Halder sabotaged Op Blau
th-cam.com/video/xBWmkwaTQ0k/w-d-xo.html&ab_channel=Shout%21Factory
Help Tik. I’m reading my GCSE notes on the Second World War saying that the Germans were defeated at Kursk because of the effectiveness of the t-34... sigh
I think you need to get some better sources.
Partially. Germany lost their ability to conduct mobile warfare because of the months of concentrated defences designed to funnel the Wehrmacht's mobile forces into kill zones.
Also The SU series was making an appearance (an effective Soviet SPATG) - more competetion in the skies, but more concerning was the 90 or so Pz Mk V Panther of which most broke down or caught fire before even reaching their start lines along with the disastrous 'Elefant' SPATG which was to slow, as well as forgetting to mount an MG on the vehicle.
The Red Army had roughly 3-4 months to prepare defences in depth, which ground down the irreplaceable panzer forces, which Hitler removed at a pivotal point on the southern pincer to react to the Sicily landings.
Kiowhatta C yes thanks for the information. History at GCSE is so simplified tearing this accurate science apart.
Don't forget ULTRA. The Brits gave a lot of accurate intel to the Russians.
The salient was an obvious target even without british assistance, the soviets knew this.
The fact they were able to replace German divisions with Italian and Romanian suggests they were capable of sending men there. I really wonder why did they thought it necessary to divert a division to France of all the places. It almost looks as if they were not really expecting a counter attack at this point.
Good point! I think the Dieppe Raid had something to do with sending units to the west.
I assume you have already seen this talk by David Glantz th-cam.com/video/7Clz27nghIg/w-d-xo.html and read his book "The Soviet-German War 1941-1945: Myths and Realities: A Survey Essay"? He mentions there several "forgotten" soviet counter offensives that happened during the operation Blau. I was wondering if those would be plausible explanations for the bad prioritization by the Germans.
@Tomasz
Burned out divisions were sent to France to be re-blooded.
The transfer was deemed 'vacation time.'
Units sent to France from the Eastern Front were always cripples... or being built way up... like the SS panzer divisions.
If trains and trucks are send fully loaded east. They have to return anyway. So taking a division back to the west wouldn't be the biggest problem.
TIK, I think I know why those reinforcements were never sent to Stalingrad. I have been watching a made-for-TV series produced in Russian in 2011 called "Soviet Storm". In episode 6, "The Rzhev Meat Grinder", it talks about the Red Armies repeated attempts to retake Rzhev, which was a major rail hub for north-south and east-west rail traffic. It was a cornerstone of Army Group Centre's supply lines, and had to be held at all costs. Knowing this, the Red Army launched a major offensives in July and August 1942 that came close to capturing the Vyazma-Rzhev rail line. Model had to commit all the troops he had assembled for his own small offensive, and only barely prevented the collapse of the central front near Moscow. According to the TV series, neither side ever talked about this after the war, the Soviets because they lost huge numbers of men, the Germans because they lost ground and fought a pedestrian defensive battle that they almost lost (hence was not good for PR). During these summer offensives, the Germans suffered around 60,000 casualties, while the Red Army lost around 314,000 men. During Operation Mars, Army Group Centre lost a further 53,000 men, while the Red Army lost at least 216,000.
If you can dig up some more information about the battles around Rzhev, it might make for a great video. Also, I know you don't like Halder, but in a sense this does rehabilitate him somewhat for the failure at Stalingrad (though not completely). It also demonstrates how thinly stretched the Wehrmacht was in 1942 (robbing Peter to pay Paul), backing up Citino's claims that this is the year that Germany lost.
Because Karma and punishment for those who dragged people out of their houses and slaughter them, before WWII started, is a Bitch....
The U.S. Army has (its on you tube) an in-depth study of the house to house close combats in the later stages of the fight for Stalingrad. I was shocked at how few men were fighting each other in those buildings when each side had access to tens of thousands of other men just a few miles away. You did a good job of enlightening others on the poor disposition of German army. Congratulations.
First of all Stalingrad was full of subways, Tunnels and unnoticed flak and strong points a single movement is could be a disaster and In last month near by Red October factory and bread factory troops concentration is low comparative to other areas because of an intal about an counter attack in volga and palus only get about 1000 men in a week to replase losses in southern sector and he was very picky to safe his losses where most of fighting was done around mama a cragen and Stalingrad factory halls
Also about 3700 tanks, 600 stukas, 800do17 bomber's and about 6 lakh solders with 4000 gun for a city less than 5 km wide and 14 in lenght
Loving this series. This is the first I have heard about the lack of reinforcements. I am curious about a couple things. Did the logistics issue at the start of Blau result from the Soviet offensive on Kharkov in May 42? Did this battle cause stockpiles meant for Blau be used and depleted? The casualty information is also interesting. I have heard the battle for the Don bend was much more brutal than typically lead to believe. This is backed up by the casualty reports. And could Hitlers belief the Soviets were beat because of early successes of Blau against disorganized units that took part in the Kharkov offensive contributed to the lack of reinforcements? By the time they figured it out, it was too late? They took units off the line and afaik they were destined for Leningrad because they thought the Soviets were beat.
You'll be happy to know that I pretty much answer all of this in this coming Monday's video :)
5:06 lol, Dumitrescu was like: "Russia is too OP, can I pls make my line shorter, so at least I have some chance of success?"
Dumb
The massive Rzhev offensive further to the north aimed at Army Group Center by the Soviets
was meant to prevent Germany from sending any relief south to Stalingrad.
Interesting analysis. I would say though that Germans suffered from hubris, and that they were defeated by the three generals; General Mud, General Winter, and General Distance
It's probably because they put Moscow as a main objective. Defeating Russian at Stalingrad in winter wasn't possible even with complete reinforcements
Lonely Monarch: Taking Stalingrad Center was a problem from the start.
What stretches of the Stalingrad riverfront were ever taken?
Hmm I have a strange feeling that Halder is responsible for a lot of German short comings during the war...
It doesn't help that he was in charge of the post-war German side of the historiography either, and is definitely to blame for the manipulated view many people have of the Eastern Front today.
Nobody knew but Halder is in fact Conrad Von Hortzendorf
Not a bad analogy. Conrad was, for a time, written in history to be a very capable commander. Read up Alister Hornes book on Verdun, where he states Conrad was one of the few Generals who was more capable then the men he commanded.
Yeah lol
You are trying to remove blame from the boss, AH?
250txc no idiot. Are you trying to cover for Stalin? You wish you were have the man AH was.
Remember the huge battles going on to defend the Rhez salient in Army Group Centre in 1942 - Walter Model commanding the 9th Army at Rhez barely held off the attacks and the Red Army lost up to 2 million men in the battles there.
No they didn't loose 2 million people. The attack against Model in the center was a part of the four planets Soviet strategic plan. It was called Mars. The only objective of this offensive was to stop Model to send reinforcement during Uranus. The objective of Uranus was to make Saturn possible. The objective of Saturn was to destroy the entire German southern front. Russians were playing chess while the germans were playing checkers.
@@antoinemozart243 Rzev salient was attacked several times before Stalingrad. Stalin was still worried about security of Moscow and wanted to destroy the Rzev salient and by doing so Wehrmacht would by that time already seriously weakened
@@b4nterontilt245 yes you are right. But during Stalingrad the Stavka ( in fact Wassilewsky and zukhov) made the four planets plan. First Uranus which led to the encircling of the VIth army and then Mars to attack again the Rjev sailliant in order to halt Model army and stop him to send reinforcements and then the final Saturn which in the first place was intended to launch several armies from'Voronej to Rostov to destro Manstein AND the army in the Caucasus. A catastrophe 10 times worse than Stalingrad. But zukhov, didn't succeed at Rjev ( in fact he didn't prepare it like Uranus) but stopped Model and when Manstein launch the attack to rescue the VIth army Saturn was transformed in little Saturn but the effect was the same. Manstein saw the catastrophic consequences and rushed back to save the army in the Caucasus.
@@antoinemozart243 Soviets didn't attack Army Group Don but other parts of Army Group B. They destroyed Italian and Hungerian units almost cutting off Army Group A and Don and pushed German 2 Army from Voronez with objective of retaking eastern Ukraine (mostly Kharkov). At the same time they achieved some progress in the centre. Germans had to abandon Rzev and Demyansk salients. Also they took Velikie Luki and in the North they partly freed Leningrad
@@b4nterontilt245 Paulus was part of army group B or army group Don. It is operation little Saturn who forced Model to retreat.
Stalingrad was one of those battles that was not expected by the Germans to be what it turned out to be. That was the German mistake of Stalingrad, a failure to understand what was going on until it was too late. They thought they would be occupying a city rather than having to take it brick by brick. Stalingrad was not a priority and the Soviets turned up the heat on the Germans just high enough to not tip them off. Stalingrad was either a happy accident or a masterpiece of Soviet strategy. The Germans just did not see the danger inherent in Blau, they underestimated the Soviets. The reinforcement/logistic issue was a symptom, not a cause of the German defeat. The entire German strategy of Blau was erroneous. The Germans took far too much for granted.
The majority of their forces were still concentrated further north nearer to Moscow, they were expecting a major attack from the Russian at that time, not south around Stalingrad.
Excellent presentation! Very good to point out that Germans were replacing their losses, but replacements were poorly distributed. It is also worth keeping in mind that the Soviets did not have an inexhaustible reservoir of manpower, since the Germans had deprived them of a significant portion of it, through occupation of the western USSR.
I agree, thanks for bringing that up.
Yes - one such was a distant relative of mine. Myalik Ivan Pavlovich was born in 1926, in what was then Poland. Then came 1939 and the border moved, leaving him in the Belorussian SSR. Then the Germans came for 3 years, then the Russians returned in 44. The Soviets inducted him into the army and he had to serve for 7 years, most of it occupation duty in East Germany. He returned home in 1951, but someone in the village accused him of being a kulak, so he was sent to clear forest in Siberia for 10 years. He came home in 61, but was sent back to Siberia for another year, for good measure, before they permitted him to remain in his native village. How many of us today could endure what they did in WW2?
Well the Soviet Union wasn’t Russia. It was a Bolshevik cancer killing of ethnic Russians and replacing them with turks tatars and mongols. That’s where they got there manpower.
You better saying keeping in mind that the Germans did not have enough soldiers to replace them active manpower killed on the field or they not have the logistic to reallocate them from Germany to Stalingrad, although russian lost a entire army up to Stalingrad, yet they don't have any problem to build another army armed with tens of thousands of tanks T34 .
Germans army say : hey we killed almost 10.000.000 of your soldiers!
Soviet army: hold my beer i can bring you another 20.000.000 army soldiers from Urals to Volga till we fight here at Stalingrad:D:D
Not to say that Italian and Romanian and Hungary army was equipped so poor, with rifles from WW 1 and no antitank guns and no tanks, the russian break the Stalingrad line front just right there with them tanks and just imagine no antitank guns, you have to shoot T34 with your riffle from WW1, that was a massacre.
That was German Army fault that they can think that Italian and Romanian and Hungary army can hold the line in front of T34 with rifle from WW1.
Also Germans lack in logistical, clothes and tanks run without fuel.
I think that agreement Lens Lee with US took a important place in the equation, Stalin received from US :food closes ammunition planes trucks trains and others
Another important place in equation was oil, the single source and only one for Germany was Romania oil field of Ploiesti. And guess what they will lose that to, After US come in actions, from may to august 1944 they assault Romania oil field Ploiesti using 1000 planes against 30 planes!
From those 30 planes : 10 was romanians fighters pilots equipped with BF109, and only 20 was germans fighter pilots, wtf germany can only supply 20 plane BF109 to defend the oil field imagine!
Erich Hartmann best ace german pilot was send it to Romania, in his memory or interviews he say they have to fight 1 BF109 against 20-30 P51 Mustang plane. In 3-4 month US planes destroyed entire oil field Ploiesti. Next US planes will destroy German Industry to, US plane bombing by daylight and UK plane by night. So that is no more oil and no more industry to produce.
Also i was reading a story about russian breaking the front line at Stalingrad from memory of Romanian Ace Fighter Pilot he say there it was russians was braking through with them news tanks T34 on our romanians line, what should we do with no antitank guns, then that Captain Romanian Ace Fighter Pilot come with idea let's turn 2-3 of our planes with top front against the russian tanks and use machine guns from plane to shoot at it. Until russian they get caught what was going up we will use other fighter planes to get out of here. So that was how that Romanian Ace Fighter Pilot was saving all the romanians pilots from that airfield of death. Later in august 1944 he will die defending Romanian oil field Ploiesti while fighting his BF109 against 20-30 P51 Mustang.
The quality of German manpower fell significantly from 1941, yes they were replaced, however the quality was not that of the original.
Why not? You do realise that they drafted the class of 1923 in April 1941? That's 18 months early. So technically you could say the same applies in 1941 as well as 1942.
I believe that one of the key factors which allowed Germany to field effective units right until the end of the war was that they never reduced the basic training period, so that all replacements were as prepared as they could be. (I believe, from memory, that this basic training was around 16 weeks in length)
My point. You can't replace a veteran with a new recruit. Worse even for officers lost.
@maciejl20 Three month experience is a lot compared to none at all.
Sixth Army was vastly over strength already and it was easily expected to secure the city, which it largely did. The only problem was the army’s flanks. The army itself was over-concentrated around the city. Weak Rumanian and Italian units held its flanks. These collapsed when the Soviet Uranus Operation began, trapping Sixth Army by double envelopment. Statistics do not tell the real story.
Yes. The Germans were not running out of people. They did overreach attempting to invade the Caucasus.
Sounds good Jeff and those flanks would not have mattered if that battle would have ended as quickly as the invading country thought at the beginning of the battle that was re-enforced\created by how quickly they marched to the city limits to the far east of the borders of RUS.
Those bar-graphs are just details of this loss. Important deals for sure but the invaders were over-confident, their leaders made mistakes, and the world is free today to a high degree and not all blonds with blue eyes!
Take a think please people: The invaders put an ~entire army in a city? And were clueless on what and who lay east of the city they were in? And then got surrounded by a force that was hidden due to the invaders incompetence? Bad decisions after bad decisions were being made inside the city limits for months on this saga.
as far as I understand out of the logistics you mention
scolars may be right that the Germans couldn't replace the dead, for a whole other reason than manpower
Because of logistics.
Rzhev offensive is the answer. That's where all German reinforcements had to go.
Thank god the Germans didn't have PowerPoint....could have been a different outcome.
as soon ill take the command in my country ill offer you the position of head professor of history in our military schools
Deal!
You'd hire a jew?
twoja stara Uh, why you think he is Jewish? And, does it matter? The guy clearly knows his stuff.
He looks jewish to me,jews dont tell truth. The guy seems to know what winners wrote in history books.
Not sure on all this but by saying halder did all this on his own, you are indirectly removing the fault from the boss, AH.
Excellent
I'm glad you think so :)
Germans enter Stalingrad, Stalin is sad 🙁
Germans locked up in Stalingrad, Stalin is glad ☺️
Wasnt the Rzeh meat grinder (army group center) requiring forces to remain stable? thats the first thing that comes to mind
I have to dig a little but to say the general staff just goofed and overlooked the prioritization of army group B is a stretch. More likely is that the general staff felt there was a distinct need to beef up army group center to counter expected Russian offensive actions or to prepare or to prepare for future operations. Then again maybe i am wrong and they did just fuck it all up. When analyzing events in history it is hard to be unbiased because we already know the outcome of said event, to truly analyze decisions made you have to understand in context what the intent of the actions were (not just the outcomes) and the information that was accessible at that time (which can be hard because in some examples speculation is the best historians can do).
Yes, I agree. As people have pointed out, the Rzhev offensives might have distracted the German High Command and lead them to beef up Army Group Centre. I've already gathered some books and I'm planning to look into this for future videos. In the meantime, I agree that things perhaps weren't so clear-cut at the time, and we're viewing this from the benefit of hindsight.
Half an hour long video. It's not like I have short attention spam, but most of the videos this long are usually simply boring and could be cut in length by half. This one, I had no problem watching from beggining to the end. Well, considering its not the first one I've watched, I just subscribed.
Hate to tell you but I'm working on a 24 hour in-depth video on the Battle of Stalingrad. This is why I'm concentrating on this subject. I promise you though, it'll be this entertaining, if not moreso, since it'll be like my more recent 'Battlestorm' documentaries. Glad to have you onboard :)
I'd like to disagree - the point isn't made directly.
Having enough to replace their losses doesn't mean they weren't in severe shortage.
The Nazis were in shortage of men which weakened their western front (making the Americans' fight much less bloody), their African campaign closed in land loss as no new men arrived to reinforce their hold, and by the time the Red Army reached Berlin they already had to recruit children.
The important point was already made earlier in the video - there was no interest in strengthening the offense in Stalingrad since it wasn't as important as the other fronts.
If the Germans HAD more men, they'd have undoubtedly brute-forced their way out (at least their forces there wouldn't have been routed).
It occurred to me that Hitler's decision to no longer employ the Fallshirmjaeger as an airborne division after the losses at Crete was a HUGE shortsighted mistake. Could he have possibly used a Fallshirmjaeger divsion to execute a Coup de Main attack on the oil fields?
Yes, it is all speculative, but I've never seen any mention of something like this before. It really depends on how many troops the USSR had guarding those fields.
Excellent information
Excellent video, I have not read all the comments so somebody might already have commented the same or something similar:
In order to conclude that it was the OKH's fault that Paulus could not take Stalingrad I would ideally like to know the following:
1) How many of the reinforcements sent to the Eastern Front were new/fresh troops and how many were in fact recovered troops that were returning to their old units after being wounded?
2) In addition I also believe that considering the first question it would be interested to look at a longer period than just the 4 months from August to November 1942 since there normally is a delay from when you take a loss and until you in fact get reinforcements / replacements.
The combination of these two factors migth be one of the reasons why especially Army Group Centre got significantly more reinforcements than than their actual losses during the 4 months?
And I would also assume that on average the units in Army Group Centre, had higher losses than Army Group South (or A and B) over the winter - and that a lot of the reinforcements received by Army Group Centre could be troops returning to the units are being wounded
I therefore - if possible - we should look over a longer period and compare losses & reinforcements of the various army groups since only looking at the 4 months from August to November 1942 might not give the right picture.
Having said all of this and considering the way Blau was progressing (or not really progressing) I do believe that OKH and Hitler should have allocated more troops to the south - and that sending most of the 11th Army north was a mistake!
I am curious, I would like to have your opinion on my comment
The Russian method is as follows:
It is possible to lose "in fight or not", up to 10% of its population and 10% of its "submissive populations" to win a war.
For World War II, Russia lost 5% of its Russian Orthodox population and 5% of "submissive populations"
(Buryats, Ukrainians, Jews, Belorussians, Chuvash, Tatars etc ...)
As an example, France lost in May 1940, less than 1% of soldiers "in the fighting"!
Moreover, the Germans and their "submissive populations" (French, Italians, Poles Christians, Romanians, Hungarians, Czechs, etc ...) were persuaded
to be a "superior race". They terrorized the Jews, always won, forgetting that the Jews were unarmed!when they found themselves in front of armed citizens, they were astonished by the situation.
Last point, the Germans have relied too much on "technology" and not enough on "hand-to-hand" warfare.
But even if 6th Army had received some replacements in Stalingrad, wouldn't that just mean that a few more would have become encircled?
They did receive replacement just not a number that kept their original numbers upward.
And yes, they allowed an entire famous army of theirs to be caught off guard and surrounded. Not sure how many it would have taken to stop this red-offense that came out of nowhere and surrounded the invaders.
The 6th could have escaped and saved many lives but who told them to stay and fight? Must be halder? lol.... He seems to be in command and control according to this thread, OK?
Manstein
@@250txc A bit late but here is the answer to it. The German intelligence suggested THAT the Soviets do not have the forces for a major offensive with long term goals. Which we know was false since they got encircled. The thinking was that even if someone broke through the weak Italian and Romanian lines that the Germans could counter it. Welp because of the bad intelligence on soviet forces and bad weather the soviet armies fast encircled the German Romanian armies in. Stalingrad. Halder is not really that much to blame eveb though he could have better anticipatea counter offensive in Stalingrad. But there was also three other battles like Rzev which basically could have been a disaster for army group center. Then Caucasia which started to be near impossible to capture and needed forces. And Leningrad which still was fighting group north. It's easy to blame one general but there is way more going on. Funny enough you can blame Model the general in Rzev for the situation in Stalingrad. Model actually blackmailed Von Kluge if he did not send him forces. Which is funny because it's not Hitler or anything being a political intrigued but a general which did it for his fame.
@@danielnikitin2020 BOT Alert! Blackmail? In all the killing, someone was looking for fame? BOT Alert or dumbness! Someone breaking through your flanks is easily contained? BS, The losers were already aware if that happened, they were toast, and they were wasted and toasted by their commanders
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You must have been an eye witness to everything happening there and flunked out on the topic of paragraphs
@@250txc 😂🤣 Not really fame that was my fault but yes he black mailed model into giving him forces that's a known fact about Rzev since you know how Hitler reacts about military failures at his generals. And yes they thought about that it was easily contained. They did not expect since intelligence said that the red army has not enough forces for a far going attack. So they used forces to other places like in the Caucasus and Rzev. The so called *losers* (Which by now shows pretty much how you don't really look objectively at history) had no idea that such a threat was aware. You want to tell me that the military staff of Germany was so incompetent to even if knowing that there was a giant force concentrated on the flanks of the 6th army they would not send forces? Don't be ridiculous its the dumbest thing I ever heard. You sir should watch a couple of Russian documentaries and books as well as German instead of American fan stories and theories.
my grandfather was in romanian army at stalingrad and he was saying that the supplies were non existent, one day in one box they found books(in german).The ammunition was rationed and even grenades were scarce .The food was completed by hunting and fishing . Many times they saw the russians doing the same.the russian attack was not a surprise and germans refused all the demands to retreat to a better position. the germans gambled on the russian innactivity and all the army was for show.
maybe if your romanian army dont collapse in 10 minutes the german 6th army can reatreat.
@@darklysm8345 Maybe if that stupid Hitler armed the allied armies better with antitank weapons, or if he was unable to do that just not rely on them fighting the russians, he would have been in a far better strategical position, avoiding overextending his fronts! Allies are useful when equipped with good arms, otherwise they are a liability and Hitler should have known that, but he was after all a mere gefreiter!
This is a very interesting presentation. I studied a lot on the war on the eastern front, but never found any documentation on the subject. You’re conclusion could be right on both ways. Either the commander Halder still priorities Moscow or they weren’t able to get the logistics right. Very curious if you manage to find the answer to this question. Go on. You’re videos are amazing, especially sources and statistics. I will recommend you to everyone I know:)
I think He Who Shall Not Be Named is likely to blame. Yes I mean Halder.
The Germans were outnumbered 2 to 1. The Russians were able to flank the Germans north of Stalingrad. If not north of Stalingrad, it would’ve been Moscow. It was a lost cause despite lack of reinforcements in Army Group B.
The Real issue was the Western front (2 fronts) and the lack of German surveillance with Siberian Russian reinforcement divisions in the east.
Hey TIK, would you recommend Glantz’s most recent abridged and shortened/condensed Stalingrad (2017) book?
Yes, definitely! It's not as in-depth as the others, but you're still getting much more than anything else on the battle.
TIK Thanks for the comment! :) I’ll pick it up later today.
Also, have you ever read John Keegan’s “The Second World War?” (General History, One Volume book on ww2) I’m reading it right now but the bibliography has no sources but rather book recommendations as decided and stated by the author. After your other book review that highlighted the importance of sources, I’m skeptical. Keegan says that he “Rather than supply an equivalent of such bibliographies, I [Keegan] have decided to offer a list of fifty books available in English which together provide a comprehensive picture of the most important events and themes of the war...”
Thoughts?
Yeah I think that was a bad call by Keegan. Sources should be standard. Secondary sources are great of course, but there's no excuse for not providing a bibliography. I haven't read his book though.
Also, just so you know, I deleted a couple comments on another video which I'd missed, but you'd responded to a couple hours ago. I'd rather not have far-right idiots spamming the comments so I'm straight up deleting and blocking them now (hate doing it, but I feel it's necessary). TH-cam doesn't like said topic and I don't want hate in the comments, so for the safety of the channel I'm playing it safe. I had to delete your comment, but you're obviously not blocked :)
TIK Thanks for your input on Keegan, and as to the other comment: I definitely feel it’s necessary and within your rights and abilities to delete those hate comments, since of course hate shouldn’t be here of all places (Censorship sucks, but sometimes it’s needed).
Anyways, I find it incredibly remarkable you have a full time job, manage to make these quality videos, reply to almost every comment, and still put in active effort to keep the comments hate-free (which is needed but sadly not done by most others). So keep up the good work TIK :)
I'd say, you're the actual scholar. Amazing series on Stalingrad, keep it up. Bye for now.
One of these numbers is my great-grandfather ... I don´t know when he died exactly but I can only hope he didn´t had to suffer in the siege
Is there any way to figure out where the fighting men from Sixth Army were from? I only read one time about a Division from Westphalia that fought in Stalingrad and that must have been the Division my great grandfather was in but I wanna learn about the History of the Division and what Division it actually was
I am just halfway the video, but it is critical to note that losses were mostly frontline troops, so a deficit of 20k men in losses compares to a much greater proportion of combat strength than the numbers may indicate
Efficiency signifies the level of performance that uses the least amount of inputs to achieve the highest amount of output.
I think that it was the target : maximum efficiency for the 6th army
Then they miscalculated
In the end I'm happy with the results of the battle :-)