Very Helpful. Would appreciate videos like these being divided into different sections along the stream player. Not sure how one does that in editing though. Some visuals would be helpful too (maybe a bullet list?). Follow up reading suggestions? Also, biggest argument I've heard against simplicity is that it trends towards modalism (according to Welty). Thoughts on how trinity and simplicity fit together?
Thanks brother. I'll see about trying to add the sections and some more visuals. I've been really pressed for time as of late but I'll try to make it a priority. :) ~ Jordan
Isn’t it more a question of what kind of simplicity one holds? I incline towards John Frame’s view of simplicity. Which, as I understand it, is that God’s simplicity is the necessary unity of any distinctions that exist with him. That is, if God has distinctions within him, such as will and intellect, or distinct archetypes of knowledge, they are not prior to him but constitute the unity of his substance. That is, unity and diversity are equally ultimate in God, they constitute his necessary aseity. The ancients were correct about God’s simplicity-that the ultimate is one substance, Spirit/Mind. But is it possible they were mistaken that one must negate all metaphysical distinctions to get there? Could it be that one must only negate all distinctions and parts in God, only if one holds that all distinctions come from matter-as Plato held. But Christians hold that God can be one Spirit/mind and no matter, yet have many thoughts/concepts. And these are not separable from God, for they are part of his natural knowledge, yet they are distinct between themselves. But there can be no separation between them and God’s mind, for they are the necessary contents of his necessary substance. Did not Duns Scotus hold to divine simplicity? Yet he said that there were virtual distinctions in God? A strong creator/creation distinction would still be maintained, yet not like this: many (contingent)/one (not contingent) But like this: Many, unity (contingent)/ One-Many (not contingent) Is something like the above not open to Christians?
Thanks for the comment, brother. A lot here, so I'll try to keep it brief. I'd say Frame's version of simplicity isn't really simplicity because a necessary condition for it is a lack of parts. Scotus's view is a version of simplicity because while he admits of intrinsic distinctions they are not parts. His formal distinction precedes every act of created and uncreated intellect but denies any sort of "real" distinction. But to the question of whether certain views are open to Christians, well, sure! One need not affirm divine simplicity to be a Christian. But that wasn't really the point behind my video here. :) ~ Jordan
@@thelondonlyceum, thanks much for the reply. My undergrad was in the classics and I’m almost done with a masters in theology, and theology proper has always been an interest of mine. Why should Frame’s view not be a legitimate form of simplicity as God is held to be uncreated and necessary, and has no material parts, and is of one substance, Spirit? Saying it’s not really simplicity, isn’t that just saying one is siding with Aquinas’ and Dolzal’s identity thesis of attributes? What do you think should constitute a real part? In Aquinas doesn’t God have intellect and will? Is this a real distinction? Sorry, I know these are difficult questions, I’ve been pondering them and neo-Platonism and Augustine for 20 years and it’s still difficult. I think for me, God is sufficiently simple if all that he is constitutes a being wholly independent of creation (which is contingent) and that God is from himself necessarily and is not dependent upon anything contingent (a real part). But I don’t object to God’s necessary being in turn eternally generating a divine will that can produce contingencies. For me this is required for God to create a contingent creation, and thus avoiding God as necessarily correlative with creation on account of God’s necessity existence. If Aquinas’ view of simplicity is true, then one ends up having to philosophically affirm the necessity of creation, but then deny it on biblical grounds. Frame’s view of simplicity avoids this problem and the attendant pantheistic implications of it-Aristotle’s co-eternal world. That is what I find attractive about Frame’s view. Do you think the concern about Aristotelian pantheism a legitimate concern with regard to necessity in God and absolute simplicity? Does absolute simplicity require a paradox with regard to the contingency of creation? (I can accept thoughtful paradoxes when necessary). I concluded, when reading Schleiermacher, that this problem is at the root of his absolute idealism and it’s pantheistic christology and universalism. I know we orthodox don’t follow that line of thinking on account of our Biblicism, but I think the problem is buried in Christian Platonism (which is not all bad, but requires refinement) and that’s why theologians like David B. Hart and John Milbank, and their soteriological universalism keep resurfacing. It’s not an accident, it’s connected to their version of monistic metaphysics. At least that’s how it appears to me. Not that you need to address all that. But that’s the big picture as I see it. I’d be most curious about my question about the contingent creation paradox. (I’m baptist BTW, though I’m fronting a presby…lol…love your stuff, right up my ally. Keep it up).
A succinct summary.
Very Helpful. Would appreciate videos like these being divided into different sections along the stream player. Not sure how one does that in editing though. Some visuals would be helpful too (maybe a bullet list?).
Follow up reading suggestions? Also, biggest argument I've heard against simplicity is that it trends towards modalism (according to Welty). Thoughts on how trinity and simplicity fit together?
Thanks brother. I'll see about trying to add the sections and some more visuals. I've been really pressed for time as of late but I'll try to make it a priority. :) ~ Jordan
Isn’t it more a question of what kind of simplicity one holds? I incline towards John Frame’s view of simplicity. Which, as I understand it, is that God’s simplicity is the necessary unity of any distinctions that exist with him. That is, if God has distinctions within him, such as will and intellect, or distinct archetypes of knowledge, they are not prior to him but constitute the unity of his substance.
That is, unity and diversity are equally ultimate in God, they constitute his necessary aseity.
The ancients were correct about God’s simplicity-that the ultimate is one substance, Spirit/Mind. But is it possible they were mistaken that one must negate all metaphysical distinctions to get there?
Could it be that one must only negate all distinctions and parts in God, only if one holds that all distinctions come from matter-as Plato held. But Christians hold that God can be one Spirit/mind and no matter, yet have many thoughts/concepts. And these are not separable from God, for they are part of his natural knowledge, yet they are distinct between themselves. But there can be no separation between them and God’s mind, for they are the necessary contents of his necessary substance.
Did not Duns Scotus hold to divine simplicity? Yet he said that there were virtual distinctions in God?
A strong creator/creation distinction would still be maintained, yet not like this:
many (contingent)/one (not contingent)
But like this:
Many, unity (contingent)/ One-Many (not contingent)
Is something like the above not open to Christians?
Thanks for the comment, brother. A lot here, so I'll try to keep it brief. I'd say Frame's version of simplicity isn't really simplicity because a necessary condition for it is a lack of parts. Scotus's view is a version of simplicity because while he admits of intrinsic distinctions they are not parts. His formal distinction precedes every act of created and uncreated intellect but denies any sort of "real" distinction. But to the question of whether certain views are open to Christians, well, sure! One need not affirm divine simplicity to be a Christian. But that wasn't really the point behind my video here. :) ~ Jordan
@@thelondonlyceum, thanks much for the reply. My undergrad was in the classics and I’m almost done with a masters in theology, and theology proper has always been an interest of mine.
Why should Frame’s view not be a legitimate form of simplicity as God is held to be uncreated and necessary, and has no material parts, and is of one substance, Spirit?
Saying it’s not really simplicity, isn’t that just saying one is siding with Aquinas’ and Dolzal’s identity thesis of attributes?
What do you think should constitute a real part? In Aquinas doesn’t God have intellect and will? Is this a real distinction?
Sorry, I know these are difficult questions, I’ve been pondering them and neo-Platonism and Augustine for 20 years and it’s still difficult.
I think for me, God is sufficiently simple if all that he is constitutes a being wholly independent of creation (which is contingent) and that God is from himself necessarily and is not dependent upon anything contingent (a real part). But I don’t object to God’s necessary being in turn eternally generating a divine will that can produce contingencies. For me this is required for God to create a contingent creation, and thus avoiding God as necessarily correlative with creation on account of God’s necessity existence.
If Aquinas’ view of simplicity is true, then one ends up having to philosophically affirm the necessity of creation, but then deny it on biblical grounds.
Frame’s view of simplicity avoids this problem and the attendant pantheistic implications of it-Aristotle’s co-eternal world.
That is what I find attractive about Frame’s view. Do you think the concern about Aristotelian pantheism a legitimate concern with regard to necessity in God and absolute simplicity? Does absolute simplicity require a paradox with regard to the contingency of creation? (I can accept thoughtful paradoxes when necessary).
I concluded, when reading Schleiermacher, that this problem is at the root of his absolute idealism and it’s pantheistic christology and universalism. I know we orthodox don’t follow that line of thinking on account of our Biblicism, but I think the problem is buried in Christian Platonism (which is not all bad, but requires refinement) and that’s why theologians like David B. Hart and John Milbank, and their soteriological universalism keep resurfacing. It’s not an accident, it’s connected to their version of monistic metaphysics. At least that’s how it appears to me. Not that you need to address all that. But that’s the big picture as I see it.
I’d be most curious about my question about the contingent creation paradox.
(I’m baptist BTW, though I’m fronting a presby…lol…love your stuff, right up my ally. Keep it up).
@@jrhemmerich edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2022/12/davies-on-classical-theism-and-divine.html?m=1
Let me know if the link works
Where are those quotes from Henry of Ghent from?
They are from his summa. This volume addresses simplicity: amzn.to/3PZpRIQ