eXaMineR: free and open source monero tracing tool

I recently explored the tracability of monero and found this gem from Ciphertrace: news.bitcoin.c...
It's a really neat visualizer of the monero blockchain with a way to trace it. And I wanted ot make something similar. So I did! Please help me improve it and make it better by contributing to my github: github.com/sup...
Analysis of ciphertrace's tool on reddit: / ciphertrace_monero_tra...
Interview with a ciphertrace employee about their monero tracing tool: • CipherTrace's Monero t...

[@oooboo3249]

you're not counting stealth addresses good luck you're going after cryptologist if the code and math checks out you cannot break it unless you use quantum computers

[@highlevelbitcoin]

@@oooboo3249 I am counting stealth addresses, and the fact that I can count them is a serious privacy problem for monero. Lightning is better.

[@oooboo3249]

@@highlevelbitcoin well if you crack Monero go to the IRS they can give you a whole bunch of money cuz they have a bounty on Monero lol

[@dairahopwood4819]

The analysis techniques that he's using reveal (heuristically, not with absolute certainty) parts of the transaction graph. Is the use of shielded addresses sufficient to ensure privacy given that information about the transaction graph? No. For example, Bitcoin wallets typically by default generate a new random address each time you ask for your address, and we don't consider that to be sufficient to make Bitcoin a private cryptocurrency.
Zcash also effectively has stealth addresses (that is, notes are encrypted to the public key of the recipient, extremely similar to what Monero does at that layer apart from using ECIES instead of ElGamal in the encryption scheme). As a designer of Zcash (and cryptologist more generally, if that credential matters to you), I don't consider that to be remotely sufficient for privacy. In fact, we don't even advertise it as a privacy feature, because that would be misleading. It helps privacy only in combination with other aspects of the protocol. In Zcash's case, the use of zero knowledge proofs has a similar effect, in Monero terms, as if shielded Zcash transactions had decoy inputs for *every* previous shielded output. While you may be able to eliminate some outputs using similar heuristics to those described in the video, you're starting from a hugely expanded set that never exhibits recency bias, for instance. Monero would need to do something similar in order to defeat the analysis described here.

[@mcneb10]

@@oooboo3249 Funny thing is, there was also a bounty issued for lightning, which has already been claimed. Use Monero

[@gleleylo]

What do you think - is Monero really private or it's just a marketing bullshit?

[@highlevelbitcoin]

@@gleleylo monero is not private, it is public. The only thing they encrypt is the amount, and even that is only partially encrypted. Lightning is superior. However, monero is better than nothing.

[@zerax6372]

That's lame